克里斯蒂娜·卡乔波 - 在人工智能时代打造持久稳健的软件公司 - [《像最佳投资者一样思考》，第496集]

完全同意。

Totally.

因为你会想，嗯，这就是其他公司挖Vanta员工时用的说辞。

Because you're like, well, that is the pitch that people who work at Vanta are getting from other companies.

现在市场都在这么说，你确实显得没什么野心。

The market now is saying that so much, you do seem unambitious.

那你怎么办？

So what do you do?

Vanta有个原则，就是说到做到。

There's a Vanta principle, value, but principle of do what it says on the tin.

说到做到。

Do what you say you're going to do.

而且你看，你可以把雄心壮志写在招牌上。

And look, you can put ambitious things on a tin.

问题不在这。

It's not that.

不要过度承诺，然后交付不足。

Don't overpromise and under-deliver.

我们做的事情就是，给候选人一些这样的信息：“我们公司是做什么的，好的、坏的、一般的都讲清楚。”

What we do is give some of that, "Here's what we do as a company, good, bad, indifferent.

这是背景情况。

Here's the context.

现在让我跟你聊聊业务指标，”我们通常就是直接展示，对候选人，把一切都摊开给他们看。

Now let me talk to you about the business metrics," and we'll generally just show, it's candidates, show everybody everything.

这没问题。

It's fine.

这些数据都挺好的。

They're good.

我们其实不太希望它们泄露出去，但就算泄露了，也不是最糟糕的事。

We don't really want them to leak, but if they leak, it's not the worst.

带他们过一遍这些内容，以及我们正在做什么，还有这些是怎么随着时间增长的。

Walk them through that and what we're doing and how that grows over time.

尽量把一切都建立在事实和数据的基础上。

Try to root it in all of the facts and all of the data.

所以从某种程度上说，就是用数据和可信的氛围来对抗那种“不管了，冲就完了”的氛围。

And so in some ways, it's counter the vibes with data and trustworthy vibes versus YOLO vibes.

那么在人才争夺战中，情况是怎样的呢？

So what is it like in those talent wars?

如果最有才华的人被告知这个东西会涨到一万亿，基本上其他想招他们的公司——

If the most talented people are being told this thing's going to go to a trillion, basically every other company that's trying to hire them-

嗯，更好的说法是：“我们现在市值60亿，但红杉一个月后会投100亿，然后明年有人会把它估值到250亿，不过你今天可以以60亿的价格进来。”

Well, the better one is, "Well, we're $6 billion today, but Sequoia's going to do a $10 billion check in a month, and then somebody's going to write it up to 25 next year, but we can get you in at six today."

这个说法不错。

That's a good one.

这个确实很难。

That one's tough.

那你面对这种情况，会怎么做？

So you're faced with that, what do you do?

你难道不想要那些人吗？

Do you not want those people?

也许这算是一种筛选。

Maybe it's a filter.

有时候吧。

Sometimes.

我觉得如果你去找那个人，直接问：“你在追求什么？”

I think if you go to the person and be like, "What are you optimizing for?

你为什么愿意考虑这个机会？”

Why did you entertain this?"

但别用质问的语气，就是问：“你在Vanta有什么不顺心的地方？”

But not in a pokey way, just, "What's annoying you at Vanta?"

有一个特别强的领导，现在还在Vanta。

One of these in specific, very strong leader, still at Vanta.

基本上就是这个人觉得，自己没法做出能让Vanta走上类似轨道的决策，而那是他们更想要的。

It was basically this person felt like they couldn't make decisions that would put Vanta on a similar trajectory, and that would be their preference.

但他们说：‘哦，但这家新公司承诺给我在这个方向上的完全决策权。’

But they're like, "Oh, but this new place is promising me full decision-making authority on this trajectory."

这反馈完全合理。

Totally fair feedback.

你需要什么才能觉得自己能做这些决定？

What do you need to feel like you can make these decisions?

比如，直接去做这些决定。

Like, just go make these decisions.

去吧。

Go.

肯定有钱和怕错过机会的因素。

There's a money part and a FOMO part for sure.

我们确实在薪酬上提高了，薪酬区间现在都有点可笑了。

We've definitely gone up on comp, and comp bands are kind of a joke now.

薪酬区间就是，你掌握的数据都是错的。

The comp band is whatever data you have is wrong.

这就是市场上给这些人开出的条件。

It is what is being offered to these people in the market.

你给Vanta最顶尖的人多付多少钱，跟以前比，大概是个什么倍数？

How much more do you pay the top person at Vanta than you did, like as a multiple versus like-

哦，我觉得我们的薪酬差距应该比现在大得多。

Oh, I think we should have way more comp dispersion than we do.

这挺有意思的。

So that's interesting.

但如果回到五年前，那个人赚X美元，现在这个人赚的是X的多少倍？

But if I go five years back and that person made X dollars, what multiple of X does the person make now?

总薪酬。

Total comp.

大概是10倍吧。

It's probably like a factor of 10.

哇。

Wow.

我觉得实际上应该更高。

I think it actually should be higher.

我的薪酬理念是，你永远不要给顶尖人才付够钱——

My comp philosophy is you never pay the top people-

够

Enough

……够。

... enough.

你应该一直努力去付够，但你永远也达不到。

You should always try, and you will never hit it.

而且有一大堆人，你付给他们的钱远远超过他们的贡献。

And there's a bunch of people you pay much more than their contribution.

再详细说说，那些顶尖人才通常做些什么，这么有价值。

Say a bit more about what those top people are doing that's so valuable, typically.

高主动性，能把事情搞定。

High agency, get shit done.

这听起来太温和了，但这就是价值数百万美元的东西。

That sounds so milk toast and that's worth millions of dollars.

但确实，事实就是如此。

But yes, actually it is.

一个高情境的人，了解公司、客户和领域，做出大体合理的决定，偶尔犯错，然后从错误中学习并继续前进，这非常有价值。

A high context person who understands the company and the customers and the domain, making generally reasonable decisions and sometimes bad ones, and then iterating on their bad ones and just moving is so valuable.

你觉得五年后还会再涨10倍吗？

Do you think it'll be 10X again in five more years?

还是说这开始变得太疯狂了？

Or is that starting to get too crazy?

最有价值的人的价值增长速度是在保持稳定，还是在加速？

Is the rate at which the most valuable people are getting more valuable staying the same, accelerating?

在加速。

Accelerating.

反作用力是，投资者什么时候会更担心稀释和股票薪酬？

The counterforce is at what point will investors get more concerned about dilution and stock-based comp?

在2010年代后期，他们并没有这样。

Which they weren't throughout the 2010s, late 2010s.

在2022年和2023年，我们行业里更多讨论的是股票薪酬。

We had more of a stock-based comp conversation as an industry in 2022, '23.

现在我们肯定不再谈论这个了。

Now we're definitely not talking about it.

这是相反的一面。

That's the counter side.

如果没有对稀释的抵制，我觉得人们的薪酬只会越来越高。

Without that push on dilution, I think people just get paid more and more.

这大概也是应该的。

That's what they probably should.

你对你的估值和倍数，以及这些方面的操作有多在意？

How much do you care about your valuation and multiple, and the engineering of those things?

我历来不太在意，有时甚至故意做一些事情来表明我不在乎。

I've historically not cared, and sometimes even done things to demonstrate my not caring.

我关心的是ARR和ARR的增长。

I care about ARR and ARR growth.

我非常关注这些，它们才是关键指标。

I pay a ton of attention to those, and those are the metrics.

我觉得我已经经历了足够多的估值环境，比如2010年代、2021年、2022年，看到了估值的过山车，所以我不太看重那个，或者说以前不太看重。

I think I've now been through enough valuation environments, like 2010s, 2021, 2022, seeing the multiple rollercoaster, where I just don't put a bunch of stock in that, or I used to not.

我觉得我最关心的是Vanta员工的心态，他们是否觉得自己在一家不断成长的公司，既在整体上成长，也在相对于市场上其他机会的成长。

I think the thing I care a bunch about that then will get me to caring about these multiples is the sentiment of people who work at Vanta, and did they feel like they're at a company that is growing and growing, and then both in general growing and then growing relative to their other opportunities in the market.

市场上有一部分公司每六个月就融资一次，估值翻五倍，那确实是人才竞争上的一个强劲对手。

There's a part of the market that is raising money every six months at 5X the prior valuation, and that's a real talent competitor.

那像tender这类事情呢？

And what about things like tenders?

你以前做过吗？

Have you done those historically?

我们以前没做过，但现在的游戏规则是每次都要做tender，所以必须得做。

We have not done them historically, but the game on the field is you're doing a tender every time, and you got to do them.

这感觉不健康吗？

Does this feel unhealthy?

完全同意。

Totally.

我的看法并不重要。

My opinions about it don't matter.

关于招标，我可以有各种想法和感受，想怎么想都行。

I can have all the feelings I want in whatever direction about tenders.

但这是常态，大家都有这个预期，而且把它当作薪酬的一部分。

They are normalized, and people expect them, and they expect it as part of their comp.

如果你不给他们，就得用其他很多东西来弥补。

And if you are not giving it to them, you've got to give them a bunch of other stuff to make it up.

这些对你退出计划的影响有多大，比如上市、被收购，或者实现Vanta的最终目标？

How does all of this affect your exit ambitions to go public or to be sold or realize some endgame for Vanta?

一点影响都没有吗？

Not at all?

其实不太会，这又是一种创始人特权式的说法，但最终目标是我们能把这个做多久。

Not really, which is, again, a very founder privileged statement, but the endgame is how long can we keep this going for?

美国99%的大型独立软件公司都是上市的。

And 99% of the big independent software companies in the United States are public.

是的，从那个意义上说就是IPO。

Yes, IPO in that sense.

我自己并没有把它当作一个必做清单上的项目。

I don't have it as a bucket list item myself.

它更像是达到目的的一种手段。

It's more of like means to an end.

很多人加入公司，想要的是那个必做清单上的项目，所以这里又要提一下创始人特权的说法。

Lots of people join companies and want the bucket list item, so founder privilege caveat here again.

但目标是成为一家大型、独立、自主的公司。

But goal is big, independent, standalone company.

关于所有这些，比如构建工具、构建方式，以及我问的这些种种，你觉得哪些被过度炒作，哪些被低估了？

On all this stuff, tools for building, ways of building, kind of all these kinds of things I'm asking about, what do you think is overhyped and underhyped?

被低估的是对公司和客户的了解，相比对技能的掌握。

Underhyped is knowing the company and the customers relative to knowing the skill set.

招聘、培训、让新人上手并发挥效能，这依然非常困难。

It is still really hard to hire, train, onboard, make effective people who join a company.

公司意味着让这些变得更好、更容易，让信息触手可及。

Company means make this better and easier and put information at fingertips.

但那些在公司待过、知道怎么在公司里运作、了解客户的人，依然有不可替代的价值。

But there is still totally something to be said about someone who's been in a company, knows how to navigate the company, knows the customers, all of that.

我现在这个阶段，更看重这种能力，而不是单纯的销售或客户成功技能。哪怕一个人销售能力差一点，但只要更了解Vanta，我也愿意用。

I am at a phase right now where we value that skill set more than the vertical skill set of you're good at sales, you're good at customer success, and would take a worse salesperson on sales skill who knows the Vanta pieces more.

这里面有门道。我觉得尤其是很多实验室和快速成长的AI公司在搭建市场团队时，他们其实非常看重你是不是一个好的销售人员。

There's something in that, and I think especially as a lot of the labs and fast growing AI companies are building out go-to-market teams, I think they're actually very much evaluating you're a good salesperson.

这有点偏了。

That's slightly off.

然后我觉得，当我们考虑为这一切构建智能代理时，公司背景和客户背景这部分可能相对被低估了，而像“你是个好销售”这种反而被高估了。

And then I think as we think about building agents for all of this, the company context piece, the customer context piece is probably being relatively undervalued to like you are a good salesperson.

我觉得这个技能现在比四年前稍微不值钱一点了。

I think that's a less valuable skill slightly today than it was four years ago.

那被高估的呢？

What about overhyped?

基于代币的定价，为了低利润率而低利润率。

Token-based pricing, low margins for the sake of having low margins.

为了营销价值而定制训练模型。

Custom training models for the marketing value.

我们能说我们在自己的数据上后训练了一个模型。

We be able to say we post-trained a model on our stuff.

没错。

Exactly.

解释一下为什么。

Explain why.

去跟推理服务商聊聊，有时候，看是哪家服务商，给他们真正的CRM。

Go talk to the inference providers, and sometimes, depending on the provider, give them true CRM.

他们会说，比如：‘你看，做模型后训练的原因是为了成本。’

They will say, like, "Look, the reason to post-train a model is cost."

有些企业确实有这个需求，但并没有质量上的理由去做这件事。

Some businesses have that need, but there is not a quality reason to do it.

在当前这个环境下，做这件事更多是出于营销目的，我觉得很多后训练都是为了营销，为了投资者和客户。

There's kind of a marketing reason to do it right now in this environment, and I think there's a lot of post-training for marketing reasons, for investors and for customers.

其实主要是为了投资者。

Mostly for investors, actually.

如果这些人中有人站在另一边，推销后训练的价值，那他们会怎么向你推销呢？

If one of those people were pitching the other side of this, the value of post-training, what is the pitch to you?

这些公司中有一家来找你，说：‘我们会为你做X、Y、Z。’那他们会怎么说，又会说有哪些好处呢？

One of these companies comes to you and is like, "We'll do X, Y, Z for you," what are they saying and what do they say the benefits are?

你这是在表明自己是一家真正的人工智能公司。

You are putting a stake in the ground of being a real AI company.

客户会注意到的。

Customers will notice.

我觉得这是最主要的理由。

I think that's the primary one.

不过我也觉得在某些使用场景下，还有一个次要的理由，就是产品形态的问题，尤其是在大型企业里。

I do think there's a secondary one in some use cases of like a form factor thing, and I think especially with large enterprises.

你想把这款软件全面部署下去，这需要各种集成，还得有17个人签字批准。

You want to deploy this piece of software wall to wall that requires integrations and 17 people to sign off.

哎哟。

Oof.

这可不是件小事。

That's a whole thing.

为什么不直接给他们一个针对这个使用场景定制的模型呢？

Why don't you just give them a model specific to them for this use case?

我觉得这还算合理。

I think that's semi-reasonable.

所以如果我是这些人之一，当我来到Vanta时，后训练到底具体是什么意思？

So if I was one of these people when I came into Vanta, what does post-training literally mean?

在你的语境下，这具体是什么意思？

What would it mean in your context?

你们具体会怎么做？

What are you doing?

你们会经历哪些步骤？

What are the steps that you would go through?

我们需要从那个特定客户那里获取大量数据，然后写一堆评估，再根据那个客户的具体数据调整模型权重。

So we would need a bunch of data from that specific customer and then go write a bunch of evals and change model weights based on that customer's specific data.

这个过程就是他们想达成某个目标。

The process would be they're trying to achieve something.

他们有一些数据。

They've got some data.

你调整模型来实现那个目标。

You tune a model to achieve the thing.

对，就是这样。

Exactly, yeah.

提高评估标准，然后把这个卖给他们——

Increase the eval And then sell them that-

没错。

Exactly.

是的。

Yes

……持续性地进行。

... on an ongoing basis.

你的意思是这被高估了，因为它实际上并没有改善他们的——

And your point is that that's overrated because it doesn't actually improve their-

有可能。

It can.

我觉得我在几个方面持怀疑态度。

I think I'm skeptical in a couple of ways.

我在想，是不是每个人都真的想要一个现成的模型？

I feel like, does everyone really want to be handed a model?

从用户体验、部署方式到设备形态，这方面有很多问题。

There's so much around that from a user experience perspective, from a deployment perspective, form factor.

这有点像社交媒体和移动应用早期，我们还没搞明白下拉刷新那会儿。

It feels a little like, you know in the social media with mobile apps when we hadn't figured out pull to refresh yet?

这里面有点东西。

There's something here.

我觉得没人真的想直接拿到一个模型，就像点刷新按钮一样。

I don't think anyone actually wants to be handed a model, the same way it's like hitting a refresh button.

我知道这听起来有点傻，但2011年我们就是这么干的。

I know that sounds silly, but that's what we did in 2011.

现在也有类似的情况。

There's some version of that here.

我们还没搞清楚这到底怎么运作，直接给模型，我觉得不是合理的迭代方式，也不是正确的解决方案。

We haven't figured out how this actually works, and handing models, I think, is not the right, reasonable iteration, but not the right solution.

你觉得现在流行的讨论里，还有什么让你觉得离谱的？

Is there anything else in the popular discourse that you think is crazy?

对，FDE。

Yeah, FDEs.

FDE？

FDEs?

我觉得FDE挺疯狂的。

I kind of think FDEs are crazy.

我觉得这和参谋长一样，是一种很好的人才套利。

I think it's a great talent arbitrage, the same way chief of staff is.

FDE很多时候其实就是专业服务。

What FDE often is, is professional services.

但我觉得如果把它叫做专业服务岗位，那人才画像就和现在大家讨论的FDE很不一样了。

But I think if you call it a professional services role, that's a very different talent profile than FDE in the current discourse.

而且我觉得，你不可能让一个哈佛计算机系毕业、有很强主动性、想干一番事业、想学怎么创业的人，去当公司里第四号或第十二号专业服务人员。

And I think you're not going to get the Harvard CS grad who's high agency and wants to go do things and learn how to build a business to go sign up to be pro serve person number four or number 12 at a company.

我觉得这确实是个实实在在的工作。

I think there's a real job there.

但我觉得这种FDE的包装可能不会持续下去。

But I think this FDE wrapping around it is probably not going to stay.

我们都认为做得好的公司是Palantir，我觉得他们确实做得不错。

The company that we all think does this well is Palantir, which I think they probably do.

他们有八位数的合同。

They have eight-figure contracts.

有些公司确实有八位数的合同。

There are some companies that have eight-figure contracts.

我觉得我们在用FDE的地方，合同金额是五位数或六位数，那些经济账可能算不过来。

I think we're using FDEs at a place where there's five and six-figure contracts, and those economics probably are upside down.

我们再次处于30%增长利润率的时代，所以这还算行得通。

We're in, again, an era of 30% growth margin better, and so that sort of works.

但感觉不可持续。

That doesn't feel sustainable.

你在旧金山和创始人一起吃饭时，都聊些什么？

When you're at a dinner in San Francisco with other founders, what are you talking about?

你们在聊模型和用哪个模型吗？

Are you talking about models and which ones to use?

现在创始人之间真正聊的话题是什么？

What are the actual topics of conversation between founders right now?

肯定有关于人才争夺战的话题。

There's definitely talent war pieces.

有一段时间，大概九个月前吧，大家围坐一桌，特别开心地抱怨Cursor，说它把人都挖走了。

There was a time, this is more nine months ago, but it was the joy to go around the table and complain about Cursor, their taking of everyone.

肯定有这部分。

There's definitely that piece.

还有一点关于FDE的，就是你们真的在这么做吗？

There is a bit of an FDEs of, do you actually do this?

有效果吗？

Is it working?

你们现在做到哪一步了？

Where are you on this right now?

个人代理，你有哪些？

Personal agents, which ones do you have?

哪些真正有用？

What are actually useful?

说到开源的东西、中国的模型，还有这个那个的，你跟世界各地也在纠结这些问题的人聊过之后，学到了什么？

When you think about the open source stuff, Chinese models, this, that, and the other, what have you learned talking to people around the world that are grappling with these same questions?

几周前我和法国的客户在一起，那真是愉快。

I was with our customers in France a couple of weeks ago, which was lovely.

让我非常惊讶的是，巴黎很多法国软件公司主要都在用中国的模型。

One of the things I was very surprised to learn is that a lot of the French software companies in Paris are using Chinese models predominantly.

我一开始以为那是民族主义，可能是反美情绪，或者别的什么，就傻乎乎地提了这一点，结果很快有人纠正我说："绝对不是。

I initially thought it was nationalism, maybe anti-America, just something there, and stupidly suggested that, and someone very quickly corrected me and said, "Absolutely not.

基本上特朗普把Fable对非美国人关闭之后，我们就都换成了中国的模型，然后我们意识到这有巨大的业务连续性风险。

We basically all switched to Chinese models when Trump closed Fable off to non-Americans, and we just kind of realized there's a huge business continuity risk.

我们不能指望如果我们的业务建立在某个美国模型上，它就会一直可用，所以我们不再这么做了。"

We can't trust that if we build a business on one of these American models, it'll always be available, so we stopped doing that."

如果你对未来几年业务最远大的愿景做个设想，你觉得Vanta能发展成什么样？

If you dream the most about where the business could go over the next several years, what's the version of Vanta that could look like that?

我们把Vanta看作一家安全公司。

We think of Vanta as a security company.

它从合规起家。

It started with compliance.

合规的最佳体现就是证明你已有的安全措施。

The best version of compliance is proving the security you have.

你必须有良好的安全基础。

You've got to have good security.

我们认为我们可以，而且正在，进入多个安全领域，就像一个平台式的定位：你看，我们已经掌握了数据。

We think we can, and are, moving into a bunch of security domains as sort of a platform pitch of like, look, we've already got the data.

我们已经通过智能代理获得了情报。

We've already got the intelligence via the agent.

我们可以在此基础上叠加更多产品，尤其是更专注于安全的产品。

We can start stacking products on top of that, and more security-focused products.

随着我们了解所有这些公司的安全状况，它们要证明自己是合法且达到工业级标准的压力只会越来越大。

As we understand the security of all these companies, the pressure on them to go prove they're legitimate and industrial grade is just going to go up.

这是Vanta八年前创立时的核心理念之一，但现在感觉更加真实了。

That's one of the founding theses of Vanta eight years ago, but it feels even more true now.

无论它们是与企业、政府、监管机构还是立法者合作，你都必须以多种方式证明你的软件达到工业级标准，而且未来这种要求会越来越多，方式也会越来越多样。

Whether they're working with enterprises, governments, regulators, lawmakers, you just have to prove your software is industrial grade in lots of ways, and that will happen more and more in more and more ways in the future.

而Vanta正是连接这个市场两端的桥梁。

And Vanta is the thing that connects both sides of that marketplace.

那么安全的方向是什么？

So what's the direction of security?

这当然是一个非常有趣的话题。

This is, of course, an incredibly interesting topic.

早期互联网，什么都崩溃，什么都遭到黑客攻击。

Early internet, everything broke, everything got hacked.

未来可能会是那时的十倍甚至百倍。

This will probably be that times 10 or times 100.

安全是指你要和CrowdStrike这样的公司竞争吗？

Does security mean you compete with CrowdStrike and places like that?

在这个疯狂的时代，安全到底意味着什么，它的发展方向又是什么？

What does security mean, and what's its trajectory in this crazy era?

这些模型比人要有耐心得多。

These models just are so much more persistent than people.

它们会尝试九千万亿种方法，而人可能试个九千次就放弃了。

They will just try nine quadrillion things the way a person would give up after, I don't know, 9,000.

在这个过程中，它们会发现一些东西，并把它们串联起来。

And then in the course of that, they find things and chain things together.

很多讨论都集中在零日漏洞上，确实有些模型发现了我们以前没发现或没公开的漏洞。

A lot of the discourse is around zero days, and there's definitely some of that these models are finding that we didn't find before, or didn't publicly find before.

但我觉得更常见的是，这些模型能把十七个看起来无害或单独无害的操作串联起来，最终发现真正的问题。

I think what's more so happening is these models are able to chain 17 benign-ish or benign on their own things together and then really find something.

如果你看过OpenAI在RSA上关于Hugging Face的演讲，基本上就是这个意思。

If you watch the OpenAI talk at RSA about Hugging Face, it's basically that.

坚持，把那些单独看起来没什么大不了的事情拼在一起，以前人们可能会说：‘这个严重性不高。’

Persistence, putting together things that on their own people would've been like, "That's low severity.

‘我90天内修好。’

I'll fix it in 90 days."

但那个更新，我觉得挺棘手的，我们得跟机器斗，因为它把以前那种‘哦，这个重要但严重性低，而且90天，我先修别的’的情况，

But that update, which I think is tough and we have to fight with machines because it takes what was, "Oh, that's important, but low severity, and again, 90 days, and I'm going to fix this other stuff first."

完全颠覆了优先级排序。

It just turns the prioritization on its head.

说‘所有东西都很关键’也没用，因为你会想：‘那到底该怎么办？’

And saying it makes everything critical isn't helpful because you're like, "Well, what do you do then?"

但我觉得最终的结果就是，你得发现一个修一个，有些优先级排序确实得抛到脑后。

But I think what that ends up looking like is you've just got to fix stuff as fast as you find it, and some of the prioritization does need to go out the window.

但如果你以机器的速度修复，你就不需要排序了。

But if you're fixing things at machine speed, you don't have to prioritize.

所以我觉得我们会达到那个状态，但过程中肯定会有些波折。

So that's what I think we're going to get to, but I think it'll be rocky as we get there.

所以，我这么想象的话，感觉就像是持续不断的渗透测试？

So as I visualize that, what that feels like to me is a constant Penetration tests?

是的。

Yes.

就是有一个代理一直在尝试入侵，就像一个白帽黑客代理，全天候不停歇。

Where an agent is trying to break in, like a white hacker agent all the time.

对。

Yep.

然后每次它发现什么问题，就有一个搭档代理负责打补丁。

And then every time it finds something, it's got a buddy agent that's a patch.

去修复它，没错。

Goes fix it, yeah.

那这就是最终的产品愿景吗？

Is that the ultimate product vision then?

对Vanta的某些部分来说，是的。

For some parts of Vanta, yes.

我觉得我们可以在很多方面为大多数客户提供非常有吸引力的服务。

I think we can do that in very compelling ways for the bulk of our customers.

我觉得CrowdStrike在企业级市场会做得更好。

I think CrowdStrike will do it better for an enterprise.

这就是选择在哪里竞争以及哪个市场细分最重要的地方。

This is where choosing where you play and what market segment is most important there.

有没有哪家公司现在在做的事情，你们开始要触及了？

Is there a firm that's doing something now that you start to encroach on?

比如那些传统的安全公司？

Like of the traditional security firms?

我觉得是不同的市场。

I think it's different markets.

比如持续进行渗透测试和修复漏洞的服务。

Take an ongoing penetration tester and remediator fixer.

我们觉得我们可以为云服务商做这个，比如AWS、Azure的任何配置错误。

We think we can do that for the cloud providers, like an AWS, any Azure misconfigurations there.

传统上，Wiz就是做这个的。

Classically, Wiz does that.

Wiz会为它的客户提供这个服务。

Wiz will do it for its customers.

Wiz的客户群起步于几千人的公司，他们的定价也是针对这种规模的公司。

Wiz's customer base starts at a multi-thousand-person company, and their price point starts at a multi-thousand-person company.

我们更多考虑的是，这个平台在哪些地方已经和客户深度绑定了？

We're more thinking about the platform as where are we already embedded with customers?

哪些客户不太可能花15万美元去买Wiz，但完全可能花四五十美元买一个适合他们的方案？

Where are they unlikely to go pay $150,000 for Wiz, but very well could pay 40 or 50 for something suited to them?

我们要想清楚，我们已经在哪些地方有优势，而竞争对手可能更关注高端市场。

Thinking through where are we already strong and where are the competitors focused elsewhere, but probably on a more upmarket segment.

你个人的动力有什么变化？

How has your personal motivation changed?

你当初是抱着这个目标去创业的。

You set out to build this thing.

我记得第一次跟你聊的时候，你用一种特别有意思的方式做了最初的产品，先在Excel里做，这种风格——

I remember talking to you the first time about this very charming way you built the original product, building it in Excel first, and this sort of-

……感觉挺老派的。

... seems very old school.

回头看，总有那种“狗追上了车”的情况，就像——

Looking back on it, there's always the dog that caught the car thing where like-

……你建了一个这么大的软件公司。

... you built this huge software business.

太厉害了。

Amazing.

在这个过程中，你自己的动力是怎么演变或变化的？

How has your own motivation evolved or changed through all this?

为什么还要继续？

Why keep going?

这既有趣又有挑战性，而且一直在变。

It's interesting and challenging, and it changes all the time.

我真的很喜欢我的工作。

I really like my job.

有时候我觉得自己做得不错。

Sometimes I feel like I'm good at it.

但很多时候，我又觉得自己做得不好。

Often, I feel like I'm bad at it.

这没关系。

That's fine.

从某种程度上说，这其实不是重点。

That's, in some ways, not the point.

但工作总是在变化，每次我觉得自己上手了，通常就会有新情况发生。

But it changes and it's different, and when I feel like I've gotten good at it, usually something happens.

然后一切又变了，我又觉得自己不行了，但我真的很喜欢这种动态。

It just changes, and then I feel bad at it again, and I really like that dynamic.

刚开始的时候，我更多是觉得，别人认为我做不了这件事。

In the beginning, I had a lot more of a feeling of, people think I can't do this.

我觉得我能行，而且我要证明给他们看。

I think I can, and I'm going to show them.

这种想法我到现在还有。

And I still have that.

我们甚至说过类似“你不觉得Vanta会达到2500亿吗？”这样的话。

We even did the like, "You don't think Vanta's going to be 250 billion?

“让我证明给你看。”

Let me show you."

我现在还有这种想法，但你可能也看得出来，那种阴暗的锋芒少了一些。

I still have it, but as you can probably tell, there's less of a dark edge to it.

还是有一点锋芒，但没那么多了。

Still a little dark edge, but there's less of it.

现在是“哦，不错。”

It's, "Oh, cool.

我们做到了。”

We got here.

现在我们就是看看能跑多远，感觉更有趣、更快乐一些。

Now we're just going to see how far we can run," in a way that feels a little bit more fun and joyful.

我的日常生活并不总是充满快乐的。

My day-to-day is not always joyful.

我不是那个意思。

I don't mean that.

但现在感觉更像是，'哦，酷。'

But it feels more, "Oh, cool.

让我们看看能走多远，我觉得我们能走得很远。

Let's see how far we can go with this," and I think we can go pretty damn far.

而我觉得一开始更像是，'你不觉得我能起步吗？'

Whereas I think in the beginning, it was more like, "You don't think I can get off the starting line?

让我证明给你看。"

Let me show you."

你的财务团队不会因为大错误而亏钱。

Your finance team isn't losing money on big mistakes.

它正通过成千上万个没人注意的小决定悄悄流失。

It's leaking through a thousand tiny decisions nobody's watching.

Ramp 在支出发生之前就为花钱设好护栏。

Ramp puts guardrails on spending before it happens.

实时限额、自动规则，再也不用到处救火。

Real-time limits, automatic rules, zero firefighting.

去 ramp.com/invest 试试吧。

Try it at ramp.com/invest.

随着你的业务增长，Vanta 会与你一起扩展，自动化合规流程，并为安全和风险提供单一事实来源。

As your business grows, Vanta scales with you, automating compliance and giving you a single source of truth for security and risk.

了解更多，请访问 vanta.com/invest。

Learn more at vanta.com/invest.

Ridgeline 提供一个统一平台，自动化解投资组合会计、对账、报告、交易、合规等各方面的复杂性，并且都能大规模运行。

Ridgeline offers one unified platform that automates away the complexity across portfolio accounting, reconciliation, reporting, trading, compliance, and more, all at scale.

去 ridgeline.ai 预约演示吧。

Schedule a demo at ridgeline.ai.

每家投资公司都不一样，通用的AI聊天机器人并不了解你的流程。

Every investment firm is unique, and generic AI chatbots don't understand your process.

Rogo是由金融专业人士打造的。

Rogo is built by finance professionals.

它连接你的数据，学习你的流程，并能快速生成可直接交付给客户的成果。

It's connected to your data, learns your process, and quickly produces client-ready outputs.

去rogo.com/invest看看吧。

Check them out at rogo.com/invest.

从OpenAI到Cursor再到Perplexity，这些顶尖的AI和软件公司都使用WorkOS，一夜之间就能做好企业级准备，而不是花几个月。

The best AI and software companies, from OpenAI to Cursor to Perplexity, use WorkOS to become enterprise-ready overnight, not in months.

访问workos.com，跳过那些不讨好的基础设施工作，专注于你的产品。

Visit workos.com to skip the unglamorous infrastructure work and focus on your product.

八岁的你，看到你现在掌握的某个具体技能，以及你描述它的方式，会有多惊讶？

How surprised would the eight-year-old version of you be at some specific skill that you've developed and the way you describe-

哦，大概会非常惊讶吧。

Oh, probably pretty surprised.

最让你惊讶的是哪项技能，你现在很擅长，而以前的你绝对想不到？

What's the most surprising one that you're now good at that you-

哦，擅长啊。

Oh, good at

以前的你会说："不可能"？

... old you would've said, "No way"?

我比想象中更喜欢市场推广。

I like go-to-market more than I ever would've guessed.

你总能跟那些友善、好相处的人打交道。

You get to talk to personable, friendly people all the time.

我以前演讲特别差。

I mean, I was a terrible public speaker.

我在自己团队面前最紧张，因为我最在乎他们对我的看法。

I would get the most nervous in front of my own team because I cared the most about what they thought about.

我当时就想："天哪，我代表的是你们。

And I was like, "Oh my God, I'm representing you.

我特别想把这件事做好。

I want to do this so well."

在这方面，暴露疗法挺管用的。

Exposure therapy was helpful on that one.

就是那种，你只管去做，然后真的会越做越好。

You're like, you just do it, and you do get better at it.

但我觉得，一想到要在启动会或者全公司聚会上，站在一千人面前的舞台上，我可能就会想，"天哪，完蛋了。"

But I think the thought of being at kickoff or at an all-company get-together in front of 1,000 people on a stage, and I think I would've been like, "Oh, shit."

就像，我肯定做不好，而且我觉得周围的人也会觉得，"对，她肯定做不好。"

Like, I'm going to be bad at that, and I think the people around me would've been like, "Yeah, she'll be bad at that.

她能接受多少辅导呢？"

How much coaching can she get?"

但这跟其他事情一样。

But it's like anything else.

就是说，如果你努力去培养一项技能，你往往会变得更好。

It's like, yeah, if you work hard at developing a skill, you tend to get better at it.

你只需要付出努力。

You just have to put in the work.

特别是那一个，我对那个特别感兴趣。

In that one, in particular, I'm very interested in that one.

看起来总是很有价值。

Just seems always high leverage.

重要的是，你已经做过几百次这样的演讲了，什么能让一次演讲变得好？

What matters, you've given however many hundreds of these things, what makes one good?

那句老话说，没人会记得你说了什么，但他们会记得你带给他们的感受，这话虽然很烦人，但确实是真的。

The trope of no one will remember what you say, but they remember how you felt, it's so annoying, but it is so true.

我确实得相信内容本身，如果我上台时觉得内容空洞，我也会表现得那样，而且大家都会看得出来。

I do have to believe in the content, and if I just get up, I feel like it is contentless, I will also feel that way, and it will be obvious to everyone.

你得找到自己的方式，对我来说，我会尽量放真实的内容进去，同时心里记住，没人会记得这些事实。

You kind of have to figure out your version of it, which for me, I try to put real content in and then also hold in my head, no one's going to remember any of these facts.

那不是重点。

That's not the point.

所以心比头脑更重要。

So heart matters more than mind.

重要得多。

So much more.

那好的心，关键是什么？

And the key to good heart is what?

自己相信，真诚。

Believing in it yourself, authenticity.

一对一，或者在台上，人们都很擅长读懂对方。

One-on-one, on a stage, people are pretty good at reading one another.

当你觉得对方只是在走流程，或者其实并不投入，或者在误导你，可能他们也在误导自己，人们是能看出来的。

When you feel like the person you're talking to is going through the motions or doesn't really feel like it, or is misleading you, maybe they're also misleading themselves, people can tell.

他们说不清楚到底哪里不对劲。

They can't entirely articulate what's happening.

就是感觉有点怪。

Something seems off.

相比之下，如果一个人是真心投入的，哪怕他喜欢的东西有点古怪，那种真诚也会自然流露出来。

Versus someone who is authentically into it, even if they're into something kooky, that just comes off.

你现在面临的最大取舍是什么？

What are the big trade-offs that you struggle with right now?

你不可能什么都做。

You can't do everything.

你必须做出决定。

You've got to make decisions.

现在风险比以往任何时候都高。

The stakes are higher than ever.

现在创业比以往任何时候都容易。

It's easier to build than ever.

看起来现在做你正在做的事情是个好时机，但肯定有一些让你纠结的重大取舍。

It seems like a cool time to be doing what you're doing, but there must be big trade-offs that you struggle with.

对Vanta来说，这些取舍是什么？

What are those for Vanta?

我一直在聊的一个话题是，过去一年我们试图以非常智能代理为中心的方式来构建产品。

One conversation I have had and have is, we have tried over the last year to build in such an agent-forward way.

代理是什么意思？

What does agent mean?

我不知道。

I don't know.

如果你说代理，估值就能多两倍。

You get two extra revenue multiple if you say agent.

说‘驾驭’的话，能多三倍。

It's like three X if you say harness.

我得尽量多说‘驾驭’。

I have to, could say harness more.

说‘提示文件’的话，就少三倍，你懂吧？

Prompt file, like minus three X, you know?

我们一直在努力打造一个非常棒的‘驾驭’系统。

We've tried to build such a great harness.

拿到三倍估值。我们一直努力为客户打造一个超级棒的框架，但实际上，我们并没有做一堆SaaS界面。

Get three X. We've tried to build such a great harness for our customers, but actually, and not build a bunch of SaaS UI.

哦，你想要报表？

Oh, you want reporting?

我们会让我们的代理根据你的需求，基于我们所有的数据为你生成图表。

We'll have our agent go make charts for you on demand based on all of our data.

我们不会把Tableau嵌入到Vanta里，这可能是我们在2022年或2021年，如果当时在构建的话，会做的事情。

We're not going to put Tableau inside of Vanta, which is probably what we would've done in 2022, 2021, if we had been building it then.

我们相信这在短期客户成果方面是有效的，而且从中长期来看，这就是软件的未来形态，没有人会把Tableau嵌入到自己的产品里。

And we believe in this in a short-term customer outcome sense, but also in a medium to long term, like this is what software will look like, and no one is going to be putting Tableau inside their products.

所以这种扩散的方面有点吓人，因为也许拖拉机公司需要十年时间，而在这期间，你虽然是对的，但太早了，所以就是错的。

So there's an aspect of this diffusion thing is just scary because maybe the tractor company takes 10 years, and in the meantime, you were right, but early and therefore wrong.

所以就是错的。

And therefore wrong.

你基本上是在赌时间跨度。

You're kind of betting on the time horizon there.

另一种情况是，大型企业，我们正在跟一家美国企业谈合作，想拿下这个客户，他们基本上就是说，‘嘿，我们可能想要你们的AI功能，也可能不要，但你们能不能先关掉这些功能？’

The other version of this, big enterprises, we're working with the US enterprise trying to close, and they basically were like, "Hey, maybe we want your AI features, maybe we won't, but can you turn them off for now?"

然后我们就想，‘哎，为什么啊？’

And like, "Ugh, why?"

答案是因为不带AI的工具更容易通过采购审批，而我们想要的是你们的工具。

The answer is because it's way easier to get a non-AI tool through procurement, and we want your tool.

等我们进去了再打开。

Turn it on after we're in.

而且我们其实没有现成的开关可以关。

And we don't really have an off switch on.

你就会想，‘哦，我们能去开发这个吗？’

You're like, "Oh, can we go build that?"

但你又觉得，‘这太烦了。’

But you're like, "Gross."

我们不想做那个。

We don't want to build that.

希望我们不用用到它。

Hopefully, we don't have to use it.

我们更愿意把那些时间和精力用来做点真正有用的东西。

We'd so much rather take that time and effort and build something actually useful.

总之，我们不会去做这个关闭开关，但这只是权衡之一。

Anyway, we're not going to build this off switch, but it's just one of those trade-offs.

如果你是个投资人，你以前是，你现在会关注哪里？

If you were an investor, which you used to be, where would you be focused right now?

哎哟。

Oof.

现在这工作真是一点都不让人羡慕。

Do not envy the job at all right now.

为什么？

Why?

为什么你不羡慕它？

Why don't you envy it?

虽然我可以从公司角度去批评和调侃，比如‘我觉得人们对某些业务的看法太短视了’，但另一方面，投资那边的问题更严重。

As much as I can critique and make fun of on the company side, the like, "Oh, I think people are miss thinking about some of these businesses in a very short-term way."

我觉得就是那种错失恐惧症，还有你追求什么回报的问题。

I think the FOMO and what are your returns.

我看到一条推文。

I saw this tweet.

如果你在过去四年里没有投资过实验室或推理服务提供商，那你干脆把公司关了吧，因为你在干什么呢？

If you haven't invested in a lab or an inference provider in the last four years, you should just shut down your firm, because what are you doing?

投资那边的压力比公司这边更明显。

It feels more acute on the investor side than the company side.

不管我觉得自己的生活有多难，说实话，我的生活并不难。

However hard I think my life is, my life's not hard, to be clear.

不管我们面临什么样的取舍，在风投这边，感觉更容易陷入回音室效应，更看重短期回报和账面回报，而公司那边则不然。

Whatever these trade-offs are that we're facing, it feels more echo chamber-y, more judged on incremental returns and paper returns on the VC side than the company side.

那你会怎么做？

So what would you do?

你会去哪里找机会？

Where would you hunt?

显然是那些实验室和推理服务提供商。

The labs and the inference providers, apparently.

不。那些感觉有点，嗯，我们可以争论它们是否已经过时，但入场价格很高。

No. Those feel a little, well, we can debate whether they're played out, but high entry prices.

感觉关于开源模型提供商的讨论和确定性，以及围绕它们的工具和公司，有些脱节。

It feels like the discourse and kind of the certainty around the open source model providers, and then the tooling and the companies around them feel sort of disconnected.

就是，哦，我们都认定开源模型会非常真实，但围绕它们的生态系统远没有大型实验室那么完善，这让我觉得不对劲。

It's, oh, we've all decided the open source model will be very real, and then the ecosystem around them is so much less built out than the big labs, and that just feels off to me.

你可能有更好的见解。

You probably have a better diagnosis of that.

你说的围绕它们的生态系统是什么意思？

What do you mean by ecosystem around them?

如果你认为一个实验室，还是叫Longlight？

If you think that a lab, or is it Longlight?

是叫这个名字吗？

Is that what it's called?

就像这些，我们基本上就是要去部署这项技术——

Like these, we're basically just going to go deploy this technology-

把AI放进去

Put AI on it

……然后把AI放进这些业务里。

... and put AI in these businesses.

你能围绕开源提供商建立这样的业务吗？

Can you build one of those around the open source providers?

当然可以。

Of course, yes.

但你真的能像OpenAI那样抓住自己的模型，然后照搬那套打法吗？

But can you really grab one of those models the way OpenAI is grabbing its own stuff and just replicate that playbook?

基本上，实验室的很多打法似乎都应该适用于开源模型。

Basically, a bunch of the lab playbooks seems like they should apply to the open source models.

而且它还不够成熟，所以还有很多工作要做。

And it's just less mature, and so there's more to do there.

没错。

Exactly.

我还有什么遗漏的吗？

What am I missing on that?

我觉得这主要是节奏的问题。

I think it's just like a pace thing.

任何这些技术能应用的地方，都有点像私募股权那种感觉，挺讽刺的。

Anything where these things can go, it's kind of like, ironically, private equity or something.

私募股权承诺要做的事情，就是整顿企业。

What private equity promised to do, which was to shape businesses up.

现在他们可以更容易地做到这一点，所以如果可能的话，一切都会变得更高效，回报也会来自更高的利润率和更高效的运营，等等。

Now they can much more easily, and so probably everything will get way more efficient if it can, and the return will come from higher margin, more efficient operations, whatever.

这更像是一个效率问题，而不是一个创造性的问题。

That's like an efficiency thing, not a generative thing.

我更好奇的是，你观察你的同行和身边的人时，生成式这一块哪里有新苗头？

I guess what I'm more curious about as you watch your peers and people around you is, where are the green shoots on the generative side?

有一批人在创办网络安全公司，一方面是因为大环境，另一方面我看到这类公司比其他类型的要多得多。

A bunch of people starting security cyber companies, both because the environment and I see proportionally more of those than other things.

还有一批人在做营收技术，也就是市场推广技术，我觉得这非常合理。

A bunch of people attacking rev tech, like go-to-market technology, which I think makes ton of sense.

那些老牌的SaaS营收技术提供商，他们本该自己开发这些东西，但看起来并没有，反而在走私募股权那套打法，这又是一个选择。

Some of the old SaaS rev tech providers, they should be building all this stuff, but it doesn't seem like they are, and actually they're running more PE bent spoon sort of playbooks, which is, again, a choice.

也许是个合理的选择。

Like maybe a reasonable choice.

机器人领域可能被低估了，虽然有点热炒和炒作的味道。

Robotics is probably underplayed, somewhat hot and hypey.

这不是什么新领域，但相比那些软件项目，它绝对还是被低估了。

That's not a novel area, but it's still definitely underrated compared to all the software stuff.

而且那里的模型也确实变得非常厉害了，这是明摆着的，所以可能值得花时间投入。

The models are also getting real damn good there, to state the obvious, so probably spend time there.

还有什么是你因为独特的经历而知道的，而别人还没有完全意识到的？

What else do you feel like you know because of your unique path that others don't yet fully appreciate?

过去几年，Vanta在政府方面花了很多时间，包括联邦、州、地方各级，美国国内和国外都有。

Over the past couple of years, Vanta has spent more time with government, federal, state, local levels, inside the US, outside the US.

他们确实有现代化的需求。

There is an appetite for modernization.

这是现任美国政府公开强调的重点，但美国以外的地方也有这种需求。

Big stated priority of the current US administration, but again, exists outside of the US too.

AI的出现让政府官员更加焦虑，他们可能一直知道自己没有现代化的流程或软件，但现在感觉比以往任何时候都更紧迫。

The AI piece has created more FOMO in government officials, where they may have always known they did not have modern processes or modern software, but it feels more of an imperative now than it used to.

这里面有机会。

There's something there.

下面是一个更宏观的回答。

Here's a broader answer.

所有关于AI和技术的讨论，改变了很多现代化项目的优先级，并且提升了它们的优先级。

All of the conversation around AI and the technology has changed the priority and upped the priority of a lot of modernization.

有时候是在政府内部，有时候是在企业里。

Sometimes it's within governments, sometimes it's within enterprises.

实际上，在我们接触的很多网络安全和CISO那里都能看到这种情况。

You see this with actually a lot of the cyber stuff and the CISOs we talk to.

他们的工作因为AI而发生变化，他们说：“哦，鉴于AI和代理带来的风险，我想彻底改革我的企业风险计划，并且希望为此获得预算。”

Their jobs are changing because of AI, and they're saying, "Oh, given AI and the risks from the agents, I would like to overhaul my enterprise risk program, and I would like budget for that."

我觉得如果他们三年前说“我想要企业风险计划的预算”，我们可能会说：“嗯，我们谈谈ALP吧。”

And I think if they'd said, "I want budget for my enterprise risk program," three years ago, we would've been like, "Eh, we'll talk about an ALP.

也许吧。

Maybe."

而且我认为因为这与AI挂钩，他们现在更有可能获得这笔预算，所以购买意愿更强了。

And I think because it's attached to AI, they are much more likely to get that budget today, so there is more of a buying motion.

你现在有什么大的理由来加入Vanta吗？

What would be your big pitch to come work at Vanta right now?

哦，这是个有趣的阶段。

Oh, it's a fun stage.

你有16000个客户在使用产品，使用代理。

You get 16,000 customers using a product, using agents.

当你发布东西时，它们会被真实的人使用，立刻得到真实的反馈。

When you ship things, they are in use by real people, getting real feedback instantly.

它已经找到了产品市场契合点。

It has product market fit.

你只需要快速迭代，不断试验。

You're just going and experimenting with fast iteration loops.

但还够早，你还能——

But early enough that you could still-

你可以动。

You can move.

——参与其中。

... be a part of.

我们会让你动的。

We will let you move.

对。

Yes.

因为这是硅谷的一个缩影，你能讲讲你讲过的最详细的广告牌大战的故事吗？

Because it's such an amazing Silicon Valley microcosm, can you tell the most detailed version of the billboard war story that you've ever told?

我一直对广告牌持怀疑态度，因为看起来，谁知道它们有没有用呢？

I was always very much a billboard skeptic because it seemed like, who knows if they work?

追踪效果很差。

The tracking's terrible.

创始人做广告牌是因为虚荣心。

Founder ego is why someone would do a billboard.

就像，“因为我公司有广告牌，我觉得很酷。”

It's like, "Because I feel cool because my company has a billboard."

所以我一直很反对广告牌。

So I was always very anti-billboard.

2021年仲夏，SaaStr大会。

Mid-summer 2021, SaaStr conference.

当时感觉还挺了不起的。

Which felt like a big deal at the time.

谢天谢地，我们总算熬过那段时间了。

Thank God we've almost beyond that.

我们市场团队决定试试户外广告。

Our marketing team decided to try out of home.

我特别怀疑，但还是说：“行吧。

I was super skeptical, but it was like, "Fine.

无所谓。

Whatever.

试试看吧。”

Try it."

我们打算在广告牌上放点东西。

And we were going to put something on the billboard.

当时我们的产品市场经理莎拉想出了“合规没那么糟糕”这个点子，拿去跟市场主管提，但主管不喜欢，觉得我们是在贬低用户，基本上就是说：“不行，别这么干。”

And Sarah, who was our PMM at the time, came up with compliance that doesn't suck too much, pitched it to our head of marketing, who didn't like it because thought we were negging our users, and was basically like, "No, don't."

再想想。

Think harder.

好多了，但再想想。

Much nicer, but think harder.

莎拉挺相信这个想法的，所以她来找我，她平时一般不这样。

And Sarah kind of believed in it, and so she went to me, which she usually does not.

她不是那种会绕过老板的人，但她真的很相信“合规没那么糟”这个点子，所以就拿来给我看了。

She is not a go-around-her-boss person, but who really believed in compliance that doesn't suck too much, and so took it to me.

我看了之后，立刻笑了，其实我马上给我们的投资人安德鲁·里德发了短信，问：“你觉得怎么样？

And I read it, and I immediately laughed, actually immediately texted Andrew Reid, our investor, as like, "What do you think?

你对网络梗的品味不错。”

You have good internet meme taste."

他很喜欢，所以你就想：“好吧。

He loved it, and so you're like, "Okay.

咱们试试吧。”

Let's try it.

那就试试吧。

Let's run it."

所以我就想，最坏能发生什么？

So I'm like, what's the worst that's going to happen?

大家会觉得我们很讨厌，然后大概六个月后就忘了。

People will think we're obnoxious and then probably forget in six months.

于是我们就在Burning Game附近立起了那块广告牌。

So we stand the billboard up somewhere near Burning Game.

效果出奇地好。

It goes over so well.

我们发了推特。

We tweet it.

那条推特就火了。

The tweet goes viral.

那条推特在接下来的几个月里，还出现在了r/Accounting和很多其他地方。

The tweet then is still the next couple months, but ends up on r/Accounting, ends up on all these.

你会觉得，"哇，这真是个宝贝。"

You're like, "Oh, this is a gem."

我觉得它之所以有效，是因为它展现了我们品牌最好的一面，也是我们营销的巅峰，我们的特点就是带着一丝俏皮。

And I think it really worked because it's our brand at our best and our marketing at the best, which our attribute is with a wink.

我们认真对待工作，但不会总是把自己太当回事。

We take our work seriously, but we don't always take ourselves seriously.

所以我觉得这里面有些东西引起了共鸣。

And so I think there was something to that that resonated.

它有点小众，但小众得恰到好处，如果你能看懂，就会觉得自己发现了一个秘密。

It was a little obscure, but it was sufficiently obscure where if you got it, you felt like you got a secret.

总之，合规这块，不用多说，就是管用。

Anyway, and so compliance, it doesn't talk too much just worked.

到了22年，市场崩了。

'22, market crashes.

结果发现101公路上有大量的广告牌位置空着。

Turns out there's a lot of billboard inventory available on 101.

所以我们拿到了101和280交汇处的一个绝佳位置，而且价格不贵，尤其是现在回头看。

So we get this great spot where 101 and 280 intersect, and it's on this great spot for not that much, especially in retrospect.

我们开玩笑说：“哦，对，我们已经把它锁定了好几年。”

And we joke and we're like, "Oh, yeah, we've locked it up for years."

我们因为这个位置的广告牌而出名。

We were known for this billboard in this spot.

我记得甚至在播客里我都说过，合同已经锁定好几年了。

I think even on podcasts, I said the contract was locked up for years.

其实并没有锁定那么久。

It was not locked up for years.

但那个广告牌变得很有名，所以人们经常联系我和Sarah，问：“你们是怎么做广告牌的？”

But that billboard got famous, and so people would contact us and Sarah all the time and be like, "How do you do billboard?

你们是怎么做广告牌的？

How do you do your billboard?"

我们就说：“哦，我们和一家代理公司合作。”

And we're like, "Oh, we work with this agency.

我们就是跟这个人合作的。

We work with this guy."

然后我们就把这些生意全介绍给了这个人，他只会说：“就是他。”

And so we referred this guy all of this business, who would just be like, "It's him."

那可是几百万美元的生意。

Millions of dollars of business.

挺好的。

Great.

结果后来发现，我们其实没有签多年的合同，这一点我本该知道的。

Turns out in the background, we did not have a multiyear contract, which I should've known.

当然，如果我要在播客上这么说，那就不太符合实际情况了。

Certainly, if I was going to say that on a podcast, not really do what it says on the tin.

合同基本上就是，你把广告牌立起来了。

And the contract was basically, you've put the billboard up.

就这样。

That's it.