大卫·乔治：打造a16z增长策略、投资AI全栈生态，以及为何市场对增长定价错误 - [像最优秀的人一样投资，第450期]

我知道这部电影，是的。

I know the movie, yeah.

你知道亚历克·鲍德温的那个场景吗？

You know the scene with Alec Baldwin?

帮我们回忆一下。

Refresh our memories.

有一个亚历克·鲍德温的场景，是在一个电话销售室里，他正在举办一场销售竞赛，他走进来，说：好了，伙计们，新竞赛开始了。

There's the scene with Alec Baldwin where he's running a sales contest, A boiler room setting, and he comes in, he's running a sales contest, and he walks in and he's like, okay guys, new contest, here we go.

第一名奖励一辆凯迪拉克。

First prize gets Cadillac.

第二名奖励一套牛排刀。

Second prize gets a set of steak knives.

第三名，你被开除了。

Third prize, you're fired.

因此，我们用这种方式来描述我们所处的大多数科技市场。

So, we've adopted that as a way of describing most of the technology markets that we live in.

因此，我们恰好认为——我个人强烈认为——根据我的经验，绝大多数市值创造都会流向市场领导者。

So, we happen to think, and I happen to think strongly, my experience has been, the vast majority of market cap creation is gonna go to the market leader.

这一点可能被低估了。

And, this is probably underappreciated.

我们经常在成长型投资行业的同行那里听到类似的说法：是的，你知道，即使是第二名也会非常有前景。

We see this all the time with our peers in the growth investing industry, where they say things like, yeah, you know, even the number two player is gonna be really viable.

也许吧。

Maybe.

但更常见的情况是，事实并非如此。

But more often than not, that's not the case.

在网络效应驱动的业务、消费类公司中，比如谷歌、脸书等，这一点显而易见。

That's obvious in network effect driven businesses, consumer companies, Google, Facebook, etcetera.

在企业级公司中，这一点没那么明显，但同样频繁发生。

It's less obvious in enterprise companies, but it happens just as often.

Salesforce 没有第二名。

There's no number two to Salesforce.

Salesforce就是Salesforce。

Salesforce is Salesforce.

Workday就是Workday。

Workday is Workday.

ServiceNow就是ServiceNow。

ServiceNow is ServiceNow.

如果你在这些市场中排名第二，甚至 worse，排名第三，你会承受巨大的痛苦。

And you'd feel a lot of pain if you did the number two, or, god forbid, the number three in those markets.

在技术变革的早期阶段，市场往往会以我们无法预见的方式碎片化。

In early days of technological shifts, markets tend to fragment in ways that we don't foresee.

最终，某些领域会变得不那么具有竞争力，人们会逐渐分散到不同的领域。

And they end up being less competitive in certain areas, and people settle into different areas.

因此，在模型层面，到目前为止，情况看起来更像是云计算行业。

So, on the model side, so far, the way it looks like it's played out is, it will be more like the cloud industry.

这不会是赢家通吃。

It's not gonna be a winner take all.

某些技术优势的时间窗口似乎很有限。

Certain technical advantages seem limited in time frame.

模型行业总是不断出现超越现象。

There's always this constant leapfrogging of the model industry.

所以我认为，它会像云计算行业一样，出现多个参与者，并且各自都能获得利润空间。

So I think it will look like the cloud industry in the sense that there will be multiple players, there will be profit pools for them.

在早期，我们一直在讨论，这会更像飞机制造，还是更像航空公司？

Early days, we were saying, is this gonna be aircraft manufacturing or is it going to be airlines?

这两者是光谱的两个极端。

Those are the two extreme ends of the spectrum.

飞机制造的利润率很高，因为资本密集度极高，技术门槛也非常高。

Aircraft manufacturing has high profit margins because there's really high capital intensity and it's extremely hard technically.

因此，这似乎与模型行业相似。

So that would seem to mirror the model industry.

另一方面，航空公司是竞争极其激烈的行业，最终都会陷入破产。

Airlines, on the other hand, are horribly competitive industries and they all go bankrupt in the fullness of time.

所以看起来，模型行业将会像飞机制造商或云行业一样。

So it seems like the model industry is gonna be like aircraft manufacturers or the cloud industry.

但为什么云行业会发展成这样？

But why did cloud play out the way it did?

只是因为市场规模大吗？

Is it just size of market?

我认为是因为规模。

I think it's size.

就这么简单吗？如果一个市场足够大，就会出现多个赢家，而不是一家独大？

Is it that simple that if a market's big enough, you're just gonna have multiple winners and not a winner take all?

这一点完全取决于市场规模。

That one is all size of market.

市场实在太庞大了。

It's just so vast.

云市场非常有趣，因为如果你能独立拥有AWS、微软Azure和GCP，这些公司将成为世界上最有价值的公司之一。

And cloud is such an interesting market because if you could just independently own AWS, Microsoft, Azure, and GCP, those would be some of the most valuable companies in the world.

拥有这些业务将会非常棒。

Those would be awesome businesses to own.

另一方面，我的一位合伙人亚历克斯·兰佩尔喜欢说这样一句话：世界上最好的企业没有客户，只有人质。

On the other side of it, one of my partners, Alex Rampell, has this statement that he likes to say, which is, the best business in the world don't have customers, they have hostages.

但在云市场中，情况并非如此。

That's not actually the case in cloud.

是的。

Sure.

确实存在一些像数据迁移费这样的问题。

There are some things like egress fees.

云服务商通过数据迁移费来抑制竞争。

The clouds are anti competitive with egress fees.

它们让客户很难离开并取出自己的数据，但这些问题只是次要的。

They make it really hard to leave and get your data out and all that stuff, but that's minor.

总的来说，这个市场的客户得到了很好的服务。

Generally speaking, the customers in that market are well served.

他们很满意。

They're happy.

对某些人来说，情况一直很积极，同时，云业务本身也是非常好的生意。

It's been positive some for them, and at the same time, the clouds are really good businesses.

我认为模型领域也很可能发生同样的情况。

I think the same is likely to happen in the model space.

所以，这个市场将会非常庞大，以至于会以我们目前无法预料的方式出现碎片化。

So, the market is gonna be so big, it will fragment in ways that we don't yet expect.

即使你在绝对收入规模或市场认知度上排名第二，也没关系。

And even if you're in a number two in terms of absolute revenue size or market awareness, that's okay.

但可能不好的是，在类似主导的消费者聊天界面这样的领域中位居第二。

What's not okay, probably, I would think, is being in the number two in something like the dominant consumer chat interface.

我想谈谈我们行业中的竞争，以及面向市场领导者（由技术巨头或其他人主导）的投资机会。

I wanna talk about competition in our industry for investment opportunities in the market leaders led by technical terminators or others.

在我们的职业生涯中，这已经成为一种共识，你在这个领域从业的时间比我长得多。

It's become in our collective careers, you've been in this specific business much longer than me.

但纵观你的职业生涯，这个行业已经变得更加制度化了。

But across your career, it's become way more institutionalized.

参与者多了很多，资金也多了很多。

There's way more players, there's way more money.

你每天面对的竞争对手，有时在才华上要强出许多。

The people you're up against on a daily basis are probably more talented sometimes by a lot.

所以你必须跟上这种节奏。

So you have to keep up with that.

当你试图在由一位广受认可的杰出人物领导、身处巨大市场中的激动人心的公司进行重大投资时，描述一下这种竞争态势。

Describe the competitive dynamic when you are trying to make a big investment in a big exciting company led by a consensus amazing person in a big market.

现在这种感觉是怎样的？

What does that feel like now?

我也很想知道，这种状况随着时间发生了怎样的变化。

And I'm also interested in how it's changed over time.

马克和本已经讲述过他们创立这家公司的起源，以及他们在风险投资产品方面的经历，还有他们为何以这种方式打造公司。

So Mark and Ben have told the stories about the origin of starting the firm and their experience with the venture capital product and why they built the firm the way they did.

每当他们讲这些故事时，我都觉得太棒了。

And whenever they tell those stories, I'm like, that's great.

天啊，要是能在这个时代竞争该多有趣啊。

And man, wouldn't it have been fun to compete in that time?

那一定会很棒。

That would have been awesome.

现在的市场无疑更具竞争性了。

The market is definitely more competitive now.

它已经变得更加制度化了。

It's become a lot more institutionalized.

不过，它变得更加制度化是有充分理由的。

It's become a lot more institutionalized for good reason though.

我现在经常跟我们的团队以及合伙人谈到的一点是，我们已经是一个成熟的行业了。

The thing that I'm telling our team and I talk about with my partners now, is we're a grown up industry now.

这不再是什么小众的定制化资产类别了。

This is no longer some little bespoke asset class.

我刚入行的时候，你我刚大学毕业，当时全球市值最大的十家公司里，可能只有一两家科技公司。

When I started my career, you and I were getting out of college, there were probably one or two technology companies in the largest 10 market cap companies in the world.

现在，十家中有八家，而这八家中有七家是西海岸的风投支持的科技公司。

Now, it's eight of ten and seven of the eight are West Coast technology venture backed companies.

这个认知还没有真正渗透到金融行业。

That realization hasn't really fully hit the finance industry.

但如果你看一下，科技公司已经主导了所有的市值创造，成为股市和经济的主要推动力。

But, if you look at that, tech has overtaken all of the market cap creation and is mostly driving force of the stock market and the economy.

私募市场已经真正成为一个资产类别。

The private markets have become a real asset class.

这正是我现在正在研究的课题，因为风险投资行业，我一直认为它是一个小规模、不可扩展的领域。

This is something I'm studying now because the venture industry, I've seen as this small non scalable thing.

结果发现，私募市场的市值达到了五万亿美元，过去十年增长了十倍。

Turns out there's 5,000,000,000,000 of private market cap that is up 10 x in the last ten years.

而且，这些公司中确实有一些是世界上最好的企业。

And it's honestly some of the best companies in the world.

这一市值几乎占了标普500指数的四分之一。

That market cap represents almost a quarter of the entire S and P 500.

它超过了魔七公司市值的一半。

It's more than half of the mag seven.

所以我认为，我们现在已经进入成年人的顶级联赛，必须开始像那样行事。

So I think that we now are in the grown up in the big leagues, and we need to start acting like it.

因此，我们已经根据这一认知对我们的公司进行了大量调整。

So we've adapted our firm a lot to that realization.

顺便说一句，关于这个行业如何变化，我再补充一点。

And oh, by the way, one other comment just on that industry, how it's changed.

我们刚刚完成了这项分析。

We just did this analysis.

如果你看看我们的公开投资组合，也就是我们花最多时间研究的领域，主要是软件、消费科技和金融科技。

If you look at our public universe, so where we spend most of our time, it's software consumer and fintech stuff.

在这些领域的公开市场中，增长超过30%的公司不到五家。

The public universe in those sectors, there's less than five companies growing 30%.

这有点令人震惊。

It's kinda staggering.

这个数字很低。

That's a low number.

我们的投资组合按平均美元权重计算，增长率达到了112%。

Our portfolio on average dollar weight is growing a 112%.

其中一些公司已经大到足以成为大型企业。

And some of these companies are big enough to be the large companies.

如果你看一下小盘股市场和公开市场，首先，过去二十年里，公开市场的规模已经缩小了一半。

And if you look at the small cap universe and the public markets, first of all, public markets have shrunk by half in the last twenty years.

如果观察小盘公开公司的构成，我会说，其质量远低于私募市场中可获得的公司。

And if you look at the composition of small cap public companies, the quality, would argue, is so much lower than what is available in the private markets.

所以这个行业是实实在在的。

So the industry is real.

竞争加剧并不令人意外。

It shouldn't be a surprise that the competition has intensified.

我对竞争的看法，就像我们的风投同事那样，认为市场已经变成了哑铃形。

I think about the competition similar to how our venture folks think about it, which is the market has become a barbell.

一方面，我们面临那些拥有强大风投业务的大型多阶段公司，它们是我们最激烈的竞争对手。

So we're faced with the large multi stage firms that have very strong venture practices on the one hand, and those are the fiercest competitors for us.

我尊重那些同行。

I respect my peers there.

他们试图和我们玩同样的游戏，那就是当我们遇到A轮或种子轮的特别项目时，我们想牢牢抓住它。

They're trying to play the same game as us, which is when we have something special at the series a or the seed, we wanna hold it really tightly.

而他们也想做同样的事情。

And they wanna do the same thing.

有时候他们成功了，有时候我们成功了，但我们都得为此竞争。

And sometimes they're effective at it, sometimes we're effective at it, but we have to battle that out.

在风投领域，一切都是定制化的。

On the venture side, it's bespoke.

以零售业作类比，有像沃尔玛和亚马逊这样的超级商店，这正是我们被归类的方式。

In the retail analogy, there's the superstore like the Walmart and Amazon, which is how we would get characterized.

而另一端就像是古驰店、普拉达店，代表深度专业化。

And then the other side is like the Gucci store, the Prada store, which is like deep specialization.

所以纳特和丹尼尔就是埃拉德的一个例子。

So Nat and Daniel would have been an example of the Elad.

还有许多其他人也在自己擅长的领域做得非常出色。

And then there's many others that do a really good job at what they do.

因此，我非常尊重我们这个领域中许多跨界人士，他们建立了自己的私营企业，并且做得很好。

So I have respect for a lot of the crossover folks who are in our world and have built private businesses and have done a good job with it.

那么，你们如何击败这些人呢？

So what do you do to beat these people?

我尤其想知道答案中最极端的版本。

And I'm especially curious in the actual extreme versions of the answer.

你们愿意为获胜做到什么地步。

The lengths that you're willing to go to to win.

我认为你们会喜欢听一个听起来在当时很轰动的故事，比如我们做过一些疯狂的事。

I think you would love to have some story that's like sensational in the moment where we did something crazy.

成长阶段企业的现实是，我们通过多年的关系建立来赢得交易。

The reality of the growth stage business is we win deals based on years of relationship building.

我们最近完成了一笔交易，当时我们与创始人合作得非常紧密，他主动给我们打电话说：嘿，我准备好了。

We recently did a deal where the founder we had worked with the founder so hard that he called us and he was like, hey, I'm ready to do this.

我就直接和你谈吧。

I'll just talk to you.

我心想，哇。

And I'm like, wow.

好吧。

Okay.

这是我努力的成果。

Fruits of my labor.

两年的坚持。

Two years of this.

这真不错。

This is good.

而到了那个时候，它已经是市场上最优秀的公司之一了。

And then, at that point, it's one of the best companies in the market.

而我们面临的局面是，好吧，这真是太棒了。

And the dynamic that we are faced with is, okay, this is awesome.

我得到了一个清晰的视角。

I got a clean look.

我确信如果他进入市场，他能得到比他刚才告诉我的更高的价格，但我能承受那个价格吗？

I know for sure if he was going to market, he would get a higher price than what he just told me, but can I bear the price?

因此，作为成长型投资者，我们经常需要进行的思考是：我们对产品或市场有哪些与众不同的认知，或者我们抱有哪些预期，使得我们能够做到这一点，而这些可能并不那么显而易见？

So that's often the exercise that we have to go through as growth investors, is what do we know differently about the product or the market or what are our expectations that will allow us to do it, that maybe aren't as obvious?

在那两年里，你们做了些什么来赢得这个权利？

What are you doing in those two years that earn you that right?

也许这就是需要采取极端措施的地方。

Maybe that's where the extreme measures are.

就像我们已经是他们公司的投资者一样去帮助他们。

Helping them as if we were already investors in their company.

所以我们会帮助他们寻找候选人、拓展客户，投入高质量的时间，表明我们理解他们的业务。

So helping them with candidates, helping them with customers, spending quality time and showing that we understand their business.

通常这最重要。

Often that's the biggest thing.

说实话，对于那些我们还不是投资方的公司，奇怪的是，有时候反而更容易，因为我们的平台和品牌都非常强大。

Honestly, for the companies where we're not existing investors, oddly enough, sometimes it's easier because our platform is so strong, our brand is so strong.

我再给你讲一个有趣的例子，就是Figma的Dylan。

I'll give you another fun example, which was Dylan at Figma.

当我们最初投资Figma的Dylan时，我正考虑从GA加入这家公司。

When we first invested in Dylan at Figma, I was considering joining the firm from GA.

那是2018年。

This was 2018.

我早就认识公司里的所有人，因此我花时间与我们的合伙人彼得·莱文交流。

I knew all the guys already at the firm, and so I'm spending time with Peter Levine, who is one of our partners.

我去找他时，直接问：彼得，你目前最关心的是什么？

And I come in, and I'm like, Peter, what's top of mind?

你如何看待增长业务？

How are you thinking about the growth business?

我能告诉你什么？

What can I tell you?

他跟我说，我们明天就需要这个。

And he was like, we need this tomorrow.

我们必须投资Figma。

We gotta invest in Figma.

我们明天就需要这个。

We need this tomorrow.

我不明白我们怎么会没做到。

I don't know how we didn't.

我们错过了。

We missed it.

我对此反应太慢了。

I was late to it.

我们只需要一个增长型业务，这本来就是一个增长型交易，我们本该做下来的。

We just need a growth business and it was a growth deal and we should have done it.

这太疯狂了。

It's crazy.

我们很早就收购了GitHub。

We did GitHub early.

我们怎么就没做这个呢？

How did we not do this one?

他当时气得暴跳如雷。

And he was just apoplectic.

我需要这个。

I need this.

这非常鼓舞人心，令人兴奋。

That was very encouraging and exciting.

所以第一天我就跟你说过，我了解投资组合里的六家公司。

So day one, I told you, I knew the six companies in the portfolio.

我也知道 portfolio 外面大约五家我特别喜欢的公司。

I also knew the five ish companies that I really loved outside the portfolio.

Roblox 就是我很亲近的一家。

Roblox was one that I was close to.

Figma 是另一家。

Figma was another.

所以从我加入的那一刻起，我们就对 Dylan 发起了全面攻势。

So from the moment I joined, we had done the full court press on Dylan.

他来参加了我们的峰会。

He came to our summit.

那是马克和本的熊抱。

It was Mark and Ben bear hugs.

他当时对加密货币非常着迷。

He was really into crypto.

我们在加密货币主题上也给了他一个熊抱。

We bear hugged him on the crypto set.

我们为他做了所有能做的事，帮他寻找董事会成员。

We did everything we could with him, helping him with a board search.

我们把我们网络中的一位人士推荐到了他的董事会。

We placed a person in our network onto his board.

我们竭尽全力想推动这笔交易，但他总是说：‘我会告诉你们的，我会告诉你们的。’

We were trying to do everything and trying to catalyze a deal and he was like, I'll let you know when, I'll let you know when.

疫情爆发后，他给我们打了电话，说：‘现在是时候了。’

So COVID strikes and he calls us and he's like, now's the time.

天哪。

Oh my god.

那时正值疫情高峰期，我们都觉得世界要完了，一切全乱了。

This was in the moment of COVID where we all thought the world was gonna end and everything was screwed.

股市大跌。

Stock market was way down.

我觉得太好了。

I felt like, great.

时机真好。

Good timing.

所以至少我们运气不错。

So at least we got the luck.

于是他来做了推介，我们已经做了所有前期工作，团队正在展开讨论。

So he came and pitched, we had done all the work, and we're having the debate as a team.

我和我的团队从传统的增长视角来看待这件事，觉得设计师的市场并不大。

And me and my team were taking this traditional growth lens, looking at it, and we're like, market for designers is not that big.

真的很小。

It's really small.

如果你算一下设计师市场的规模和他们的收费，我觉得20亿美元的估值说不通。

And if you do the math of the market size of designers and what they charge, I don't think the price makes sense at $2,000,000,000.

这太局限了。

It's too limiting.

我们的风投团队在这场讨论中快疯了。

And our venture guys were losing their minds in this discussion.

他们说，你们完全误解了重点。

They're like, you guys are totally missing the point.

现代科技公司中，设计师与工程师的比例几乎是两倍。

The ratio of designers to engineers is basically double for the modern technology companies.

这是一个领先指标。

So that's a leading indicator.

这个比例将会改变。

That ratio is gonna change.

世界上设计师的数量将会翻倍。

There's gonna be double the designers in the world.

更重要的是，整个工程到设计的流程正在发生变化。

More importantly, the whole engineering to design process is changing.

前端工程与设计正在融合。

And there's a melding that's happening of front end engineering and design.

因此，把这仅仅看作是一个设计市场就太局限了。

So thinking about this as a market for design is way too limiting.

所以你根本没抓住重点。

So you're just missing the point.

所以我们当时在争论，但就像各说各话。

So we were debating it and it was like speaking past each other.

最后，本结束了对话。

And finally, Ben called it off.

他说，好吧。

He's like, okay.

行了。

Alright.

我们今晚解决不了这个问题。

We're not gonna solve this tonight.

最终，这是增长基金方面的决定。

And ultimately, was a call on the growth fund side.

我思考了一晚上，醒来后心想：这是一个非常出色的商业模式，只是我们对市场规模的判断还不够确信。

And I slept on it, and I woke up, and I was like, look, this is an exceptional business model, and we're squinting to believe enough on the market size.

优秀的创始人，优秀的商业模式。

Great founder, great business model.

市场足够好吗？

Is the market good enough?

我愿意承担这个风险。

And I'm happy to take that risk.

我不愿承担的风险是企业的质量和创始人的质量，但要真正理解这一点，你必须对市场有细致入微的洞察，就像用传统的成长型投资视角一样。

The risk I don't wanna take is quality of business, quality of founder, but you really had to have a nuanced view of the market in order to get there, like with a traditional growth investing lens.

幸运的是，我们最终做出了正确的判断，结果非常好。

And so fortunately, got there and it worked out really well.

我提起这个故事，第一是为了说明，对于最顶尖的公司，价格就是价格，你必须判断自己是否愿意接受它。

I bring up that story, one, to say that's an example of something where the price is the price, and you have to figure out if you can take it, if you're willing, for the very best of the best companies.

第二，我认为这体现了我们所拥有的优势，以及在成长型投资中取得成功所需的东西。

But two, I think it speaks to the advantage that we have, and what you need to be successful in growth investing.

你需要具备产品和市场的洞察力，否则你只会困在电子表格里，死在电子表格里。

You need those product and market insights, or you're just gonna live in a spreadsheet and die in a spreadsheet.

我们所做的一切，包括我和我们的团队为设计一种与早期团队紧密协作的流程，都是为了优化对人、产品和市场的洞察。

So everything that we've done or I've done and our team has done to design a process of tightly integrating with our early stage teams has been in the spirit of optimizing insights around people, products and markets.

我认为，真正的成功就源于此。

And I think that's where you actually get success.

我最近越来越想多了解一些关于你日常生活的细节，因为我对此很感兴趣。

One thing that I'm trying to do more of because I'm just interested by it is to hear about the minutiae of your day and life.

在这个竞争极其激烈的环境中，我对一些顶尖投资者是如何具体安排他们一天生活的感到好奇，想看看对你来说是怎样的。

In this incredibly competitive environment, I've become interested in how some of the best investors literally just like run a given day and what that looks like for you.

我想你会惊讶于我对这些细节有多感兴趣。

And I think you'd be surprised how in the weeds I'm interested in learning about.

所以，就细节而言，我只是好奇你的工作日常究竟是什么感觉、什么样子。

So like on the side of detail, I'm just curious what the actual life of your job feels and looks like.

我的一位长期导师和朋友、我们公司的运营合伙人鲍勃·斯万，给了我一条非常好的建议：他和约翰·多纳霍每年年底都会花两个小时回顾一整年的日程安排，并设定一个目标：删掉其中30%的事项。

Bob Swan, who is a long time mentor and friend of mine and an operating partner at our firm, gave me this really good advice that he and John Donahoe, at the end of every year, always went through an exercise where they spent two hours looking at their calendar from the year, and then they had an objective of cutting 30% of stuff that was on their calendar.

这样做的目的是确保他们能把责任下放给团队成员，同时也能获得更大的杠杆效应。

There was a way for them to make sure that they were giving responsibility down to the people on their teams, but also that they would get leverage.

所以他给了我这个建议，当我忙于一些我不该忙的事情时，他还会提醒我。

So he's given me that and then he reminds me of it when he can tell I'm too busy with things that I shouldn't be.

我觉得我在这方面并不擅长，但我还是会回答这个问题。

So I think I'm not very good at this, but I'll answer the question anyway.

我努力确保自己花足够的时间去会见公司。

I try to make sure I'm spending adequate time meeting companies.

目前，我们的投资业务大致是三分之二为相对知名的公司，三分之一为新公司。

So right now, our investment business looks something like two thirds relatively known companies and one third newer stuff.

但我希望我的时间分配能与此大不相同。

But I wanna make sure my time is spent pretty differently than that.

我希望我的时间有20%花在这些知名公司上，花时间与Ali、Vandrol这样的创始人，以及像Flock Safety这样的团队交流。

I want my time to be 20% on those known companies and spending time with people like Ali and the founders Vandrol, like, whatever it may be, Flock Safety.

但我希望大部分时间都花在新公司上。

But I want most of my time spent on the new stuff.

因为我需要了解这些新兴市场。

Because I need to be learning about those new markets.

所以我不断与人工智能创始人会面，与聪明的人工智能员工交流，确保自己深入且能进行对话，真正理解这些市场。

So constantly meeting with AI founders, talking to smart AI employees, and making sure that I'm deep and conversational and have an understanding of those markets.

所以我把一天中的大部分时间都花在这上面。

So I spend a lot of my day on that.

我开始不再安排一对一会议，我想：你知道吗？

I've started to move away from doing one on ones, and I'm like, you know what?

我不需要安排一对一会议。

I don't need to schedule one on ones.

我随时都在和我的团队交流。

I talk to my team all the time.

我会在下班后给他们打电话。

I'll call them after hours.

我开始有意识地预留出一些时间段和整天的时间。

I've started to very deliberately block off hours and days.

所以我每周二预留两小时，每周四预留两小时，另外每周下午还会安排两次一个半小时的时段。

So I block off two hours every Tuesday, two hours every Thursday, and then I also put an hour and a half block twice a week in afternoons.

而这些时间常常被紧急事务占用，比如我需要打电话之类的。

And that often gets consumed with things that are pressing and I need to make calls or whatever it may be.

但我发现，通过留出思考时间，我能学到很多东西，并且形成自己的见解。

But I find that I learn a lot and develop a lot of my own thinking just by having think time.

我就是这样的人，浏览器里开着二十个标签，都想看完，结果却一个都没看。

I'm the kind of person that has 20 things open in the browser and I wanna read them all and then I don't get to them.

所以，除非我专门腾出大块时间，否则我根本没花足够的时间去学习。

So unless I block off a bunch of time, I actually just don't find that I'm spending the time learning as much as I should.

因此，我想把80%的时间花在了解公司、与创业者交流上。

So trying to learn about companies, spending time with entrepreneurs, I want to be 80% of my time.

剩下的20%则是与创始人、内部管理层沟通，或者在融资期间调整时间安排。

And then 20% is spending time with founders, internal management, time shift when we're fundraising.

你每周大概能见到多少家新公司？

How many new companies do you think you meet a week?

作为一家成长型基金，我们每周大概会接触30家公司，不是全新的，但每周大约30家。

We as a growth fund probably meet 30 companies a week, not new, probably 30 companies a week.

我个人大概会见10家左右。

I personally probably meet 10, somewhere around there.

你如何进行这些会议？

How do you run those meetings?

如果我参加其中一场，会议的结构是怎样的？

If I came into one of those 10, what is the structure of the meeting?

我会把开场白保持得非常简短。

I keep the introduction super brief.

我喜欢直接切入主题，说：嘿，你能花五分钟向我解释一下你的战略和愿景吗？

I like to jump in and say, hey, why don't you please spend five minutes explaining to me the strategy and your vision?

因为我已经看过你们的网站，对这家公司有些了解，可能也和一些客户聊过。

Because I've read your website, I know a little bit about the company, I've talked to some customers maybe.

但更大的方向是什么？

But what is the bigger thing?

你来告诉我。

You tell me.

然后我就问二十分钟的问题。

And then I just ask questions for twenty minutes.

好的。

Okay.

那你对这个怎么看？

So what do you think about this?

你对那个怎么看？

What do you think about that?

这可能是个愚蠢的问题，但你能告诉我关于这个的情况吗？

This may be a stupid question but can you tell me about this?

我发现这样做有效得多，创始人给我们的最高赞誉是：谢谢，你做了充分的调研；或者：谢谢你问了这个问题，真聪明。

And I find that to be a lot more effective and the ultimate compliment that we get from a founder is, thanks, you've done your research or hey, thanks for asking that question, that's pretty smart.

如果你思考你这样做的原因而不是其他方式，最重要的原因是什么？

If you think about the reasons why you do this versus something else, what are the most important ones?

你为什么不当创始人？

Why aren't you a founder?

你为什么不在其他行业工作呢？

Why don't you work in some other industry?

你为什么不创办自己的公司呢？

Why don't you have your own firm?

你本可以做其他事情的。

There's other things that you could do.

你选择做这件事最重要的原因是什么？

What are the most important reasons why this is the thing you do?

所以我妻子会说我的注意力持续时间很短，她的意思是我对很多不同的事物都感兴趣，而这是一种了解大量新事物的绝佳方式。

So my wife would say that I have a low attention span and what she means by that is I'm interested in a lot of different things and this is a really cool way of getting to learn about tons of new stuff.

我猜这也是你喜欢投资的原因，我们有多幸运呢？

I suspect this is the same reason that you like to invest is how lucky are we?

我们能够坐下来，与那些正在打造当今世界上最有趣公司的创业者们共度时光。

We get to sit and spend time with the entrepreneurs who are building the most interesting companies in the world right now.

我们能够了解最前沿的技术，如果你在公开市场或只是一份普通工作中，是永远没有机会接触到的。

We get to learn about the most cutting edge technology stuff that if you were in the public markets or just in a job, you would never get a chance to learn about.

所以我热爱学习，也喜欢与优秀的创始人一起探索非常有趣的事物。

So I love to learn and I love to be around great founders as they're exploring really interesting things.

因此，这部分对我来说极具吸引力。

So that part of it is really really attractive.

还有另一部分则契合了我完全不同的另一面，那就是这个行业是一个有胜负记录的行业。

There's another part that plays to a totally different side of me, which is this business is a scoreboard business.

我经常向我们的团队传达这一点。

And I convey this to our team all the time.

这个行业有明确的胜负记录，我们的期望是赢得胜利。

There's a scoreboard in this business, and our expectation is that we win.

虽然这个胜负记录的时间跨度很长，尤其是在风险投资领域，但在成长型投资中也是如此。

Now, it's a very long dated scoreboard, especially in the venture side, but on the growth side even.

这其实是一个相当长期的胜负记录。

It's a pretty long dated scoreboard.

但归根结底，我们必须实现回报。

But at the end of the day, we have to put up returns.

我们的客户是创始人和我们的有限合伙人。

Our customers are founders and our LPs.

在创始人这一端，我们需要确保为他们提供卓越的服务，如果我们做到了，就会形成一个良性循环。

And on the founder side, we need to make sure we do a great job with them, and there's a virtuous flywheel if we do.

在有限合伙人这一端，情况很简单。

On the LP side, it's pretty simple.

我们是否在很好地创造回报？

Are we doing a good job generating returns?

16倍，我们作为一家公司以独特的方式运营是众所周知的。

A 16 z, we're known as running ourselves a little bit differently as a firm.

马克和本真正推动了这一点。

Mark and Ben really drive that.

我们会做一些事情，比如本亲自负责每一位新员工的入职培训，并带领他们学习我们的文化手册。

We do things like, Ben runs every new employee onboarding and he runs through our culture document.

当你在我们公司签署录用通知书时，你不仅要签录用通知书，还要签署我们的文化手册，其中阐明了我们的文化原则。

When you sign an offer letter at our firm, you sign your offer letter but you also have to sign our culture document, which lays out our cultural principles.

我还为我们的增长基金制定了一套特定的原则。

I also created a subset of principles that I wanted to convey for our growth fund.

‘ scoreboard 和我们期望获胜’这句话直白地表达了我们必须保持竞争力。

The scoreboard and we expect to win is a very direct way of saying we better be competitive.

我有一条是：我们是洋基队，我们要像洋基队那样行事。

I have one that is we are the Yankees and we're gonna act like it.

我这么说的意思并不是我们要傲慢，或者自认为是最好的团队之类。

And what I mean by that is not we're gonna be arrogant or we think we're the best team or something like that.

我的意思是，我们有幸成为一家拥有非凡品牌公司的成员。

What I mean by that is we're lucky enough to be a part of a firm that has an incredible brand.

因此，我们要以极高的绩效标准来运营我们的团队。

So we're gonna run our team very very high performance.

如果你在洋基队，你就必须表现出色。

If you're on the Yankees, you better be performing.

这是大舞台。

This is the big stage.

所以，我们对团队的期望是，大家要高度协作，重视团队胜利，但你必须足够优秀。

So our expectations for our team, we're very collaborative, we care about winning as a team, but you better be good.

你必须把你的工作做得非常出色。

You better be doing your job really well.

你必须努力工作。

You better be working hard.

这可能是别人不太容易注意到的一点。

This is one of the things that maybe is not as obvious to people.

实际上，直到我加入公司后，我才真正意识到这一点。

It wasn't as obvious to me actually until I joined the firm.

很有趣的是，在我考虑加入之前，从外部看我的印象是，马克和本是真正的名人，算是半名人。

It's so funny, when I was considering it, my perception from the outside before I really started the process was Mark and Ben, they're really celebrities, semi celebrities.

他们真的努力工作吗？

Do they really work hard?

他们还有那么多其他的兴趣。

They got all these other interests.

我进来之后才发现，这里真是个充满竞争的地方。

And I got in and, man, it is a competitive place.

我们之间的竞争非常激烈。

We are very intensely competitive.

我们渴望胜利，每个人都极其努力地工作。

We wanna win and everybody works really really hard.

没人会躺在功劳簿上睡大觉。

No one is resting on their laurels.

我们一直在不停地交流讨论。

We're all constantly chatting nonstop.

深夜里，我们都在拼命工作。

Late at night, we're all working hard.

我们不断碰撞想法，我特别喜欢这一点。

We're kicking around ideas, and I love that.

我喜欢这种合伙关系的氛围，但对绩效的要求极高。

I love the dynamic of partnership, but high expectations around performance.

我为什么会在16z呢？

On the why am I at a 16 z?

我为什么不自己开一家公司？

Why don't I run my own firm?

我总是跟别人说，我有一份理想的工作。

I always tell people I have a dream job.

这太棒了。

This is awesome.

我加入了一家正处于巅峰状态的公司。

I got to join a firm that was on the top of their game.

他们正处于上升期，但我们确实有巨大的机会在增长方面打造一个品牌。

They were on the ascent, but there was a real latent opportunity for us to build a franchise on the growth side.

我之前所在的GA文化非常强大，但我加入的这个地方充满乐观精神。

And I came from a place with a really strong culture at GA, but I joined a place that is full of optimism.

我认为在成长型投资中，你确实需要这种精神。

And I think you need that in growth investing.

换句话说，这是最重要的因素，你必须保持乐观。

Like, that is the number one ingredient, is you gotta be optimistic.

你必须能看到事情可能顺利发展的方面。

You gotta be able to see what can go right.

但我也有机会组建自己的团队。

But I also got a chance to hire the team.

我可以制定战略、设定投资流程，把我认为一些宝贵的经验带过来，同时放下一些旧的做法。

I got to set the strategy, set the investment process, take what I felt were some of the learnings that I had, which were great, and bring those things with me and leave some things behind.

比如，我们一开始设立的投资决策流程，就和传统的成长型股权投资公司有所不同。

So, for example, one of the things that we set up at the outset was a bit of a different investment decision making process than a traditional growth equity investment firm.

大多数成长型股权投资公司都有一个投资委员会。

So most growth equity investment firms have an investment committee.

这是核心环节。

It's central.

你去汇报，争取投票支持，然后投票结束，事情就尘埃落定了。

You go, you present, you battle to get the votes, and then they disappear and then the smoke comes out.

这就是决策。

And here's the decision.

我们在增长基金中决定完全采取不同的做法。

And what we decided to do at the firm in the growth fund was do it totally differently.

所以我们打算让决策流程像我们的风险投资流程一样，由单人拍板。

So we were gonna actually make the decision process just like our venture process, which is single trigger puller.

我对团队设定的期望，马克和本也传达了，我认为我们做得相当好：你必须保持智力上的诚实，必须透明，并且我们公开欢迎分歧。

And the expectation I have set with our team, and that Mark and Ben have conveyed, and I think we do a pretty good job of is, you gotta be intellectually honest, you've gotta be transparent, and we openly expect disagreement.

但一旦你表示异议，就要先异议，然后全力支持决定。

But once you disagree, you disagree and then you commit.

我认为这样做的好处是，鼓励人们充分探讨投资的风险和回报。

I think by doing it this way, you encourage people to fully explore the risks of investing and fully explore the rewards.

你永远不会陷入急于出售、为投票而搞政治，或因错误原因影响他人决策的诱惑。

You're never in this temptation to sell or to politic for a vote or try to influence someone's decision for the wrong reasons.

你真的喜欢某件事吗？你真的想推动它吗？

Do you really like something and you really wanna push?

我们没有这种动态。

We don't have that dynamic.

所以我认为这让我们能够更开放地探讨投资的优劣，我认为这个过程相当不错，而且我们规模很小。

So I think it allows us to more openly explore the merits of an investment and I think it's been a reasonably good process and we're small.

所以我们行动非常迅速。

So we move very fast.

我们以非常迭代的方式进行。

We do this very iteratively.

我们并不需要搞一个周一的投资委员会流程。

It's not like we need to have a Monday investment committee process.

我加入公司之前的第一个投资委员会决策，是和马克·斯科特一起吃早餐时做出的，我们在早餐时就决定了投资。

My first investment committee decision was before I even joined the firm, and it was Mark Scott and I having breakfast, and we were deciding on our investment at breakfast.

所以我喜欢保持非正式，但同时希望过程严谨。

So I like to keep it informal, but we wanna make it rigorous at the same time.

另外一件我做得有点不同的事是，当我们招聘团队时，我感到非常幸运。

The other thing I did that's a little bit different is when we hired the team by the way, I feel very lucky.

这对我来说是工作中最特别的部分之一。

It's one of the most special parts of the job for me.

团队有多大？

How big is the team?

大约有10位投资人，所以规模很小。

It's about 10 investors, so it's pretty small.

我们能这么小的原因是我们有早期阶段的团队。

The reason we can be so small is because we have the early stage teams.

但我们做得相当好的一个文化特质就是协作精神，以及愿意卷起袖子帮助他人。

But a cultural trait that I think we've done a pretty good job of building is just collaboration and the willingness to roll up your sleeves and help people.

在团队晋升评估标准中，我会纳入他们对集体投资判断的贡献。

As part of the team's promotion criteria evaluation, etcetera, I put in their contribution to collective investment judgment.

初级职位。

Entry level.

从一开始，这就是你工作的一部分。

From the start, this is part of your job.

你最好能为我们的集体投资判断做出贡献，这是我们从一开始就将评估你的方面。

You better be contributing to our collective investment judgment, and it's something that we're gonna evaluate you on from the start.

所以对一位初级人员来说，面对这种情况会有点不同。

So it's a little bit different for a junior person to be faced with that.

很多时候，新人加入后需要找到自己的定位，知道什么时候该发言，什么时候不该发言。

And a lot of times the junior folks when they join, they have to find their footing and when do they chime in, when do they not.

但我认为这让我们团队在做决策时变得更好了。

But I think it's made us better as a team at making decisions.

如果你思考一下对你所从事的这种成长型投资来说，哪些环境更优或更差，这些条件是什么？

If you think about the environments that are better or worse for growth investing of the type that you do, what are those conditions?

如果你能在厨房里调配出最适合你投入资金的完美环境，它具备哪些特征？

If you could cook up in the kitchen the perfect environment for you to be deploying dollars, what are the features of it?

理想情况是产品周期早期，资本周期低迷。

Well, the optimal would be early product cycle, bad capital cycle.

但这两种情况很少同时出现并相互重合。

But those rarely happen and coincide with one another.

如果非得选一个，那就是早期产品周期。

If I had to pick, it's all early product cycle.

对于我们所从事的增长型投资风格而言。

For the style of growth investing that we do.

早期产品周期是什么意思？

What does that mean early product cycle?

这意味着我们正处于一项新技术变革的初期。

It means we're at the outset of a new technological change.

市场浪潮的开端。

Beginning of a market wave.

是的。

Yeah.

新的市场浪潮。

The new market wave.

所以也许最好从回顾的角度来说明。

So maybe it's easiest to highlight in retrospect.

事实证明，当我们刚开始投资生涯时，我们赶上了非常好的时机。

It turns out that when you and I were starting our investing careers, we started at a really good time.

你才是。

You did.

我当时在公开市场。

I was in public markets.

嗯，你在公开市场，所以得应对全球金融危机之类的事情。

Well, you were in public markets and so you had to deal with GFC and stuff.

但不管怎样，那是资本周期的问题。

But notwithstanding that, it's capital cycle, that one.

事后看来很明显，但在当时却很难感受到。

It's obvious in retrospect, but it's really hard to feel it in the moment.

也许没那么明显，因为人工智能已经被广泛讨论，问题是：我们现在是不是处于人工智能泡沫中？

Maybe less so because AI is so well covered and the question is, are we in an AI bubble now?

而不是：我们前方是否有一个良好的产品周期？

Not, is there a good product cycle ahead of us?

但事实上，与此同时，我们赶上了移动互联网、云计算、SaaS、电子商务，所有这些都同时出现了。

But turns out that at the same time, we had the mobile, we had cloud, SaaS, ecommerce, all at the same time.

这为我们创造了绝佳的环境。

And that was a great setup for us.

如果你看看我们这个行业所犯的所有错误，2021年的情况已经被充分讨论了。

If you look at all the mistakes that we've made as an industry, 2021 is very well covered.

我总是告诉人们，2021年最大的错误是我们错过了产品周期的时机，当时我们根本没有意识到。

I always tell people the biggest mistake from 2021 is that we were late product cycle, and we just didn't realize it at the time.

新冠疫情带来了一些误导，但我们没意识到自己已经错过了产品周期。

There's a bit of a head fake with COVID, but we didn't realize we were late product cycle.

这在实际中意味着，我们的想法都变差了。

And what that means in practice is the ideas are just worse.

市场机会也变差了。

The market opportunities are worse.

想要成功变得困难多了。

It's just harder to go be successful.

现在，当我与我们的投资者、有限合伙人交谈时，他们都在问我所有这些问题：我们是不是处于泡沫中？

Right now, when I talk to our investors, our LPs, they're all asking me all of the questions are, are we in a bubble?

市场是不是太热了？

Is the market too hot?

你们是怎么应对估值的？

How are you dealing with valuations?

我说，我们要尽量保持平衡的态度。

And I'm like, look, we're trying to be very balanced about this.

同时，十年后，将会涌现出一大批非常优秀的企业。

At the same time, ten years from now, there's gonna be a bunch of really, really great companies.

所以我们必须在市场上积极参与。

So we gotta be in the market on the field.

事实上，从2022年到2025年初的这两年，我认为是一个非常好的时期。

It turns out that the last two years coming out, '22 to early twenty five, I think are a really good period.

我觉得这将是投资的一个绝佳时代。

I think this is gonna be a great vintage of time to have been investing.

我们也对这些公司保持私有状态的时间之长感到惊讶。

We also have been surprised at how long the companies have stayed private.

它们在我们的投资清单上停留的时间比我们预期的要长。

They've stayed on the bingo card for us longer than we expected.

这非常好，因为我们以非常有吸引力的方式将它们转化了。

And that's been great because we've converted those in a really attractive way.

如果你看一下我们过去一年的活动，我们的投资组合按美元加权增长了112%，而我们进入时的收入倍数是21倍。

If you look at the last year of our activity, our portfolio dollar weighted is growing a 112%, and we entered at 21 times revenue.

所以我会参与这场辩论。

So I'll have this debate.

首先，我承认收入倍数是有缺陷的，尤其是对传统投资者而言。

First of all, I recognize that revenue multiples are flawed and all that, especially for traditional investors.

但我告诉我们的投资者，如果我能在余下的职业生涯中，投资那些年增长112%、业务卓越、市场前景良好、且收入倍数仅为21倍的公司，我会毫不犹豫地去做。

But what I tell our investors is, if I could invest for the rest of my career in a 112% growing companies that are really, really great and good end markets at 21 times revenue, I would do it in a heartbeat.

我会毫不犹豫地去做。

I would do it in a heartbeat.

另外，顺便说一下，我们以前在GA也有过这样的争论。

And, oh, by the way, we used to have this debate at GA.

我认为这比在私募股权中以15倍EBITDA买入一个12%增长率的公司要安全得多。

I think that's way less risky than something where you're buying a 12% grower in PE for 15 times EBITDA.

从某种奇怪的角度来看，这反而风险更低，因为增长本身就能解决很多问题，大大降低风险。

In a weird way, it's less risky because growth just takes care of so much for you and de risks so much for you.

我认为，当增长率超过30%时，市场仍然没有充分认识到这种增长速率的价值。

I think above 30% growth, the market still doesn't fully value the growth rate.

为什么会这样呢？

Why is that the case?

我觉得只是很难建模。

I think it's just hard to model.

我的结论是，我研究了所有这些我称之为‘模型破坏者’的公司。

My conclusion, I've studied all these companies that are I call them the model busters.

但我研究了这些公司之后发现，任何投资者要构建一个能持续反映高增长的五年或十年模型，都实在太难了。

But I've studied all these companies and it is just so hard for any investor to build a five or ten year model where high growth persists.

这很不自然。

It's just not natural.

没有人曾为谷歌或维萨建立过一个预测它们在成立二十年后仍以15%或20%增长的财务模型。

No one built a financial model for Google or Visa that had them growing twenty years into existence at 15 or 20%.

这么做会完全不合常理。

It would just be totally unnatural to do so.

如果你回顾iPhone问世的那一刻，这就回到了关于产品周期以及你能有多意外的讨论。

If you look at the moment of the iPhone, and this goes back to the point about product cycles and how much you can get surprised.

在2009年，如果你查看当时对苹果的市场一致预期，并与2013年的实际表现进行对比。

In 2009, if you looked at consensus estimates for Apple, and then compared for 2013.

2009年对2013年的市场一致预期，与2013年的实际业绩相比，误差达到了三倍。

So 2009 consensus estimate for the year 2013, and compared it to actual performance in 2013, consensus estimates were off by three x.

这是一个巨大的偏差，而苹果可是全球最受关注的公司。

That's a massive number, and that's the most covered company in the world.

所以，我认为在这些公司身上，你确实可能对增长感到意外。

So, I think you can be surprised on growth on these things.

我对此特别感兴趣，努力去了解很多，但我认为用这种方式建模是不自然的。

I get a big kick out of that, I try to learn a lot about it, But I think it's not natural to model anything that way.

人们很自然地就会说，一家公司增长了80%，接下来会增长65%，然后是50%、40%、30%，最后是一个永续增长率和永续利润率，这就是我们的数字。

It's so natural to just say, hey, company's growing 80%, then they're gonna grow 65, then 50, then 40, then 30, then a terminal growth rate, and a terminal margin, and here's what our numbers are.

如果一家公司增长了80%，然后增长率持续不变，这和这种情况非常不同。

It's very different than a company if it grows 80 and then the growth rate persists.

75%，65%。

75, 65.

这会导致你的估值出现三倍的差异。

It's like a three x difference in your valuation.

所以你可能会得到完全不同的结果。

So you can just get it massively different.

这就是为什么我热爱高增长。

So that's why I love high growth.

这很明显。

It's obvious.

这就是我喜欢它的数学原理。

That's the math behind why I love it.

但再说一遍，很难真正理解，因为没人会这样建模。

But again, it's actually just hard to appreciate because it's not natural to build a model that way.

你和我以前讨论过关于推式公司和拉式公司的概念。

You and I have talked before about this idea of push versus pull companies.

你能描述一下这两者的区别吗？以及在评估公司时，这个概念为什么对你很重要？

Can you describe that difference and how that's an idea that you care about when evaluating them?

当你找到一家拉式公司时，那简直太神奇了。

It's magic when you find a pull business.

所以，我办公桌上贴了一张便利贴，上面写着：市场是否在主动要求更多你的产品？

So, I have a post it note on my computer in the office that says, is the market demanding more of your product?

当这种情况发生时，这是最特别的事情。

It's the most special thing when it happens.

顺便说一下，很多这些AI公司，ChatGPT的增长方式究竟神奇在哪里？

By the way, a lot of these AI companies, what's so magical about the way ChatGPT has grown?

它有十亿用户，完全是自然增长，全是品牌效应。

It's a billion users, it's organic, it's all brand.

顺便说一句，令人震惊的是，它并没有网络效应。

And the shocking thing about that one, by way, is it doesn't have a network effect.

这对我们来说是最令人惊讶的事情之一。

That was one of the more surprising things for us.

市场是否在要求你的产品更多？

So, is the market demanding more of your product?

这可能是我们能回答的最重要的问题。

Is probably the most important question that we can answer.

因为当这种情况发生时，尤其是在消费领域，往往能创造出世界上最具特殊性的公司。

Because when it happens, especially in consumer, it tends to create the most special companies in the world.

我们已经在像Roblox这样的公司中看到过，当它真正发挥作用时，而Roblox拥有双重网络效应，因此格外特别。

So, we've seen it in companies like Roblox, when it really works, and that one has two network effects and so it's super special.

我们也在那些没有网络效应或非消费类的公司中看到过这种情况。

We also see it in companies that aren't network effect or consumer.

以Andoroll为例，事实证明市场确实非常迫切地需要他们的产品，这背后有诸多原因。

Like in the case of Andoroll, turns out the market really really really is demanding more of their product and there's many reasons for that.

我们同时迎来了AI能力、自主性、专业知识以及如何应对政府监管的汇聚，这些大多来自Palantir和SpaceX等公司的前员工。

We've reached all at the same time, this confluence of AI capabilities, autonomy, know how, and how to navigate governments, mostly from alums of companies like Palantir and SpaceX.

与此同时，我们面临着迫切的地缘政治需求。

At the same time that we have a desperate geopolitical need.

市场对他们的产品需求旺盛，这非常特别。

The market is demanding more of their product and that's really special.

我常提到关于推式业务的一点是：你必须亲自去销售它。

One of the things that I say about push businesses, which is you gotta go sell it.

有时这类业务非常成功，在某些行业确实如此，比如网络安全等领域。

Sometimes those are really successful and there's industries where this is the case, like cyber security and things like that.

这类业务并不会随着时间推移而变得更容易。

They don't tend to get easier over time.

相反，它们往往会变得更加困难。

They tend to get harder.

如果你必须去推销或营销你的产品，随着规模扩大，通常会变得越来越难。

If you have to go sell or market your product, the bigger you get, often it gets harder.

所以这并不总是如此。

So that's not always the case.

有时候，品牌等因素会带来规模递增的回报。

Sometimes you get increasing returns to scale from brand and things like that.

但特别是在消费领域，如果你是推式业务，几乎总是会越来越难。

But especially on the consumer side, it almost always gets harder if you're a push business.

TikTok 可能是这个规律的例外。

TikTok maybe is the exception of the rule.

是因为他们早期就大力推广了吗？

Because they pushed it early?

他们不仅早期就大力推广，而且极其激进。

They pushed it early and so aggressively.

显然，如果你是Facebook，你可能会永远纠结于那个决定。

And obviously, if you're Facebook, you probably sit around and think about that decision forever.

也许这甚至不是一个决定。

Maybe it's not even a decision.

我当然没有在内部。

I wasn't on the inside, obviously.

但TikTok的增长在很大程度上是由在Facebook上的广告推动的，这想想真是令人难以置信。

But the growth of TikTok was fueled by advertising on Facebook in large part, which is crazy to think about.

但特别是如果你是一个依赖谷歌或Facebook广告的业务，它几乎永远不会变得更容易。

But especially if you're a Google or Facebook driven ad business, it almost never gets easier.

它总是会变得更难，而谷歌和Facebook则随着时间的推移积累了更好的经济效益，代价是那些在它们平台上投放广告的人。

It always gets harder and Google and Facebook are the ones who accumulate better economics over time at the expense of the people who advertise on them.

所以这是推式与拉式的区别。

So the push versus pull thing.

所以现在，在人工智能时代，我们谈论这一点。

So right now, we talk about this in the age of AI.

我认为，如何评估当前的人工智能企业是一个有趣的问题。

I think there's how do we assess AI businesses right now is an interesting thing.

一是客户获取的便捷性。

One is ease of customer acquisition.

我们看到那些真正特别的案例，比如Cursor，它的增长主要靠病毒式传播。

And we see this with the really really special ones, like Cursor, which has been largely viral growth.

因此，即使是一些需要主动销售的产品，比如桥梁，客户获取的便捷性也能实现。

So ease of customer acquisition, it happens even with things that need to be sold, like a bridge.

你得去向医院系统推销。

You gotta go sell to hospital systems.

结果发现，医院系统正迫切需要这个，因为医生们非常喜欢。

It turns out, hospital systems are dying for this because the doctors love it.

它真的非常好。

It's really good.

它为他们节省了大量时间，而且非常有价值。

It saves them a lot of time and it's really valuable.

因此，在这场AI浪潮中，客户获取的便捷性对我们来说是必不可少的。

So ease of customer acquisition is something that is sort of a must for us in this AI wave.

第二个是客户行为。

The second is customer behavior.

客户留存率和客户参与度。

Customer retention, customer engagement.

我们见过一些表面繁荣的现象，某些产品增长迅速，但随后就迅速下滑，属于短期实验性质。

There are some head fakes that we've seen of things that grow really fast, and then they fall off and they're experimental.

真正具有持久行为的产品，比如Cursor，用户会持续频繁地使用，而且随着时间推移，使用频率还会越来越高。

So the things that have durable behavior, things like cursor, where the users really really use it, and ideally or increasingly use it over time.

Harvey是一家典型的公司，随着模型不断改进，客户的参与度和使用量实际上显著增长。

Harvey is an example of a company where, as the models have gotten better, customer engagement and usage has actually really grown.

它经历了一次跨越式提升，这一点很有趣，因为这一变化恰好与推理能力的突破同时发生。

It actually took a step change, which we've seen, which is interesting to see because it happened at the same time as the reasoning breakthroughs.

我们心想，这其实说得通。

We're like, oh, that makes sense, actually.

律师需要推理能力，而当模型的推理能力大幅提升后，人们使用这些产品的频率也大大增加了。

Lawyers need to reason, and turns out models got really good at reasoning, and people use the products a lot more.

所以，客户获取的便捷性、我们在客户留存和参与度上观察到的行为，以及毛利率。

So, ease of customer acquisition, the behavior that we observe on customer retention engagement, and then there's gross margins.

目前我们在毛利率上稍微放宽一些标准。

And we give a little bit of a pass on gross margins right now.

我们现在处于一个奇特的环境中，对于后期的SaaS云公司，我们过去会看一家公司，心想：天啊，如果你的毛利率不是70%以上，你就根本算不上真正的SaaS或云业务，这会成为劣势，人们会以不同方式给你估值，那时你的价值取决于收入而非毛利润。

We're in this funny environment where late stage SaaS cloud, we would look at a company and it's like, oh, man, if you're not 70% plus gross margin, you're not really a SaaS business or cloud business, whatever, that's gonna be a knock and people will trade you differently and that's when you get valued as revenue versus gross profit or whatever.

但现在，低毛利率反而成了一种荣誉标志，因为我们想：至少有人在使用你的AI产品。

Now it's like a badge of honor to have low gross margins, because we're like, oh, at least people are using your AI products.

我们收到一些推介，对方说：我有个AI产品，毛利率有75%。

We get these pitches and they're like, I have an AI thing and I got 75% gross margins.

我会说：那说明根本没人用你的AI功能。

I'm like, well, no one's using the AI stuff then.

这看起来不像是一个真正的AI产品。

That doesn't really seem like an AI product to me.

所以我们在这方面会稍微放宽一些标准。

So we give a little bit of a pass on that.

预期成本将继续下降。

The expectation is the cost is gonna continue to go down.

只是推理成本吗？

Just inference cost?

推理成本随着时间的推移会下降。

Inference cost is gonna go down over time.

我的意思是，关于市场结构存在许多根本性问题会影响推理成本，但技术的历史表明，成本会随着时间推移而下降。

I mean, there's so many existential questions about market structure that will predict inference cost, but a history of technology would suggest that it's gonna go down over time.

推理成本在推理能力提升的同时也在下降，因此令牌使用量大幅增加。

The cost of inference has gone down at the same time that reasoning happened and so token token usage has gone way up.

所以你至今还没有看到毛利率有任何改善。

So you haven't yet seen any improvement in gross margins.

但我认为，随着时间的推移，这种情况很可能会发生。

But I think over time, that's likely to happen.

你基本上根本不在乎吗？

Do you basically just not care?