Todd Combs - Investing, The Last Liberal Art - [Art of Investing, EP.1]

你先是为佛罗里达州的监管机构工作，后来去了进步保险。

You began working for the state regulator of Florida and then Progressive.

回头来看，你其实拥有非常宝贵的东西，能为世界上最好的投资者之一提供帮助。

You actually, again, all in hindsight, you had something very powerful to bring to one of the world's best investors.

尤其是在当前就业市场紧张、投资行业某些领域正在缩减用人需求的情况下，我觉得学生更应该意识到，还有很多其他路径值得探索，特别是去企业工作。

And I think it's just particularly as we're in a tight job market right now, and there are certain aspects of the investing world that are actually contracting from a labor standpoint, I think students should be encouraged to appreciate that there are lots of avenues here that you can explore, particularly across working for corporations.

这个观点非常到位。

That's a very, very good point.

我当时特别羡慕那些拿到埃森哲、安达信、普华永道这些公司offer的朋友。

I was very jealous of my friends who were getting hired by Accenture and Anderson Consulting and PwC, etcetera, etcetera.

他们没给我offer，我确实挺嫉妒的。

They didn't make me offers, and, I was jealous.

但后来我们聊天时才发现，我从那些看似不上台面的经历里，收获了远多于他们的实际经验。

Now as it ended up, as we'd sit around talking about our jobs or whatever, I got far, far more experience from wherein it doesn't look good on a resume or anything like that.

他们的简历看起来光鲜得多，工资也比我高那么一点。

Their jobs looked far better on the resume, and they made slightly more than I did.

但即使在不理想的环境下，你也能找到积累经验的方法。

But you can find ways to compound even in non ideal situations.

我学到了更多东西。

And I learned a lot more.

你怎么能把负面情况转变成正面机会呢？

Again, how do you turn a negative into a positive?

我后来去了美国通用金融公司，那家公司后来被AIG、保德信或者巴内特银行收购了，那是佛罗里达最大的银行。

I would go into American General Finance, which ended up being owned by AIG or Prudential or Barnett Banks, which was the biggest bank in Florida.

之后又被美国银行、雷蒙德詹姆斯这些公司收购了。

It got acquired by Bank of America, Raymond James, etcetera, etcetera.

而我呢，就在那儿工作。

Here I am.

你是监管者。

You're the regulator.

实际上，你才是上司。

You're the boss, actually.

所以我一个刚满21、22岁、啥都不懂的小子，居然能坐下来跟这些大公司的首席财务官聊上好几个小时，不停地问问题，问得对方都忍不住问：你到底想干嘛？

So I would be able to sit down with the CFO of these huge, huge companies as a 21, 22 year old, literally know nothing kid, and literally just fire away with questions for hours and hours and hours on end until this CFO is like, where is this going?

我只是想多学点东西。

I'm just learning.

而且你能接触到所有内部信息。

But you've got full privy.

我那些在八大事务所的朋友可没这机会。

And my friends at the big eight weren't able to do that.

他们都被困在非常狭窄的领域里。

They were in very, very siloed niches.

简历上看着是挺光鲜，但他们实际接触的，无非就是Rooms To Go这种公司的应付账款或者应收账款回收。

So it looks great on the resume, but here they were looking at, like, the accounts payable or the accounts receivable collections at rooms to go.

真的吗？

Really?

我那天一整天都跟着Raymond James的首席财务官。

I spent the day with the CFO, Raymond James.

他们就说：‘什么？’

They're like, what?

这不公平。

That's not fair.

在Progressive也是这样。

And same thing at Progressive.

我本来根本没想过要进保险公司，结果最后却走上了数据科学这条路。

I was not dreaming of working in an insurance company or anything like that, and then it ends up being this data science field.

我负责一个小州，后来我们为整个行业推出了基于遥测技术的信用服务。

And I had one small little state, and we ended up rolling out credit for the industry, telematics.

我的名字上了专利。

I have my name on patents.

一件事接着一件事，就这么顺理成章地发展下去了。

So one thing just kind of leads to another leads to another.

我觉得有些人总想倒推人生轨迹，而像麦肯锡、高盛这样的公司，也一直想让你相信这套逻辑。

I think people try to back solve sometimes, and obviously, the McKenzie's and the Goldmans of the world want you to perpetuate those thoughts.

但很多时候，这就像个不太合适的例子，你可以想想阿拉巴马大学橄榄球队。

But often, it's like being it's a bad example here, but you could use Alabama football.

我得说明白，我不是阿拉巴马橄榄球队的粉丝。

I am not an Alabama football fan to be clear.

他们的目标当然是招五个五星级的进攻锋线球员，轮着上，但这并不一定真的适合他们。

But, of course, their goal is to get five five star offensive linemen five deep, but that doesn't mean that's the right thing for them.

这其实是个GP-LP的问题，我管这叫一般合伙人和有限合伙人的矛盾。

It's a GPLP problem, as I call it, the general partner or limited partner.

对一般合伙人有利的，有时候对有限合伙人并不见得有利。

What's good for the GP is sometimes not good for the LP.

这当然就是阿拉巴马想做的。

Of course, that's what Alabama wants.

每个橄榄球队都这么想。

That's what every football team wants.

但这不意味着对第五替补的进攻锋线球员就是好事。

It doesn't mean it's good for the fifth string offensive lineman.

你可能更适合去别的地方从头开始，没必要非得挤进前五名之类的。

You might be far better off going to somewhere else you can start, and you don't have to be five deep and etcetera, etcetera.

所以这里也存在权衡。

So there's trade offs there too.

而且我总觉得，很多人只是说：‘我想选这个，因为看着体面。’

And I think too oftentimes people just say, oh, I want that because it's gonna look good.

这又是个短期和长期的问题。

And it's a short term, long term thing again.

对吧？

Right?

简历上好看的东西是短期的，但你最终到底收获了什么实际经验？有多实在？

What looks good on the resume is a short term thing, but what actual experience are you getting at the end of the day and how tangible is it?

因为这才是关键。

Because that's what matters.

明白了。

Okay.

咱们花几分钟聊聊蓝岭和老虎基金吧，以前我们在上一份工作时，花了很多时间写案例研究，对象是我们称之为‘黑马’的投资者——那些至少十五年持续实现高回报的人。保罗就写过一篇关于老虎基金的案例。

Let's geek out for a few minutes on Blue Ridge and Tiger because we spent a lot of time collectively back in our prior jobs writing these case studies on what we called horses, investors who had compounded at high rates for at least fifteen years and Paul authored a case on Tiger.

我们跟朱利安、他家人，还有所有‘小虎’们都很熟。

We spent a lot of time with Julian, with members of Julian's family, with all the Cubs.

我还写过一篇关于史蒂夫·曼德尔和 Lone Pine 的案例。

I wrote a case on Steve Mandel and Lone Pine.

我刚着手写蓝岭的案例，正和约翰一起做，结果我们的小研发项目就突然停了。

I was just starting a case on Blue Ridge working with John on that just as our little r and d project was shut down.

但这可是投资界一段难得的历史切片。

But this is an extraordinary snapshot of history into the investing world.

就像我之前说的，如今老虎基金更出名的是它培养出的那些‘小虎’，以及‘小虎’们再带出来的人才，现在可能都到第三代、第四代了。

And as I said before, Tiger today is known more for the Cubs that it produced and the Cubs that the Cubs produced and there's probably like a third or fourth generation of that.

我们准备这次对话时，也找了一些来自蓝岭的朋友聊了聊。

And we spent some time in preparation talking with some of our friends out of Blue Ridge.

彼得，当然还有大卫·格林斯潘，是的。

Pete, of course, David Greenspan Yeah.

罗伯托·马格农，你实习的时候他大概刚起步。

And Roberto Magnone, who probably was just setting a bridger around when you interned.

他是蓝岭的第一位员工。

I think he the first Blue Ridge guy.

是的。

Yeah.

他是约翰招的第一人，皮特是第二个，而他在我加入之前一年就独立出去了。

He was the first hire of John's, and Pete was the second, and he spun out, like, a year before I started working with them.

他们都是很棒的人。

They're all great guys.

太了不起了。

Amazing.

真是了不起。

Amazing.

都是了不起的人。

Amazing guys.

是的。

Yeah.

其中好几位，比如克里斯·汉森，都是瓦利安特资本的，他们后来都成了我们的导师，深深影响了我们作为投资人的思维方式。

A number of them Chris Hansen is another one of Valiant Capital that have all become mentors of ours and have shaped us as investors.

不过，我们还是回头说说老虎基金吧。

So, but let's go back to Tiger.

好的，老虎基金是1980年成立的。

Okay, Tiger was founded in 1980.

在那之前，朱利安在海军服役了很长时间。我想他刚退役时，长期在基德·皮博迪这家经纪公司工作。

Prior to that, Julian served in the Navy for a long time and I think when he first transitioned out of the Navy, he worked for Kidder Peabody, the brokerage services for a very long time.

这里面还有很多有意思的小故事，again，说说他的经历跨度。

And there's a lot of interesting tidbits, again, talk about range.

在创办老虎基金之前、离开基德·皮博迪之后，朱利安带着全家去了新西兰待了一两年，那段时间他还写了一本小说。

Before starting Tiger, but after leaving Kidder Peabody, Julian moved his family to New Zealand for a year or two and actually wrote a novel during that time.

很明显，他是个对各种领域都充满兴趣、涉猎广泛的人。

Clearly, individual who was interested in a variety of subjects and a variety of disciplines.

另一个有趣的线索，随着我们更深入地讲伯克希尔的故事，可以提一下：Tiger的模式，如果简化来说，就是寻找那些管理优秀、商业模式出色、估值合理的企业做多，同时做空相反的标的。

Another fascinating thread that maybe we can pull on as we get a little bit more into the Berkshire story is the Tiger model is sort of, if we were gonna simplify it, is known to have looked for these investments to buy to go long on that were a quality management, great business models, good valuations and then sort of short the opposite.

这当然有点过于简化了。

That's an oversimplification.

但我们在研究Julian时发现一件有意思的事——当然，他几年前已经去世了，愿他安息。

But one of the things that was interesting to us in our research with Julian is when we asked Julian, and God rest his soul, he passed away a number of years ago.

当我们问Julian他的投资理念是在哪里成型的，他其实和沃伦一样，最初是个‘雪茄烟头’型投资者。

But when we asked Julian where his investment philosophy took shape, he actually, like Warren, started as a cigar butt investor.

也许这和当时的时代背景有关，但让我觉得有意思的是，那些长期坚持下来的投资者，往往都会自然地从追求低价转向更看重企业质量，更倾向于选择那些能长久生存的公司。

And maybe some of that was a product of the times, but I do find it interesting that time and time again, it seems like there is this natural arc for the investor who sticks with it enough toward quality and toward situations, companies that are more likely to endure.

他还提到另一点：他的投资理念在这段时间里发生了巨大转变，但很大程度上是受他的门徒们影响，比如Steve Mandel、John Griffin这些他吸引来的优秀人才。

And he said another thing which was that his investment philosophy evolved immensely over that time, but it was probably mostly shaped by his mentees, by the talent that he attracted like Steve Mandel, like John Griffin.

John曾长期担任Tiger Management的总裁，之后才创办了Blue Ridge。

And so John served for a long time as the president of Tiger Management before starting Blue Ridge.

而John在创办Blue Ridge时，延续了一个关键理念：不断吸引顶尖人才，并以各种方式赋予他们充分的自主权。

And, certainly, one of the key elements that John carried forward in Blue Ridge was this sort of insatiable desire to draw talent to the organization and then to empower that talent in a variety of ways.

你也能看到，他们一直都有一定的专业分工，就像你提到的，皮特专攻金融，克里斯也是。

And you see that where there was always some level of of specialization, like you said, with Pete in financials and Chris.

我第一次去印度，差不多二十年前了，是克里斯·汉森陪着去的，因为他和福特蓝岭团队在印度投资上早就建立了明显优势，但这些人其实都在不断进化，同时关注多个领域。

My very first trip to India, gosh, almost twenty years ago was chaperoned by Chris Hansen because he and Ford Blue Ridge had cultivated a real edge in investing in India, and yet these people were all evolving and focused on numerous fronts.

顺便说一下，我想花点时间聊聊他们的业绩记录，因为我们总在谈复利的力量。

And by the way, I just wanna talk for a second about the track record because we talk about the power of compounding.

老虎基金持续了二十年，很多人讨论它为什么偏偏在2000年3月纳斯达克泡沫破裂的那个月关闭。

For twenty years, Tiger was around, and there's a lot of talk about how and why Tiger shut down literally the same month that the Nasdaq bubble burst in March 2000.

但整整二十年，他们的年化回报率高达30%，听起来很惊人，但你算一算，资本的累计倍数绝对超过两百倍。

But for twenty years, they compounded at 30%, which obviously sounds exciting, but if you do the math on that, I think the rough math on the multiple on capital is well over 200 x.

是的。

Yeah.

这是一段极其非凡的业绩记录，非常值得深入研究。

So this is an extraordinary extraordinary track record that is very much worthy to be studied.

当然，蓝岭基金后来也延续了差不多二十年的类似辉煌历程。

Of course, Blue Ridge went on to, I think, have almost another similar in duration twenty year legacy.

我们跟大卫和皮特聊起你来授课的事时，他们俩都问了同一个问题。

When we spoke with David and Pete about you coming in and teaching, they both had a similar question.

这个问题当然跟伯克希尔有关——你不太关注做空，但你确实精于此道，而且做得相当出色。

It was really directed at, of course, at Berkshire, you're not very focused on short selling, but you did hone that craft and you were quite good at it.

我想知道，回过头来看你现在的投资方式，甚至你作为高管的行事风格，当年做空的经历对你今天的投资理念产生了怎样的影响？

And just curious how, as you look back on the way that you invest today and the way that maybe even you operate yourself as an executive, what that tradition of short selling and that experience, how that shaped you as an investor today?

这其实是沃伦和我少数意见不一致的地方之一。

It's one of the few things Warren and I disagree on.

我们俩在99%甚至99.9%的事情上都看法一致。

I think we probably agree on 99 or 99.9%.

他和查理都曾经历过非常糟糕的做空经历。

He and Charlie both had such a miserable experience short selling.

说起来，这倒是个挺有意思的故事。

In fact, this is a great story.

我第一次去他办公室见沃伦时，他桌上摆着奥巴马颁给他的总统自由勋章证书，旁边是他参加戴尔·卡耐基课程的结业证书。

First time I met Warren in his office, got a certificate from Obama with the Medal of Honor, and he's got his certificate from Dale Carnegie class.

但他还有一张西联汇款的证书，我就盯着这些看。

But then he's got this Western Union certificate, and I'm looking at these.

有些一眼就能看出来。

Some of them are obvious.

这个是干嘛的？

What is this?

他笑着回答：哦，那是我放弃做空的时候。

And he laughs and he says, oh, that's when I quit short selling.

他和查理在1956年左右就发现，西联汇款已经彻底资不抵债了。

And he and Charlie had figured out in 1956 or whatever it was that Western Union was completely and absolutely insolvent.

他们的养老金缺口比市值还大，企业价值等等全都不够填。

That basically, the pension hole was greater than the market cap, their enterprise value, etcetera, etcetera.

于是他们做空这只股票，结果股价反而涨了。

So they short it and the stock goes up.

后来他们还写了一份报告，发给了很多朋友。

And so then they actually do a report and send it out to friends.

股价还在涨。

Stock goes up.

他们把报告发给了更多人。

They send it out broader.

股价继续涨，就这样一直下去。

Stock goes up, etcetera, etcetera.

从那时到现在，股价可能涨了一千倍，或者至少一百倍吧。

And from even where it is from then to today, it's probably been a thousand bagger, 100 bagger or something like that.

所以他只是说，我不明白，为什么那次不是唯一一次失败的做空。

So he's just like, I don't understand that that was not the only unsuccessful short.

那次才是压垮他的最后一根稻草。

That was the final straw.

所以这是一种看法。

So that's one take on it.

至于你的问题，我的看法是，对我而言，这绝对是、毫无疑问地塑造了我今天投资理念的核心。

My take on it to your question is I think that it's absolutely, for me, again, everybody's different, absolutely positively fundamental to my being and how I think about investing today.

虽然伯克希尔从不做空，但这并不妨碍我心想：这东西明显有问题啊。

So even though we don't short at Berkshire, it doesn't keep me from thinking about, oh, this thing is a sure you're looking at a name.

我每年要看过二百多起伯克希尔的收购案。

I look at over 200 acquisitions a year that come into Berkshire.

其中很多，我跟投行的人说的时候，一半是开玩笑，一半是真觉得该做空。

A lot of them, I would say, I'll tell bankers half the time half flippantly just to give it back to them.

我肯定做空它。

I'd short that.

所以当我评估一家公司时，说‘我觉得它被高估了’完全没问题。大多数情况下，股价基本是合理的。

So and when I look at names, there's absolutely nothing wrong with saying, if you think it's worth more, you think it's most of the time, most things are roughly approximately fairly valued.

至于到底有多少被高估？我说不准，可能市场好的时候占两成吧。

I don't know if it's 10, depends on the market, 20% of the time.

一看见这种，我就想：这玩意儿该做空。

You're like, oh, I'd short that.

对我来说，这种思维模式，就是我跟沃伦说过的核心观点。

And having that to me, that is what I told Warren.

我们之前聊过这个话题。

So we've talked about this before.

你不可能只看资产负债表的一半。

You don't look at half of the balance sheet.

我在摩根大通的董事会任职，所以你可以去看看他们的资产负债表。

I'm on the board of JPMorgan, and so you could look at that balance sheet.

如果你只看资产端，那规模是两万五千亿美元。

And if you're only looking at the asset side, it's 2 and a half trillion dollars.

然后你会说，天哪。

And you say, oh my god.

这太棒了。

This is amazing.

那可是两万五千亿美元的资产，等等。

It's 2 and a half trillion dollars of assets, etcetera.

如果你只看负债端，也是一样的道理。

It's same thing if you just look at the liability side.

负债和权益加起来也是两万五千亿美元。

There's two and a half trillion of liabilities and equity.

你肯定会说，天哪。

And you'd say, oh my god.

这简直是一场灾难。

This thing's a catastrophe.

你怎么可能敢持有这种东西呢，等等？

How could you possibly own this, etcetera?

你得把两边都看清楚。

Well, you have to look at both.

这就是我对做空的看法。

And that's how I view short selling.

在我看来，做空和做多其实没什么区别，真正知道自己在干什么的人少之又少。

Now it's no different than long investing, in my humble opinion, is very, very, very few people know what they're doing.

你连全科医生都不找，就敢动脑外科手术？

You don't have a primary care physician, go do brain surgery.

所以这非常困难。

So it's very hard.

这一点毫无疑问。

There's no question about that.

毫无疑问，在做多方面积累资本确实要容易一些。

There's no question that it's quote unquote easier to compound your capital on the long side.

你只要跟着标普指数走，就能做得很好，根本不用分析个股，也不用成为专家。

You can go by the S and P index and do perfectly fine and never have to analyze a stock or become an expert.

但在做空方面却没有类似的捷径，因为那真的难太多了。

And there is no equivalent on the short side because it is that much harder.

我一直觉得，做空时你得有大约85%的正确率才能赚钱。

I always felt you had to be about 85% correct on the short side to make money.

我觉得这个说法挺公允的。

And I think that's pretty fair.

你必须非常非常出色才行，但如果你不变得狭隘、固执，不被简单的叙事牵着走，这些要求反而会让你在做多时受益良多——无论是发现能持续增长的公司，还是识别弱点和护城河。

You have to be damn, damn good, but that helps you If you don't become myopic or dogmatic or solve for the lazy narrative or any of that stuff, it very, very much helps you on the long side, both to identify compounders, to identify weaknesses and moats.

你找空头机会时关注的那些东西——资产负债表出问题、护城河崩塌、CEO把所有短期利益都提前兑现了——这些其实也该是你在做多时留意的。

Because the same thing you're looking for in a short, a broken balance sheet, a collapsing moat, a CEO who's pulled forward all the benefits to the short term, all of those things you should be looking for on the long side too.

但你不是把它当空头机会来看。

But you're not looking for it as a short.

你只是出于理性诚实去分析，结果会怎样，就让它怎样。

You're just looking at it for intellectual honesty, and then wherever the answer falls out is where the answer falls out.

我就是这么想的。

That's how I think about it.

没有更多，也没有更少。

And it's no more or less.

沃伦也不会反对这个观点。

Warren wouldn't disagree with that.

他只会说，这不是他的专长，而这也正是他的优势之一——他能坦然承认这不是我的核心能力。

He'd just say that's not his expertise, which is also one of his superpowers is to say that's not my core competency.

我当时就想，可你没意识到，你其实一直在这么做。

I was like, yeah, but you don't realize you are doing that.

因为我们一谈到公司或者收购之类的事，就会说，这价值根本没那么高。

Because when we talk about companies or acquisitions or whatever, we'll say, well, it's not worth anywhere close to that.

区别在于，他会说，我未必会去做空它。

The difference is he would say, I wouldn't necessarily take action to short that.

而我会说，那你就可以找一些触发事件了。

And I would say, well, then you could look for precipitating events.

但他根本不在乎这些，这也没关系。

He just doesn't care about that, which is fine.

我经常听到一些优秀的空头投资者说，做空这个工作天然会让人保持思维的开放性。

One of the things that I continue to hear from great short sellers is how it naturally keeps you intellectually flexible.

没错。

Absolutely.

很多时候，你刚开始分析一家公司时，本来觉得该做空，或者该买入，结果最后反而得出完全相反的结论。

Often, you go into evaluating a company and you initially are leaning toward thinking it's a short or thinking it's a long, and actually, you come out on the other side.

但正是因为你愿意同时从正反两面去看，才让你始终对任何发现都保持开放心态。

But just that you have that aperture to look at both tends to generate this continual openness to whatever you find.

另一个让空头处于劣势的因素是，你的盈利空间是有限的。

One other dynamic that sacks the deck against short sellers is that your upside's capped.

股票最多只能跌到零。

The stock can only go to zero.

不过我还记得，当年我们研究隆派恩这家公司时，纳斯达克泡沫破裂，像隆派恩和蓝岭这样的机构做空了那些严重高估的科技股，还不断加仓做空。

Although I do remember when we did the case on Lone Pine, there was a couple of years as the Nasdaq burst at literally the Lone Pines of the world and the Blue Ridge of the world had short these way overpriced tech stocks, and they were reinvesting into the short and doubling down.

他们的投资回报率一度超过了百分之百。

Their ROIC was actually above a 100% for a

持续了好几年。

few years.

那真是一段非凡的时期。

It was just an extraordinary time.

不过我想问问，你第一次接触到巴菲特和芒格的投资理念，是什么时候？

But curious on that point, do you happen to recall the first time that you came into contact with Buffett or Munger and their teachings?

当然记得。

Oh, sure.

嗯，那应该是……让我想想。

Well, it would have been let's see.

我1993年从佛罗里达州立大学毕业。

I graduated Florida State in '93.

那会儿大概是我大学最后几门金融课之一，那时候伯克希尔还没什么名气。

It would have been I think it was probably one of my last finance courses at Florida State, and Berkshire was not well known at that point.

授课老师开的是价值投资课，给我们看了沃伦和伯克希尔的投资业绩。

The professor, it was a value investing type course, and they showed Warren's track record, Berkshire's track record.

还让我们读了大概过去五年左右的致股东信。

And then they had us read a couple, it was probably the last five years of letters or something like that.

我清楚记得，可口可乐这些名字当时就特别突出。

And I remember distinctly, obviously, Coca Cola and etcetera, those names.

说实话，之前我根本没接触过这些内容。

So I was not familiar with it at all up until that point, to be completely honest.

那时候我才22岁。

I was, what, 22 at that point.

而真正的重点并不在于怎么去复制他的做法。

And then really the lesson, it wasn't so focused on how to replicate that.

而是在于复利的魔力，那个被称为世界第八奇迹的东西。

It was really about the magic of compounding, that eighth wonder of the world and all of that.

那是我第一次真正记住这些。

So that's the first time I remember.

那一年，我买下的前两只股票也是那时候。

And then my first two stocks that I ever bought were that year as well.

一只叫百事可乐，另一只是普林姆克里克林业。

That was Pepsi and Plum Creek Timber.

我当时还想着，这普林姆克里克林业，说不定哪天真会变成伯克希尔那样的公司。

And I do remember thinking, oh, this Plum Creek Timber would be a name that that Berkshire company would probably be.

我记得自己当时就想，行吧。

I remember like, alright.

就那么一点念头。

Just a little seed.

当然，沃伦投资的是可口可乐，而我买的是百事。

Of course, Warren had Coke, and this was Pepsi.

那时候百事的股息比可口可乐还高。

Pepsi had a higher dividend than Coke at the time.

这点我也记得清清楚楚。

I remember that too.

所以我早就开始拿两者做比较了。

So I remember already drawing a compare and contrast.

那就是1993年的事。

So '93.

托德，我记得沃伦说过，大概是在2021年伯克希尔的信里，他说每个大学生找工作时，都应该专注在自己最感兴趣的方向，只考虑那些

Todd, I recall Warren saying, and I think it was in the 2021 Berkshire letter, that every college student should focus their career search on their area of greatest interest and aim only

能让你和优秀的人共事，同时把存钱当作动力的公司。

to work with high quality people while putting money aside as a motivating factor.

对于年轻人的职业发展，你还有什么建议吗？

What other advice would you have for young people in their careers?

这真是个好问题。

Well, it's a great question.

再说一遍，没有固定公式。

Again, there's no formula.

我只能回想起自己的经历。

I just go back to my experiences.

我当时就想，我干嘛要当监管人员呢？

I thought, what the hell am I doing working as a regulator?

我觉得我当初该去个更好的大学。

I thought I should have gone to a better undergrad.

那时候，佛罗里达的银行危机来得特别晚。

At the time, this banking crisis had rolled through Florida late.

真可以说是经济低迷了。

So talk about a bad economy.

1989年，根本没人招人。

In '89, nobody was hiring.

不好意思。

Sorry.

到93年了。

'93.

89年我还在上高中。

'89 was my high school.

但93年的时候，储蓄贷款危机通常说是89到92年，不过佛罗里达那边来得晚。

But '93, and it was the S and L crisis is generally listed as '89 to '92, but Florida got it late.

不过就像我前面说的，不管是保险还是别的行业都一样。

But same thing I mentioned earlier with insurance or whatever.

只要你有求知欲，又肯努力，机会多得是。

So you find if you're intellectually curious and you're hardworking, you will find plenty and plenty and plenty of opportunities.

但我觉得很多人犯的错是倒着推：我想找工作，又不想提麦肯锡。

But I think the mistake that people make is trying to back solve for it and say, oh, I want to work, and I don't wanna pick on McKinsey.

可你其实是因为想进麦肯锡——觉得能赚大钱，简历上也好看，才想去的。

But, you know, I wanna work at McKinsey because I'll make a lot of money, and I'll look great on a resume, etcetera.

这完全违背了沃伦那句话的本意。

That's the antithesis of what Warren means with that quote.

我总是跟孩子们说，如果你想去巴黎当画家，想走极端——沃伦最让我欣赏的地方，就是他总爱拿极端情况来说事。

I always told our kids, if you wanna be a painter in Paris, if you want to try and take the extreme and Warren, this is my favorite part of his letters where he always takes the extreme.

如果大家都觉得这话说得通，那把它推到极端，还成立吗？

If people think this is true, if then you take it to the extreme, is it still true?

很多时候一推到极端就站不住脚了，这就说明原来的想法根本不对。

And oftentimes it falls apart, which means this actually isn't true.

所以我们一直这样教孩子。

So that's the way we always tell our kids.

不管你人生想做什么，别冲着钱去，别冲着名声或别人的吹捧去。

Literally, whatever you wanna do in life, you don't solve for money, you don't solve for prestige or adulation or anything like that.

这需要时间、成熟和成长，而且也会随时间变化，因为人总会变。

And that takes time and maturity and growth and also changes over time too because we all evolve.

没有什么是一成不变的。

Nothing is static.

所以，再反过来想，人们往往用一种静止的眼光看问题。

So then, again, if you invert the concept, I think people tend to think very statically.

我觉得我就是这样的人，我的目标就是这个。

Oh, I'm this, and this is what I'm gonna solve for.

但其实有很多研究都表明了这一点。

But then there's a lot of research, obviously.

每个人，不管怎样，骨子里都低估了自己未来生活会有多大的变化。

Every single person, it's probably innate in us somewhere in our DNA, massively underestimates how much their life is going to change going forward.

无论你处在人生的哪个阶段，都是如此。

Every single person at every age of your life.

我现在是这样，你到了四十岁、五十岁、六十岁、七十岁，也还是这样。

I would be doing it now, and you do it when you're 40, 50, 60, 70.

这并不会随着年龄变好一点。

It doesn't get better or anything.

你总觉得自己已经看清楚了过去的改变，也意识到自己和以前不一样了，但现在的我，已经定型了。

You constantly think, oh, I recognize that there's been a lot of change, and I realize that I'm different than I was, but now I'm set.

人们没意识到，生活就像湿水泥一样，一直在变化。

People don't realize that it's constantly wet cement.

他们以为水泥已经干了，其实并没有。

They think that the cement is dried, and it doesn't.

这个想法其实让人很放松。

And that's a freeing concept.

尼尔·德葛拉司·泰森谈过宇宙。

Neil deGrasse Tyson talks about the universe.

有些人一想到宇宙的浩瀚，就觉得特别压抑。

There's some people who think about the enormity of the universe, and they find it depressing.

但也有人一想到宇宙的浩瀚，反而觉得无比自由、开朗、充满希望。

There's And other people who think about the enormity of the universe, and it's very freeing and liberating and optimistic.

我属于后一种人。

I tend to be in that latter category.

沃伦肯定也是。

Certainly, Warren is.

所以我也说不准。

So I don't know.

我觉得对你来说没什么捷径。

I think there's no magic for you.

你只需要保持开放的心态。

You just have to be open.

这又回到了里克的说法。

It goes back to Rick's comment.

你得对经历和好奇心保持开放，因为你真的可能什么都不知道。

You have to be open to experiences and curiosity because you literally may not know.

我记得以前带人做这个的时候，他们其实挺惊讶的。

I remember taking people would find this actually surprising probably.

我记得在哥伦比亚大学的时候，我说过我想当投资人，当时做了个性格测试，结果是INTJ，我想这最适合哪种职业呢？因为我以为会是公共关系之类的。

I remember sitting at Columbia where I said earlier that I knew I wanted to be an investor, taking one of these personality tests, and I'm an INTJ, what does that fit best with in terms of prevent like, because I thought, well, public.

我那时候一直在和蓝岭团队合作。

I'd been working with the Blue Ridge guys.

也许我该考虑一下私募股权。

Maybe I should think about private equity.

也许我该想想风险投资。

Maybe I should think about venture.

所以经历这些的时候，你得保持开放，接受自己可能错了，事情会变——因为它们确实会变。

So going through all this stuff, you have to remain open to the fact that you can be wrong, the fact that things can change because they do.

我们聊过LPGP的运作、做空，还有保持乐观、敢于冒险。

We talked about LPGP dynamics, short selling, being willing to be optimistic and take a risk.

筹建城堡点公司，下一阶段是什么感觉？

What was it like building Castle Point, the next phase?

也许吧。

That might have been.

这和本科时光很不一样，方方面面都不同，某种程度上甚至可以说很煎熬。

It's very different than the beauty of undergrad in a lot of different ways because it was hell in some ways too.

但自己亲手把蛋糕做出来，这种感觉你们现在正在体会。

But there's something about baking your own cake, and you guys are living it now.

那种肾上腺素飙升的感觉，那种纯粹的快乐，还有你可能会犯错——但那些错都是你自己犯的。

The adrenaline and the sheer joy and the fact that you may absolutely make mistakes, but they're your mistakes.

一想到Castle Point，我就想起史蒂夫·弗里德曼，他以前管高盛，我们见面时的事，你想听的话我可以说说，不过重点是它到底是怎么成立的。

When I think of Castle Point, and there's a great story with Steve Friedman who used to run Goldman Sachs and when we met, and we can get into that if you want, but how it actually came to be.

但每当我回想起来，也许正是这种纯粹性，我一直努力保持——最后我身边只有五个分析师。

But when I think of it, and this is the purity maybe that I try and maintain, I ended up with five analysts.

当时我们的管理规模超过十亿美元，那在当时算得上是大基金了，现在看简直不值一提。

We're over half 1,000,000,000, which was a big fund back then, and now it's peanuts.

但我那时只有五个分析师、一个CFO，还有

But I had five analysts, a CFO, and

一个行政助理。

an admin.

这种事也总发生在我身上，比如资产负债表突然就失衡了。

That happens to me exactly, say, to gross balance sheet.

所以她

So she

好的。

alright.

但这可不是小数目。

Well, it's not peanuts.

差不多是天文数字了。

It's roughly nuts.

可在我看来，这些都不算什么。

But it's all peanuts.

我知道。

See I know.

没错。

That's right.

完全正确。

That's exactly right.

说到这个，我第一时间想到的就是纯粹性——刚起步的前六个月，就我一个人。

The purity of it, my favorite where my mind immediately goes when anyone mentions it, it's the first six months, it was just me.

我打印了24份证券化文件，每一份都有几百页厚。

And I printed off 24 securitization documents that are hundreds and hundreds of pages long.

当时Countrywide和Washington Mutual都拥有Long Beach抵押贷款，我办公室里到处都是这些材料。

So Countrywide and Washington Mutual had Long Beach mortgage, and I literally had them all over my office.

我常常熬到深夜，一边翻看这些文件，一边对照我在纽约大学学过的证券化课程和Excel表格，琢磨这些证券化产品中哪一层会最先崩盘。

And I would sit there until late hours of the night going through these things back to my NYU securitization course and an Excel spreadsheet figuring out which tranche of these securitizations was going to get blown through.

这层被称为临界层。

And it's called the fulcrum class.

你要找到这个临界点，然后给它设定一个置信区间——至少我是这么做的，来判断哪一层最可能是临界层。

So you want to find the fulcrum, and then you assign a confidence interval, or I did, to which I thought would be the fulcrum class for these securitizations.

这种做法挺怪的。

And that's a weird duck.

真有人愿意干这种事，那这个人也太特别了。

That's a weird individual that wants to go do something like that.

一提到这个，我脑子里立刻就想到这些。

So that's where my mind immediately goes.

并不是我们接触到的第一个大投资者，虽然他非常出色。

It wasn't to the first big investor that we got who was phenomenal, who was great.

那确实也让人兴奋。

That was exciting too.

但那些都只是结果，在我看来，都是那个过程带来的副产品。

But those were just consequences that in my mind felt were outcomes of that process.

所以我一直，一直，一直最爱的是那个过程。

So I always, always, always loved the process.

我的思绪总会回到那里。

That's where my mind goes.

不是那个六千万的投资人。

It wasn't the first big investor, which was 60,000,000.

也不是那个让我们突破十亿大关的投资人。

It wasn't the one that got us over half 1,000,000,000.

我们当时接触过很多欧洲的基金母基金。

We had all these European fund of funds.

我们本可以押上一千亿、一千五百亿。

We could have bet a billion, billion and a half.

并不是因为那些追捧和赞美。

It wasn't all of that adulation.

也不是我招进来的第一个员工。

It wasn't the first hire that I made.

而是我在审阅证券化文件时，不仅找到了核心层级，还突然发现——天哪。

It was going through the securitization documents and finding not only the fulcrum class, but then finding, oh my god.

这些金融担保方正在为这些产品提供担保。

These financial guarantors are wrapping this stuff.

我第一次发现，AIG竟然在通过后门买入这些资产，做负基差交易。

And first time I found AIG was buying this stuff in the back door and doing negative basis trades.

这就像一个谜题。

So it's the puzzle.

就是解开这个谜题的过程。

It's figuring out the puzzle.

一想到城堡点，我就兴奋得不得了。

That's where I get giddy thinking about Castle Point.

我后来想明白了，但那时候没几个人看出来。

And I figured it out, and not a lot of people had at that point.

其实有个挺有意思的故事，以前可能只有十个人知道，现在嘛，人多了。

Fun story, actually, that maybe 10 people know, so now a lot more.

关于《大空头》，我和作者迈克尔·刘易斯挺熟的。

So the big short, I'm friendly with Michael Lewis, the author.

我刚到伯克利的时候，我们还一起吃过饭之类的。

We have dinner when I got to Berkeley and stuff.

他真的是我这辈子见过的最聪明的五个人之一。

He's literally one of the five smartest people I've ever met in my life.

他聪明得简直让人难以置信。

He is unbelievably brilliant.

我们后来打过一个电话。

So there was a call that we had.

当时在电话里的有塞思·克拉曼，还有我们一共二十二个人，都是在做空。那时候是2007年，贝尔斯登内部一个证券化团队快撑不住了，打算坑我们。

We being there was Seth Klarman, and there were 22 of us on the call when there was a securitization group, a hedge fund within Bear Stearns that was going under in o seven, and they were gonna screw us.

当时就是塞思加上另外二十一个人。

And we were Seth and 21 others.

我们站在了这场博弈的对立面，做空他们。

We were on the other side of this thing being short.

有一天，塞思突然给我打了电话，那时候我们其实并不算很熟。

So Seth called me one day, and we didn't know each other super well at the time.

他跟我说：我听说你掺和进这事了。

And he says, I hear you're in this.

我当时还懵了：你说的是哪件事？

I was like, what are we talking about?

总之，简而言之，我们主动组织了一次与证交会的通话，明确表示：贝尔斯登这么做完全是违法的。

Anyway, long story short, we had a call with the SEC that we organized to say this is absolutely illegal what Bear Stearns is trying to do.

如果你们放任不管，我们不惜打到最高法院也要把这事掀到底。

And if you allow this, we're gonna take it all the way to the Supreme Court if we have to.

这树立了一个非常糟糕的先例。

This is extremely bad precedent.

这个故事的结局是，迈克尔·刘易斯不知怎么搞到了那份名单。

The punchline of the story is that Michael Lewis got that list somehow.

我不清楚他是怎么弄到的。

I don't know how.

我也没问他。

I didn't ask him.

我也不想弄清楚。

I don't wanna know.

但他某天突然给我打了个电话。

But he calls me one day randomly.

我以前从没跟迈克尔说过话，而我的助理叫迈克尔·刘易斯。

I had never spoken to Michael, and my assistant, Michael Lewis.

所以，我们就聊了起来。

So, anyway, we talk.

他说，我们正在通话中，然后就聊了起来。

And he says, were on this call and da da da da da.

我就问，你到底想说什么？

I said, where is this going?

他回答，我正在写一本书。

He said, I'm writing a book.

就是那本《大空头》。

This is the big short.

他还说，这本书讲的就是这些事。

And he says, so I'm writing this book about this stuff.

于是我们聊了大概四十五分钟，全是这些内容。

And so we talked for about probably forty five minutes about all this stuff.

我平时从不跟记者这么聊。

I didn't talk to reporters or anything like this.

这所有的话都是私下说的，不对外。

This is all off the record.

于是我们说到另一个人。

So we get to the other guy.

他说，好的。

He says, okay.

这太棒了。

This is great.

你看起来真的很不错。

He you seem really great.

我很想哪天见你一面，等等。

I'd love to meet you sometime, etcetera.

我说，我不想出现在这本书里。

I said, I do not wanna be in this book.

我不想要任何关注，等等。

I don't want any attention, etcetera.

他说，别担心。

He says, don't worry.

你不会被写进去的。

You're not going to be.

他说，你看起来太普通了。

He says, you seem too normal.

我在这儿。

I'm here.

你坐得像个

You're sitting like a

特别好的人。

really nice guy.

你真的很普通。

You're really normal.

不过，说起来，那段背景故事其实挺有意思的，只是成了其中一小部分。

But, anyway, it was really interesting backstory, actually, to be like one small little piece of that.

所以还挺有意思的。

So it's fun.

这挺有意思的。

It's funny.

托德，你提到了史蒂夫·弗里曼。

Todd, you mentioned Steve Freeman.

我想问问所有有朝一日想创业的人，

I'm just curious for everyone who thinks that someday they might wanna take that entrepreneurial leap.

能跟我们多说说这个决定吗？

Just tell us more about that decision.

你觉得自己准备好了吗？

Like, did you feel ready?

没有。

No.

我一点都没准备好。

I wasn't ready at all.

我这辈子从来没觉得自己真正准备好了哪件事。

I've never really been ready for anything in my life.

这可能是每个人都该记下来的一点。

That's probably one takeaway everybody should write down.

当别人看到你身上你自己都没发现的优点时，那真的很了不起。

When people see things in you that you don't see in yourself, that's amazing.

史蒂夫身上就是这样的。

And that was true with Steve.

查理身上也完全如此。

That was certainly true with Charlie.

沃伦身上也多次出现过这种情况。

That was true with Warren multiple times with Warren.

在伯克希尔，我刚开始做投资时，路的组合资产是20.25亿美元。

For Berkshire, I started as an investor with Lou's portfolio at $2.02 and a half billion.

结果他有一天，我刚上班六个月，就跑来跟我说：咱们把它翻倍吧？

Then he comes down one day, like six months into the job, and he says, why don't we double it?

我当时就惊了。

And I was like, woah.

天啊

Woah.

真的吗

Woah.

他说不行

And he's like, no.

你没问题的

You're fine.

我根本没准备好面对这个

And I wasn't ready for that.

我也没准备好接手Haven

I wasn't ready for Haven.

更别提要去评估每年两百起收购了

I wasn't ready to then go into looking at 200 acquisitions a year.

我绝对没准备好去管理一家四万人的公司

I sure as hell wasn't ready to run a 40,000 person company.

但我认识了史蒂夫·弗里德曼。

But I met Steve Friedman.

我给你讲个简短的故事。

Just super quick story.

他们听说过埃利奥特·斯皮策这个名字吗？

So would they know the name Elliot Spitzer?

大概没听过。

Probably not.

他主导了一次全面调查，而Marsh McLennan是全球最大的保险经纪公司。

So he did this whole investigation, and Marsh McLennan's the biggest insurance brokerage firm in the world.

他们当时拥有几家大型私募股权公司。

They had their huge private equity firms.

后来他们又成立了一家隶属于Marsh的私募股权公司，专门做金融服务。

Then they go over and start this private equity firm that was part of Marsh, and it was all based on financial services.

总之，斯皮策就在这时候出现了。

So, anyway, Spitzer comes in.

汉克·格林伯格当时在掌管AIG。

Hank Greenberg was running AIG.

他的儿子则在管理马什公司。

His son was running Marsh.

斯皮策觉得他发现了各种串通行为。

Spitzer thinks he finds all kind of collusion.

他逼走了这些公司的首席执行官，说：‘要么你们辞职，要么我就起诉你们。’

He ousts basically the CEOs of these companies and says, or I'm gonna indict you.

这种事是不能允许的。

You can't have that.

董事会最终把他赶走了。

The boards kick him out.

于是他们去找史蒂夫，说：‘我们想请你来接管马什公司。’

So they went to Steve to say, we want you to run Marsh.

所以他打电话给一位保险业专家，问：‘谁最了解马什麦克伦南公司？’

So he calls this insurance guru and says, who knows more about Marsh McLennan?

这其实也是一个挺不错的短篇故事。

And this is a good short story actually too.

我做空Marsh已经两年了。

I've been short Marsh for two years.

我等了两年，就等着这一切发生，而我早就通过一堆其他材料把事情摸清楚了，那些都在更长的故事里。

Two years waiting for all this to happen, and I had uncovered it through a whole bunch of stuff that's in a longer story.

最后事情真发生了，我那时候也做空了AIG。

So it finally happens, and I was short AIG too.

这些事一发生，那位保险专家就知道我做空了。

So these things happen, and this insurance guru knew that I was short.

于是他告诉Steve：你得跟Todd谈谈。

So he tells Steve, you gotta talk to Todd.

他是所有这些事背后那个真正动手的人。

He's the so called axe on all of this stuff.

有一天，Steve Freeman给我打了电话，他可是个传奇人物，等等，他说：咱们能一起吃个早餐吗？

So I get a call one day from Steve Freeman because he's a legend, etcetera, and he says, can we have breakfast?

我不明白他约我吃早餐是啥目的。

I don't know what the breakfast is for.

我就过去了。

I show up.

他问了我一大堆关于马什·麦克莱南的事。

He asked me all about Marsh McLennan.

如果我接下这份工作，到底会卷入什么麻烦？

If I take this job, what am I getting myself into?

于是我把他知道的情况都跟他讲了一遍。

So I walk him through what I know.

但这还不是最精彩的部分。

So that's not even the punchline, though.

谈话到了最后。

We get to the end.

史蒂夫是房利美的董事会成员。

Steve is on the board of Fannie Mae.

他就说，好吧。

So he says, okay.

这太好了。

This is great.

我们聊了整整两个小时的马什公司。

You know, we talked about Marsh for two hours.

他们要走了。

They're leaving.

他顺便问，你还有什么别的把握吗？

He says, by the way, are you sure of anything else?

我当时太天真了。

I was so naive.

我根本不知道史蒂夫是房利美的董事会成员。

I didn't know that Steve was on the board of Fannie Mae.

我就说，哦，房利美比马什公司糟糕十倍。

And I said, oh, Fannie Mae is 10 times worse than Marsh.

他一听，差点没摔倒。

He turns like, he almost fell over.

他是董事会主席。

He's chairman of the board.

他整个人都醉得站不稳了。

He turns three sheets away.

他一把抓住桌子，以为我在跟他开玩笑。

He grabs the table because he thinks I'm messing with him.

他问：‘什么？’

He's like, what?

我就说，Fannie Mae 完全就是一场会计欺诈。

And I said, oh, Fannie Mae is a complete accounting fraud.

我当时想，这事儿肯定得有人进监狱。

I was like, there's gonna be people that go to jail, prison over this.

他问我：‘你知道我也是董事会成员吗？’

He's like, you know I'm on the board?

我当时就说，没有。

And I was like, no.

我根本不知道这事。

I didn't know that.

我说，我明天就立马从董事会辞职。

I said, I would get the hell off that board, like, tomorrow.

所以他问，明天一起吃个早餐怎么样？

So he's like, can we have breakfast tomorrow?

我说，好。

I said, yeah.

咱们再约一次。

We'll do it again.

当然。

Sure.

所以我们聊了整整四个小时。

So we talked for, like, four hours.

我给他详细解释了所有衍生品会计和那些复杂得离谱的玩意儿。

I walk him through all of this derivatives accounting and all this arcane Byzantine stuff.

他不得不中途离开一下。

He has to excuse himself.

他是个律师。

He's a lawyer.

他中途离场，当天五点就退出了董事会。

He's excusing himself from the meeting, and he left the board that night at five.

后来他回来，第二天给我打电话，说：我们想请你来管一个基金，我们已经找了七八年了。

So then he comes back, called me the next day, and said, we want you to start a fund, we've been looking for somebody for seven or eight years.

有时候事情的发展还真是挺巧的。

And so it's funny how things work out.

这真是个了不起的故事。

That's an amazing story.

我们正慢慢接近那些关键的对话——先是和查理，然后是沃伦，正是这些对话让你从纽约一路迁移到了内布拉斯加的大平原。

And we are gradually inching closer to those fateful conversations, first with Charlie and then Warren that led you to your migration all the way to the Great Plains Of Nebraska from New York.

我们再回头聊聊复利公式吧，我觉得我们刚才其实已经提炼出一些关于找到‘p’的关键建议，‘p’传统上代表本金。

But let's come back one more time to that compound interest equation, because I think we've hit on some really important tips for finding your p, which obviously traditionally stands for principle.

但我觉得我们真正想说的是，这个‘p’也可以理解为你的热情或人生目标，就是你想要不断积累的那件事。

But I think what we're saying is that it can really be considered your passion or your purpose, whatever that thing is that you're trying to compound.

对我们每个人来说，找到自己的‘p’都是人生旅程中特别重要的一环，你刚才分享的这些想法真的很有启发。

And that process of discovering your p for all of us is just such an important part of our personal journeys, and you've given us some great ideas there.

我觉得我最大的收获就是：别压抑你的好奇心。

I think the main message I'm taking away is just let your curiosity go.

让它自由奔跑，你只要尽力跟上就行。

Let it run free and just try to keep up.

然后就是‘r’，回报率，或者说是成长的加速度、增长速率。

And then we have the r, the rate of return or the velocity vector, the growth rate.

你到底该怎么真正提升自己？

How do you actually get better at something?

随着时间推移，你怎样才能让自己的成长越来越快？

How do you, over the course of time, speed up your growth?

我以前就听过你提倡主动学习，而不是被动学习。

And I've heard you in the past advocate for active learning versus passive learning.

今天我们聊了很多关于培养强烈职业精神的视野。

Today, we've talked a lot about developing your aperture for a strong work ethic.

而关于拓展能力广度的这个想法，我觉得真是特别精辟。

And now this idea of cultivating range, I I think that's just such a killer insight.

明白了。

Okay.

那我们现在来看看第三个关键变量。

So now let's turn to that third critical variable.

我觉得，也许我们的理解完全错了，但我和保罗都觉得，这个变量最重要，也最难把握，那就是时间变量 t，也就是复利的持续时间。

And I think, again, we could be completely off on this, but I think Paul and I tend to feel this is both the most important and also the hardest one to harness, and that is the t exponent, the time horizon or the duration of compounding.

世界上有很多人，尤其是在投资领域，好像总能找到某个方向，或者至少能连续五六年、七八年干得不错，但不知为什么，后来就突然下滑了。

Now the world is full of people, particularly in investing, I think, that just seem to find their thing or or something at least, do well for five, six, seven years, but then for whatever reason, things just drop off.

另一方面，我们常把伯克希尔称作永续复利的典范。

And on the other hand, we we talk about Berkshire as being the eternal compounder.

就像一家公司一直在持续成长、蓬勃发展。

It's like a company that just continues to grow, thrive.

就像一棵红杉，完全突破了自然规律的限制。

It's like a Redwood that just defies the traditional laws of nature.

托德，如果你有任何想法，不管是关于伯克希尔，还是你自己的生活，你是怎么让这一切持续下去的？

I I'd love it, Todd, if you just have any reflections, whether it applies to Berkshire or even just in your own life, how do you keep it going?

你该怎么延长这个时间，才能抵达那些遥远的年份——我记得沃伦在六十年代就写过，那时候复利的真正威力才开始显现。

How do you extend the tea in order to get to those out years where I think it was back in the sixties when when Warren first wrote about this where the joys of compounding are really unleashed?

这其实又回到了目标感。

Well, it comes back to purpose.

汤姆·布雷迪之所以一直想打球，不是因为他擅长，而是因为他热爱，正因热爱，他才擅长。

There's a reason Tom Brady kept wanting to play because you're good at it, but you're good at it because you love it.

我可不是把自己和汤姆·布雷迪相提并论。

And I'm not comparing myself to Tom Brady with that.

我刚想到这话听起来可能有点奇怪，但你

I just thought about how that might sound, but you

谁要是真有这本事，都能做到。

could take anyone who's really, really good.

费德勒根本不想退役。

Federer didn't wanna retire.

德约科维奇也不想退役。

Djokovic didn't wanna retire.

他们之所以继续，是因为真的热爱这项运动。

They wanna keep doing it because they love it.

你看诺瓦克，刚拿了第二十四座大满贯。

Like, Novak, he's just won his twenty fourth grand slam.

他正在打破所有纪录。

He's breaking every record there is.

我记得，就在他赢得美网之前，有人问他怎么还能一直保持状态。

And I recall, I I think it was actually just before he won the US Open where he was asked about how he continues to keep it going.

他的回答很简单：他就是特别享受打网球的感觉。

And his answer basically came down to the fact that he really just loves hitting a tennis ball.

他就是舍不得停下打那个毛茸茸的黄球，因为这给他带来了太多快乐。

Like, he just doesn't want to stop the fundamental act of hitting a fuzzy yellow ball because it brings him too much joy.

其实我觉得，很多职业网球选手并不像他那样，真正享受打网球这个最基本的动作。

And, actually, I think there's a lot of professional tennis players out there who just don't love that fundamental act of hitting the tennis ball like he does.

当你看到

When you see

任何一项运动都是这样，总能听到关于拉里·伯德或者斯蒂芬·库里的故事，他们总是最早到训练馆，最晚离开，诸如此类。

it with any sport, you hear the stories about Larry Bird or Steph Curry being in the gym, the first one in, the last one out, etcetera, etcetera.

如果你不爱这项运动，光靠意志力是撑不了多久的，毕竟这世界竞争太激烈了。

You can only drive yourself or push yourself so much if you don't love it because it's a super, super, super competitive world.

想成为德约科维奇、汤姆·布雷迪、斯蒂芬·库里、沃伦·巴菲特这样的人，多得数不清。

There's a million people that wanna be Djokovic or Tom Brady or Steph Curry or Warren Buffett or whatever.

所以，毅力和自我驱动当然重要，但在有上百万人都在拼命争取的环境里，如果只有百分之一的人真正发自内心地热爱，天天想着它、梦里都是它、一睁眼就想着它，那你如果没有这种骨子里的热爱，根本不可能跟他们比。

So, yeah, grit and pushing yourself can go a long way, but in a world where a million people are trying to do this, if point 1% of them just absolutely love it so passionately that they're going to bed about it, thinking about it, they're waking up thinking about it, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera, you're never gonna be able to compete with that if you don't love it to your core.

所以这又回到了你之前问的问题：为什么坚持这么重要。

And so that comes back to your question about why it's so important to fight.

如果你是为了追求富有、出名或者被人追捧才去做这件事，那这种动力完全是短期的。

If you're back solving for the narrative of I wanna be rich or famous or have adulation or these things, It's totally short term.

这种东西转瞬即逝。

It's ephemeral.

它根本留不住。

It's transitory.

你也许能骗自己一阵子。

You may be able to fool yourself for some period of time.

这条路是线性的。

It's more linear.

你永远没法跟那些真正发自内心热爱它的人竞争。

You're never gonna get the log scale to compete with the people who really, really truly love it.

所以，找到你的热情所在才这么重要。

So that's why it's so important to find your passion.

我觉得在这一点上，年轻的时候更该大胆去冒险。

And I think in that vein, I'd say it's super, super important to take a lot of risk when you're young.

我觉得这真的特别重要。

I think that's really, really important.

我确实这么做了，因为我没什么可失去的，这点要说明白。

I did because I had nothing to lose, to be clear.

最难的其实是逼自己去冒险，尤其是当你出身优渥，或者本来就有不错的基础时——你输不起。

I think that the hardest thing to do actually is to force yourself to take that risk when you either come from privilege or if you have a foundation that's much higher, you have downside.

所以年轻时冒险才这么重要，因为年纪越大，输的代价就越高。

So that's why it's important to take risk when you're young because as you get older, you have more downside risk.

你这个年纪，根本没什么可输的。

So you've got nothing to lose at your age.

去冒险吧，大不了搞砸了，只要不是诈骗之类的事，没人会真跟你过不去。

You take the risk, and you can massively screw up, and nobody's gonna hold it really against you unless it's fraud or something like that.

要冒有脑子的风险。

I mean, take intelligent risk.

别去冒傻冒。

Don't take stupid risk.