片段：彼得·莱因哈特和他的大学室友兼联合创始人

是的。

Yeah.

然后我们得出结论，这个想法行不通。

And then we came to the conclusion that it was a dead idea.

所以我们尝试了别的东西。

So we tried something else.

我们试了做了一个MySpace个人资料创建器。

We tried a Myspace profile creator.

然后我们试了做广告定制工具，像是广告优化器。

Then we tried an ad customizer, like an ad optimizer.

但与此同时，我们想，嘿，不如别把这东西关掉。

But in the meantime, we're like, hey, let's just not shut this thing down.

我其实不记得有没有讲过这个故事。

I actually don't think I've ever told this story.

我们想，不如就让它继续在线上吧。

We're like, let's just leave it online.

不知怎么的，大约十二到十八个月后，这个东西突然自己开始蓬勃发展起来，完全出乎意料。

And somehow, about twelve to eighteen months later, the thing just starts taking off on its own completely out of nowhere.

我们当时就想，嘿，也许这主意也没那么糟。

And we're like, hey, you know, maybe this isn't such a bad idea after all.

哇。

Wow.

这真是

That's

酷。

cool.

但我的意思是，你们有计划吗？

But, I mean, did you have a plan?

如果这个没成功，你们打算怎么办？

Like, if that didn't work, what what what were you guys gonna do?

我们当时在讨论各种不同的想法。

We were discussing all kinds of different ideas.

我们曾经和PG开过办公时间会议。

We'd had, like, office hours with PG.

我们向他提过很多不同的想法。

We'd given him a bunch of different ideas.

他就说，这真是个糟糕的主意。

He was like, like, so he was just like, that's a terrible idea.

所以，我们确实已经黔驴技穷了。

So, yeah, we're we're kinda at wit's end.

简直就像是走到了死胡同。

Like, it was kinda the end of the road.

你还记得那次谈话吗？

Do you remember that conversation?

就是你们当时在哪儿？

Like like, where you were?

你们当时是不是都坐在一起？

Like, were you guys all sitting together?

那场争论很激烈吗？

Was it pretty heated?

当时情况是怎么样的？

Like, how did how did that go?

是的。

Yeah.

那是在我们位于俄罗斯山千栗街的公寓兼办公室发生的。

It was in our apartment slash office on Russian Hill at Thousand Chestnut.

那场争论是关于分析用的 JavaScript 的。

That was the argument about analytics JS.

当时我们一整天都坐在那里，看着事情爆发。

And then that was also where we were sitting all day when it was blowing up.

所以我们又在那个公寓里继续开发了六个月。

So we kept we kept building out of that apartment for another six months.

对。

Yeah.

你的意思是，你们在 Hacker News 上发帖，然后就突然爆了？

How how did that I mean, so you so you post on Hacker News and then it just blows up.

那就是你们觉得‘等等，这就是关键时刻’的瞬间吗？

Was that the moment you're like, wait, this is where this is gonna be it?

我的意思是，很明显我们当时只需要专心去做这件事。

I mean, it was clear that we just needed to go work on that.

所以我们几乎立刻就开始着手做这件事了。

So we just, like, pretty much immediately started working on that.

但我们几乎像是从愿景设定中休了个假。

But we we we almost took like a holiday from vision setting.

我们只是觉得太累了，总是‘哦，又来一个愿景’。

Like, we were just like we were so exhausted of just like, oh, here's a vision.

我们只想去实现那个愿景，说实话，我也不知道该怎么说。

Let's go build the vision that we're just like, I don't know, man.

我们就只想做人们真正想要的东西。

Like, let's just build whatever what are people asking for?

人们想要更多的集成。

People want more integrations.

人们想要一个托管版本。

People want a hosted version.

不错。

Cool.

我们就这么做吧。

Let's just do that.

一种彻底的疲惫感，情绪上到了尽头。

Just like an absolute state of exhaustion and, emotional, like, end of the road.

所以我们接下来大概六个月就是这样，尽量不去设定什么愿景。

And so that's kinda what we did for, like, six months is we, like, we tried not to have a vision.

我们只是尽力去实现人们所要求的每一个功能。

We just tried to build exactly whatever people were asking for.

随着时间推移，愿景逐渐清晰起来了。

And then over time, the vision, you know, solidified.

我觉得，当我们刚刚看到一点起色时，就觉得这已经足够让我们开始用力拉拽了。

I think the moment that we got even, like, a glimmer of traction, it felt like enough of a rope that we should start pulling on it.

所以，我们实际上就这么做了。

And so that's effectively what we did.

对我来说，我一度感到非常震惊，甚至不觉得这会成为一个真正的生意，直到八个月后我们签下了第一个企业合同。

I think for me, I came out shell shocked enough that I didn't even think this would be a real business until, like, eight months in when we signed our first enterprise contract.

但我觉得，对我们所有人来说，当时的想法就是：好吧。

But I think for all of us, it was like, okay.

至少这里已经有了一些成效，这比我们迄今为止的任何成就都要成功。

There's at least something working here, which is more success than we've ever had to date.

所以我们不妨继续看看它能走多远，弄清楚有没有可能把业务做得更大。

So we might as well keep seeing where it goes and figure out if there's a way to get to a bigger, bigger business.

但这个过程非常不同，实际上感觉还挺棒的——对我们来说，产品与市场的契合几乎就像是我们长期推着一块巨石上山，但至少我们还能掌控它。

But it was a it was a very different motion, and it was kind of a cool feeling actually, like a product market fit for us almost felt like we've been pushing this boulder uphill for a really long time and but we were in control of it.

然后，突然间，仿佛市场接管了这块巨石，它开始顺坡而下。

And then it was sort of felt like the market like took control of the boulder and it started rolling downhill.

一方面，这非常令人兴奋。

And on the one hand, it was very exciting.

但另一方面，我又想，天哪。

And on the other hand, it was like, oh my god.

我真的再也控制不了这件事了。

Like, I don't I don't really control this thing anymore.

这并不是我想去的方向。

Like, it's not where I wanna go.

这是市场想要的方向，这也带来了一种失落感。

It's like where the market wants to go, which was also like a feeling of loss.

所以我们花了好几个月才在情感上重新调整过来，意识到：好吧，这其实令人兴奋，很酷，很有前景。

So it took like months for us to like kind of emotionally get realigned into like, okay, this is actually exciting and this is cool and promising.

你刚才说对了。

What so so you said it.

我的意思是，你推出产品时，只剩下六个月的现金流了。

I mean, when you launched it, you had six months runway left.

你们最低降到多少了？

How low did you get?

我觉得我们一度只剩下四周了。

I think we got down to four weeks.

可能只有三周。

Maybe three weeks.

是的。

Yeah.

然后我们联系了投资者，说：嘿。

And then called our investors and was like, hey.

我觉得现在是我们融资的时候了。

I think it's time for us to raise.

他们说：哦，好的。

And they're like, oh, cool.

然后问：进展怎么样？

Like, how's it going?

最后他们问：你们还剩多少现金？

And like, at the end the they're like, how much cash do you have left?

我说：哦，大概三到四周吧。

I'm like, oh, like three or four weeks.

他们说：天哪。

And they're like, holy shit.

你们现在已经开始融资了？

Like, you got a fundraise now.

这到底是怎么回事？

Like, what is going on?

然后，从那以后，确实就是这样了。

And then, yeah, from there it was yeah.

我们真正开始起飞了。

We're truly off to the races.

我们曾经也有过，除了YC之外，只剩下三周现金的时候。

We got I think at one point in time, we had like three weeks of cash left too outside of YC.

你知道吗，那时候我们开始制定应急计划，考虑下个月怎么付房租，因为房租马上就要到了。

You know, at that point, we started making contingency plans about how you're gonna pay rent next month because it's coming up.

就是下个月的事，你们会聊这种话题。

It's like next month and you guys have those kind of conversations.

我当时非常天真。

I was very naive.

我们就像一头撞向墙壁一样。

We were just like running at a wall.

是的。

Yeah.

哦，那太棒了。

Oh, that's awesome.

所以是的。

So yeah.

所以那时候，我的意思是，你融到资了，压力就卸下来了。

So so at that point, I mean, you raise money, you got that pressure off your back.

它开始快速增长花了多长时间？

How quickly did it start taking off?

没那么快。

Not that fast.

基本上，我们在用户数量上一直呈线性增长，这非常奇怪。

Like, we basically grew linearly forever in terms of number of users, which is very strange.

我到现在还是不明白为什么。

I still don't understand why.

随着时间推移，我们发现我们的增长很大程度上来自于逐步拓展更大的客户。

And what we figured out over time was a lot of our growth was driven by moving into larger accounts over time.

比如，是大公司而不是那些每月只付20美元的小初创企业。

So, like, bigger companies instead of, you know, a small start up paying $20 a month.

最终，宝洁公司每年支付了700万美元。

Like, in the end, Procter and Gamble paying, like, $7,000,000 a year.

因此，随着时间推移，客户规模和合同金额都发生了很大变化，因为我们之前收费严重偏低。

And so, like, there was a lot of that kind of shift in account size over time, which was both bigger companies and larger contract value because we were grossly undercharging.

我们根本不敢开口要钱，早期甚至有客户发邮件说：嘿，你们得涨价了。

We were terrified to ask for money and in the early days, customers would even email and be like, hey, guys, you gotta charge more.

我不相信你们能撑那么久。

I like don't trust that you're gonna be around that long.

你们能不能把价格提一提？

Can you please like, you should raise the price.

你还记得第一次觉得这事儿要成的时刻吗？

Do you remember the first moment you're like, this is gonna be big?

就是那种感觉，这真的行得通？

Like, this is really working?

我想大概是第一次我们雇了新的销售顾问，我当时还在拼命琢磨怎么做企业销售。

I think probably the first time we hired a new sales adviser and I was like struggling to, you know, figure out how to do enterprise sales.

我们去见了Xamarin的Nat。

And we went to meet with Nat at Xamarin.

Nat Friedman，真正的硅谷元老级人物。

Nat Friedman, like, real, like, Silicon Valley stalwart.

当时他正在运营自己的公司Xamarin，也在使用我们的产品，但支付的费用非常低。

And, you know, he was running his company Xamarin at the time, and they were using us, but not paying very much.

每个月50美元左右。

$50 a month or something.

所以我们去参加一场销售会议，打算说服他们升级到企业版计划。

And so we're going to a sales meeting where we're gonna upsell them onto an enterprise plan.

我们的销售顾问说：‘彼得，在这次谈话中，你必须要求他们每年支付12万美元。’

And our sales adviser was like, Peter, in this conversation, you have to ask for a $120,000 a year.

我当时想：我不知道自己能不能开口提这个要求。

And I was like, I don't know if I can do that.

这太疯狂了。

Like, that's crazy.

我们其实当时只向他们收取每年120美元。

We're I think I think actually we're charging them a $120 a year.

所以这相当于价格提升了上千倍。

And so it was like a thousand x increase in price.

我当时想，我觉得我做不到。

I was like, I don't think I can do that.

他问，那你的销售顾问是谁呢？

And he's like, like, what is your sales adviser then?

他开始走开，我心想：哇。

And he started walking away and I was like, woah.

好吧。

Like, okay.

我问一下。

I'll ask.

我问一下。

I'll ask.

所以我们坐下来，一直到对话结束。

So we sat down, to the end of the conversation.

这真的很有说服力。

That's like, it's really compelling.

就是，你知道，这项服务多少钱？

Like, know, how much does the service cost?

我当时说，你知道，一年12万美元。

And I was like, you know, 120,000 a year.

我瞬间脸涨得通红，红得发紫、直冒血色。

And I turned just like completely beet red, just like bright pulsating red.

他看了看我，说：那一年1万2千美元怎么样？

And he kinda looked at me and he's like, how about $12,000 a year?

我当时说：那1万8千呢？

And I was like, how about 18?

我说，这样挺好。

I was like, that's fine.

我走出那场会议时，觉得特别尴尬。

And I walked out of that meeting and I was like, very embarrassed.

然后还心想：天啊。

And then also was like, oh my god.

我们创造的价值要高得多。

The value that we're creating is is just way higher.

你知道的。

You know?

所以很快我们就达成了3.6万美元的交易，接着是4.5万美元，然后是15万美元，最后是Angie's List的20万美元。

And so pretty quickly then we got to a 36 k deal and then a 45 k deal and then a 150 k deal and then Angie's list of, like, 200 k.

于是我心想，这事儿的上限在哪里？

And so I was like, where's the ceiling on this?

当我们开始看到合同金额不断上涨，并且收入突破了100万美元时，我就觉得，好吧。

Like, as we started to see those contract values creep up and we crossed, 1,000,000 in revenue, that was like, okay.

我现在明白了，这为什么能成为一个大生意，因为我已经看到每个客户的价值达到了足以支撑大规模业务的水平。

I now understand how this can actually be a big business because I'm I've been seeing the value per customer at like a level where that could be big.

所以，考虑到上次转型，你知道，那时候这个想法看起来非常脆弱。

So, you know, considering the last pivot, you know, it seems like the idea was so fragile at that point in time.

你的经验教训是什么？经历了多次转型后，最终找到了真正成功的方向？

Mean, what do you kind of take away from that experience going through the pivots and then ending up on something that really, really worked?

我的意思是，从那中学到了很多东西。

I mean, there were a lot of learnings from that.

对我来说，一个重要的教训是，理解市场比任何愿景都重要得多。

One learning for me was just like how important understanding the market as compared to like whatever your vision is.

对吧？

Right?

愿景在那个阶段毫无价值。

Like visions are worthless.

真的毫无价值。

Truly worthless in that stage.

对吧？

Right?

当你试图让整个公司围绕一个方向齐心协力时，愿景就非常重要。

They matter a lot when you're trying to, like, rally a company of people around, like, a direction to to all pull the oars together.

但当你只有四个人住在公寓里，试图找到产品市场契合点时，世界根本不在乎你认为世界应该如何运作。

But when it's, like, four people in an apartment and you're trying to find product market fit, it's like the world could care less what you think about how the world should operate.

人们有需求。

People have problems.

如果你能解决他们的问题，而不是你自己的愿景，那么回报就会随之而来。

If you solve those problems for them, they're their problems, not your vision of it, then it'll will start rewarding you.

所以在那个阶段，你需要有十倍的谦逊。

And so, like, just like 10 x more humility at that stage.

除非你在这个领域深耕已久，否则你根本一无所知。

Unless you've been steeped in the space for a long time, you've got no idea.

你知道吗，我知道，你明白，很多创始人，我想每个创始人都会在某个时刻面临抉择：是继续坚持一个陷入困境的想法，还是尝试新的方向？不同的初创公司以不同的方式取得成功。

You know, I know, you know, a lot of founders I mean, probably every single founder at some point has to decide, you know, whether they keep working on idea that's in struggle mode, try something new, you different startups find success in different ways.

你该如何帮助人们应对这个问题呢？

Like, how how do you help people navigate that question?

天啊。

Boy.

对我来说，归根结底还是要回到对客户和市场的理解上。

I guess for me, it's always come back to, like, the understanding of the customer in the market.

尤其是在硬科技领域，人们往往会过度沉迷于科学或技术能力，却未必真正理解他们所面向的客户需求。

And particularly in hard tech, people can get very carried away with the science or very carried away with the capability and not necessarily understand the, like, customer need that they're selling into.

因此，失败往往就出在这里。

And so it's almost always where the where the failure mode is.

那种在默默无闻中埋头苦干的状态。

Of sort of, like, grinding away in obscurity.

对吧？

Right?

就像是在试图解决某个可能根本无关紧要的复杂技术问题。

It's like trying to solve some hard technical problem that might not even matter.

所以，我通常会提醒人们：先去深入理解客户的问题，只有真正理解了，你才能凭借这种理解彻底超越竞争对手。

So I guess that's that's where I always try to point people is, like, go understand the customer problem that you're gonna be able to, like, blow the competition out of the water through that understanding.

Segment 最终发展到了多大规模？

How big did Segment eventually get?

被收购时，我们大约有600名员工，年收入超过1亿美元。

At the time of acquisition, we were about 600 people and doing, like, north of 100,000,000 in revenue.

然后我们在2020年以超过30亿美元的价格被收购，之后继续加速增长，这令人兴奋。

And then and we got acquired in 2020 for a little over 3,000,000,000 and then continued to accelerate growth afterwards, which was exciting.

给我们描绘一下当时的场景吧。

Just paint a picture for us.

在宣布收购团队的前一晚，你做了什么？

Like, what were you doing the night before you announced the acquisition of the team?

收购完成后的那一晚，你又做了什么？

And like, what what did you do the night after you did?

天哪。

Oh, man.

那段时期全都模糊不清了。

That whole period is a blur.

我觉得那段时间我睡得不太好，因为你得像一个公司CEO那样过着双重生活。

I don't think I was sleeping very well because you have to live like a double life as, like, a a CEO of a company.

你必须继续推进工作，同时还要和小团队一起与收购方进行尽职调查和谈判。

It's like, you have to keep executing and yet with your small team, be in discussions with in diligence with the acquirer.

一方面，我们气势汹汹地要去完成X、Y和Z这些事。

And so on the one hand, like, guns blazing, we're gonna go do x, y, and z thing.

但你的情绪完全被收购这边的‘着陆’任务占据了，因为这对每个人来说都是改变人生的大事，而且每一场对话都充满极高的风险，完全是另一回事。

But, like, your emotional state is completely consumed with, like, landing the plane on the acquisition side because it's life changing for everybody and, like, a completely different thing with, like, incredibly high stakes in every conversation.

所以我记不太清了，但就是睡不好。

So I don't remember exactly, but, like, not sleeping well.

然后我记得是在太平洋时间凌晨4:30，上Squawk Box节目，当时我待在楼下那间破旧的房间里，穿着一件我平时根本不会穿的劣质领衬衫。

And then I think it was, like, squawk box at, like, you know, 04:30AM Pacific, you know, in my, like, weird janky room downstairs with, a crappy collared shirt put on that I, like, you know, never wore.

所以整个人情绪上彻底耗尽了。

So just, like, emotionally spent.

作为创始人，你们有没有过这样的时刻？我知道，至少在我的经历里，总是忙得不可开交。

Did you guys, as founders ever you know, I know, at least in my experience, it's, like, busy, busy, busy.

但你们有没有过一段真正放松的间隙，比如创始人之间，从数学营的伙伴，到室友，再到如今取得这样的成功，彼此对视一眼？

But But did you ever have a moment of downtime where, like, just between founders, you kinda, you know, looking from, you know, math camp to roommates to, like, that kind of success?

你心里会想：我们真的做到了？

You're like, like, we kinda did it?

是的

Yeah.

是的

Yeah.

我们每年都会尝试组织这些创始人的旅行，让我们三个人一起抽身出来，好好思考和反思这些经历。

We've been trying to organize these founder trips every year where the three of us just go and kind of, like, zoom out and think about those and kind of reflect on it.

对我来说，以及对很多在那里的人来说，并购本身就像是一个章节的圆满结束。

Both for myself and I think for a lot of folks there, like, the acquisition itself was kind of this, like, nice end of a chapter.

我们基本上花了十年时间打造这家公司，而我最感激的一件事，就是看到那些职业生涯因Segment而开启的人们。

We basically spent ten years building this business, and I think one of the things that I'm most grateful for is seeing everyone whose careers were launched by Segment.

对我来说，最酷的一件事是并购后，我们专门去感谢了最早的员工。

I actually think the coolest part for me is one thing that we did post acquisition is we went around to the earliest employees and actually just thanked them.

我们三个人一起打电话给那些仍在公司的人，也包括那些已经离开的人。

All three of us got on a call, folks who were still at the company and folks who weren't.

看到这段经历对他们生活产生的改变，是我最珍视的回忆之一。

And I think seeing the difference that it made in their lives is one of the things that I'll treasure most.

所以我认为对很多人来说，这意味着我们已经为所有人把这家公司带到了一个有意义的终点，现在是时候迈向下一个阶段了。

And so I think for a lot of folks, it was like, Okay, we've taken this business to a meaningful outcome for everyone, and now it's time to continue on to the next phase.

至少对我来说，我没有去Twilio工作，我的联合创始人Ilya也没有去。

At least for me, I didn't go on to work at Twilio and neither did my cofounder, Ilya.

所以三名创始人中，只有彼得留了下来，直到一年后他离开。

So it was kind of only Peter who was there from the three of us founders until he left a year later.

广告后继续。

More after the break.

我们回来了。

And we're back.

当然，Segment并不是你唯一的创业故事。

And so, you know, obviously Segment's not your only founder story.

你是怎么进入下一家你创办的公司的呢？

You know, how how did you move into the next company that you started?

是的。

Yeah.

我于2018年创立了Charm Industrial，这个想法实际上源于我在Segment作为客户时遇到的一个问题。

I started Charm Industrial in 2018, and it actually came out of a problem that I experienced as a customer at Segment.

在Segment，我们希望从气候角度做正确的事，因此我们购买碳抵消额度，保护 supposedly 位于印度尼西亚和亚马逊的森林。

At Segment, we wanted to do the right thing from a climate perspective, and so we're buying offsets and, you know, protecting forests supposedly in in Indonesia and the Amazon.

当时，我觉得自己做了一件很棒的事。

And, you know, I was like feeling really good about that.

你说你想购买碳信用额。

You said you wanted to buy carbon credits.

你想做正确的事。

You wanna do the right thing.

嗯。

Mhmm.

那为什么这对你来说如此重要？

And why why was that important to you?

我觉得我妈妈对这件事影响很大。

I think my mom is a pretty big influence here.

她一直很明确地告诉我，取得成就、积累财富固然很好，但你对周围世界产生的影响以及你如何实现这些影响同样重要。

She was always clear with me, like, it's great to do well and build wealth, but the impact that you're having on the world around you matters and how you do that.

而这正是其中的一部分。

And this was part of that.

对吧？

Right?

其中一部分就是，试图找到利用产品帮助我们周围世界的方法。

Part of that was, like, trying to find ways that we could use the product to kinda help the world around us.

我不确定我们是否真的找到了答案。

I don't know that we ever really figured that out.

那是个很棒的生意，但传输数据就是这样。

It was a great business, but moving around data is like that.

这本质上是一门生意。

It's a business.

而且，我们确实有一些非营利项目，支持那些我们认为使命良好的组织，至少在减缓我们对气候的影响方面，这似乎是一种产生影响的好方式。

And mean, we had, like, some nonprofit programs and so on where we kinda support folks that we thought had good missions, minimizing the impact that we're having at least on the climate seemed like a a good way to have impact.

所以我认为，这最终就是动机的来源。

So that that I think is ultimately where the motivation came from.

所以我们购买碳抵消额度，第一次购买是在2015年或2016年，我想。

So we're buying offsets, and we made the first purchase in 2016, I think, or 2015.

然后在2017年，我重新关注了一下，心想：不错。

And then in 2017, I like circled back and I was like, cool.

你知道吗，后来怎么样了？

Like, you know, what happened?

我们花在上面的那两万美元，真的产生了我们期望的效果吗？

Like, did we have the effect that we wanted with that $20,000 that we spent on it?

你知道，这里到底发生了什么？

Like, you know, what happened here?

于是我们开始深入调查那些我们捐过钱的非营利组织，越深入，我越觉得：天啊。

And so we started digging into the nonprofits that we'd sent money to, and the deeper I got into it, more I was like, oh, boy.

我觉得，这并没有产生我们期望的影响。

Like, I don't think that this is having the impact that we wanted it to.

比如，70%的资金最终变成了各种层级的营销费用，完全浪费了。

Like, 70% kind of went off into marketing fees that were lost at various levels.

直到你往下看到最后那30%，才真正有证据表明钱确实用在了雨林保护上。

And so it wasn't until you got down to like, you know, the last 30% that actually there was any evidence that the money was actually going into into rainforest protection.

然后你看到这样的头条新闻：亚马逊着火了，印度尼西亚经历了有史以来最严重的火灾季节等等。

And then you're seeing these headlines like Amazon on fire, biggest for a fire season ever in Indonesia, etcetera.

你会想，我们划出来保护的那片土地，到底有没有被保护住，还是已经化为灰烬了？

And you're like, well, was the land that we put aside, like, it protected or did it go up in flames?

因为说实话，我不知道我们是不是该多买一些。

Because like, I don't know, should we buy more?

这到底是个什么情况？

Like, what what's the deal here?

我越深入调查，就越觉得，我根本找不到任何证据表明事情真的发生了。

And the deeper I got into that, the more I was like, like, don't I have no evidence that anything could happen.

所以我真的很想要一个碳去除产品，能让我确信碳确实被去除了，有经过验证，并且我能亲自查看某种账本，确认它确实被正确执行了。

And so I really wanted, like, a carbon removal product where I had trust that it actually had been removed and that it had been verified and that I could personally inspect some kind of ledger to show that it had been done correctly.

所以，Charm 的最初灵感就是一种高质量、可验证的碳去除方式。

So that was kind of the initial inspiration around Charm was a high quality verifiable carbon removal.

所以我们现在正在推进 Charm 这个项目。

So we're kind of moving in the Charm.

你会怎么向你的孩子解释它呢？或者也许更有趣的是，你的孩子是怎么描述它的？

You know, how would you either describe it to your kids or or actually maybe more interesting, how how do your kids describe it?

是的。

Yeah.

我有三个孩子，分别是七岁、五岁和两岁。

I have a seven, five, and two year old.

两岁的孩子更喜欢用他现在能拼凑起来的三个词，跟我们讲动物园的事。

The two year old prefers to talk about the zoo with his, you know, three words he can string together right now.

七岁的孩子已经开始理解了。

A seven year old is starting to understand it though.

我们经常说，世界上有很多问题，气候问题是其中之一，而它的挑战在于这是一个非常长期的问题。

We often you know, there are many problems in the world of which climate is one, and it's challenging because it's a very long term problem.

对吧？

Right?

还有许多其他极其紧迫的问题，而气候问题之所以棘手，是因为它既非常重要，又是一个长期性的问题。

There are lots of other problems that are extremely urgent, and climate is tough because it's one that's both very important but also very long term.

所以我们试着向他解释，就像地球被一层气体笼罩着，而这层气体正变得越来越厚。

And so we we try to describe to to him, you know, as like, there's a blanket around the earth from this gas, and it's just kinda getting thicker and thicker.

总有一天，这会变得非常严重。

And at some point, it's gonna become really problematic.

因此，我正努力让这层毯子变薄，把其中一部分以生物油的形式重新埋回地下。

And so I'm trying to thin that blanket by putting some of that blanket back underground in the form of bio oil.

顺便说一下，当你看到烟雾，有时天空变成橙色时，我们其实可以预防一些野火，因为我们埋入地下的东西是植物物质，否则这些物质会变成野火烟雾释放到空气中。

And along the way, by the way, you know, you see the smoke and sometimes the sky turns orange and, like, we can prevent some of those wildfires because the stuff that we're putting underground is actually plant matter that would otherwise go up in wildfire smoke and so on.

所以，这就是我向他们解释的方式。

So that's kinda how I explain it to them.

而且，碳去除是很重要的。

And, you know, carbon removal is important.

这只是问题的一小部分。

It's a small part of the problem.

首先，我们必须在整个供应链中减少所有排放，而清洁能源——如太阳能、风能和核能、地热能等——是其中的重要部分。

First, we have to reduce all our emissions along the whole supply chain, and clean power is a big part of that with solar and wind and nuclear, geothermal, etcetera.

但很大一部分来自工业领域，比如水泥和钢铁。

But big part of it is industrial, like cement, steel.

这些领域的脱碳非常困难，因此我们应该想办法重新设计工业流程，在生产过程中捕获碳，而不是排放它。

It's, like, really hard to decarbonize areas, and so we should figure out a way to reengineer our industrial processes to remove carbon in their processing instead of emitting it.

所以，‘charm industrial’就是‘char farm industrial’，意思是把生物质从田里移走，留下炭，再把生物油作为工业原料。

So charm industrial is char farm industrial because the idea is you take the biomass off the field, you leave behind the char, and you take the bio oil as an industrial feedstock.

未来，我们希望我们生产的这种液态生物质可以作为这些工业过程的原料。

In the future, we hope that the sort of liquid biomass that we make that we can, you know, use it as a feedstock in those.

我认为，随着成本下降，这可能在二三十年代成为现实。

I think that's probably like a twenty thirties kind of proposition for us as we come down the cost curve.

但今天，我们只是把生物油直接埋到地下。

But, yeah, today, we just take the bio well and stick it underground.

你能给我详细讲讲吗？

Like, walk me through.

我的意思是，你提出了这个想法，然后决定是时候做点新的事情了。

Mean, you come up with the idea, you know, you decide it's time for you to do something new.

当时有哪些早期的迹象让你相信自己方向是对的？

You know, what were the early signals that gave you the confidence of the right direction?

这个想法更多是因为我坚信这件事必须发生，而且需求会随着时间推移而出现。

This one was more like I was convinced that this had to happen and that demand would materialize over time.

这更多是基于直觉，而不是对这些行业的深入了解。

That was based more on instincts than, you know, knowing these industries.

花了好几年时间，不断碰壁，才终于突破了科技行业的圈子，进入软件行业，再深入到钢铁、混凝土、氨气这些领域。

And it took several years of, like, smashing my head against the wall to break out of the tech industry networks into software industry networks into, like, steel, concrete, ammonia.

你知道的？

You know?

我觉得这招可能没那么有效，但有一次，我去芝加哥为Segment跑销售，途中在优步车上临时决定去了一趟CK工业之类的公司总部。

Like, I don't think this worked that well, but, like, you know, at one point, was on a sales trip to Chicago for Segment, and I, like, made a stop in my Uber at, like, the headquarters of, like, CK Industries or something.

有一家公司在美国运营着大部分用于化肥生产的氨工厂。

There's, like, the the company that runs most of the ammonia plants for fertilizer production in The US.

我 literally 打印了一些传单，其实就是一份备忘录，然后直接走进那栋楼，把东西递给了一位秘书，说：‘这个是给X的。’

And I, like, literally, I had, like, printed out, you know, flyers basically with, a memo, And I, like, walked in cold to the building and, like, handed it to a secretary and was like, you know, this is for x.

所以，我真的是一头撞墙，才好不容易进入了一些这样的地方。

So it was like, I really smashed my head against the wall to, like, get into some of these places.

在钢铁方面，另一个非常具有挑战性的情况是，我们有一位投资者，他的弟弟曾经在大学里和某人合住过，而那个人的兄弟后来继承了家族在俄亥俄州的轧钢业务。

Another one on the steel side that was very challenging was we had an investor whose younger brother had been a roommate with someone in college whose brother had then inherited the family's rolled steel products business in Ohio.

所以我通过这层关系联系上了他，这时候我们已经深挖了四层关系。

And so I got an insurer through that chant him, so we're, like, four steps deep already.

然后他把我介绍给了加拿大钢铁协会。

And then he introduced me to, like, the Canadian Steel Association.

加拿大钢铁协会觉得这挺有意思，于是把我介绍给了他们在ArcelorMittal Defasco的同事。

The Canadian Steel Association thought this was interesting enough that they introduced me to their colleagues at ArcelorMittal Defasco.

他们觉得这很有意思，经过三次会面后，终于把我介绍给了位于魁北克的直接还原铁工厂——这原本就是我的目标。

And they thought it was interesting enough that after, like, three meetings, they finally introduced me to the direct reduced iron plant, which was my original target in Quebec.

然后，我就想，哦，我正好会去那个区域。

And then, you know, I was like, oh, I'll be in the area.

像是魁北克北部，你根本就不是在那附近。

Like, it's like Northern Quebec, like, you're not in the area.

所以我直接飞了过去，后来我们建立了一段富有成效的关系。

And so I just like flew out there and that became a productive kind of relationship.

所以我也说不准。

So I don't know.

要打入这些行业真的很难。

It was very hard to break into these industries.

我的意思是，奇怪的是，这似乎和那个细分市场的故事有点相反。

I mean, some ways, oddly enough, it seems like a bit of the opposite to the segment story.

但听起来，也许是客户的需求给了你信心，让你觉得这就是我们需要继续前进的方向。

But also, it sounds like, you know, maybe it was the customer pull that was really giving you the confidence, like, this is direction we need to keep going.

是的。

Yeah.

我不说我们直到2020年才有了客户牵引力，但我也确实没有专注于内部事务。

I wouldn't say that we had customer pull until 2020, but also that I was not internally focused.

我只是觉得这是一个战略性的领域，但要找到产品市场契合点可能需要很长时间。

Like, I had a feeling that this was, like, a strategic area to be in, but that it was gonna take a while to figure out what the product market fit was.

最终，我们在碳去除领域找到了产品市场契合点，说实话，它的增长速度比我预期的要快得多。

And eventually, we found this product market fit on carbon removal, and it's like, it's honestly just grown faster than I expected.

我总是有点怀疑。

Like, I am always a little skeptical.

我在想，到底会有多少人愿意自愿购买碳去除服务呢？

I'm like, but how much voluntary carbon removal are people gonna buy?

你知道的。

You know?

我是它的客户，但其他人真的会为飞行买单吗？

Like, I mean, I was a customer of it, but, like, are other people really gonna step up for plane?

我当时想，我不确定。

I was like, well, I don't know.

我们可能会达到一千万美元的预订量。

Like, we'll probably get to 10,000,000 in bookings.

然后我们达到了一千万，我当时想，我不确定。

Then we got to 10, and I was like, well, I don't know.

我基本上能看到一亿美元的预订量。

Like, I kinda have visibility to a 100,000,000 in bookings.

我们现在有一亿美元的预订量，而且基本上能看到十亿美元的预订量。

And I'm like, well, we're at a 100,000,000 in bookings and, like, kinda have visibility to, like, a billion in bookings.

所以你只能想，好吧，我们就继续推进吧。

And so you're just kinda like, I guess we'll just keep rolling with it.

但重要的是，作为创始人，我没有把时间花在技术流程的繁琐和默默无闻上。

But importantly, I wasn't spending my time as founder on the grinding and obscurity on the technical process.

我一直在努力推进客户对话，比如去雪佛龙炼油厂拜访。

I was trying to go knock down these customer conversations, things like showing up at the Chevron refinery.

我一直在外面实地了解什么对他们有吸引力。

Like, I was out in the field trying to understand what was compelling to them.

彼得提到的一个故事让我印象深刻，他说自己在已经成为一位相当成功的创始人之后，仍然会直接去公司拜访，比如走进魁北克北部的一家公司，走进大堂，然后说：嘿。

One of the stories that Peter talked about that really struck me, you know, he talks about going cold into companies after he's already been a pretty successful founder of his own right, walking to their lobby, like, you know, a company in Northern Quebec and just basically saying, hey.

我想见一下这个人。

Like, I wanna meet with this person.

你能想象这种情况会怎么发展吗？

I mean, how do you imagine that going?

你觉得他身上有什么特别之处？你觉得那些对话是怎么进行的？

And like, what do you think it is about him and and how do you think those conversations went?

我觉得我们早期的失败在于，我们带着一种理所当然的预期进来，觉得我们肯定会成功。

I think our early failure where we came in with such expectation for like, oh, of course, we're going to succeed.

我们之前在其他所有事情上都成功了。

We succeeded at everything else before.

当然，我们一定能做出人们想要的东西。

Oh, of course, we're going to make something that people want.

当然，我这个想法，就是世界应该运作的方式。

Oh, of course, this idea that I have, like, that's the way the world should work.

我觉得被一次次狠狠地提醒，嘿。

I think being hit over the head so many times with, like, hey.

世界并不是非得按那样运转。

The world doesn't necessarily work like that.

世界有它自己的运行方式，关键在于你得弄清楚如何融入其中，并打造一家能让它变得更好一点的公司。

The world works a certain way, and it's kind of up to you to figure out how to fit into it and to build a company that makes it work a little better.

我觉得这个教训对我们所有人都打击很大，尤其是对彼得在产品市场契合度方面。

I think that lesson hit all of us pretty hard and especially Peter on the product market fit side.

所以我认为从那以后，坦白说，彼得最大的超能力就是为一家公司找到市场进入路径。

And so I think since then, like, frankly, Peter's biggest superpower is, like, figuring out the go to market path for a company.

我觉得世界上有大量问题存在，而我认为他会去解决它们。

And I feel like there's lots of problems out there, and I think he's gonna go after them.

从局外人的角度来看，我觉得你们三人后来探讨气候科技以及各种解决方案的方式非常有趣。

You know, from an outsider's perspective, I think it's actually fascinating about how the three of you in some way, post segment explored, you know, climate tech and, you know, kind kind of various solutions.

伊利亚研究火，你研究热泵，而彼得显然在做Charm公司。

You know, Ilya with fire, you with heat pumps, you know, Peter was obviously doing Charm.

我的意思是，你觉得是不是有什么特别的原因？

I mean, do you have any insight into like, was there something in the water?

你觉得是什么让你们三个人都对这个领域产生了广泛的兴趣？

Like, what do you think it was that got all three of you interested broadly in this space?

我觉得对于彼得来说，他一直想解决我们这个时代的一些重大问题，产生更大的影响。

I mean, I think for Peter, he's always wanted to solve, like, one of the big problems of our time and have more of an impact.

如果退一步看，甚至想想离开那个阶段后的生活，我觉得对我们所有人来说，我们都真心想解决某个问题，当我们看到它时，会忍不住说：天啊。

And I guess stepping back, even thinking about kind of, like, post segment life, I think for all of us, we really wanna try and solve some problem where we look at it and we're just like, oh, man.

这感觉是一件值得全力以赴的事情。

Like, this feels like a worthy thing to swing for.

所以对他来说，气候变化显然是我们这个时代最重大的问题之一，他觉得自己有办法解决它。

And so I think for him, obviously, climate change is, like, one of the biggest problems of our time, and he feels like he has a way to solve that.

我觉得他深入钻研并试图理解，这很合理，比如：

I think it it makes a lot of sense that he would, like, get deep into it and try and understand, like, hey.

我该如何建设一批基础设施来解决这个问题？

How can I build a bunch of infrastructure to solve this problem?

我认为他确实对我和伊利亚产生了影响，我想这是因为我们经常讨论这个话题。

I think he's definitely had an impact on me and Ilya as well, I would say, just from, like, talking about this so much.

我觉得我从他和他的妻子艾丽卡那里学到了很多关于气候领域的事情，比如哪里存在问题，以及哪里需要更好的解决方案。

Like, I feel like I've learned so much from both him and his wife Erica about the climate space and, like, where there are problems and where people could use better solutions.

目前，他正在通过Charm公司从事碳去除工作，同时也在帮助运营Revoy这家电动货运初创公司。

Like, right now, he's doing the carbon removal stuff with Charm and also helping run Revoy, this electric freight startup.

所有这些加在一起，真是令人难以置信。

Like, between all those things, it's crazy.

所以我会说，他确实以一种积极的方式影响了我们。

So I would say that's definitely he's rubbed it off on us in a good way.

然后你也加入了Revoy，这是一家我们投资过的公司。

And then you also joined Revoy, which is a company that we've invested in.

你能描述一下Revoy是做什么的，以及你是如何决定参与其中的吗？

Can you describe what Revoy does and how you decide to get involved?

是的。

Yeah.

Revoy是由我的朋友Ian创立的，他也是我们在麻省理工学院时的楼友。

Revoy was founded by my friend Ian, who is another floor mate of ours at MIT.

当Calvin、Eli和我住在一起时，他其实是我们的隔壁邻居。

He was actually our next door neighbor when Calvin, Eli, and I were were roommates.

他对Revoy有一个非常了不起的想法。

A really brilliant idea that he had for Revoy.

这个想法是：在标准的柴油牵引车和标准拖车之间安装一个电动拖车装置。

So the idea is it's an electric dolly that sits in between your standard diesel tractor and a standard trailer.

不需要任何特殊接口，就像你平时把拖车连接到牵引车一样。

No special hookups, like just you would normally hook up a trailer to a tractor.

有趣的是，它在牵引销上装了一个载荷传感器，可以判断卡车是否在加速。

And what's cool about it is that you just have, a load cell in the kingpin, and it basically tells you whether the truck is trying to accelerate or not.

仅凭这一点，就能将94%的机械动力从电动拖车装置提供，而不是来自卡车燃烧的汽油。

And purely on the basis of that, instead of burning gas, you can transfer 94% now of the mechanical power is coming from the electric dolly, not from the gas burning in the in the truck.

这简直太惊人了。

It was pretty incredible.

换句话说，这时候卡车几乎只是在怠速运行。

Like, effectively, the truck is, like, barely idling at this point.

对吧？

Right?

如果你使用了Revoy，你的重型卡车油耗能达到每加仑120英里，而不是7英里。

If you're hooked up to a Revoy, you're doing a 120 miles per gallon in your semi truck instead of seven.

这是一项非常了不起的技术，并且在合适的市场中能迅速推广。

So it's really incredible piece of technology and very quickly in the right markets.

我们认为，只要有25到50台Revoy设备，就能达到毛利为正的水平，也就是与柴油成本持平。

And we think with, like, 25 to 50 Revoy's, we can get to a place where it's gross margin positive, like, breaking even with diesel.

而且这是一个对成本非常敏感的行业。

And that it's a very cost sensitive industry.

所以，如果你能每英里节省哪怕几美分，对运输公司来说就会变得非常有吸引力。

And so I think if you can even start chipping off, like, a few cents per mile, start you to be actually pretty compelling for carriers to use.

从安全角度来看，它的制动距离更短，因为Revoy和卡车的其他轴都配备了再生制动系统。

And from a safety perspective, in many ways, it's better your stopping distance is shorter just because you have the regenerative brakes on the Revoy and other axle in addition to the truck.

而且你还能获得更快的加速，相当于随时拥有双倍的动力。

And you also get faster acceleration, be, like, twice the power at your fingertips.

因此从这个角度看，司机们非常喜欢。

So drivers love it from that perspective.

他们能感受到更好的操控性，比如在驶入高速公路时不会被后车追尾，也不会在加速车道上堵住其他车辆，而且在发生事故或下坡时，制动距离也更短。

They kinda get this better maneuverability of, like, accelerating onto the freeway without getting, you know, hit from behind or jamming someone in the in the on ramp lane as well as, yeah, shorter stopping distances in the case of, like, an accident or coming downhill.

你拥有再生制动系统，能将大量能量回收到电池中，而不是在长下坡时一味地磨损刹车片，甚至可能引发刹车失灵。

You have a regenerative braking that's, like, taking a huge amount of energy into the battery instead of a long downhill where you're just burning brake pads and, you know, could potentially have a brake failure.

因此，这在安全性和驾驶体验方面也有优势。

So there are safety and driver experience benefits as well.

我知道自己只是粗略地了解了你们在这里所做的部分工作。

You know, I've had a a very small view of some of the work you've been able to do help out there.

我必须说，这真的非常令人印象深刻，非常有条理，专注于执行。

And, you know, I have to say it's been super impressive, just super methodical, very focused on execution.

你在Segment和Charm积累的最重要经验有哪些，现在应用到了Revoy上？

What are some of the main lessons from Segment and Charm that you think you've been able to bring to Revoy?

我认为从Charm的经验中学到的最重要的一课，虽然很痛苦，就是删除某些部件真的非常重要。

I think from the Charm experience, the number one learning, which has been quite painful, is just, like, deleting the part is really important.

如果你能消除一个部件，就能降低维护成本，减少故障模式，几乎总是能提高可靠性。

Like, if you can eliminate a part, you lower the maintenance cost, you lower the failure mode, so you increase reliability almost always.

你知道，这少了一件需要设计和跟踪的事情，我怎么强调都不为过：如果你能删掉某样东西，就一定要删掉。

You know, it's one less thing that has to be designed and kept track of, and I just can't overstate, like, if you can delete something, you must delete it.

我给你举一个Revoy当前的例子。

I'll give you one example for Revoy right now.

我们现在的后轴可以转向，这在挂接拖车时非常方便。

We have a we have turning on the rear axle, which is really convenient when you're trying to hitch it up.

但你会因此增加很多摩擦，还需要额外的重量。

But you get a lot of extra friction, need a lot of extra weight.

所有这些部件都需要管理那个可转向的车轴。

There's, like, all these components that then are managing the fact that that axle can turn.

总之，我们正在对此进行实验。

Anyway, so we're experimenting with that.

我对此非常兴奋，因为如果你取消了转向功能，就能去掉所有这些齿轮、摩擦和其他各种部件。

I'm very excited about this because if you delete the ability to turn, you delete all these gears, you do all this friction, all these, like, other pieces.

所以，任何你能找到办法删掉的东西，都会带来巨大的变革。

So it looks like anything that you can find a way to delete is, like, so transformative.

现在要把‘删掉这个部件’当作座右铭。

So delete the part as a mantra now.

你觉得彼得在优势方面有什么特别之处？他独特地贡献了哪些别人难以企及的东西？

What do you think is special about Peter in terms of his strengths, terms of what he, like, uniquely contributes as different than most other people?

彼得能够在如此广泛的领域中深入钻研，可能比我认识的任何人都更广。

Peter is able to go deep in such a broad range of subjects, like maybe more than almost anyone I know.

这简直令人难以置信。

It's ridiculously impressive.

他能迅速跨越不同学科，深入多个领域，或许比我还见过的任何人都更投入。

He's, like, quickly able to cross disciplines and dive into a bunch of different areas, like, maybe more voraciously than anyone else I've ever seen.

所以，我认为，找到一个这样的人——他既有如此广博的涉猎范围，又能以深刻、缜密且注重细节的方式去执行，是非常罕见的。

And so I think finding all of those in one person who has that range, but also has that ability to then go and just, like, execute in, like, a very deep, thoughtful, and inspection driven way, I think is very rare.

因为我觉得我经常和很多投资者交谈。

Because I guess I I feel like I talk to a lot of investors.

我觉得投资者的视野很广，但通常缺乏那种运营节奏。

Like, I think investors have the range, but, like, not often that sort of, like, operational cadence.

所以，单就彼得想要把事情做成的意愿而言，我不会对他持怀疑态度。

So I I would not bet against Peter just in terms of his desire to go and get things done.

从某种意义上说，生活中的乐趣就在于奋斗以及随之而来的所有学习。

The joy in life in some sense is like the struggle and and all the learning that comes along with it.

我不确定。

I don't know.

我觉得有很多重大问题亟待解决，因此去应对这些问题很有趣。

I feel like there are big problems that need to need to be solved, so fun to to go tackle them.

这太棒了。

Well, that's awesome.

这次对话真的非常棒。

This was really great.

谢谢分享你的故事。

Thanks for sharing your story.

是的。

Yeah.

谢谢你邀请我。

Thanks for having me.

本播客由Leap Forward Ventures赞助，这是一家投资早期初创企业的风投机构。

This podcast is brought to you by Leap Forward Ventures, an investor in early stage startups.

如果你喜欢这个节目，最重要的事情是注册以接收新剧集发布的通知，其中包括每期故事的文本稿和关键要点。

If you like the show, the number one thing you'll want to do is sign up to get notified when we release new episodes that includes transcripts and key takeaways from each story.

请前往leapforward.fm注册。

Head to leapforward.fm to sign up.

我也很希望听到你对本集的反馈，以及你希望下一期邀请谁做客。

I'd also love to hear your feedback on the episode and who you want to hear from next.

请发送短信至(415) 915-3050与我们联系。

Just shoot us a text at (415) 915-3050 to get in touch.

本集由西奥·巴尔科姆和金·纳德芬·彼得塞制作。

This episode was produced by Theo Balcom and Kim Naderfain Peterse.

克雷格·埃利是我们工程师。

Craig Elli is our engineer.

里斯·拉达诺设计了我们的封面艺术。

Reese Ladano made our cover art.

音乐由温德利公司的吉姆·布鲁姆伯格和本·兰斯弗克创作。

Music is by Jim Brumberg and Ben Lansverk of Wonderly.

我是大卫·鲁塞诺，这里是Leaf Forward播客。

I'm David Rusenko, and this is the Leaf Forward podcast.

下集见。

See you next episode.