本集简介
双语字幕
仅展示文本字幕,不包含中文音频;想边听边看,请使用 Bayt 播客 App。
大多数软件公司都试图最大化你在他们应用上的时间,以提升用户参与度。
Most software companies try to maximize your time on their app to juice engagement.
Ramp 的做法恰恰相反。
Ramp does the exact opposite.
Ramp 深知没有人愿意花数小时追索收据、审核报销单据或检查政策违规情况。
Ramp understands that no one wants to spend hours chasing receipts, reviewing expense reports, and checking for policy violations.
因此,他们构建的工具旨在将这些时间还给你,利用人工智能自动化 85% 的报销审核,准确率高达 99%。
So they built their tools to give that time back, using AI to automate 85% of expense reviews with 99% accuracy.
由于 Ramp 能帮企业节省 5% 的开支,难怪 Shopify、Stripe 以及我的公司都在使用 Ramp。
And since Ramp saves companies 5%, it's no wonder that Shopify runs on Ramp, Stripe runs on Ramp, and my business does too.
想了解消除繁琐事务后会发生什么?请访问 ramp.com/invest。
To see what happens when you eliminate the busy work, check out ramp.com/invest.
OpenAI、Cursor、Anthropic、Perplexity 和 Vercel 都有一个共同点。
OpenAI, Cursor, Anthropic, Perplexity, and Vercel all have something in common.
它们都使用 WorkOS。
They all use WorkOS.
这就是原因。
And here's why.
要实现大规模的企业采用,你必须提供SSO、SCIM、RBAC和审计日志等核心功能。
To achieve enterprise adoption at scale, you have to deliver on core capabilities like SSO, SCIM, RBAC, and audit logs.
这就是WorkOS的作用。
That's where WorkOS comes in.
你不必花几个月时间自己构建这些关键功能,而是可以直接使用WorkOS的API,在第一天就获得所有这些功能。
Instead of spending months building these mission critical capabilities yourself, you can just use WorkOS APIs to gain all of them on day zero.
这就是为什么你听说的许多顶尖AI团队都已经在使用WorkOS。
That's why so many of the top AI teams you hear about already run on WorkOS.
WorkOS是让你快速达到企业级标准并专注于最重要事情——你的产品——的最快方式。
WorkOS is the fastest way to become enterprise ready and stay focused on what matters most, your product.
访问workos.com开始使用。
Visit workos.com to get started.
每位投资者都应该了解Rogo,因为Rogo AI的平台不仅仅是一个普通的聊天机器人。
Every investor should know about Rogo because Rogo AI's platform is not just another generic chatbot.
相反,它专为支持华尔街银行家和投资者的实际工作方式而设计,涵盖从尽职调查和建模到将分析转化为交付成果的全过程。
Instead, it was designed to support how Wall Street bankers and investors actually work, from sourcing diligence and modeling to turning analysis into deliverables.
对我来说,Rogo 有三个关键优势。
For me, three key things differentiate Rogo.
首先,它能直接连接到您的系统,从而使用您的实际数据进行工作。
First, it connects directly to your system so it can work with your actual data.
其次,它理解您的工作流程,即在交易或投资过程中工作真实发生的方式。
Second, it understands your workflows, how work really happens across a deal or an investment.
第三,它端到端运行,生成真正的输出成果,就像顶尖专业人士所做的那样:可审计的电子表格、投资备忘录、尽职调查材料以及符合您标准的演示文稿。
And third, it runs end to end and produces real outputs the way the best people do Auditable spreadsheets, investment memos, diligence materials, and slide decks that match your standards.
这一切都源于 Rogo 由金融专业人士为金融专业人士打造。
This all comes from the fact that Rogo is built by finance professionals for finance professionals.
它已经获得全球一些要求最严苛的机构采用。
And it's already being adopted by some of the most demanding institutions in the world.
如需了解更多,请访问 rogo.ai/invest。
To learn more, visit rogo.ai/invest.
大家好,欢迎各位。
Hello, and welcome, everyone.
我是帕特里克·奥肖内西,欢迎收听《像最好的投资者一样投资》。
I'm Patrick O'Shaughnessy, and this is Invest Like The Best.
这档节目将开放地探索市场、理念、故事和策略,帮助你更好地投资你的时间和金钱。
This show is an open ended exploration of markets, ideas, stories, and strategies that will help you better invest both your time and your money.
如果你喜欢这些对话并想深入了解,不妨查看我们的季度出版物《Colossus》,其中包含对塑造商业和投资领域人物的深度专访。
If you enjoy these conversations and wanna go deeper, check out Colossus, our quarterly publication with in-depth profiles of the people shaping business and investing.
你可以在colossus.com上找到《Colossus》以及我们所有的播客节目。
You can find Colossus along with all of our podcasts at colossus.com.
帕特里克·奥肖内西是Positive Sum公司的首席执行官。
Patrick O'Shaughnessy is CEO of Positive Sum.
帕特里克和播客嘉宾表达的所有观点均为他们个人意见,不代表Positive Sum的立场。
All opinions expressed by Patrick and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of Positive Sum.
本播客仅作信息参考之用,不应作为投资决策的依据。
This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions.
PositiveSum的客户可能持有本播客中讨论的证券。
Clients of PositiveSum may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast.
如需了解更多信息,请访问 psum.vc。
To learn more, visit psum.vc.
我今天的嘉宾是丹·索恩海姆。
My guest today is Dan Sondheim.
丹是D1资本合伙公司的创始人兼首席投资官。
Dan is the founder and CIO of D1 Capital Partners.
我早就想进行这次对话了。
I've wanted to do this conversation for a long time.
丹是那种持续思考市场和商业的人,他的职业生涯完全围绕着这份痴迷建立。
Dan is one of those investors who thinks about markets and business constantly and has built a career entirely around that obsession.
他独特之处在于,他同时在公开市场和私募市场中全情投入,不仅在SpaceX、OpenAI和Anthropic等全球最重要的一些私营公司中持有重大股份,还管理着一个覆盖几乎每个行业的全球公开股票投资组合,且不集中于主流共识标的。
What makes him unique is that he operates at full intensity across both public and private markets simultaneously, with major stakes in some of the most important private companies in the world like SpaceX, OpenAI, and Anthropic, while running a global public equity portfolio that spans nearly every industry and doesn't concentrate in the consensus names.
我们从他职业生涯的起点开始聊起,分享一个我从未听他公开讲述过的故事:他曾写过一篇关于Orthodontic Centers of America的空头分析报告,并发布在Value Investors Club上,结果导致该股票崩盘,并帮他赢得了第一份工作。
We start at the beginning of his career with a story I've never heard him talk about publicly before, how a short case he wrote on Orthodontic Centers of America and posted on Value Investors Club crashed the stock and helped him land his first job.
他分享了为什么在许多人认为Anthropic只是OpenAI的Uber式机会时,他仍然选择投资Anthropic;阅读达里奥·阿马德的论文如何让他联想到贝索斯致股东的信件;以及他如何以Netflix和Spotify的视角来思考大语言模型的商业模式。
He shares why he backed Anthropic at a moment when many people told him it was the lift to OpenAI's Uber, what reading Dario Amade's essays reminded him of Bezos's letters to shareholders, and how he thinks about LLM business models through the lens of Netflix and Spotify.
我们花了时间回顾2021年初GameStop事件对该公司造成的巨大压力,以及丹认为当前全球经济体面临的最大单一尾部风险是什么。
We spent time on the extraordinarily stressful moment in early twenty twenty one when GameStop hit the firm and what Dan believes is the single biggest tail risk facing the global economy right now.
与丹相处一段时间后,很难不被他对工作的真正热爱所打动。
It's hard to spend time with Dan and not come away struck by how much he genuinely loves his work.
希望你们喜欢这次与丹·松德海姆的精彩对话。
I hope you enjoy this great conversation with Dan Sondheim.
我想花大量时间聊聊公开市场与私人市场之间的区别。
I wanna spend a bunch of time talking about public versus private.
你两者都做。
You do both.
你十年前就开始投资私人市场了。
You started investing in privates more than ten years ago.
你可以说是这一领域的先驱之一。
You were kind of one of the pioneers of this.
你持有了一些令人惊叹的大型私人投资头寸。
You've got some amazing, huge private positions.
请描绘一下2026年今天这两个市场的感受有何不同。
Draw the contrast today in 2026 of the difference in how the two markets feel.
我很好奇很多方面,比如你如何思考估值差异,一个市场能向你揭示另一个市场的什么信息,以及私人投资与公开股票对冲基金的运作方式。
I'm curious a lot of things here, like how you think about valuation differences, what one tells you about the other, you know, the business of privates versus a public equity hedge fund.
我想深入探讨所有这些内容。
I wanna go into kind of all of it.
从宏观层面来看,你对这两个市场的差异有何感受?
At a high level, what is your feeling on the difference between the two markets?
这种差异会随着时间变化。
It changes over time.
这取决于你处于周期的哪个阶段。
It depends on where you are in a cycle.
我认为目前,晚期阶段的私人投资存在许多有趣的机会。
I'd say right now, I think that there's a lot of interesting opportunities in late stage privates.
目前,世界上一些市值最大的公司都是私营企业。
Some of the largest companies in the world by market cap are private right now.
这些公司不仅规模庞大且为私营,还在以改变世界的方式进行创新。
And not only are they large and private, they are innovating in a way that's gonna change the world.
这个时刻尤其值得关注。
This moment is particularly interesting.
我认为,总体而言,私募市场竞争较小。
I think that in general private markets are less competitive.
当然,分析企业的核心能力是创造价值的主要部分,但还有其他方面也很重要。
There's obviously the core skill set of analyzing businesses is the majority of what creates value, but there's other aspects of it too.
通常,私募投资者对某家公司是否卓越并无分歧。
Like oftentimes there's no disagreement among private investors that a certain company is is excellent.
这家公司必须愿意让你成为其投资者。
That company has to want you to be an investor in the company.
因此,从能够投资于最佳公司的角度来看,这仍然是一个竞争激烈的领域。
So it's competitive from the standpoint of like being able to create a situation where you can invest in the best companies.
但就评估公司来产生回报的难度而言呢?
But in terms of like how difficult is it to generate returns by assessing companies?
我认为公开市场是全球最竞争激烈的市场,尽管它们的效率不如以前了。
I'd say the public markets are the most competitive in the world, even though they are less efficient than they were before.
但仍然有更多的人在更多地方关注公司的信息。
It's still you have more people in more places looking at information in companies.
而在私人市场方面,根据定义,关注每个情况的人更少,资本也更少。
Where in the private side, just by definition, you fewer people looking at every situation and less capital.
我认为其中一个平衡因素是,在私人市场中,你不会遇到这种动态:人们因为关注短期利益或商业模式与基于长期内在价值的投资不一致而做出经济上不理性的行为,而这种现象在公开市场中是存在的。
I would say that one difference that equalizes a bit is that you don't have this dynamic on the private side of people doing things that are economically irrational because they're focused in the short term or they're just their business model is not consistent with investing based on long term intrinsic value, where you have in the public market.
在私人市场中,每次我们评估一家企业时,每个人都在做同样的事情。
In the private market, every time we're looking at a business, everybody's doing the same thing.
我们可以与其他投资同一家公司的公司交流。
We could talk to other firms that are investing in the same company.
他们的研究可能和我们的不同,但都是为了得出同一个答案。
Their research may be different than ours, but it is all trying to get at same answer.
这与公开市场非常不同。
That's very different than the public markets.
所以竞争的人更少,但他们都做着同样的事情。
So there's fewer people competing, but they're all doing the same thing.
而在公开市场,竞争的人非常多,但每个人玩的都是不同的游戏。
Whereas the public markets, there's tons of people competing, but they're all playing a different sport.
如果你想想你当前私人投资组合中的关键公司,比如Anthropic、OpenAI、SpaceX、Ramp等。
If you think about the key companies in your private portfolio today, Anthropic, OpenAI, companies like SpaceX, Ramp, etcetera.
这个群体教会了你什么?
What does that group teach you?
你认为未来可能会出现什么,而公开市场尚未充分认识到,且没有同样接触到这些优秀的私人企业?
What do you think you see coming that maybe the public markets don't fully appreciate yet, that don't have that same exposure to those great private businesses?
自从我开始从事私人和公开市场投资以来,某些时候确实存在协同效应。
As long as I've been doing private and public investing, at some points in time there is synergy.
但如果说我们创立公司之初,当时有25%的时间我们在评估一家私人公司时,能与我们在公开市场的投资产生协同效应。
But I'd say if you go back to when we founded the firm, 25% of time we looked at a private company, there was some synergy with what we were doing on the public side.
现在由于人工智能以及私人市场中如此多的创新,这种协同效应比我以往见过的都要强得多。
Now because of AI and because of there's so much innovation happening in the private markets, the synergies are just greater than I've ever seen before.
我认为,如果你要对那些深受人工智能影响的上市公司形成观点——最终几乎所有上市公司都会如此——
And that I think if you're gonna take a view on public companies that are deeply impacted by AI, which eventually will be almost every public company.
你就应该对当前技术的发展阶段、技术的未来走向以及其影响有自己的判断。
You should have an opinion on where is the technology now, where is the technology going, what are the implications of it.
投资这些公司能让你获得这种视角,而这种协同效应是我从未见过如此强烈的。
And investing in those companies gives you that perspective in a way that I've never seen greater synergy.
当你最初考虑对OpenAI和Anthropic进行初始投资时,你是否将它们的业务或商业模式与历史上见过的任何案例进行过类比?
When you first were considering your initial investments in OpenAI and Anthropic, did you pattern match their businesses or their business models on anything that you had seen historically?
它们让你想起了什么吗?
Did they remind you of anything?
它们非常不同,因为当我们最初投资OpenAI时,我并不认为这有什么反主流之处。
They were very different in that when we first invested in OpenAI, I wouldn't say it was contrarian at all.
在某种程度上,我们最初是在估值1250亿美元的那轮融资中参与投资的。
To some extent, we invested originally at the $125,000,000,000 round.
所以我认为当时人们并没有完全认同大语言模型作为一种商业模式。
So I don't think people were entirely sold on LLMs as a business model.
但如果你想投资大语言模型这一商业模式,OpenAI 是唯一的选择。
But if you want to invest in LLMs as a business model, OpenAI was the one.
是否投资大语言模型曾引发广泛讨论。
Whether you invest in LLMs or didn't invest in LLMs was debated quite a bit.
我的意思是,当时人们对这些公司的最终商业模式存在很大不确定性,所以我们必须弄清楚这一点。
I mean, I think there was a lot of uncertainty about the ultimate business model of these companies, so that was what we had to figure out.
Anthropic 的情况则不同,当我们最初投资 Anthropic 时,我接触过的一些我认为非常聪明的人,将它与 Uber 和 Lyft 做了类比,探讨为什么要去投资第二名。
Anthropic was a different situation in that when we first invested in Anthropic, a number of people that I spoke to who I think are very smart drew the analogy of Uber versus Lyft or why you invest in the second player.
在大多数行业中,投资第二名并不是通向成功的路径。
In most industries, investing in the second player is not the path to glory.
但我当时的看法是,在那个阶段,根本很难判断谁会成为第一名,谁会成为第二名。
But the way I viewed it was it was incredibly difficult at that stage to say like who was going to be first and who was going be second.
要回答你关于 Anthropic 的问题,我的模式识别方式就是阅读 Dario 的文章,并听他在播客中的发言。
The pattern recognition to answer your question for me on Anthropic was just reading Dario's essays and listening to him on podcasts.
当我回顾我的职业生涯,回想我们错过的公司,比如亚马逊早期阶段,我在想我当时能发现什么?
When I look back at my career and look back at the companies we missed, Amazon in the early days, and I think what could I have seen?
如果你看他们的损益表,只会看到一片红色。
If you look at their income statement, you would just see a sea of red.
唯一的线索是阅读杰夫·贝佐斯1997年的股东信,其中展现出的思想清晰度、他对目标的深刻理解以及为股东创造价值的方式,远超我接触过的几乎所有上市公司CEO。
The only telltale sign was reading Jeff Bezos's 1997 shareholder letter, which was like the clarity of thought, his understanding of what he wanted to achieve and how to create value for shareholders was greater than almost a public CEO I dealt with.
如果我当时读了那封信,几乎忽略其他所有信息,那将是一个极其重要且盈利的信号。
If I had read that and almost ignored everything else, it would have been a really important sign and very profitable.
达里奥给我的感觉就是这样。
Dario struck me like that.
当时那些模型并没有那么大的差异性。
It wasn't that the models at that point were so differentiated.
我认为在那时,他们被认为可能是最终可能重要的五到七个玩家之一。
I think they were considered to be one of probably maybe that point five, six, seven players that could ultimately be important.
关于大语言模型作为商业模式,至今仍有很多争议。
There's still a lot of debate around LLMs as a business model.
但我感觉他极其出色且高度专注。
But I felt like he was incredibly skilled and extremely focused.
我非常重视清晰的思维和作为CEO的表达能力,即你想要实现什么以及如何实现,尤其是在书面形式上,因为花时间写下来,你必须真正梳理清楚自己计划做的一切,并以一种让所有人都能理解的方式表达出来。
And I place a lot of weight, rightly wrongly, on clarity of thought and the ability to communicate as a CEO, like what you want to achieve and how you're gonna achieve it, especially in written form because taking the time to write something down, you actually really have to go through everything you plan to do and express it in a way that makes sense to everybody else.
达里奥在这方面做得比我自贝索斯以来见过的任何CEO都要好。
And Dario just did that better than almost any CEO I've seen since Bezos.
你今天会如何界定关于大语言模型作为商业模式的争论?
How would you frame the debate today about LLMs as a business model?
我们如何能了解更多?
How do we know a bit more?
那时,人们在讨论这些企业是否能产生经济回报。
Back then, it was like, are these businesses going to ever generate an economic return?
我想到的一个类比是,人工智能会变得非常重要,就像航空旅行一样。
I think one analogy was AI will be huge, so was air travel.
但航空公司并不是一门好生意。
Airlines were not a good business.
航空公司之间没有什么区别,因此回报率会降至资本成本水平。
There's nothing differentiating about one airline or the other and so therefore the returns go down to the cost of capital.
显然我们持不同观点,但当时我们对这一看法的可信度大约是六五开、七三开。
Obviously we took a different view, but that was like a 65, 35, seventy, thirty degree of confidence in that at that point.
更重要的是这种不对称性。
It was more about the skew.
如果事情如我们所料发展,且商业模型真的能实现,那将是一个巨大的市场。
If things played out like we thought and the business models were actually moded would be huge.
我认为,如今我们在这一讨论所处的位置已经不同了。
I think at this point we're in a different place in terms of the debate that's important.
如果从积极的角度来看——而我们确实如此——当前重要的讨论是,这些公司在人工智能领域采取了略有不同的路径,并在不同方面表现出色。
The debate that's important now, if you wanna look through a positive lens, which we do, you'd say that the businesses have taken slightly different lanes and have excelled at different things within AI.
因此,OpenAI 在消费者市场表现优异,并在企业市场取得了良好进展。
So OpenAI has been a great consumer and has had good traction enterprise.
Anthropic 在编程领域取得了巨大成功。
Anthropic has been incredibly successful at coding.
我们最初投资时有一个观点,认为API或让其他软件公司、开发者接入你的模型这一商业模式会被商品化。
There was a thesis when we first invested that APIs or the business of having other software companies plug into your other developers plug into your model would be commoditized.
这将变成一场价格战。
It would just be a race to the bottom.
我认为这个争论现在基本无关紧要了,因为你已经看到Clog代码甚至OpenAI的API业务,这些都是持久的业务。
I think that debate is more or less irrelevant because you've just seen with Clog code and even OpenAI's API business, these are durable businesses.
是的,你能切换吗?
And yes, can you switch?
你可以切换,就像你可以切换AWS或Azure一样,但对许多企业来说,这样做并不值得。
You can, the same way you could switch AWS or Azure, but it's not worth it for a lot of businesses to do it.
而且,这些模型之间存在足够的差异性。
And, there's sufficient differentiation among the models.
如果你看看这些公司的底层利润率,它们并不是商品化行业常见的利润率。
If you look at the underlying margins of these companies, they are not the margins that you see in a commoditized industry.
毛利率相当高。
The gross margins are quite high.
我认为竞争格局并没有太多争议。
The competitive landscape I think is not heavily debated.
到目前为止,你可能已经有四到五个大型语言模型将在长期保持重要地位。
At this point you probably have four or five LLMs that will be relevant in the long term.
我不认为这种情况会改变。
I don't see that changing.
并不是说外面缺乏足够的人才,而是进入这个领域所需的资本太过庞大,这些公司目前规模已经太大,而且你越有资本,就能获得越多的算力,吸引更好的研究人员,形成滚雪球效应。
Not that there's not sufficient talent out there, it's just that the capital required to get into this business is too great and these companies are too big at this point and then you kinda get the snowball of more capital you have, the more compute, you get better researchers.
我认为这会非常困难。
I think can be very difficult.
因此,竞争格局实际上并没有疑问。
So the competitive landscape is not really in question.
我不认为有人会说这些商业模式是商品化的。
I don't think anyone would say that these business models are commoditized.
我认为真正的争议在于,这些是资本密集度极高的业务。
I think the real debate is these are extremely capital intensive businesses.
这种资本密集程度在商业史上前所未有。
Capital intensive to a degree that we've never seen before in the history of business.
问题是,你投入了大量资本,但这些资本的最终回报却是未知的。
And the question is, you're spending a ton of capital and the ultimate return on that capital is unknown.
这不像普通企业那样建个工厂就知道会卖什么。
So it's not like a normal business who builds a factory and knows what they're gonna sell.
你正在投入大量资本来训练模型。
You are spending tons of capital to train a model.
问题是,规模定律是否能确保这些资本的回报持续具有吸引力,也就是说,你能否因此吸引更多的资本并构建更好的模型,还是说你会达到这样一个节点:所有人都回头说,我们融了太多钱,花了太多钱训练模型,却没有获得经济回报?或者,同样可能的是,人们会说,最终你还是会获得经济回报,只是比预期慢了很多。
And the question is, do the scaling laws work such that the returns on that capital continue to be attractive, which means that you will be able to attract more capital and build better models or are you going to get to a point where everyone looks back and says we raised too much money, we spent too much training models, we didn't get the economic return or I think equally likely, not more likely people would say ultimately you will get the economic return, but it just happened slower than you would have thought.
企业采用的速度并没有像你预期的那样迅速提升,因此,当一家企业如此资本密集时,它会带来远超普通企业的财务杠杆和运营杠杆。
Enterprise adoption just didn't take off as quickly as you thought and therefore the problem is when you are this capital intensive as a business, it introduces financial leverage and operating leverage to a degree you don't see in normal businesses.
所以,你没有两三年时间来容忍事情比预期进展得更慢。
So you don't have the luxury of two or three years of things going slower than you otherwise would expect.
我认为,规模定律、资本回报率,以及这些工具和人工智能在整个经济中被采用的速度,才是关键问题。
I think the scaling laws, the returns on capital, and the speed at which these tools and AI is adopted throughout the economy are the questions.
Netflix之类的公司能给我们什么启示吗?
Is there anything that Netflix or something like that could teach us?
另一个让人想到的业务是,它们投入了巨额资本来构建资产,然后将这些成本分摊到越来越庞大的用户群体上。
That's another business that comes to mind where there's crazy amount of capital that was spent to build an asset and then it gets amortized over a bigger and bigger user base.
这最终成为了一只表现优异的股票,我知道你持有过很多。
And that's turned out to be a great stock and one that I know you've owned a lot.
你觉得这两者之间有什么有趣的相似之处吗?
Is there any analogy between those two that's interesting to you?
当我与大语言模型公司的高管们交谈时,我是这样比喻的:我认为你们的业务是Netflix和Spotify的某种结合。
When I was speaking to the executives at the LLMs, the way I framed it is I said, look, I think your business is some kind of combination between Netflix and Spotify.
像Netflix一样,与其他科技公司不同,你们需要在前期投入大量资金来训练这些模型。
Netflix in that unlike other tech companies, you are spending a ton of money upfront to train these models.
一旦模型训练完成,你们就能以极高的边际利润率进行销售。
Once these models are trained, you go sell them at extremely high incremental margins.
你们并不知道这个固定资产能带来多少收入。
You don't know what the revenues are gonna be from that fixed asset that you've built.
但既然你已经建成了这个资产,你就希望尽可能多地销售,以便获得现金流来构建下一个模型,以此类推。
But to the extent that you've built that asset, you wanna sell as much as possible so that you can get the cash flows to build the next model and so on and so forth.
这与Netflix非常相似,因为他们投资于内容。
That's very similar to Netflix, in that they invested in content.
作为这类固定资产业务的早期进入者,你会大力投资,获得资本来大规模投入,获得收入,并将成本分摊到越来越多的用户身上,然后继续加大对这一固定资产的投资,从而形成一种良性循环:收入增加、内容增加、收入再增加、内容再增加。
And when you're an early mover, this kind of fixed asset business, you invest heavily, you get the capital to invest heavily, you get the revenues, you spread it out over an increasing number of people, you invest more in that fixed asset, and that just kind of has a flywheel effect of generating more revenue, more content, more revenue, more content.
最终,你会达到一个几乎无法被竞争的地步,因为先发优势实在太强大了。
And eventually you get to the point where it's almost impossible to compete because it's just a first mover advantage is too great.
如果你要问Netflix和这些模型之间的重要区别是什么,那就是Netflix的内容是差异化的。
The difference, if you were to say like what is an important difference of Netflix versus these models is Netflix's content was differentiated.
而这些模型之间的相似性远大于差异性。
The models are more similar than they are different.
在任何给定时间,OpenAI可能拥有更好的模型,Anthropic也可能拥有更好的模型。
At any given time, OpenAI may have a better model, Anthropic may have a better model.
但大量的专业知识和创新都会很快被传播开来。
But a lot of the expertise and innovation gets disseminated pretty quickly.
所以这些模型并没有太大区别。
So these models are not terribly different.
这就是为什么会出现Spotify的类比。
And that's where the Spotify analogy comes in.
我认为,如果你是谷歌或OpenAI,差异点不一定会在于谷歌能给你更好的答案。
In that, I think if you're Google or you are OpenAI, the differentiating factor will not necessarily be that Google gives you a better answer.
如果我们只是简单地向Gemini或ChatGPT提问,我认为长期来看,并不会明确地说哪一个能给出更好的答案。
Like if we were just like to query Gemini or ChatGPT on something, I don't think it's the case that we would say definitively one will give you a better answer over time.
然而,个性化才是关键。
However, the personalization matters.
而先发优势在于,这些模型对你了解得越多——了解你的生活方式、健康状况以及对你重要的所有事情——你积累的数据历史就越深厚,用户粘性也就越强。
And the first mover advantage is like the more that these models know about you, how you live your life, your health, all the things that are important to you, you build up this data history and it becomes very sticky.
Spotify上的音乐与Apple Music或Amazon Music并没有区别。
The music on Spotify is no different than Apple Music or Amazon Music.
从理论上讲,它是一种纯粹的标准化商品。
Theoretically, it's a pure commodity.
是什么让Spotify拥有定价权?
What makes Spotify have pricing power?
是什么让它与众不同?
What makes it differentiated?
如果有人告诉你不能再使用Spotify了,为什么人们会如此愤怒?
Why would people be incredibly upset if you said like you had to not use Spotify anymore?
这是因为它是个性化的。
It's because it's personalized.
这是因为它们已经将这项服务进行了定制,把一个原本是大宗商品的产品,个性化到让你愿意为它支付溢价的程度。
It's because they've tailored the service to take a product which is a commodity and personalize it to the point where you're willing to pay a premium for that commodity.
如果你要给这些公司的高管提供建议,告诉他们未来五年该聚焦什么、警惕什么,我很想知道你会说什么,因为扩展定律如此引人入胜——模型一直在变得不可思议地强大,这可能意味着可获得的收入规模会大到难以想象,甚至可能覆盖全世界。
If you were giving advice to the executives at these companies and telling them what to lean into and what to look out for over the next five years, I'm curious what you would say because the scaling laws are so interesting in the sense that like the models keep getting unbelievably better and that probably means the revenue available is like, who knows how big it could be, it could be the whole world.
但成本却以数量级的速度持续上升。
But the cost keeps going up by orders of magnitude.
Colossus两个数据中心,这个难以想象的巨大工程,耗电高达两吉瓦,太疯狂了。
The Colossus two data centers, this unfathomably big thing, it's like two gigawatts of power, it's crazy.
基于你对这些庞大企业的了解,你会给他们什么建议?
What advice would you give them based on everything you've learned about these big massive businesses?
这些企业——尤其是大语言模型——真正有趣且具有挑战性的方面在于,它们现在构建的模型,乃至未来将构建的模型,几乎可以应用于经济的任何领域。
The really interesting thing and challenging aspect of these businesses, the LLMs, is that the models they are building now and especially in the future can be applied to almost any aspect of the economy.
你可以利用这些模型,让它们成为个人助手,从而提升消费者的日常生活效率。
You can take these models and you can make consumers lives more efficient by having them be personal assistants.
你可以用它们解决物理问题,协助药物研发,或提升企业运营效率。
You could solve physics problems, you could help with drug discovery, you could make enterprises more efficient.
总市场规模肯定不是问题。
The TAM is certainly not the problem.
焦点将成为一个疑问。
Focus is gonna be a question mark.
一方面,用固定的资产进入更多的终端市场,效果会更好。
And on the one hand, the more end markets you go after with a fixed asset, the better.
你将成本分摊到更多的终端市场,从而获得更多的收入,这些收入又能被重新投入。
You're spreading that cost over more end markets and having more revenue which then can be reinvested.
我认为相反的一面是,我很少看到有公司试图同时开拓多个终端市场还能成功的。
I think the flip side of that is that I rarely have seen any company succeed trying to do, go after multiple end markets at the same time.
通常,一支顶尖团队只会专注于一件事。
Usually you have an a team, an a team is focused on one thing.
一家公司的文化要么面向消费者,要么面向企业。
Your culture as a company is oriented towards either consumer or enterprise.
即使是亚马逊,你也可以说它是一家从消费者业务切入企业市场的公司。
Even Amazon, you'd say is like the example of a consumer company that got into enterprise.
他们是在上市多年后,大约七年才进入企业市场的。
They got into it like seven years later after, even after they went public.
所以,试图同时做所有事情很有诱惑力,因为如果你成功了,你实际上是在将固定成本分摊到更多的收入来源上。
So trying to do everything at once is tempting because if you're successful, you're effectively just amortizing that fixed asset over more revenue streams.
但与此同时,你也会冒失去在任何一件事上做到顶尖的风险。
At the same time, you risk not being the best at any one thing.
这就是其中的权衡。
So that is the trade off.
我认为我们还没有最终的答案。
And I think that I'm not sure we have the final answer.
目前,市场曾经历过一些阶段,认为Anthropic是Lyft,而OpenAI是Uber。
Right now, the market has gone through periods where they thought Anthropic was Lyft and OpenAI was Uber.
直到最近,对OpenAI的评价还更消极。
And up until recently, the sentiment on OpenAI was more negative.
我认为OpenAI采取的策略是:我们什么都做。
I think OpenAI is taking the strategy of let's do everything.
我们要进军苹果硬件、机器人、企业、消费市场和科学领域。
We're gonna go after Apple hardware, we're gonna go after robotics, gonna go after enterprise, consumer, science.
他们在很多方面都非常成功,但这很难。
They've been very successful in a lot of ways, but that's hard.
我肯定还有一些我没想到的公司,但我想不到有多少例子能成功做到这一点。
I'm sure there are companies I'm not thinking of, but I can't think of many examples where that's been successful.
我理解这样做很有吸引力。
I understand the temptation to do it.
显然,与历史不同的是,世界上最有智慧的人现在都去这些公司工作了。
And obviously the difference versus history is that the smartest people in the world are all going to work at these companies.
所以,如果有人能成功,那一定是他们。
So if anyone's gonna pull it off, they will.
Anthropic 采取了不同的策略,直接表示:我们只专注于企业市场。
Anthropa took a different approach and just said, we are going to focus on enterprise.
他们早期尝试过消费市场,但很快发现没有取得进展。
They tried consumer early on but it became clear they didn't have traction.
于是他们全身心投入企业市场。
So then they just went all in enterprise.
他们在编程和企业领域取得了巨大成功,因为现在已经占据了市场领先地位。
They've had a lot of success with coding and enterprise because they've now taken a market leading position.
普遍的看法是,Anthropic 正在获胜,如果要用这个类比,他们现在就像是 Uber。
Generally sentiment is that Anthropic is winning and they are like now the Uber, if you wanna use that analogy.
我认为这种情况会随着时间推移反复变化,人们很可能在两个方向上都过度热情,但我觉得这些是最大的差异。
I think this is gonna go back and forth over time and people probably get carried away in both directions, but I think those are the biggest differences.
我可能会倾向于专注,但我理解试图同时做很多事情的经济逻辑。
I would probably on the side of focus, but I do understand the economic rationale for trying to do as many things as once.
早在我们投资OpenAI的时候——这大概是一年半前,我就对他们说,你们必须这么做。
The only thing I early on when we invested in OpenAI, this is probably a year and a half ago, I said to them, you have to do that.
我明白,我已经见过太多次了。
I understand, I've seen it so many times.
硅谷的人们对广告这种想法,
People in Silicon Valley, the idea of ads like
好像就是那一个。
Appears to that one.
因为这就像我拥有一个极其出色的纯技术产品,而你却希望我
Because it's like I have this amazing pure technology product and you want me to like
玷污它。
Taint it.
用广告来涂抹它,就像你看到Anthropic在超级碗的广告一样。
Paint it with ads and like you see Anthropix, Super Bowl commercial.
话虽如此,即使是那些最坚决反对投放广告的公司,比如奈飞。
That being said, even the companies that were the most adamant about never getting into ads like Netflix.
如果你回溯十五年前奈飞的说法,那时他们甚至会认为,做广告简直是疯了,我们绝不会这么做。
If you go back and just listen to what Netflix was saying even fifteen years ago, it was like getting into ads, even Reed would have been like, you are out of your mind, we would never do that.
但最终,他们还是这么做了。
Ultimately, they did it.
在我看来,如果你最终决定做广告,第一,如果你不这么做,就很难与那些使用广告的公司竞争,这非常困难。
And to me it's like, if you're going to do it ultimately, one, you can't really compete against companies that are using ads if you're not, very hard.
如果你最终决定做广告,不如早点开始,因为你需要时间来建立相应的文化。
If you're ultimately gonna do it, you might as well start earlier because you have to build a culture around, just takes time.
我不觉得推迟启动是个大问题,我可能确实——无论对错——比他们实际选择的时间更早地推动了广告的引入。
I don't think it's a big deal that opening, I waited, but I was probably, rightly or wrongly, I was pushing for ads sooner than they've chosen to do it.
我认为现在他们很可能能做对这件事。
I think now they're probably gonna get it right.
随着你的业务规模扩大,一切都会变得更加复杂,尤其是你的合规和安全需求。
As your business scales up, everything gets more complex, especially your compliance and security needs.
由于众多工具只提供临时解决方案和补丁,某些问题漏掉的可能性实在太高了。
With so many tools offering Band Aids and patches, it's unfortunately far too easy for something to slip through the cracks.
幸运的是,Vanta 是一个强大的工具,旨在简化并自动化你的安全工作,为合规与风险提供单一可信数据源。
Fortunately, Vanta is a powerful tool designed to simplify and automate your security work and deliver a single source of truth for compliance and risk.
Ramp、Cursor 和 Snowflake 都使用 Vanta,这并非偶然——它让他们能够专注于打造卓越且独具特色的产品。
There's a reason that Ramp, Cursor, and Snowflake all use Vanta it frees them to focus on building amazing, differentiated products.
知道合规与安全都得到了有效管控。
Knowing that compliance and security are under control.
了解更多,请访问 vanta.com/invest。
Learn more at vanta.com/invest.
我亲身体会到资产管理人的技术栈有多么复杂,每新增一个工具或数据源,都会让问题变得更糟,带来更多复杂性、人力负担和风险。
I know firsthand how complex the tech stack is for asset managers, and seemingly every new tool and data source makes the problem even worse, adding more complexity, more headcount, and more risk.
Ridgeline 提供了更好的解决方案:一个统一的平台,自动处理投资组合会计、对账、报告、交易、合规等所有复杂环节。
Ridgeline offers a better way forward, one unified platform that automates away all that complexity across portfolio accounting, reconciliation, reporting, trading, compliance, and more.
而且能够规模化运行。
All at scale.
Ridgeline正在革新投资管理,帮助有抱负的公司更快地扩展、更智能地运营,并保持领先。
Ridgeline is revolutionizing investment management, helping ambitious firms scale faster, operate smarter, and stay ahead of the curve.
看看Ridgeline能为您的公司带来什么突破。
See what Ridgeline can unlock for your firm.
前往ridgelineapps.com预约演示。
Schedule a demo at ridgelineapps.com.
我很好奇,你现在觉得超大规模云服务商未来会怎样?
I'm so curious what you think is gonna happen to the hyperscalers now.
前几天我看到一则新闻,说Anthropic正在考虑为自己争取10吉瓦的电力,这让我想到,好吧,他们将掌握电力资源。
I saw this news report the other day that Anthropic's considering securing 10 gigawatts now of their own power, which just makes me think, okay, they're gonna have the power.
规模会变得如此庞大,为什么他们不干脆自己打造云平台呢?
The scale's gonna be so big, why don't they just create their own clouds effectively?
硬件可能会不同,更专注于推理等任务。
The hardware might be different, more focused on inference, etcetera.
这会不会威胁到人们原本认为超大规模云服务商非常出色的那些商业模式?
Does that jeopardize what these business models would I think people have thought of as pretty damn good at the hyperscalers.
你认为人工智能会让未来有所不同吗?
Do you think the future is different as a result of AI?
是的。
I do.
我大概一年来一直这么想。
I've kind of thought this for probably about a year now.
我更加确信,从长远来看,超大规模云服务商的商业模式是最差的。
I am more confident in the thesis that the hyperscalers are a worst business model going forward.
现在有趣的是,当你说某个商业模式最差时,通常意味着增长会放缓,利润率会下降。
Now it's interesting because usually when you say something is a worst business model, you're implying that growth is going to slow, margins are going to contract.
但我实际上认为,情况恰恰相反。
I actually think you're going to see the opposite.
我认为AWS和Azure,也许Azure不会加速,但GCP肯定会。
I think that AWS and Azure, maybe Azure doesn't accelerate, certainly GCP.
我认为这些业务在一段时间内反而会加速发展。
I think these businesses are gonna accelerate for a while.
仅仅因为他们的客户群体,比如Anthropic和OpenAI,正在以惊人的速度增长。
Just because they are, their customer bases, Anthropic, OpenAI are growing at enormous pace.
随着它们在业务中所占比例越来越大,增长会进一步加速。
And as they get to be a bigger part of the business, the growth accelerate.
问题是,过去AWS、Azure,某种程度上还包括GCP,它们的客户群体遍布全球每一家企业。
The problem is that you went from a dynamic where AWS, Azure, some extent GCP, their customer base was like every corporation in the world.
因此它们面临客户分散的问题,但也因此获得了任何单一公司都无法企及的巨大规模经济优势。
And therefore they had fragmentation and they had the benefits, massive economies of scale that no single company could get.
那是一个非常好的、非常赚钱的业务。
And it was a good, very good business.
但未来的问题在于,我认为从经济角度看,大型语言模型几乎不可能不集中在四到五家公司手中。
The problem going forward is that I think that economically it's highly unlikely that LLMs are not very concentrated in the hands of four or five companies.
这些公司目前,正如我们讨论的,正在投入大量资金,且现金流为负。
Those companies right now, they are obviously, as we discussed, they're investing a ton and they're cash flow negative.
因此它们正在四处寻找任何能获得的计算资源。
And therefore they're looking for compute anywhere they can get it.
但如果我们判断正确,任何拥有这些公司的人都认为,在未来五到十年内的某个时刻,它们将产生巨额的自由现金流。
But if we're correct, and if anyone who owns these companies is correct, at some point in the next five to ten years, they will be generating enormous amounts of free cash flow.
一旦发生这种情况,我认为它们很可能会将计算资源内部化。
When that happens, I think that they're likely to in source the compute.
每年,人工智能在任何超大规模云服务商的工作负载中所占比例都会越来越大。
And every year AI is going to be a bigger percentage of the workloads at any hyperscaler.
因此,如果展望十年后,我认为大多数工作负载很可能是人工智能相关的。
And so if you roll out ten years from now, I think that the majority of the workloads will probably be AI.
大型语言模型可能会提供其中大部分工作负载。
The LLMs will probably be providing a lot of those workloads.
我认为,将这些业务内部化在经济上是合理的。
And I think that it will make economic sense to take it in house.
目前,我认为它们将超大规模云服务商视为一种融资机制。
Right now I think that they look at the hyperscalers as more of a financing mechanism.
这些公司资本雄厚、资产负债表强劲,但我并不认为它们在建设数据中心方面比这些公司更出色。
These are well capitalized companies with big balance sheets, but I don't think these companies are better than them at building data centers.
构建CPU集群与构建GPU集群是不同的。
Like building CPU clusters is different than building GPU clusters.
在GPU上运行推理与在CPU上运行工作负载非常不同。
Running inference on GPUs is very different than workloads on CPUs.
我认为这些DLMs在推理方面实际上比超大规模云服务商更出色。
And I think these DLMs are actually better at inference than the hyperscalers.
然后你还会面临整个新兴云平台的动态变化。
And then you have this whole dynamic of neo clouds.
现在我认为,大多数公众投资者最初的看法是,这仅仅是多余的容量。
Now I think that the initial view from most public investors was that this was like pure overflow capacity.
当时GPU供应不足,这些公司一旦微软跟上步伐就会倒闭。
There weren't enough GPUs and these things would be dead as soon as Microsoft got their Caught up.
是的。
Yeah.
我当然不会说它们是绝佳的生意,但我认为它们不会像人们预期的那样消失。
I certainly would not make the case that they are fantastic businesses, but I don't think they're going away like people thought.
所以我认为,它们在运行GPU集群方面比传统的超大规模云服务商更胜一筹。
So I think they're better at running GPU clusters than the traditional hyperscalers are.
我认为英伟达和其他芯片公司对确保客户基础多元化非常感兴趣。
And I think there's a lot of interest from NVIDIA and other chip companies to make sure that their customer base is diversified.
英伟达拥有雄厚的资产负债表,他们希望这些公司能够持续运营下去。
NVIDIA has a very big balance sheet and they want to keep these players in business.
在未来十年,我认为这些超大规模云服务商,比如AWS和Azure,将会快速增长。
Over the next ten years, I think that these hyperscalers, AWS, Azure will grow fast.
我认为它们的利润率可能会受到挑战,因为这些业务正变得越来越资本密集——AI比传统工作负载需要更多的资本投入。
I think the margins, my guesses will be challenged both because the businesses are getting a lot more capital intensive because AI is capital intensive, more capital intensive than traditional workloads.
同时,客户群体也正变得越来越集中。
And also the customer base is getting more concentrated.
Meta并不是一家超大规模云服务商,但它们已经将所有计算资源内部化了。
Meta is not a hyperscaler, but they insourced all their compute.
那它们为什么要付费呢?
Why would they pay?
我的意思是,它们规模太大了,不可能依赖外部供应商来实现增长。
I mean, they're just too big to use somebody on the upside.
如果你回顾过去几年,你可能做得最好的事情就是全面参与AI基础设施的建设。
If you think about the last couple of years, probably the best thing you could have done is just belonged the AI build out in all its various forms.
而且未来可能依然如此。
And maybe that will remain true going forward.
但似乎市场现在开始思考AI软件带来的其他影响了。
But it seems like the market a little bit is starting to think now ahead to the other implications of AI software.
我们说的是,在软件股刚刚遭遇重创之后的一周,大家都因为代码臃肿和糟糕的体验,认为软件公司完蛋了。
We're talking like the week after software got absolutely decimated in the market and everyone thinks because of clogged code and the amazing experiences that they're having with clogged code, like software businesses are just screwed.
我很好奇,你现在如何看待超越AI基础设施建设的其他方面?
I'm curious how you're starting to think now beyond just the AI build.
好吧,看起来AI确实会到来。
Okay, it seems like there's a thing, like it's gonna be here.
现在,整个世界都必须开始适应这项技术。
Now the rest of the world has to start to absorb this technology.
你是怎么思考这个问题的?
How are you thinking through that?
我非常好奇你对软件板块的抛售怎么看,但更广泛地说,实体经济现在必须开始消化这项新技术。
Maybe I'm super curious what you think about the software sell off, but even more broadly, the real economy now has to start to swallow this new technology.
我特别想知道你觉得这会如何发生。
I'm so curious how you think that's gonna happen.
要弄清楚这一点非常困难。
It is incredibly difficult to know.
我认为这并不是因为我信息不完整。
And I don't think that's because I don't have perfect information.
我认为这是因为这些模型的改进速度呈指数级增长,而理解它们如何渗透到实体经济及其影响是很难的。
I think it's just these models are improving at a rate which is exponential and understanding how that makes its way into the real economy and the implications is difficult.
我认为你可能需要使用一些框架。
I think that you probably want to use a few frameworks.
归根结底,关键在于你觉得哪些公司能在大多数情况下拥有护城河。
It really comes down to like which companies do you think will have a moat in most circumstances.
要识别那些受到数字大语言模型保护的护城河其实相当直接,比如数字智能的广泛普及。
It's fairly straightforward to identify moats that are protected from digital LLMs, like just the proliferation of digital intelligence.
一旦进入机器人技术和其他领域,你就不得不开始质疑一些传统工业公司的护城河,以及在全球范围内,那些依赖劳动力套利的国家相对于发达经济体的表现如何。
Once you get into robotics and other areas, you start to have to question the moats around some other traditional industrial companies and globally, how do countries that were arbitraging labor do relative to a developed economy?
因此,这个过程会分阶段进行,第一阶段是软件。
So there's going to be phases of this where the first phase is software.
这主要是因为‘堵塞的代码’已经进入了时代精神。
And that's really because like clogged code entered the zeitgeist.
突然之间,人们开始接触到‘堵塞的代码’,然后在推特上看到有人说:‘我一天之内就建了一个客户关系管理系统。’
And it's like all of a sudden people receive clogged code and all of a sudden they just see on Twitter that people are saying like, oh, I created a CRM system in like a day.
我当时就想:天啊,这可不妙。
And I was like, oh my god, this isn't good.
现在人们就处在这样的阶段。
That's kind of where people are now.
我们在年终报告中写道:我认为,从公共市场的投资角度来看,基础设施建设仍将是重点,但越来越关键的问题将是哪些公司会受到影响,而且迄今为止,在人工智能领域还没有出现过做空。
We wrote in our letter at the end of the year, I said, look, the build out is still gonna be a thing in terms of like places to invest in the public markets, but it's increasingly gonna become which companies are affected and it's gonna become there haven't been any shorts in AI.
在2026年之前,实际上几乎没有做空行为。
There was like basically no shorts prior to 2026 really.
如果你只是想说,我要因为AI做空某只股票,那你根本赚不到多少钱。
Like if you wanted to just say like, I'm gonna short something because of AI, you didn't make a lot of money.
在我们的信中,我说过,由于AI,将会出现大量做空和一些做多。
In our letter, I said like, there are going to be a lot of shorts, some longs because of AI.
软件是第一个。
Software is the first one.
我认为市场往往会走向极端。
I think the market tends to swing to extremes.
我猜测,软件行业必须进化,未来可能成为一个更差的商业模式。
My guess is that software will have to evolve, will probably be a worse business model going forward.
但我觉得,就像沃尔玛在电子商务中演变一样,他们当然更希望电子商务从未发生过?
But I think the same way that Walmart evolved with e commerce and yes, would they have all us equal preferred that e commerce never happened?
可能至少在初期,需要巨额投资,他们的利润率受到冲击,还出现了新竞争对手。
Probably, at least at the beginning, required enormous amount of investment, their margins took a hit, they had new competitors.
我认为软件也会是这种情况,那些拥有卓越分销渠道和优秀商业模式、且其系统已成为企业记录的公司会保持优势。
I think that'll be the case with software too where companies that have really great distribution and great business models and their systems are record for companies.
我做的一件事是问了大语言模型:你们在自己设计ERP系统吗?
One of the things I did is I asked the LLMs, I said, are you designing your own ERP system?
它们回答说:不,我们正在从这家公司的购买新的ERP系统。
And they said, no, we're buying a new ERP system from this company.
法院书记员。
Court tellers.
如果他们正在
If they're at
至少如果他们还没这么做,你们在几年内还是有保障的。
least you're protected at least for a few years if they're not doing it yet.
所以我认为,作为企业记录的系统很难被取代。
So I think systems of record are gonna be difficult to displace.
我认为,尽管开发用于小幅提升生产力的软件很有趣,但如果你真的想用ERP系统或CRM系统来运行整个企业,我觉得人们要过很久才会用‘氛围编程’来开发一个ERP系统。
I think companies, while it's neat to create software for small productivity enhancements, if you really want to run your entire business on something like an ERP system or a CRM system, think I it's gonna be quite a while before people are just gonna be vibe coding an ERP system.
展开剩余字幕(还有 480 条)
但我不认为一家软件公司可以坐等,声称自己是系统记录者,就万事大吉了。
But I don't think that you can just sit back as a software company and say, we're a system of record, we'll be fine.
你必须整合人工智能,就像沃尔玛将电子商务融入其商业模式一样。
You're gonna have to integrate AI and find ways the same way Walmart integrated e commerce into their business model.
这个过程长期以来都很痛苦,而且可能还要经历另一端的调整。
And it was painful for a long time and probably the other side of it.
但我的信心其实很低,因为关于人工智能对经济的影响,本质上都是低确定性的——我认为每个人都可能低估了这些模型将如何大幅进步。
But this is like, I'd say fairly low conviction because everything about AI's impact on the economy is inherently low conviction because I think everyone is likely underestimating how much these models are going improve.
要真正思考未来会发生什么,你几乎不能以投资者的思维来思考。
And to really think about what's going to happen, you have to almost not think like an investor.
你必须像一个科幻爱好者那样去思考。
You have to think like somebody who's into science fiction.
你能想象这样一个版本的故事吗?这一切都被夸大了?
Can you imagine a version of the story where this is all just overblown?
有没有一种连贯的未来可能性,五年后我们回头一看,发现这些其实没那么重要,或者远没有我们今天坐在这里时想象的那么重大?
Is there any coherent potential future where five years from now we're just like, actually these things weren't that big of a deal, or they were much less of a big deal than we thought they were gonna be sitting here today?
我认为这种情况发生的唯一可能是,即便如此,这个论点也站不住脚,那就是规模定律彻底停止了。
I think the only way that would be the case is, and even this I think that argument wouldn't hold, would be if scaling laws just totally stopped.
但即使规模定律停止了,即使这些模型不再进步,我认为人们仍然有三年时间去学习如何将人工智能融入日常生活或公司运营中。
But even if scaling laws stopped, even if these models got no better, I think you probably have three years of people learning how to incorporate AI into their daily life or their companies.
如果规模定律停止了,这对企业当然不会是好事,但我仍然认为经济中会经历相当深刻的变化。
Certainly that wouldn't be good for the businesses if scaling laws stopped, but I still think you'd have pretty profound changes within the economy.
而假设规模定律会停止,这是一个概率极低的假设。
And betting that scaling laws are gonna stop is a really low probability assumption.
我的意思是,根本没有任何迹象表明情况会如此。
I mean, there's just nothing to suggest that's the case.
因此,事实上,所有迹象都表明情况恰恰相反。
And so, in fact, everything suggests the opposite.
我认为很难真正理解这意味什么。
I think it's difficult to really get your arms around what that means.
因为我们从‘这只是一个像谷歌一样的有趣聊天机器人’,一下子变成了‘天啊,这些模型将解决人类无法解决的问题’。
Because we went from like, this is like an interesting like chatbot that's like Google to like, oh my god, these are gonna be solving problems that humans can't do.
我们已经几乎达到了。
We're already almost there.
我有一个12岁的儿子,他对投资感兴趣。
I have a 12 year old son who's interested in investing.
我觉得你的儿子也对投资感兴趣。
I think your son's interested in investing.
我们以前也讨论过。
We've talked about before as well.
你给他怎么说这个职业的未来,考虑到这些工具?
What do you tell him about the future of this profession, given these tools?
这当然也适用于我们。
Surely, applies to us too.
我们现在可能已经很聪明了。
And we may be smart now.
埃隆·马斯克说,我认为他曾经说过一句话:与其做一个悲观者并被证明是对的,不如做一个乐观者并被证明是错的。
Elon Musk says, I think a line he's used is it's better to go through life being an optimist and be proved wrong than a pessimist and be proved right.
年轻时对某件事充满热情,却因为……而被劝退
To be young and to be interested in something and be dissuaded because
你只是过时了。
You're just obsolete.
你的眼睛会比你更厉害,我认为这是一种非常自我挫败的心态。
Your eyes gonna be better than you, I think is like a very self defeating mindset.
所以,你认为未来某一天,我们所做的一切都会被人工智能套利掉吗?
So do I think that it is likely that at some point in the future, everything that we do is arbitraged away by AI?
当然。
For sure.
我的意思是,如果我说不会,那未免太天真了。
I mean, I think that that would be naive of me to say no.
你觉得在未来两三年内会发生这种情况吗?
Do I think that's happening anytime the next couple of years?
我不这么认为。
I don't.
但这就像是,你会告诉别人去关注什么?
But it's almost like, what do you tell someone to focus on?
首先,除非一个人真的对某件事感兴趣,否则他不可能擅长它。
Like, first of all, unless someone's really interested in something, they're not gonna be good at it.
所以,也许当一名水管工或电工是世界上最有前景的职业,但如果你不想当水管工或电工,这也没什么帮助。
So it might be the case being a plumber or being an electrician is the most motive job in the world, but if you don't wanna be a plumber or electrician, it doesn't help very much.
所以,很难告诉你的孩子:不要做这个,不要做那个,因为这些将来会变得无关紧要。
So it's hard to tell your kids, don't do this or don't do that because it's gonna be irrelevant.
我最近看了一期播客,里面有一位离开谷歌的研究员,他说:我甚至都不建议我女儿去学习。
I saw a podcast recently with a Google researcher who left and he said like, oh, I don't even tell my daughter to study.
就只是去外面好好玩一玩吧。
It's just like go out and have a good time.
我认为这是一种非常消极的生活方式。
I think that's like a very destructive way of going through life.
你应该以一种想要达成目标、对事物感兴趣、充满好奇的态度去生活,就像这些都不会消失一样。
Like you should go through life thinking that you want to achieve things and that you're interested in things and you're curious and same way as if this doesn't exist.
如果最终你设想的那份工作已经不复存在,你就必须做出调整。
And if it turns out that whatever job you envision having no longer exists, then you'll have to adjust.
你之前和约翰、丹尼尔聊过GameStop的故事。
You've talked with John and Daniel about the GameStop story.
我们也可以在这里简单提一下。
We can touch on it here too.
但我很好奇,在那段时期——传说中2月1日,也就是1月发生GameStop事件的时候——你曾对团队说,今年你们的薪酬计算将不包含1月。你当时从中学到了关于自己什么?
I'm curious though what you most learned about yourself during that period of time when lore has it that February '1, so January was GameStop, that you went to your team and basically said, look, the way we're going to calculate your comp this year is not going include January.
那真是一段完全疯狂的时期。
Like that was just a completely insane period of time.
于是你采取了一些措施,比如为业务创造稳定性之类的。
And so you took certain steps to like create stability in the business or whatever.
但在那样一个充满巨大波动的高压时期,我很好奇你对自己有了什么新的认识,或者那段经历在情感上是怎样的。
But in such a stressful period of returns, I'm just curious what you learned about yourself or what it was like emotionally to go through that time.
这真的非常艰难。
It's incredibly difficult.
我从不希望让人觉得我在夸大自己的经历,因为有些人在生活中经历的困难要严重得多。
I never wanna come across as like too exaggerative about my experience because there's people who go through a lot worse things in life.
但作为投资者,我认为那已经是最糟糕的情况了。
But as an investor, I'd say that was about as bad as it gets.
我们从被奉为神明、人人都觉得我们如履平地,一下子变成了人人都觉得我们会倒闭。
We went from being top of the world, everyone thinks we walk on water, to being like, everyone thinks we're gonna go to business.
我不觉得自己有巨大的自尊心,但我对自己的工作非常自豪,我不需要被吹捧,但我确实非常不喜欢我们的公司和业绩被贬得一文不值。
I don't think I have an enormous ego, but I have a lot of pride in what I do and I don't need to be celebrated, but I also really did not like having our firm and our performance dragged through the mud.
当然,这种对待是应得的,因为我们的业绩确实非常糟糕。
Granted, it deserved to be treated that way because the performance was very bad.
而且那种时候也挺孤单的,你知道,在GameStop事件期间,可能只有少数几个人在经历和你一样的事情。
It also is a bit lonely in that like, you know, there's was during GameStop, there was probably of people on
电话里的人。
the call.
或者只有另外一两个人正在经历和你相同的事情。
Or two other people who are going through the same thing you had.
我发现回头去阅读和聆听肯·格里芬在2008年的访谈,以及我所敬重的人的言论,很有帮助。
I found it helpful to go back and like read and listen to like Ken Griffin's interviews in 2,008 and people that I respected.
但这很孤独。
But it's lonely.
这是在考验你的韧性。
It's a matter of testing your resilience.
我从未接近过破产。
First of never came close to going into business.
那纯粹是胡说八道。
That was just nonsense.
但我从未打算放弃。
But I never was going to quit.
尽管我们犯了一些错误,但我深信我们依然擅长自己所做的事情,我们对这个世界仍有价值,我们还能再次变得卓越。
Even though we had made some mistakes, I deeply believe that we were still good at what we do and that we had something to offer the world and we could be excellent again.
我对这一点很有信心,但GameStop事件标志着零售端市场结构变革的开始。
I was confident in that, but GameStop, it was the beginning of a change in the market structure on the retail side.
所以我明白我们必须适应这一点。
So I knew we had to adapt to that.
我不确定这会如何发展。
I didn't know exactly how that would play out.
到那时,也就是2021年、2022年,我已经从事这份工作二十年了。
By that point, by 2021, 2022, I've been doing the job for twenty years.
我从未真正经历过严重的逆境,可能是因为在某个时候,安德烈亚斯总是能迅速进行风险管控。
I never really had severe adversity, probably because at some point, like, Andreas would just like he was just very quick to risk manage.
但我从未真正遇到过那种情况。
But I never really had that.
于是我自己想,我真的会是那种第一次遇到困难就放弃的人吗?
And so like, I thought to myself, like, am I really gonna be a guy who quits the first time?
人们给出的类比是,一天天来。
I think the analogies that people gave was like, one day at a time.
就像阿克曼说的,每天试着做点能让事情变得更好一点的事。
Was like, Ackman was like, look, every day try to do something that makes things a little bit better.
因为当你经历这种程度的回撤时,如果我连续三个月表现极佳,投资者只会说,他只是波动太大、太疯狂了。
Because it's not like something that when you have that kind of a drawdown, if I hit the ball out of the park for like three months, like investors would be like, he's just volatile and and crazy.
但如果我缓慢而系统地推进,有些人就会放弃,因为他们会觉得这实在太疯狂了。
And if I slowly and methodically did it, some people would just give up because they'd say, this was just too crazy.
我们不相信他。
We don't believe in him.
所以在短期内,你不可能驳斥这种负面叙事。
So it's impossible to disprove the negative narrative in the short term.
这需要很长时间,好几年。
It takes a lot of time, years.
因此,我意识到这不可能一夜之间就改变。
And so acknowledging that this was not going to be something that you changed overnight.
人们对我的投资能力的看法,以及人们对D1作为资本投资目的地的看法,无论我做什么,都不可能一夜之间改变。
People's perception of you as investor, people's perception of D1 as an attractive place to invest capital, that was not going to change overnight no matter what I did.
我只能向内看,确保团队全体目标一致,明确我们想要达成什么,并且无论外界有多少人怀疑我们,我们都会坚持去做。
It was looking inwardly at the team, making sure that we were all on the same page, what we were trying to achieve, and that no matter how many people outside might doubt us, we were gonna do it.
或者至少我们会非常、非常努力地尝试。
Or at least we're gonna try very, very hard.
在整个经历中,有没有哪一个时刻特别突出地留在你的记忆中?无论是困难的一面,比如情感上的煎熬,还是坚韧的一面,比如你决定继续前进的那一刻?
Was there one moment in the whole experience that most stands out in your memory as particularly salient, whether it was on the difficult side, like emotionally difficult, or on the resilient side, like a decision that you were gonna forge ahead?
有没有哪一个时刻特别突出?
Does any one moment stand out?
有不同的一些时刻以不同的情感方式击中了你,比如新闻文章,朋友打电话问你:你们要破产了吗?
There are different moments that emotionally just hit you in different ways, like news articles and friends calling you saying, are you going out of business?
或者类似这些事情很多。
Or a lot of that.
当然,这些事情都很痛苦,是我以前从未需要面对过的。
And obviously those things are painful and something I had never had to deal with before.
我从未试图成为公众人物。
I've never tried to be a public figure.
突然间,一切都变得非常公开了。
And all a sudden it became very public.
最重要的时刻是我们每年两次与有限合伙人举办投资者晚宴。
The most important moment was we do semi annual investor dinners with our LPs.
这是我们主要的沟通方式。
That's our primary form of communication.
我们会定期写信,但我们会举办这些半年一次的晚宴,在四天的时间里与所有有限合伙人见面。
We write letters periodically, but we we do these semi annual dinners where over a period of four nights we meet with all of our LPs.
那是2022年6月,2022年5月是我们资金回撤的最低点。
It was June '22, June '22, trough of our drawdown was at the May 2022.
这些晚宴原定于6月3日举行。
And these dinners were scheduled for like June 3.
我们公司的总裁杰里米对我说:我们不能举办这些晚宴了。
Jeremy, the president of our firm, he said to me, he said like, we can't do these dinners.
你知道,这将会是一场灾难。
Like, you know, this is gonna be a bloodbath.
对我来说,这一点非常清楚。
To me, was like really clear.
我说,不行。
I said, no.
我们必须举办这些晚宴。
We have to do these dinners.
这正是我们走出去与投资者沟通的最重要时刻。
And this is the most important time to go out there and speak to our investors.
我有一个信息想要传达。
I had a message I wanted to convey.
我要传达的信息是我们将采取不同的做法。
Message was that we were gonna do things differently.
股票选择等所有方面都将保持不变,但投资组合的构建方式将变得更加低风险。
The stock selection, all of that was gonna be the same, but the portfolio construction was gonna be done in a way that was much less risk prone.
我打的比方是,我们会打出一垒安打和二垒安打。
The analogy I gave was like, we're gonna hit singles and doubles.
因为一垒安打和二垒安打不是烟花表演,所以我们可能需要更长时间才能回到高水位线。
It might take us longer to get back to the high watermark because singles and doubles are not fireworks.
但我们觉得,2021到2022年经历的这一切已经足够艰难了,即使从正净现值的角度来看,继续承担巨大风险才是正确的选择——而通常,当你亏光所有钱的时候,正是承担最大风险的最佳时机。
But we feel like what we've gone through in 2122 was tough enough that like even if like the right positive NPV thing would be to just keep taking a ton of risk and obviously usually the best time to take a ton of risk is when you've lost all the money.
从情感上讲,我无法再经历一次这样的过程。
Emotionally, I would not be able to go through this again.
所以我们决定,要以不同的方式经营这家公司。
So we just said look we're gonna run the business differently.
我们非常清楚,这并不是你们当初签约时所期待的。
We very much understand that this is like not what you signed up for here.
不过我认为,那时人们并没有真的认同‘他们应该承担更多风险’这种想法。
Although I think at that point people were not like yeah, signed up for like them to take on more risk.
他们更像是觉得,即使不太相信,大多数人听到这个决定还是感到欣慰的。
They were kinda like, I think most of them were like happy to hear it even if they didn't believe in it.
我们真的彻底改变了对公司的管理方式。
You know, we really went about managing the firm differently.
因此,那是一个非常关键的时刻——看着所有投资者的眼睛,我感到无比糟糕,方方面面都是。
And so that was a pretty pivotal moment just looking in the eyes of all the investors and feeling pretty horrible in every way.
扭亏为盈的过程令人振奋。
There is something invigorating about turnaround.
当你经历像这样世界崩塌、无能为力的事情时,那种处境非常令人不安。
When you're going through something like games happen like this is the world collapsing and there's nothing you can do, it's like, that's a very uncomfortable position.
即使情况真的很糟,只要你有计划并相信它,视角就会完全改变。
Even if things are really bad, when you have a plan and you believe in that plan, it changes the perspective entirely.
我确实相信这个计划,也相信我的团队,因此突然间我觉得,尽管其他人可能怀疑我们,但我坚信不疑,我们现在开启了一项使命:大幅提高回报、改善公司,并重新赢得我们作为优秀投资人的声誉。
And I really did believe in the plan and I believe in the team and so all of a sudden I felt like, okay, everybody else may doubt us, but I believe it And we are now the start of a mission to dramatically improve our returns, improve our firm, and earn back our reputation as being great investors.
假设确实有人这么做了,你如何看待那些在那段时间从D1赎回资金的人?
Assuming some did, what do you think of the people that redeemed from D1 during that time?
我不怀有任何恶意。
Well, I don't harbor any ill will.
我的意思是,从赎回行为本身来看,在某种程度上,我们活该如此。
I mean, looking at the act of redeeming is like, to some extent, we deserved it.
我的意思是,当然,我更感激那些即使在最糟糕的时候依然支持我们的人,我每次聚餐都会从这点说起。
I mean, obviously I appreciate it much more when people I always start out these dinners, even though it was the worst time.
我会说,随便问,随便批评我。
I say like, ask me anything, criticize me.
为你创造价值是我的职责。
It is my job to deliver for you.
如果我没做到,那是我的责任。
If I don't do it, it's on me.
我最终认为,当你在商业中犯错时,资本会追随回报。
I ultimately think that when you screw up in business, capital follows returns.
当你提供糟糕的回报时,资本就会离开。
And when you deliver poor returns, capital will leave.
我们有很多优秀的投资者坚持了下来,我对此深表感激,远胜于对那些赎回的人的怨恨。
We had a lot of great investors that stuck through it and I deeply appreciate that more than I resent people redeeming.
这非常不对称。
It's pretty asymmetric.
这个故事有趣的地方在于,当你去问别人时,大多数人会说你异常冷静,心率很低。
What's interesting about the story is when you ask around, most people would say that you have an incredibly calm, like your resting heart rate is very low.
你总是保持在四到六之间。
Like you're always between a four and a six.
当事情顺利时,你从不过分兴奋;当事情不顺时,你也从不过分沮丧。
Like you're never overly excited when things are going well or overly despondent when things are going poorly.
我很想知道,这种性格对卓越的投资有多大的影响。
And I'm curious how much you think that disposition matters for great investing.
以你的经验来看,如果没有一个相对稳定的情绪区间——既不轻易兴奋也不轻易沮丧——还能做好投资吗?
Can you do great investing in your experience meeting others without having like a pretty narrow band of excitability versus despondency?
不管好坏,从我第一天上班起,我就一直对自己所做的事情充满信心。
For better or worse, I've always from the first day I got the job, had a lot of confidence in what I was doing.
我从不会去说‘我比所有人都强’之类的话。
I never like stepped in and said like, I'm just better than everyone else.
当真正面对一家公司并做出决策时,我对自己是有信心的。
That was never it, when it came down to looking at a company and making a decision, I felt confident in it.
当我对分析有信心时,我通常都会保持相当的平衡。
And when I felt confident in the analysis, I generally am pretty balanced.
一个人是否可能性格非常情绪化,但通过训练来应对市场的起伏?
Is it possible for somebody to have a very volatile personality, but train themselves to deal with the ups and downs of markets?
我认为答案是肯定的。
I think the answer is yes.
我认为有一些对冲基金经理,他们确实属于世代级的顶尖人物。
I think there are some hedge fund managers that have been like truly generationally great.
你听过一些故事,说他们早期在交易大厅里乱扔东西、大喊大叫,但最终却取得了巨大成功。
And you hear the stories of early on, they were just like throwing things at people on the trading floor and yelling and like ultimately they ended up being great.
但你必须能够不让这些情绪影响你的交易决策。
But you have to be able to not let that emotion influence your trading.
如果你思考世界的未来,考虑到技术的惊人变革,我们还没谈到SpaceX,那是一个完全不同的维度,正在发生着惊人的技术曲线。
If you think about the future of the world, given the crazy changes in technology, we haven't talked about SpaceX yet, that's a whole different dimension of like an incredible technology curve that's going on.
你之前提到过保持乐观的重要性。
You mentioned earlier the importance of being optimistic.
你在哪些方面最乐观?
Where are you the most optimistic?
那么,世界上哪些方面及其发展最让你感到犹豫?
And what parts of the world and its progression gives you the most pause?
或者你有没有关注某些事情,即使不担心,也想保持留意?
Or do you have things you have your eye on to be, if not worried about, keep your eye on?
我对经济增长最为乐观。
I'm most optimistic in economic growth.
我认为,如果你相信规模效应并相信人工智能,那么经济增长一定会非常强劲。
And I think it has to be the case that if you believe in scaling laws and you believe in AI, that economic growth will be very powerful.
这简直就是终极的生产力工具。
I mean, this is the ultimate productivity tool.
生产力的作用在于,它能让你在实现低通胀甚至通缩的情况下实现增长,这对市场来说简直是天堂。
And what productivity does is allows you to grow while having disinflation, which is like nirvana for markets.
因此,我对这一点非常看多。
So I'm very bullish on that.
而由此衍生出的更宏观的影响,是我们不直接涉足的领域,但经济增长能解决赤字问题,带来许多好处——无论是对对冲基金经理、首席执行官,还是基层员工,经济增长都能带来巨大益处。
And then there's implications that flow from that, which are more macro, which is something we don't do, but like that can cure deficits, do a lot of great things like economic growth does a lot of great things for everybody from hedge fund managers and CEOs to people in lower level jobs.
如果一个国家没有增长,就很难提高生活水平。
If a country is not growing, it's hard to have a better standard of living.
这是我更乐观的看法。
That's my more optimistic take.
而我更不确定的部分是,我认为作为人类,我们从未遇到过即将面对的这种状况。
The part of me that is more uncertain is that I think that we, as humanity, we've never encountered something that we're about to encounter.
因此,这种深刻的变化是,我们正从地球上最聪明的动物转变为不再是。
And so with that kind of profound change, like we're going from the smartest animals on the planet, we were never the fastest or the strongest, just we're smarter than other animals.
我们不再会是地球上最聪明的生物。
We are no longer going to be the most intelligent beings on the planet.
那么这会带来什么影响呢?
And so what are the implications of that?
我真的不太确定。
I'm not really sure.
我认为这其中有很多负面的外部效应,比如我不认为人类——尽管像Dario这样我非常尊重的人可能会说,我们只要给每个人发一笔钱,大家就靠全民基本收入生活就行了。
I think that there's a lot of negative externalities in that like, I don't think humans, as much as people like Dario, who I respect a lot, might say like, well, we're just gonna give everybody a check and like everybody just kind of live off universal basic income.
我只是不认为人类的天性是只靠领补贴、整天去打球消遣。
I just don't think humans are wired to just collect a check and go around and like play sports all day.
人类的天性是建立关系、创造价值、工作、与他人协作并达成目标。
Humans are wired to create relationships, to create value, to work, to coordinate with other humans and achieving things.
我认为,如果一个社会里的人只是靠政府发放的补贴生活,而这些补贴又源于一场巨大的经济繁荣,那这个社会并不会很好。
And I just, I don't think you're in a great society if it's just a bunch of people living off of checks that come from the government as a result of this massive economic boom.
你以前给我讲过的一个最有趣的故事,是你曾经在Rivian和SpaceX上做了规模差不多的投资,当时时间点也一样。你能再讲讲这个故事吗?这两笔投资显然都很大,尤其是SpaceX,你现在持有巨额股份。
One of the most interesting stories you've told me before was this time when you made, I think similarly sized investments in Rivian and SpaceX at the Can same you tell that story, both big, big bets, obviously SpaceX, you've got this huge position now.
但我特别喜欢你讲述的那种大规模押注私营市场和前沿科技的方式,以及事情后来如何发展。
But I loved that story of like, this style of big bet private market investing and exciting technologies and then the way things can go.
如果你能带我们回到那些决策时刻,你当时签下的那些巨额支票,我非常想听听这个故事。
If you could bring us back to that, those moments of decisions, those are huge checks that you wrote into I those would love to hear that story.
我的观点是,电动汽车将主导汽车市场,而且电动汽车是完全不同的汽车类型,本质上是软件产品。
Thesis was that EVs were going to dominate the auto market and that EVs were an entirely different kind of automobile, like in that they were software.
这就像iPhone与摩托罗拉和诺基亚之间的区别。
And it was the equivalent of like the iPhone versus Motorola and Nokia.
就像诺基亚和摩托罗拉无法转向智能手机一样,因为那是硬件而非软件。
The same way Motorola and Nokia were not able to move into smartphones because that was like hardware and not software.
只有少数公司能够成功做到这一点。
There'd be few companies that would be able to do this successfully.
最终,汽车行业是个糟糕的生意。
Ultimately, autos are a bad business.
可能是软件驱动的汽车,也可能是硬件驱动的汽车。
It could be software autos, hardware autos.
这本来就是一个糟糕的生意,而且很难规模化,需要大量资本投入。
It is a bad business and it's a really tough business to scale, very capital intensive.
制造过程并没有像预期那样顺利。
The manufacturing didn't go as smoothly as it could have.
在扩大生产规模并大量烧钱时,制造延误的成本非常高。
And the cost of delays in manufacturing when you're ramping up and burning a lot of cash are quite significant.
我认为技术本身一直不错,但没能快速爬升制造曲线,意味着无法迅速实现规模效应。
The technology I think was always good and not getting up the manufacturing curve very quickly meant you didn't get the scale fast enough.
我确实相信电动汽车的规模至关重要,这也是特斯拉获胜的原因之一。
And I really believe that scale in EVs is going be important, which is why Tesla's one of the reasons why Tesla's won.
你知道,在IPO时,情况非常好。
You know, at the IPO, it was great.
它看起来像一个绝佳的投资。
It looked like a great investment.
但最终,我不确定我们在Rivian上的回报到底有多少,但肯定没有达到我们投资时的预期。
But ultimately, I don't I don't know what our ultimate return was on Rivian, but it wasn't what we planned for when we made the investment.
那些糟糕的投资往往更快地暴露出来。
The bad ones tend to be more obvious faster.
伟大的私人科技投资有时需要更长时间才能证明其卓越,因为那些了不起的创始人不断做出决策,引导企业走向不同方向,而这些决策的复利效应需要时间,但最终会带来卓越的结果。
The great private tech investments, think, are sometimes slower to prove how great they are because like you have these amazing founders who are just constantly making decisions which take the business in one direction or another and ultimately the compounding of those decisions takes time but leads to great outcomes.
SpaceX的发射业务至少在我看来,显然会成为一个非常出色的业务。
SpaceX, it was pretty obvious to me that the launch business at a minimum was gonna be a very good business.
他们所取得的成就,从工程角度来看,简直不可思议。
And what they had achieved, thought was just like from an engineering perspective, insane.
所以对我来说,如果我能以某个收入倍数、在当时现金流消耗极少的情况下,收购一家实现了我见过的最惊人工程成就的公司,
So to me, if I could buy a company that had achieved the most amazing engineering feat I'd ever seen at some multiple of revenue with very little cash burn at that point.
我当时并不知道接下来会发生什么。
I didn't know what was going to come.
我只是知道,这种可能性非常有利。
I just knew that the skew was very good.
如果他们已经做到了这一点,那谁知道他们未来还能实现什么。
If they had achieved that, then like who knows what they could do in the future.
你今天对这个业务怎么看?
What do you think about that business today?
自从你最初投资以来,已经发生了太多变化。
Like so much has changed since you first invested.
你对它的最新预测或看法是什么?
What's your updated prognosis for it or thoughts about it?
最初的预测一直就是,他们会成为低成本的发射服务提供商。
The initial prognosis was just always that like, you know, they were going be a low cost provider of launch.
我认为星舰的成功,我不敢说我们已经完全到位了,但我觉得我们差不多已经达到了。
I think the success of Starship, I wouldn't say like we're fully there, but I think we're pretty much there.
实现了完全可重复使用和规模化,是的,还有更多进展即将到来。
Approved full reusability and scale, yeah, okay, there's more to come.
星舰是一个改变游戏规则的突破,我们很早就意识到了这一点,但当时并不确定它是否能成功。
Starship is a game changer, which we knew about fairly early on, but didn't know if it would work.
这简单来说意味着,发射所有东西的成本将大幅下降。
And what that means very simply is that the cost of launching everything goes down dramatically.
97%,不管具体是多少百分比。
97, whatever percent.
他们在卫星上利用太阳能并实现高速带宽传输的工程成就,让我感到意外地超出预期。
And the engineering that they've done with the satellites to harness solar power and be able to deliver really high speed bandwidth has surprised me to the upside.
这其中还涉及大量软件,因为这些网络和卫星都在相互通信。
And there's a lot of software that goes into that too, just given these networks and satellites are all communicating.
我认为这意味着,全球电信市场现在成为了总可及市场(TAM)。
The ramification of that I think is that the telecom market globally is now the TAM.
它们的成本已经大幅下降。
They've come so far down the cost curve.
我认为在相对较短的时间内,几个月到几年内,它们在提供宽带服务方面的成本将远低于任何其他方式。
I think that in a relatively short amount of time, months, few years, they are gonna be dramatically cheaper than any other form of delivering broadband.
你曾说过你有多喜欢做空股票。
You said how much you love shorting stocks.
你最喜欢它哪一点?
What is it about it that you like?
因为现在你几乎遇不到多少人还专注于这个领域,或者真的擅长这个了。
Because you just don't meet that many people that are focused on this or really that good at this anymore.
我妻子一直求我停止做空股票。
My wife begs me all the time to stop shorting stocks.
这是一门糟糕的生意。
It's a bad business.
你真的必须在智力上被它所吸引。
You really have to be intellectually stimulated by it.
市场上的大多数人根本不是基于基本面的,就是这样。
Most people in the market are just not fundamentally based, period.
即使他们基于基本面,也不感兴趣做空,或者假装在做空,实际上只是做空指数之类的。
And even if they are fundamentally based, they're not interested in shorting or they pretend like they're shorting and they kind of short indices or whatever.
真正做这件事的人非常少。
Very few people are doing it.
有大量的人投资那些纯粹基于故事的东西,比如因为社交媒体,因为罗宾汉。
There are tons of people investing in things that are just based on stories, like because of social media, because of Robin Hood.
如果你有耐心并采取基本面视角,做空的机会多得是。
There's just endless amounts of shorts if you have duration and if you take a fundamental view.
你为什么认为现在的市场效率更低了?
Why do you think markets are less efficient now?
我认为这是因为市场中的交易者,或者进行交易的机构的性质发生了变化。
I think it's just the people transacting in the market or the nature of the institutions transacting in the market.
如果回溯十年前、二十年前,共同基金、多空对冲基金还是市场的重要组成部分。
If you go back ten, twenty years ago, mutual funds, long short hedge funds, they were a big part of the market.
现在市场上有很多被动型投资者和散户,他们做投资决策时并不基于对内在价值的长期考量,还有量化交易者,甚至多经理多空基金。
Now it is a lot of passives, a lot of retail investors, people who are making investment decisions that are not based upon long term considerations of intrinsic value, quants, even multi manager, long short funds.
尽管他们关注基本面,但出于必要性,他们的视角是短期的。
While they are focused on fundamentals, by necessity, they are short term oriented.
如果你专注于在短期内寻找优势,那将是极其有效的。
If you're focused on trying to get an edge in the short term, that is extremely efficient.
但这是一种我根本不参与的游戏。
And it's a game I just don't play.
你有一些极其复杂的公司,使用先进的量化方法来分析另类数据。
You have firms which are incredibly sophisticated using amazing quantitative, methods to go through alternative data.
在那里根本不存在任何优势。
There's absolutely no edge there.
一旦你超越任何短期事件,开始思考一家企业究竟值多少钱、长期现金流如何、公司的波特五力特征是什么,这时竞争者就变得非常少了。
Once you go beyond any kind of short term event and you start to think about what is a business worth, what are the long term cash flows, what are the Porter's five forces attributes of the company, That's when the competitive set gets pretty thin.
坦率地说,越多人关注短期,就越有机会通过中长期视角来进行套利。
And frankly, the more people focus on the short term, the more opportunity there is to arbitrage that and have a medium term view.
我认为,对于大多数公司和整个经济而言,没有人能准确预测三年之后会发生什么。
I don't think anyone knows what's going to happen past three years for most companies and for the economy as a whole.
很难预测。
It's hard to predict.
因此,我不把自己视为一个只是买入并持有五到十年的人。
And so I don't consider myself to be an investor that just buys and holds things for five or ten years.
但我们完全专注于评估一家公司值多少钱,一个季度可能影响、也可能不影响我们对长期价值的判断。
But we do focus entirely on what is a company worth and a quarter may or may not impact what we think the long term value is.
大多数情况下,短期内的价格波动会夸大公司内在价值的真实变化,从而导致市场效率降低。
The majority of the time, the moves you see in the short term exaggerate the true change in intrinsic value of the company, which makes for a less efficient market.
你的财务团队并不是因为重大错误而亏钱。
Your finance team isn't losing money on big mistakes.
而是通过无数个没人留意的小决定一点点地流失。
It's leaking through a thousand tiny decisions nobody's watching.
Ramp会在支出发生前设置管控措施。
Ramp puts guardrails on spending before it happens.
实时限额、自动规则,零紧急应对。
Real time limits, automatic rules, zero firefighting.
立即前往 ramp.com/invest 试用。
Try it at ramp.com/invest.
随着您的业务增长,Vanta 会同步扩展,自动化合规流程,并为您提供安全与风险的单一信息源。
As your business grows, Vanta scales with you, automating compliance and giving you a single source of truth for security and risk.
了解更多,请访问 vanta.com/invest。
Learn more at vanta.com/invest.
从 OpenAI 到 Cursor 再到 Perplexity,最顶尖的 AI 和软件公司都使用 WorkOS 在一夜之间实现企业级准备,而非耗时数月。
The best AI and software companies from OpenAI to Cursor to Perplexity use WorkOS to become enterprise ready overnight, not in months.
访问 workos.com,跳过枯燥的基础设施工作,专注于您的产品。
Visit workos.com to skip the unglamorous infrastructure work and focus on your product.
每家投资公司都是独特的,通用型 AI 无法理解您的流程。
Every investment firm is unique, and generic AI doesn't understand your process.
Rogo 可以。
Rogo does.
这是一个专为华尔街打造的AI平台,连接您的数据,理解您的流程,并生成实际成果。
It's an AI platform built specifically for Wall Street, connected to your data, understanding your process, and producing real outputs.
了解更多请访问 rogo.ai/invest。
Check them out at rogo.ai/invest.
Ridgeline 正在重新定义资产管理技术,成为真正的合作伙伴,而不仅仅是软件供应商。
Ridgeline is redefining asset management technology as a true partner, not just a software vendor.
他们已帮助多家公司实现五倍增长,推动更快的发展、更智能的运营和竞争优势。
They've helped firms 5x in scale, enabling faster growth, smarter operations, and a competitive edge.
访问 ridgelineapps.com,了解他们能为您的公司带来哪些突破。
Visit ridgelineapps.com to see what they can unlock for your firm.
我非常感兴趣的一点是,我会用‘忠诚度’这个词来形容。
One of the things that interests me a lot about you is, I'll use the word like loyalty.
杰里米一直是您的合作伙伴,也是您从小一起长大的最好的朋友之一。
So Jeremy's been your partner, he's one of your best friends from growing up.
每个人都是您的家族办公室、研究总监。
Like everyone's your family office, your director of research.
你许多重要的合作伙伴都是你认识很久、关系很好的朋友。
Lots of your key partners you've known a really long time and are good friends of yours.
我觉得你是在大学认识你妻子的,我也是,每当我听到这样的例子,都会让我特别开心。
I think you met your wife in college, I did too, so that always perks me up when I hear that example.
你能稍微谈一下,你对忠诚感的看法吗?以及这些数据点所暗示的忠诚角色?
Can you say a little bit about how you feel about loyalty and kind of the role that all those data points suggest?
有几点需要考虑。
There's a few things to consider.
我最了解这些人,因此我与他们一起经历了生活中的许多事情,我对他们的能力充满信心。
I know these people the best, and so I've just dealt with them through so many different things in life, and I have a lot of confidence in their confidence.
对我来说,生活中有很多我因为各种原因而喜爱的人,他们都是很棒的人,也都会忠诚。
So to me, there's a lot of people that I love in life for different reasons and are wonderful people and you know, would be loyal.
但他们必须对自己的工作充满信心。
But they have to be really confident in the job.
这是一份非常紧张的工作。
This is a very like intense job.
门槛非常高,而我雇用的那些一直以来都是我朋友的人,我完全有信心他们早已远远超过了这个门槛。
The bar is extremely high and the people that I've hired that are friends of mine forever, I am just confident that they've cleared that bar by a lot.
但当你能够找到那些在你还没钱、还没任何迹象表明你将来会有钱时就认识你、喜欢你的人时,那种关系是不一样的。
But when you are able to find people that you know for a long time and liked you before you had any money or any signs you'd ever have any money, that is a different kind of relationship.
就我目前而言,我不确定。
For me at this point, I don't know.
他们对我好,是因为觉得我能为他们做点什么吗?
Are they nice to me because they think I can do something for them?
他们是我生命中一群始终陪伴在我身边、会在我余生中与我保持亲密的人。
They're a group of people in my life that have always been there and that they will be close to me for the rest of my life.
只要我能和这些人合作,那就再好不过了。
And like to the extent I can work with those people, great.
但正如我所说,他们必须非常优秀。
But as I said, they have to be excellent.
你做的一件事是,为你的投资组合群组创建了一个聊天频道,里面充满了你对市场动态的思考。
One of the things that you do is, for your portfolio host, this like group chat that's just full of your thinking on what's going on in markets.
而让我印象最深的一点就是,你在里面产出的内容实在太丰富了。
And one of the things that struck me the most about this is just how prolific you are in it.
你随时随地都在思考和写下这些市场相关的东西。
Like you're just thinking and writing about this shit at all hours, all the time.
很明显,这正是你热爱并充满激情的事情。
Clearly like this is the thing that you just love and are passionate about.
这种习惯带来了什么影响?
What has been the impact of that?
也就是持续不断地跟你在乎的人交流市场动态。
Like constantly communicating with the people that you care about, about markets.
我问这个问题,是因为我想举些例子来鼓励其他人也这么做。
I ask the question because I just wanna give examples to encourage other people to do the same.
这可能会产生巨大的力量。
It can be so powerful.
当你私下投资一家公司时,显然驱动因素是财务方面的。
When you're investing in a company privately, there is obviously a financial aspect to it that's the driver.
但这也涉及到人际关系的一面。
But there's also a relationship part of it.
因为你承诺了要帮助对方成长事业,陪伴他们度过起起落落。
Like in that you are signing up to hopefully help that person grow their business, be with them through ups and downs.
在进行初始投资时,你们会花很多时间在一起。
When you're doing the initial investment, you spend a lot of time together.
但后来我发现,如果没什么事情发生,我很容易几个月都不和私营公司的首席执行官联系。
But then I find that like it's very easy for me to go months without communicating with the CEO on the private side if nothing's happening.
我不喜欢这样。
I don't like that.
如果我们能提供一些东西,让对方自行选择是否订阅,他们可以阅读我写的内容,也可以不读。
If we have something that we can offer people and they can just opt in, they can either read the stuff I write or not read the stuff I write.
这是一种向我想保持联系的人广播沟通的方式,我希望他们更了解我们公司,更了解我这个人,更了解我们公司。
It is a way to broadcast communicate with people that I want to be in touch with and I want to know us better as a firm, know me better as a person, know us better as a firm.
我现在发现,即使我有三个月没和首席执行官说过话,一打电话过去,他们几乎会觉得每天都和我交流一样。
I find now, even if I haven't spoken to a CEO in like three months and I call them, it's almost like they feel like they talk to me every day.
这就像在新冠疫情期间通过Zoom认识某人一样,你其实从未亲自见过那个人。
It's the same way like when you meet someone on Zoom during COVID, you don't really you never met that person in person.
我知道当创始人是很孤独的,要经历各种各样的问题。
I know that being a founder is lonely, going through all kinds of issues.
因此,与其他创始人在一起时,我得到的反馈几乎都是:创始人喜欢和其他创始人待在一起,因为只有他们才能理解并共情彼此所经历的一切。
And so being around other founders almost universally, the feedback I get is that founders like to be around other founders because they're the only people that can sympathize and understand everything that they go through.
所以,把他们聚集在一个聊天群中,从商业角度来看对我们有帮助,但我觉得用‘团体治疗’这个词可能太重了,不过让他们知道,还有其他人在同一个社区里,可以随时联系这些人、听到他们的观点,这确实很有意义。
And so by having a bunch of them together in a chat, it's helpful to us for a business perspective, but I think it's also just group therapy would be too strong of a word, but I think it's like nice for them to know that these other people are part of this community that they're in and that they want to reach out to these people they can and they hear these people's perspective.
这些人的某些人是人工智能等领域的世界顶尖专家,他们的见解将对那些不精通AI的公司产生重大影响。
And some of these people are world leading experts in areas like AI that are gonna be impactful to companies that are not experts in AI.
因此,获得这些输入我觉得非常有帮助。
So just getting that input I think is really helpful.
我们拥有一个涵盖众多公司和行业的网络,能够分享洞见,不只是我关于市场的观点,而是让公司之间相互分享见解,了解世界如何影响企业。
We have a network of a lot of companies, a lot of industries being able to share the insights, not just my insights on markets, but having companies share insights with each other and seeing how the world is impacting companies.
你是否在意D1作为一家企业是否具有企业价值?
Do you care whether or not D1 has enterprise value as a business?
你有考虑过这个问题吗?
Is that something you think about?
这是我最近才开始更多思考的事情。
It's something I've started to think about more recently.
我认为答案是否定的。
I think the answer is no.
对我来说,钱是一种评分标准。
Money to me is a scorecard.
我想取得最好的分数。
I want have the best score.
成为一名优秀的投资者,这会带来非常好的正向外部效应。
It is a really great positive externality of being a good investor.
也许我只是对担任首席执行官这个想法产生了浓厚的智力兴趣,想把这部分工作从占我10%的时间增加到30%到40%。
And maybe I will just be so intellectually interested by the idea of being a CEO that I want that go from being 10% of my job to 30 to 40% of my job.
这就是创造企业价值的方式。
And that's how you create enterprise value.
我现在还没到那个阶段。
I'm just not there right now.
我希望提供出色的回报,足以在财务上完全弥补一切。
And I want to deliver amazing returns that'll be financially more than compensatory.
也许有一天吧,但我认为对冲基金不是一个好生意。
Maybe one day, but I don't think hedge funds are a good business.
客观地说,我们的业务简直糟糕透顶。
Objectively, our business like is horrible.
它有惊人的现金流,却没有任何终值。
It's amazing cash flows, has no terminal value.
我对我投资的公司说过:你们没有现金流,却有巨大的终值。
I told this to my companies I invested, I'm like, you have no cash flows and tons of terminal value.
我有巨额现金流,却没有终值——我们正好互补,可以利用这一点套利。
I have tons of cash flows and no So terminal we're good together, we can kind of arbitrage that.
但我认为资产管理领域还有其他具有价值的业务。
But I think there's other businesses within asset management that have value.
我绝对从未渴望拥有数百名员工之类的情况。
I definitely do not ever aspire to having hundreds of employees or something like that.
所以,这正是你需要做才能获得企业价值的地方。
So and that's kind of what you need to do to have enterprise value.
你为什么这么在意评分标准?
Why do you care so much about the scorecard?
你的竞争动力来自哪里?
Like where does the competitive drive come from?
这就是我倾注一生去做的事情,对吧?
This is what I've devoted my life to, right?
因此,对于你倾注一生去做的事情,你希望做得出色,或者至少产生可感知、可衡量的影响。
And so if anything you devote your life to, you want to be great at, or at least having an impact that is tangible and measurable.
我现在完全可以做一个家族办公室。
I can be a family office right now.
做家族办公室有很多积极的方面。
And there's plenty of positive things about being a family office.
缺点就是,你没有身处赛场。
The drawback is like, you're not in the arena.
我和其他投资者非常合作。
And I'm very collaborative with other investors.
我不是那种喜欢耍手段的人。
It's not like I'm sharp elbowed.
但能够走出去,证明我们团队可以很出色,而不仅仅是我个人,这让人充满活力。
But being out there, like being able to prove that we can be great and not just me, like our firm can be great is invigorating.
我觉得,如果只是投资我自己的钱,我会有点无聊。
I think I'd be kind of bored if I was just like investing my own money.
回到一些历史背景,我从未听你公开谈论过你在Value Investors Club早期写的文字,特别是你写的关于美国正畸公司的做空案例。
Going back to some of the history, something I've never heard you talk about publicly is the early writing you did in Value Investors Club, and specifically the orthodontics of America short case that you wrote about.
我真的很想听听你是怎么找到Vic的,以及你为什么开始做这些。
I'd love to just hear the origin story of how you found Vic, why you started doing it.
我对这个观点非常感兴趣:如果你在网上发表一些出色的文章,能带来多少可能性。
I'm very interested in this idea of how much can come if you do some great posting online.
这是这个想法的非常早期的版本。
This is a very early version of this.
所以能不能给我们讲讲Vic的故事,以及你最初对股票的热情?
So maybe just tell us the story of Vic and that early passion for stocks.
那是2002年。
It was 2002.
我当时在贝尔斯登的一家私募股权部门工作。
I was working at a private equity group within Bear Stearns.
我一直对股票感兴趣,但真正接触到对冲基金经理或投资经理撰写的投资观点,唯一途径就是这个叫价值投资者俱乐部的网站。
I always had an interest in stocks, but the only way to really get exposure to investment ideas written up by hedge fund managers or investment managers was this site called Value Investors Club.
我们需要提交一个投资想法。
We had to send an idea.
我申请了,每周都会有人匿名发布数十个投资观点。
I applied and like every week you'd have tens of ideas posted by people anonymously.
你可以阅读这些内容。
You could read them.
我只是不停地阅读所有内容。
I would just consume everything.
所以既有看多的思路,也有看空的思路。
So it was like long ideas, short ideas.
每周他们会奖励5000美元给最佳建议,我被这些阅读内容深深启发,决定尝试寻找属于自己的投资点子。
Every week they paid $5,000 to the best I just got inspired by all the stuff I was reading and decided to try to find some of my own ideas.
大约六个月到一年后,我在价值投资者俱乐部上积累了一整套自己写的投资建议,于是我决定去对冲基金工作。
After maybe six, twelve months, I had a portfolio of things I'd written up on Value Investor's Club and I decided I wanted to go work at a hedge fund.
对冲基金最先要求你做的就是讲述一个投资想法,而我正好有这么多现成的投资点子。
First thing hedge funds ask you to do is talk about investment idea and so I had all these investment ideas.
我去面试的一家对冲基金是SAC分出来的,专注于医疗领域,他们告诉我:我们希望你为面试做一个案例研究。
One of the hedge funds I went to interview at, it was a spin off of SAC that did healthcare and they said to me, we want you to a case study for the interview.
这家公司叫Orthodontic Centers of America。
The company is called Orthodontic Centers of America.
对我来说,这根本不是一项任务。
So I, for me, this was not like a task.
这对我来说是一件让我非常兴奋的事,因为我从未让我的作品被专业人士看过。
It was like something I was really excited to do because I had never had my work given to somebody who was a professional.
我回家后花了好几个小时,仔细研究财务文件,试图建立一个模型。
I went home and I spent maybe like hours and hours going through the financial filings and trying to build a model.
我在会计方面还挺在行的。
I was pretty good at accounting.
我努力深入分析财务报表,结果发现一切都对不上,完全说不通。
I really tried to get deep into the financial statements and I realized nothing reconciled, nothing made sense.
我突然意识到,他们所做的正是最简单的会计欺诈形式——将本应立即费用化的支出大规模资本化。
It hit me that what they were doing was the simplest form of accounting fraud, is just capitalizing expenses that should have been expensed in a big way.
还有其他问题,但这是最严重的。
There are other things too, but that was the most egregious.
我成功地证明了这一点。
I was able to effectively prove that.
这并不是无可辩驳的证据,但已经非常接近了。
It wasn't incontrovertible proof, but it was pretty close.
只是通过构建他们声称与单位经济相比较的所有单位经济数据,而这些数据实际上可以通过分析他们的财务报表来推断出来。
Just by building up all the unit economics as they said they were comparing them to the unit level economics that you could actually decipher by going through their financial statements.
很明显,我写了一份大约六页的报告。
And it was clear I did a write up that was about six pages long.
这份报告很不错。
It was good.
完成得非常好。
It was well done.
在我回去进行后续面谈并展示我的案例研究之前,我觉得我可能发现了什么。
Before I went back to do the follow-up interview where I presented my case study, I was like, I think I'm onto something here.
让我先把它发布到网上,看看大家的反馈。
Let me post it online first and I'll get some feedback.
由于我在一家投资银行工作,所以我不被允许买卖股票。
I wasn't allowed to trade stocks because I was working at an investment bank.
因此,我既没有做空这只股票,也没有做多这只股票。
So I wasn't short the stock, I wasn't long the stock.
价值投资者俱乐部是匿名发布的,使用一个标签名。
Value Investor's Club is done anonymously with a tag name.
所以我把帖子发到了网上。
So I posted online.
几个小时内,股价就开始下跌了。
Within a few hours, the stock started to go down.
我觉得这很酷。
I was like, that's cool.
人们注意到了,网上有几条评论。
People are noticing, there's a couple comments online.
市场几小时后收盘了,不管怎样。
The market closed a few hours later, whatever.
我在线上观察,又有一些帖子说这真的很有趣。
I'm watching online, there's some more posts being like, this is really interesting.
有人核对过这些数据吗?
Has anyone double checked these numbers?
有人在评论。
There's people like commenting.
第二天股价暴跌,下跌了大约30%。
Next day stocks are such a crater, stocks down like 30%.
我开始接到一些在共同基金工作的电话,他们持有这只股票,尽管网上是匿名的,但我已经告诉过我在对冲基金的朋友,让他们关注这只股票并做空,我觉得这是个骗局。
I started getting calls from people working at mutual funds who own the stock because even though it was anonymous online, I had told friends of mine at hedge funds, I'm like, you should look at this stock and short it, I think it's a fraud.
他们又告诉了其他人,于是我开始接到贝尔斯登的人打来的电话,比如T公司的相关人员。
And they had told other people and so I started getting calls at Bear Stearns for like people at T.
道富、富达。
Rowe Price and Fidelity.
你在投资银行工作。
You work in an investment bank.
你最后不想做的就是发帖谈论公司,我当时也不知道它们是不是你的客户。
Last thing you're trying to do is supposed to like posting about companies that are I was like, I didn't know if you know if they were a client.
股价直接腰斩了。
The stock just got halved.
我回到面试中,呈上了这个案例分析。
I went back into the interview to present the case study.
到这时,他们只是问:‘你做了什么?’
At this point they were just like, What did you do?
我对他们说:‘你们让我去研究这个公司的。’
And I was like, look, you told me to look at this.
我觉得这是一场骗局。
I thought it was a fraud.
他们问:‘你有没有告诉别人,是你们让我去做的?’
They're like, did you tell anyone that we told you to do this?
我回答:‘没有,没有。’
I was like, no, no.
他们说:‘你确定吗?’
They're like, you sure?
我说:‘是的,是的,是的。’
And I'm like, yeah, yeah, yeah.
没人知道。
Nobody knows.
他们说,我们本来以为你会回来告诉我们,他们将会错失收益。
And they're like, we basically thought you were gonna come back and tell us that they were gonna miss earnings.
我不想去医疗行业,我也没在那里工作过。
I didn't wanna do healthcare, I didn't work there.
但我现在有了这份报告,可以发给不同的对冲基金。
But I now had this write up that could go around to different hedge funds.
大多数人都已经知道了,因为报告发布后他们会做空它。
And most of already knew about it because they would short it after the write up.
这就是我得到这份工作的原因。
That's how I got my job.
你最终去了Viking。
You end up at Viking.
你在那儿当了很长时间的首席投资官。
You're there for a long time as CIO.
你在那里的时候有着令人难以置信的业绩记录。
You've got an incredible track record while you're there.
如果你回想一下决定创办D1的那一刻,带我们回到那个你决定自立门户、打造这个事业的时刻。
If you think about the moment that you decided to go start D1, bring us back to that moment to go hang your own shingle and build this thing.
我最初是一名银行分析师。
I started out as a banks analyst.
那是我头几年的工作内容。
That's what I did for the first couple years.
我仍然保持着价值投资的倾向。
I still had a value bent.
我认为,大多数热爱投资的投资者最初都带有深厚的价值投资倾向。
I think most investors who love investing start out with a deep value bent.
如果你想了解历史上伟大的投资者,他们中的大多数都是深度价值投资者,比如本·格雷厄姆、巴菲特。
If you wanna read about great investors historically, most of them were deep value investors, Ben Graham, Buffett.
我当时为一位名叫汤姆·珀塞尔的人工作,他是一位了不起的投资者。
I was working for somebody named Tom Pursell, who's an amazing investor.
我意识到汤姆是一位出色的导师,但我也发现汤姆在为维京公司创造回报和金融服务方面非常得心应手。
I realized that Tom was an awesome mentor, but I realized that Tom was very well equipped to generate returns and financial services for Viking.
因此,如果我想发展我的事业,就必须转向其他领域。
And so if I wanted to grow my career, I had to move it to other areas.
渐渐地,我开始涉足其他行业,比如从医疗保健、工业和TMT开始,这些公司的性质与银行截然不同。
Gradually, I took on other sectors, like starting with healthcare, industrials, TMT, and the nature of those companies was different than banks.
这是一个学习的过程。
That was a learning process.
就是花了好几年时间覆盖不同的公司和不同行业。
It was just like years of covering different companies and different industries.
你越深入研究,就越发现TMT领域创造价值的方式,与工业或医疗保健领域创造价值的方式不同。
The deeper you got into like what created value in TMT was different than what might create value in industrials or healthcare.
所以对我来说,如果你热爱投资,我在维京的经历简直太棒了,因为我几乎接触到了每一个行业。
So to me, if you love investing, my time at Viking was amazing because I was able to get exposure to every industry almost.
到2016年,我管理着维京资本的超过一半,大约是维京资本的55%左右。
By 2016, I was managing just over half of Viking's capital, somewhere 55 something percent of Viking's capital.
我从2002年开始当分析师时,没有任何投资组合。
And I had started out in 2002 being an analyst with no portfolio.
我从零投资组合起步,逐步成长为投资组合经理,最终成为首席投资官,管理着公司超过一半的资本,这在维京历史上是异常高的比例。
I'd gone from no portfolio to portfolio to eventually CIO to managing more than half the firm's capital, which was an abnormal percentage historically for Viking.
维京通常更加分散化。
Viking's usually more diversified.
从商业角度来看,我清楚地意识到,让一个人管理超过一半的资本,并不符合安德烈亚斯的最佳利益。
It was pretty clear to me that from a business perspective, it was not in Andreas' best interest to have one person manage more than half the capital.
我认为这对有限合伙人也不利。
I don't think that would be even good for LPs.
因此,我意识到自己在维京已经基本达到了所能达到的顶峰。
And so I kind of recognized that I had pretty much achieved what I could achieve at Viking.
随着时间推移,无论我表现多好,我管理的资本比例都可能会逐渐减少。
Over time, I'd be probably managing a smaller percentage almost regardless of how well I did.
我一直抱有成长的心态:我想进步,想变得更好,想实现新的目标,而我觉得在维京已经没什么更多值得我去实现了。
I've always had a mindset of like, I want to grow, I want to get better, I want to achieve new things and I kind of felt like there wasn't that much more for me to achieve at Viking.
我当时40岁。
And I was 40.
我在人生较晚的阶段创办了一只基金。
I started a fund relatively late in life.
我意识到,到了某个年纪,你就不会再有精力去做像创办基金这样庞大的事情了,你知道的,这显然是个巨大的工程。
And I kind of recognized that at some point you just wouldn't have the energy to go do something like starting a fund is, you know, obviously it's a big endeavor.
我觉得自己还有足够的精力,于是所有事情都水到渠成了。
I felt like I had the energy and so everything kind of came together.
你对艺术哪里感兴趣?
What interests you about art?
显然你非常关心艺术,也花了不少时间去了解它。
Like it's something that obviously you care a lot about, you've devoted some time to understanding.
是什么吸引着你呢?
What is it that attracts you?
我一直以来更倾向于人文领域,而不是STEM,这比较特别,尤其是在科技和金融领域。
I've always had more of a leaning towards humanities than STEM, is unusual and certainly tech and somewhat finance.
这就是为什么我把我的工作更多地看作是艺术而非科学。
That is why I perhaps look at my job as more art than science.
科学部分非常简单。
The science is very simple.
现金流折现模型,我二十五年前就会做了,而且它从未改变。
The DCF I could learn how to do twenty five years ago and it doesn't change.
人性的一面让我感兴趣,而艺术无疑是其中的一个方面。
The humanity side interests me and art is certainly one aspect of that.
我尤其对美学感兴趣。
And I am particularly interested in aesthetics.
我喜欢设计。
I like design.
我喜欢建筑。
I like architecture.
我喜欢艺术。
I like art.
对我来说,这就是美。
To me, like, it's just beauty.
你去海滩,看着海浪,那就是美。
You go to the beach and like watch the waves, that's beauty.
世界上到处都有美,而艺术就是美的一个例子。
Like there's beauty in the world and like art is one example of beauty.
艺术背后通常都有一个故事,背后也有具体的人。
There's usually a story behind it and there's people behind art.
艺术之所以重要,是因为它是人创造的。
Art is important because it is created by people.
我认为,艺术的特别之处在于,当其他一切都被自动化、无限复制,由AI生成时,由人创作的艺术却能反映情感,常常体现着创作者创作那件作品时的世界现状或个人生活境遇。
And I think the bold case in art would be as everything else is automated and in infinite supply because it's being created by AI, Art created by people reflects emotion and oftentimes, like what's happening in the moment in the world when they're making that piece of art or what's happening in their life.
如果你应用同样的美学理念,美好的理念,你见过最美好的企业是什么?
If you apply the same aesthetic idea, the beautiful idea, what is the most beautiful business you've ever seen?
就是你见过的最棒的企业。
Just like the best business you've ever seen.
我认为最好的企业通常是低成本生产某种非常耐用产品的企业。
I think that the best businesses are usually low cost producers of something that's very durable.
我认为人们低估了以低成本可持续提供某种产品或服务的能力,而这里存在一个正向反馈循环:低成本带来更高销量,更高销量又进一步降低成本。
And I think people underestimate the ability to provide a given product or service sustainably at low cost and where there's a positive feedback loop of like low cost drives more volume, which drives low cost.
我能想到一些非常优秀的企业,比如穆迪或标普,这些企业确实很棒,别误会。
And I I can think say like a bunch of businesses which are really great, like Moody's or S and P, those are great businesses, don't get wrong.
但有些企业的成本优势如此巨大且难以逾越,比如SpaceX的发射业务,或者Costco的杂货业务。
But something where the cost advantage is so substantial and so impenetrable, like SpaceX with launch or Costco with groceries.
对我来说,大多数企业获胜的唯一方式就是以低成本提供优秀的产品。
To me, it's like the only way to win in most businesses is to provide a great product at a low cost.
那些能够规模化实现这一点并构建护城河的企业,非常了不起。
Businesses that do that at scale and build a moat around it are amazing.
亚马逊的电子商务业务非常出色。
Amazon's e commerce business is amazing.
有太多了不起的企业,但真正的垄断却很少。
So many amazing businesses, very few monopolies.
当它们成为垄断企业时,通常会变得懒惰,回报也不会那么好。
And when they are a monopoly, usually what happens is they tend to get lazy and the returns aren't as good.
你认为世界上哪些地区目前被低估了?
What parts of the world do you think are underappreciated right now?
当我看你前十大持仓时,实际上有不少公司我都不认识。
Like when I look at your top 10 holdings, I actually like didn't recognize a number of the companies.
很多公司并不在美国,而是在海外。
Lots of them are not in The US, they're international.
你现在关注的是哪个地方,你觉得世界还没有给予足够关注?
Where's your eye right now that you think the world is not paying enough attention to?
很难说欧洲,因为欧洲经济处于停滞状态,我不确定是否值得人们关注。
It's hard to say Europe, in that like Europe is economically stagnated, so I'm not sure anyone should pay attention to it.
除非你是一个纯粹的基本面股票选股者,否则这是一个更容易的市场。
Other than if you are a pure fundamental stock picker, it's an easier market.
我认为随着全球政治格局的变化,亚洲正在发生一些非常有趣的事情。
I think there's really interesting things happening in Asia, just as globally as politics change.
就像你看到日本发生的情况一样,这是日本首次可能在未来某个时候重新成为军事强国。
Like you saw what happened in Japan, for the first time, Japan's probably gonna become a military power at some point in the future again.
然后,你知道,这会带来各种影响。
Then, you know, that has all kinds of implications.
我认为国防领域正在发生很多事。
I think there's a lot going on within defense.
我认为人工智能显然也很重要。
I think there's obviously AI.
从地理上看,欧洲始终是最无效的市场。
Geographically, Europe is always the most inefficient.
我认为日本和韩国也可能相当低效。
I think Japan and Korea are probably pretty inefficient as well.
很多散户投资者,一些真正优秀的企业。
A lot of retail investors, some really great companies.
过去二十年,日本和韩国没有做好准备,因为当时主要是数字公司主导。
Japan and Korea were not well positioned for the last twenty years because it was just like digital companies.
但说到真正的有形资产和优秀的工程能力,德国、韩国和日本拥有大量拥有卓越实物资产和工程实力的公司。
But when it comes to like actually hard assets and good engineering, Germany, Korea, Japan have a lot of companies that have excellent physical assets and engineering.
今天除了我们聊过的,还有没有其他你心里特别想说、特别关注或正在思考的世界性问题?
Is there anything else that we haven't talked about today that you have on your mind or you're especially passionate about, things you're thinking about in the world?
坦白说,最让我担忧的是,我认为我们在半导体问题上正与中国走向正面冲突。
The thing that troubles me the most, frankly, is I think we are on a collision course with China over semiconductors.
我认为有办法避免这种情况,但没有一个是容易的。
I think there are ways to get out of that, but none of them are easy.
如果我们不能解决这个问题,就可能会遭遇类似大萧条的后果。
To the extent that we don't figure that out, we're gonna have something akin to the Great Depression.
再多说说这个。
Say more about that.
这种情况会如何发生?
How would that come to pass?
这非常直接明了。
It's very straightforward.
台湾生产了90%以上的先进半导体,而我们使用的一切都依赖半导体。
In that In Taiwan produces 90 something percent of the most advanced semiconductors, and everything we use is semiconductors.
这几乎就像回到五十年前,如果只有一个国家生产石油。
It's almost as if you went back fifty years, if there's only one country that produced oil.
我的意思是,那重要吗?
I mean, was that important.
我们曾为石油发动战争,尽管石油在世界各地都能获取。
We went to war over oil, even though you could get it all over the world.
台湾生产了绝大多数领先的半导体。
Like Taiwan produces vast majority of leading semiconductors.
而这些半导体正是驱动一切的核心。
And that is what powers everything.
这条供应链非常脆弱。
And that supply chain is fragile.
这可不是轻易就能复制的。
Like it's not like it's easy to replicate.
很容易被摧毁。
It's easy to destroy.
如果这条供应链遭到破坏或中断,我们的经济将陷入极其糟糕的境地,堪比大萧条。
If that supply chain were to get screwed up or distermediated, we would have like a incredibly bad economy on the order of depression type economy.
我认为政府中很多人对此心知肚明。
Probably a lot of people in government understand this.
我听过斯科特·贝松谈论过这个问题。
I've heard Scott Besson talk about it.
我认为人们明白,有些情景对全球经济来说是可以接受的,但我想不到任何一种能让所有人都满意的局面。
I think people understand that there are some scenarios that are okay for the global economy, but there is no scenario I can think of where everybody's happy.
中国开心,台湾开心,美国也开心。
China's happy, Taiwan's happy, and The US is happy.
总会有人不开心,要么是因为经济崩溃,要么是因为主权被让渡。
Somebody's going to be unhappy either because the economy collapses or because their sovereignty is handed over.
你希望发生什么?
What do you hope happens?
关于 Bayt 播客
Bayt 提供中文+原文双语音频和字幕,帮助你打破语言障碍,轻松听懂全球优质播客。