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你基本上把枪指着自己的头,而银行余额正朝一个方向变化,你对一个从未被任何人证明过的理论有着极强的信念。
You have this gun pointed at your head, basically, and the bank balance is going one way, and you have this really high conviction with a thesis that no one has ever proven before.
我们觉得,这就是关键所在。
We're like, this is the thing.
我们一定要让这件事成功。
We're gonna make this work.
在今天的节目中,我很高兴邀请到萨姆·乔杜里。
For today's episode, I'm excited to be joined by Sam Chaudhary.
萨姆曾担任经济学教师和麦肯锡顾问,现在是ClassDojo的联合创始人兼首席执行官,ClassDojo是一款连接教师、学生和家庭的课堂管理与沟通工具。
Sam spent time as an economics teacher and McKinsey consultant and is now the co founder and CEO of ClassDojo, a classroom management and communication tool that connects teachers, students, and families.
我们曾与里德·霍夫曼进行过这场对话。
We had this conversation with Reid Hoffman.
他认为,每个成功的互联网消费型企业的核心,都某种形式的网络效应。
He was like the most enduring thing at the heart of every great consumer business on the internet is some kind of network.
如果我们无法构建一个网络,那么我们做的其他一切都将无关紧要。
If we could never build a network, then nothing else we did would really matter.
在我们的对话中,他详细讲述了公司如何找到产品市场契合点,以及他如何在传统上难以盈利的市场中建立了一个极其成功的企业。
In our conversation, he details the company's journey to finding product market fit and how he's built an extremely successful business in what's traditionally a difficult market.
没人关心老师,对吧?因为他们没多少钱。
No one cared about teachers, right, because they don't have that much money.
那你为什么要为他们开发产品呢?
So why would you ever build products for them?
我们探索了方方面面。
We explore everything.
他为什么保持团队规模小,他的多业务战略,他是如何做到一分钱都不花在客户获取上的,还有更多内容。
Why he's keeping the team small, his multi business strategy, how he's managed to not spend a single dollar on customer acquisition, and a whole lot more.
我们能让一个不会阅读的孩子,在每天大约十五分钟、完全无人干预的情况下,短短三四个月内达到早期识字水平。
We can take a kid from not knowing how to read to early literacy in, like, three or four months in about fifteen minutes a day with no humans involved.
这以前是根本不可能的。
That's never been possible before.
我们开始吧。
Let's dive in.
所以我想我们可以从结尾开始。
So I thought we could start at the end.
我非常好奇,从你的角度来看,你认为为什么这家公司能在这样一个长期以来大多数人持非常负面看法的领域取得成功——当你跟大多数在教育领域创业的创始人交谈时,他们都不想再做一次教育产品。
And I'm really curious for your perspective on why you think the company has been successful in a category that most people have been very negative on for a very long time, which is you talk to most founders that have built in quote education and they never want to build an education again.
当你跟大多数投资过教育公司的投资者交谈时。
And you talk to most investors that have looked at education companies that have invested in education companies.
他们中的大多数都会认为这是一个不适合创业的糟糕市场。
And most of them would label it as a bad market to start a company in.
而你们却做了一些非常特别的事情,通常情况下,大多数公司都是规则之外的例外。
And so you all have done something really special and I think it tends to be the case that most companies are exceptions to the rule.
但我很好奇,当你尽可能详细地剖析这家公司成功的原因时,你认为关键是什么?
But I'm curious when you pick apart why the company has worked in as much detail as possible?
对你来说,首先想到的是什么?
Like what comes to mind for you?
嗯,首先我要说,我们仍然在不断改进中。
Well, look, I'll say first, we're still very much work in progress.
所以我们仍然深陷其中。
So we're still in the thick of it.
但老实说,当我们搬到美国时,我们和任何人一样感到意外。
But honestly, were as taken by surprise as anyone when we moved to The US.
我们俩都是英国人,搬到美国来创办这家公司,怀有一个极其雄心勃勃的想法:如果我们能让全球每个孩子都接受他们热爱的教育,那将会非常棒。
So we're both British, moved to The US to start the company, had this enormously ambitious, idea that it would be really great if we could give every kid on the planet an education they love.
我们认为这是推动世界进步的强大引擎。
And we think that's like a big engine for progress in the world.
这不仅对个人的生活大有裨益,也有助于推动世界向前发展。
It's great for for people in their individual lives, but it also helps the world move forward.
来到这里后,我们经历了一个非常激烈的学习过程。
And then we got here and we had this like very intense learning process.
这简直是一次当头棒喝,因为我们遇到了许多教育科技创业者。
It was kind of a rude awakening because we'd met we'd meet all these ed tech entrepreneurs.
我们见到了一些曾在这一领域创业的创始人,还有投资者。
We'd meet, you know, founders who had built stuff in the space investors.
我们听到了持续不断的负面声音。
And we heard this like continued, negativity.
我的意思是,事实是,如果你看看这个领域的成果,它其实并没那么令人兴奋。
I mean, the truth is like the right, like if you look at the results in the space, it's not been a very exciting space.
你知道,大多数教育公司基本上只是小型企业。
You know, most education companies basically just like remain small businesses.
是的。
Yeah.
它们从未触及十亿用户。
They never reach billions of people.
它们从未实现数千亿美元的收入。
They never reach tens of billions in revenue.
它们从未达到数千亿美元的市值。
They never reach hundreds of billions in market cap.
这让我们感到困惑,因为这里存在一种奇怪的悖论。
It was puzzling for us because there's a kind of a weird paradox here.
地球上每个家庭都希望孩子能接受更好的教育。
Every family on the planet wants a better education for their kid.
不管收入水平如何,不管去哪个国家,你遇到的每一个家庭都会说,我希望我的孩子能比我拥有更多、做得更多、成为比我自己更优秀的人。
Like no matter the income level, no matter the country you go to, every single family you ever meet is like, I want my kid to have more and do more and be more than I was or than I had.
然而,这些公司似乎都无法成功。
And yet these companies don't seem to make it.
所以你不得不问自己为什么。
So you kind of have to ask yourself why.
我们确实问了。
And we did.
我们其中一个诊断是,这里的大多数公司——这听起来可能有点戏谑,但我们当时确实抱着初学者的心态,而且我们在美国的访问签证只有90天,必须迅速形成一个观点。
And one of our diagnoses was that most companies here, and this is gonna sound a little facetious, but we kind of had like the beginner's mindset and we were in The US for we had ninety days, right, on our our visit visa, and we had to quickly come with a point of view.
我们其中一个观点是:等等。
And one of our points of view is we're like, hold on.
这里的大多数公司实际上服务的是学校。
Most companies here are actually serving schools.
它们在向学校销售软件。
They're selling software to schools.
这本身没什么问题。
Nothing wrong with that.
但那是市场的供给侧。
But that's the supply side of the market.
我们真正想服务的人其实是孩子和他们的家庭。
Like the people that we're trying to serve are actually kids and their families.
那么,谁在为孩子和家庭做产品呢?
So like who's building for kids and families?
谁在为消费者做产品?
Who's building for the consumer?
我们曾经用过一个类比:如果你在打造Airbnb并希望改变住宿行业,你不会从向酒店销售软件开始。
Like, the analogy I think we used was if you're building Airbnb and you want to transform hospitality, you don't start by selling software to hotels.
这或许能让酒店变得更好、更高效,但并不会显著提升最终用户——房东和房客——的体验。
That might make hotels a little bit better, a little bit more efficient, whatever, But it doesn't massively transform the experience for the end user, for hosts and for guests.
所以我们基本上采用了这个类比,即教育科技一直是以向学校销售软件为主的商业模式。
And so we kind of just took that analogy where like, EdTech has been the business of selling software to schools.
如果有人直接服务客户——也就是终端用户呢?
What if someone served the customer, like the consumer?
因此我们当时说,我们要在一个历来属于企业级的领域里打造一家面向消费者的公司。
And so we were saying we were going to build a consumer company in a historically enterprise space.
当时还有另一家公司也在这么说,那就是Duolingo。
There was another company saying that, which was Duolingo.
我们当时并不太了解他们,但采取这种做法的公司寥寥无几。
We didn't know them well at the time, but there were not many that took that approach.
我认为,正是这个单一的选择极大地改变了我们的前景。
And so I think that single choice changed a lot about our prospects.
而我们当时并不知道这个选择有多么重要。
And we didn't know how important that choice was at the time.
因为当你从另一面来看——也就是企业端,向学校销售产品,这就像在美国向大约13万家官僚主义严重、预算有限的小型企业推销,而这些机构却在努力完成一项非凡的任务。
Because when you look at the other side of this, the enterprise side of this, you know, selling to schools, it's a bit like selling to in The US, like a 130,000 pretty bureaucratic, very small businesses with not much budget, who are trying to do a heroic job.
但你知道,我真的不喜欢这样。
But you know, really don't like it.
这不是个好市场,你知道的,每个人都在争夺同样的预算,试图从学校里再抠出几美元,从公共税收预算里再挤出几美元。
It's not a great market, you know, and yet everyone is after the same budget trying to eke out another few dollars from the school, another few dollars from the public tax budget.
这是一个具有挑战性的终端市场,因为尽管支出总额巨大,但他们却不愿意在软件采购上花钱,这背后结构性的问题到底是什么?
And it's a challenging end market because even though it's extraordinary amounts of spend, they're unwilling to spend on software procurement is like what structurally is going on?
因为总的支出确实非常庞大。
Because certainly like total spend is enormous.
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是,通常被引用的数字大概是GDP的3%左右,但其中70%都花在了工资、福利和人员上。
I mean, I think the number that's quoted usually is like 3% ish of GDP, but 70% of that is on salaries and benefits and people.
对。
Right.
然后还有一大笔钱花在了设施和建筑上。
And then there's a good chunk that goes into facilities and buildings.
所以当你最终能用于教室里非必需品、技术和其他东西的预算时,就已经少得多了。
And so by the time you get to like, what could you spend on basically discretionary stuff, technology, other things in the classroom, it's way smaller.
而且这种公共预算还带来了一些特有的问题。
Then there's some artifacts of this being a public budget.
对吧?
Right?
你不可能一次性永久批准。
It's not like you can just sign it forever.
它必须定期申请续期。
You have to it has to come for renewal.
你必须重新审议它。
You have to reconsider it.
采购流程众所周知地繁琐。
The procurement process is, you know, famously difficult.
但我认为核心问题其实并不在于这些因素。
But I think the core issue is kind of none of those things.
实际上,对我来说,核心问题在于激励机制的导向完全错了。
Actually, core issue for me is that the alignment of incentives is kind of all wrong.
所以对我而言,也许是因为我和利亚姆的思维方式,我们希望激励机制能与我们试图邀请、最终服务的对象紧密挂钩。
So for me, and maybe just the way Liam and I are wired, we want our incentives to be tied to the person that we're trying to invite, the person we're ultimately trying to serve.
在教育领域,我们所有人最终都是为了孩子和家庭服务的。
Now, all of us in education is ultimately trying to serve kids and families.
因此,我们的观点是:你不希望激励机制出现脱节——比如某天你突然发现,你不得不为某个学校或某个学区制定一个路线图,即使这对孩子和他们的家庭来说并不是最好的选择。
And so our view is like, well, you know, you don't want a divorce in your incentives between, you know, you wake up one day and you're like, well, we have to build a roadmap that so and so school or in so and so district wants, even if that's not the best thing for kids, for a kid and their family.
我们希望激励机制能与真正为孩子和家庭做对的事紧密绑定。
We want our incentives to be tied to doing what's exactly right for kids and families.
所以我认为,这才是更重要的观点。
And so I think that was actually the more important point.
你需要有自由和自主权,去全心全意地服务你的客户。
You want the freedom and agency to really obsessively serve your customer.
而这就是我们当初采取的定位。
And that was kind of the orientation we took.
你刚才稍微提到了这一点,但在你思考这个机会时,有没有花很多时间纠结于:这是一个好的市场吗?
And so you hinted at this a little bit, but when you were thinking about the opportunity, did you spend a lot of time obsessing over like, is this a good market?
我们能打造一个大生意吗?
Can we build a big business?
在从零到一的阶段,这部分占了多大比重?
How much of that was a part of the zero to one phase?
是的。
Yeah.
你知道,我们很清楚,学校这一侧并不是一个好市场。
You know, we, we knew the school side wasn't a good market.
根据我们所见,我们一直遇到那些创业者,他们花了二十五年时间建立公司,却几乎毫无进展,最后可能只是被私募股权公司收购了。
Like from all we'd seen, we'd keep meeting these entrepreneurs who just had like a really rough time over, I don't know, twenty five years of building a company and not really going anywhere and maybe being sold to a private equity firm or something.
所以我们知道,那不是我们要走的路。
And so we knew that wasn't the thing.
后来,很多年之后,我们有一次对话,用更精炼的语言让我明白了这一点,但当时我们只是单纯地相信并坚信:家庭真的非常关心他们的孩子。
And then, actually, we had a conversation many years later, which put this into much more eloquent words for me, but we kind of just had this belief and this conviction that families really care about their kids.
如果你关心孩子,下一步很可能是你会为他们花钱。
And the next step is if you care about your kids, it's probably a thing you're going to spend money on.
这很可能是一个你愿意为之投入资金的事业。
It's probably a cause you're going to spend money on.
你可以看看所有关于总可用市场(TAM)的市场研究,对吧?
And you can look at all the market research on TAM and whatever, right?
但关于这一点,有一个更有趣的视角。
But there's a much more interesting view on this.
我曾与Spotify的一位高管交谈,他谈到了Spotify初创时的情况。
I spoke with someone at Spotify, one of the C level at Spotify, and he was talking about when Spotify started.
这涉及到投资方面对市场风险的考量。
And such goes into the investing side on market risk.
即使一切顺利,这个市场到底能有多大?
Even if everything goes well here, how big is this market really?
大多数人讨厌这个问题,因为他们会想:天啊,如果市场太小,那就不是一个好机会。
And most people hate that because they're like, Oh God, if the market's too small, then it's not a good opportunity.
但我认为,这其实还有另一面,那就是这是一种最令人兴奋的风险形式——作为创业者,如果你对一两个关键假设判断错误,或者判断正确,就可能突然解锁一个无人知晓的巨大市场。
But I think there's actually another side to that, which is it's actually the most exciting form of risk, where there's one or two assumptions that if you are wrong about, or if you're right about as an entrepreneur, you suddenly unlock an enormous market that no one knew is there.
因此,这类例子并不鲜见,但Spotify的例子特别有趣。
And so, there's famous examples of this, but the Spotify one is interesting.
他说,如果在Spotify刚推出时,你想通过线上音乐市场来估算规模,你会去看卖出了多少张CD,然后说,大约是一亿张CD,每张10美元。
He was like, if you tried to proxy the market for music online, when Spotify launched, you'd look at how many CDs are sold and you'd be like, it's a 100,000,000 CDs, call it $10 a CD.
所以这看起来是个十亿美元的市场。
So it's like a billion dollar market.
这个市场规模太小了,不足以支撑一家巨型公司的成长。
It's way too small to build a huge company in.
但如果你换一种思路,从第一性原理出发,你可能会意识到:等等。
But then if you take the other stones where you reason a bit from first principles, you might realize that, well, hold on.
地球上每一个社会都曾以某种形式拥有音乐,无论是发展还是采纳了它。
Every society on the planet has had some form of music, has evolved it or adopted it.
音乐在每个人一生中的某个阶段,都是他们最感兴趣的五大领域之一。
Music is in the top five interests of basically everybody in the world at some point in their lives.
因此,每个人所指出的市场缺失,实际上可能只是产品和包装的问题。
And so it could be that what everyone is pointing to is like a lack of a market is actually just a product and packaging problem.
我认为我们在Dojo项目上就遇到过类似的情况,当时没人证明过你能在教育领域建立一个大型的消费者业务。
I think we kind of had something like that with Dojo where no one had demonstrated that you could build a very large consumer business in education.
但我认为我们只是坚信,父母是关心孩子的,而且他们愿意为孩子花钱。
But I think we just took this conviction that we'll actually think parents care about their kids and we think they'll spend on things for their kids.
公司在早期,大约三四个月时,我们做了第一次变现测试。
Now we did early on the company, like three, six months in, we did our first monetization test.
规模非常小。
It was very small scale.
非常简单。
It was very trivial.
我们可以稍微谈一谈这个。
We can talk a bit about it.
那时我们就知道,父母是愿意付费的。
We knew at that point that parents would pay.
我们不知道具体会是多少,规模会有多大,但我们知道父母们会愿意掏钱,为对孩子有益的东西付费。
We didn't know how much or how big it would be, but we knew that parents would open the wallet and pay for something that would be good for their kids.
我想这就是全部了。
I think that was the extent of it.
当时有一些推理,或许还基于一种近乎第一性原理的信念:照顾孩子是进化上的本能,因此我们认为我们可以满足这一需求。
There was some reasoning and maybe there was some conviction based on almost like this first principle's reasoning that it's an evolutionary imperative to care for your kids and therefore we think we can serve you in that need.
让我们再往回追溯一下。
So let's go farther back.
在你创办公司前几年,你当时在做什么?
What was going on with you a couple of years before you started the company?
而且你当时是进入了一个什么样的契机?我想你曾经在麦肯锡工作过一段时间。
And what was the entry point into actually, I think you were at McKinsey for a period of time.
是的。
Yeah.
那对我来说是个有点奇怪的转折。
That was kind of a weird left turn for me.
所以,我不打算讲太远的过去,但我知道,我在几个奇怪的地方长大。
So, so I I I'm not going into ancient history, but, know, I I grew up in a couple of weird places.
我在威尔士的乡下长大,上了一所非常温馨、规模很小的学校。
I grew up in like the countryside in Wales, to like a very loving, very small school.
然后在我青少年时期,我们从中东搬到了阿布扎比。
Then we moved from The Middle East to Abu Dhabi in my teens.
我去了一所有三千名学生的国际学校。
Went to like a 3,000 kid international school.
这所学校真的很棒。
This school is amazing though.
他们坚持让学生既学习也教学。
They insisted on kids teaching as well as learning.
所以,我在整个青少年时期都在教课,大概占了我在学校时间的四分之一到三分之一,而我当时完全没想到这对我会如此重要。
So I actually taught all the way through my teens for probably be about a quarter to a third of my time at school, which is I hadn't had no idea how formative that would be for me.
我上了大学。
I went to college.
我是一名经济学家,数学成分很重。
I was an economist with a heavy dose of math in it.
我以为我会在其中一个领域攻读博士学位。
I thought I was gonna do a PhD in one of those things.
就在我要开始之前,一位教授请我去帮他的一个朋友改善学校的教学。
The month before I started, one of my professors asked me to go and help a friend of his with his school.
于是我去了那所学校,帮助他们更好地教授经济学和数学,并改进了他们的教学方式。
And so I went to the school and helped them teach economics and maths better and turned around some of the ways they were teaching it.
随后,麦肯锡公司前来招聘,宣传他们正在组建一个教育团队,为政府提供改善公共教育系统的建议,这听起来太棒了。
And then from there, McKinsey came and did the recruiting spiel about how they're building an education group that was advising governments on improving public education systems, which sounded amazing.
当我去那里时,我意识到,等等,这全是咨询工作。
And so as I went there, I think when I got there, I realized, hold on, this is all advising.
这不是真正去做事。
This isn't doing a thing.
这确实是个很好的训练场,但我根本不可能留下来。
And so it was a great kind of training ground, but there's no way I was going to stay.
所以我离开了,当时我在伦敦有一些朋友正在创办一家公司。
So I left and there were some friends of mine in London who were starting a company.
我们在伦敦有一小群人。
There was a small group of us in London.
我们都是在大学和麦肯锡等地认识的,但那时我们都一直在阅读积极的新闻。
We all met kind of at university and McKinsey and so on, but we'd all been reading happy news.
而当时这还是一种边缘现象。
And this was like a fringe thing at the time.
这并不是什么主流事物。
This wasn't like a mainstream, whatever.
没人真正知道
No one really knew what
当时大部分科技领域都属于边缘领域。
was Most of tech was a fringe thing at the time.
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是,像Airbnb是在2008年左右上线的,或者iPhone是在2007年推出的。
Mean, like Airbnb had launched, I think in 2008, or the iPhone had come out in 2007.
比如,Facebook在2011年的时候还是私有公司,你知道的。
Like, Facebook was still private, you know, in 2011.
所以,总之,我们当时一直在读Hacker News,PG的那些文章对整个团队影响特别大。
So, anyway, so so we we were reading Hacker News, and PG's essays were just, like, so formative for this whole group.
他提到的一件事就是:找到你能合作的最聪明的一群人。
One of the things he said was just find the smartest group of people that you can work with.
于是我找到了伦敦一家初创公司里的这群人。
And so I found this group at a startup in London.
我和他们一起工作。
I was working with them.
在那期间,我去参加了一个黑客马拉松周末活动。
And while I was there, I went to a hack weekend.
我遇到了我的联合创始人Liam。
I met Liam, my co founder.
所以,这并不是你应该认识联合创始人的正常方式。
So it's not the way you're supposed to meet your co founder.
你应该在还是朋友的时候就认识彼此。
You're supposed to know each other when you're friends.
当我们一周后在伦敦再次见面时,他真的非常有天赋。
Whenever we got together in London like a week later, he was he's incredibly gifted.
他是一位出色的工程师。
He was an amazing engineer.
他正在攻读计算机科学的博士学位。
He was doing a PhD in computer science.
他开发过世界上最大的儿童游戏之一。
He'd built one of the world's biggest kids games.
我们开始讨论一起合作的事。
We got talking about working together.
我原本的计划是,我要离开这家初创公司,去搞一个教育项目。
My plan had been, look, I'm going to leave the startup and go and work on an education thing.
我要以独立创始人的身份申请Y Combinator。
And I'm going to apply to YC as a solo founder.
哦,但你决定要创办一家公司了。
Oh, but you decided you were going to start a company.
我当时想,我要在教育领域做点什么,但根本找不到合适的方向。
I was like, I'm going do something in education and I couldn't find a thing to do.
我其实给可汗学院的萨尔·汗发过邮件,那边有个人回了我,说:这太棒了。
I'd actually emailed Sal Khan at Khan Academy and someone there had written back and said, Hey, this is great.
你应该来加入我们。
You should come and join us.
我们是个很小的团队。
Like we're a tiny team.
办个签证过来就行了。
Just get a visa and come.
我当时想,这可是个大决定啊,你知道的?
I'm like, that's a big step, you know?
所以这看起来并不像一条可行的路。
And so that didn't seem like a path.
我想,好吧,你确实关心教育这件事。
I'm like, well, you know, care about this education thing.
在我看来,世界上有两个根本性问题亟待解决。
And it feels to me, I think there's like two fundamental problems in the world that need to get solved.
我很久以前就一直这么想了。
And I've thought this for like a long time.
这些是我小时候就感兴趣的事情。
This is stuff I was interested in when I was a kid.
一个是能源问题——我们需要提供足够的能源来支撑所有人类活动。
One is just the energy problem of we just need to provide enough energy to fund all of our activity.
这是一个生存问题。
And the second, and that's like a survival problem.
而第二个是繁荣问题——当你确定自己能持续存在时,如何把事情做到极致?
And then I think the thriving problem is once you know you're gonna be around, how do you make things as good as they can be?
我认为,这个问题的答案是一个非常简单的过程,那就是人们发现自己的才能和潜力,并以某种方式将其应用于世界,从而有所成就。
And the answer to that, I think is a very simple process, which is like, it's just people, just people discover their talents and capacities and apply them in some way in the world and make something of them.
如果你在空间和时间上持续这样做,你就能让世界变得对每个人更好。
And if you do that over space and time, you make the world a better place for everybody.
因此,我认为,这个问题正是我想用一生去投入并努力改变的。
And so that, that problem is, I think, like the problem that I wanna spend my life on and and and make a dent in.
所以我很清楚,我注定要在这领域做点什么。
So it very clear I was gonna do something in this.
我只是还不知道具体该做什么。
I don't know exactly what.
我是去教书吗?
Do I go and teach?
我是创办一所学校吗?
Do I start a school?
我怎么知道呢?
Do I know?
但后来我在 Hacker News 上看到,有人发帖说杰夫·拉尔森——后来成为了 YC 的总裁——正在创办一个名为 Imagine K12 的平行加速器,它的结构和 YC 一样,邀请的演讲者也大多相同。
But then I think on hacking news, someone had posted Geoff Ralston, who then became president of YC, was starting this parallel incubator called Imagine K12, which was gonna have the same structure as YC, a bunch of the same speakers.
只不过这个加速器专门针对教育类公司。
It was just gonna be for education companies.
我当时想,天啊,这太棒了。
I was like, oh my god, is amazing.
我必须去参加这个项目。
Like, I I have to go to this.
与此同时,利亚姆一直在单独给保罗·格雷厄姆发邮件,两人来回交换谜语。
Liam, meanwhile, had been emailing with Paul Graham totally separately, and they were trading riddles back and forth.
他有一些想法正想向保罗请教。
Had some idea that he was running by Paul.
保罗回信问:‘这个想法的 Altair Basic 版本是什么?’
Paul wrote back with, what is the equivalent of the Altair basic for this idea?
利亚姆正在思考这个问题。
Liam was pondering.
总之,我们之前在 Hacker News 和 YC 周围有过一番互动,然后 Liam 和我开始讨论合作的事,最终我们同意一起干,这真是个疯狂的决定,因为我们才认识几周。
Anyway, so we had this whole flirtation around hacker news and and and YC, and then Liam and I got talking about working together and we, we agreed to work together, which was a crazy decision because we'd known each other for, a few weeks.
但我觉得,你知道,就是那种时候,你就是知道。
But I think, like, you know, I think this was when you just when you know, you know.
我当时根本没想到他会成为我最好的朋友,我最理想的联合创始人,接下来几年的室友。
And I didn't know that he would be my best friend, like the best co founder I asked for, my roommate for the next several years.
那价值观契合、共同愿景这些你最终必须具备的东西呢?
What about things like values alignment and do you have a shared vision and all the things you end up needing to have?
那些其实是后来才慢慢形成的。
That actually came a little bit later.
所以我们进入 Imagine K12 之后,就离开了湾区。
So after we got into Imagine K12, we got out the Bay Area.
我忘了是谁说的,但有人提到,初创公司失败只有一种原因。
I forget who it was, but someone was like, There's only one reason that startups fail.
在那个孵化器的活动中有一场演讲。
There's a talk at this incubator thing.
我当时就想,显然是产品市场契合度,他们根本找不到。
And I was like, obviously, product market fit, they never find it.
我知道答案。
Well, I know the answer.
他说:不是。
And he was like, no.
他说,初创公司失败的唯一原因是创始人放弃了努力。
He was like, the only reason that startups fail is because the founders stopped trying.
他说,只要创始人还在努力,基本上就能解决所有问题。
He's like, if the founders are trying, you can basically figure out every problem.
我当时就想,好吧,那为什么创始人会放弃努力呢?
And I was like, okay, like why do the founders stop trying?
这些人都很坚韧。
Like, these are tough people.
这个人的观点是,通常是因为你们对未来的方向没有共同的愿景。
And this person's point was that it's usually because you just don't share a vision of where you want to go.
所以我和利亚姆对这一点非常警惕。
And so Liam and I, was very paranoid about this.
我觉得很多创始人都很焦虑,但我特别担心我们会分道扬镳,就是因为这个原因导致事情搞砸。
I think a lot of founders were very paranoid, but I was very paranoid about us breaking up and yeah, this this not working out for that reason.
所以那天我们真的回到家,各自在一张纸上独立写下了我们想做什么、想走多远。
So we actually came back home that day and both like independently on a piece of paper wrote down kind of what we wanted to do or how far we wanted to go.
这个人把这个问题表述为:一个创始人想打造一家非常大的企业。
This guy had framed it around one founder wants to build a very large business.
另一个则想做一种生活方式型的事业。
The other one wants to do a lifestyle thing.
我们基本上互相展示了这些小纸条,上面写的内容大致相同:我们当时离开了家人、朋友和关系,来到湾区。
We basically showed each other this little bits of paper and it said roughly the same thing, was, we've left family and friends and relationships at the time to come out to the Bay Area.
我们打算在这里待上九十天。
We hear for ninety days.
我们有九十天的时间来证明一些东西,这样我们才能留下来更久,因此压力很大。
We had ninety days to prove something that would then allow us to stay for longer so that the pressure was on.
他说:你看,我只是想打造我们在教育领域能想象到的最伟大的东西,而我也写下了类似的内容。
He was like, look, I just just wanna build the greatest thing we can imagine building in in education, and then I wrote something similar.
因此,在非常深层的层面上,我们达成了共识。
And so it felt like at a very deep level, was an alignment.
我觉得我们越来越了解彼此,感受到了对方的轮廓。
And I think we got to know each other more and feel like the shape of each other.
但我们一起住了八年,所以学到了很多东西。
But we lived together for eight years, so you learn a lot.
你觉得你们两个人是截然不同却互补,还是非常相似?
And do you think the two of you fit the were very different and compatible or were very similar?
我觉得我们的价值观几乎完全一致,只是表达方式很不一样。
I think we have almost exactly the same values and we express them in quite different ways.
这样做的好处是,从来没有任何权力斗争,比如‘我想负责公司的产品’,或者‘我想做这个、那个或别的什么’。
The good thing about that is there's never been like a power struggle for, oh, I want to do product in the company, or I want to do this, that or the other.
一直以来,我们的角色都相当互补。
It's always been like quite complimentary.
所以我们实际上尝试了,你知道,这件事上我们非常民主。
So we tried actually, you know, it's very democratic with this stuff.
我记得在我们的A轮融资时,我们做了一个组织架构图,因为觉得在融资材料里放这个很重要。
I remember in our series a, we had like an org chart because that seemed important to put in the deck.
我们去见投资人时,上面写了我和他俩是联席CEO。
We turned up and we had like co CEO on there for me and him.
其中一个投资人说:这是什么?
And one of the investors like this, what is this?
像我需要一个能开除人的人。
Like, one of the sponsors I need, I need someone to fire.
我很喜欢这种情形。
And I love those.
而且,我主动提出承担这个角色,但从来不是出于一种必须拥有这个头衔的本能,更像是我们在共同建设这个事业。
And, and like, I, I was volunteered, but, but it was never like an instinct of like, oh, I must, I must have this, you know, it was more like, oh, like we're building this thing together.
直到今天,我们依然保持着各自在公司的不同角色,但保留了许多机制和流程,比如我们都坐在董事会里。
And, you know, to this day, we've kept every we we have different roles in the company, but we've kept a lot of the the mechanics and logistics about you know, we're both on the board.
我们有过分歧,但总是非常友好且容易解决。
We've had disagreements, but it's always been, like, just so amicable and easy to resolve.
当我们不喜欢某件事时,我们会坦诚相告,但从不曾变成苦涩或怨恨的情绪。
We've been candid with each other when we don't like something, but it's never been a bitter, seething kind of thing.
所以我认为这与求知欲有关。
So I think there's something around intellectual curiosity.
我认为这与谦逊、低自我、愿意学习以及高学习速率有关。
I think there's something around humility and low ego and a willingness to learn and having a high rate of learning.
我觉得这肯定也是其中的一部分。
I think that's definitely in there.
我的意思是,从某种层面来看,就是有一种愿意拼命工作的态度,你知道,PG 曾提到过‘不懈的机智’。
I mean, look at some level, think there's there's just like a willingness to work really hard that, you know, PG had that thing about relentless resourcefulness.
我认为我们两人都具备这两种特质。
I think both of us have both of those traits.
确实有一种坚持不懈和驱动力,同时也具备机智灵活的能力。
Like, there's there's definitely relentlessness and a drive, but also a resourceful ness.
我们会想办法解决的。
Like, like, we'll figure it out.
无论发生什么,我们都会想办法解决。
Like a stance that come what may we'll figure it out.
我觉得除此之外,我们的性格可能不太一样,但这样其实挺好的,因为有时候我情绪高涨时他情绪低落,我低落时他高涨,我们可以互相平衡。
I think outside of that, you know, we probably have different temperaments and, know, like, it's probably a good thing because there are times where I'm up and he's down and I'm down, he's up and we can balance each other out and all that.
那你当初申请Imagine K12时带的是什么项目?
So what did you apply to Imagine K12 with?
申请材料里具体是什么内容?
What was the actual thing that was in the application?
Liam最好的朋友之一,我觉得是他室友,是个老师。
One of Liam's best friends, I think his housemate was a teacher.
我们聊到他遇到的一个大问题,就是如何在课堂上分组。
And we talked about one of his big problems and one of his big problems was making groups in the classroom.
于是我们做了一个简单的分组应用原型。
And so we'd made a little prototype of this group making app.
于是我们带着这个分组应用推进了下去,但我们还有一整套计划,说明这个分组应用将如何被老师使用。
And so we went through with this group making app, but we had a whole scheme for how this group making app was going to be used by teachers.
然后它不仅仅是一个用来分组的工具,还要成为记录和追踪课堂内所有教学与学习活动的平台,诸如此类。
And then it was going to become a platform not just to make groups, but then to like what all the teaching and learning happening in the classroom and yada yada yada.
当然,出于很多原因,这其实是个糟糕的主意,但我们还是带着它去尝试了。
Now for lots of reasons, this was like a bad idea, but it was like we we got in with it.
你是带着这个点子去申请的,然后你们就出现了。
You applied with that idea and then you show up.
那接下来发生了什么?
And so then what happens?
我们到了那里,你知道的,YC的口号,Imagine K12也一样,就是让很多人想要参与。
We show up and the, I mean, like, you know, the YC motto, like Imagine K12 adopter too, just make so many people want.
到目前为止,我们只和Liam的这位老师朋友聊过,他非常需要这个产品,我们服务的是一位很棒的客户。
And so, so far we'd spoken to this teacher friend of Liam's and he really wanted this and we were serving this great customer.
然后我们来到了湾区。
And then we got to the Bay Area.
那这就是全部了
And that was the extent
我的意思是,说实话,我认为那是Imagine K12运行的第一个批次。
of mean, look, also, if I'm being honest, I think it was the first cohort they're running of Imagine K12.
他们说,是的,这些人有教育方面的经验。
They were like, yeah, these guys have some experience in education.
这位教过书,Liam正在攻读计算机科学博士学位,专注于帮助孩子学习的技术。
This one's taught, Liam was doing a PhD in computer science focused on technologies that help kids learn.
他们说,太好了,技术型创始人,非技术型。
They're like, guys, great, technical founder, non technical.
完美。
Perfect.
与此同时,Imagine K12正在举办一些晚餐活动,让我们了解教育科技和这个行业,而我们对它的糟糕状况越来越感到沮丧。
At the same time, Imagine K12 was putting on these dinners where we were learning about ed tech and the industry, and we're getting more and more depressed about how terrible it is.
所以这两件事正在同时发生。
And so these two things are happening in parallel.
很快,我们就觉得这个群体概念根本不是真的。
Very quickly, kind of were like, this group thing is not a real thing.
也不会有什么宏大的想法。
And there's not going be a big idea.
是因为你从老师那里听到的反馈。
Because of what you were hearing from teachers.
反应非常冷淡。
It was like very lukewarm.
我的意思是,当有人真的对某件事感兴趣,或者当有人说‘这太棒了’的时候。
Like, I mean, you know, when someone's like into the thing or when someone's like, oh, that's great.
是的。
Yeah.
而我们得到的就是这种反应,于是我们想,好吧,这可能不是我们要找的方向,但我们也不知道真正的方向是什么。
And we were getting that response, you know, we're like, okay, it's probably not the thing, but we didn't know what the thing was.
所以,实际上,自从那时起,我们在公司里经常使用这个思维模型,我们称之为‘瓶子方法’,即你要对两端都有清晰的认识。
So, you know, we've used this mental model actually a lot in the company since we call it the bottle approach where you have clarity on both ends.
一方面的清晰在于:你看,最终我认为,让世界上每个人都能发现并发展自己最大的才能和潜力,是非常重要的。
Clarity on one end was like, look, in the end, I think it's very important that everyone in the world gets to discover and develop their greatest talents and capacities.
这应该是世界应有的运作方式。
That's like a thing that shouldn't, that's like how the world should work.
我认为在那里可以打造一个很棒的商业机会。
And I think there's a great business to be built there.
另一端则是:第一步是什么?
On the other end, you're like, what's the first step?
至于中间的所有步骤,第一天不需要完全明确。
And all the steps in the middle, it's okay for those not to be completely well defined on day one.
你需要能够逐步学习并摸索出这些步骤,但我们一直在努力寻找这个杠铃的另一端。
You know, you have to like, be able to learn your way into them, but we were struggling to find this end of the barbell.
我们一直在想:这个端点到底是什么?
We're like, what is this end?
然后,我们与里德·霍夫曼进行了一次非常关键的对话,他当时作为嘉宾参加了其中一次活动。
And then we had this very, like, again, very formative conversation with Reid Hoffman who came as a speaker to one of these things.
现在我们到了这样一个阶段,我们说:听着,我们认为自己会成为一个面向消费者的公司。
Now we'd got to the point where we were saying, look, you know, we think we're gonna be a consumer company.
我们认为孩子和家庭才是我们该服务的正确人群。
We think kids and families are the right people for us to serve.
我们觉得:这样行不通。
We were like, look, this isn't working.
我们和教育科技领域的人讨论时,他们的语气总是说:哦,这太难了。
Like we literally like the tenor of the discussions we were having from the ed tech people was they're like, oh, it's so hard.
有个人来拜访我们,他说:听着,我来告诉你们解锁帆船的关键。
We had someone come in and he was like, look, I'm going tell you the secret to unlocking sails.
我们问:那关键是什么?
And we're like, what's the secret?
他说:你们得租一艘船,然后把所有这些学区主管带到切萨皮克湾的那艘特定船上,带他们出海一整天,签上这些协议。
He was like, you have to charter a boat and then take all the, this particular boat in Chesapeake Bay and take all these superintendents offshore for like a day and sign on these.
我当时想:这根本不是我来这里要做的事。
I'm like, I'm like, this is not like the, this is not what I came here to do.
所以,我认为我们当时非常坚定地认为,我们要为消费者、为孩子和家庭打造产品。
So, so I think we got, we had a lot of conviction that we're gonna build for consumers, for kids and families.
而且,这就是我们的目标用户。
And like, that's that's gonna be the audience.
然后我们和雷德·霍夫曼进行了一次对话。
So then we had this conversation with with Reid Hoffman.
他作为演讲嘉宾来到这里,我们兴奋地向他分享了这一点。
Came as a speaker and we were talking about excitedly about this.
我们要和所有其他公司都不同。
We're gonna be different to all these others.
我们要为消费者打造产品。
We're build for consumers.
他说道,这很棒。
And he was like, that's great.
你知道,消费类公司确实很棒。
You know, consumer companies are great.
显然,我参与过很多这样的项目。
Obviously, I've been involved in a lot of them.
他说,对你来说最重要的是要弄清楚如何实现增长。
He's like, the single most important thing for you to figure out is how you're gonna grow.
对于消费类公司来说,最难的问题就是如何在不持续增加投入的情况下实现增长?
It was like, it's the hardest thing about consumer companies is how do you grow without spending more and more money?
然后你读到,作为先生……
And then you read being Mr.
网络是互联网上每一个企业或杰出消费类业务的核心,也是最持久的东西。
Network is like the best thing, the most enduring thing at the heart of every business or great consumer business on the internet is some kind of network.
所以,基本上我们当时并不知道,但公司成立的核心理念就在那时形成了。
And so basically like we didn't know it at the time, but that was basically the thesis of the company being formed right there.
被问到我们的问题是:什么样的网络能够持续、大规模地触达儿童和家庭?
The question being put to us was what network reaches kids and families in perpetuity and at scale?
其隐含的意思是,如果我们能构建一个网络,那么我们就有充足的时间去打造优秀的产品,让人们愿意为之付费,并发现人们愿意为哪些东西付费。
And the implication was if we could build a network, then we would have a lot of time to build great businesses that people would pay for, discover what people would pay for.
如果我们无法构建一个网络,那么我们做的其他任何事情都无关紧要。
If we could never build a network, then nothing else we did would really matter.
因此,我们真的认真对待了这一点。
And so we, we really took this.
我的意思是,我一直是里德所有文章的铁粉,比如他发布过领英的A轮或B轮演示文稿之类的。
I mean, I was a big nerd for basically all of Reid's writing, like he'd published the LinkedIn series a or series b deck or something.
而整个核心理念就是网络优先。
And then the whole thesis was network first.
网络是有价值的,先构建网络,然后你才能在其上建立业务。
Networks are valuable, build a network, and then you'll build businesses on it.
我们基本上就采纳了这个理念。
And we basically took that.
我们想,好吧,我们必须构建一个能触达家庭和孩子的网络。
We're like, okay, well, we have to build a network that reaches families than kids.
这就是那个二元风险。
And that's, that's the binary risk.
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这是我们首先要做的事情。
That's the thing we have to do first.
我们两个人都挺偏执的。
And we're both pretty obsessive people.
所以接下来的六七年里,我们公司只做这一件事。
So that became the only thing we did for the next, like six or seven years in the company.
那么问题来了,网络是什么?
So then the question was what's the network?
就在这时,我们恍然大悟。
And that's when the penny dropped.
我们想,等等,老师。
We're like, well, hold on teachers.
我曾经当过老师。
I've been a teacher.
对吧?
Right?
所以对我来说,这个方向还挺熟悉的。
So it's kind of familiar where I come on.
老师处于一个非常特殊的位置,首先,他们真正从事教育工作。
Teachers are in this very interesting position where every teacher, first, they actually do the education.
其次,他们每天都面对大量的孩子和家长。
Second, they're in front of lots of kids and parents all the time.
因此我们想到,如果我们能服务好老师,或许也能间接服务到孩子和家庭。
And so the thought was, well, if we could serve teachers, maybe we'd be able to serve kids and families as well.
也许他们会把我们带到孩子和家庭那里。
Maybe they'd take us to kids and families too.
于是,我们开始了对老师进行大量访谈的专注时期,试图深入了解他们超越‘利亚姆的第一个朋友’之外的真实需求。
And so that then started this obsessive period of talking to teachers and really trying to understand their needs beyond Liam's first friend.
利亚姆参与了一部分,但大部分工作都落到了我身上。
Liam did a bit of it, but mostly came to me.
我想在最初的七十五到九十天里,大概七十五天左右,我们进行了数百场与老师的对话,只为弄清楚他们真正的问题和需求是什么。
I was like, okay, well, I think in those first seventy five to ninety days, probably seventy five days, We had like hundreds, hundreds and hundreds of teacher conversations to try and understand what their real problems and real needs were.
那么,你和所有老师交谈时,对话都是怎样的?
So what did the conversations sound like with all the teachers?
很多内容都是纯粹的调研和事实收集。
A lot of it was just open of fact finding.
我有一个喜欢问的问题,虽然不是最有趣的问题,但它能直击核心,那就是:你一天中最糟糕的部分是什么?
I had this question I like to ask, not the most fun question, but it really got to stuff, which was what's the worst part of your day?
是什么让你在工作中想哭?
Like, what makes you cry about your work?
于是我们会有一些有趣的对话,他们会说,你知道,我们一直在努力接近老师,因为我们在美国根本没人脉。
And so we'd have these funny conversations where they'd be like, you know, I'd say we were doing everything we could to get in front of teachers because we knew nobody in America.
这一点怎么强调都不为过。
It's hard to overstate this.
在头一两个星期,我们住的是六号汽车旅馆,因为我们别无选择。
We were staying in a Motel six for the first week or two because we had nowhere else to stay.
后来我们在帕洛阿尔托找到了一个单间,我肯定我待在一个角落,而利亚姆待在另一个角落。
Then we found this single room place in Palo Alto that we were sure I was in one corner and Liam was in the other.
这真是非常 humble 的起步。
And it was very humble beginnings.
就像当时在美国根本没人认识我们,我们以前从未在这里生活过。
Like when you nobody in America, we'd never lived here before.
我们得到了 Imagine K12 那些人的资金支持。
And we had like this, you know, the the the Imagine K12 people had funded us.
我们和 YC 的人有些交集,但也就仅此而已。
We had a little crossover with the YC folks, but that's kind of it.
所以我们就在自己那个小房间里孤军奋战。
And so we're just like on our own in our little room.
于是我开始直接打电话、发邮件,问朋友,朋友的朋友。
And so I just started like cold calling, cold emailing, asking friends, friends of friends.
我们去了当地的学校,比如帕洛阿尔托的贡高中以及其他学校,直接去恳请老师和我们聊聊。
We went to the local schools like Gunn high school in Palo Alto and others, just like soliciting teachers basically to talk to us.
我实际上还在贡高中教了几天暑期课,作为交换,让老师们更愿意和我们交流,总之我们什么都愿意做。
I ended up teaching summer school for a few days actually at gun high school in exchange for the teachers talking to us more, you know, whatever we could do.
但对话真正转向了:最严重的痛点是什么?
But the conversations really went to what is the worst pain?
你知道那种止痛药和维生素的区别吗?
You know that whole painkiller over vitamin thing?
我们真的把这一点看得非常认真。
We're just like, okay, took that very seriously.
我们想,最严重的痛点到底是什么?
We're like, is the worst pain?
你一天中最糟糕的部分是什么?
What's worst part of your day?
我们不断深入挖掘下去。
And we just kept getting deeper and deeper.
起初,冒出来了很多听起来不错的说法。
So initially there was all kinds of good sounding stuff would come up.
他们会说,比如,抄作业很烦人。
They'd be like, you know, it's mocking homework.
这真的太烦人了,就是抄作业。
It's just so annoying, know, mocking homework.
我们就会说,哦,好吧。
And we'd be like, oh, okay.
你知道,但你也基本上能自己决定布置多少作业。
You know, but also like you, you kind of decide how much homework you want to set roughly speaking.
那么,这里到底真正发生的是什么?
So like, what what's really going on here?
他们说,是的,其实根本不是批改作业的问题。
And they're like, yeah, you know, it's not actually the marking homework.
其实是,我回到家时已经精疲力尽了。
It's it's actually, I get home and I'm just exhausted.
我们说,这说得通。
And we're like, that makes sense.
每个人,都是一天很长。
Everyone, it's a long day.
每天十个小时,你知道的,但也有其他人每天也是十个小时。
It's ten hours a day, you know, but there's other people who are ten hours a day as well.
那到底是什么让你这么累?
Like, what, what get, what, like, why are you so exhausted?
你知道吗?
You know?
他们说,其实是我自己感到精疲力尽。
And they're like, well, know, it's actually something I'm exhausted.
就是这么回事。
It's, it's like this.
我遇到了一个孩子,或者一个家庭,不管怎样。
I just had this one kid or one family or whatever.
我和他们之间出了点大问题。
I'm having a real problem with them.
归根结底,这其实是个人际关系问题。
It basically boiled down to like a human issue.
他们遇到的是课堂管理问题,因为有个孩子给他们制造麻烦,扰乱了课堂,或者是一家人对他们不满,双方在邮件里吵得不可开交,你知道的。
They're like classroom management because some kid was causing them issues and disrupting the class, or it was a family that was upset with them and they were like having like a flame war with them, you know, and over email or something.
我们就会说,哦,这真是个有意思的问题。
And we're like, oh, like, that's an interesting thing.
这确实是个真正的人际问题。
That's like an actual human issue.
这才是你真正担心的事,因为对面是个活生生的人。
That's the thing that you worry about because there's a human being on the other side of it.
其余的那些都更像是流程和某种事务性的工作。
The rest of this is kind of like workflow and whatever transactional in a way.
但这些问题都伴随着情绪。
But these things have emotions attached to them.
你能从他们的眼神里看出来。
You could see it in their eyes.
你能感受到它。
You could you could feel it.
然后你会进一步深入,你会发现我其实能感同身受,因为老师们会说,我当初没想当老师是为了做这些事。
And and then you'd get to you'd go even deeper and you'd get and I I could empathize with this because I'd I'd told they'd say things like I didn't get into teaching to do this.
于是他们心中对自己的期待,却始终无法实现。
And so there was this vision that they had of themselves that just wasn't coming to light.
那时你就会开始有一种微妙的直觉,觉得这里有什么东西值得挖掘。
That's when it started to you get that like tingly sense of like, oh, there's something here.
所以我们的第一个产品创意就是从这里来的,我们意识到教师面临的一个大问题就是课堂管理。
And so that's kind of, that's kind of where, where our first kind of product idea came from, where we realized one of the big problems for teachers is it's called classroom management.
对。
Right.
你面对一个班上三十个孩子,该怎么维持一个积极良好的学习环境呢?
So you've got 30 kids in a class and, and how do you keep it a positive and good learning environment?
而他们当时主要依赖的技术手段,基本上就是惩罚。
And that the main technology they had was basically punishment.
就是等着事情失控,然后给学生留堂,或者提高音量、大喊大叫,你知道,这些做法根本不像在设计一个理想的环境。
It was like, wait for things to go off the rails and then give kids detentions or like raise your voice or yell, you know, all these kinds of things that just like, you just wouldn't do if you were designing like a great environment.
于是我们开始思考,有什么更好的方法。
And so then we thought a bit about what a better way would be.
我们的第一个产品,只是为老师提供一种非常简单的方式,来给予学生正面反馈。
And, our first product was just a really simple way for teachers to give kids positive feedback.
这几乎像是一种游戏。
So it was almost, it felt like a game.
它感觉像一个小玩具,但老师可以登录一个网站,注册后输入班级名单,并添加你希望在班级中认可的价值观,比如互相帮助、善良、好奇心等等。
It felt like a little toy, but as a teacher, could sign up as on a website at the time you'd sign up, you'd put your class list in, you would add the values that you want to recognize in your class, like helping each other, kindness, curiosity, whatever it is.
然后在课堂上,你可以这样说:‘布雷特,你问了一个非常好的问题。’
And then during class, could say, you know, Brett, that was a great example of, asking a great question.
比如,为提出好问题加一分。
Like here's a plus one for asking a great question.
你会得到一个小贴纸。
You get this little sticker.
现在,其中非常重要的一点是,我们当时大多是面对面进行的。
Now, one of the things that was very important was we were in person for a lot of these.
我们也打了很多电话,但很多情况都是亲自到场,因为这些事情主要发生在教室里。
We did a bunch of phone calls too, but we were in person for a lot of this because a lot of this was happening in the classroom.
所以我们去观察老师们是如何在课堂上使用这个早期产品的。
So we'd go and see how teachers were using this early product in the classroom.
于是你就会看到这些零星的喜悦时刻,如果你只是躲在电脑屏幕后面观察,是绝对不可能发现这些的。
And so you ended up getting these like little sprinklings of delight, which you totally wouldn't have done if you just stayed behind a computer screen to look at it.
所以,当一个小贴纸出现在孩子的个人资料中时,我们会播放一种非常悦耳的提示音。
So one thing we did was when a little sticker would, would appear in like a kid's profile, we had it all like ping sound, like a very pleasant kind of nice sound.
利亚姆花了一些时间来设计这个音效。
Liam spent some time on it.
当时你并不担心这算不上一项生意。
At the time you weren't concerned that this isn't a business.
这就像一个小游戏。
This is like a little game.
有几点原因。
There's a couple of things.
第一,我们知道我们想要触达家长。
One, we knew we wanted to get to parents.
所以我们是清楚这一点的。
So we knew that.
但在此之前,前提是YC的信条:打造人们想要的东西。
But the precondition to that was the YC mantra is make something people want.
你知道,我们心里的步骤是:先做出老师想要的东西。
You know, the steps were in our minds, make something that teachers want.
第二步则是个问号。
Step two was like question mark.
第三步就是赚钱。
And then step three is like money.
但第二步是想办法让产品到达孩子和家长那里。
But step two is like get it somehow to, to, to kids and to parents.
然后第三步,我们想,总有一天我们会打造家庭真正想要的产品。
And then step three, we're like, one day we'll build things that we think families want.
但一切的起点是我们需要构建一个网络。
But the starting point for everything is we need to build a network.
是的。
Yeah.
这个网络需要教师、家长和学生。
And the network needs teachers, parents, and students.
这就是我们的理论。
That was our theory.
这就是我们的理论。
That was our theory.
当你在与教师交谈、讨论时,你actively试图弄清楚这个网络中的价值单位是什么?
And then you were actively, as you were talking to teachers, as you were talking about, you were actively trying to figure out what is the unit of value in this network?
网络是什么?
What is the net?
对。
Yeah.
我们一开始根本没有网络。
Like, well, we didn't have a network to start with.
我们只有一个工具。
We had a tool.
我刚才说的那个工具,对吧?
And the thing I just described as a tool, right?
你可以说教室里有一点点交流,老师和学生之间之类的,但那根本不是你所理解的网络。
You could say there's a little bit of communication inside the classroom, teachers with kids or whatever, but it wasn't like a, like what you think of as a network.
接下来发生的是,我应该说这个产品突然大受欢迎。
What happened next was, so I should say this product exploded in popularity.
你就直接把它带给了那些
And you just took it to the people that
你认识的人,你知道,我认识的三分之一都用了,他们都很震惊。
you've And spoken like, you know, I know a third of them used it and they were blown away.
我们可以把一部分成功归功于一个好产品,我们在这方面确实做得不错。
We can ascribe some to a nice product and we did a good job with that.
另一部分是我们选择了一个被严重忽视的客户群体,因为根本没人关心老师,对吧?
Then the other part of it was we picked a customer that was massively underserved because no one cared about teachers, right?
因为他们没多少钱。
Because they don't have that much money.
那为什么你要为他们开发产品呢?
So why would you ever build products for them?
因为他们根本付不起钱,你知道的?
Because they can't pay you anything, you know?
但我们意识到,等等。
But what we realized was, well, hold on.
这里存在着巨大的痛点。
There's a huge amount of pain here.
而且实际上,他们是值得信赖的人。
And actually they're a trusted figure.
如果我们能服务好他们,就能接触到更多的人。
And if we could serve them, then you get access to a whole lot more.
所以我当时在看别人忽视的地方,也许在商业模式上也有类似的平行情况。
And so I was kind of looking where the people weren't looking, maybe there's a parallel to the business model side of it as well.
所以这并不明显,但我们发现,过度服务教师这一做法带来了爆炸性增长。
So it's not obvious, but we were assessing, over serving teachers that exploded.
你知道吗,我们的一位投资者其实和我上同一所大学,来自Superhuman的Rahul就说过,真正唯一的增长渠道就是口碑传播。
You know, I think, so one of our investors, we actually went to college together, Rahul from superhuman who was like, you know, there's only one real growth channel and that's word-of-mouth.
而口碑传播来自于打造一款卓越的产品。
And that comes from making a remarkable product.
真的是卓越到极致的产品。
Like literally remarkable.
让人忍不住想要谈论它。
Like people want to remark on it.
而这款产品就是那样的产品。
And this, this was that product.
我的老师们会向他们的朋友推荐它。
My teachers would tell their friends about it.
当时就像是,他们面对了一场疯狂的野火,你知道的?
And it was like, they came at this crazy wildfire, you know?
所以每一期YC的创业公司里,总会有至少一家公司呈现出那种漂亮的指数增长曲线。
So every batch of the YC companies, whatever, there's always at least one company that has that kind of like nice hockey stick.
我们一开始进场时放弃了原来的点子,大家都觉得我们完蛋了。
So we, we were the one that started, threw away our idea when we turned up and we're like, everyone's like, they're toast.
他们根本不可能成功。
They're never gonna gonna make it.
但到了演示日,我们展示了一个看起来异常疯狂的指数增长图表。
And then we turn up a demo day and we had this like crazy looking hockey stick chart.
我们从零迅速增长到大约一万名教师在使用它,
We'd gone from zero to like, I think it was like 10,000 teachers using it out of
就在那短短时间内。
the gate.
在发布产品之前,你有没有想过这真的会火起来,人们会如此痴迷,还是只是想看看会怎样?
Before you shipped the product, did you think this, this is really going to catch on and people are going to be obsessed or it's like, oh, see what happens with it.
我们强烈感觉到这里确实存在一个真正的痛点。
We had a strong sense that there was a real pain here.
我不认为我们预料到会如此迅速地传播开来。
I don't think we expected the spread.
这真的让我们大吃一惊。
It really took us by surprise.
我想我们之前没意识到教师群体被如此忽视。
I think we hadn't realized just how underserved teachers were.
有很多令人惊叹的特质。
There's lots of amazing characteristics.
我们意识到,教师们并不是为了钱或名声而投身这一行。
We realized teachers don't get into it for the money or the fame.
是的。
Right.
他们投身于此,主要是因为认同这份使命。
They get into it largely because they care about the mission.
当他们找到帮助自己实现使命的人时,就会想告诉其他人。
And when they find someone that helps them on their mission, they want to tell other people about it.
所以他们会向其他老师推荐。
And so they tell other teachers about it.
我们还可以聊很多其他与教师相关的具体事情,但这些都是我们在深入之后才逐渐了解的。
There's lots of other things we can talk about and like the specific to teachers, but we learned a lot of that as we got into it.
我之前提到过他们的应变能力。
I talked about the resourcefulness thing.
你可以从不同角度看待一种情况,当你观察教师时,可能会觉得这是一个非常糟糕的商业模式或收入渠道。
There's something to looking at a situation with different lenses and you look at teachers and say, oh, it's a very bad business or revenue channel.
但你也可以换个角度,看到他们是一群有真实痛点、并且能影响大量他人的用户。
We can look at them and say, hey, it's a user with real pains that influences a lot of other people.
你对这一点有什么感受?
What was your feeling about that?
你当时感到失望吗?
Were you, were you delated?
我的意思是,我们欣喜若狂、难以置信,简直像在掐自己一样,这一切都出乎意料。
I mean, elated, amazed, like pinching ourselves, all of it was unexpected.
记得在演示日那天,大家都非常激动,因为保罗·格雷厄姆要来。
Remember on demo day, the big, everyone was very riled up because Paul Graham was gonna be there.
而且传言说他打算投资这家公司。
And, the rumor was he was gonna invest in the company.
在所有演示结束后,保罗走到我们的展台前。
And Paul comes over to our booth thing after the after the presentations.
我当时展示了一个指标,关于用户反馈增长的速度。
There was some metric I'd showed about how quickly the, you know, feed points giving was growing.
他转向利亚姆说:‘嘿,利亚姆,你能给我看看这个指标在过去两周左右的变化吗?’
And he kind of goes to Liam and is like, hey, Liam, can you just show me that metric over, like, you know, two weeks or something?
利亚姆心想:‘天啊,保罗·格雷厄姆居然让我展示一个指标。’
And Liam's like, oh god, Paul Graham's asked me to show him a metric.
他立刻冲到终端前,试图找出正确的数据。
Like, he's like, dives into terminal to try and, know, pull up the right stuff.
莱姆说,这得花点时间。
And Liam's like, it's it's gonna take a minute.
我当时觉得,放一盒甜甜圈在那里会是个吸引人的点子。
And I had thought it would be great to have a box of donuts there because that would be like a draw for people.
保罗说,没关系。
Paul says, that's fine.
我就吃个甜甜圈,等着吧。
I'll just have a donut and wait.
压力一下子上来了。
It's like pressure is on.
总之,他最后决定投资。
Anyway, end up investing.
你觉得呢
What do you think
关于那个甜甜圈?
of the donut?
这真是很棒的甜甜圈。
That's excellent doughnut.
不。
No.
不。
No.
我真的很喜欢选择高品质的甜甜圈。
I really really like went for high quality doughnuts.
是的。
Yeah.
这发生在那时候
This is at a time
我还没有对你下注。
when I had no bet into you.
你筹款的角度是让我们准备一些甜甜圈
Business that your angle on fundraising was let's have some doughnuts in
不。
No.
当时的想法是,这是一件目标导向的事情。
Was like, look, it was a goal oriented thing.
我觉得,你参加演示日并不是为了坐等融资。
I'm like, you're at the you're you're not like sitting at the demo day hoping to fundraise.
你是坐在那里,吸引别人来找你。
You're sitting there to get people to come to you.
我当时想,那我们再吸引一些关注吧。
And I'm like, well, let's draw some more attention.
如果增长曲线不够吸引人,那甜甜圈就能做到。
If the hockey stick doesn't do it, the donuts will.
那么,好吧,你当时有一个应用,这个应用允许老师给予虚拟奖励。
So then, okay, so you had this app and the app allowed teachers to give virtual rewards.
然后我们开始分析一些用户群体,发现有一组用户非常忠诚。
We're then looking at some of the cohorts, and we started to see that there was a set of users that were incredibly sticky.
他们每天都回来。
They'd come back every day.
我们进一步深入查看,发现他们到底在产品里做什么并不明显,于是我们打电话给他们,和他们聊了聊。
And we clicked a bit further into it, and it wasn't obvious what they're doing in the product, but we called them and and spoke to them.
结果发现,他们把所有的奖励都截取下来,转成PDF发给家长。
And, basically, it turns out they were taking all the rewards, like, as a snapshot and turning into a PDF and sending it home to parents.
他们是在和家长沟通。
They're, like, communicating with parents.
这显然是一种非常……我们原本不确定这是相关性还是因果关系,但似乎印证了一个模式:沟通本身确实非常能留住用户。
And and this was evidently like a very we didn't know if correlation, causation, whatever, but it kind of fit a pattern of like, oh, well, actually communication is like a very sticky thing.
你 probably 也经历过和朋友的微信群吧,想退出可真难,对吧?
And you've probably been in like WhatsApp groups with your friends, very hard to drop out of them, you know?
于是我们意识到,我们真正打造的其实是一个沟通应用。
And so that then turned us on to, oh, actually what we're really building is a communication app.
有几件事突然就清晰起来了。
And a few things like snapped into place.
我们意识到,这提供了一种从教师扩展到家长和孩子的途径,真正开始构建一个网络。
We're like, okay, that's a, that's a way to expand from teachers to, to parents and kids and really start to build a network.
第二,我们还发现了这种模式的留存率和参与度有多高。
Two, we discovered just how, how high retention and high engagement that is as well.
因此,我认为找到这类黄金用户群体非常重要。
And so I think finding those kind of like golden cohorts was, was really important.
这对我们来说几乎是第二次产品市场契合的时刻。
That was like almost like a second product market fit moment for us.
于是,Dojo 开始扩展。
And so Dojo then expanded.
我们开发了家长账户和孩子账户。
We built parent accounts, kid accounts.
家长的典型体验是:我不知道孩子在学校里发生了什么。
The median experience of a parent is I don't know what's happening at school.
我可能每六个月才参加一次家长会,有时只能从书包里拿到一张纸条。
I maybe go to a parent teacher conference once every six months And sometimes I get a piece of paper home in a backpack.
但这个人却是我在这个世界上最在乎的人。
And yet this is the person I care most about in the world.
所以,从这一点转向这样一个看似微不足道的事情,对吧?
And so to go from that to this seemingly very trivial thing, right?
就像,布雷特今天问了一个好问题,但知道这一点后,就能在家开启一场对话:那是什么问题?
It was like, you know, Brett asked a good question today, but knowing that then starts the conversation at home of like, what was that?
你问的是什么问题?
What was that question you asked?
你们聊了什么?
Like, what did you talk about?
你知道的。
You know?
这对父母和孩子来说都是一个很棒的时刻。
And that's like an amazing moment for the parent and the kid.
但我觉得,我们分享的是课堂上的积极时刻,而不是负面消息,比如你孩子被罚留校了。
But I think that then I teach like, well, we're sharing these positive moments from the classroom instead of like bad news and your kid got detention.
我们现在分享的是正面消息。
We're now sharing positive news.
所以这对每个人来说都是一种极大的鼓舞。
And so that was like a great lift for everyone.
然后这变得非常自然。
And then it became very natural.
比如,我们其实就想聊聊这件事。
Like, well, actually we want to talk about that.
我们想发送消息。
We want to send messages.
老师们说,现在教室里已经开通了Dojo系统。
Teachers are like, well, we now Dojo was open in the classroom.
他们说,现在我们想拍下教室里发生的事,捕捉一些课堂瞬间,比如孩子朗诵诗歌的视频,或者其他类似的真实、可爱的小片段。
They're like, now we want to take pictures of what's happening in the classroom, little snapshots of moments in the classroom, like a video of this, you know, the the kid doing a poem or whatever, you know, just like real, real, like, cute kind of stuff.
还有更小的孩子。
There's younger kids.
因此,从那里发展出来的Dojo贝塞尔曲线,最终成为了我们最早构建的这个通讯应用。
And so that Dojo Bezier from there expanded into, I think, what the the first part that we ever built was this communication app.
它对孩子们、老师和家长都非常有用,因为它让整个社区保持了紧密联系。
And it was very useful for kids and teachers and parents, because it kept the whole community connected.
它也实现了扩展Dojo网络这一目标,我们可以稍后讨论。
It also served this goal of growing like the Dojo network, which we can talk about.
是的。
So yeah.
再多讲一点吧,关于基于贴纸产品衍生出的第二款产品的第一个版本是什么样的。
Share a little bit more about what was the first version, I guess, of the second product built on the back of the stickers product.
是的,它只是一个简单的扩展。
Yeah, it was just a simple extension.
我们为家长创建了账户。
We built parent accounts.
现在,你有了一个连接家长的渠道,孩子也包含在其中。
So you can now, you now had a channel to the, to the parent and the kid was in there as well.
作为老师,你可以给学生发消息,当然,学生和家长的账户是关联的,你们可以互相发消息。
You can message the kid as a teacher, obviously, but the, you know, the kid and parent accounts were attached and you could you can message back and forth.
接下来的版本增加了摄像头功能。
And then the next version added a camera.
我们当时的想法是,现在可以在教室里拍照了。
And we're like, you can now take pictures in the classroom.
然后我们又加入了视频功能,于是它逐渐从仅仅分享贴纸,演变为用来分享教室里那些美好的瞬间。
Then we added video and, you know, so it kind of progressed from just sharing stickers to basically communicating about really nice moments in the classroom.
那么当时这个业务的规模大概是多少?
And so what, what were the numbers of the business at that point, roughly?
你们看到了什么样的情况?
Like, what were you seeing?
增长速度有多快?
How fast was it growing?
有多少人在使用它?
How many people were using it?
天哪。
Oh my gosh.
真的很难说,但你看,在种子轮阶段,我想我们大概有大约一万名教师在使用它。
It's really hard to say, but I mean, look, think at, at, the seed round, I think, I know we had maybe some of that, like, maybe like 10,000 teachers ish using it.
从那以后,到A轮融资时,我们基本上看到了教师用户的持续增长,以及家长用户开始出现。
I think from there, this series a, we basically just showed continued teacher growth and the beginnings of some parent growth.
这个国家大约有280万教师。
There's there's about 2,800,000 teachers in the country.
所以我想我们在美国的用户达到了大约二十分之一左右。
So I think we got to like maybe one in 20 or something like that in The US.
一个有趣的现象是,我们也开始看到国际用户以完全自发的方式增长。
One interesting thing was we'd also started to see international growth completely organically.
在2012年,我想我们已经覆盖了大约40到50个国家,至少每个国家都有几位用户。
So we were actually at the 2012, I think we were in like 40 or 50 countries with at least a few users.
所以你当时有没有想过
And so did you think
我们一直在思考如何让这个产品增长得更快?
a lot about how do we get this thing to grow faster?
我们确实这么做了。
We did.
是的,我们确实这么做了。
Yeah, we did.
所以最初,就像我说的,我们只是在打造一个出色的产品,人们非常喜欢它,并且会告诉他们的朋友。
So initially, like I said, it was just, we're just building a great product and people love it and they tell their friends about it.
我想那是某一个夏天,就是之后的那个夏天。
I think it was, I forget now, it was one of those summers, that summer, the summer after.
我们开始更深入地了解这个产品是如何增长的。
We basically got a bit more involved in trying to learn about how this thing was growing.
然后发生了一些事情。
And a few things happened.
首先,我意识到自己曾去城市里的一所中学进行用户调研,当时我坐在一位科学老师旁边,她叫詹娜,我们心想,哇,她真是个好老师,她在使用Dojo。
One, we realized I actually went on a user research visit to a middle school in the city and I was sitting in with this science teacher, her name is Jenna, and we're like, wow, she's a great teacher, she's using Dojo.
我们当时只是去了解什么有效、什么无效,然后回办公室。
We were like, you know, just just there to learn about what's working and not working and go back to the office.
我想一周或两周后,我收到了Jenna的一封邮件。
I I think a week or two later, I get an email from Jenna.
她发消息说:嘿。
And she was like, hey.
你知道,她打算暑假期间暂停教学。
You know, I'm, like, gonna take a break over the summer from teaching, obviously.
她问:我可以来Dojo实习吗?
Like, can I come and do an internship at Dojo?
我们当时想:我们真不知道她能在这里做些什么。
And, we were like, we don't really know what she would do here.
我们那时候只有四五个人左右,但还是说:好啊,当然可以。
Like, we were like four or five people or something, but we're like, yeah, sure.
来吧,也许可以帮忙做一些客服工作。
Like, come by, you know, like maybe do some support.
我当时负责所有客服工作。
I was doing all our support.
我可能当时说:‘这些客服工单都交给你了。’
I was probably like, please do all support tickets here.
但她在实习一个月后,拿出了一个她一直在做的秘密项目。
But, like a month into her internship, she comes back with this secret project she's been doing.
这个秘密项目是她对我们通过学校扩展情况的看法。
And the secret project was her view of how we were growing through schools.
她所展示的基本内容是,在我们拓展的所有学校里,我们都找到了一位非常热情的老师。
And basically what she was able to show is that in all the schools that we're growing in, we found one really passionate teacher.
后来我们发现,大多数学校其实都遵循这种钟形曲线分布。
And every turns out we found out later on that most schools follow this kind of bell curve distribution.
我们有非常热情、充满激情的老师,一堆模棱两可的人,还有一堆滞后者。
We have, like, you know, really passionate, excited teachers and a bunch of module news and a bunch of laggards.
但她却说:‘这些热情的老师,就是像我这样的人。’
But she was like, these passionate teachers, these are, these are people like me.
这些人真的渴望站在前沿,做酷炫的事情,追求卓越,发现最好的东西。
These are people who like really want to be on the cutting edge and do cool stuff and do the best, find the best things.
她说,我觉得这些人其实是我们的倡导者,我们应该帮助他们。
And she's like, I think these people are kind of our champions and we should help them.
于是,她基本上成为了我们的第一位社区领袖。
And so she basically became our first community leader.
她再也没有回到教室。
She never went back to the classroom.
她建立了一个社区,让我们能从每所学校邀请出核心用户。
And so she built this community where we'd get the power user from every school.
他们彼此见面后,都会说:天啊。
And they would all meet each other and they'd be like, my god.
世界上居然还有这样的人。
There's people I mean in the world.
这又是一个重要的转折点。
And that was that was like another big inflection point.
你们是面对面做的吗,还是
And you did that in person or
我们最初在地区层面组织了一些线下聚会,但后来就变成了一个Facebook群组。
was We we had a few in person meetups because we did it regionally first, but then it became a, like, Facebook group.
他们每个人都和詹娜建立了非常深厚的关系。
They all had, like, really deep relationships with Jenna.
他们了解整个团队。
They had they knew the whole team.
所以,你知道,这种体验真的无可替代。
And so that you know, there again, there's really no substitute for that.
你无法假装关心。
You can't really, fake the care.
你知道的吗?
You know?
他们会发短信,而且会收到回复。
Like, they would text and they'd get a text back.
你没法假装这个。
Like, you can't fake that.
所以我觉得这是一件非常重要的事。
So so I think that that was like one very important thing.
还有哪些其他因素促进了增长呢?
What are the other sort of things that helped inflect growth?
我们开始意识到,在美国,我们现在虽然已经扩展到全球,但最初有一个‘先渗透再扩展’的模式,我们需要先在一所学校里用Dojo接触到第一个团队,也就是我们的第一个教室。
We started to realize in The US, we had this like around the world now, but we had this like land and expand dynamic where we had to like get to our first team basically using Dojo in a school, our first classroom.
然后就有了向整个教室扩展的路径。
And then there was a path to expanding to the classroom.
现在我们的业务中有一个令人难以置信但确实属实的奇怪数据:直到今天,我们还没有为用户获取花过一美元。
Now we have a weird stat in the business, which is hard to believe, but it's true, which is that to this day, we still haven't paid a dollar for user acquisition.
我们的所有增长都完全来自于口碑传播、病毒式传播、社区运营之类的,就像这些是你的边际成本项目。
So a 100% of our growth has been some combination of word-of-mouth, virality, you know, some community stuff, like, this is your marginal cost programs.
但我给你举个例子。
But I'll give you an example.
我们会找出哪些方法有效,然后加以放大。
We would find how what was working and then amplify that.
我们发现老师们会在学校里参加专业发展培训。
So we found teachers were sitting in school doing professional development sessions.
这是老师们必须做的事情。
Now this is the thing teachers have to do.
他们需要完成一定的课时。
They have some hours they have to cover.
于是他们就会说:‘我要做个关于Dojo的专业发展培训。’
And and they were like, this I'll do a professional development session on Dojo.
这太棒了。
This is great.
这是我今年发现的最新事情。
This is the latest thing I found this year.
我们旁听了其中几次。
And we sat in on a few of these.
我们想,干脆直接给你一个非常棒的PowerPoint演示文稿。
We're like, we could just give you, like, a really good PowerPoint presentation.
我们可以在结尾放一个二维码或者链接,让你在屏幕上一展示,大家就能加入。
And we could probably put, a QR code at the end of it or a link that you could, you know, flash up on the screen and everyone would join.
结果发现,这个词用得简直太妙了。
Turns out that word, like, magnificently.
这真是个典型的例子,回头一看,你如果不深入到细节,根本不会注意到这一点。
That was it's such a, like, you know, in retrospect, like, you don't get that unless you go right down to the detail.
对吧?
Right?
我们意识到的第二件事是,听起来虽然很荒谬,但教室之间根本没有互动效应,所以相邻的教室完全可以各自使用,互不知情。
Second thing we realized was that as silly as it sounds, there was no interaction effect between classrooms, so you can just use it next door to each other and not not even know.
于是我们构建了这样一个概念:你可以加入一所学校,只要在同一所学校里,大家就能互相看到。
So we had this built this concept of a school, like you would join a school and now you could all see each other if you're in the same school.
这样一来,你就相当于成了学校的通讯录。
So you kind of became the contact book for the school.
这显然是一个非常粘性的功能,你在WhatsApp、Discord以及其他许多平台都看到了。
And that was obviously a very sticky feature, which you've seen in WhatsApp and Discord and a bunch of others.
所以这些至少是几个关键点。
So those are at least a couple of things.
由于我们是做产品的人,所以我们关注世界上有哪些成功的产品和功能。
There's a comp of like things that are working in the world and product because we're product people.
我认为,思考如何为我们的产品构建网络,对我们来说非常重要。
I think thinking about how you create network of our products was, was important to us.
因此我们开始注意到,如今Dojo已经应用于全国90%的学校,国际上的使用量可能是这个数字的两到三倍。
And so we started to see, and if you look now, Dojo is used in nine out of 10 schools in the country and maybe two or three times as many as that internationally.
很多情况下,这仍然是一个‘先渗透、再扩展’的动态过程。
A lot of it's still been this land and expand kind of dynamic.
是什么让你
What gave
有勇气在多年里只专注于发展这个产品,而完全不考虑商业模式?
you the confidence to just grow this thing for many years without thinking about the actual business?
第一,我们很早就做了变现测试,大概在一年后。
One, we'd done that monetization test early on, maybe a year in.
我们对此非常紧张。
We were pretty nervous about it.
我们其实没有什么可以卖给家长的产品。
We didn't really have a product to sell parents.
我们心想,嘿,我们什么都没做出来。
We're like, well, we haven't built anything.
所以我想我们创建了一套虚拟形象。
So I think we we created like an avatar set.
因为孩子们都有这些小怪物。
Because kids have these little monsters.
我们觉得,哦,你可以自定义你的怪物,给它戴顶帽子之类的。
We're like, Oh, you can just like customize your monster, give them like a hat, whatever.
这花不了多少钱。
This is very cheap to do.
我们就把它添加到了家长账户里。
And we just popped it in the parent account.
说实话,我都记不清当时的转化率是多少了。
And you know, I don't even remember what the conversion rate was.
低得可怜。
It was like abysmal.
但我们还是惊呆了,天啊,有人真的在给我们付钱。
But we're like, Oh my God, people are paying us money.
这是公司收到的第一笔钱。
It's like first dollars in the company.
这太不可思议了。
This is incredible.
所以我们觉得,肯定有什么地方对劲。
So we're like, There's gotta be something.
但我们还不知道那是什么。
We don't know what it is.
可能不是这个,但总有一天我们会发现其中的关键。
It's probably not this, but there's gonna be something here one day.
我觉得这更多是我们自己建立信心的过程。
I think it was more like just a confidence building thing for ourselves.
真正的答案可能是,那时我们已经没有退路了。
The real answer might just be, we had kind of burned our boats at that point.
当我们来到美国时,我们有一个非常明确的理论,基于这个理论筹集了资金,我们仍然相信自己是对的,这个理论依然合理,我们也在持续取得进展。
Like we turn up in The US, we had this very specific thesis, we'd raise money on that thesis, we still thought we were right, the theory still made sense, We were still making progress.
每年我们都会带来更多的教师和家庭。
Like every year we turn up with like, you know, more teachers and more families.
现在孩子也越来越多了。
Now more kids now as well.
以前只关注教师,后来才扩展到其他群体。
It used to be just teachers and expand these other groups.
所以,当我们进入第六七年,也就是2018年、2019年的时候,我们突然意识到:天啊,我们似乎正在形成一个网络的雏形。
And so, like we were like six or seven years in six years, 2018, 2019 when we were like, oh my God, we think we've got the beginnings of a network.
我觉得我们一直看到一些相近的行为或涌现的行为。
I think we kept seeing adjacent behavior or emergent behavior.
我认为这实际上在消费类产品中是一个非常重要的信号。
I think that's like a really important sign actually in consumer products.
我认为在企业领域可能没那么重要,但在消费端,我们非常谨慎,避免过度设计,也不严格规定用户必须如何使用这个产品。
I think there's a lot of probably not as important in the enterprise world, but in the consumer side of things, we are very careful not to overbuild and really tightly specify how you must use this product.
我们实际上保持了开放性,看看会涌现出什么。
We actually kept it kind of open to see what would emerge.
因此我们看到了很多涌现的现象。
And so we saw a bunch of emergence.
其中之一是国际增长。
One was the international growth.
这完全不是我们主动做的。
Nothing we did.
我们并没有翻译这款应用。
We didn't translate the app.
最终我们开发了一些软件,让用户能够自行翻译它。
Eventually we built some software which allowed our users to translate it.
但我们开始发现,嘿,人们真的很喜欢这个产品。
But we started to see like, Hey, people love this.
他们告诉在假期认识的老师,然后这些老师就开始在荷兰的国际学校里使用它。
They tell that teacher they met on holiday about it and they start using it in their international school in The Netherlands.
接着又有其他几位国际学校的老师问:那个有怪物的工具是什么?
And then there three are other international school teachers like, what's that thing with the monster?
他们互相推荐,于是我们开始看到这种模式在全球范围内传播。
And they tell, you know, and so we started to see these spread patterns around the world.
我当时就想,这真是太棒了。
I was like, oh, that's like really cool.
现在它已经覆盖了大约160个国家。
Now it's in like 160 countries or whatever.
对。
Right.
但那只是其中之一。
But that was one.
我认为第二个阶段是我们开始看到其他群体的孩子使用这个应用。
I think the second was we started to see other groupings of kids using the app.
除了教室之外,还有体育俱乐部、课后俱乐部和日托中心。
So beyond the classroom, sports clubs and after school clubs and daycare.
我们当时就想,哦,原来这不只是在教室里使用。
And we're like, oh, so this isn't just classroom.
结果发现,孩子们在很多群体中都会使用。
Turns out kids are in many groups.
这潜力也可能非常巨大。
That could be enormous too.
一旦我们达到一定的规模,比如在美国,大约每四个或五个家庭中就有一个每周使用Dodgina,我们就开始收到大量来自教育机构、学校、学区、州政府,甚至有些联邦政府的主动联系。
Once we hit a certain level of scale, like in The US, you know, something like one in four, one in five families in America use Dodgina every week, we start to get a ton of inbound from the institutions, from schools, from districts, states, in some cases from some federal governments.
所以我认为,有时候这些时刻更多是一种感觉,你会觉得你已经达到了某种临界点,是谁说的来着?
And so so I think there's these moments where maybe it's more of a feel thing where you feel like you've who said this?
就像你感觉自己跳进了一个泳池,然后游到边缘时才发现原来是个湖,再游到湖的另一端,才发现那根本就是一片海洋。
Like, you feel like you've got into a pool and then you, like, get to the edge and you realize you realize it's actually a lake and then you get to the edge and you realize it's actually an ocean.
然后我们不断感受到我们正在构建的这款通讯应用中,可能性正在持续扩展。
And then we just kept feeling the sense of like expanding possibilities in the communication app that we were building.
所以我觉得,那种感觉就是我们似乎抓住了什么关键的东西。
And so I think that like kind of just felt like we were onto a thing.
继续前进。
Like keep going.
那么,推出第一个业务的背后故事是什么?
So what's the story behind launching the first business?
是的。
Yeah.
到了2019年,我们更多是凭一种直觉在行动。
So we got to 2019 and basically it was more just like a, like a feel thing.
我们觉得,看,我们似乎已经初步建立了一个网络。
We were like, look, like we think we've got the beginnings of a network here.
我认为当时我们和Roblox是最大的两个,但我们觉得,对于年幼的孩子来说,我们是全球最大的两个网络之一。
I think it was us and Roblox was bigger, but we're like, there's not, we're one of the two biggest networks on the planet for younger kids.
而这只是
And this is
到目前为止有数百万用户了吗?
millions of users at this point?
是的。
Yeah.
肯定有数百万。
Millions for sure.
你知道,美国有大约两千五百万个家庭有13岁以下的孩子。
You know, think there's 25,000,000 families in The United States with kids 13.
我假设这个
And I assume the
产品也非常具有用户粘性,这
product was also highly retentive, which was
超级,超级。
super Super.
是的。
Yes.
非常高。
Super high.
所以,让我们更有信心的另一件事是我们拥有极高的留存率和极高的参与度。
So one of the that was maybe one of the other things that gave us confidence was that we had incredibly high retention, incredibly high engagement.
直到今天,我的意思是,它一开始就很髙,随着我们的发展,它变得更高了,但这是一个极其粘性的产品。
So to this day, I mean, I mean, it started high and it's got even higher as we've grown, but it's an incredibly sticky product.
人们非常喜欢使用它。
Like people love using it.
另一点是,所有使用都是自愿的。
The other thing was it was all voluntary usage.
我们从未强迫任何人。
Like we haven't twisted anyone's arm.
不是你的学区会来检查你。
It's not your school district is gonna check up on you.
就是我自己选的。
It's just like, I I chose it.
所以我认为,当你看到这些迹象时,它们非常罕见,每次我们向消费者投资者展示时,他们都很震惊,但B2B投资者就是不明白。
And so I think when you see those signs, they're so rare, you know, and every time we show them to a consumer investor, they're and the B2B investor just didn't get it.
他们会觉得,这到底是什么东西?
You know, they're like, what is this thing?
消费者投资者会说,天哪。
The consumer investors were like, oh my god.
这真的吗?
Like, is that real?
你知道的?
You know?
那个每周到每月的比率是真的吗?还是留存曲线是真的?
Is that, like, weekly to monthly ratio real, or is that, like, retention curve real?
而且我们只需要展示一下,你知道,通常拥有消费者应用的公司,其30天后的留存率在5%到15%左右。
And and we could just show, like, you know, you see you see companies with consumer apps usually have five to 15% retention to 30 later or something.
而我们六个月后的留存率却是那个数字的六倍,你知道,这太惊人了。
And we were at like six X that, like six months later, you know, and it was wild.
那前六年大部分时间是不是只是在逐步改进核心产品?
Was most of that first six years just incrementally making the core product better?
除了你之前提到的那些业务增长方式之外,那六年里还发生了什么?
Like what was going on for those six years other than working to grow the business in all the ways you discussed?
说实话,很难形容那几年有多艰难。
Honestly, it's hard to convey how hard those years were.
我们熬到了第七年,那时团队只有30个人。
We got to seven years in and we were 30 people.
我们在只有30人、零收入的情况下完成了C轮融资。
And we had done the series C at 30 people, with $0 of revenue.
我们坚持的依然是完全相同的理念。
And we had the exact same thesis.
实际上,公司在成立一两年后,我就写了一份战略文档,试图清晰地阐述这一点,以便我们能直接拿给投资者看。
Like, so I actually wrote a strategy document like a year or two into the company, tried to articulate this so that we could just give it to investors.
直到今天,每个人还在读这份文档。
Everyone still reads that document today.
文档中写道:我们的使命是让全球每个孩子都能获得他们热爱的教育。
It read like our mission is to give every kid on earth an education they love.
我们认为,这是进步的根本所在。
We think this is fundamental to progress.
这是推动全球进步的最重要因素。
It's the single biggest enabler of progress on the planet.
问题是,如何实现?
The question is how?
第一步,我们要服务教师。
Step one is we're going to serve teachers.
第二步,我们要从教师扩展到整个教师、学生和家庭的社群。
Step two is we're going to expand from teachers to this whole community of teachers and kids and families.
第三步是,我们要为家庭打造产品和服务,帮助他们的孩子以他们期望的方方面面学习和成长。
Step three is we're going to build products and services for families that help their kids learn and grow in all the ways they want.
而这就是我们将要建立一些伟大企业的方向,大致如此。
And that's where we're going build some great businesses, roughly speaking.
你知道,这其中还有更多深层次的内容,确实非常艰难,对吧?
You know, there's lot more depth to yeah, so it was incredibly hard, right?
因为本质上,你头上顶着一把枪,银行账户余额一路下滑,而你却有着极强的信念,或许还有一群同样信念坚定的创始人,持有一个前所未有人证明过的理念。
Because you have this gun pointed at your head basically, and the bank balance is going one way and you have this really high conviction and maybe high conviction founders with a thesis that no one has ever proven before.
再强调一遍,我们别太纠结于细节了。
Again, let's not align eyes it too much.
我只是在想,当时我们正处于二十多岁的年纪。
I'm just thinking about like the moment in time where we were, we were in our mid twenties.
我们搬到了美国。
We'd moved to America.
我们几乎没有任何牵绊。
We had like basically no attachments.
我们每天住在一起,也每天一起工作。
We were living together every day and working together every day.
我们再次选择了破釜沉舟。
We, again, we kind of burned the boats.
这就是我们要做的事。
We're like, this is the thing.
我们一定要让这件事成功。
We're going to make this work.
那么在2019年,你们是怎么决定现在是时候创业的呢?
So how in 2019 did you decide now is the time that we're going to start a business?
我觉得我们刚完成C轮融资,然后就想,天啊,我们不能再做一轮毫无把握的融资了。
I think we had just finished the series C and we're like, man, we can't do another round with no brainer.
侥幸过关了。
Got away with it.
它
It's
很棒。
been great.
最大的消息是,我们有数百万家长在使用Dojo,这以前从未发生过。
The big news is we had millions of parents on Dojo and that had never happened before.
可以达到数百万,而不是仅仅几十万。
Could show like millions, not like a few 100,000.
我们当时想,哇。
And we're like, wow.
好吧。
Okay.
我们这里已经有了庞大的用户群体。
We've got a large audience here.
所以,我们觉得网络方面的进展让我们相当鼓舞。
And so, you know, we were like, okay, we're feeling pretty encouraged about the progress on network side.
但这从来不是业务的最终目标。
It was never the end state of the business.
这始终是下一步的前提,即开始构建能够以各种方式服务儿童和家庭的业务,帮助孩子学习和成长。
It was always a precondition to the next thing, which was starting to build businesses that serve kids and families in all the ways that that help kids learn and grow.
所以我们从那些看起来切实可行的事情开始,老实说。
And so we started with, honestly, like, what felt achievable.
有一个产品,我们至今仍在使用。
There was a, it's a product that we still have.
它叫Plus。
It's called plus.
当时它被称为Beyond School,我们观察到,家庭其实并不知道该如何花钱来提升孩子的教育。
I was at the time it was called beyond school that we had this, this observation that families don't actually know how to spend money to make their kids' education better.
我在想,如果你能有信心说,这100美元是我能花的最值的钱,会怎么样?
I'm like, what if with confidence you could say, this is the best $100 I can spend.
我们组建了一个小团队,负责这个付费产品,当时它叫Plus或者Beyond School,但很快就被重新命名为Plus。
We started a small team, which was working on the paid product and it was called Plus or beyond school at the time, then very quickly rebranded to Plus.
我们基本上添加了一些家长长期要求但我们一直没时间开发的功能。
And we basically put in a few features that parents had asked for for like a long time that we hadn't got around to building.
这下彻底爆发了。
And that just exploded.
其中一个功能是,不再只是滚动浏览,而是在Dojo应用中提供一个照片和视频的动态信息流。
One of them was instead of scrolling, there's a feed of photos in the dojo app photos and videos.
所以,与其让你不断向下滚动,查看去年或今年早些时候你孩子的所有照片,我们直接为你制作一些精美的数字相册。
So instead of scrolling down this feed of photos and videos to see all your kids' pictures from like last year or earlier in the year, we'll just make some nice digital albums for you.
我们称它们为‘回忆’。
We call them memories.
对吧?
Right?
你可以查看这些回忆,结果发现,这纯粹是个锦上添花的功能。
And so you can check out these memories and turns out, you know, total nice to have.
你并不非得购买这个功能,但很多人非常需要它,而且用起来感觉特别好。
You don't have to buy that, but a lot of people really want that and it's like a good feeling thing.
所以,这就是其中一个功能。
And so that was one feature.
另一个是老师发放的贴纸。
Another one was the stickers that teachers were giving.
你在家也可以发放这些贴纸。
You could give those at home as well.
有些家长希望有这个功能,这些都算是对产品核心互动循环的较小扩展,但它们是围绕我们多年来构建的核心互动循环设计的。
And some parents wanted that, you know, so like relatively small extensions to the core engagement loops in the product, but they were built around the core engagement loops that we'd been building for years.
于是我们开发了这个功能,它就这样逐渐发展起来了。
And so we built this and it just kind of started to grow.
但这如何
But how does that
能说明这是你花过的最值的100美元呢?
map to this is the best $100 you can spend?
还达不到。
It's not yet.
好的。
Okay.
但它正在朝那个方向发展。
But it's going that way.
对吧?
Right?
所以最初的想法是,让我们更好地让你与课堂保持联系。
And so it started with like, look, the value there was let's keep you better connected to the classroom.
它最初是从高级功能开始的。
It started with premium features.
一些高级功能。
Some premium features.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
当然。
For sure.
但这个想法是,你希望在客户生命周期内,不断为这个产品增加越来越多的价值。
But like the the the idea was that you kind of want to start to add more and more more and more value to this over the lifetime of a customer.
你希望这个产品变得如此有价值,让人不买它都显得很疯狂,但我们现在必须从某个地方开始。
You wanna have so much value in this that it's crazy for you not to buy this, but we have to start somewhere right now.
我们不能一开始就直接实现整个愿景。
We can't start with like deliver the whole vision.
所以我们推出了这个产品,然后它就开始不断增长,不断增长,
So we launched this and that just started to grow and grow and
不断增长,不断增长。
grow and grow.
你指的是在不久的将来就能带来数百万的收入吗?
And you're talking about like millions in revenue very shortly?
是的。
Yeah.
第一年。
Year one.
是的
Yeah.
一开始是单个数百万美元。
One was like single digit millions.
是的
Yeah.
是的
Yeah.
那是2020年。
That was 2020.
但那之后增长得非常快。
But that's that just scaled very quickly.
我们用户中,有越来越多的人表示:我确实想要这个。
Like a growing percentage of our base was like, actually I want this.
而且它
And it
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