夏扬·桑卡尔 - 庆祝异见者 - [像最好的投资者一样投资，第462期]

你之前根本无法预测到这些，尤其是事前。

None of what you could have predicted, specifically ex ante.

如果你愿意一次次地这样做，不断跳入深水区，去追求那些你坦白说还不具备资格应对的问题，但你内心相信自己有潜力完成，你就会变成一个超级英雄。

And then if you just are willing to do that serially, just keep jumping off the deep end, go after problems you're frankly not qualified to go after, but there is some belief you have the raw potential to do, you turn into a superhero.

我认为这正是Palantir成为创始人摇篮的原因。

I think that's actually why Palantir is a founder factory.

你有过自己的伽马射线时刻吗？

Did you have your own gamma ray moment?

有没有那么一个最初的时刻，让你发现了自己真正的潜力？

Was there an original moment like that for you where you discovered your own potential?

这篇文章谈到了在COIC的部署。

The article talks about the deployment at the COIC.

我认为那是一个关键的时刻，当时由我负责部署。

I think that was a seminal one where I was leading the deployment.

所有压力都落在我身上，直到最后一刻之前，都根本不清楚它是否会成功。

It was all on me, and it was never obvious until basically the last second whether it was gonna work or not.

这让我在过程中学到了很多教训，也正是在这里，我真正领悟到：成功看起来充满了痛苦。

And it allowed me to learn a lot of the lessons along the way, which is really where I internalized, oh, success looks like a lot of pain.

那种本能地想要减少痛苦的念头——比如，下次怎么做才能少点痛苦——恰恰是错误的本能。

That instinct to figure out how to reduce the pain, like, how do I do this the next time with less pain, is exactly the wrong instinct.

如果你要给一群听过这场对话的人做毕业演讲，你会如何劝他们去寻找这种经历？

If you were giving a commencement speech to a group of people that heard this conversation, how would you urge people to seek that out?

比如，如果一个人还没经历过‘伽马时刻’，但对这种考验感兴趣，人们该如何让自己接受这种考验？

Like, if someone is pre gamma exposure and they're interested in that test for themselves, How can people expose themselves to that test?

我认为，这其实是周围那些愿意给你机会的人所构成的一种默契。

I think this is the conspiracy of the people around you who give you that chance.

我不明白为什么凯文·哈茨会雇佣我这个去跟他谈话的斯坦福研究生。

I don't know why Kevin Hartz hired me as some Stanford grad student coming to talk to him.

但他愿意下注，直接把我扔进现场，这在很大程度上是我第一次真正跳入深水区。

But the fact that he took the bet and just threw me out there, that was the first time I got to jump off the deep end in many ways.

所以，我真的在想，你该如何找到这样的机会？

So I I really think, how can you find it?

你在评估那些雇佣你的人，就像他们在评估你一样。

You're assessing the people who are hiring you as much as they're assessing you.

这是一个会支持我的环境，还是一个只想把我当小牛犊榨取的环境？

Is this an environment that I think is gonna bet on me, or is this an environment that wants me to be a veal cow?

他们能容忍我的怪癖，还是会试图压制它？

Are they gonna be able to tolerate my eccentricities, or are they gonna try to squash that?

你怎么知道一个人值得投资？

How do you know someone's worth betting on?

这个问题的另一面。

The other side of that equation.

新的、未经验证的人才。

New unproven talent.

你怎么判断？

How do you know?

在某个时刻，这就会变成蜥蜴脑的反应。

At some point, it becomes a lizard brain.

你得反复实践，积累足够多的经验。

You get enough reps in doing it.

但早期，我认为关键的迹象是第一手的证据，证明某种独特性。

But early on, I think the early indicators would be first derivative, proof of some sort of sui generis.

他们是否从零到一创造过什么东西？

Did they create anything from zero to one?

然后是主动性和自主性的体现。

And then expression of agency and initiative.

我最简单的说法就是。

Just the simplest way I'd say it.

如果我给这个人一英寸的空间，他能不能把它扩展成一英里？

If I give this person an inch, can they turn it into a mile?

最糟糕的投资就是：我给了这个人一英里，结果他却只走了一英寸。

And the worst sort of bet to make is I gave this person a mile and somehow they turned into an inch.

是的。

Yeah.

这是一个非常强大的理念，显然，Palantir的文化催生了大量拥有超强自主性的创始人。

It's an incredibly powerful idea, and it seems like the culture of Palantir mean, obviously, there's tons of founders that have come out of this that have mega agency or something like this.

如果你思考Palantir未来十年的发展——如今它已经成立十九年了——你希望未来十年最显著的变化是什么？

If you think about Palantir's future for the next ten years, now nineteen years in, what do you hope changes most in the next ten?

显然，它现在已经是一家庞大的公司。

Obviously, it's now a huge company.

它是全球和国内市值最大的公司之一，正在与众多有趣的客户开展大量引人注目的工作。

It's one of the bigger companies by market cap in the country and in the world, doing lots of really interesting work with lots of interesting customers.

但总的来说，你对未来五到十年它的发展有什么期望？

But generally speaking, what are your hopes for it over the next five to ten years?

所有价值的创造都源于文化。

All value creation is downstream of the culture.

持续营造一种环境，让新人进来就能承担巨大责任，管理那些在这里工作了十年的人，或者没有，这就是那种组织结构。

Continuing to be in an environment where a new person can come in and just have huge responsibility, be in charge of people who've been here ten years or not, it's like that org structure.

我称之为量子式组织结构。

I call it a quantum org structure.

我认为扁平化的组织结构并不是最优的。

I don't think a flat org structure is optimal.

这实际上行不通。

That doesn't actually work.

我认为你想要的是一个能够根据当前问题结晶出正确结构，并能随着问题在未来变化而重新调整的组织结构。

I think what you want is an org structure that can crystallize is the right structure to solve the problem as it exists today and is able to reform as the problem manipulates tomorrow.

你可以看到大公司在每五年左右就会经历一次大规模重组，即使你从最有利的角度来看也是如此。

And you can see the pathology of big companies as they go through some sort of big reorg every five years, even if you just steel man it.

很可能它们在诞生之初就是错误的。

Probably most of them are wrong even that inception.

但如果你只是从最有利的角度说，嘿。

But if you just steel man and say, hey.

它们只是进行了重组。

They just reorg.

这是这家公司今天最合适的组织结构。

This is the right org structure for this company today.

每一天，熵都在与他们作对。

Every day, the entropy is against them.

每一天，它都比前一天更偏离正确方向。

And every day, it's slightly more wrong than it was before.

如果你过于僵化，固守现有的组织结构，非要等到它彻底崩溃才重新调整，那就是一个根本性的弱点。

If you're so ossified and committed to your structure that you have to wait until it's totally broken before you reorganize it again, that's a fundamental weakness.

因此，这种适应性，以及你如何从问题出发逆向思考并加以投入，正是我们创造价值的方式，而且这种做法必须保持一贯性。

So that plasticity and how your commitment to working backwards from the problems, that is how we generate value, and that has to be consistent.

我认为，如果我们能保护并推动这种文化，将其传承给未来的世代，我们就将持续取得成功。

And I think if we can protect that and promote that, promulgate that culture in the future generations, we're gonna keep winning.

你对Palantir最认真的批评是什么？

What critique of Palantir do you take the most seriously?

当你拥有这样的结构时，你无法像希望的那样与人们共处太多时间。

When you have a structure like this, you don't get to spend nearly as much time with people as you'd want.

辐射的速率非常不均匀。

The rate of irradiation is very heterogeneous.

Palantir员工的在职时长似乎呈现某种双峰分布。

There's some sort of, like, bimodal distribution for how long do people stay at Palantir.

如果你已经待了三年，那么你再待十年以上的概率极高。

The probability that you'll stay for a decade plus if you've stayed three years is incredibly high.

但在大约三年这个节点，每个人都会面临一个考验：他们会环顾四周，心想这个地方真是乱七八糟、疯狂至极，但他们必须明白，这恰恰是它的特点，然后就会留下来。

But roughly around the three year mark, everyone faces this crucible where they look around and they say, this place is so fucked up and crazy, and they have to understand, oh, but that's the feature of it, and then they'll stay.

要不要加入？

Sign up for it or not.

对吧？

Right?

或者他们会认为这是个问题，必须赶紧离开。

Or they'll say this is the bug of it, and I gotta get out of here.

这行不通。

It's not gonna work.

我最重视的批评是：我认为只要稍加帮助，更多人就能跨越这个门槛，而这正是公司未来的希望，目标就是这些人。

The critique I take most seriously, because I think with a little bit of help, a lot more people can make that hump, and that's the future of the business, It's for those people.

如今我们得面对这么多该死的推销，都是关于什么公司里的前线部署什么什么的，这都得怪你。

We have you to blame for how many freaking pitches we have to take that involve some forward deployed something or other in a company these days.

你才是真正开创了Palantir这种模式成功的人。

You were the one that really pioneered the success of this model at Palantir.

现在人人都说，每个公司都必须有前线部署的工程师，或者前线部署的某某，才能成功。

Everyone is saying it now that every company has to have forward deployed engineers or forward deployed so and so's to be successful.

当然，我认为这并不适用于每一家公司。

Obviously, I think that's not true for every company.

但在Palantir的情况下，这确实是成立的。

It's true in Palantir's case for sure.

你能给我们讲讲这个术语的由来、它的含义，以及为什么它如此有效吗？

Can you tell us the story of what this term means, where it came from, and why it's powerful?

我们可以先从我对传统软件工业体系的批评说起，比如说，你坐在帕洛阿尔托，开发着某款软件。

We could start by maybe thinking about my critique of the conventional software industrial complex, which is that you're sitting, let's just say, in Palo Alto, and you're building this piece of software.

而你判断这款软件是否有价值的核心反馈循环就是：我能把它卖出去吗？

And your essential feedback loop on is this software valuable is, can I sell it?

如果有人愿意为此付费，那它一定是有价值的。

And if someone's willing to pay for it, it must be valuable.

这是一个还不错的反馈循环。

That's an okay feedback loop.

有一个更强有力的反馈循环，那就是：这款软件真的有价值吗？

There's a stronger feedback loop, which is, is this software valuable?

它是否实现了预期的结果？

Did it deliver the outcome?

要评估这一点，唯一的方法是亲自到现场，与终端用户一起在工厂车间、在战壕里体验。

The only way you can assess that is actually in the field with the end user on the factory floor, in the foxhole.

所以在我们的情况下，光靠这一点是不够的。

So in our case, it wasn't gonna be enough.

在IT采购方和实际操作者之间存在着一种奇怪的割裂。

You have this weird division between the IT buyer and the operator.

真正的验证将来自操作者。

The validation is gonna come from the operator.

这个想法实际上是想通过反向传播的方式来构建软件。

The idea was really almost to, like, build software through back propagation.

嘿。

Hey.

你怎么去找那个有这个问题的人？

How do you go to the person who has the problem?

你带着你在象征性的帕洛阿尔托所构建的最好假设去见他们。

You're showing up with your best thesis of what you've built in the metaphorical Palo Alto.

但你并不是只派一名销售工程师去那里，他的工作只是试图促成交易。

But then you are not just sending a sales engineer out there whose job is to try to, like, ring up the sale.

你派去的是一个极度关注软件是否能在现实中产生影响、愿意不断逆向解决问题，并且技术足够扎实、能理解整个技术栈的人。

You're sending someone out there who is obsessed with whether it's going to generate an impact in the world or not and is willing to continuously solve backward and is technical enough to understand the full stack.

我们如何从具体案例中学习，并随着时间推移将这些经验推广到产品层面？

How would we take the specific and learn how to generalize it over time in terms of the product?

看待这个问题的一种方式是，实际上存在两种类型的工程师。

One way of thinking about this is there really are two types of engineers.

有些人知道如何构建正确的东西，有些人知道如何以正确的方式构建它。

There are people who know how to build the right thing, and there are people who know how to build it the right way.

他们的多巴胺刺激来自不同的东西。

And their dopamine hits comes out of different things.

知道如何构建正确东西的人，更像麦盖佛。

The people who know how to build the right thing, they're more like MacGyver.

他们人生中的高光时刻是：我解决了这个问题。

Their high in life is, I solved the problem.

在他们看来，解决正确的问题占了80%的工作量。

In their mind, solving the right problem is 80% of the work.

另一端是一些更像传统艺术家的工程师。

On the other end, you have engineers who are more like artists in the traditional sense.

你难道看不出我构建的东西有多美吗？

Don't you see how beautiful the thing I built is?

架构的优雅、它的可扩展性，这才是让他们感到兴奋的源泉，其他都不重要。

The architectural elegance, the scalability of it, that's what gives them the high never mind.

这并没有解决任何人关心的问题。

That doesn't solve the problem anyone cares about.

它本身就是一种艺术。

It's art on its own.

它应该被欣赏。

It should be appreciated.

我常常用向量数学来思考这个问题。

And I think about this like vector math.

前线工程师更倾向于黑客思维。

So the forward deployed engineers skew towards hacker mentality.

产品工程师则更偏向这种艺术家思维，而你们正处于一种不稳定的平衡中，试图将这些向量对齐，以实现逆风前行。

The product engineers skew towards this artist mentality, and you have an unstable equilibrium where you're trying to align these vectors in a way that you're gonna go upwind.

如果任何一方占据主导，你们就真的无法做成一个生意。

If either side dominates, you don't really have a business.

因此，他们之间的这种互动，实际上需要一个像独裁者一样的人物来管理和决策。

And that's why that scene between them, you actually need a dictator like figure to manage and decide.

许多结果，特别是我认为，当你把客户视为某种幂律分布时，这个模型非常有价值——即他们接下来可能要求的每一个边际改进，对于产品整体发展的重要性。

And many of the outcomes, particularly, I think this model is super valuable when you think about your customers as existing as some sort of power law in terms of how useful the next marginal thing they're going to be asking for is in terms of the overall development of the product.

如果呈高斯分布，你就应该对所有客户进行调查，取平均值，然后决定开发什么。

If it's a Gaussian, you should just survey all your customers and average it out and figure out what to build.

这就像传统的产研流程。

That's like a traditional product development process.

但另一方面，如果你认为有一部分客户正生活在未来。

If on the other hand, you think some percentage of my customers are living in the future.

是的。

Yes.

今天只有他们或极少数人遇到这个问题，但我能判断出，这是一个真正有价值、却尚未有人解决的问题。

Only they or only a handful of people have this problem today, but I can assess that this is actually a really valuable thing to solve that no one else has solved.

我们应该现在就解决它，从而有效垄断这项能力。

We should solve it now and effectively have a monopoly on the capability to do that.

如果我们专注于这个问题，我们将领先所有人五年。

We'll be five years ahead of everyone else if we lean into this problem.

你只能通过这种前瞻性的工程方式来发现这一点。

You can only surface that in this sort of forward deployed engineering way.

从蒂尔的角度来看，关于前沿工程师的另一点值得说的是秘密的重要性。

The other thing about forward deployed engineers that's worth saying in the Thielian sense is the importance of secrets.

彼得谈到了秘密的重要性。

Peter talks about the importance of secrets.

如果你要做一些真正有影响力的事情，就必须相信世界上某件别人不同意你的事情。

If you're gonna do something really impactful, there has to be something true about the world that you believe that other people disagree with you on.

轨道速度正是源于其中一个秘密。

Orbit speed is born out of one of those secrets.

在那十五年里，我们的软件一直被用于制造现实世界中的产品。

For that part of fifteen years, our software has been used to make things in the world.

在新冠疫情之前，你不能告诉任何人他们的制造软件是无效的。

The one thing you could not tell anyone before COVID is that their manufacturing software doesn't work.

人们会指着他们的ERP系统说，看它多棒。

People would point at their ERP system and be like, look how great it is.

我为此花了50亿美元，100亿美元。

I spent $5,000,000,000, $10,000,000,000 doing it.

但作为一名现场工程师，当我走进工厂的最终装配线时，每个人都在用Excel。

But as a forward deployed engineer, when I would go to the final assembly line on the factory floor, everyone's using Excel.

这里存在一个矛盾，却没有人被迫去正视它，这实际上说明了这些软件与我想要做的事情完全不匹配。

There's a contradiction here that no one is somehow forced to reconcile with, which is really what they're saying is this software is so ill fit for what I'm trying to do.

我按下了紧急退出按钮。

I hit the eject button.

我把数据导出到Excel，然后自己手动开发解决方案。

I pull the data out to Excel, and I'm, like, hand rolling my own solution.

这显然是一个信号，说明某些地方出了问题。

That should be an obvious sign that something's not working.

从限制的角度来看，如果存在x或z，你就不能使用这个模型，或者你需要满足什么条件才能使用这个模型？

What are the limitations of it in the sense of if you have x, or z, you shouldn't try this model, or you need this to try this model?

一个想法是，这个产品必须很昂贵，因为听起来部署现场人员、高度训练的昂贵人员等过程成本很高。

One thought would be the product needs to be expensive because it sounds like an expensive process to deploy people on-site, highly trained, expensive people, and so on.

所以你需要销售一种非常昂贵的产品。

So you need to be selling a very expensive product.

但如果你要给其他创业者关于在软件业务中使用或不使用现场工程师这一概念的建议，你会怎么表述呢？

But if you were giving advice about use or don't use this concept of forward deployed engineering in your software business, how would you frame it up to other entrepreneurs?

我会这么说。

I would say this.

你必须相信，你能够为你所解决的问题捕捉到有意义的价值。

You have to believe that you're gonna be able to capture meaningful value for the problems you're solving.

因此，你所解决的问题必须非常重大，这意味着背后有巨大的价值。

So your problems you're solving are really big and therefore imply there's a lot of value behind them.

如果你能以深入的方式解决这些问题，你就能捕获这些价值。

And if you can solve them in a deep way, you'll be able to capture that.

我们所解决的许多问题，比如要获得机会，你不会得到很多前期报酬。

A lot of the problems we're solving, like, to get at bat, you weren't gonna get paid a lot upfront.

你实际上需要投入大量资源去为客户提供服务。

You're actually gonna invest a huge amount into the customer to go do that.

但你会这么做，是因为你相信最终我们能够捕获到我们所创造价值的一部分。

But you would do that because you believe that actually in the end, we'll be able to capture the value, a portion of the value we're creating.

我们的经济收益将取决于客户的经济收益。

Our economics will be downstream of our customers' economics.

另一方面，你的抱负超越了线性的框架。

The other part is that your ambition extends beyond a linear box.

当我们进入商业世界时，总是遇到困难，比如盖特纳这样的公司，他们有一套这样的框框。

We always struggled when we came into the commercial world where you had the Gartner's of the world, and they have this sort of box.

这就是我的企业架构。

This is my enterprise architecture.

我把所有东西都拆成了这些框。

I've broken up in all these boxes.

你属于哪个框？

What box do you fit in?

对我们来说，答案是：我们不属于任何一个框。

The answer for us is, well, we don't fit in any box.

我们适用于所有这些框。

We fit in all the boxes.

这有点像某种异质性的东西。

It's some sort of heterox thing.

你正在解决各个缝隙中的所有问题。

You're solving for all the problems in the seams.

也就是说，你实际上是在解决这样一个问题：这个架构图是由某个中级产品市场经理画出来的。

Like, you're basically solving for the fact that architecture diagram was made by some mid level product marketing manager.

它从未在实际应用中被使用或验证过。

It's never been used or validated in anger.

它从未真正解决过现实世界中的任何问题，但IT采购者的迷信却一直坚信他们应该购买它。

It's never actually solved a problem in the real world, but the cargo cult of the IT buyer just keeps believing they should buy it.

我认为，如果你被框在那种模式里，做前沿工程部署就太疯狂了。

I think if you fit into that, doing forward deployed engineering would be crazy.

你为什么要这么做？

Why would you do that?

但如果你像我们一样，无法融入其中，你就必须想方设法 Scraping 和 Clawing，交付足够的价值，迫使机构正视问题。

But if you're like us and you don't fit into it, you need some way of just scraping and clawing to deliver enough value that the institution has to confront.

但即使它属于异端，即使它违背了我的企业架构理念，它依然有效。

But even though it's heterodox, even though it's heresy to my enterprise architecture, it works.

直到我读了杰里米对你和Palantir的专访，我才真正理解了Gotham、Foundry以及其产品和商业模式是如何运作的。

It probably took until I read Jeremy's profile of you and of Palantir that I really understood how Gotham and Foundry and the product and the business worked.

有趣的是，Palantir对外界而言相当难以理解，除非你仔细阅读关于产品实际运作的详细描述。

It's interesting how Palantir, somewhat inaccessible from the outside unless you read a fairly detailed description of what is literally going on in the product.

我认为Palantir早期的几年尤其具有探索性，你和Alex以及团队一起努力，试图弄清楚这一切。

And I think the early years of Palantir were especially exploratory, trying to figure all this out with all your efforts with Alex and the team.

你能简单解释一下Palantir是什么吗？

Could you just explain what Palantir is?

这听起来像是个很基础、很愚蠢的问题，但说实话，除非我读过详细描述，否则我可能真的说不清楚。

It's like such a basic stupid question, but again, until I read a detailed account, I actually probably couldn't have done so.

所以我非常好奇，你是如何定义或向别人解释它的？

And so I'd really be curious how you like to frame it or explain it.

这实际上是我这辈子遇到过最难的问题。

This is actually, like, the hardest question in the world for me.

我们构建了一个企业操作系统，我们的核心理念是，真正让这些内容有价值的是决策，而不是数据。

We have built an enterprise operating system where our core thesis is what makes this stuff really valuable is decisions, not data.

这涉及到约翰·博伊德的OODA循环。

Goes to John Boyd's OODA Loop.

我们真正提供的是一个操作系统，它能让你将所有企业数据整合在一起。

What we're really providing is an operating system that allows you to bring all of your enterprise data together.

它解决了类似这样的数据与系统之间的不匹配问题。

It solves for the impedance mismatch between, like, yeah.

听好了。

Look.

我收集的所有这些数据，都是按照底层交易系统或机构某个部分的逻辑来收集和存储的，但这些数据并没有真正反映我们机构中的人们如何看待我们所面临的问题。

All this data I've collected, it was collected and stored in a way that makes sense to the underlying transactional system or makes sense to some part of my institution, but doesn't actually represent how the humans of my institution think about the problems that we're facing.

因此，我们所代表的是我们称之为本体的东西，这不仅仅是一个数据模型。

So that we represent what we call the ontology, which is not just a model of the data.

它也是对行为的建模。

It's also a model of the actions.

我们称之为动力学。

We call that the kinetics.

如果你要做一个决策，你可能是在分配库存。

If you're gonna make a decision, you might be allocating inventory.

你该如何做到这一点？

How do you do that?

因此，这个本体层几乎成为了业务的API层。

So this ontology layer almost becomes like an API layer for the business.

它使业务可编程，从而改变了你在此基础上叠加发展的速度。

It makes the business programmable, and that changes the rate at which you can compound on top of it.

现在，你有了这个抽象层，可以用来构建管理你的价值链的应用程序。

So now you have this abstraction layer that you can use to build applications that manage your value chain.

从你的供应商手中到你的客户手中，你可以称之为价值链。

From the hand of your supplier to the hand of your customer, you can call it a value chain.

你也可以称之为决策链。

You can also call that a decision chain.

你的整个业务，如果你稍微眯眼看的话，其实就是一系列你做出的决策。

Your whole business, almost, if you just squint at it, is just a series of decisions you're making.

每一个这样的决策，你都希望有一个OODA循环。

Every one of those decisions, you wanna have an OODA loop.

我想做出今天我能做的最好的决策。

I wanna make the best possible decision I can have today.

更重要的是，我希望它的一阶导数是良好的。

More importantly, I want the first derivative to be good.

我想明天学会如何做出比今天更好的决策。

I wanna learn tomorrow how to make a better decision than the one I had today.

你能举个例子吗？比如你去到某个客户那里，描述一下他们当时的数据或系统状况，然后你是如何建立和构建本体的？我认为这个过程非常好、很恰当，尽管‘本体’这个词听起来有点高大上——它实际上是将现实映射到系统中，而不是强行把现实塞进一个预先存在的系统里。之后，这种做法为客户带来了什么样的转变，而这些转变用之前的系统是根本不可能实现的？

Could you give an example of a customer where you showed up and maybe describe the circumstance of their data or their systems or something, then what you did, what the process is of establishing and building the ontology, which is, I think, very good, appropriate, but fancy word for mapping reality onto a system versus jamming reality into a preexisting system, And then what sort of transformation that enabled at that customer that would have been impossible with the former system?

用一个简单的例子把它生动地展现出来吧。

Just bring it to life with, like, a simple example.

我想提出两点，这会让事情更清楚。

Two things I just wanna put down that will make this make more sense.

首先，我们希望打造的软件能让你更独特，而不是更相似。

The first is that we wanna make software that makes you more different, not more similar.

我们把它看作是阿尔法，而不是贝塔。

We think about it as alpha, not beta.

第二点是，我们是一家高度归纳性的公司。

The second thing is that we are a wildly inductive company.

我们绝不会带着‘这就是航空业本体’这样的预设观念去见客户。

We would never show up to a customer with some preconceived notion of this is the aerospace ontology.

我稍后会举一个航空业的例子。

I'm gonna pick an aerospace example in a second here.

而是要深入理解让你的航空公司在各方面与众不同的那些价值和特点。

It's rather all the values and understanding what makes your aerospace company different than all the others.

我该如何让你在这方面更加独特？

How do I make you more different there?

这就是你竞争的差异化所在。

That's the differentiation you're competing on.

当我们第一次接触空客时，空客正处于A350量产的初期阶段。

When we first came to Airbus, Airbus was in the midst of ramping the a three fifty.

A380是一款很棒的飞机，但其项目在结构上是亏损的。

The a three eighty was a wonderful plane, structurally unprofitable program.

因此，A350在2015年成为了整个公司押注的关键项目。

So the a three fifty was this bet that the whole company was effectively riding on in 2015.

你第一次制造飞机时，总会遇到各种问题。

The first time you make an airplane, you're always gonna have issues.

生产过程中存在一个学习曲线。

There's a learning curve to the production.

而最需要尽快弄清楚的一件事是，哪些问题只是单纯的不符合标准，比如：

And one of the most important things to figure out as quickly as possible is what is an issue that is just a nonconformity that, like, hey.

我给这个人一些培训，他就能学会如何解决这个问题。

I'll give this guy some training, and he'll learn how to figure it out.

这是起步阶段的阵痛。

It's teething pain.

它会消失的。

It'll go away.

而哪些是反复出现的问题，实际上是设计缺陷，需要我去和供应商或上游环节沟通解决？

And what is a recurring issue that is actually a design defect that I need to go work with my suppliers or upstream?

你能多快解决这些问题，直接决定了产能爬坡的形态和成本。

How quickly you can solve that becomes fundamental to the shape of the ramp and the cost of the ramp.

我们做的第一件事就是开始坐在图卢兹总装线的用户旁边。

The first thing we did is we just started sitting with users on the final assembly line in Toulouse.

这些人本质上就是拧扳手的工人。

These are wrench turners effectively.

了解清楚，嘿，是什么让你的工作这么痛苦？

And understanding, hey, what makes your life suck?

这件事难在哪里？

What's hard about this?

处理这些不符合项的挑战是什么？

What's the challenge in working on these nonconformities?

基本上，他们正在使用Excel。

Basically, they're going through Excel.

他们在SAP中查看报告，试图弄清楚如何将这些源源不断的问题分类归组。

They're looking at reports in SAP, trying to figure out how do I bucket all of these issues that are coming in.

所以我们只是帮助他们自动化所有这些流程。

So we just help them automate all of that.

当时本体主要与零部件、工作顺序、缺陷率以及所有与质量相关的内容有关。

And the ontology at that point was really related to parts, sequencing of work, defect rates, everything related to quality.

但一旦你拥有了如此庞大的质量资产，你就能真正地转向并意识到：好吧。

Once you had this immense quality asset, though, you were able actually to pivot it to realize, okay.

现在我已经掌握了学习曲线。

Now I'm up the learning curve.

这自然引出了下一个问题，即生产计划。

It naturally leads to the next problem, which is production planning.

所以是从质量到生产计划，再到售后服务。

So quality to production planning to then in service.

现在你拥有了针对这一环节最强大的数据资产。

Now you have the greatest data asset possible for this tail.

当这架飞机投入服务后，我该如何帮助客户最大化该资产的正常运行时间？

As this plane enters service, how do I help maximize the uptime of this asset for my customers?

我该如何与另一家航空航天制造商竞争？

How am I gonna compete against the other aerospace manufacturer?

这是我们看到大多数客户自然演进的过程。

That's the natural evolution that we see with most customers.

你从一个问题开始，但这些问题是存在于这个连贯的决策链条中的。

You start with one problem, but, of course, they exist in the context of this connect decision chain.

长期处理军方和政府客户与商业客户有什么不同？

What's the difference between dealing with military customers government customers, which you did for a long time, and commercial customers?

军方领域存在更多非市场因素。

There's a lot more nonmarket forces in the military.

军队是世界上唯一一个将供需严重分割的机构。

The military is the only institution in the world that profoundly divides up supply and demand.

大多数公司的核心在于这种整合，即销售与运营规划流程。

The beating heart of most companies is that integration, that sales and operation planning process.

你们有作战司令部，我们称之为，负责处理现实世界中的事件。

You have the combatant commands, we call them, that deal with real world events.

如果你正在与俄罗斯作战，那就是欧洲司令部。

If you're fighting Russia, that's the European command.

你过来。

You come.

然后你们还有各军种，如陆军、海军、空军、太空军等。

And then you have the services, the army, navy, air force, space force, etcetera.

他们的职责是人员配备、训练和装备。

Their job is to man, train, and equip.

这就是供应端。

That's the supply side.

有一群人完全不负责需求，却在决定要建造什么、建造多少，以及如何人员配备、训练和装备这些装备。

You have a group that has no responsibility for demand, essentially deciding what to build, how much to build, how am I gonna man, train, and equip this.

然后他们把这些部队交给作战司令部，说：这就是你们解决这个问题的资源。

And then they present these forces to the combatant commands and say, this is what you have to solve this problem.

这增加了额外的复杂性。

That adds an additional level of complexity.

所以如果需求方说：嘿。

So if the demand side says, hey.

我真的很需要这个。

I really want this.

这是我们所需要的作战能力。

This is the capability we need.

但他们无法直接采购。

They can't buy it.

那么，你该怎么解决这个矛盾呢？

So how do you kinda square this?

所以我认为你需要应对所有这些非市场力量。

So I think you have all these other nonmarket forces to deal with.

但我认为，作为一家同时面向商业和政府的公司，其优势之一在于，政府方面的内在回报非常高，极具激励性。

But I think one of the things that is really advantageous to being both a commercial and government oriented company is that the intrinsic rewards on the government side are so high, so motivating.

这使你能够克服并解决极其困难的问题，这种方式就像潮水上涨，带动整个业务共同发展。

It enables you to get through and solve really hard problems in a way that is kind of like a rising tide for the whole business.

你如何定义我们今天军队的状态？

How would you define the state of our military today?

我知道这是一个很大的问题，但这是一个重要的问题。

I know it's a big question, but it's an important question.

你已经看到了它的许多方面，并在多个领域服务过。

You've gotten to see so many sides of it and serve many aspects of it.

你如何描述美国军队的现状？

How would you describe the state of the US military?

我们是世界上最强的军队。

We are the best military in the world.

我们的现役军人比我们配得上的还要优秀。

Our uniformed service members are better than we deserve.

实际上，有个人告诉我，嘿。

Actually, I had someone tell me, hey.

你什么时候才会不再对这个四级军士长能如此出色地开发这个应用或完成这件事感到惊讶呢？

When are you gonna stop being shocked at how good this e four is at building this app or doing this thing?

这种人才的数量真是令人瞠目结舌。

And it's like, the amount of talent is eye watering.

我认为我们用太多流程束缚了他们。

I think we encumber them in a lot of process.

我们剥夺了他们很多自主权，也确实对官僚体系有很多批评。

We deprive them of a lot of agency, and certainly have a lot of critiques of the bureaucracy.

但我认为我们面临的核心挑战，其实是需要从一个更远的距离来观察当今军队本身，而军队的全部意义就在于威慑我们的对手，避免冲突。

But I think the structural challenge we have is actually something that we just need to observe from a distance from the military we have today per se, which is the whole point of the military is to deter our adversaries from conflict.

如果你回顾过去十年，我们没能有效阻止很多冲突的发生。

If you look back over the last ten years, we've not been able to deter a lot of conflict.

2014年发生了克里米亚并入俄罗斯，之后他们告诉奥巴马总统不会军事化南沙群岛，但随后却军事化了南沙群岛。

We had the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the militarization of the Spratly Islands after they told president Obama, we will not militarize it.

他们军事化了南沙群岛。

They militarized Spratly Islands.

我们在以色列遭遇了一场大屠杀。

We've had a pogrom in Israel.

我们经历了对乌克兰的入侵。

We've had the invasion of Ukraine.

中国在南海开展了前所未有的灰色地带零阶段行动。

We have unprecedented gray zone phase zero operations by the Chinese in the South China Sea.

我认为， arguably，过去一年里，我们开始恢复威慑力。

I would say, arguably, in the last year, we've started to restore deterrence.

不管你如何看待，‘午夜锤’行动是一次极具威慑力的行动。

Whatever you think about it, Midnight Hammer was a massively deterring operation.

马杜罗具有强大的威慑力。

Maduro is massively deterring.

你在多个层面上都有这种能力。

You have it on multiple levels.

通过‘午夜锤’行动，显然展现了我们所能实现的压倒性力量、精准度以及行动的极端复杂性。

With Midnight Hammer, it's obviously the overwhelming strength, the precision of what we're able to do, the incredible complexity of the operations.

世界上没有任何其他军队能做到这一点，但我们需要将这视为一次单一打击，而对同等对手的威慑能力在于：你能否每天都能发动这样的打击，直到敌人屈服于你的意志？

No other military in the world could have done But we need to view that as a single strike, and the deterrence capability against a peer adversary is, can you generate that strike every single day until the enemy submits to your will?

想想马杜罗，这也展示了我们的能力。

You think about Maduro, it also shows our capability.

literally，突袭发生的那天，正是中国人在场的时候。

Like, literally, the raid happened the day the Chinese were in town.

马杜罗拥有大量中国和俄罗斯的武器，就在委内瑞拉，但这些武器似乎完全不起作用。

Maduro has all these Chinese and Russian weapons, Venezuela, and they don't seem to work at all.

这向所有认为自身安全来自购买中国和俄罗斯武器的人传递了一个非常强烈的信号。

And that sends a very strong message to everyone who else who thinks that their security is coming from buying Chinese and Russian weapons.

现在我认为我们可以追溯回去，这正是我在第十八篇论文中真正探讨的内容。

Now I think we trace back, and this is what I really wrote about in the eighteenth thesis.

所以如果我们从头开始，可以说我们已经失去了威慑力。

So if we start, we say, we've lost deterrence.

让我们对此保持清醒的认识。

Let's be clear eyed about that.

在过去一年里，我们开始重新夺回它。

In the last year, we started regaining it.

发生了什么？

What happened?

因为我们曾经长期拥有它。

Because we had it for a long time.

我们在九十年代是唯一的超级大国，并且每年在国防上投入相当多的经费。

We were the sole superpower in the nineties, and we spend a fair amount every year on defense.

人们总想谈论一些狭隘的问题，比如采购改革或武器组合。

People wanna talk about narrow things like acquisition reform or the mix of weapons.

我认为问题最终还是回到人身上。

I think it comes back to people.

这又回到了那些持不同意见者身上。

It comes back to the heretics.

在第二次世界大战初期，我们在大规模生产方面是最出色的。

At the dawn of World War two, we were the best at mass production.

实际上，是我们国家发明了这一模式。

Effectively, our country invented it.

为了建立工业基础，我们聘请了通用汽车的二号人物比尔·克努森，他之前是福特的二号人物，是一位丹麦移民，堪称大规模生产的完美实践者。

And in order to create an industrial base, we took the number two at GM, who was previously the number two at Ford, Bill Knudsen, who was a Danish emigre, who was really the perfecter of mass production.

我们直接任命他为三星将军，并让他负责战争动员。

And we direct commissioned him a three star general, and we put him in charge of war mobilization.

克努森是一位世界级的工程师。

And Knudsen was a world class engineer.

那我们做了什么？

And what do we do?

我们赋予他权力，让他去全美各地会见其他世界级的工程师。

We gave him the authority to go meet other world class engineers all around America.

我们在二战期间有一个关键的时间优势，那就是租借法案。

We had one key advantage in World War two in terms of timing, which is that we had lend lease.

有一段时间，我们在尚未参战时就已经开始动员生产。

There was a period of time that we actually mobilized production when we were not fighting.

我们制造了大量物资，提供给我们的盟友，尤其是英国人和苏联人。

We were building stuff that we gave to our allies, to the Brits in particular, and the Soviets.

但这让我们得以建造新工厂、改造现有工厂，并实现产能爬坡，因此在珍珠港事件发生后，我们基本已达到满负荷生产，并能够全力投入这些项目。

But that allowed us to build factories and retool existing factories and hit a production ramp so that after Pearl Harbor happened, we were basically at full rate production, and we're able to go after these things.

将这一点与我们的对手德国人相比，他们的工程师实际上比我们更优秀。

And put this in context of our adversary, the Germans, they were actually better engineers than we were.

他们只是生产了数量极少但极其精良的物品。

They just made a very small number of very exquisite things.

如今，如果我们看当下，我们听起来就像当年的德国人。

Now if you come to the present moment, we sound like the Germans.

我们只生产数量极少、真正精美绝伦、令人惊叹的物品，而我们的对手却是全球最擅长大规模生产的国家。

We make a very small number of truly exquisite, eye wateringly exquisite things, and our adversary is the world's best at mass production.

所以这应该让我们所有人都感到些许不安。

So this should give us all a little bit of discomfort here.

第二部分涉及工业基础的性质。

The second part of this is the nature of the industrial base.

今天，我们称之为国防工业基础。

Today, we call it the defense industrial base.

我认为它过去曾被称为美国工业基础。

I think it used to be the American industrial base.

直到柏林墙倒塌之前，只有6%的重大武器系统支出流向了国防专业公司，我。

Until the fall of the Berlin Wall, only 6% of spending on major weapon systems went to defense specialists, I.

那些只与国防部做生意的公司。

Companies that only did business with the defense department.

大部分支出，94%，流向了我所谓的双重用途公司。

Most of that spending, 94 percent, went to what I call as dual purpose companies.

导弹是单用途的。

A missile is single use.

没有哪种导弹是军民两用的。

There's no dual use missile.

但像克莱斯勒这样既生产导弹又生产微型面包车的公司，意味着它们在生产材料、设备和机床上的所有研发都可以被共享，从而补贴了我们的国家安全；我们认识到，自由与繁荣是同一枚硬币的两面。

But the idea that Chrysler would build missiles and minivans meant that all the r and d that they were doing on production material, equipment, machine tooling could be leveraged and was subsidizing our national security, that we recognize that freedom and prosperity were two sides of the same coin.

今天我们离那个世界已经太远了。

We're so far away from that world today.

通用磨坊公司，这家以食品闻名的企业，曾经制造过鱼雷和惯性导航系统。

General Mills, the serial company, used to build torpedoes and inertial guidance systems.

柯达，这家胶片公司，也曾是“科罗娜”计划（我们的第一颗间谍卫星）的关键供应商。

Kodak, the film company, also was a key supplier to Corona, which is our first spy satellite.

但正是这个工业基础赢得了第二次世界大战，赢得了冷战初期，并真正威慑了我们的对手。

But this is the industrial base that won World War two, won the early Cold War, and really deterred our adversaries.

而成为唯一的超级大国，才导致了这一切的变化。

And it's only a consequence of becoming the sole superpower that everything changed.

这种变化体现在两个方面。

And it changed in two ways.

第一，今天的这个6%数字已经变成了86%。

One, that 6% number today is 86%.

因此，86%的主要武器系统仅来自专业的国防公司。

So 86% of major weapon systems come from defense specialists only.

另一方面，是工业基础的性质发生了变化。

The other part of it is the nature of the industrial base.

我们通常想到的是诺斯罗普·格鲁曼公司。

We think about it as Northrop Grumman.

更准确地说，那是杰克·诺斯罗普。

Much more accurately, it was Jack Northrop.

那是勒罗伊·格鲁曼。

It was Leroy Grumman.

那是威廉·勒尔。

It was William Lear.

那是亨利·福特。

It was Henry Ford.

那是亨利·凯撒。

It was Henry Kaiser.

你有这些创始人人物。

You had founder figures.

他们本身就是一种异端。

They were their own sort of heretics.

我们今天在硅谷所认识的这种人才，当时就在这里。

What we would recognize in the Valley today, that's where this talent was.

这些人才存在于美国的工业公司中，我们押注的是这些人，而不仅仅是他们的机构，来实现这种能力。

It was in the industrial companies of America, and we were betting on these people, not just their institutions, to deliver this sort of capability.

1993年，五角大楼举行了一场著名的晚宴，被称为‘最后的晚餐’。

In 1993, there was a very famous dinner at the Pentagon called the Last Supper.

我们赢得了冷战。

We had won the Cold War.

我认为，在民主国家中，人们希望减少国防开支是非常合理的。

I think in a democracy, very reasonable for the people to say we wanna spend less on defense.

我们的威胁到底是什么？

What exactly is our threat?

于是我们大幅削减了国防预算。

So we slashed the defense budget.

在这次晚宴上，国防部长向一部分人传达了信息。

And in this dinner, the secretary of defense told a subset.

我想是51家主要承包商中的15家。

I think it was 15 of the 51 primes.

我们曾经有51家主要承包商。

We had 51 primes.

如今，我们只剩下五家。

Today, we have five.

他们告诉他：你们所有人都撑不下去了。

They told him, you're all not gonna survive.

预算正在被削减。

The budget's getting cut.

我们允许你们进行整合。

We give you permission to consolidate.

也许你们中的一些人应该彻底退出国防业务，要知道你们中的一些人可能会倒闭，而我们不会救你们。

Maybe some of you should exit the defense business altogether and know that some of you may go out of business and we're not gonna save you.

这引发了一场并购狂潮，使企业数量从51家 Consolidated 到只剩下5家。

And this just set off a merger frenzy that led from the consolidation from 51 down to five.

现在大多数人看待这件事，我认为他们得出了错误的结论，觉得这就是我们失去竞争的时候。

Now most people look at this, and I think they take away the wrong conclusion, which is like, oh, this is when we lost competition.

当我们还有竞争时，情况要活跃得多。

When we had competition, it was much more dynamic.

我认为更深远的后果是，这一刻标志着工业基础的深度金融化和同质化。

I think the much more profound consequences this is the moment of profound financialization and conformity in the industrial base.

你们失去了那些疯狂的人。

You lost the crazy people.

他们去了科技行业。

They went to tech.

他们去了我们经济中其他充满正和能量与增长的领域，那里不仅仅关注股息和股票回购比率以及金融工程。

They went to other parts of our economy where there was enough positive sum energy and growth, and it wasn't just about dividends and buyback ratios and financial engineering.

那里关注的是真正的工程。

It was about real engineering.

世界级的工程师们，我们为什么要庆祝海曼·里科弗？

The world class engineers, why should we celebrate a Hyman Rickover?

或者凯利·约翰逊？

Or a Kelly Johnson.

凯利·约翰逊是洛克希德臭鼬工厂的创始人。

Kelly Johnson was the founder of Skunk Works at Lockheed.

在他的一生中，他设计了41种飞机机身。

In his lifetime, he built 41 airframes.

这简直不可思议。

That is insane.

其中许多飞机我们至今仍在飞行。

Many of which we still fly today.

他在十三个月内建造了U-2飞机。

He built the u two in thirteen months.

我们所谈论的时间表简直令人难以置信。

The timelines we're talking about are just incredible.

你看到这些，不可能不认为他是个艺术家。

You can't look at that and think anything other than this is an artist.

艺术家。

Artist.

他所能做到的，简直像是神迹。

This is, like, divine, what he's able to do.

我认为我们搞错的很多地方在于，那些成就原本是混乱、充满挑战且充满摩擦的。

And so much of what I think we've gotten wrong is those things were messy and chaotic and hard and frictionful.

随着时间推移，我们试图引入大量流程，让这些事情变得不那么混乱、不那么无序。

And over time, we've tried to install lots of process to make these things less messy, less chaotic.

但结果却是，它们最终失效了。

As a consequence, though, they end up not working.

我们需要多一点疯狂，才能让这些事情真正运转起来。

We need a little more crazy back to get these things to work.

我们该如何扭转这种情况？

How do we undo this?

我想起了丘吉尔的一句话，原话可能不完全准确，大概是：美国总是在试遍所有其他方法之后，才会做对正确的事。

I'm reminded of the Churchill quote, won't get it exactly right, something like The US always does the right thing after trying everything else first.

很多情况下，我们把生产实物的能力转移到了海外，以优化各种因素，因为那样更便宜、更易扩展、也更容易。

And a lot of what's happened is that we have shipped the capability to produce physical things off our shores to optimize for a variety of things, but it's much cheaper and more scalable and easier.

我们如今主要成为一个国家，其市值几乎完全建立在科技、知识产权和顶尖人才之上——少数卓越的事物、卓越的人才、卓越的研究人员。

And we've become primarily a country with all the market cap that rests on technology and IP and extreme talent, the small number of exquisite things, exquisite people, exquisite researchers.

我们在这一点上做得非常出色，但我们现在在这里制造的东西已经很少了。

We've done an amazing job there, but we don't make much here anymore.

很多生产都发生在中国和海外。

A lot of it happens in China and overseas.

我们该如何逆转这一趋势？

How can we reverse that?

这看起来如此不平衡，如此令人望而生畏，简直不可能实现。

It seems so imbalanced and so daunting as to seem impossible.

但我当然知道，你认为这至关重要。

But of course, I know you think it's critical.

那么，要做到这一点，第一步该是什么呢？

So what is even the first step in being able to do this?

你说得完全正确。

What you said is exactly right.

这确实令人望而生畏，但至关重要。

It is daunting but critical.

所以我们别无选择，只能迎难而上，立即行动。

So we have no choice but to lean into that and start.

最好的行动时机本该是昨天。

The best time to start would have been yesterday.

次佳的时机就是今天。

The next best time is today.

让我也说明一下为什么这至关重要，因为如果我们不这么做，我们就完蛋了。

Let me also give the case for why it's critical, because I think we're screwed if we don't do this.

我们从全球化中接受的最大谎言就是：我们会搞创新，而他们会搞生产。

The biggest lie that we bought from globalization is this concept of we will do the innovation and they will do the production.

你必须认识到，创新本身就是生产力的结果。

Well, you have to recognize that innovation is itself a consequence of productivity.

用我认为在座听众最能直接理解的说法来说，是什么促使谷歌在2017年发表了《注意力机制就是你所需的一切》这篇论文？

To put it in terms that I think our audience here would understand most directly, what motivated Google to do the research behind the attention is all you need paper in 2017.

如果你问他们，他们会说，当时团队只是在尝试将谷歌翻译的性能提升3%。

If you ask them, they'll say, well, the team was working on an incremental 3% improvement to Google Translate.

你很难想象还有什么比这更平凡的起点，却带来了如此革命性的成果。

You cannot think of something more banal, leading to something more revolutionary than that.

所以，如果你没有提升生产的输入动力，你就根本无法捕捉到创新。

So if you don't have the input stimulus on improving production, you're actually not gonna be able to capture the innovation.

而这正是我们今天在市场中真实看到的情况，也就是说，好吧。

And that's literally what we're seeing play out in the marketplace today, which is, okay.

他们从制造电池发展到制造整辆汽车。

They went from making a battery to making the whole car.

药明康德从最初只是为制药行业提供廉价的移液合同研究服务，到现在中国研发的药物占全球所有临床试验的50%。

WuXi went from being basically a cheap pair of hands for pipetting contract research in the pharma industry to actually now 50% of all clinical trials are drugs that are created in China.

所以我们已经播下了创新的种子。

So we have seeded the innovation.

并不是创新被我们剥夺了。

It's not that it was taken away from us.

我们只是因为完全错误的预设而播下了它。

We just seeded it because we had a completely incorrect preset.

所以我们现在必须重新出击。

So now we have to reattack that.

我们应该利用某种非对称优势来做这件事。

We should do this with some asymmetric advantage.

我认为我们有几个这样的优势。

I think we have a couple of them.

我不认为我们国家不擅长制造东西这个说法是正确的。

I don't think it's true that we're not great at building things in this country.

看看埃隆和他的追随者们。

Look at Elon and the progeny of Elon.

我们确实知道如何在这里制造产品，而且我们必须以全新和独特的方式思考制造。

We do know how to manufacture things here, and we're gonna have to think about manufacturing things in new and novel ways.

此外，并不是所有东西都必须是全新的。

In addition, it doesn't all have to be new.

就像福特、通用汽车，它们也是世界级的制造商。

It's like Ford, General Motors, these are world class manufacturers too.

我们具备这种能力。

We have that capability.

但我们也有了更深入、更垂直整合的生产新思路，把生产过程本身看作一种更迭代、更像软件的东西，可以持续升级，并将研发与生产紧密结合起来。

But we also have new ways of thinking about this with much deeper, vertically integrated production, thinking about the production process itself as something that's more iterative and software like that you're gonna keep upgrading, colocating r and d with production itself.

所以我认为，这些类型的工艺技能正是我们可以依靠的。

So I think these sorts of trade crafts are the things that we can lean on.

我认为最后一部分是，人工智能就是大卫的投石器。

And probably the last piece I'd say is AI is David's slingshot here.

如果我们能让美国工人获得超能力，让他们的生产力达到其他国家工人的50倍，那么我们就将彻底改变这里所能制造产品的效率边界。

If we can give the American worker superpowers, if you can make the American worker 50 times more productive than a worker anywhere else, you're going to change the efficient frontier of what can be made here.

因此，我认为我们应该采取激进的再工业化策略。

And I think as a consequence, we should be re industrialization maximalist.

那些自由贸易者喜欢说，也许我们可以把生产转移到法国或者其他地方。

The free traders out there like to say, like, maybe we can French shore or whatever.

我觉得这种说法太容易让我们逃避责任，根本无法解决问题。

I think that stuff can let us off the hook too easily, fails to solve the problem.

我再举一个帕特里克·麦吉书中的例子，关于苹果在中国的情况，那是一本非常好的书。

The other example I'll give you from Patrick Magee's book, Apple in China, is that great book.

人们总爱说，美国没有机床工程师。

People love to say something like, well, we don't have the machine tools engineers in America.

你几乎找不到两个人能坐下来好好讨论这个问题。

You could hardly get two people in a room to talk about it.

你可以在中国的整个体育场里填满人。

You could fill a whole stadium in China.

但你看看，苹果在过去五年里，按通货膨胀调整后的计算，投入了相当于两个半马歇尔计划的资金来在中国培养人才和能力。

But then you look, Apple has spent the equivalent on an inflation adjusted basis in the last five years of two and a half Marshall plans building talent and capacity in China.

我们何不试着在这里投入一个马歇尔计划呢？

About we try to spend one Marshall plan here?

我认为问题在于我们甚至都没有尝试，部分原因是被吓住了，部分原因是经济的某些部分没有意识到，这其实不会一直有效。

I think the problem is we're not even trying, in part because we're daunted, in part because parts of our economy don't recognize that, actually, this isn't gonna keep working.

你会失去一切，而不仅仅是某些东西。

You're gonna lose everything, not just something.

这就是为什么我觉得必须发出紧急行动的呼吁，说我们正处于一种未宣布的紧急状态。

It's why I feel I need an urgent call to action to say, like, we are in an undeclared state of emergency.

这不仅仅是关于制造我们所想的实体产品。

And it's not just manufacturing the physical things we think about.

我甚至从药物的角度来思考这个问题。

I even think about this in terms of drugs.

我们80%的仿制药都以某种方式来自中国，无论是活性药物成分还是成品本身。

80% of our generic drugs come from China in one way or another, whether it's the APIs or the finished product themselves.

这是一个巨大的问题。

That is a huge problem.

今天，你的孩子得了中耳炎。

Today, your child has an ear infection.

这算是很普通的小病。

That's pretty trivial.

你以为我会拿点仿生抗生素，它就会好起来。

You think I'll have some generic antibiotics, and it'll go away.

如果你与中国展开激烈竞争，而美国人民在真正意识到‘我的五岁孩子可能因中耳炎而丧命’时才愿意奋起抗争，那会怎样？

If you have great power competition with China and the will of the American people to fight when they have to really contemplate, hey, my five year old might die of an ear infection.

所以我们必须更认真地对待这些问题，并深入到供应链的更下游。

So we need to take these things much more seriously and further down the supply chain.

我很高兴我们从稀土开始着手，但即便如此，你也可以说我们是被狠狠打了一拳才动员起来的。

I'm glad we're starting with rare earths, but there you could say we had to get punched in the face to mobilize around it.

也许我们所有人都应该思考的一件令人愤慨的事情是，我们已经盯着稀土问题长达十五年了。

Maybe one of the galling things we should all think about is we've been staring at this rare earths problem for the better part of fifteen years.

我们差不多已经用大约20亿美元解决了这个问题。

We more or less had solved it for, like, $2,000,000,000.

相对于我们所做的一切，这几乎可以忽略不计，而我们现在正朝着实现它迈进。

It's roughly a rounding error relative to everything that we're doing, and now we're on a trajectory to do it.

所以我认为，部分工作才刚刚开始。

So I think part of it is just starting.

我非常希望把所有东西都带回国内。

I would love to bring everything back.

我认为，即使只提升10%的水平，也能显著削弱对手的筹码。

I think making a marginal improvement of even 10% dramatically reduces the adversary's leverage.

我刚刚在回顾今天与你们会谈前，从格雷厄姆·艾利森关于中国与战争宿命的书中做的笔记。

I just was reviewing my notes ahead of our conversation today from Graham Allison's book on China, destined for war with China.

你能谈谈你如何看待中国作为对手、作为一个国家吗？

Can you give your perspective on how you think about China as an adversary, as a country?

我强烈推荐《苹果在中国》这本书。

I highly recommend the book Apple in China.

我的意思是，它让你深刻感受到，我们最重要的公司与那里的制造业究竟有多紧密地融合在一起。

I mean, it really gives you this deep sense of how tightly integrated arguably our most important company is with manufacturing there.

我必须承认，这是一种非常奇特的情况，因为我去过中国。

It's this very strange circumstance, I have to admit, where I've been to China.

那里是另一个充满人类、有趣事物和精彩独特文化的地方，有各种各样的积极面。

It's another place filled with human beings and interesting things and amazing, interesting culture and all sorts of positives.

很难去应对这样一个事实：他们在传统意义上是我们的对手。

It's a hard thing to wrestle with, that they're an adversary in the traditional sense.

但我认为其中确实存在一些因素，而这种细微差别非常重要。

But I think there are components of that, and the nuance is important.

我真想听听你如何从政治实体、对手和国家的角度来理解中国。

I'd love to just hear you describe how you think about China as a political entity, as an adversary, as a country.

我觉得理解你的观点尤其重要。

Just feels like an especially important thing to understand your view on.

当我们赢得二战后，我们用自己的钱重建了德国和日本。

When we won World War two, we spent our own money to rebuild Germany and Japan.

由于我们帮助推动了这一进程，微电子产业转移到了东南亚，正如《苹果在中国》和《芯片战争》这两本书所记载的那样。

Microelectronics moved to Southeast Asia as Apple China documents and Chip Wars documents because we helped move it there.

是的。

Yes.

我们换来了更便宜的商品，但这些国家的经济发展——它们如今繁荣起来以促进全球稳定——也是我们权衡的一部分。

We got cheaper goods in return, but the economic development of these countries that are flourishing in order to create global stability was part of the calculus.

将中国接纳进世界贸易组织也是同样的情况。

Same thing with admitting China to the World Trade Organization.

问题是，他们从头到尾都在作弊。

The problem is they cheated the whole way through.

即使回到邓小平时代之前，他们也称我们为头号敌人。

And even if you go back to a pre Deng Xiaoping era, they call us the big enemy.

我认为部分原因在于我们自己的天真，我们相信资本主义和人类的繁荣会是繁荣的自然结果。

I think part of it is our own naivety, our own belief that capitalism and human flourishing is a natural consequence of prosperity.

所以，好吧，他们说了这些话，但随着他们变得越来越富有，他们会改变对这些问题的看法，我们最终会找到一种对世界持正和观点的方式。

So, okay, they're saying these things, but as they get richer, they're gonna change their perspective on these things, and we're all gonna find some way of having a positive sum view on the world.

这本质上就是没有发生的事情。

That's essentially what didn't happen.

我认为我们面对中共的挑战在于，中国仅仅富裕是不够的。

I think the challenge for us with the CCP is that it's not enough for China to be prosperous.

美国必须失败。

America must fail.

只需通过一些简单的行动就能看清这一点。

Just see this through simple acts.

如果你看看农业，这完全在他们的掌控之中。

If you look at agriculture, it is totally their prerogative.

是否购买美国大豆或巴西大豆，这是一项商业决策。

It's a business decision whether you wanna buy American soybeans or not or you wanna buy Brazilian soybeans.

我一点也不怨恨他们。

I do not begrudge them one bit.

当你试图偷偷引入农业真菌，让我们无法种植大豆时，情况就完全不一样了。

It's totally different thing when you're trying to smuggle in agricultural funguses so we can't grow soybeans.

如果你开始细数真正发生的事情，那就是事情的本来面貌。

Now if you start going down to the laundry list of what's actually happening, that's the shape of what's happening.

他们在某种程度上是强大的对手，因为我们对战争的理解是动能式的。

They're a formidable adversary in the sense that our conception of war is kinetic.

那是孤胆英雄在逆境中凭借勇气获胜。

It's the lone heroic cowboy against the odds winning through heroism.

他们对战争的理解是欺骗。

Their conception of war is deception.

那是那位将军诱使敌军进入山谷，然后决堤淹没他们的故事。

It's the general who tricked the adversary to get into the valley and then flooded it.

这是一种文化现象。

It's a cultural thing.

你希望不发一枪就赢得胜利。

You wanna win without firing a shot.

所以，许多正在发生的事情都低于我们所认为的冲突阈值，但它们绝对属于冲突。

So a lot of the things that are happening are below what we would consider the threshold of conflict, but it absolutely is conflict.

这属于他们的系统破坏战。

It is in their system system destruction warfare.

他们通过一切手段进行战争，因为他们会在自己拥有非对称优势的地方发动战争。

It's waging war through all the means because they're gonna wage it where they have asymmetric strength.

美国加尔文主义的观念在结构上是积极的。

The American Calvinist sensibility is structurally positive some.

我们会一再忍让，一次又一次地转过脸去，但总会有一条底线。

We're gonna turn the other cheek time and time again, over and over again, but there will be some line.

总会有一个点，让我们最终做出反应。

There'll be some point at which we just react.

当我们做出反应时，我最喜欢的一位海军上将说过一句最好的话：这不再是约翰·博伊德的OODA循环——观察、判断、决策、行动。

And when we react, the best quote I have from the admiral that I like is, it's no longer John Boyd's OODA loop, observe, orient, decide, act.

而是美国式的OODA循环：观察、过度反应、摧毁、道歉。

It's the American OODA loop, observe, overreact, destroy, apologize.

我们希望通过足够的威慑力来防止这种情况发生，使我们不至于被逼到必须做出反应的境地。

What we wanna do is prevent this from happening by having enough deterrence that we're not provoked to being in a position where we even need to react.

你多次提到不对称性，核潜艇就是我们相对于其他对手最后几个巨大不对称优势的例子之一。

You mentioned the idea of asymmetries a few times, nuclear subs being an example of one of our last huge asymmetries versus others.

在你看来，对于美国和中国来说，最重要的不对称优势是什么？

What are the most important asymmetries in your mind for The US and for China?

他们在哪些方面对我们拥有不对称优势？

Where do they have an asymmetric advantage against us?

我们在哪些方面对他们拥有不对称优势？

Where do we have it against them?

你

And what do you

希望什么会发生改变？

hope shifts?

这是个非常好的问题。

This is a great question.