汤姆·迪根与格雷格·斯图尔特：打造全球最佳健身应用 - [像最佳投资者一样投资，第454期]

但我在那里的头两三个月，花了很多时间去分析当时的业务模式。

But we spent a lot of time the first two, three months I was there trying to dissect the current business.

当时的业务本质上是一个一对一的平台，连接独立教练和寻求私人训练的客户。

And the current business was this one to one, essentially marketplace, connecting independent contractor coach with a consumer who is looking for personal training.

我们一直在研究用户行为，观察实际情况。

We're studying the behavior and watching what's going on here.

我注意到，教练们可以自己定价。

And what I noticed was that coaches could set their own price.

有些人定价高得离谱，有些人则更亲民。

And some people had crazy high prices, some people had more approachable prices.

他们声称这是定制化方案，根据你的具体目标量身打造，所以才收这个价。

And they're building this as customizable program, I'm building it for you based on your very specific goals, that's why I'm charging you this amount.

但后台数据显示，其实根本谈不上个性化。

And on the back end, we can see that it really wasn't personalized.

只是把用户分成了几个大类标签而已。

It was big bucket personas.

名字叫Sally Pilates，宣传说是高度个性化的训练计划，收费也跟一对一教练一样高。

The names were Sally Pilates, and that was being billed as super personalized programming and charging like you would work with a coach.

但我们一看，发现其实都是大类人群的模板。

But we could see like these big bucket personas.

我们就开始想，也许真正的关键不是个性化，而是有针对你需求的优质训练内容。

We're like, okay, maybe personalization isn't the secret here, but it's having good programming that's relevant to you.

当时我翻了下教练名单，发现大多数人都赚不了多少钱，但有那么几位每月能挣四五百块。

In that same moment, I went through the list of coaches and there weren't a lot of coaches that were making a lot of money on this, but then we had a couple that were making 4 or $5 a month.

我就去了解了他们的做法，问他们：你们到底做错了什么不一样的？

And I spent time with them and I asked them, what are you doing differently?

为什么别人都做不下去，你们却能做成？

How are you making this a thing when everybody else is struggling with it?

我们发现其中有一位特别突出，我就想，行，咱们好好看看。

And we have one in particular, and I was like, alright.

你每个月能挣四五百块。

So you're making $4 a month.

你的收入没在增长。

Your earnings aren't growing.

你是怎么做到的？

How did you get there?

为什么现在不再增长了？

Why isn't it growing anymore?

劳伦是纽约的一名教练，主要做线下高价私教，但她把所有空闲时间都用来接Ladder平台的线上客户。

And Lauren was a trainer in New York, like a high ticket trainer in person, and she was filling up all of her downtime with online clients with Ladder.

我们当时完全不知道怎么扩大规模，但她发现自己的Instagram账号有五六千甚至上万粉丝，她通过讲故事吸引他们，客户就源源不断地来，可她的时间全被占满了，再也接不了新客户。

And we had no idea how to grow, so she figured out I have this Instagram profile, she had five or 10,000 people, and she was telling a story to her audience and they were coming in, but she filled up all of her time and she couldn't take on any more clients.

这根本不是个好生意。

I mean, that's a bad business.

你把自己的成长空间给锁死了。

You've capped how big this can get.

瓶颈就在于人的时间。

The constraint is human time.

于是，我们从两个洞察出发：一是看穿个性化服务的虚假宣传，二是观察Lauren的做法，看她是如何增长的，然后把这两点结合起来，形成了这个愿景的初步试验版本。

So these two insights of calling bullshit on personalization, watching what Lauren was doing and seeing how she was growing, and piecing those together into what became a trial test or an MVP of this vision.

我们当时并不清楚最终要做出什么，但觉得这些想法里藏着点东西。

We didn't know what we would build, but we said there's something in these concepts.

2020年2月，我们对Lauren说：你不能再接新客户了。

And in February 2020, we said, you can't take on any more business, Lauren.

如果我们临时改造一下现有的应用，让一个房间里能同时容纳多个人，会怎么样？

What if we Jimmy rigged the existing app and we created an experience where there could be more than one person in there.

你要为一群女性设计课程。

You're gonna program for a group of women.

你去你的Instagram粉丝群里说：嘿，这个课程是给纽约那些忙得团团转、练壶铃的女性准备的。

You'll go out to your Instagram audience, and you'll say, hey, this is for I'm a New York busy women in New York kettlebell training.

我是个有经验的教练。

I'm an experienced coach.

每周我都会给你新的训练计划。

I'm gonna give you new workouts every week.

这不是定制化的，但她明确针对的是某一类特定人群。

It's not customized, but very specific persona that she was talking to.

我们打算在App里搞个聊天功能，让大家都能互相交流。

And we're gonna have this chat in the app where we all can talk to each other.

App界面丑得要命，功能也 barely 能用，但想法本身很清楚。

And the app looked like shit, the functionality barely worked, but the concept was clear.

当时我们正处在濒临崩溃的边缘。

We're in process of dying in this moment.

她去自己的Instagram上一推广，短短时间就有一百多人报名，每人一百美元。

She went out to her Instagram audience and we had like a 100 people sign up at a $100 a very fast.

这比我们之前赢下美国运通和债权人那些事还要让人兴奋。

Like, that was the most exciting thing I'd seen yet other than getting wins against American Express and her creditors.

那真是棒极了。

And that was awesome.

我们意识到，真的有需求。

We're like, okay, there's demand.

劳伦的受众非常明确地表现出对这个理念的兴趣。

Lauren's audience, they came in very clearly that there's interest in this concept.

所以第一个月，我们只能盯着发生了什么，因为产品上实在没什么别的可看的。

So that first month, we're just watching what was happening because there was nothing else to look at from a product perspective.

对我来说，最令人震撼的是，这些人在应用里竟然找到了彼此。

I think what the most amazing and impressionable thing to me was these people had found each other in the app.

他们的身份特质很相似。

They were similar personas.

也都住在差不多的地方。

They lived in a similar place.

都是忙碌的女性，每天跟着同样的训练计划，跟教练和彼此互动。

Busy women following the same workouts every day, interacting with the coach and each other.

她们之前根本没见过面。

They'd never met each other.

但她们开始在Instagram上发帖谈论劳伦和Ladder。

But they started posting on Instagram about Lauren and Ladder.

然后我们看到他们在纽约的公园里见面了。

And then we saw them meeting up in New York at the park together.

他们之前根本没见过面。

They'd never met each other before.

那感觉简直像魔法一样。

And that was like magical.

这里有社群氛围、社交互动，而且他们都挺开心的。

There's community elements and social and they're happy.

我们以前在产品的原始版本里从来没见过这样的情况。

And we'd never seen anything like that in the original version of the product.

所以，关于这种编程理念——虽然不是个性化的，但质量很高——这些小小的希望迹象开始浮现。

So all these little glimmers of hope on this concept of programming, it's not personalized, but it's high quality.

它是为特定人群量身打造的。

It's meant for a specific persona.

社交监督这些元素，全都像真实可信的证据一样冒出来，证明这确实值得深入探索。

The social accountability element, all these things are like bubbling up as real tangible proof points of something that could be interesting to go work on.

那个群体的续费率超过了百分之九十。

That group, the renewal rate was 90% plus.

人们愿意再次付费。

People paid again.

我们当时都惊了。

We're like, damn.

他们真的在坚持锻炼，而且一直留了下来。

Like, they're doing the workouts and they're staying with us.

如果你光看那个App，肯定会觉得一塌糊涂。

And if you looked at the app, you would go, this is garbage.

但我们承诺的东西，实实在在地兑现了。

But the promise was being delivered on what we were proposing.

我们又找了一位教练做了新一轮测试。

We ran one more trial with another coach.

结果完全一样。

It was the exact same outcome.

我亲自给几乎所有那些女性打了电话。

I talked to almost all those women on the phone.

她们都问：你是谁啊？

They was like, who are you?

你怎么找到劳伦的？

How did you find Lauren?

你为什么会用这个应用？

Why did you go into this app?

你当时想解决什么问题？

What problem were you trying to solve?

我们跟她们一一聊了，建立了联系，这些对话都成了重要的参考。

And we talked to all of them and built a relationship and like all those were inputs.

这些对话里有什么让你感到意外的吗？

Did anything surprise you in those conversations?

这验证了我们很多想法

It validated a lot of

我们当时正在实时学到的东西。

things we were learning in real time.

就是你为什么会加入呢？

It's like why did you join?

我早就厌倦了每天纠结该做什么运动。

I'm tired of thinking about what workout to do.

我本来就已经在健身了，但还得花时间专门规划。

I'm already into fitness, but I spend time actually planning this.

这真是个让人头疼的问题。

It's a pain point for me.

我不想花一千美元去请私人教练。

I don't wanna go spend a thousand dollars on a coach.

我需要一个更亲民的方案，但也需要有人帮我制定计划。

I need something more approachable, but I need help with a plan.

我需要确认自己做的是对的。

I need to know that I'm doing the right thing.

我希望有个教练能帮我，让我确信自己做的是对的。

I want a coach that is helping me and have confidence that it's the right thing to do.

这确实是真实存在的。

That was a real thing.

后来我们看到他们聚在一起，说：‘我遇到了和我一模一样的人。’

And then we saw them meeting up and they would say, oh, I met someone just like me.

他们有同样的困扰，于是成了朋友，一起锻炼。

And they had the same pain points and they'd become a friend and we work out together.

那真是太神奇了。

And that was magic.

这些零散的片段，通过一次次对话，慢慢拼出一幅越来越清晰的画面，这就是这个产品的雏形。

And so all these little kernels just speaking and forming a picture that got clearer and clearer and clearer was the beginning of what that product would be.

现在大家都很推崇埃隆那种打造公司的方法。

Everyone's very fond of the Elon algorithm for company building now.

这种做法已经被广泛传阅，当成一种标准模式了。

That's been passed around as like one method for doing this.

如果你要提炼出一套方法，从最初那个洞察——有人愿意为此付费、真的喜欢，我们可以据此做点什么——一路走到今天的产品，你会怎么总结？

If you had to distill your algorithm for how you proceeded from that initial kernel of an insight of, okay, here's something that people are paying for and like, and we can do something with this all the way through to where the product is today.

作为CEO，你在迭代优化的过程中，用的是什么方法，才把最初那个想法发展到现在的？

What's been your, as the CEO, algorithm for that iterative improvement to get from the original kernel to now?

首先我要说，千万别听投资者对产品的意见。

Well, can tell you number one is don't listen to investors on product feedback.

这一点最重要。

That is by far number one.

对我们来说，其实就两条。

But for us, it's just two things.

第一，优先级，必须极度聚焦。

It's prioritization, ruthlessly prioritize.

你们得互相证明，这个改动真的能给产品带来增值。

You have to prove to each other that this is going to be additive to the product.

所谓增值，就是我们的假设能提升用户的锻炼完成率。

And additive to the product means we have a thesis that is going to increase workout completions.

这就是我们的核心目标。

That's our North Star.

我们不是为了让你一次性付费，而是希望你能真正坚持用Ladder完成锻炼。

We're solving, not for getting you to pay one time, we're solving for you to actually complete workouts with Ladder.

我们能做些什么来提高你坚持锻炼并留下来的可能性？

And what can we go build to go improve the odds of you doing that and staying with us?

我们从不靠猜测来做决定。

And how we get to that is we don't guess.

我们会吸收所有收到的信息，这些都来自我们的用户。

We absorb every piece of information that's coming in and it's all driven by our members.

只要你问对问题，又有用户愿意跟你交流，你就能逐渐看清哪些关键领域真正能推动进展。

And if you ask the right questions and you have people that are talking to you, you can start forming a picture of what are the huge buckets that actually move the needle.

你还可以进一步评估，实现这些目标到底有多复杂。

And you can do some work to figure out how complex is this to go build and go do it.

别因为某件事听起来有趣或者你能做，就去忙活十件别的事。

And don't do 10 other things just because it's interesting or you can do it.

就专心做一件事，把它做到极致，然后反复去做。

Just do the one thing and do it really well and then do it again.

今天依然是这样。

That's still the case today.

我们刚推出了营养计划。

We just launched nutrition.

这是自产品初版以来我们打造过的最大功能。

It's the biggest thing we've built since the first version of the product.

外界有些人说，这应该做成独立的App，或者是个不同的生意。

And people on the outside were like, that should be a separate app or like, that's a different business.

但我们说，对我们的用户来说，根本不是这么回事。

And we're like, well, to our customer, it's not.

一年前我们做了一次调研。

We did this survey a year ago.

我们找了五千人，每人花五十分钟，既有定性访谈也有定量数据，就是想搞清楚，哪些方向最值得我们下重注。

We had 5,000 people spending fifty minutes and it was qualitative and quant, and we were trying to figure out what are the biggest bets that we could go make.

我们准备推进一个大项目，不想靠猜测。

We were ready for a big project and we didn't wanna guess.

通过这项工作，我们很清楚地看到，营养管理就是关键。

And out of that work, it became very clear that it was nutrition.

我们发现，有三分之一的会员在追踪宏量营养素。

What we learned was we have a third of our members who are tracking macros.

在这三分之一的人里，90%都在用某个应用。

Of that third, 90% are using an app.

而这90%当中，大多数人用的是MyFitnessPal，但他们特别讨厌它。

Of that 90%, most are using MyFitnessPal, and they hate it.

他们早就受够了在两个不同的地方管理同一个问题。

And they're really tired of managing their problem set in two different spaces.

通过和会员深入交流，我们明白，对用户来说，这其实是一个问题。

And what we learned through that experience in talking to members was that for the consumer, it's one problem set.

我想减重。

I want to lose weight.

我想增肌。

I want to gain muscle.

这背后有一套数学公式，有输入也有输出。

There are inputs and outputs to that math equation.

输出就是你的活动和锻炼。

Outputs is activity and exercise.

输入就是你吃的东西。

Input is what you're eating.

他们现在得在两个地方管理这些事，其实他们也知道这样不对——要是有教练指导，这些东西本来就是一体的。

And they're managing this in two places and they know that's not the right way to do it because if you worked with a coach, these things are all symbiotic together.

但这一切都源于会员们的反馈，我们很清楚，这件事一定能带来改变。

But it all started with a kernel from our members and we had a really clear line of sight that this would move the needle.

他们跟我们说：你得把激励机制、连续打卡、徽章、庆祝功能全都用上，同时帮我解决方程的另一端，因为那才是决定成败的关键。

They were telling us, I want you to use all of these things, motivational mechanics, streaks, badges, celebrations, and help me with the other side of the equation, which is going to dictate success or not.

等我们有了这个核心想法，就又做了一次调研。

And then once we have that kernel, we do another survey.

我们在营养方面研究得非常深入，真的深入到极致。

We go very deep on nutrition, like extremely deep to understand.

我们所有人都会仔细阅读、整理所有内容，从中提炼出一套行动指南。

And we all review it, read everything, we synthesize it, and it gives us a blueprint.

当你这么做之后，该做什么就一目了然了。

And when you do that, it becomes obvious what to build.

什么叫‘非常深入’？

What does very deep mean?

那个营养调查问卷，大概有两百道题左右。

The nutrition survey, that was probably a couple 100 questions.

每一道我们都认真看过了。

We read all of them.

现在你完全可以把这些内容丢进ChatGPT里分析。

Now you can put them in ChatGPT.

刚开始的时候，我会把App Store里的评论一条条复制下来，粘贴到Word文档里。

In the beginning of this, I would copy and paste App Store using to a Word doc.

我会仔细阅读每一份。

I would read every single one of them.

我把这些词按类别分组。

I organized the words by buckets.

用不同颜色标记，再拿去给ChatGPT分析。

Would color code them, and I would do ChatGPT.

我有好多文档，每份都有一百页长，全是拆解自会员们的原话。

I have these documents that are a 100 pages long and it's all just deconstructed words from our members.

跟做问卷调查很像。

Very similar to survey work.

一开始，我们就是靠问卷来做这些的。

In the beginning, we would do that with surveys.

我们会拆解出核心主题。

We'd dissect the themes.

大家真正关心的是什么？

What do people care about?

现在你可以用ChatGPT把这些内容整合起来。

And now you can use ChatGPT to synthesize all of this.

我们能为会员做出的最大假设是什么？

What is the biggest bet that we can make on behalf of our members?

然后我们得想想，这个功能应该包含哪些核心模块？

And then we'll think about what are the building blocks of what this should do?

这是营养指导吗？

Is this nutrition coaching?

还是热量追踪？

Is it macro tracking?

这个功能具体要解决什么问题？

What does the feature set do?

你要通过提问来发现他们的痛点和真正需求。

And you aim questions at uncovering the pain point and what they're looking for.

这些发现就会成为第一版产品的指导方向

And that becomes the guide on the first version of the

这个功能你学到了什么？

feature What did you learn there?

大家对营养方面最想要什么？

What do people want on nutrition?

从我的角度看，这分成两个部分。

There are two halves to this from my perspective.

一个是回顾过去，一个是展望未来。

It's looking backwards and looking forwards.

他们之前的做法是记录，回头看，让追踪宏量营养素变得特别简单。

What they were doing is tracking looking backwards, make it really easy to track macros.

我想知道自己是摄入超标了还是不足了。

I wanna know if I'm in a surplus or a deficit.

我希望有清晰的可视化图表。

I want good visualizations.

我还希望记录起来特别方便。

And I want it to be really easy in terms of how to log.

这太繁琐了。

It's very tedious.

用一些现有的老产品来做，特别困难。

It's very hard with some of the existing legacy products.

所以给我一个简单的方法来做这件事。

So give me an easy way to do this.

对我们来说，回头看这部分基本是标配。

And so the looking backwards to us was basically the table stakes.

我们必须提供一条极其简单的路径，帮助用户追踪宏量营养素、记录三餐和食物摄入，并清楚地告诉他们结果如何。

We need to give a really easy path to tracking macros, logging your meals, logging your food, and telling you what's happening as a result.

如果我们把这一点做到极致，就能进一步提供下一步该怎么做建议。

And then if we do that and we do that really, really well, there's gonna be a whole other opportunity to tell you what to do.

不是告诉你过去做了什么，而是告诉你接下来该做什么。

Not what you did, but what to do.

用户想知道具体该吃什么。

Members wanna know what to eat specifically.

我该去哪儿找呢？

Where should I get it?

我现在在餐厅。

I'm at a restaurant.

这是菜单。

Here's the menu.

根据我的目标，现在点什么最合适？

What's the best choice right now based on my goals?

他们想要明确的建议。

They want prescriptive advice.

但当时他们用的那些App，都只回头看过去的数据。

But the looking backwards was what they were using for the apps that they were using at that moment.

大部分人都在用我的健身环。

It was mostly My Fitness Pal.

而且他们对这些App根本没有感情或忠诚度。

And there was no brand affinity or love.

它只是当时存在的一个工具，大家信任它，因为它数据库最大，而且做了很久。

It was just the tool that existed, that there was trust because they had the biggest database, they had done it for a long time.

但在这些对话里，大家在做这些事的时候，其实吃了不少苦头。

But there was just a lot of pain in these conversations on how they were doing this stuff.

所以我们决定干脆不收钱。

So we made a conscious decision not to charge for it.

这一部分我们免费提供。

So we're gonna give this part away.

我们的目标是先赢得这群人的信任，用 Ladder 替代他们现有的记录方式。

We wanna go build trust with this group and win over tracking with Ladder.

我们不打算说服一群全新的人来做这件事。

We're not gonna convince a whole new group to do this.

我们要找的是那些已经在做的用户。

We're gonna go get the people who are already doing it.

我们要做得更好。

We're gonna do it better.

我们会赢得他们的信任。

We're gonna win their trust.

开始收集这些数据，之后我们就能推出上百万种新产品。

Start compiling this data, and there's a million products that we can now build.

想想营养学对我们意味着什么，它为我们提供了完整的输入与输出数学模型。

Like if you think about what nutrition does for us, it gives us the whole math equation of inputs and outputs.

世界上没有任何其他产品能做到这一点。

There's no product in the world that has that.

围绕消费者的这张图景，是任何其他潜在产品或服务都无法比拟的。

So the picture around the consumer, it's the clearest of any other potential product or service around this consumer.

我们清楚地知道方程两边的每一个细节，这将催生大量帮助消费者的产品和服务。

We know exactly what's happening on both sides of the equation, and that's gonna unlock a whole bunch of products and services to help our consumer.

比如，我可以拍一张食物的照片。

And this would be things like I could take a picture of my food.

这个我们已经有了。

We already have that.

那只是基本要求。

That was table stakes.

拍张照片，这很简单。

Take a picture, that's easy.

但还得告诉你它的可信度和准确率是多少，因为用拍照、扫条形码，或者手动输入成分和食谱，各有取舍。

But also tell you what's the level of confidence and accuracy because there are trade offs if you use take a picture versus scanning a barcode or entering very specifically an ingredient or a recipe.

我们得把这个场景做到极致，让它特别流畅、特别好用。

We had to nail that use case, make it super slick, make it very easy to use.

而这正是建立信任的起点。

And that was the beginning of building trust.

就连在这个过程中，你也得想清楚，到底该开发什么？

Even in that process that you have to like, how do you figure out what to build?

我们先做了一个初版。

We built the first version.

我们有一群两千人的内测用户，把产品给了他们。

We have a group of 2,000 members who are beta members and we give it to them.

但首先，我们团队内部先做一遍。

But first we do it as a team.

这算是内部测试版。

That's the alpha.

我们通过Slack频道一起提反馈。

We're all giving feedback with a Slack channel.

大家都在交流使用中的情况。

Everyone's communicating on what's happening.

这样整个画面就越来越清晰了。

That helps the picture get clear.

然后我们把产品推给内测用户，让他们实际使用。

And then we release to our beta members, and it's in the wild, and they're using it.

问题马上就暴露出来了。

And you hear it right away.

哪里出了问题？

What's wrong?

现在还缺什么？

What's the gaps?

你们需要什么？

What do you need?

我们每周都会对这些用户做一次调研。

We would survey these users every week.

我们问了一个问题：你有多大可能换掉现在用的这款应用？

We had a question, how likely are you to switch from your existing app that you're using?

刚开始的时候，这个比例只有20%，很低，对我们来说并不算特别理想。

And when it started, the number was 20%, pretty low, not super exciting for us.

然后我们就去开发，把情况理清楚，帮用户解决他们遇到的问题。

And then we would go build and make the picture clear and help fill the gaps of what folks were experiencing.

这个数字一直在涨，一直在涨，一直在涨。

And it kept going up, kept going up, kept going up.

理论上你可以一直不停地迭代MVP，但有一天它突然升到了85%，我们就觉得：可以了，准备好了。

And there's a point where you could just keep building the MVP forever, but it was eighty five percent one day and it was like, we're ready.

我们完成了。

We're done.

这下可以推向市场了。

This is ready for the wild.

我们上线后，反响特别好。

Then we released it and it's been a home run.

现在是第六周，已经有近四百万顿饭被记录了，想想当初那些早期故事，那时候我们连App里的每个用户都认识，真是不可思议。

We're in week six for almost 4,000,000 meals logged, which is insane thinking about those early stories where we were literally we knew all the people in the app.

你之前说过，别听投资者对产品的意见。

You said before, don't listen to investors on product.

能再详细说说吗？

Can you say more about that?

我觉得第一点，别只听某一个人对产品的意见。

Oh, I think one, don't listen to any one person on product.

每个人都有自己独特的使用场景、身份和想要的解决方案。

Everyone has a unique use case persona, solutions that they're looking for.

所以没有人能代表绝对正确。

So no one person is the source of truth.

你收到一条反馈，那只是一条反馈而已。

If you get one piece of feedback, that's just one piece of feedback.

说到投资者，我记得早期开会时，他们总是给出特别具体的建议，说你得赶紧做这个。

So when we talk about investors, I remember earlier meetings, it would be like really prescriptive advice and you should go build this.

但那可能吧。

And it's like, maybe.

我不确定。

I don't know.

那只是他们自己的想法。

Like, that's what you want.

然后

And then

我们会拿去测试，问问我们的用户，结果他们都说：不。

we would go test that with our user base and ask them and they would say, no.

不想这样

Don't want

对

Yeah.

这是一种非常实证的构建方式。

That's an extremely empirical way of building.

这种做法是实证的，不一定要求完全精确，但能很清楚地看出哪些是关键部分，其他边缘的东西就一目了然。

Which is empirical, and it doesn't have to be completely precise, but it becomes very clear what the big chunky buckets are and everything else on the fringe.

这其实没那么重要。

It's like, that's not that important.

但真正重要的东西会变得特别明显，哪怕它和投资人想的是一致的，或者

But what is important becomes very, very obvious, even if it's in line with what investor is looking for or

不一致。

not.

在公司发展的不同阶段，你和我打过几次电话，每次你都会说，你把自己关起来，专门花时间研究某个新领域。

At various points to this business, you and I have had a call, and it will be some period where you describe him having gone into like a cave like process to go study some new topic.

最近有个新问题成了业务的瓶颈。

Some new thing has become the bottleneck for the business.

我记得好几次，他都在埋头研究X、Y或者Z。

I can think of several occasions when he was studying x y or z.

从你的角度看，他为了突破这些瓶颈，是怎么进入那种闭关式研究状态的？

Describe from your perspective this cave like process that you've seen him go through to unlock these bottlenecks.

大概四年前，我们还在摸索增长方向。产品已经做出来了，用户很喜欢，也不断告诉我们该加什么功能、怎么优化，可我们就是搞不懂怎么扩大规模。

Probably four years ago when we're trying to figure out growth, we've built a product, people love it, they're using it, they're telling us what we need to build and what features we need to evolve to improve it, but we still haven't figured out how to grow.

从零做到一百万ARR，和从一百万做到一千万，完全是两码事。

The way you get from zero to 1,000,000 ARR is very different than the one to 10.

当时格雷格的想法是：咱们干脆做点实验吧。

For us, Greg's view was, look, let's go run some experiments.

于是我们开始研究几种不同的增长路径，列出了眼下所有可能的选择。

And so we're looking at some different ways to grow saying, here are the different options right now.

比如SEO，我们就在考虑怎么开始做搜索引擎的内容布局。

There's SEO, and we're thinking about how to go and start to create content on search.

我们App里有很多现成的资源可以利用。

We have a lot of assets in the app that we can leverage there.

我们在看几个不同的渠道，TikTok最明显，因为那儿用户扎堆，但品牌还没怎么进去。

We're looking at some different channels, TikTok being the most obvious where it's just all the eyeballs are there, but the brands aren't there yet.

这让我们很动心。

That was compelling to us.

我们意识到，消费者对短视频互动特别感兴趣。

We understood that the consumer was very interested in engaging with short form video.

Meta当时还没把Reels做起来，但很明显，用户的注意力已经往那儿走了。

Meta hadn't quite copied that with their Reels product yet, but it was obvious that that's where the consumer was going with their attention.

可品牌们还没开始在那里投钱。

And yet the brands weren't there spending yet.

我们跟一些教练合作了，都是顶尖的创作者。

We partnered with coaches, these world class coaches who are all creators.

他们全都没玩过TikTok。

None of them knew TikTok yet.

他们全都习惯用Instagram。

They were all Instagram native.

事实上，我觉得当时他们连TikTok都没注册。

In fact, I don't think any of them at this moment were even on TikTok.

我们特别想试试看能不能把这事做成。

And we were excited to go figure this out.

这事儿特别搞笑，格雷格，你看过他的Instagram吗？根本一点都不潮。

And it was hilarious because Greg, I don't know if you've seen his Instagram, it's not particularly cool.

他根本不是内容创作者，可他倒好，说我要去当TikTok达人。

He's not a creator, but he was like, I'm gonna go and become the TikTok guy.

我当时就说，行吧。

And I'm like, alright.

这位可是要当TikTok大神了。

Mister TikTok over here.

我就跟他说，你得赶紧找个专业的人来帮忙。

I was like, you gotta go hire somebody.

我说，我来搞定吧。

I'm like, I'll figure it out.

于是他就像个疯狂科学家一样，拼命研究TikTok的每一个细节，结果两年后，来自中国的顶尖工程师居然跑到我们办公室来了。

So he goes all mad scientist on trying to just understand every aspect of TikTok to the point where we'll fast forward two years later and the big dog engineers from China are in our office.

因为格雷格老是打电话来说，算法出问题了。

Cause Greg would be calling and being like, the algorithm's broken.

对方就回他，没有啊，没出问题。

And they'd be like, no, it's not.

然后格雷格就会去找瑞安·莫德要一堆数据，再发过去。

And then Greg would go get a bunch of information from Ryan Maud and send it through.

对方一看，哦等等。

They'd be like, oh, wait.

他居然对了。

He's right.

广告管理器确实有毛病。

There's something wrong with Ads Manager.

因为广告技术当时还很新。

Because the ad tech was very new.

所以格雷格一直在实时处理和解决他们的广告技术问题。

And so Greg was very much triaging and troubleshooting their ad tech in real time.

还有另一件事，我记得那是2021年冬天，大概是二月或三月，我去找格雷格，发现他躲进了自己的房间。

The other story that I just speak to Greg going into his cave, it is winter two thousand twenty one, probably March or February.

我不太记得当时德州大停电那会儿，整个州都停摆了。

And I don't remember, like, the Texas freeze when, like, the entire state shut down.

我们这儿才积了一英寸的雪，但电网彻底瘫了。

We have an inch of snow, but we lost the power grid.

总之，格雷格躲进房间没事干，就翻起了《跨越鸿沟》这本书——那本所有创业者都该读的经典之作。

So anyways, Greg goes into a cave because there's nothing else to do, and he's reading the book Crossing the Chasm, great book that I think all founders have read.

但他读完《跨越鸿沟》后，搞出了一个一百页的幻灯片，一恢复供电就发给我了。

But Greg's output of reading the Crossing the Chasm was a 100 page slide deck that he sends me when the power comes on.

等网络终于恢复，他直接跟我说：‘我搞清楚我们的客户是谁了。’

And we finally have Internet again, and he's just like, I figured out who our customer is.

这事儿至关重要，因为它为我们后来在抖音上的行动打下了基础——不搞清楚目标客户，根本不可能成功。

Ultimately, that was very important work because it set up what we were about to go do on TikTok that you couldn't have success without understanding who that customer is.

书里到底讲了什么？

What did you find in the book?

尤其是刚开始的时候，别想着讨好所有人。

Not trying to be all things to all people, especially early on.

你可以瞄准一个大的市场问题，但没必要一开始就从那里下手。

You can go after a big market problem, but you don't have to start there.

我们当时想把故事讲给每一个人听。

We were trying to tell a story to everyone.

那会儿世界乱了套，消费者都飘着，健身的人全待在家，一切都乱七八糟。

The world was upside down, consumers were up for grabs because your gym folks were at home, everything was a mess.

其他公司都在推新品，我们呢？举重、自重训练、健身房、居家——全都要。

All these other companies are launching and we're saying, we're weights, we're body weight, we're gym, we're home.

想包揽一切，结果啥也没做成。

It was all things to all people and it wasn't working.

我们根本没接触到对的人。

Like we weren't getting to the right person.

跨越鸿沟这本书帮我明确了当前最该聚焦的人群，以及谁真正从中受益。

And crossing the chasm just helped me zone in on who is the most important person that we're talking to right now and who's finding success.

我们要怎么专门跟这些人沟通，而不是去讲一个对Peloton用户有用的故事。

And how do we speak specifically to that person and not go try to tell a story that's relevant to a Peloton user.

你现在有充足的时间跟我们聊聊，你们是怎么解决这个问题、通过TikTok实现增长的。

You have unlimited time right now to talk to us about solving this problem, how you cracked the code of growing through something like TikTok.

越具体越好。

The more detail, the better.

我觉得，产品确定之后，这绝对是你们早期最关键的转折点。

I just think obviously it was a or the critical moment for the business early on once you had figured out the product.

你就随便聊聊，当时具体做了些什么。

Just riff on the experience, literally what you did Yeah.

还有你从中得到了什么教训。

And what you learned.

我们开了一次白板会议，讨论有哪些增长循环是我们可以利用的，哪些是我们有优势的，哪些是我们团队自己能搞定的，还能快速学到东西、拿到成果并深入下去。

Had a whiteboard meeting where like, what are the growth loops that we think are available to us, that we think we have an advantage on, that we think we can do within our own team, that we can learn fast enough to get proof points and to dive in on goal and on.

最后，TikTok 从里面脱颖而出，成了我们的选择。

And TikTok came out of that as the winner.

我们开始做内容，但其实啥都不懂。

What we started to do was make content, and we knew nothing.

我跟负责品牌创意的负责人一起吃了顿早餐。

I had this breakfast meeting with who leads branding creative.

我就跟他说：嘿，兄弟。

And I was like, hey, man.

你愿意跟我一起做 TikTok 吗？

Do you wanna work on TikTok with me?

他直接说：行啊。

And he was like, sure.

这个人现在负责我们所有精彩的品牌活动。

This guy is building all of our amazing campaigns.

他可是给耐克拍广告的。

Like, he's shooting for Nike.

他之前干过好多大项目。

He's done all these things.

我想请你跟我一起做TikTok内容。

I need you to make TikToks with me.

对。

Mhmm.

就咱们两个人一起干。

And it's just gonna be me and you.

他有特别强的创意能力。

He's got the creative mind.

我们找了个教练，跟他说我们要从零开始做账号。

And we grabbed a coach and we said, hey, we're gonna start an account from scratch.

你平时不上TikTok，正好咱们一起去摸索学习。

You're not on TikTok, we wanna go learn.

把你iPhone里所有的视频都发给我们。

Give us all your video that you have on your iPhone.

你手里有这么多视频素材，再加上一个有创意的人。

So you have this inventory of video, you have a smart creative person.

我们用教练的名字开了账号。

We started handles in the coaches names.

然后我们就开始制作内容。

Then we started to create content.

很快我们就摸清了哪些内容更受欢迎。

And very, very quickly we started to learn what was the content that worked.

我们把每一个细节都拆开分析。

And we were dissecting every inch of it.

为什么同样的内容能连续火起来？

What worked multiple times in a row, why?

它们有什么共同点？

What are the commonalities?

这个产品是怎么用的？

How is this product used?

这不是Instagram，更像是电视。

It's not Instagram, it's like TV.

人们看内容是为了娱乐。

People are consuming content for entertainment.

它不是一个社交平台，而是一家媒体公司。

And it's not a social platform, it's a media company.

所以你得想清楚，什么样的内容既有教育意义、能提供价值，又能精准触达目标人群。

And so you have to think about what is the right content that is educational, provides value, that gets to the right person.

因为跟Instagram不一样，那里你面对的是自己积累的观众，而这里你得做出算法知道该推给谁的内容。

Because unlike Instagram, where you have an audience that you're creating content for, you have to create content that the algorithm knows who to put in front of the right person.

所以关键全在内容上。

So it's all about the content.

但那时候我们的优势是，不管你有多少粉丝都没关系。

But the advantage for us at that moment was it didn't matter how many followers you had.

你可以从零开始。

You can start from scratch.

那时候没人知道该怎么操作。

Nobody knew how to go do this.

但我们最早做的那个账号，我还记得当时正和孩子们在公园里玩。

But that first account that we started, I remember being on the playground with my kids.

我就喜欢这样，兄弟，一条视频就火了。

And that's all I like, dude, one's ripping.

结果播放量直接上了一百万。

And it was like a million views.

我们当时都惊呆了。

We're like, holy shit.

这太惊人了。

That's amazing.

那段视频你两秒钟就拍完了。

That video took you two seconds to make.

然后我们就想，再来一次。

And it was like, do it again.

我们就又做了一次。

We did it again.

我们把这个账号从零做到二十万粉丝，只用了四十五天。

We took that account from zero to 200,000 people in forty five days.

那时候我们根本没考虑过付费推广。

And we weren't thinking about paid at all.

我们想的是，TikTok这个产品到底是什么？

We were thinking about what is TikTok as a product?

用户是怎么使用它的？

How is it being consumed?

什么样的内容容易火，我们该怎么做出这样的内容。

And what content wins, how do we create that content.

所以我们有了播放量，也有了实际的数据支撑，于是我们就说，行了。

So we got views, we had proof points of traction, and we said, alright.

我们有了Blink和Bio。

We have Blink and Bio.

我们能不能把人吸引到App里？

Can we get somebody into the app?

我们很快就做到了，而且吸引来的都是对的人。

And we did very quickly, and we're getting the right people into the app.

这时候，这些效果开始明显累积了。

Now these things were really starting to compound.

我们又开了一个账号，照着同样的方法做。

We started another account, did the same things.

我们意识到，这事儿不用花钱也能做起来。

We're like, we can do this organically.

三个月后，我们决定投点钱进去，看看效果会怎样。

It was three months, and then we said, let's start putting some money behind this and see how it goes.

我们当时根本没有专门的付费推广团队。

We had no performance marketing team.

我们根本没有外包团队。

We had no agency.

我坚决反对从公司外部招聘任何人。

I was absolutely against hiring anybody outside the company.

我就下定决心，自己学着做TikTok上的效果营销。

And I just committed to learning how to be a performance marketer on TikTok.

因为我们之前没做过效果营销，也没玩过Facebook，所以根本没什么先入为主的观念。

Because we didn't come from performance marketing or Facebook, we had no preconceived notions of how things should go.

你去问那些从Facebook转到TikTok的营销人员，他们还在把Facebook和Instagram那一套规则和经验硬套到TikTok上。

And when you talk to Facebook marketers who are moving to TikTok, they were applying all these rules and heuristics of Facebook and Instagram to TikTok.

但这两个平台完全是两回事。

But these are two separate platforms.

一个是中国的应用，算法也完全不同。

You have this Chinese app and a different algorithm.

那这套规则在这儿凭什么管用？

Why would those rules matter over here?

我在TikTok的全员大会上发过言。

I spoke at a all hands for TikTok.

我谈到了我们的某些策略，对自己做的事很有信心。

And I was talking about some of our strategy and I had conviction in what we were doing.

我说，没错，我每天要调整七到十次预算。

And I was like, yeah, I make budget changes seven to 10 times a day.

如果你去问TikTok团队的人，他们会说，别碰它，至少得等两周。

And if you talk to the TikTok group, they're like, you shouldn't touch it for two weeks.

这还在学习阶段，有各种讲究。

It's the learning phase and all these things.

可这些人全是从Facebook来的。

Well, all those people came from Facebook.

他们告诉我的那些规则，全是Facebook那一套。

And all the rules they were telling me were Facebook rules.

会议结束时，有个女士走过来对我说，你刚才最有把握的那些做法，恰恰跟我们给客户建议的完全相反。

And at the end of the meeting, this woman comes up to me and she was like, that was really interesting because the things you had most conviction in are the opposite of what we're telling our clients to do.

我很快就意识到，大家都把这套思维模式照搬过来，却没人重新思考：只要有效，就重复做。

I realized pretty quickly that everybody is taking this mental model over here and applying it and not trying to figure it out from scratch of like, if it works, do it again.

谁在乎那些规矩呢？

Who cares what?

他们告诉我，这招管用。

They tell me it worked.

那就再做一次。

Do it again.

独立思考，该怎么干就怎么干，这点特别关键。

That was an important piece of just thinking on our own on how this should go.

我第一次投放了广告。

I launched my first ad.

行，没问题。

Okay.

咱们能成。

We can do this.

很快就把用户吸引进了应用里。

Very quickly, was getting people into the app.

然后这就成了一种上瘾。

And then it just became a drug addiction.

说白了，就跟炒股一样。

I mean, it's like trading.

我心算不太好，但对交易员特别着迷。

I'm bad at mental math, but I'm also fascinated by traders.

后来在高盛的时候，我跟交易员打交道，简直太神奇了。

Then when I was at Goldman, I would interact with traders, it was just magic to me.

满屋子的屏幕，注意力高度集中，这到底是怎么做到的？

All the screens and the attention span, just like how does this happen?

但对我而言，就是这种感觉。

But it felt like that for me.

我好像在来回调动资金，推动业务增长，整个过程就像打游戏一样。

Like I'm moving money around, driving growth for the business, and it became a video game.

这就像是今天怎么才能赢下这个游戏？

It's like how do we beat the video game today?

我有个特别棒的创意搭档，叫Utzl。

And I had this amazing creative partner in Utzl.

我知道怎么把广告投放这份工作做得又脏又累。

I can figure out the ugly of how to be an ads manager person as my job.

这两样东西结合起来，让我能一直坚持下去，不断推进。

And those two things together unlocked that channel to just keep going and keep pushing on it.

我觉得在消费类业务里，做这件事的回报非常高，所以很多人试过，但真正成功的没几个。

I feel like the rewards for doing this in a consumer business are extremely high and so lots have probably tried but not lots have succeeded.

你觉得是什么让你开始赢得这个游戏的？

What do you think it was that let you start to win the video game?

是因为你懂得怎么剪视频吗？

Was it the knowledge of how to cut a video together?

是因为选题吗？

Was it topics?

不是。

No.

在创意方面，我们发现推荐页其实是在判断你的内容适合谁，然后把内容推给这些人。

The creative side, what we learned is the for you page is making a decision on your content of who your content is for, and then shoving it to that person.

所以创意层面的第一个挑战是：我们能不能做出能让这位教练的目标人群看到的内容？

So the first game on the creative side was, can we create content that gets to the right person for this coach?

这是一种CrossFit训练方式。

This is a CrossFit modality.

我们能不能用内容触达CrossFit爱好者？

Can we get to CrossFit people using content?

这完全是靠不断尝试。

And that was just iteration.

我们每次做点什么，就观察效果。

We would do something.

那你就会想，CrossFit爱好者真正关心的是什么？

And so you'd say like, what does a CrossFit person care about?

他们关心什么？

What do they care about?

他们的痛点和解决方案是什么？

What's their problem solution statement?

教练该怎么说才能吸引你？

What should a coach say to get you in?

我们明白了钩子的重要性。

We learned about hooks.

开头前三秒说什么，非常关键。

What you say in the beginning, the first three seconds, it matters.

一个好的钩子该是什么样子？

What should a hook look like?

我该说些什么？

What do I say?

这就像一块广告牌，必须在瞬间抓住你的注意力。

It gets a billboard that I need to get your attention very quickly.

我们之前有很多效果很差的内容。

And we had a lot of bad content that didn't work.

后来才慢慢出现了一些起效的。

And then we had stuff that started to work.

我们用白板把每一个细节都拆解分析。

And we have these whiteboards where we dissect every inch.

她穿的是什么衣服？

It's like, what is she wearing?

第一个词是什么？

What word was first?

健身房的场景是怎样的？

What was the setting of the gym?

动作是什么？

What was the movement?

我们当时说了什么？

What did we say?

所有这些洞察都来自于真正了解你的用户。

And all of the insights of that come from knowing your customer.

并不是我们突然就搞懂了TikTok，我们是靠实打实的努力。

It's not, hey, we magically figured out TikTok, we did.

我们的优势在于，对用户的需求了如指掌。

But our edge was we knew our customer inside and out.

我深入分析了这些App Store评论，连CrossFit用户在使用这款应用时嘴里常说的话都摸得一清二楚。

I dissected these App Store reviews so deeply that we knew the words that were coming out of the mouth for people in CrossFit coming into the app.

我们把这些当成武器，用来设计沟通方式和吸引人的内容，快速抓住用户，讲出打动他们的故事，让他们一进来就停不下来。

And we used that as our ammunition on how to speak to them and create compelling content, hooks that got to that person and told the story very fast that got them to keep going to fall into the app.

为了帮大家理清时间线，当初业务刚起步时，营收大概是多少？后来增长有多快？

And just to orient in the history of the business, how much revenue or whatever was there at the start of this s curve and how quickly did it accelerate?

年经常性收入四千五百万美元。

$45,000,000 of ARR.

我们一开始有点起色，但就像TikTok旅程的初期，起步时只有三百万，直到我们开始往系统里投钱，才真正爆发。

We were getting some success, but like the beginning of the TikTok journey, it started 3,000,000, but five when we started to put money into the machine.

从那以后，它就突然爆发了。

And it sort of exploded since there.

确实爆发了，但我们学到的关键一点是，你必须亲自掌控创意内容。

It exploded, but one of the things we learned that was critical to TikTok is you have to own the creative.

这在我们这个行业里可不常见。

And this was like not typical for brands in our space.

他们通常会找广告公司，让公司来制作内容。

They'd hire an agency, the agency would make creative.

但我们一直在摸索有机增长的玩法，发现迭代速度实在太快了。

We're But learning all this stuff on the organic and we're learning the iteration cycles are so fast.

你没法把事情丢给广告公司，指望他们能准确无误地交回来。

You can't just hand it off to an agency and hope that it comes back correctly.

所以我们开始全职投入打造创作者团队。

So we started investing in creators full time.

2023年，我们官网的招聘职位直接写的是‘全职TikTok创作者’。

We had JDs on the website in 2023, it said full time TikTok creator.

人们都问：这到底是个什么工作？

People were like, what the hell is this job?

但这跟十年前的社交媒体岗位没什么两样。

But it's no different than social media jobs ten years ago.

那时候还不算正经工作。

That's not a job.

可它确实是份工作。

Well, it is a job.

只是当时还没被当成工作罢了。

It just wasn't a job yet.

情况其实是一样的。

And it was the same dynamic.

所以我们完全掌控创意内容。

So complete control over the creative.

我们团队里有这些指导人员，帮我们积累了快速迭代的经验——不像那些外包公司，只能干等着，指望别人随手扔过来一个靠谱的内容。

We have these coaches on our team, gave us this edge on compounding learnings as many agency that was figuring it out across all these different creators that we controlled, that we weren't just waiting and hoping that somebody on the other side of the fence would throw us the right thing.

如果那时候算是前沿领域，那

If that was the frontier then, what

现在的前沿又在哪里呢？

is the frontier now?

我们目前考虑的是，短视频策略将始终是我们整体战略的核心组成部分。

What we're thinking about now is the short form video strategy will always be a core part of our strategy.

这一点不会改变。

That's not going away.

不过我觉得我们学到的

But I think what we learned

范围已经扩大了。

It's expanded.

到了这个阶段，我们也会入驻TikTok。

We'll be on TikTok at this stage.

没错。

Exactly.

不过我觉得去年我们学到的一点是，产品本身根本不是问题。

I think what we learned last year though is that we certainly don't have a product problem.

我们的产品非常独特。

We have a very special product.

用户非常喜欢我们，还希望我们能更深入地帮他们，但大多数人还是不知道Ladder是谁。

Our customers love us and they're asking us to go deeper with them, but most people still don't know who Ladder is.

我们在App Store的品类里一直稳居前三或前四，可品牌认知度却很低。

We're consistently top three or four in our category in the App Store and yet the awareness is very low.

我觉得这主要跟我们之前的短视频策略有关——我们跟创作者合作，用那些热门形式触达特定人群，但从来没突出Ladder这个品牌。

I think that's largely a function of the short form video strategy that we had that was speaking with creators in these winning formats to a specific persona that wasn't really leading with the Ladder brand.

现在我们很期待尝试明星合作、户外广告和电视投放。

Now we're excited to go and think about celebrity partnerships and out of home and TV.

这些广告活动我们其实已经在做了。

And we're already making these campaigns.

接下来就是要把这些内容放到其他渠道上去。

Now we're just gonna go and put them in these other channels.

所以明年的一个重点，就是讲一个更广的故事，这其实会进一步放大我们在短视频上已经做得不错的内容。

So that's certainly a big focus of next year is just telling a wider story that frankly is just gonna amplify what we're doing on short form video.

你们打算怎么像之前做产品和营销那样，用数据来验证这一点呢？

How are you gonna be empirical about that in the same way that you've been about product and marketing so far?

我们会做小规模的可控尝试。

It's small controlled bets.

规模可以大，但每次尝试的投入都控制得很谨慎。

Big on scale, but limited on bets that we're making.

比如找明星合作，我们得清楚知道他们的粉丝群体是谁。

So if it's a celebrity partner, we need to know exactly who that audience is.

这些人会不会认同我们的用户？

Is this someone that resonates with our user?

他们能不能帮我们传递出真正代表Ladder的核心信息？

Are they going to amplify the right message that represents Ladder?

到目前为止，我们花的每一分钱都必须看到明确的回报。

To date, we had no leeway to spend money that didn't turn into results.

那时候就是，账上有钱，就拿去拉用户，一遍又一遍地重复这个过程。

It was like, here's the money in the bank, turn it into users, keep doing it again.

但现在情况有点不一样了。

This is a little bit different.

我们很快意识到，其实大家对我们的认知还不够。

What we've realized very quickly is we do have an awareness problem.

有人听说过Ladder。

People have heard of Ladder.

我们的规模在扩大。

We're getting big.

我们在App Store的健身类应用里排名第一。

We're the number one grossing fitness app in the App Store.

我们在全美所有应用中排名前一百。

We're top 100 in The US of all US apps.

规模确实不小了。

It's big.

所以我们得集中资源，投一些特别精准的项目，直接打动我们的用户，充分发挥团队的创意优势。

So we need to go invest in really concentrated bets that speak very specifically to our user that leverages the creative horsepower in our team.

我们团队里有一些特别厉害的人，能做出世界上其他品牌根本做不到的内容。

We have really special people in our team that can create stuff that no one in the world can from a from a brand perspective.

这事儿没那么科学，我大致把它分成两条路，但我的长期目标是让短视频引擎变得高效得多。

So it's not as perfect of a science, and I kind of bucket it in two different paths, but my thesis over time is going to make the short form engine a lot more efficient.

如果用户根本不知道Ladder，那我们只能靠一条视频来吸引他们。

If people are not aware of Ladder, we have like one video we're trying to convert you.

他们就是通过这条视频第一次听说Ladder的。

They're learning about Ladder in that video.

如果你已经看过、信任了推荐它的人，或者对品牌有了一些印象，那这个人更可能迈出第一步。

If you've seen and build trust with someone who's endorsing it or you have consciousness and nugget, yeah, there's a higher likelihood that that person's gonna take the first step.

我觉得这两者结合起来，你问过去几年我们是怎么突然加速的？

So I think the two played together and you asked like what was the supercharge over the last couple of years?

我们和通用资本合作了，他们的客户价值基金彻底改变了我们的局面。

We did deal with General Catalyst that changed the game for us and their customer value fund.