亚历克斯·贝林和丹尼尔·施瓦茨——走进3G资本——[像最佳投资者一样投资，第458集]

比如，我们按北美团队、欧洲团队、亚太团队来划分，再按类别查看我们所有的支出情况。

So let's say by the North American group, the European group, the Asia Pacific group, and then we look at by category, all the way we're spending money.

我们称之为零基预算，基本上让每个人都能清楚地看到成本分布。

We call this zero based budgeting, and we basically give visibility on cost to everyone.

我们说，看看。

And we say, look.

如果某个团队在这个领域花了这么多钱，那为什么我们不能在整个组织内推行统一政策，既与内部其他部门对比，也与外部公司对标呢？

If this one group is spending this much on this area, well, why can't we apply policies throughout the organization to benchmark both with ourselves internally and other companies externally?

通过这种简单而有效的内外部对标，你会发现大量的节省空间，但只有获得高层的认同，那些视自己为企业主人、希望为公司最优运营而非个人利益做决策的人支持，你才能真正实现这些节省。

And you find enormous amounts of savings and just doing kinda simple internal and external benchmarking, but you only are able to capitalize and achieve those savings if you have buy in at the top of people who view this as owners of the business who want to run it optimally for the business and not necessarily for themselves.

集中管理的需求是什么？

What is centralized the what need?

本质上是为了给人们自由去探索解决方案，并将讨论聚焦在我们真正想达成的目标上——我认为，作为公司的领导层，你必须深度参与这一讨论。

It's basically to give people freedom to figure out things and focus the discussion in terms of what is it that we want to accomplish, which is where I think as a leadership of the company, that's an important discussion that you should be really a part of, that discussion.

一旦目标明确，就给予人们自由去决定如何执行，因为你真正希望将决策权下放到问题发生的最前线。

And then once that's settled, then give people freedom to figure out the how because you really want to push decision making close to the problems.

只要我们在更宏观的层面上对目标达成一致，具体如何执行、如何推进，团队就应该拥有很大的自主权。

And then as long as we are all aligned in terms of what is it that we are trying to achieve on a more broad perspective, the actual how you're going to do it and how you're going to go about it, the team should have a lot of autonomy on that.

丹所提到的那些真正优秀的人才，对一切至关重要。

Really good people that Dan is alluding to, it's absolutely key to everything.

他们喜欢自主探索的空间。

They like freedom to figure out.

他们喜欢解决问题。

They like to solve problems.

他们喜欢接受挑战，并且渴望拥有决策的自由。

They like to be challenged, and they like the freedom to make decisions.

因此，你不应该营造一种把犯错当作问题的文化。

So you shouldn't have a culture where making mistakes is a problem.

犯错、尝试解决难题，这本应是公司雄心勃勃议程中自然发生的一部分，关键是从中学习并继续前进。

Making mistakes, trying to figure out a problem that's part of the company's ambitious agenda should be something that happens where you learn something from it and you move forward.

我认为，这正是将‘做什么’的讨论集中化、而将‘怎么做’的执行去中心化的意义所在。

I think that's what this thing about centralizing the discussion of the what and then decentralizing the how comes in.

作为汉堡王的CEO，你经历过的最紧张的时期是什么时候？

What was the most stressful period for you as CEO of Burger King?

那一刻是什么样的？

What was that moment like?

我尽量不让工作上的压力影响自己。

I try not to get too stressed work wise.

我总是努力保持心态平稳。

I try to always keep things pretty even keeled.

我曾经有个篮球教练说过，压力就像是你给轮胎充的气。

I had this basketball coach who once said, pressure is something you put in a tire.

所以我总是把这句话记在心里。

So I always try to keep that in the back of my head.

我想说，有一次我确实挺紧张的，那是2014年。

I'd say there was one time that I I was pretty stressed was this was the 2014.

我们在2010年收购了汉堡王，投入了十亿多美元的股权。

We had bought Burger King in 2010, billion and change of equity.

在几年之内，这无疑是一个非常成功的结局。

Within a couple years, it was objectively a great outcome.

每个人都拿回了全部投资，甚至还赚了不少。

Everyone got all their money and then some back.

到2014年年中，我们已经是一家价值100亿美元的公司，并且持有该公司70%的股份，客观来说非常成功。

And by mid twenty fourteen, we were like a $10,000,000,000 company and we had owned 70% of the comp so objectively good.

我们所有人都非常兴奋地决定收购蒂姆霍顿斯，包括亚历克斯、我和我们的CFO乔什·科布扎。

And we all decided, Alex, myself, and Josh Kobza, who is our CFO, we all got really excited about buying Tim Hortons.

我们正在积极谈判收购蒂姆霍顿斯的交易。

And we were actively negotiating an acquisition, a merger of Tim Hortons.

亚历克斯定期与他们的首席执行官会面。

Alex was meeting with their CEO on a regular basis.

亚历克斯当时是我们的执行董事长，我是首席执行官，我们正处在这一场长期谈判交易的过程中。

Alex was our executive chairman and I was the CEO then and we're in the middle of doing this prolonged negotiated deal.

我们从彭博社的记者那里听说，他们即将发表一篇关于我们在汉堡王的报道，重点聚焦在管理团队的年龄上。

We get wind from the reporters at Bloomberg that they're gonna run an article on us at Burger King really centered around our ages, the ages of the management team.

我们正试图收购这个标志性的加拿大品牌资产——Tim Hortons。

We're trying to buy this iconic Canadian institution asset, Tim Hortons.

Tim Hortons一方可能对我们和Burger King的业务有些疑虑。

There were some probably reservations on the Tim Hortons side and around us and business and Burger King.

所以我们正处于谈判的最后阶段。

So we're in the final stages of negotiating this deal.

这篇文章发布了。

The article comes out.

标题是《Burger King由孩子们经营》。

The title is Burger King is run by children.

这并没有帮上忙。

That wasn't a help for it.

我正在印度与当地的特许经营合资伙伴一起巡访餐厅。

I'm touring restaurants in India with our local master franchise joint venture partners.

我们正在开车四处走访。

We're driving around.

我不知道你有没有在孟买待过很长时间。

I don't know if you've spent much time in Mumbai.

我们被困在寸步难行的车流中，这时文章发布了。

We're driving around stuck in bumper to bumper traffic, and the article comes out.

我正在读这篇文章。

I'm reading it.

我心里想，这简直是选在最糟糕时刻发布的最糟糕的文章。

I'm like, this is just the worst article that could have come out at the worst time.

与此同时，所有人都给我们发消息，说恭喜。

Meanwhile, everyone's writing us, oh, congrats.

恭喜。

Congrats.

多棒的投资啊。

What a great investment.

真酷。

Really cool.

我当时就想，我们该怎么摆脱这个困境？

And I was like, how are we gonna get ourselves out of this?

这简直是给董事会看的反面教材，让他们不想和我们合作。

This is exhibit a for the board to not wanna do a deal with us.

但是我们

And but we

在谈判过程中，亚历克斯和我一直在努力。

worked and Alex and Along the negotiation.

花了六个月时间？

It took six months?

是的。

Yeah.

那时候我压力很大。

I was pretty stressed then.

我们花了大量精力才让他们对我们产生兴趣，还不得不指出文章中的所有事实错误。

It took a lot of work to get them to be excited about us, and we had to point out all the factual inaccuracies in the article.

我稍后会再回到大家都很年轻这件事上，因为我觉得这非常有趣。

I'm gonna come back to the everyone being young thing just in a minute because I think it's so interesting.

但当我们第一次共进午餐时，你跟我讲了这个关于蒂姆·霍顿斯的有趣来回故事，以及你最初联系他们的经历。

But when we first had lunch, you told me this story like, funny back and forth with Tim Hortons and your initial outreach to them.

你也能讲讲这个故事吗？

Can you tell that story as well?

当然可以。

Sure.

我通过一个共同的朋友，得以在多伦多附近与首席执行官共进晚餐，并飞了过去。

I was able through a common friend to get a dinner with the CEO near Toronto, and I flew out there.

我们吃了一顿很棒的晚餐。

We had a great dinner.

非常投缘。

Really hit it off.

他愿意考虑接受一个将两家公司合并的提议，我们可能在一周或两周后就去见了沃伦。

And he was open to potentially receiving a proposition to put the companies together, which we, maybe a week later two weeks later, went to Warren.

当我们几乎立刻讨论时，沃伦表现得非常非常令人安心。

And Warren was super, super reassuring as we talked about in a nearly instance.

我的意思是，我记得和沃伦通话才十秒钟，他就高度赞扬了这家企业的质量。

I mean, I remember ten seconds into the call with Warren, he really, really praised the quality of the business.

丹和我总是回想起爸爸说过的话，感叹他有多正确，而我们当时甚至没有完全意识到这家企业最终有多优秀，但现在我们明白了。

And Dan and I always go back to dad and saying how right he was, and we didn't even fully appreciate how good a business it ultimately was, which we do now.

但不管怎样，事情进展得非常顺利。

But anyway, so that went really well.

所以我们已经安排好了融资。

So we had the financing lined up.

他愿意接受一个提议。

He was open to receiving a proposition.

我们起草了一份提案，并向他展示了它。

We put a proposal together and we presented it to him.

然后接下来的一周，我们陷入了沉默。

Then there was radio silence for a week.

我们认为一周的沉默是正常的。

We felt radio silence for a week is normal.

这么大的交易，他们正在认真考虑。

This big deal, they're deliberating about it.

但后来变成了两周、三周。

But then that became two weeks and three weeks.

第四周了。

The four weeks

那时我只买过一家公司。

I'd only bought one company at that point.

所以我对亚历克斯说：这正常吗？

So I'm like, Alex, is this normal?

我说，我觉得这确实正常。

And I like, I'm before saying that it kinda is.

但他却说，别担心。

But he's like, don't worry.

他说，他希望我专注于业务。

He's like, he wanted me to focus on the business.

他说，不行。

He's like, no.

别担心。

Don't worry.

这完全正常。

It's totally normal.

完全正常。

Totally normal.

完全正常。

Totally normal.

像八周左右，或者

Like eight weeks or

七周。

seven weeks.

所以六周左右的时候，我收到了一封回信，大致说：听着。

So six weeks into it or something, I get an email back basically saying, listen.

非常感谢你的提案。

Thank you so much for your proposal.

我们目前不打算继续推进。

We're not prepared to move forward.

祝你未来一切顺利。

And something like best of luck with your future endeavors.

那封信只有两行，可能还不到两行半。

And it really had two lines, maybe a two and a half line.

那一刻，我拿起电话，打给了那个我和他特别投缘的人。

At which point I picked up the phone and called this guy whom I had hit it off so well with.

我说：听着。

And I said, listen.

谢谢你的邮件。

Thank you for your email.

意思是，它。

Mean, of it.

你能再详细说一点吗？

Can you elaborate a little further?

他回答说，不行。

To which he answered, no.

我做不到。

I can't.

我的意思是，你还想让我怎么说？

Mean, I what else do you say?

你知道，我挂了电话又给他打回去。

You know, I hanged up and I called him.

我说，怎么样？

Say, how did it go?

我说，当然了。

I said, well, sure.

没那么好。

Not so well.

有点短。

Kinda short.

然后我们又做了一些工作，改进了我们的提案。

And then we did some more work and made improvements to our offer.

接着我们把修订后的提案发给了他，希望这样能更有吸引力。

And then we send it to him, revise that offer to them in the hopes that that would be enticing.

然后我们再次准备好等待一段很长的时间，却没想到几个小时后就收到了回复，两个小时，或者是的。

And then we were prepared again to sit and wait for an extended period of time only to be surprised and get a response back in hours, two, or Yeah.

在一天之内。

Within a within a day.

我觉得我得说，不到一天就回复了，感谢你的提案。

I think I wanna say less than a day saying thank you for your offer.

我们暂时不准备推进，再次祝你未来一切顺利。

We are not prepared to move forward, and we wish you again the best of luck with your future endeavors.

好消息是，我们两人都不害羞，而且都很执着。

The good news is neither of us are shy and both of us are persistent.

所以我们现在拼命寻找各种可能的方式，试图与对方建立对话，弄清楚我们是否需要做些什么才能开启对话。

So now we're really scrambling and trying to find every possible way of engaging in the dialogue and figuring out what is it that we had to do, if anything, to get a conversation going.

最终，我们找到了一些方法，得以与他和他的首席财务官会面，然后再次与我一起深入交流，获得了明确的洞察，知道了我们究竟需要做些什么。

And ultimately, we found ways by means of which we're able to meet with him and his chief financial officer, and was able to then drag down with me again and and engage into a conversation and gain some insight in terms of what is it exactly that we would need to do Exactly.

来促成这些公司的合并。

To get these companies together.

在那场对话进行一段时间后，我们提出了一个修订后的方案，他们觉得这个方案足够有吸引力。

And then after some time in that conversation, we're able to have a revised offer that they thought was then enticing enough.

随后，我们进入了常规的文件起草、法律和尽职调查阶段，却在某个周日下午接到《华尔街日报》的电话，他们说：听好了。

We then moved on to the usual drafting and legal and due diligence phase of it only to receive a call on a Sunday afternoon from The Wall Street Journal saying, listen.

我们知道你们即将宣布这笔交易。

We know you guys are about to announce the deal.

我们即将公开报道，你们只有三十分钟时间决定是否要发表声明。

We are going to go live with it, and you guys have thirty minutes to decide whether you wanna say something.

当时情况很微妙，因为蒂姆霍顿斯是一个规模巨大的品牌，我甚至不确定它在美国消费者中是否真的存在。

It was delicate at the time because Tim Hortons is a brand of a magnitude that I almost wanna say that I'm unsure whether exists in The US in terms of a consumer

在加拿大却是无处不在。

ubiquitous in Canada.

这个品牌在加拿大实在太庞大、太重要了，如果这个交易消息在错误的时间以错误的方式泄露，可能会毁掉我们这六个月来的所有努力。

It's just so so large, the brand in Canada, so important for the Canadians that this information about a deal coming out the wrong way at the wrong time could have killed it after all this six months.

那么你问，他什么时候感到紧张？

So you ask then when is it that he was nervous?

就是在这个时候，尽管我早已满头白发，却也感到紧张了。

This is when I, in spite of my den already abundant, man of gray hair, was nervous.

最终是怎么搞定的？

How did it ultimately get done?

他为什么在最初的两次回应中表现得如此迟疑又迅速？

And what was the reason that he was slow and quick in his initial two responses?

据我所知，我们并没有掌握所有细节，但他在董事会内部与前任担任主席的CEO之间存在一些真正的分歧，他们正在内部激烈讨论这笔交易。

So, apparently I mean, we were not privy to all the details, but the board dynamic there between him and the prior CEO that was chairing the board and whatnot, there was some genuine doubt about the deal, and they were discussing it intensively internally.

是的。

Yes.

想象一下，如果往前回溯几年，它曾是温蒂汉堡的子公司。

Think if you rewind a bunch of years earlier, it was a subsidiary of Wendy's.

而且

And

没错。

That's right.

这正是推动

That's what drove the

你知道吧，我们真的还想再和汉堡品牌牵扯上关系吗？

You know, like, do we really wanna be attached to Burger Brand again?

没错。

That's right.

但最终，我认为我们成功说服了他们，这对所有人都会是好事，这将是一个品牌组合，我们会把蒂姆霍顿斯国际业务独立出来，最重要的是，该品牌在加拿大仍将保持独立运营和自主管理。

But, ultimately, I think we were able to convince them that this was gonna be great for everybody, that this was gonna be a portfolio of brands, that we would take Tim Hortons International, and that most importantly, the brand would retain its independence and independent management and focus in Canada.

而且，对他们来说，促成这笔交易的不仅是财务方案，更重要的是我们向他们保证，加拿大的蒂姆·霍顿斯所有者——这个品牌的灵魂与核心——在我们的拥有下将会蓬勃发展。

And also, think that what sealed the deal for them, of course, the financial proposal, but it was also the reassurance on our part that our owners in Canada, Tim Hortons owners, which were the heart and the core of the brand, would really thrive under our ownership.

这对他们来说至关重要。

That was key for them.

他们非常在意这一点。

They really cared about that.

加拿大有成千上万的所有者。

There were thousands of owners in Canada.

正是他们成就了这个品牌。

They made the brand into what it is.

你是说特许经营者吗？

So the franchisees, you mean?

特许经营者。

The franchisees.

而在蒂姆霍顿斯的情况下，我们称他们为所有者。

Which which in the case of Tim's, call them owners.

我认为这对他们来说至关重要。

I think that was key for them.

一旦我们披露了我们的计划以及我们认为这些计划会成功的理由等等，这也极大地缓解了他们的顾虑，因为这有助于消除他们对过去发生的事情的疑虑。

Once we disclosed what our plans were and why we thought that they would work out and so on and so forth, that went a long way with them as well because that helps this mystify these concerns about what happened in the past.

这种情况不会重演。

This wouldn't repeat itself.

你提到了关于这一点你和沃伦的通话。

You mentioned the call with Warren on this one in particular.

这些年来，这些通话是什么样的？

Over the years, what have those calls been like?

从你与他在高层级上就潜在资产、潜在投资的互动中，我们所有人都能学到什么？

What could we all learn from the sorts of interactions you have with him at the really high level about a potential asset, a potential investment?

我们只是通过与他共处大量时间就学到了很多。

We learned a lot just by virtue of spending so much time with him.

我认为沃伦有一种非凡的能力，能迅速判断一家企业是否优秀，并对此有极其清晰的认识。

And I think Warren had this uncanny ability to quickly identify whether a business is good or not and really, really have clarity around that.

他拥有那种近乎百科全书式的商业知识，当然，我们公司在这一点上还远远达不到，但我们确实努力在我们长期关注的公司和建立的关系中，模仿他的一些做法。

A little bit this encyclopedic knowledge of business that he has is something that, of course, we're nowhere near having here at the firm, but we do try to emulate some of that around the table of companies that we follow over a long period of time and the relationships that we build.

这是我们从他身上学到的另一件事。

That's the other thing that we learned from him.

他非常重视这些关系。

He really sort of values these relationships.

他常常在没有任何业务可谈的时候就开始建立关系，始终保持着尊重、谨慎和极佳的态度。

He builds them oftenly when there's no business to talk about and he's always respectful and mindful and great around that.

我认为，从与他的所有互动中，我 personally 深刻铭记了这两点。

And I think those are the two things I took personally to heart from all these interactions with him.

你还有什么要补充的吗？

Anything you'd add?

沃伦从不妥协于业务质量，并始终坚持纪律。

Warren never compromises on business quality and takes discipline.

我认为我们在这里的做法，也自认为在这一点上效仿了他：我们绝不会在业务质量上妥协，宁愿什么都不做，也不收购一家我们认为不够出色的公司。

And I think what we do here, and we like to think that we emulate him in that capacity, that we will never compromise on business quality, rather do nothing than buy a business we don't think is great.

我想再回到这个年轻人才的话题上。

I wanna come back to this young talent thing.

我有个三G的故事，我觉得还没告诉过你们俩：在我以前做投资的时候，我经营一家量化投资公司，我们经常向养老基金做推介，我确实向卡夫亨氏的养老基金做过推介，后来我们最终管理了他们一大笔资金。

I have a three g story that I don't think I've told either of you, which is in my prior investing business, when I was running a quantitative investing firm, we'd be pitching pension funds all the time, and I actually pitched the Kraft Heinz, then we ended up managing money for the pension, you know, a big slug of money.

我记得去参加最终的答辩会，那是一场我们和其他公司的正式比拼，当时我就想，哇，这些人跟我年纪差不多。

And I remember going to the finals meeting, that's like this formal bake off between us and others, and thinking at the time, wow, these guys are like my age.

我当时二十多岁快三十岁，而他们也都是二十多岁。

I was late 20s or something like this, and they were all late 20s.

我就想，你们这些人到底是谁啊？

And I like, well, who are you guys?

结果发现，他们是首席财务官、财务主管之类的。

And it was like the CFO, the treasurer, and whatever.

你知道的？

You know?

这地方竟然是由一群孩子在管理

It's run by children to

把问题抛回给你。

throw it back at you.

但把问题抛回给你，你在二十多岁时就有资格管理资金，那他们为什么不能有资格经营企业呢？

But to throw it back at you, you were qualified in your late twenties to manage the money, so why wouldn't they be qualified to run the business?

但我真想听听你是如何开始培养这些极具才华的年轻人才，让他们不仅获得重要职位，还掌握控制权和所有权的。

But I wanna hear about the roots of how you built this empowering very talented younger people into positions of not just importance, but control and ownership and all these things.

这个理念的传承到底是什么？

Like, what is the legacy of this feature?

这首先基于一个愿望：成为顶尖人才的理想去处。

It's predicated first and foremostly on this desire to be a great place for the best talent.

我们认为，这类人群被吸引的一个原因是，他们知道在这里，很可能会有人早早地对他们下注，比其他任何地方都更早。

And one of the things that we think is appealing to this sort of cohort of people is that go to a place where they know that there's a decent chance that someone's gonna make a bet on them early, earlier than probably anywhere else.

当然，仅仅比其他地方更早下注是不够的，如果他们没有真正成功的可能性。

Then, of course, just making a bet on them earlier than anywhere else is not good enough if they don't have a real chance of succeeding.

而真正成功的可能性，来自于在下注时为他们提供良好的支持环境。

And the real chance of succeeding comes from surrounding them well when you make these bets.

比如，正如丹所说，当他经营汉堡王的时候，我担任他的执行主席。

For instance, as Dan said, when he was running Burger King, I was there as executive chair for him.

我之前就做过类似的事。

I had done it before.

我尽我所能，在各个方面帮助他。

I was trying to help him everywhere, each and every way I could.

此外，我们在汉堡王团队中引入了一些曾在啤酒厂、铁路及其他地方参与过类似流程或工作的人，他们拥有丰富的运营经验，正是我们希望在汉堡王推行的那些做法。

And also, we brought people on the team at Burger King that have been involved in prior instances at the brewery and the railroad and other places and senior operating functions on sort of the same processes or things that we wanted to implement there.

因此，这些因素的结合为你成功奠定了基础。

So that sort of that combination of things set you up for success.

光有成功的前景是不够的，你必须做好准备，但并非所有这些尝试都会成功。

Nothing more than teaser success and you have to be prepared, but some of these things will not succeed.

有些高风险的提拔可能会失败，但你必须最大限度地提高它们成功的可能性。

Some of these risky promotions won't succeed, but you have to maximize the chances that they work.

我的联合创始人就是那位在铁路公司帮助我的董事会成员。

So my cofounder is one of the board at the railroad that was helping me.

其中一位在董事会，那段时间教会了我很多。

One of them was at the board, and and taught me a lot in that period of time.

我的另一位联合创始人马塞尔，给我介绍了啤酒厂里许多训练有素、能帮助我的人。

And my other cofounder, Marcel, gave me all these people from the brewery that were well trained that could help me.

因此，这是吸引最优秀人才的关键所在——你要让他们相信，自己能在这个早期阶段大有作为，能最大程度地提升他们成功的几率。

So that's a key element into attracting some of the very best people, that you're gonna make this early best, that you're gonna maximize the chances that they will succeed.

从那里，其中一些人最终可能再次成为投资者。

And from there, some of them will have to actually chart at becoming investors again.

但也有一些不会。

Some won't.

有些人更愿意留在公司里。

Some will prefer to be at a company.

但这就是我们的行事方式的关键所在，如果你愿意这么称呼的话。

So but that's a key element of our modus operandi, if you will.

我们很幸运，因为我认为我们两人在职业成长过程中都身处极度纯粹的 meritocracy（能者上位）环境，那里真正重视才能而非资历。

We're lucky because I think we both grew up work wise in these extremely pure meritocracies that genuinely valued talent over tenure.

我认为亚历克斯在领导铁路收购时受益于这一点，联合创始人给了他一个机会，让他在30岁时成为拉丁美洲最大铁路公司的CEO。

And I think Alex benefited from that when he led the acquisition of the railroad and the co founders gave him a shot to be the CEO of the largest railroad company in all of Latin America at age 30.

这对他来说再正常不过了。

So that was normal to him.

在一起工作了五年多，或者六年之后，他了解我。

And after working together for, I guess, what, five plus years, we or six years, he knew me.

他信任我，知道我会倾尽全力，绝不会让汉堡王失败，这正是他愿意同样给我机会担任CFO和CEO的原因——因为曾经有人给了他机会。

He trusted me, and he knew I'd give everything that I had, and I wouldn't let Burger King fail, which is why he was comfortable similarly giving me a shot as CFO and CEO because someone gave him a shot.

在我担任这一职务期间，我投入了不成比例的大量时间专注于招聘，寻找我认为最顶尖的人才。

And when I was in that role, I spent a disproportionate amount of my time focused on recruiting and recruiting who I believed would be the best, best, best people.

不是那些愿意去南佛罗里达一家汉堡连锁店工作的人，而是真正最优秀的人才。

Not the best people who'd be willing to go to work in a burger chain in South Florida, but just the best people, period.

无论是麦肯锡、黑石、高盛，还是其他公司的明日之星，我都想要最顶尖的人才。

And whether it's, like, the rising star at at McKinsey or at Blackstone or Goldman Sachs or at another company, I'd want the best, best, best people.

我也愿意比其他公司更早地给予他们机会，赋予他们更多责任和更多股权。

And I similarly was willing to give them shots way earlier than they get elsewhere, both more responsibility and more economics.

其中一个早期的例子就是乔什·科布扎。

And one of the early examples of that was Josh Kobza.

乔什在25岁时，当亚历克斯在32岁提拔我当CEO时，我认为乔什在26岁就当上了CFO。

Josh when he was 25, and when Alex promoted me to be CEO at 32, I think Josh became CFO at 26.

随着时间推移，像萨米这样的人，是的。

Over time, people like Sammy Yes.

萨米是第二年，还有蒂亚戈和大卫。

Sammy who was the next year and Thiago and David.

这些家伙。

All these guys.

这些家伙。

All these guys.

我记得当时我被提拔为CEO时，亚历克斯问我，乔什是不是太年轻了。

And I remember at the time when I was getting promoted CEO, Alex asked me, Josh was kinda young.

这样可以吗？

Is it okay?

我觉得他比我那个年纪时好得多，也成熟得多，所以你们给了我机会。

I'm like, he's much better and more mature than I was at that age, and so you guys gave me a shot.

我也想给他一个机会。

I'd like to give him a shot.

所以当你在这种环境中成长时，你会更愿意信任那些经验稍少但你真心认可的人。

So when you grow up in this environment, you get more comfortable making a bet on someone who has a little less experience, but who you genuinely believe in.

我们并不是凭直觉瞎猜。

And we're not just shooting from the hip.

亚历克斯，我在成为CFO之前为你工作了六年。

Alex, I worked for you for six years before you let me go be CFO.

而且，你通过导师和团队成员帮助他们，传授他们还不懂的东西，从而为他们的成功创造条件。

And, again, you set people up for success through people to mentor them and people on the team to help them, the stuff that they don't yet know.

所以你也必须为他们的成功做好安排。

So you have to set it up for success as well.

我在想你的导师和联合创始人。

I'm thinking about your mentors and your cofounders.

我很想知道，如果你分别从贝托、马塞尔和豪尔赫身上学习，他们每个人教会你的最突出的教训是什么？

I'd be curious if you go one each from Beto, Marcel, and Jorge, what lesson stands out that each of them taught you?

豪尔赫有一种非凡的能力，能够看得非常长远。

So Jorge has this incredible ability to see very far.

他真正理解一家企业的潜力、一个人的潜力，而他的远见，我认为是独一无二的。

So he really understands the potential of a business, the potential of a person, And his vision, I think, is unique.

他在这方面是独一无二的。

He's unique that way.

他思维清晰，能够为任何情况规划出一条出路。

He thinks very clearly and is able to chart a path out of any situation.

贝托有一种非凡的能力，能够与人建立联系、领导他人，并让企业最基层的员工都感到兴奋和热情，而且他完全无所畏惧。

Bateau has this incredible ability to relates to people and lead people and get people even at the shop floor, quote, unquote, of a business excited and enthusiastic and is someone that's completely fearless.

在三人中，马塞尔可能是最擅长打磨我们在酿酒厂最喜爱的这种商业模式的人，当时他负责运营。

And Marcel is probably of the three of them, the one that really honed this business model that we all like the most at the brewery when he ran it.

他通过一套非常清晰的流程，在多年间培养出了大量优秀人才。

And he was able to basically create so many good people over the years in a very clear process.

当然，我们所做的和其他公司所做的都有各自不同的特色，这些特色都是由此演化而来的。

Of course, what we do and what other companies do have their own different flavors that evolved from it.

但他是最积极参与创建这一运营模式的人。

But he was the most involved in creating that operating model.

如果你把我说的这三件事结合起来，它们都非常互补。

They're all very complimentary if you put the three things I said together.

是的。

Yeah.

当然。

Sure.

非常互补。

Super complimentary.

我有幸和亚历克斯在一起，所以我得到了这三方面的全部影响。

I had the benefit that I was with Alex, so I got all three.

而且我还想说，亚历克斯带给我的其中一件事是，当你让公司拥有强烈紧迫感的时候。

And then some I'd say one of the things that Alex brought to me in this was when you get to the company having this massive sense of urgency.

因为公司往往行动缓慢，不像投资领域那样快速运转。

Because companies have a tendency of moving slowly and don't operate maybe as quickly as things operate in the investment side.

但如果你要做某件事，就在这季度完成吧。

But if you're gonna do something, just do it this quarter.

或者你这季度做，那就这个月做。

Or you do it this quarter, do it this month.

如果这个月做，那为什么不能现在就做呢？

If do it this month, why can't you do it now?

这种紧迫感，快速把事情搞定真的非常重要，因为我认为公司10%是战略，95%是执行。

And that sense of urgency, getting stuff done fast really, really matters because companies, I think, are 10% strategy and 95% execution.

而执行就是快速把事情完成。

And execution is getting stuff done quickly right.

你如何在战术层面注入这种紧迫感？

How do you inject that very tactically?

你如何持续地在公司中注入紧迫感？

How do you constantly inject a sense of urgency into a company?

我认为这归结为两点。

I think it comes down to two things.

第一，招聘那些希望昨天就把一切做完的人。

One, hiring the right people who want to get everything done yesterday.

那些本来就具有这种特质的人。

People that are wired that way already.

你需要约束那些人，而不是推着他们前进；作为领导者，你必须不断保持这种快速推进的期望，绝不能表现出任何自满，始终追求非常非常迅速地完成任务。

People who you have to hold back and not push forward, you yourself as the leader constantly keeping this expectation of wanting to move quickly, never showing any level of complacency whatsoever, wanting to get stuff done very, very quickly.

我猜你，帕特里克，在你投资的科技初创公司中也能看到这一点。

My guess is you see that you, Patrick, see that in the tech startups that you invest in.

它们正在开发新产品，颠覆新领域，每一分钟、每一小时、每一天都至关重要，必须快速行动，才能获得下一轮融资或赢得下一个客户。

They're building new products that are disrupting new categories that every minute, hour, day count, and they need to move quickly to either get to the next round or get to the next customer.

你试图将科技初创公司那种资金有限所带来的紧迫感，带入到一个现金流充沛的成熟企业中。

And you try to bring that same sense of urgency that exists if you're a tech startup with finite amount of cash to a mature business that's highly cash flow generative.

如果我要

If I were to

问问所有直接向你汇报的人，你是怎么做到的，会不会归结为清晰的战略沟通和持续的跟进？

ask everyone that worked directly for you how you did this, would it round to clear strategic communication and constant check-in?

这是这种方法的运营系统吗？

Is that the operating system of this method?

再加上极度的透明度，这也是我从亚历克斯和那些为公司设定宏大、雄心勃勃目标的人身上学到的，你会不断让所有人了解你作为高层领导以及公司整体的进展状况。

Coupled with extreme levels of transparency, which I also learned from Alex and the guys who set these big, hairy, ambitious goals for the company, and you're constantly letting everyone know how you as senior leaders and the company as a whole is tracking.

因为如果你不让人看到这些信息，他们可能就不明白你为什么要求他们这样做，并以如此紧迫感行动。

Because if you're not giving people visibility into this, they might not understand why you're asking for it and acting with such a sense of urgency.

这对这一点至关重要的另一点是确保每个人的激励机制都对齐，这一点非常重要。

The other piece that's crucial to this is making sure everyone's incentives are aligned, and that matters a lot.

所以作为公司领导者，从下一级、再下一级、再到更下一级，每个人都持有股票或股票期权，明白我们在这里创造价值的方式，这种价值创造会自上而下在整个组织中传递，并让每个人的激励、目标和体系保持一致。

So as leaders in the company, one level down and two levels down and three levels down, everybody having stock or stock options, knowing that the way that we're gonna create value here, the value creation will cascade itself down throughout the organization and having everyone's incentives and goals and systems aligned.

人们在激励这一部分上常犯什么错误？

What do people screw up about that incentive piece?

如果你自己做错了，或者看到别人做错了，没能释放出这种力量，会是什么情况？

What if either you yourself done wrong or seen others do wrong that don't unleash that power?

这更多是基于过程而非基于成就。

Comes a lot more can you based than achievement based.

当你出现这些问题时，就会出状况。

That's when you have issues.

这并不简单，但你需要拥有非常优秀的人才，一些是外部招聘的，一些是内部成长起来的。

It's not simple, but you wanna have very talented people, somebody you hired from the outside, a lot that grew in the system.

首先，他们需要清楚地知道你想要实现什么目标。

They need to have clarity, first of all, in terms of what is it you're trying to achieve.

然后，他们需要有行动的自由，去在各自的团队中实现这一目标，应该拥有独立决定如何做的权力，同时每个人的利益都与股东的整体命运紧密相连。

And then they need to have freedom to act to achieve that on their respective teams should have that independence to basically decide the how, and then everybody's tied into the fortunes of the shareholders altogether.

我认为这就是这个体系的精髓。

I think that's the system in a nutshell.

如果你具备了所有这些要素，通常就能取得良好的成果。

And if you have all those components in place, you tend to do well.

但当然，帕特里克，随着公司规模扩大，实施这一体系的难度也会增加。

But of course, I mean, Patrick, this is the degree of difficulty of doing this increases with company size.

像我们这里这样一家20人的投资公司，这样做要容易得多，但在一家50亿美元的公司里，就稍微难一些。

Like to do this in an investment firm with 20 people that we have here, much easier Then in a $5,000,000,000 company, a little harder.

100亿美元、300亿美元、500亿美元，事情只会越来越难。

$10,000,000,000, 30,000,000,000, 50,000,000,000, it just gets harder.

我认为，当像亚历克斯所说，把股票奖励发给每个人并变成一种预期时，事情就会出问题。

I think it goes awry when, to Alex's point, you're going out stock awards to everybody and becomes an expectation.

当你试图追求公平时，事情也会出问题。

It also goes awry when you try to be fair.

‘公平’这个概念其实非常棘手，因为如果你想要实行精英管理，从定义上讲，很多人会觉得你不够公平。

And this concept of fair is really tricky because if you wanna operate as a meritocracy, definitionally, a lot of people aren't gonna think you're being fair.

他们会觉得自己被低估了，而别人却拿得太多。

Is they're gonna think that they're being underpaid and other people are getting overpaid.

我从3G的同事们那里学到了这一点，当时我觉得自己很公平。

And I learned this from the folks here at 3G that I felt I was being fair.

我认为我为员工做了正确的事，但我并没有平均分配股票。

I think I was doing what was right by the people, but I did not allocate stock equally to people.

我根据我们对每个人当前和潜在未来贡献的判断，给了某些人是其他人数倍的报酬。

I gave certain people multiples of what other people got based on our thoughts of people's existing and potential future contribution.

但并不是每个人都这么做。

And not everyone does that.

即使是CEO们，也常常面临压力，要给每个人分配同等的数额，这会变得政治化。

Even the CEOs, there's a lot of pressure to at a given equal amount, get political.

有时确实会变得政治化。

Political at times.

我始终努力向这些人学习，绝不搞政治。

I always tried and learned from these guys just never be political.

如果你真心认为某些人能做出更大贡献，就给他们更大比例的股权激励。

If you genuinely think certain people can contribute more, give them outsized grants or outsized, you know, equity awards.

我们在薪酬领域学到的一件事虽然艰难但属实：无论你最终如何决定薪酬，都不可能让每个人都满意。

One of the things we learned from this compensation arena that's tough, but it's true, is whatever it is that you ultimately do on compensation, you're not gonna make everyone happy.

所以你不应该试图这么做，因为这几乎是不可能的。

So you shouldn't try to do that because it's quasi impossible.

你应该尽力根据功绩主义的原则做出公平的决定，并尽可能清楚地解释它。

You should try to do what you think is fair from a meritocratic standpoint and explain it as well as you can.

我认为这是很多管理者常犯的错误。

I think it's a common mistake a lot

CEO们常常会犯这样的错误。

of CEOs make.

我认为正因为我们没有这样做，才让我们能够吸引到最优秀的人才，尤其是在早期阶段，这让我能够突破常规的薪酬曲线和既定体系，为真正出色的人才破例支付更高的报酬。

And I think because we don't do that, I think that allows us to get some of the best people, especially in the early days that allowed me to attract some of the best best people because I was willing to pay people outside of the normal whatever preset pay curve and preset systems that we had if I was a superstar and make an exception.

作为CEO，我保留了这样做的权利。

I reserve that right as CEO to do that.

你能谈谈人才金字塔顶端的那些做法吗？你过去和现在最有效的方法是什么，尤其是在他们还很年轻的时候发现人才？

Can you talk about the very top of that talent funnel and the things that you have done and still do that are the most effective at finding people when they're very young?

我想了解得很具体，当你第一次见到他们时，你会问哪些问题？

I'm interested down to the granular level of what questions are you asking them when you first meet them.

那个针对20位顶尖人才的最顶层渠道，具体是什么样子的？

What is that very top of funnel for the 20 talent look like?

我比你早一步。

I'm a step before you.

问题是，你怎么认识他们？

The question is how do you meet them?

一般来说，这是靠口碑，以及愿意尽可能多地打开大门。

And it's generally speaking word-of-mouth and being willing to open as many doors as you can.

当我经过一家投资公司时，有人在香港随口跟我提到了一位刚离开的超级明星分析师。

Someone made an offhand comment to me when I was in Hong Kong passing through an investment firm about this superstar analyst who had just left.

他的名字叫乔什·科布扎。

His name is Josh Kobza.

我记下了这个名字，然后直接给乔什打了电话。

Took note and then cold called Josh.

乔什说：‘我会把我的号码给你。’

And Josh is like, I'd get my number.

别担心这个，乔什。

Don't worry about that, Josh.

没关系。

It's fine.

Anyway，把他带到了迈阿密。

Anyway, brought him to Miami.

我们当场就雇用了他，我以前也说过这一点。

We hired him on the spot, and I would and I've said this in the past.

我们会去沃顿和哈佛商学院拿简历册，给那些简历出众的人发冷邮件，如果他们看起来非常热情，并且在寻找的是一项事业而非单纯的工作，我就会当场提供职位，这在当时是闻所未闻的。

We'd go to Wharton and HBS and get the resume book, cold email people who had impressive resumes, and if they seemed like they were really passionate and they were looking for like a project and not just a job, I'd offer people jobs on the spot, which again was unheard of.

我相信在你的领域里也有一些类似的例子。

And I'm sure you have some examples in your world

我有两个看法：当你看这些简历、和人交谈时，你试图找出那些在年轻群体中取得显著成就的人，因为这表明他们勤奋且有积极的抱负。

like The two comments I would make are when you look at those resumes and when you talk to people, you're trying to identify the people that achieved a lot for their age on the young cohort because that's indicative of them being hardworking and ambitious in a positive way.

我发现这在很大程度上预示着他们极有可能取得成功，因为我在我们公司长期招聘的分析师和年轻人群体中观察过。

I find that speaks volumes in terms of them having a chance of really succeeding because I look here at the firm at cohorts of analysts and young people that we recruited over a long time.

然后我会思考，回过头来看，那些表现更出色的人究竟有什么特质让他们脱颖而出。

And then I try to think what is it that makes in hindsight some of the better ones, what made them stand out from the rest.

他们真的、真的、真的、真的、真的非常渴望这个机会。

I think they really, really, really, really, really wanted it.

你的财务团队并不是因为重大错误而亏钱。

Your finance team isn't losing money on big mistakes.

而是通过无数个无人关注的小决策慢慢流失。

It's leaking through a thousand tiny decisions nobody's watching.

Ramp 在支出发生前就设置了管控措施。

Ramp puts guardrails on spending before it happens.

实时限额、自动规则、无需应急处理。

Real time limits, automatic rules, zero firefighting.

立即前往 ramp.com/invest 试用。

Try it at ramp.com/invest.

随着你的业务增长，Vanta 也会随之扩展，自动化合规流程，为你提供安全与风险的单一信息源。

As your business grows, Vanta scales with you, automating compliance and giving you a single source of truth for security and risk.

了解更多，请访问 vanta.com/invest。

Learn more at vanta.com/invest.

每家投资公司都是独特的，通用的人工智能无法理解你的流程。

Every investment firm is unique and generic AI doesn't understand your process.

Rogo 可以。

Rogo does.

它是一个专为华尔街打造的人工智能平台，连接你的数据，理解你的流程，并生成实际成果。

It's an AI platform built specifically for Wall Street, connected to your data, understanding your process, and producing real outputs.

了解更多请访问 rogo.ai/invest。

Check them out at rogo.ai/invest.

从 OpenAI 到 Cursor 再到 Perplexity，最优秀的人工智能和软件公司都使用 WorkOS 在一夜之间实现企业级准备，而不是耗时数月。

The best AI and software companies, from OpenAI to Cursor to Perplexity, use WorkOS to become enterprise ready overnight, not in months.

访问 workos.com，跳过枯燥的基础设施工作，专注于你的产品。

Visit workos.com to skip the unglamorous infrastructure work and focus on your product.

Ridgeline 正在重新定义资产管理技术，成为真正的合作伙伴，而不仅仅是软件供应商。

Ridgeline is redefining asset management technology as a true partner, not just a software vendor.

他们已帮助多家公司实现五倍规模增长，推动更快的发展、更智能的运营和更强的竞争优势。访问 ridgelineapps.com，了解他们能为你的公司带来什么。

They've helped firms 5x in scale, enabling faster growth, smarter operations, and a competitive Visit ridgelineapps.com to see what they can unlock for your firm.

我听到过一个评论，我不确定为什么突然想起这个，也许这里有点关联，就是当初你收购汉堡王时，它的品牌影响力远大于其业务本身。

One of the comments I heard, I don't know why I was reminded of this, maybe there's somewhat relation here, which is the concept that when you bought BK originally, that the brand was way bigger than the business.

我觉得这种说法很有意思。

And I just thought that was like an interesting framing.

我想请你再多谈谈这个观点或概念，是否你如今也会留意那些品牌影响力超过实际业务的情况？

And I'm curious for you to say a little bit more about that insight or that concept and whether or not that's become something that you keep your eye out for where a brand is bigger than a business.

听我说，我是在巴西长大的，你知道的。

Listen, I grew up in Brazil, as you know.

我从七岁起就经常来美国。

I used to come to The US since I was seven years old.

我特别痴迷于汉堡王和皇堡，每次我提到这一点，人们都觉得我在撒谎，只因为我们的投资太成功了。

And I was just crazy for Burger King and for Whoppers, which every time I mentioned that, people thought I was being untruthful about it just because our investment was so successful.

我找到了一封我刚刚给你看的信作为证据，信中我写于1975年，那时我才七岁。

And I found proof on this letter that I just gave you that shows I wrote this in 1975, meaning I was seven years old.

你可以看到我的笔迹。

You can see my handwriting.

字迹真漂亮。

Some nice handwriting.

字迹很好。

Nice handwriting.

是的。

Yeah.

我给爸爸写信，说我在一个叫汉堡王的地方吃饭，每天都会吃皇堡。

Writing to my dad saying I ate in this place called Burger King and that ate Whoppers every single day.

后来我上大学期间做兼职，当巴西游客参观美国迪士尼世界的导游，人们都非常喜欢汉堡王。

And then I worked growing up during college as a tour guide for Brazilians that came to Disney World in The US, and people just loved Burger King.

在巴西，这是一个家喻户晓的品牌。

It was a well known brand in Brazil.

你跟任何人聊天，他们的表亲都知道汉堡王是什么。

Everyone you talked to and their cousin knew what Burger King was.

但当时巴西根本没有汉堡王门店。

There were no Burger Kings in Brazil.

然后，当我们收购这家公司时，大约只剩下十几家了。

And then eventually, by the time we bought the company, there were like maybe a dozen.

这说明了汉堡王这个品牌不仅在美国，而且在全球范围内的知名度都远超其实际业务规模，这是一个独特的机遇。

So this is illustrative of the fact that Burger King, not only in The United States, but globally, brand was much bigger than the business, which was a unique opportunity.

因为要培育这样一个品牌是非常困难的。

Because to grow a brand like that is very hard.

需要大量的时间和资金。

A lot of time and dollars.

对于汉堡王来说，是的，我们还可以进一步扩大品牌影响力，但关键在于

In case of Burger King, yes, we can grow the brand further, but it was about

卖汉堡比打造品牌更容易。

Easier to grow burgers than brand.

开新店很容易，是的。

Easy to open stores Yeah.

一个每个人都已经想要的品牌。

Of a brand that everybody already wants.

当我们通过筛选发现这家公司并进行了一些计算后，我们得出结论：收购汉堡王需要大约十亿美元的股权资本。

When we found the company on one of our screening exercises and we ran some math, we concluded it would take a billion and change dollars of equity capital to buy Burger King.

当时，麦当劳的市值大约是80900亿美元。

At the time, McDonald's was, I don't know, say like an $8,090,000,000,000 dollar company.

百胜的市值是300亿美元，而汉堡王则让人感觉存在明显的不匹配。

Yum was a $30,000,000,000 company and Burger King just felt like there was this mismatch.

当然，我们做了大量工作来论证和支持这一观点：品牌价值大于实际业务。

Obviously, we did a lot of work to justify and support this thesis that the brand was bigger than the business.

但即使只是初步一看，我们就都觉得这不合常理。

But even just the very first glance, we both said, it doesn't make sense.

不对。

Wrong.

因为一定有什么地方不对劲。

Because something's wrong.

当然，亚历克斯会问：‘你确定股本数量没错吗？’

Of course, Alex is like, you sure the share count's right?

你知道的。

You know?

漏掉了一些股份之类的。

Missed some shares or something.

看起来不太对劲，但他确认了我们的股数是正确的，但还是觉得不对，于是我们问了身边的一些人。

And it didn't look right, but he made sure we got the share count right, and It didn't meet the smell test, and we asked some people around us.

我以前问过我当时的未婚夫，他是个医生，还有我妈妈是律师，他们都很聪明，但不懂金融，麦当劳值900亿美元。

And I said in the past, I asked my then fiance, who's like a doctor, and my mom was a lawyer who are objectively smart, but not in finance, and McDonald's is $90,000,000,000.

你觉得汉堡王值多少钱？

What do you think Burger King's worth?

没人说是一十亿。

No one said a billion.

有一个人说了一十亿。

One said a billion.

他们说：不会是200亿、300亿吧？

They're like, I don't 20,000,000,000, 30,000,000,000?

因此，它通过了嗅觉测试，我们做了大量工作来支持我们的观点，即我们能够从EBITDA和现金流的角度显著提高业务的盈利能力。

And so it met that smell test and we did a lot of work to support the view that we would be able to run the business much much more profitably from EBITDA standpoint, from a cash flow standpoint.

如果我们把几件事做对了，我们还能让它增长得更快。

And if we got a few things right, we can grow it much faster too.

哪里出了问题？

What was wrong?

显然，一定有什么原因导致只用十亿美元的股权资本就能买下这家公司。

So obviously, something had to contribute to the fact that it only took a billion dollars of equity capital to buy the thing.

问题出在哪里？

What was the issue?

那么，在你收购之后，你最早采取了哪些措施？

And then what are the early levers that you used once you owned?

嗯，有两三个原因。

Well, there are two or three things.

对吧？

Right?

其中之一是我们没有专注于成为优秀的特许经营商。

One of them was we were not focused on being a great franchisor.

我们在太多国家、太多地方运营了太多餐厅。

We're operating too many restaurants in too many places, in too many countries.

这并不是一个很好的专注点。

And that was not a great source of focus.

它模糊了组织结构。

And it muddled the organizational structure.

它让我们想做什么变得不清晰。

It muddled the clarity of what we were trying to do.

我们后来解决了这个问题，但当时在全球拥有近2000家餐厅。

That's something that we fixed, but it had almost 2,000 restaurants around

是的。

Yeah.

市场进入方式各不相同，有的是总特许经营，有的是多店特许，有的是直营。

Different the go to market, some master franchise, some multi franchise, some company.

此外，我们在潜力最大的地区——巴西、中国和法国，并没有找到合适的合作伙伴。

And then separately, we didn't have the partners, the right partners in the different parts of the world where the potential was the greatest, namely Brazil, China, France.

法国对我们来说是一个巨大的机会。

France was a huge opportunity for us.

那里是零，对吧？

There's zero, right?

现在它已成为我们全球第二大销售额达20亿欧元的市场，诸如此类，豪尔赫。

And now it's the second €2,000,000,000 in sales, largest market in the world for us, and so on and so, Jorge.

我们现在在全球各地都有了合适的合作伙伴来推动业务增长。

We have the right partners around the world to grow the business.

而在国内，公司与特许经营者之间存在的问题。

And domestically, the issues that the company was having with its franchisees.

快餐特许经营是个很棒的生意，但你绝不能忘记，它确实是个好生意。

It's a great business, quick service restaurant franchising, but you need to never lose sight of the fact that it's a good business.

如果你和你的特许经营者都能长期赚钱。

If you make money long term and your franchisees make money long term.

当年在美国，有一些促销活动，比如一美元双层芝士汉堡，销量因此增长，但特许经营者却因此不满并亏钱，甚至起诉了公司。

And there were some things going on in The US back in the day where there were promotions, where sales grew because of a dollar double cheeseburger, but the franchisees were unhappy and losing money on that, and they were suing the company.

当时围绕这个问题存在真正的紧张关系，我们必须加以解决。

There was real issues around tension around this that we had to fix.

我认为，早期最重要的三个杠杆就是这些。

I mean, those are the three, I think, main levers I think early on.

从外部来看，我们认为公司可以运行得更加高效。

From an outside in, we felt that the company could be run a lot more efficiently.

我认为EBITDA有4亿美元的提升空间。

I think there was a 400 in change of EBITDA.

确实存在。

There was

一旦我们开始行动，4亿美元的差距就变得更加明显。

400 became even more apparent once we

一旦我们简化了业务。

Once we simplified the business.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

Exactly.

当时他们的运营开支超过了EBITDA，而资本支出约为EBITDA的一半，尽管当时90%都是特许经营。

And they were basically spending overhead exceeded EBITDA, and CapEx was about half the EBITDA despite the fact that it was 90% franchise at the time.

因此，我们认为我们能够更高效地运营企业，解决这些问题，并创造大量价值。

And so we felt like we would be able to run the business more efficiently, fix some of these problems, and we could create a lot of value.

当然，事后看来，这确实是一笔绝佳的投资，回报达到了25倍。

And, look, in hindsight, yes, it was a great deal and mentions, like, 25 times return.

但在当时，这些问题都是真实存在的。

But at the time, these were real issues.

我认为我们较早地认识到特许经营模式的强大，而更广泛的市场在随后几年才更加充分地认识到这一点。

And I think we had an early appreciation for the strength of the franchise business model that the broader market subsequently more greatly appreciated in the years to come.

但在当时，没有任何其他人出现。

But look at the time, no one else showed up.

当时还有一个竞标流程，叫‘通勤竞标’，不管他们怎么称呼，都没有其他私募股权公司出现。

And there was a go shop, window shop, whatever they call it, and no other private equity firm showed up.

我当时认为，当时的普遍看法是我们出价过高了。

And I'd say the consensus at the time was that we overpaid.

正如报纸头条所说的，是的。

As the newspaper headlines Yeah.

传达信息。

Communicate.

我们收购了

We bought

这是从非常精明的投资者手中买下的，他们也从自己的投资中获得了丰厚回报。

it from extremely savvy investors who had made a great return on their investment too.

我认为他们在十年前收购汉堡王时，就已获得了五倍以上的回报。

I think made five plus times their their money on the acquisition of Burger King that they did a decade prior.

也许可以问同样的问题。

Maybe the same question asked.

我喜欢你对亨特道格拉斯所做的简单而优雅的解释。

I liked how you gave such a simple elegant explanation of Hunter Douglas.

为什么汉堡王和特许经营模式本身是一个好生意？

Why is Burger King and the franchise model a good business in the first place?

因为如果你拥有一个足够强大且有意义的品牌，就能让全球的创业者投入自己的资金和劳动来扩大业务、投资增长，并帮助融资以维持品牌的新鲜感和现代感。

Because if you happen to own a brand that is large and meaningful enough that you can have the entrepreneurs around the world put their capital and their work into growing the business, investing to grow the business, and help finance the marketing to maintain the brand sharp and current.

我认为，只要你拥有这样的业务，它就是一个非常棒的商业模式，能够以非常高效的方式在全球扩张。

I think to the extent you own such a business, it's just a great business model and something that can grow in a very efficient way globally.

然而，当你审视许多企业时，很难找到这些特质。

However many businesses you look at, it's hard to find those traits in the business.

这是一个高度产生自由现金流的、基于特许权的模式，围绕着我们所拥有的这些标志性品牌。

It's a highly free cash flow generative, royalty based model centered around these iconic brands that we get to own.

而且，再次强调，你有与你利益一致的创业者，是的。

And again, you have entrepreneurs aligned with you Yeah.

遍布全球，真的。

All over the world, really.

140个国家

140 countries that are

优秀的经营者会推动品牌发展，他们赚取自己的利润，同时作为品牌所有者，帮助品牌扩大规模。

Great operators who are gonna grow the brand, and they will earn their profits, and they'll grow the size of the brand for us as the brand owners.

也许作为这个故事中的一个小片段，你们是如何在法国从零做到20亿美元的？

Maybe just as, like, a little vignette in this story, how did you take it from 0 to 2,000,000,000 in France?

这个过程的具体故事是怎样的？

What was the literal story

发生了什么？

of what happened?

显然，一切始于我们有多么幸运，找到了这样的合作伙伴。

Obviously, everything starts with how lucky we were to found the partner that we did.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，伯特兰一直是我们出色的合作伙伴，他曾经在巴黎与喜力啤酒业务有关联，有在法国收购餐厅并扭亏为盈的经验，深谙如何在法国卓越运营。

I mean, Bertrand has been an incredible partner of ours, and that was someone that had some affiliation with the Stella Artois business at some point in Paris, had a record of buying restaurants in France and turning them around and understood how to operate with excellence in France.

我多年来一直参与Cooke品牌，深知加盟商的两大核心能力：找到最佳地点和招募最优秀的经理。

I was involved with the Cooke brand for years and someone that knew two core skills of a franchisee, which is to find the best locations and to find the best managers.

他在这方面有着实实在在的业绩记录。

So he had a demonstrated record of that.

不过，我觉得还是值得谈一谈我们的模式。

I think it's just worth talking about our model though.

正如亚历克斯提到的，我们

So as Alex mentioned, we

收购了这家企业，有些国家是公司直营店，有些国家是多店特许经营，还有一些国家是总特许合作伙伴关系。

bought the business, and some countries had company stores, some countries had multi franchise stores, some countries had master franchise partnerships.

我们开发了这种总特许合资模式：我们认为，要运营出最好的餐厅、以对顾客最有利的方式管理品牌，并最快地扩大品牌规模，最好的方式就是让资金雄厚的本地企业家成为我们的合作伙伴。

And we developed this master franchise joint venture model where we said, look, the best way for us to run the best restaurants, manage the brand in a way that it's gonna be great for the guests and grow the brand the fastest would be to have well capitalized local entrepreneurs as our partners.

我们通过在巴西、中国、印度和法国等地创建大规模的特许合资企业，验证了这一模式的有效性，而法国正是全球最好的汉堡市场之一。

And we proved that out through the creation of these mass pre franchise joint ventures in places like Brazil and in China and in India and in France, which is one of the best burger markets in the world.

我记得我们最初在法国南部的一个机场开了第一家餐厅，一夜之间就大获成功，于是我们前往法国寻找一位能管理该国业务的合作伙伴。随着时间推移，我们找到了奥利维耶·贝特朗，他是一位杰出的餐饮经营者。与他合作，我们打造了这家价值超过20亿欧元的企业。

I think we had opened our first restaurant in an airport in the South Of France and it was an absolute hit overnight and so we went to France to look to find a partner to manage that country And as time went by, we found Olivier Bertrand, and he's an incredible restaurant operator and collaborating with him, we built this €2,000,000,000 plus business.

我想谈谈卡夫亨氏以及从中吸取的教训。

I'd to talk about Kraft Heinz and the lessons learned from it.

这是一个很有趣的案例，因为正如我们之前提到的，如果你只看表面，你可能会说，是的。

It's an interesting one because as we've talked about before, if you just looked on a piece of paper, you'd be like, yeah.

这又是你做的另一项投资。

It was another investment you made.

它的表现不如RBI。

Didn't do as well as RBI.

还算可以。

It was fine.

但表象之下的情况要有趣得多。

Everything underneath the surface is far more interesting.

所以我想听听你回顾这段经历的看法，但更重要的是，你从中学到了什么，这些经验如何改变了你对商业、投资或其他任何事情的看法。

So I'm curious for your perspective on the story now looking back on it, but most especially for just what you take away from the experience that altered how you think about your business, investing, or anything else.

如果我们来看卡夫亨氏的故事，对我们来说，亨氏的投资结果还算不错。

If you look at the Kraft Heinz story for us, the Heinz investment turned out to be a pretty decent one.

我们在它上面赚了近三倍的钱，并且能够通过卡夫投资返还投资者的资本，尽管卡夫投资显然表现不佳。

We make almost three times our money on it, and we're able to return our investors' capital in the Kraft investment, which didn't do obviously as well.

帕特里克，我认为我们从中得到的教训是，我们没有充分评估这家企业的质量。

And Patrick, I think the lesson for us there is basically, don't know that we underwrote the quality of the business well.

意思是，卡夫投资组合中有相当一部分产品是高度商品化的，因此在私人品牌和大型零售商纷纷进入市场、抢占份额的动态变化中，它们受到了过度冲击。

Meaning, I mean, there were significant portions of the Kraft portfolio which were relatively commoditized and therefore overly exposed to this changing dynamic where private label and the big retailers were essentially getting into the business and taking share.

我认为我们从一开始就没能充分理解这一点。

And I think we didn't fully understand that from the get go.

仅看过去的财务数据是无法看出这一点的。

Looking at past financials would not show you that, really.

我认为这就是问题的核心所在。

And I think that was the main issue with it.

我们有没有执行方面的问题？

Did we have some execution issues?

有，但我们已经解决了这些问题。

Yes, but we fixed those.

我认为这些问题并不是导致这项投资表现不佳的决定性因素。

And I don't think those were determinant to the investment not having been so well.

事实上，我们早在几年前就已经退出了这项投资。

In fact, we have many years ago already, several years ago, left our involvement there.

我认为这家公司有不错的团队在运作，并且管理得不错，但坦白说，股价并没有特别出色。

I think the company has decent people working there and doing a good job managing it, but it's not like the stock did particularly better, frankly.

对我们来说，教训是：在投资评估过程中，我们必须更加谨慎、更加细致地评估企业的质量，我认为这帮助我们完善了流程，从而更好地完成了对Hunter Douglas和随后Skechers的投资。

The lesson for us is, again, the how much more difficult and how much more diligent, therefore, we need to be in evaluating business quality on the investment process, which I think helped us beef up the process to make both the Hunter Douglas and its investment and then subsequently the Skechers investment.

即使一家企业有着出色的财务历史，我认为以今天的标准，我们很可能不会愿意承担如此集中的客户风险。

Even if a business has great historical financials, I think today, we likely wouldn't be willing to take big customer concentration risk.

而这又回到了被边缘化的可能性，以及无法有效定价风险的问题。

And then that goes back to that likelihood of or potential of being disintermediated and an inability to price risk.

在这一具体案例中，集中度问题体现在哪里？

What was the concentration issue in that specific case?

在美国，几乎任何快消品公司都会有大约三分之一的业务，有时更多，来自沃尔玛，或者另一大块来自好市多；在其他国家也是如此，通常一到三家零售商就占据了大部分业务。

Pretty much any CPG company in The US is gonna have a third of the business or so, sometimes more with Walmart or another big chunk with Costco or and it's short in other countries as well where between one and three retailers, you're gonna have the bulk of the business.

把你在麦当劳和汉堡王市值上用过的那种方法直接套用到Spotify上，这样说公平吗？

Is it ever fair to just apply like the thing you did with McDonald's Market Cap versus Burger King's and just say, I always did this for Spotify.

就像我说，我为Spotify付了x的价格。

It's like, I pay x for Spotify.

我觉得我愿意付三倍x的价格。

I think I'd pay three x.

它们真的很容易理解。

They're like really easy.

这就是定价权。

And that's pricing power.

对于Skechers，你可以做类似的事情。

With Skechers, you could do something similar to that.

Skechers是全球第三大运动鞋公司。

I mean, Skechers is the third largest sneaker company in the world.

这肯定让很多人感到惊讶。

That surprised people, I bet.

这让很多人感到惊讶，包括我们第一次得知时。

It surprised many people, including us the first time we

前两名是耐克和

First two being Nike and

阿迪达斯。

Adidas.

阿迪达斯。

Adidas.

其中的数据有点失真。

And the numbers are a little skewed in it.

我指的是仅限运动鞋，而像耐克和阿迪达斯这样的公司还有服装业务，而斯凯奇的业务99%都是鞋类。

I'm referring to sneakers only, and a lot of these companies like Nike and Adidas have apparel businesses, and Skechers is 99% footwear.

令人惊讶的是，斯凯奇每年的运动鞋销售额高达90亿美元，而阿迪达斯是140亿。

It's also surprising the distance because Skechers sells 9,000,000,000 a year in sneakers and Adidas sells 14.

是的。

Yeah.

我们不会猜对的。

Would not have gotten that right.

在大多数人看来，回到麦当劳和汉堡王的类比，他们会对这些数字感到惊讶。

In most people's minds, going back to the McDonald's, Burger King analogy, most people would be surprised by those figures.

是的。

Yeah.

这是不是一种业务领先于品牌的情况？

Is this the case where the business is ahead of the brand?

不是。

No.

因为它的增长速度太快了。

Because it's growing so fast.

三分之二的业务已经位于美国以外。

Two thirds of the business is already outside of The US.

当你观察是谁在购买这个品牌，以及公司在这些客户群体中的市场份额时，其实表现相当不错。

And when you look at who is buying the brand and the market share the company has within those customer cohorts, it's actually pretty good.