本集简介
双语字幕
仅展示文本字幕，不包含中文音频；想边听边看，请使用 Bayt 播客 App。
对我来说，公司每个项目都故意人员不足非常重要。
It is really important to me that we feel that we've deliberately understaffed every project at the company.
如果你人手过多，就会出现政治斗争，人们会去做那些优先级本不该那么低的事情。
If you overstaff, you get politics, you get people working on things that are further down the priority list than necessary.
那是毒药。
That is poison.
这是浪费。
It's wasteful.
它会拖慢你的进度。
It slows you down.
它会制造冗余。
It creates cruft.
你曾在Rippling担任了很长时间的首席运营官。
You've been a long time COO at Rippling.
最近，你转任Rippling的首席产品官（CPO）。
Recently, you moved into CPO, chief product officer at Rippling.
你经常提到，非凡的成果需要非凡的努力。
Something you talk a lot about is that extraordinary results require extraordinary efforts.
如果你想在成果上达到前百分之一，那将会非常困难。
If you wanna be in the ninety ninth percentile in terms of outcomes, it's gonna be really difficult.
你得不断提醒人们，如果他们在工作中发现自己处于舒适区，那肯定是在犯错。
You gotta sort of remind people that if they ever find themselves in the comfort zone at work, they are definitely making a mistake.
工作本该让人精疲力尽。
It's supposed to be really freaking exhausting.
你非常支持及时升级问题吗？
You're a big fan of escalating issues?
从根本上说，最自私的行为就是对他人隐瞒反馈。
Fundamentally, the most selfish thing you can do is withhold feedback from someone.
当你想到一个能帮助他人改进的想法，却因为怕让自己不舒服而选择不说，那你就是在为自己的舒适度着想，这本质上是自私的。
When you think a thought that would help someone improve and you avoid giving it to them because it would make you uncomfortable, well, you're optimizing for your own comfort, and it's fundamentally selfish.
太多人的团队都未能高效运转。
So many people have teams that are not functioning incredibly well.
团队会
Teams will
总是优先考虑局部的舒适，而非公司整体成果。
always optimize for local comfort over company outcomes.
企业中最纯粹的抱负和最强烈的能量来源，是创始CEO。
The purest form of ambition and most intense source of energy in the business is the founder CEO.
在创始CEO之外的每一层管理圈，都可能使能量强度下降一个数量级。
Every next concentric circle of management beyond the founder CEO has the potential to be an order of magnitude drop off in intensity.
这他妈太危险了。
That is fucking dangerous.
作为高管、作为领导者，你的职责是尽可能保持这种高强度。
As an executive, as a leader, your job is to preserve that intensity at its highest possible level.
你对自己创业公司有过一些非常有趣的经历。
You've had a couple of really interesting experiences with your own startup.
我们在硅谷常说永不放弃，但这完全是风险资本的胡说八道。
We talk in Silicon Valley about never quit, but that is complete, venture capital bullshit.
今天，我的嘉宾是马特·麦吉尼斯，Rippling的首席产品官，曾任长期首席运营官。
Today, my guest is Matt McGinnis, chief product officer and formerly long time chief operating officer at Rippling.
如果你对Rippling不太了解，它是一家极其成功的公司，最近估值超过160亿美元。
If you don't know much about Rippling, it's a massively successful business, last valued at over $16,000,000,000.
他们拥有超过5000名员工，而马特对这一成功起到了关键作用。
They have over 5,000 employees, and Matt has been instrumental to that success.
他还拥有极其罕见的特质：极度诚实、丰富的经验，曾打造一家复杂且极其成功的公司，并能清晰地阐述自己所学到的一切。
He's also got a really rare combination of brutal honesty, a ton of experience building a very complex and very successful business, and being able to clearly articulate what he has learned really well.
马特分享了许多我在这档播客中从未听其他人提及的见解和建议，听完这次对话后，我觉得每位领导者都必须听取他的建议。
Matt shared a lot of insights and advice that I have not heard anyone else on this podcast share, and I left this conversation feeling that every leader needs to hear his advice.
衷心感谢阿尔伯特·斯克拉希姆和孙利·拉赫曼为本次对话建议了话题和问题。
A huge thank you to Albert Scrashim and Sunil Rahman for suggesting topics and questions for this conversation.
如果你喜欢这档播客，请别忘了在你最喜欢的播客应用或YouTube上订阅和关注。
If you enjoy this podcast, don't forget to subscribe and follow it in your favorite podcasting app or YouTube.
这会有极大的帮助。
It helps tremendously.
如果你成为我通讯的年度订阅者，你将免费获得19款精彩产品的全年使用权。
And if you become an annual subscriber of my newsletter, you get a year free of 19 incredible products.
整整一年的Lovable、Replit、Bolt、Gamma、Aneta、Linear、Devon、Post Talk、Superhuman、Descript、Whisperful of Perplexity、Warp、Granola、Magic Patterns、Raycast、Chappy R D Mobbin和Stripe Atlas。
An entire year of Lovable, Replit, Bolt, Gamma, Aneta, Linear, Devon, Post talk, superhuman, descript, whisperful of perplexity, warp, granola, magic patterns, raycast, chappy r d mobbin, and Stripe Atlas.
前往lennysnewsletter.com，点击Product Pass。
Head on over to lennysnewsletter.com and click product pass.
好了，接下来在简短的赞助商广告后，我为大家带来Matt McGinnis。
With that, I bring you Matt McGinnis after a short word from our sponsors.
本播客由谷歌赞助。
This podcast is sponsored by Google.
大家好。
Hey, folks.
我是Amar，谷歌DeepMind的产品与设计负责人。
I'm Amar, product and design lead at Google DeepMind.
你是否曾想为自己、朋友构建一个应用，或者终于实现你一直梦想的副业项目？
Have you ever wanted to build an app for yourself, your friends, or finally launch that side project you've been dreaming about?
现在，你无需任何编程背景，只需通过 Google AI Studio 中的 Gemini 3，就能将任何想法变为现实。
Now you can bring any idea to life, no coding background required, with Gemini three in Google AI Studio.
这被称为氛围编码，我们让它变得极其简单。
It's called vibe coding, and we're making it dead simple.
只需描述你的应用，Gemini 就会为你自动连接合适的模型，让你专注于创意构想。
Just describe your app, and Gemini will wire up the right models for you so you can focus on your creative vision.
前往 ai.studio/build 创建你的第一个应用。
Head to a i.studio/build to create your first app.
本集由 Datadog 赞助，Datadog 现已整合 Epo，全球领先的实验与功能开关平台。
This episode is brought to you by Datadog, now home to Epo, the leading experimentation and feature flagging platform.
全球顶尖公司的产品经理都在使用 Datadog——这正是他们的工程师每天依赖的平台，用于将产品洞察与产品问题（如 Bug、用户体验摩擦和商业影响）联系起来。
Product managers at the world's best companies use Datadog, the same platform their engineers rely on every day to connect product insights to product issues like bugs, UX friction, and business impact.
它从产品分析开始，产品经理可以观看用户回放、分析转化漏斗、深入研究留存率，并探索增长指标。
It starts with product analytics, where PMs can watch replays, review funnels, dive into retention, and explore their growth metrics.
当其他工具止步时，Datadog 却走得更远。
Where other tools stop, Datadog goes even further.
它能帮助你真正诊断出漏斗流失、错误和用户体验摩擦的影响。
It helps you actually diagnose the impact of funnel drop offs and bugs and UX friction.
一旦你知道该关注哪里，实验就能证明哪些方法有效。
Once you know where to focus, experiments prove what works.
当我还在Airbnb时，我亲身体验到了这一点，我们的实验平台对于分析哪些方法有效、哪些环节出错至关重要。
I saw this firsthand when I was at Airbnb, where our experimentation platform was critical for analyzing what worked and where things went wrong.
而构建Airbnb实验平台的同一团队，也打造了Epo。
And the same team that built the experimentation at Airbnb built Epo.
Datadog还让你通过会话回放超越数字本身。
Datadog then lets you go beyond the numbers with session replay.
通过热力图和滚动图，精确观察用户如何与产品互动，真正理解他们的行为。
Watch exactly how users interact with heat maps and scroll maps to truly understand their behavior.
所有这些功能都由与实时数据关联的功能标志驱动，使你能够安全发布、精准定向并持续学习。
And all of this is powered by feature flags that are tied to real time data so that you can roll out safely, target precisely, and learn continuously.
Datadog不仅仅是工程指标。
Datadog is more than engineering metrics.
这里是优秀产品团队快速学习、智能修复并自信发布的地方。
It's where great product teams learn faster, fix smarter, and ship with confidence.
请访问 datadoghq.com/lenny 申请演示。
Request a demo at datadoghq.com/lenny.
就是 datadoghq.com/lenny。
That's datadoghq.com/lenny.
马特，非常感谢你来到这里，欢迎来到本播客。
Matt, thank you so much for being here, and welcome to the podcast.
谢谢你的邀请。
Thank you for having me.
我想从一件我知道对你非常重要、你经常谈论、但人们在类似这样的播客中却听得太少的事情开始，那就是非凡的成果需要非凡的努力。
I wanna start with something that I know is really important to you, something you talk a lot about that I don't think people hear enough on podcasts like this, which is that extraordinary results require extraordinary efforts.
谈谈为什么这一点如此重要，你认为人们需要听到什么。
Talk about why this is so important, what you think people need to hear.
这个说法实际上是我一位朋友丹·吉尔提出的，他是Carvana公司的首席产品官，而Carvana这家公司也因未能获得足够认可而令人遗憾，它实际上是一家非常出色的科技公司。
I this is a term that phrasing I actually attribute to a friend of mine, Dan Gill, who's the chief product officer at Carvana, which as a company also doesn't get enough credit for how much of a tech company it actually is super interesting.
对我来说，这通常是一个通用框架，我今天跟你说的很多内容其实并不专门针对产品工作。
And I think as a general framework for me, not just and a lot of what I say with you today is not really specific to product in any way.
我们其实应该谈谈这一点。
We should actually talk about that.
产品职能实际上是管理这一普遍概念的具体体现。
It's like the product function is an instantiation of, like, the general concept of management.
比如，首席产品官和首席其他官并没有太大区别。
Like, being a chief product officer is not that different from being a chief whatever officer.
你需要运用相同的框架和理念，才能让团队共同实现目标。
You have to apply the same frameworks and concepts to get people to achieve goals together.
但有一件事是绝对普遍的，我认为我们——尤其是在硅谷，很多人并没有真正内化这一点——那就是，如果你想实现真正非凡的成果，如果你想在成果上达到前1%的水平，那一定会非常困难。
But one thing that is, like, absolutely universal that I think we honestly, I think we forget it in Silicon Valley where a lot of people don't sort of internalize it is that if you wanna accomplish something truly extraordinary, if you wanna be in the ninety ninth percentile in terms of outcomes, it's gonna be really difficult.
这会非常不舒服。
Like, it's gonna be really uncomfortable.
你必须不断提醒人们：如果他们在工作中感到舒适，那他们肯定犯了错误。
And you gotta sort of remind people of that that if they ever find themselves in the comfort zone at work, they are definitely making a mistake.
他们肯定在某些地方搞砸了。
Like, they have definitely screwed up somehow.
非凡的努力并不足以带来非凡的结果，但毫无疑问，它是完全必要的。
It's not that it's not that an extraordinary effort is sufficient to an extraordinary outcome, but it is 100% true that it is necessary.
因此，我确实将这一框架作为自己领导风格的指导原则。
And so I do use that framework as a sort of guiding principle in my own leadership.
为了让这一点对人们来说更真实，有哪些特别艰难的时刻可以举例？
To To make this even more real for people, what are examples of moments that were extraordinarily hard?
这并不是关于任何宏大的单一故事。
It is not about any sort of grand single story.
我认为，真相实际上是通过无数细小的事情展现出来的。
I think the truth the story is actually told through a thousand little things.
所以对我来说，这个故事是通过成千上万的Jira工单讲述的，而不是通过成千上万的宏大事件。
And so for me, the story is told through a thousand Jira tickets, not through a thousand grand events.
非凡努力这件事提醒我们，它本就应该让人精疲力尽。
The extraordinary effort thing is is is an reminder that, like, it's supposed to be really freaking exhausting.
就该是这样的。
It's supposed to be.
所以，比如周五晚上，当你突然收到紧急事件，或者工程团队发来一堆新bug需要你紧急处理时，这些时刻正是优秀员工和优秀团队与普通员工和普通团队的分水岭。
So, like, on Friday night, when you get hit with an escalation on Friday night, when you get sort of, you know, hit with a bunch of new bugs from someone in the engineering team that you've got a triage, those are the moments where great players and great teams are separated from good players and good teams.
在Rippling这样的公司说这话很容易，因为我们正在赢。
And it's so easy to say this at a company like Rippling because because we're winning.
比如，作为一家公司，尽管我们有各种问题，我们今天确实应该花时间讨论哪些地方还不完美、还不够好。
Like, as a company, for all of our foibles, and we should spend time today talking about where things are not perfect and not great.
但公司基于现有收入基础的增长率是非凡的，真的非常令人信服。
But the growth rate of the company on the on the revenue foundation that we have is extraordinary, like, really, really compelling.
它为你作为领导者提供了空间，让你能站在团队面前说：嘿，伙计们。
And it it gives you as a leader the air cover to get up in front of your team and say, hey, guys.
我需要你们最后一点精力。
I need the last ounce of oil that you've got left.
如果你的公司增长不快，事情没那么好，增长率只有30%或40%，那么作为员工，在周五、周六或周日拼尽全力投入工作，就不会有那么强的成就感，因为你不知道这些付出会不会有回报。
And if your company is not growing very quickly, if things aren't that great, if your growth rate is 30% or 40%, you know, it doesn't feel as good as a contributor in that business to, like, lean in and give everything you've got on Friday or Saturday or Sunday because you don't know that it's gonna yield much.
因此，非凡的结果需要非凡的努力。
And so extraordinary results, outcomes demand extraordinary efforts.
但如果根本没有可能取得非凡成果，就很难激发非凡的努力。
But if there's no chance at an extraordinary outcome, it's very hard to get the extraordinary effort.
因此，我喜欢提醒里pling的同事们，能够成为这样一个团队的一员是多么罕见——你周五或其他任何时间付出的非凡努力，真的能促成非凡的成果。
And so I like to remind people at Rippling at least that, like, it's so rare to have the opportunity to be able to be a part of a team where the extraordinary effort that you do put in on Friday or whatever whenever it is is actually contributing to an extraordinary result.
这是一种非常特殊且罕见的机遇，这给了我作为领导者的超能力，因为当我从那些感到无聊和疲惫的员工身上榨取最后一丝精力时，我可以依靠这一点。
It's a it's a it's a very special and rare thing, and it gives me a superpower as a leader because I can lean on that when I, you know, when I'm wringing the oil out of somebody who's in the bored and tired zone.
我实际上在Airbnb和Brian Chesky身上也看到了同样的情况。
I saw the same thing actually at Airbnb with Brian Chesky.
我总感觉事情进展得非常顺利，好像在某个产品大获成功后，我们可以稍微歇一口气。
I always felt like things were going great and, like, maybe we could take a break after something we shipped was killing it.
但感觉总是恰恰相反。
And it always felt like the opposite.
总是在想，我们怎么才能再踩一脚油门？
It always felt like, how do we press the gas pedal further?
我们如何更快前进？
How do we go faster?
我们如何做得更大？
How do we go bigger?
从来没有任何可以休息的时刻。
There's never, a moment to take a break.
我在苹果工作了七年，在史蒂夫·乔布斯担任CEO期间向他学习，了解我们所谓的‘死亡行军’——那就是我们对工程师们所做的事情。
I spent seven years at Apple and learned under Steve Jobs, you know, when he was the CEO, learned what we called the death march, which is what we did to the engineers.
一旦你发布了一个版本的iPhone，就会立刻被扔进构建下一个版本的深渊，根本没有休息的时间。
It was like, the the soon as you ship one version of the the iPhone, like, you were just immediately thrown into the into the pit of building the next one, and there was no break.
这简直永无止境。
It was just it was just relentless.
但最终，这确实带来了非凡的成果。
And talk about an extraordinary outcome at the end of the day.
没有任何喘息的机会。
There is no relief.
在竞争激烈的市场中，如果市场有价值，就必然充满竞争。
It's just like every in a competitive market, and and if the market is valuable, it's competitive.
毫无疑问。
No question.
如果你在战场上留下任何空隙，稍微给竞争对手留下一点机会，他们100%会去填补那个缺口。
If you leave anything on the field, if you sort of leave a crack for your competitor, like, 100% chance they're gonna go fill that crack.
因此，你必须毫不松懈。
And so you have to be relentless.
整个组织绝不能有任何松懈。
There can be no relaxation of the organization.
这并不意味着人们不能来来去去，不能休假，或者不能过自己的生活，当然可以。
Doesn't mean people can't come and go or people can't take vacations or sort of live their lives, of course.
你不能忽视人是活生生的个体。
And you can't it's not like people are human beings.
你不能把个人压垮，但整个团队作为一个集体，必须时刻保持警觉。
You can't grind the individuals down, but the team as as a collective group of people has to be sort of on the ball all the time.
不能有任何停歇。
There can't be a break.
如果你留下一个空隙，你就等于是邀请更饥饿的竞争对手来抢走你的饭碗。
And if you leave one, you're just begging for the slightly more hungry competitor to come and eat your lunch.
你知道，这就是资本主义的美妙之处。
And, you know, that's the beauty of capitalism.
而且，非常反直觉的是，也许从更乐观的角度来看，当你给团队空间无所事事时，坏事就会发生。
Also, very counterintuitively and maybe, like, the the more optimistic perspective here is when you do give your team space to just twiddle their thumbs, bad things start to happen.
根据我的经验，士气实际上会下降。
Morale actually dips in my experience.
人们会分心。
People get distracted.
他们会想，我们到底在做什么？
They're like, oh, what are we even doing?
这没什么意思。
It's not interesting.
我发现，让员工保持忙碌、有动力和充满激情，即使你认为他们可能会因为放几周假、放慢节奏而更快乐，但实际上，这些时刻他们的士气反而会更低。
I find that keeping people busy and motivated and fired up, even though you may think they'll be happier taking a, like, many week break and slowing things down, I find they get more more actually goes down in those in those moments.
这是我经常使用的一个管理框架。
Here's the so here's the management framework that I use fairly often.
作为高管，你无法确切知道如何做出每一个决策都是正确的。
As an executive, you don't know how to get any decision exactly right.
这是无法预知的。
It's not knowable.
你不知道该分配多少预算。
You don't know how much budget to allocate.
你不知道该为一个项目安排多少人。
You don't know how many people to put on a project.
你不知道该如何设定交付产品的截止日期。
You don't know how to set a deadline for when you're gonna ship something.
但当然，你必须设定一个默认值。
But, of course, you have to set some default.
你做出最好的猜测，然后围绕这个猜测进行管理，并在过程中不断学习。
You you make your best guess, and then you manage to that best guess, and you learn as you go.
因为在软件开发和一般商业中，一切都是涌现出来的。
Because in software development and in in business in general, everything's emergent.
这些事情无法从上至下或先验地知晓，因此你只能做出最佳猜测。
It's these are not things that are knowable top down or a priori, and so you take a best guess.
既然知道你无法得到正确答案，你就需要判断相对于你感知的中点，是过度调整还是调整不足更好。
And knowing that you're not going to get the right answer, you need to decide whether oversteering or understeering relative to your perceived midpoint is is better.
那么我们来谈谈人员配置。
And so let's talk about staffing.
比如，当你为一个项目配置人员时，在明知无法准确把握的情况下，是人手过多好，还是人手不足好？
Like, when you staff a project, is it better to overstaff, or is it better to understaff knowing that you can't get it right?
嗯，人手不足更好。
Well, it's better to understaff.
如果你人手过多，就会出现你刚才说的所有问题。
If you overstaff, you get everything you just said.
你会遇到政治斗争。
You get politics.
你会看到人们在做那些优先级比必要情况更低的事情，我认为这最重要。
You get people working, I think most importantly, on things that are further down the priority list than necessary.
你有一份包含20项任务的优先级列表，你知道必须先做前五项，但接下来的十五项则比较模糊，而你却为这个项目配备了过多的人手。
You have, like, 20 things on a stack rank list and, like, you know that you gotta do the top five, but the next 15 down is kind of ambiguous, but you've overstaffed the project.
所以，接下来的十项任务就开始被处理了。
So, like, the next 10 things down are getting worked on.
在你还不确定它们是否必要之前就着手去做，这是有害的。
Before you even know if they're necessary, that is poison.
这是浪费。
It's wasteful.
它会拖慢你的进度。
It slows you down.
它会制造技术垃圾。
It creates cruft.
因此，很明显，人员不足比人员过剩更少有害。
And so it's very clear that understaffing is less evil than overstaffing.
在这个特定的框架中，建议始终故意减少人员配置。
In this particular framework, the advice is understaff deliberately always.
而智慧的部分在于知道不要过度减少人员，并能够区分这两者之间的差异。
And then the wisdom the wisdom element is to know not to under understaff and sort of knowing the difference between those two things.
这就是我们在Ripleying公司的工作方式。
And so that's the way we work at Ripleying.
每个人都在不断要求更多资源。
Everyone is constantly asking for more resources.
当然，在我们负担得起且合适的情况下，新的资源会到位。
And, of course, where we can afford to and where it's appropriate, new resources arrive.
但对我来说，非常重要的是，我们要意识到公司每个项目都故意人员不足。
But it is really important to me that we feel that we've deliberately understaffed every project at the company.
有一位之前的嘉宾，我忘了是谁了。
There's a previous guest, I forget who that this who this was.
他们用了一个比喻，说他们希望团队处于脱水状态，总是渴望更多的水。
They used this metaphor of they want their team to be dehydrated, to always be wanting more water.
然后最终，他们变得太脱水了。
And then eventually, they're too dehydrated.
然后，我们需要一个人来
And then, Let's we needed someone to
帮忙。
help.
有意思。
Interesting.
是的。
Yeah.
有一句话大致是这样的：我想确保我读一下这段话，因为我觉得这非常好。
There's a line along the lines of extraordinary efforts I wanna make sure I read because I think this is really good.
这可能是对你所说内容的一种总结：优秀的团队会感到疲惫，而正是这时，伟大的团队会击败优秀的团队。
This may be a way to summarize what you're saying, that good teams get tired, and that's when great teams kick the good teams' asses.
是的。
Yes.
这句话实际上是孙宁说的，他从一位女子篮球队教练那里看到的。
This was a quote actually from Sunil, and he found it from a from a women's basketball team coach.
这正好印证了我之前的观点：你必须时刻让引擎运转在红线区间，因为只要你一松懈、一减速、一放松，给竞争对手留下一丝缝隙，优秀的团队就会趁虚而入，把普通团队打得落花流水。
And it is it is to my point earlier about, like, you gotta run the engine at in in the red line at all times because the minute you let your guard down, the minute you slow down, the minute you relax, the minute you leave a crack for your competition, the great teams are gonna come in and kick the good team's ass.
你知道，说到体育，我并不是个很爱运动的人，但体育的比喻却让人难以抗拒，因为归根结底，商业就是一场游戏。
And it's like, you know, sports I'm not a very sporty guy, but sports analogies are sort of irresistible because at the end of the day, business is a game.
你知道，这些其实都没那么重要。
You know, none of this matters.
我们不可能把它们带进坟墓。
We're not gonna carry it to the grave.
你来到这个世界，做这些事，是因为它们在你活着的时候能带给你某种满足感。
It's like, you're here you're here to do this stuff because it somehow fulfills you while you're on the planet.
我热爱商业这场运动，尽管我几乎不看体育比赛，但我发现它和军事一样充满策略。
And I love the sport of business, and I find that that sports, notwithstanding the fact that I watch very little of it, isn't is a very that military.
你知道，这些是非常丰富的资源，可以从中提炼出适用于领导力的平行概念。
You know, those are very ripe sources of parallel concepts to apply in leadership.
我也发现，那些最紧张、压力最大、通宵达旦的时刻，恰恰是你在打造事业时最难忘、也最怀念的时刻。
I find also those most intense stressful long nights are the moments you remember most and remember most fondly back to when you're building something.
不过，关键正如你所说，事情必须顺利进行。
The key though is that it has to go well, as you said.
如果你成功了、赢了，这一切最终都会变得浪漫而令人怀旧。
If you are succeeding and winning, all of this is romantic in the end and nostalgic.
还记得我们曾经一起打造这个东西，熬到深夜，终于上线的那段时光吗？
Remember that time we built this thing and worked late nights and shipped this thing?
如果事情毫无起色，你就不会有这种感觉。
If it doesn't go anywhere, you don't you don't feel that.
所以我认为，这非常重要的一点是：你必须取得胜利，必须成功。
So I think that's a really important component of this is you need to be winning and succeeding.
我的一点体会来自帕克，他是Ripling的CEO。
I mean, one thing that I've learned from Parker is Parker's our CEO of Ripling.
他说，你知道，你其实不是从错误中学习的。
He, you know, he said, you don't you don't really learn from your mistakes.
你是从成功中学习的。
You learn from your successes.
当然，我也这么认为，他会承认，你确实能从错误中学到一点东西。
And I it's like, you do, of course, and he would admit, you you learn a bit from mistakes.
但我确实觉得这是一种让人感觉良好的废话，就像你说，你没成功，但至少你学到了点什么。
But I do think that this is sort of feel good bullshit that, you know, it's like, well, you know, you didn't succeed, but, you know, at least you learned something.
我经历过失败。
I've had failures.
比如，当我回顾从2009年第一天开始投入Inkling，直到2018年把这家公司卖给一家私募股权公司这九年时光，经历了硅谷潮流的上升，又跌入了默默无闻的另一端。
Like, when I look back at the nine years I spent working on Inkling from day one in 2009 until we sold that business to a private equity firm in 2018, up the curve of Silicon Valley coolness back down the other side into obscurity.
当然，那段时间我学到了很多，成长了很多，但如今，我想算算，距离我在Rippling工作已经快七年了，我学到的东西却多得多，因为我见证了成功。
Like, of course, I learned and grew a ton during that time, but in now what I think is six or seven years, I'm trying to do the math, seven years coming up on at Rippling, I've learned so much more because I've seen success.
我亲眼目睹了公司迅猛、疯狂、超出预期的成功，这更具有启发性。
Like, I've seen rapid, wild, crazy, off the charts success of the business, and it's more informative.
与其从错误中学习，不如从正确的做法中汲取更多经验。
Like, there's more to glean from seeing how it's done right than there is to glean from seeing how it's done wrong.
如果我告诉你，你要乘坐一架飞机，一位维修技师见过正确操作一百次，另一位虽然见过错误操作一百次并声称从错误中学习了，
If I tell you you're gonna get on an airplane and one maintenance technician has seen it done right a 100 times and the other maintenance technician has seen it done wrong a 100 times, but he learned from his mistakes.
但如果他自己从未成功过，拜托，别开玩笑了。
Like, if it still hasn't had any success himself, I mean, give me a break.
这两架飞机，你根本不用比较，就知道该选哪一架更安心。
There's not even a comparison which plane you're gonna feel more comfortable on.
所以我认为，‘从错误中学习’这种说法不过是一种安慰性的陈词滥调，现实中其实没什么实质依据。
And so I do think that, like, learning from your mistakes thing is a bit of a feel good trope that actually has very little substance in reality.
这就是为什么，作为刚入行的产品经理，或者坦白说，无论你处于职业生涯的哪个阶段，如果你想学习，就应该加入一支成功的团队。
It's it's and it's why as an early career product manager or it's it's why, like, frankly, at any stage of your career when you wanna learn, you should join a winning team.
二十岁就去创业固然很酷。
Like, it's cool to go and start a company at 22.
祝你好运。
Good luck to you.
几率并不站在你这边，但当我看简历时，如果看到某人曾加入过那些在高速增长、充满活力的优秀公司，
The the odds are not in your favor, but the folks who when I look at a resume and I see that someone's joined they were at, like, really good companies when those companies were super exciting and in crazy growth mode.
我就会立刻想面试这位候选人，因为我很想听听他从一个成功团队中学到了什么。
I'm like, I instantly wanna interview that candidate because I wanna hear what they learned from being part of a winning team.
这几乎是我评估候选人时的首选标准之一，我认为这是一个被低估的准则。
And that's that's sort of one of my go to heuristics when I'm looking at candidate profiles, and I think it's an undertold trope.
但别误会。
Like but not sorry.
这不是一个被低估的准则。
Not an undertold trope.
这是一条我在硅谷认为人们还不够重视的建议：成功会带来更多的成功，你应该去追求成功。
It's a it's a piece of advice that I don't think people embrace enough in the valley that, like, success begets success, and you should chase success.
说到成功和学习，你长期担任Rippling的首席运营官。
Speaking of success and learning, you've been a long time COO at Rippling.
而你最近之所以来这里，是因为你刚刚升任Rippling的首席产品官，这非常令人兴奋，也非常罕见。
And the reason you're here, recently, you moved into CPO, Chief Product Officer at Rippling, which is very exciting and very rare.
我很少看到CO转去做产品。
I don't see a lot of COs moving into product.
让我问问你，为什么你要转到这个职位？
Let me ask you why that why did you move into into that role?
我觉得你在CO岗位上表现得非常出色，也许这就是原因。
I feel like you've been killing it at CO, maybe that's the reason.
小心你擅长的事情。
Be careful what you're good at.
另外，转去做产品有哪些让你意外的地方？
And, also, just what what are some surprises about this about moving into product?
因为很多人对产品岗位的想象和实际做起来是不一样的。
Because a lot of people imagine what it's like, and then you're actually doing it.
Rippling的故事相当有趣。
The story at Rippling is pretty interesting.
我会讲一讲，因为我觉得这能解释我为什么做出这个转变，但这其实不是关于我的事。
And I'll tell it because I think it explains why, you know, why I'm making this transition, but this isn't really about me.
我认为这是一个你的听众会觉得很有用的模式。
I think it's sort of a pattern that your listeners would find useful.
一般来说，你最优秀的高管是那些你可以随便丢进任何挑战中，他们都能化混乱为秩序的人。
In general, your best executives are the ones that you can mostly toss into any challenge, and they will bring order to chaos.
他们会把问题解决掉。
They will fix the thing.
我很欣赏里普林公司的人对我的评价，比如提到麦金尼斯的受伤鸟类——在任何时刻，总有一些职能陷入混乱或岌岌可危，而我会专注于那个职能，仔细梳理，让它重回正轨，成功率可能高达80%。
And I do appreciate the terms that people have used at Ripley for me, you know, talking about McGinniss' injured birds, where at any given moment, some function is in disarray or in jeopardy, and I go and focus very carefully on that function to get it back in order, batting 800 maybe.
你知道的？
You know?
并不是每次都大获成功，但我几乎在所有领域都这么做过，除了研发。
Like, not always wild success, but I did that anywhere except r and d.
我会考虑帮助销售团队的某些部分，比如我们的渠道团队，或者当招聘职能因公司增长需要重新调整时，我曾多次花时间重建它。
I would be I would, you know, think about helping out with components of the sales organization, like our channel team, or I spent time, you know, building out the recruiting function a few times when it needed to be sort of rethought in response to our growth.
但唯独不会去研发。
And but it never r and d.
所以我常常跷着二郎腿，坐在桌边，望着远处那片火光冲天的混乱场面，看着它冒着烟，心想会不会有人进去处理一下。
And so I I sort of I I would have my feet up on the table looking out across the floor at this dumpster fire off in the distance, just sort of emitting smoke and wondering if someone was gonna go in and deal with that.
没错，这些烟雾呈现出各种形式。
And, yeah, the the smoke takes various forms.
当像Rippling这样快速增长时，问题并不总是直接影响客户，但你会忍不住想：‘操。’
And when you're growing as quickly as rippling is growing, it's not always something that necessarily even impacts customers, but it's the sort of thing where you're like, fuck.
这个架构不对，或者他们对用户采用率的衡量方式有误。
That that architecture is not right or this you they're not measuring adoption correctly.
从外部来看，我其实有不少可以指出的批评意见。
From the outside, I actually had quite a few criticisms that I could lob in.
Rippling发生的问题是我们招错了一些人。
And what happened at Rippling was we made some hiring mistakes.
我认为那些岗位上的人自己也会承认，他们并不是合适的人选。
I think the folks that we had in those roles would agree that they weren't the right people.
我们在工程领导层犯了一个招聘错误，当时的产品负责人不得不临时接管工程团队。
We had a hiring mistake in engineering leadership where the product leader at the time had to sort of run engineering.
我们后来在产品招聘上又犯了一个错误，我们很多人都不得不挺身而出。
We subsequently had a mistake in in product hiring, and a lot of us had to sort of pitch in.
帕克和我在这两年的混乱、无序和痛苦中彼此对视，始终没有同时拥有合格的工程和产品高管领导。
And Parker and I sort of stared at each other through two years of this kind of disarray or this chaos or this agony of of things and just never really having good executive leadership over both engineering and product at the same time.
我记得帕克瘫坐在椅子上，说：‘操。’
And I remember Parker sort of Parker sort of slumped down in his seat and said, oh, fuck.
我得再启动一次招聘。
I have to run another search.
我说：‘不。’
And I said, no.
这游戏结束了。
Like, the gig's up.
我要亲自去干。
I'm gonna go do it.
他一下子从椅子上坐直了。
And he really sprung up in his seat.
他问：真的吗？
He's like, really?
你真的要去干这个？
Like, you go do that?
我对他说：老兄，这才是业务真正需要的。
I'm like, dude, this is what this is what the business needs.
于是我就这么做了。
And so that's what I did.
这大概是一年前开始的，当时我意识到自己必须这么做，并在十二月向帕克表达了这个想法。
And that really started about a year ago in sort of I realized I was gonna do it and expressed that to Parker in December.
我真正接手是在2025年1月。
I really took it on in January '25.
到现在已经学习了十一个月。
And so it's been eleven months of learning.
当我接手产品岗位时，产品团队虽然有不少优秀人才，但人手严重不足。
Jumping into the product role when the product function itself, although staffed with really talented people, wildly under understaffed.
而且在顶层没有一位精神领袖来推动一致性和流程卓越，导致系统虽然在本地优化，但整体上却混乱不堪。
And without a single spiritual leader on top of it to drive consistency and process excellence had become locally optimized but globally incoherent.
如果你了解康威定律，你就注定会交付你的组织架构图。
And if you know Conway's law, you are destined to ship your org chart.
因此，面对一个本地优化但全局混乱的团队，你得到的也是一个本地优化但全局混乱的产品体验，这亟需解决。
And so with a locally optimized, globally incoherent team, you had a locally optimized, globally incoherent product experience that needed to be resolved.
所以，在过去十一个月里，我的努力是建立更清晰的做事方式、更好的流程，以及更优的领导层招聘与淘汰机制。
And so my efforts over the last eleven months have been to establish, you know, like, greater clarity in terms of how we do things around here, better process, better, you know, general leadership hiring and firing.
我的工作就像是清理第三 aisle 那些本该处理的杂务，尽管团队中的很多人其实非常有才华，出色地管理着自己的特定领域。
I mean, just doing the sort of cleanup on Aisle 3 that needed to be done even though a lot, again, a lot of the people in the in the team were quite talented and doing an excellent job of managing their specific domains.
接手产品角色让我大开眼界。
Jumping into the product role has been, like, quite eye opening.
我对自己一年前从外部看待这个问题的天真态度感到有点不好意思。
I feel a little bashful about the naivety of my view from the outside a year ago.
产品团队有需求层次，我们常常倾向于指出更高层次需求未被满足的失败，并指责组织未能像仔细衡量采用率指标那样，密切追踪这些指标以推动执行。
Product teams have a hierarchy of needs, and we like to sort of point at the failures to meet elements of that hierarchy higher up the triangle and sort of impugn the failure of that organization for not, as an example, measuring adoption metrics very carefully and not closely tracking those metrics as a means by which to drive execution.
我刚接手时就想，天啊，我们需要为测试覆盖率建立一些基本标准。
When I jumped in, I was like, man, you know, we need to establish some some basic standards for test coverage.
我们需要为产品在准备下线时进行所谓的‘工厂检查’建立一些基本规范。
We need to establish some basic standards for how we do what I call a factory inspection on a product once it's ready to roll off the assembly line.
我们有没有一份关于所谓产品品质的检查清单？
Do we have a checklist for what we call product quality?
那么，产品品质到底意味着什么？
And what does product quality mean?
这些基本的东西当时都不存在。
Those basic things weren't there.
因此，我们花时间去衡量用户采用率指标的想法简直是荒谬的。
And so the idea that we should be spending time measuring adoption metrics is absolute insanity.
你跳过了从这里到那里之间的很多步骤。
You're skipping a lot of steps between here and there.
因此，我们已经取得了巨大进展，我认为这正在转化为客户体验的产品质量提升。
And so we have made great strides, and I think it's translating to product quality improvements for our customers.
但正如我所说，当我深入其中后，回想起自己以前的想法，我觉得自己有点傻。
But I feel, as I said, a little dumb for the way I was thinking about it before I jumped into the deep end.
作为高管，置身于混乱之外却自以为知道答案，这完全说不过去。
There is just no excuse as an executive for sitting outside of the mess and thinking you know the answers.
作为高管，这样做是不可原谅的错误。
It's a it's a cardinal sin as an executive to do that.
你必须亲自去查看。
You need to go and see.
你要去锅炉房里看看。
You'd be in the boiler room.
你需要从底层开始研究整个系统，提出如何改进系统的假设，这正是我一直在做的。
You need to study the system bottom up and and develop hypotheses for how to amend the system, and that's what I've been doing.
我很喜欢听这些，因为很多人团队运作得并不好，听到一个并非长期从事产品工作的人进来试图解决这些问题，对大家来说非常有帮助和有趣。
I love hearing this because so many people have teams that are not functioning incredibly well, and hearing from someone that is not a long time product person come in and try to fix these problems, I think is really useful and interesting for people to hear.
更深入地探讨一下，你最大的教训和醒悟时刻是不是在于，要实现你想要的目标——即很好地衡量参与度和采用率——必须先完成大量基础性工作？
To dig into this a little bit more, was the big lesson and kind of, eye opening moment that there's a lot of kind of foundational work that needs to happen to achieve this outcome that you're trying to achieve, is measure, engagement and adoption well?
是像追踪、指标和数据科学那样的东西吗？
Is it like tracking and metrics and data science?
那就是这里的教训吗？
Is that kind of the the lesson there?
教训是，所有事情都必须按时间和顺序进行。
The lesson is that everything must be done in its time and order.
你可以非常、非常迅速地推进。
And you can move really, really quickly.
你可以，没有任何借口不去以紧迫感处理这些事情，但你必须按顺序来做。
You can you can there's no sort of excuse not to move with urgency on all of these things, but you gotta do them in order.
你必须自下而上地领导。
And you have to you have to lead bottom up.
你必须从你观察到的具体情况出发来领导。
Like, you gotta lead from the specific circumstances you observe.
我认为，在过去十一个月里，我经历的最好的一件事就是，我更加信任自己的直觉了——我在其他职能中观察到的模式确实适用于产品领域，但我也因之前从未负责过产品职能而拥有优势和劣势，因此我必须从第一性原理出发思考每一个问题。
And I think for me, one of the best things that's happened over the last eleven months is that I've gained a greater trust in my own instincts, that that the that the the sort of patterns I've matched across other functions do indeed apply in product, but I have both the advantage and disadvantage of not having let a product function before and therefore must think about every problem from first principles.
我没有选择。
I have no choice.
我可以在网上看各种东西。
I can read shit on the Internet.
我可以聆听那些在相关话题上思路清晰的人的见解，吸收他们的想法，但我非常不愿意在没有拆解其组成部分并弄清它们如何适用于Rippling的情况下直接采纳某个观点。
I can, like, listen to clear thinkers on topics and import their ideas, but I'm very reluctant to import an idea without breaking it down into its constituent parts and figuring out how it applies at Rippling.
因此，从原则上讲，我对采用率指标根本不在乎。
And so I don't actually give a shit about adoption metrics as a matter of principle.
只有当我关心采用率指标时，我才会在意它们。
I care about adoption metrics when I care about adoption metrics.
我知道这听起来是个同义反复，但我会慢慢讲清楚。
Like, I realize that that's a tautological statement, but it's like, I'll get there.
因此，在我们产品的某些部分，我确实非常关心采用率指标。
And so in certain parts of our product, I really do care about adoption metrics.
在我们的候选人追踪系统和招聘产品中，我非常关注采用率指标，因为它们在易用性方面已经做得很好了。
I care a lot about adoption metrics in our applicant tracking system, our recruiting product, because it's in a really good place from a usability standpoint.
它的监控非常完善。
It's very well instrumented.
它的用户非常满意。
It's got like very happy users.
它的增长前景非常出色。
It's got an awesome growth profile.
所以我们应该非常关注采用率指标，因为我认为这是长期降低用户流失率的重要因素，比如减少实施过程中的摩擦。
And so we should we should be really focused on the adoption metrics because I think that's gonna be an important ingredient to low churn over time, you know, removing friction from the implementation process as an example.
在我们产品的其他部分，我根本不在乎采用率，反而更关注基础性的东西，就像我前面说的，测试覆盖率之类的，只是为了确保产品稳定、优质，一旦被采用就能准确交付应有的功能。
There are other parts of our product where I would say I don't care at all about adoption and am much more focused on foundational things like I said earlier, test coverage or whatever just to make sure that the thing is stable and good and delivering exactly what it's supposed to deliver to deliver once it's adopted.
既然你现在身处产品团队内部，你觉得那些不在产品团队的人——比如两年前的马特，或者其他市场负责人、高管——应该了解但目前还不了解的关于产品的什么关键点？
Now that you're on the inside of the product team, what's something that you think people outside of product, say, Matt two years ago or other, I don't know, go to market leads, other execs, should hear need to understand about product that they don't until they're on the inside.
我再给你一个我喜欢的框架。
I'll give you another framework that I like to use.
在金融领域，有一个叫做‘超额收益’的概念。
In the financial world, there's this concept of alpha.
阿尔法是指相对于指数的超额收益。
Alpha is outperformance relative to the index.
这就是为什么seekingalpha.com会成为一个非常受欢迎的网站。
So that's why you have seeking alpha.com as a very popular website.
他们的意思是，你希望购买某种资产组合，使其表现优于，比如说，以标普500指数为基准。
What they mean by that is you're looking to buy something, some combination of assets that will outperform, let's say, the S and P 500 if that's your benchmark.
因此，阿尔法是指相对于指数的超额收益。
So alpha is the outperformance relative to the index.
然后你还有贝塔这个概念。
And then you have the concept of beta.
贝塔就是波动性。
Beta is just volatility.
贝塔不是好事。
Beta is not good.
高贝塔的股票会毫无理由地剧烈波动。
A high beta stock jerks around for no particular reason.
它与指数呈非相关性。
It's like discorrelated with the index.
它就是，你知道的，波动性非常高。
It just you know, it's very high beta.
对于期权交易员来说很好，但除此之外，这种资产你并不真正想要。
Great if you're an options trader, but other than that, it's not really something you want in an asset.
因此，你理想的股票是高阿尔法、低贝塔的股票。
And so your ideal stock is a very high alpha, very low beta stock.
它们实际上并不以这种形态存在，因为阿尔法和贝塔往往相关，但当你购买金融资产时，这正是你想要的。
They don't really come in that shape because alpha and beta tend to be correlated, but that's what you want when you buy a financial asset.
那么，这个类比是什么？
So what's the analogy?
我认为那些高阿尔法的人非常有价值。
I think you have high alpha people who are very valuable.
我认为低贝塔的人也同样非常有价值。
I think you also have low beta people who are also very valuable people.
丹尼斯·罗德曼，篮球运动员，疯疯癫癫的，但alpha值极高。
Dennis Rodman, basketball player, nut job, very high alpha.
你知道，每支球队都需要一个像丹尼斯·罗德曼这样的人，他可是我的最爱。
And, you know, there's room on every team for one Dennis Rodman is a favorite of mine.
这就像是你可以拥有一位问题多多但潜力巨大的员工。
It's like you can have one difficult employee who's got a ton of upside.
所以这个alpha-beta的概念，我在思考想要什么样的人、以及想要什么样的流程时，经常用到。
And so this alpha beta thing, I use it pretty often when contemplating what kind of person I want and also what kind of process I want.
因此，当你从零到一打造一款产品时，你很可能在追求alpha。
So when you're building a product from zero to one, you're probably pursue pursuing alpha.
你在寻找某个市场或客户问题的独特切入点，让产品能相对于默认解决方案带来超常的回报。
You're looking for some angle on this market or this customer problem where the product is actually gonna provide an outsized return relative to whatever the default solution is.
如果你的产品更成熟，或者你有负责产品运营的团队，那你可能更希望营造一个低beta的环境，让产品稳定可靠地运行。
You have a more mature product or if you have somebody in the product operations group or whatever, you probably want a more low beta environment where it's like it cranks it out, it does it very reliably.
我们的薪资产品，我们非常希望它能保持极低的beta值。
Our payroll product, we badly want the payroll product to be very low beta.
我们真的不希望薪酬产品有任何不可预测性或异常。
We really don't want the payroll product to have any unpredictability or aberration.
因此，我们愿意接受更多的流程。
And so we're willing to accept more process.
这是组织设计中的一个基本原则，即业务中的流程存在的唯一目的就是降低beta值。
And here's a fundamental principle of design in an organization, which is that processes processes in a business exist for the sole purpose of lowering beta.
流程的作用是减少系统输出的波动性。
Processes are for decreasing volatility in the output of the system.
流程的缺点是会抑制alpha，因此在产品团队中应用流程时必须极其谨慎，确保只在需要降低beta的地方实施，而不要在需要alpha的地方抑制它。
The the the downside of a process is that it suppresses alpha, and you have to be super, super careful and judicious in the application of process in the product team to know that you're lowering beta in the places where you wanna do that without suppressing alpha in the places where you need it.
因此，在过去一年里，我们在改革Rippling产品开发方式的过程中，一直在识别那些需要引入一点流程的地方，仅仅是一点点。
And so as we've gone through the last, you know, year of reforming the way that we build product at Rippling, it's been a game of recognizing those places where I need to implement a touch of process, just a touch.
在另一些地方，我们需要实施非常明确、严格的流程，因为我不希望有alpha。
Other places where I need to implement a very clear, rigid process where I don't want alpha.
我只想要低beta。
I just want low beta.
展开剩余字幕（还有 480 条）
因此，这类例子包括我们的产品质量清单，我们在Rippling亲切地称之为‘泡菜’。
And so examples of this are, let's say, our product quality list, which we lovingly at Ripland call the pickle.
为什么叫泡菜？
Why pickle?
是的。
Yeah.
这实际上是一件非常重要的事情。
So it's actually a really important thing.
我认为，如果你想在这样一个团队中推动文化变革，看看吧。
I think if you wanna bring about cultural change in a team like, look.
我们的研发团队有1300人。
We have we have 1,300 people in our r and d organization.
我们驾驭的是一艘庞大的船。
It's a big ship that we have to steer.
如果你想创造一个深入人心、成为人们共同认知或精神象征的时刻，你就必须创造一个承载意义的实体，然后用你的意义去填充它。
If you wanna create a moment that sticks in people's brains and sort of becomes a zeitgeist or something that they latch onto, you gotta create an entity, a vessel for meaning, and then you gotta fill that vessel with your meaning.
你可以称之为一个迷因。
A meme, you might say.
对。
Yeah.
没错，确实如此。
Well, it's sure.
一个迷因，没错。
A meme yeah.
比如，迷因在流行文化中就是一个很好的例子。
Like, a meme is actually a good example of this in common culture.
你知道的。
You know?
在流行文化中，我认为，当人们带着来自外部的想法加入讨论时，我非常欢迎这些外来想法。
And I in pop culture, I think, like, it's why when see when people come to the table with with with ideas from the outside, I welcome those outside ideas.
但如果我首先要求这个人不使用那些词来解释他们的意思呢。
But if the first thing I ask the person to do is to tell me what they mean without using those words.
所以当有人进来 saying，嘿。
So when someone comes in and says, hey.
我想做这个策略相关的事情。
I wanna do this thing on strategy.
我会说，好啊。
I'm like, cool.
告诉我，不用‘策略’这个词，你到底是什么意思。
Tell me what you mean without using the word strategy.
这迫使他们将其分解为各个组成部分。
And it forces them to break it down into its constituent parts.
如果他们能不用这个词清晰地表达出来，我就知道他们真的懂。
And if they can articulate it clearly without using that word, I know that they know what they're talking about.
如果他们只是反复纠结于‘策略’这个词，我会想，好吧。
And if they just fumble around with the word strategy again, I'm like, okay.
你其实并没有深入思考过这个问题。
You actually haven't thought this through.
所以对于这个‘腌菜’，也就是产品品质清单，我本可以找一个通用术语，但我真的希望公司新加入的员工明白，这是Rippling独有的东西。
And so with the pickle, with the product quality list, it's like, could come up with some generic term for this, but I really want a new joiner at the company to understand that this is an idiosyncratic thing to Rippling.
这只有我们才有。
This is unique to us.
你想要理解这个东西。
You you wanna understand this thing.
我也希望它能成为产品管理和工程团队日常工作中的一种常用说法。
I also want it to become a component of common parlance in the day to day work of the product management and engineering teams.
因此，‘腌菜’这个词，尽管听起来调皮或滑稽，但我是故意选它作为容器，赋予它特定的含义。
And so Pickle, as cheeky or silly as it sounds, was deliberately sort of angular or stood out as a vessel I could fill with a particular meaning.
所以我们有一个产品品质清单。
And so we have a product quality list.
这个产品品质清单是轻量级的，它只是以最简单的方式阐明了你在发布产品时需要达到的标准。
And the product quality list is lightweight in the sense that it just articulates in the simplest ways the standards we want you to meet when you ship a product.
并不是每个产品都适用。
Doesn't apply to every product.
并非每一条都适用于每个产品，但它很全面，为我提供了一个框架，让我们在学习过程中不断迭代。
Not every line applies to every product, but it's comprehensive, and it provides me with a framework for iterating over time as we learn.
就在昨天，我们把产品发给了帕克。
And so just yesterday, we shipped the product to Parker.
这是我们流程的一部分。
This is part of our process.
当我们发布新产品时，它会发送给帕克，他是里pling内部的主要管理员。
When we ship a new product, it goes to Parker who is the big admin for Rippling at Rippling.
如果你还不知道，帕克是里pling所有5200名员工的唯一薪酬管理员。
If you're not aware, Parker is the sole payroll administrator for Rippling for all 5,200 employees.
他亲自处理每一次薪酬发放。
He personally runs payroll always.
对于这5200名员工，没有任何例外。
There is no exception for all 5,200 people.
他有时会抱怨，但这对软件来说是一项了不起的成就，或许对他本人也是如此。
He does complain about it sometimes, but it's a remarkable achievement for the software and perhaps for him.
因此，他还会安装我们打算为自己部署的任何新应用，因为我们几乎会全面使用自己开发的所有产品。
And so he also installs any new app that we're gonna install for ourselves because we dog food the hell out of everything we build.
昨天，他去安装这个新应用。
Yesterday, he goes to install this new application.
我们即将发布一个新应用，用于收集反馈，让员工可以在公司内部互相给予反馈。
We're about to ship a new app for feedback, allowing people to give one another feedback in their companies.
他安装后进入应用，结果被丢到了一个空白的屏幕上。
And he installs it, and he goes in and it dumps him onto an empty screen.
他顿时懵了：这他娘的是什么？
And he's like, the fuck is this?
这到底是什么东西？
What is this?
发生什么事了？
What's going on?
喂，等等。
Like, hey.
哇。
Wow.
我们在谈论失败。
We're talking about fail.
我又切掉了一个手指。
So I chop another one of my fingers off.
我现在只剩九个了。
I'm down to nine.
我在想，我们到底漏掉了什么？
And I'm like, what what did we miss?
我们漏掉的是，有个该死的功能开关。
What we missed was there was a fucking feature flag.
该死的功能开关。
Fucking feature flag.
我一说到功能开关就非得加个该死的前缀，因为功能开关简直是我的噩梦，是这个世界上最糟糕、总惹麻烦的东西。
I'm just I'm not allowed to say feature flag without fucking in front of it because, like, feature flags are the bane of my existence and the worst things in the world that constantly cause problems.
工程师们暂时添加了它，然后就忘了。
Engineers put one in temporarily and forget it.
这就像盖房子时用的垫片，总承包商在某些地方放了垫片，却忘了自己放了这些垫片，接着把墙砌在上面，最终垫片失效，门就卡住了。
It's like shims if you're building a house and the general contractor puts little shims in places and then forgets that they put the shims there and then builds a wall over them and eventually the shim fails and all of a sudden your door doesn't fit.
功能标志非常危险，需要小心管理。
Like, feature flags are super dangerous and need to be managed carefully.
他妈的功能标志。
So fucking feature flags.
不管怎样，我们确实有一个。
Anyway, we had one.
帕克安装了它。
Parker installs it.
他们忘了关闭这个功能标志。
They forgot to disable the feature flag.
他安装应用程序时看到了空白屏幕。
He gets a blank screen when he installs the application.
我做了什么？
What did I do?
我的反应是：呃。
My reaction was, ugh.
回到团队，给他们直接反馈，告诉他们不要再犯这种错误。
Go back to the team, give them direct feedback, tell them not to make that mistake again.
但也要问一个问题：我们为什么在工厂检验过程中没发现这个问题？
But also ask the question, how do we miss this in the factory inspection process?
答案是我们没有在检查清单里为功能标志设置任何条目。
And the answer is we didn't have any line item in the pickle for feature flags.
所以我往该死的检查清单里加了一条：在发布时，你最多只能保留一个控制整个产品功能的功能标志。
And so I added a line to the fucking pickle that said, you are allowed to have one feature flag that governs your entire product at ship.
这是一个可能难以实现的极端标准，但这是我们追求的目标。
It's an extreme standard that might not be achievable, but it's the standard we aspire to.
这个框架，即检查清单，通过持续迭代并根据我们不断积累的经验进行调整，构成了一种非常轻量级的方式，可以降低系统的β风险，同时对产品开发的α效率影响极小。
This framework, the pickle, given these lightweight checklists iterated on consistently in response to everything we learn as we go constitutes a very nice lightweight way to lower the beta of the system with hopefully only a modicum of negative impact on the alpha for how we build product.
所以，你知道的，你问我一个很简单的问题。
And so that's you know, you asked me a very simple question.
我给了你一个冗长的回答，但这些框架帮助我设计可扩展的系统，比如从一个人扩展到两千名技术人员。
I gave you a very long winded answer, but these frameworks help me design systems that scale, you know, across one going to 2,000 technical workers.
哇。
Wow.
好的。
Okay.
顺便问一下，Pickle 是个缩写吗？还是只是因为我喜欢这个词，所以我们叫它 Pickle？
By the way, Pickle, is that is that like an acronym or it's just like, I like this word we're gonna call it Pickle?
产品质量清单。
Product quality list.
产品。
Product.
好的。
Okay.
我明白了。
I see.
所以这是辅音。
So it's the consonant.
好的。
Okay.
P Q L，也就是。
P q l, which Okay.
除了Pickle，你还能怎么念它？
How could you pronounce it other than pickle?
我想象着你们所有的演示文稿里都有小小的腌黄瓜表情符号，
I'm imagining all your decks have little pickle emojis and
还有Slack里那个跳舞的腌黄瓜表情。
and The pickle emoji thing, the dancing pickle in Slack.
有很多，是的。
There's a lot of yeah.
它
It
它本身就带点趣味。
it lends itself to a bit of fun.
我想到了《泡菜里克》。
What I think about is Pickle Rick.
嗯。
Yeah.
你觉得雅各布能懂这个梗吗？
Do you think Jacob get that reference?
这是一次洛扎克测试。
This is a Rorzak test.
好的。
Okay.
所以这个高阿尔法、低贝塔，我喜欢这个概念。
So this high alpha, low beta, I love this concept.
所以，这个理念是根据团队和问题的不同，我们需要一个高阿尔法、低贝塔的人，或者对于这个特定项目，我们也能接受较大的波动性。
So the idea is depending on the team, depending on the problem, we need a high alpha, low beta person or actually we're okay with a lot of variance for this specific project.
是的，没错。
That's Yeah.
我们愿意接受这个领域中的大量波动，以换取这些人在创造力和冒险精神上带来的收益，或者说是他们缺乏流程所赋予的自由度，让他们能够做自己想做的事。
Willing to accept a bunch of volatility in this area in exchange for the upside we get from the creativity and risk taking of these people or these or the lack of process that sort of gives them the latitude to do what they wanna do.
因此，当你在招聘时，你关注的是，这个人是否属于低贝塔类型？
And so when you're hiring, you're looking for, again, is this person in low beta or not?
当然了。
That's kinda For sure.
我的意思是，这其实是一种非常有用的方法。
I mean, it's really quite a useful way.
你知道，当你遇到一个候选人时，我的工作方式是——我来谈一谈招聘吧，我在Rippling花了很多时间与团队讨论我是如何招聘的，这种做法源于投球练习。
You know, when you you meet a candidate and you I mean, my my my modus operandi, and I think, you know, with talk about hiring for a second, I think I've spent a lot of time with teams at Rippling talking about how I hire, and it is born of batting practice.
没错，就是这样。
Me to yeah.
如果能倒带重看我人生中的经历，真正去反思我曾在各种情境下见过多少候选人，那将会非常有趣。
I it'd be super interesting to actually be able to rewind the tape on my life and sort of contemplate how many candidates I've met in every context.
成千上万，你知道的，也许有数万之多。
Many thousands, you know, maybe tens of thousands.
我不确定。
I don't know.
这相当于进行了大量的击球练习，也在我大脑中积累了大量的模型训练。
It's a lot of batting practice and a lot of model training in my brain.
所以我非常依赖我的直觉，当然，人力资源人员会说你不该这么做。
And so I rely a lot on my intuition, which, of course, HR people say you're not supposed to do.
这完全是胡说八道。
That's complete bullshit.
如果你有良好的直觉，就绝对应该依赖它。
If you have a good intuition, you should absolutely rely on your intuition.
当你对候选人产生反应时，尤其是在招聘过程中，你需要解读你的直觉，以便能够以建设性的方式向他人表达出来。
And what you have to do after you have a a reaction to a candidate when you when you're looking at hiring somebody is you need to decode you need to decode your intuition so that it can be expressed to other people productively.
因此，我用来做这件事的一个框架是SPOTAC。
And so one of the frameworks that I use for this is SPOTAC.
这是一个非常难看的缩写词。
It's a very ugly acronym.
这个想法要归功于宇宙中某位最初提出它的人。
There's a hat tip to somebody out there in the universe who originally thought of this.
不是我想出来的，但我采用了它。
It's not me, but I adopted it.
它指的是人们聪明、热情、乐观、坚韧、适应力强且善良。
And it's it's that people are smart, passionate, optimistic, tenacious, adaptable, and kind.
这五个方面。
Those five things.
六个，我都数不清了。
Six, can't even count.
我跟你说过我因为犯错丢了一根手指，对吧？所以我少了一根。
I I told you I lost a finger, right, when I made a mistake, so I was down one.
还剩九个。
Nine nine to go.
SPOTAC 单独来看并不是一个很好的自上而下的框架。
SPOTAC isn't by itself a good top down framework.
但当你思考‘为什么我没有感觉？为什么这个候选人没让我满意？’时。
But when you're thinking about, oh, why did I not why did this candidate just like why did it not click?
为什么我不喜欢他们？
Why did I not like them?
你就逐项检查，然后会说：‘哦，对了。’
You go down the list, you're like, oh, yeah.
我知道。
I know.
这个人的问题在于，他们对这个想法并不兴奋。
This person it's it's that they were not excited about the idea.
他们缺乏热情。
They weren't passionate.
你知道吗？
You know?
就是他们一直在贬低之前的经理，还把自己当成前两家公司业绩不佳的受害者。
It's like it's that they talked shit about their previous manager and that they were a victim of the performance of their last two companies.
就是这么回事。
That's what it was.
他们并不乐观。
They're not optimistic.
你知道，这个框架在评估人员时非常有用，我觉得阿尔法贝塔框架也非常有用。
You know, it's the the framework is super useful to evaluating people, and I think the the alpha beta framework is also super useful.
当你结束一次对话后，你会想：我喜欢这个人。
When you come away from a conversation, you're I like that guy.
我觉得他会非常、非常出色。
I think he'd be really, really good.
为什么我会觉得他在这个产品上不会做得好呢？
Why is it that I don't think he would do a good job on this product in particular?
答案是，这是一个高阿尔法产品领域，而他是个低贝塔的人。
And the answer is like, this is a high alpha product area, and he's a low beta person.
很有价值，但绝对不适合这个岗位。
Valuable, but definitely not the right fit for this.
因此，我认为在这种情境下也非常有用。
And so I think it's really useful in that context as well.
我超爱这些框架。
I love all these frameworks.
你正在对这个观众讲话。
You're speaking to this audience.
框架。
Frameworks.
框架。
Frameworks.
框架。
Frameworks.
是的。
Yeah.
所以高高阿尔法，低贝塔，有时高贝塔也可以。
So high high alpha, low beta, sometimes high beta is okay.
SpoTech。
SpoTech.
在招聘方面，在我们转向其他话题之前，你还有什么觉得特别有用的方法吗？
In hiring, is there anything else that you find really useful before we move on to a different topic?
当我刚开始在产品部门工作时，我接触到了一个面试框架或面试技巧，这在我职业生涯中几乎没怎么用过，那就是每个产品人员，无论级别高低，都会被给予同一个案例研究。
When I first started working in the product organization, I was introduced to a an interview framework or an interview tactic that I hadn't really used much at all, I think, in my career, which is that every product person at every seniority level is given the same case study.
这个案例研究极其困难。
And the case study is extraordinarily difficult.
它要求你同时考虑许多维度，思考数据传播问题。
It requires you to think about many, many dimensions simultaneously to think about data propagation issues.
这相当技术性。
It's it's quite technical.
我们用来评估这个案例研究表现的评分标准，为我们提供了指导，说明初级产品经理、初级、中级和高级产品经理各自应该是什么样子。
And the rubric that we use to sort of evaluate performance of that case study is it gives you guidance on what for us, like, an entry level PM looks like, what a junior, mid career, senior executive PM might look like.
每个人结束面试后都觉得自己表现得很糟糕，觉得自己失败了。
And everybody comes away from that interview feeling like poop, like they had failed it.
而对我们来说，我们却会说：哇。
Whereas on our side of it, we're like, wow.
这个人已经走得相当远了。
That person got really far.
他们非常出色地看到了三个或四个关键点。
Like, they saw around three or four corners in a really impressive way.
还有十个他们没看到，但他们看到了其中最困难的四个。
There was 10 they didn't see around, but they saw around four of the hardest ones.
当我们提供新信息，质疑他们解决方案的有效性时，他们并不防御，反而愿意打断我们，提出更多问题，展现出许多基本的人际互动模式。
And they were not defensive when we gave them new information that called into question the validity of their solution, and they were willing to interrupt us to ask more questions and and and like a lot of the sort of basic human interaction models.
你知道，你从不会觉得，给一个人一个不可能完成的任务，甚至让初级员工和副总裁面对同一个任务，会有什么成效。
I I you know, you never think that, like, giving someone an impossible task and even including the l five person versus the VP on the same thing would be productive.
让我们说，我们的招聘团队对此仍然有些疑虑，觉得我们在面试的这个阶段淘汰人太过严厉。
And let's just say our recruiting team still sort of a bit about this and feels like we eliminate people too aggressively at this stage of the interview process.
但我从中看到了智慧，认为给每个人一个同样简单却复杂的任务确实很有用——就像递给他们一个电钻，再给一面混凝土墙，看看他们能不能钻进一毫米或一英寸。
But I found the wisdom in it and think it's actually quite useful to give everyone the same simple complicated prompt and just see hand them a drill bit, give them the concrete wall, and see if they can get a millimeter or an inch into the concrete.
你知道吗？
You know?
他们永远不可能完全钻穿这面墙。
They're never gonna get all the way through the wall.
这并不重要。
It doesn't matter.
但你会学到很多东西。
You're gonna learn a lot.
我发现这对我来说是一种令人耳目一新的新体验，而且非常有趣。
And I've found that to be kind of an eye opening new thing for me that that has been fun.
我的意思是，你看，产品和产品管理的乐趣，以及成为其中一员的乐趣——实际上，如果让我列个清单，还有很多种乐趣。
I mean, look, the joy of product and the joy of product management and the joy of of being part of I think there's a bunch of joys, actually, if I could give you a sort of running list.
但其中一个巨大的乐趣是，你能与软件领域一些最聪明的人共事。
But, like, one of the big joys is that you get to work with some of the smartest people in software.
工程师都非常聪明。
Engineers are very smart.
但他们并不总是最擅长社交的人，你知道的。
They're not always the best sort of social, you know, entities.
销售人员是非常出色的社交能手。
Salespeople are awesome social entities.
但他们并不总是最好的系统思考者。
They're not always the best systems thinkers.
你可以继续往下列举。
You can go down the list.
但产品管理的神奇之处在于，你得知道，我们常说你是迷你CEO。
But the the magic of product management is that you kinda have know, we talk about the the mini CEO.
我觉得这个说法有点愚蠢，但其中确实有些道理，我认为关键在于你必须成为一个通才。
I think it's kind of a stupid misnomer, but there's some there's some wisdom there, and I think the wisdom is that you have to be a polymath.
你必须非常擅长与他人合作。
Like, you've gotta be really good at working with other people.
你必须擅长沟通和表达。
You gotta be good at communications and articulation.
你必须擅长项目管理。
You gotta be good project management.
你必须精通科学、数学和工程。
You gotta be good at the science and the math and the engineering.
这真的太酷了。
It's really fucking cool.
所以，我认为这份工作给我带来的巨大乐趣之一，就是能与行业内最聪明、最具通才精神的顶尖人物互动。
And so I think one of the great joys of this job for me has been interacting with, like, the the tippity top of the smartest and and most polymathic people in the industry.
我再讲另一件我喜欢领导产品的原因：作为COO时，我的工作是接受现有的产品，然后围绕它优化一切。
I'll say one other thing about what I love about leading product, which is as a COO, my job was to accept the product as it was and optimize everything around that.
我的职责是确保产品运营——在我们公司，就是与保险公司、支付机构、政府监管机构的接口——都能顺利运行。
My job was to make sure that the product operations, in our business, the interface to the insurance carriers, the interface to the payment entities, the government regulators, that stuff all just sort of worked.
我的职责是确保我们的销售引擎、营销引擎以及所有市场推广工作都能围绕产品本身进行优化。
It was to make sure that our sales engine, our marketing engine, all the go to market stuff, like, optimized itself around what the product was.
我的工作是招聘并确保我们能招到人来从事产品工作。
It was about recruiting and making sure we got people in to work on the product.
你只要看看研发以外的任何职能，我都会参与其中，试图根据产品的实际情况，让这些职能发挥出最佳效能。
You kinda go down any function that isn't in r and d, and I had some hand in trying to figure out how to make that function work to the best of its ability given what the product was.
而现在我负责产品了，我才意识到：哇哦。
And now that I lead product, I'm like, oh, wow.
这才是高层次的核心。
This is the high order bit.
我以前也不是完全不懂，但现在我真正明白了，产品才是高层次的核心。
Not that I didn't sort of understand that, but, like, now I really get that product is the high order bid.
如果你把产品做对了，它自然就能契合市场。
If you get the product right, it fits in the market.
其他所有事情都会变得更容易。
Everything else gets easier.
财务更容易了。
Finance is easier.
销售更容易了。
Sales is easier.
营销更容易了。
Marketing is easier.
招聘更容易了。
Recruiting is easier.
一切都变得他妈的容易了。
Everything gets fucking easier.
因此，我认为领导产品职能的另一个乐趣在于，我能将企业成功的核心要素设为1。
And so I think the other joy of of leading the product function is that I get to set the highest order bit in the business's success to one.
听到这些真的太好了。
This is really great to hear.
很多时候，产品之外的人并不理解这些事情，常常轻视产品团队，尤其是销售人员和CEO们。
A lot of times people outside product don't understand these sorts of things and look down on product a lot of times, especially sales folks, CEOs a lot of times.
我很高兴你能看到这一点，意识到并认识到这份工作有多么重要、有趣且具有挑战性，以及产品经理有多么了不起。
I love that you're seeing this and realizing this and recognizing just how important and interesting and challenging this work is and just how awesome PMs are.
你知道吗？
You know?
正如你所知，很多人对产品经理非常反感。
As you know, a lot of people are very anti product manager.
我们为什么需要产品经理？
Why do we need product managers?
我们不需要他们。
We don't need them.
只要放慢一切，搞这么多流程。
Just slow everything down, all this process.
我在这里有个区别，那就是我反对糟糕的产品经理。
I have a distinction there, which is I'm anti shitty product managers.
这正是我表达的方式。
That's exactly how I put it.
如果你讨厌产品经理，那只是因为你没遇过优秀的产品经理。
If you hate product managers, you just haven't worked with a great product
经理。
manager.
听好了。
Look.
我超爱葡萄酒。
I I love wine.
葡萄酒是我的爱好之一，我学到了很多关于葡萄酒的知识。
Wine's one of my things, and I've learned a lot about wine.
我最喜欢的一句话是：我不喜欢霞多丽。
And one of my favorite lines, like, I don't like chardonnay.
我说：不。
And I'm like, no.
不。
No.
不。
No.
不。
No.
不。
No.
霞多丽是世界上最美妙的葡萄酒品种之一。
Chardonnay is the most fucking amazing varieties of of wine in the world.
你只是没喝过好的霞多丽而已。
You just haven't had good chardonnay.
你知道吗？
You know?
总有一款霞多丽适合你。
And there's a chardonnay out there for you.
产品管理也是一样，你只是不喜欢产品管理。
Product management is like, you don't like product management.
你觉得产品经理很糟糕。
You think product managers suck.
就像你说，你只是还没喝过好的霞多丽而已。
It's like, well, you just you just haven't had a good chardonnay yet.
这正是我想要的。
That's exactly what want.
一旦你喝过一次，你就再也忘不掉了。
Once you have one, you you know, you can't unlearn it.
你知道的，咱们赶紧找那个产品经理吧。
You know, like, let's find that PM ASAP.
好的。
Okay.
咱们赶紧找那瓶霞多丽吧。
Let's find that Chardonnay ASAP.
找个产品经理，再配上点霞多丽。
That PM with them with some Chardonnay.
你之前提到过产品市场契合点，我想进一步深入这个话题。
You met you touched on this product market fit point, and I wanna double down on this thread.
你有过几次在自己创业时难以找到产品市场契合的有趣经历。
You had a you've had a couple of really interesting experiences of struggling to find product market fit with your own startup.
你说你为此努力了九年，是吗？
You said you worked on it for nine years, you said?
嗯。
Mhmm.
好的。
Okay.
而到了Rippling，情况完全相反，产品市场契合度极高，一路飙升。
And then with Rippling, complete opposite, extreme product market fit, up into the right.
关于这一点，你学到了什么？你认为人们可能不理解的是，获得产品市场契合时的感觉是什么样的，需要什么条件，以及事情会如何变化。
What's something you've learned about just that, that you think people maybe don't understand about what it feels like, what it takes to get product market fit, how things change.
有一位风险投资人说过一句话，我就不提他的名字了：产品市场契合是一种你一看就知道有没有的东西，因此，如果你没有绝对确定它存在，那你就还没有达到。
There's a line that this venture capitalist whose name I will not mention said, which was that product market fit is a sort of thing where you absolutely know it when you see it, And therefore, if you don't absolutely know it, you don't have it.
这让我回到了我之前的观点：从错误中学习，而不是从成功中学习。
And this kinda gets back to my point about learning from mistakes versus successes.
就像，天啊，多年来我在Inkling公司时，一次又一次地以为我们找到了。
It's like, ah, man, over and over again, over the course of the many years that that I spent at Rippling sorry, Inkling.
我们以为自己已经实现了产品市场契合。
We thought we had it.
也许吧，也许吧。
We thought we had product market fit, maybe, maybe.
你知道的。
You know?
但回头来看，既然我已经亲身体验过真正的产品市场契合，就发现我们当时根本没有，这太明显了。
And in hindsight, with the benefit of now having experienced solid product market fit, it was so so obvious that we didn't.
我投资了大约60到70家公司。
And, like, I've invested in, like, 60 companies or 70 companies.
我不确定。
I don't know.
这并不是我主动去做的事情，但由于我在Rippling的职位，机会自然而然地出现了。
It's not something I actively do, but but opportunities by virtue, I think, my my role at Rippling sort of show up.
我经常与许多创业者交谈，我非常喜欢这样。
And I talk to lots of entrepreneurs, and I love it.
我觉得这非常有启发性，也很喜欢那些新鲜的想法。
And I find it super stimulating, and I love the fresh ideas.
这对我来说，只是我原本就热爱的事业上的一点额外甜头。
And it's just something I do as a real cherry on top of the sport that I play already.
但当我看到那些已经坚持了三四年的人的投资者更新时，再读我2011年和2012年发给投资人的那些更新，我感到心碎。
But when I get the investor updates for the guys who've been at it for, like, three, four, you know, years, and I read the updates from them that I sent to my investors in 2011 and 2012.
我有点心碎。
I'm kinda heartbroken.
我们在硅谷总说永不放弃，但那完全是风险投资的胡说八道。
We talk in Silicon Valley about never quit, but that is complete absolute venture capital bullshit.
风险投资家的动机就是往你的公司投钱，然后把你榨干。
The incentive of venture capitalist is to put money into your company and milk you dry.
他们永远拿不回自己的钱。
They never get their money back.
他们无法收回这笔投资。
There is no way for them to take that investment back.
因此，他们唯一合乎逻辑的期望就是让你不顾一切地继续尝试，因为偶尔确实有例子显示，有人从A转向X，彻底转型并取得了成功。
And so the only logical desire that they would have is for you to keep trying against all odds because there is the occasional example where someone pivoted from a to x, and it was wildly different and it worked.
Slack最初是一家游戏公司，后来变成了企业聊天工具。
Slack was originally some sort of a gaming company and became corporate chat.
比如Airbnb之类的。
You know, Airbnb maybe.
确实有一些公司进行了剧烈的转型并取得了成功，但这种案例极其罕见。
It's like there's some examples of companies having made wild pivots and succeeded, but man is that rare.
我的意思是，简直罕见到极点。
I mean, just so exceedingly rare.
我认为重要的是要记住，比如，我今年45岁了。
And I think it's important to remember, like, you know, I'm 45 years old.
我将活在这个星球上，我的意思是，美国男性平均寿命大约在七十五岁左右。
I we're gonna be on the planet I mean, the average age of a man in The United States when he dies is something in the mid seventies.
也就是说，我在这世上可能还剩二十、三十年，如果够幸运的话，四十年左右。
Like, I got 20, 30, maybe if I'm lucky, forty years left on the planet.
我非常清楚自己所剩的时间。
Very conscious of the time that I have.
而且，我对在Inkling所做的事并不后悔。
And, like, I don't regret what I did at Inkling.
我学到了很多东西。
I learned a lot.
这些经历塑造了我现在的做法。
It informed what I do now.
我认为，我目前所处的阶段离不开之前的所有经历。
I don't think the chapter I'm in right now could have come without the chapters before it.
因此，我所做的这一切是一段美好而珍贵的历程。
And so it's a it's a beautiful wonderful thing that I did what I did.
但当我读到投资者更新时，我就想：你现在的处境就是我曾经的处境，而你却无法脱身。
But when I read the investor update and I'm like, you're where I was, and you are not getting out of this.
硅谷那种‘坚持到死’的心态并不利于创业者。
The Silicon Valley try until you die mindset is not pro entrepreneur.
它有利于风险投资人。
It's pro venture capitalist.
我知道为什么会这样，但我认为有必要大声说出来：你他娘的就该放弃。
And I know why that is, but I think it's important to say out loud that you should fucking quit.
你应该重新开始计时。
You should reset the clock.
你应该重新调整股权结构。
You should reset the cap table.
因为相信我，当产品市场契合真正到来时，那感觉会疯狂而令人兴奋，你应该去追求它，但绝不要欺骗自己，以为你已经拥有了它，而实际上并没有。
Because trust me, product market fit when it arrives is insane, and it's exciting, and you should pursue it, and never delude yourself into believing you have it when you don't.
这是危险且令人后悔的。
It is dangerous and regrettable.
这演讲怎么样？
How's that for a speech?
太棒了。
Beautiful.
这是一场反风险投资的演讲。
The the the anti the anti VC speech.
我还有很多类似的内容。
The I got more where that came from.
顺便说一句，这并不是反风险投资。
By the way, it's not it's not anti VC.
这是反风险投资的宣传。
It's anti VC propaganda.
这是硅谷中每个人都在根据自己的利益行事。
It's the incent everybody's acting in accordance with their incentives in Silicon Valley.
高管、创始人、风险投资人，所有人都在根据自己的利益行动，而风险投资人有着强大而持久的激励机制，这些机制塑造了硅谷的运作模式。
The executives, the founders, the the venture cap everybody's, of course, acting, behaving in, you know, in accordance with their incentives, and the venture capitalists have very strong enduring incentives that have shaped the dynamic of how Silicon Valley works.
这没什么错。
There's nothing wrong with that.
但非常重要的是，要指出来并大声斥责那些25岁的创业者，他们根本不知道这些东西是怎么运作的。
It's just really, really important to point them out and scream at them for the 25 year old entrepreneur who has no fucking clue how this stuff works.
相信我。
Trust me.
那些45岁或50岁的创业者，或者有多年经验的风投，他们都是明白的。
The 45 year old entrepreneur or the 50 year old venture capitalist who have been in the game for a while, they get it.
他们已经观察过了。
They've observed it.
他们知道这感觉是什么样的。
They know what it's like.
这套系统就是为了利用那些不懂的人，或者至少对激励结构来说，他们是最容易得手的目标。
The system is there to take advantage of the people who who don't, or at least it is the easiest prey for the incentive structures.
而不是针对风投个人，他们中的每个人都很优秀、很出色。
Not for venture capitalists as individual people who are beautiful and wonder all of them.
这些人真的很好。
It's really wonderful people.
只是激励机制在某些情况下会导致一些真正的伤害，我认为。
It's it's just that the incentive structures lead to some real harm, I think, in certain cases.
我发现当你退出时，风投们总会跟我说：嘿。
And the thing I find is when you do quit, VCs, like, I'm always just like, hey.
你开始下一个项目时告诉我一声。
Let me know when you're starting your next day.
我很期待投资。
I'm excited to invest.
他们很少会生气，除非他们不是优秀的风投；通常他们只是难以理解：你怎么可能没把这个做成呢？
They're never they rarely unless they're not a great VC, they rarely are they just pissed at you for, like, how could you possibly not make this work?
就是这样。
That's the thing.
作为创始人，当你决定放弃业务时，你总是执着于要回报投资人的资金，我总会提醒创业者：嘿。
Like, as a as a founder, when it's time to throw in the towel on your business and you're so obsessed with giving money back to the cap table, I always remind the entrepreneur, like, hey.
如果你在种子投资领域，你的预期就是归零。
If you're in the seed investing game, your forecast is zero.
你对每一笔投资的假设都是它会归零。
Your assumption on every investment is that it's gonna go to zero.
任何不持这种观点的种子投资者都是不正常的。
Any seed investor who doesn't take that stance is is off their rocker anyway.
你知道，他们是非常糟糕的投资者。
You know, they're a very bad investor.
寻找那些着眼长远的投资者，他们希望参与你的第二家、第三家公司，并愿意在第一家公司上赌一把，允许它归零，以便你能继续前进。
Seek investors who play the long game, who wanna be in your second and third company, and are willing to take a bet on the first one and let it go to zero so that you can get on with stuff.
我的意思是，我经常和别人聊过这个话题。
I mean, this is like I've had that conversation many times.
本集由GoFundMe GivingFunds赞助，这是一个零费用的捐赠者建议基金。
This episode is brought to you by GoFundMe GivingFunds, the zero fee donor advised fund.
我想向你们介绍GoFundMe刚刚推出的一款新DAF产品，它让年末捐赠变得轻松简单。
I wanna tell you about a new DAF product that GoFundMe just launched that makes year end giving easy.
GoFundMe GivingFunds 是一个由全球第一大捐赠平台支持的捐赠者建议基金，已获得超过2亿人的信赖。
GoFundMe GivingFunds is the DAF or donor advised fund, supported by the world's number one giving platform, entrusted by over 200,000,000 people.
它本质上是你自己的微型基金会，无需律师或行政费用。
It's basically your own mini foundation without the lawyers or admin costs.
你可以注入资金或股票等增值资产，立即获得税收减免，可能减少资本利得税，然后自行决定何时捐赠给哪些机构。
You contribute money or appreciated assets like stocks, get the tax deduction right away, potentially reduce capital gains, and then decide later where you wanna donate.
该基金不收取任何管理费或资产费，你可以现在锁定税收减免，之后再决定捐赠对象，非常适合年末捐赠。
There are zero admin or asset fees, and you can lock in your deductions now and decide where to give later, which is perfect for year end giving.
加入拥有2亿多成员的GoFundMe社区，一边帮助你最关心的事业，一边节省税务开支。
Join the GoFundMe community of over 200,000,000 people and start saving money on your tax bill, all while helping the causes that you care about most.
立即前往 gofundme.com/leni 开设你的捐赠基金。
Start your giving fund today at gofundme.com/leni.
如果你将现有的捐赠者建议基金转入，他们甚至会为你支付转移费用。
If you transfer your existing DAF over, they'll even cover the DAF pay fees.
要开始操作，请访问 gofundme.com/leni。
That's gofundme.com/leni to get started.
这就引出了一个问题：究竟什么时候该放弃呢？
And this begs the question of just when is it time to quit?
你知道，听到这些的人可能会想：天哪。
You know, people hearing this might be like, oh, man.
那么，有哪些迹象表明是时候该收手了呢？
Like, what are some signs that, okay, it's time to it's time to wrap it up?
在这儿。
Here.
看。
Look.
历史为我们提供了明确的指引。
History provides us with a clear guide.
当你观察那些取得巨大成功的企业时，它们往往很快就能成功。
When you look at companies having hit it big, they hit big pretty quick.
在派对快结束时才加入是非常非常危险的。
It's very, very dangerous to be late to the party.
太早入场也非常危险，而大多数时候，这正是问题所在。
It's very, very dangerous to be early to the party, and the vast majority of the time, that's the problem.
你知道吗？
You know?
比如，Rippling 如果在2014年创立，也不会有今天的成就。
Like, rippling, had it been started in 2014, would not be what it is today.
我认为，如果Rippling今天才创立，五年后也不会有今天的成就。
I think rippling, had it been started today, would not be what it is five years from now today.
所以我认为，时机至关重要，而且很难掌控。
And so I think, like, timing is a lot and it's very hard to control for.
但当你把握住了时机，市场真实存在，产品也有效，正如我之前所说，产品与市场的契合度会非常清晰。
But when you get the timing right and the market is real and the product works, product market fit, like I said earlier, it's it's super clear.
因此，如果我要凭我的亲身经历随便选一个数字，我认为这非常重要。
And so if I were to pick a number out of a hat just from my lived experience, I think it's very important.
顺便说一句，别向别人寻求建议。
One one aside, don't ask people for advice.
向有相关经验的人请教。
Ask people for relevant experience.
如果你向他们寻求建议，他们总会给出建议。
If you ask them for advice, they will always give it.
但如果你向他们询问相关经验，他们很少能提供什么。
But if you ask them for relevant experience, they rarely have any to offer.
如果他们没有可提供的经验，那就别向他们寻求建议。
And if they don't have any to offer, then don't ask for their advice.
所以，向人们询问相关经验，我也会这样去做，比如在我与自己的创业者合作时。
So ask people for relevant experience, and I try to do this, you know, with with my own entrepreneurs when I work with them.
我会说：让我分享一下我相关的经验。
It's like, let me offer you whatever relevant experience I have.
关于何时该放弃，我的相关经验是，我认为我们本可以在第二次或第三次转型后就放弃，那大约是在第四年。
And my relevant experience on this topic of when to quit is, like, I think we could have called it after the second or third pivot, which was somewhere around year four.
当然，相信你所打造的东西并保持坚持是非常重要的。
It is all is, of course, very important to believe in what you're building and to be, you know, like to be persistent.
但承认我们已经调整过一两次，绝对没什么可羞愧的。
But there is definitely no shame in saying, look, we pivoted once or twice.
这并不是什么丢脸的事。
It's not catching.
我得去干下一件事了。
I gotta go do the next thing.
我认为，如果你已经创业到了第四年或第五年，而你的项目显然并不是一个迅猛增长的故事，那真的非常艰难。
And I think, like, if you're year four, year five in your entrepreneurship journey, and it's not just obviously a screaming rip roaring growth story, it's extraordinarily difficult.
这种情况极其罕见。
This is so extremely rare.
所以，除了从一开始就可能面对的那些罕见的成功几率，现在这些几率还要进一步转化为某种疯狂的结果。
So beyond even already the rare scores you're gonna, you know, face from the outset that that that that that that now is is gonna convert to something crazy.
这听起来可能很难接受，但我猜，当你真的豁出去说‘去他的’时，反而会感到无比解脱。
So that's hard to hear, I I guess, but, man, it can be really liberating when you're like, fuck it.
我要去做这件事了。
I'm I'm gonna do this.
我有这个精力。
I have the energy.
我会再做一次。
I'm gonna do it again.
我会用一张白纸重新开始。
I'm just gonna do it with a clean sheet.
这真的很有帮助。
That is really helpful.
你用受体和药物来描述产品市场契合度的方式非常有趣。
You have this really fun way of describing product market fit around receptors and drugs.
哦，是的。
Oh, yeah.
对。
Yeah.
我认为这是一个被严重误解的动态。
I think this is like a really fundamentally misunderstood dynamic.
当创始人给我发消息，说嘿。
When I when when founders message me and they're like, hey.
就像我的领英帖子和这次发布的推文。
Like like my LinkedIn post and my tweet for this launch.
我会去做。
I do it.
我会转发它。
I retweet it.
我会点赞。
I like it.
随便吧。
Whatever.
反正也没人关注我的推特。
Nobody follows me on Twitter anyways.
这没关系。
It doesn't matter.
但说实话，我确实会这么做。
But, like, I, you know, I do that.
但我会想，这并不是事情的真正重点。
And then but I think to myself, like, this is not what this is about.
这不是伟大公司该有的建设方式。
Like, this is not this is not how great companies are built.
这或许能成为一个起点，但算不上大事，因为根本没人关心你的公司。
It could be a a nucleating a nucleating event, but it's not a major thing because nobody cares about your company.
你的发布根本不重要。
Like, your launch doesn't matter.
那些大张旗鼓、拉满弓弦的发布，在创业和公司的喧嚣海洋中，只相当于一滴微不足道的水。
Big fat pull the pull the slingshot back launches amount to the teeniest thimble of water in the ocean of noise about startups and companies.
所以你必须一块砖一块砖地从底层慢慢搭建，这些发布其实没什么大不了的。
And so you just gotta build it brick by brick bottom up, and and these launches don't really amount to much.
那你又是怎么看待这一点的呢？
And so how do you think about that?
你觉得你的产品发布微不足道吗？
Like, do you think about the insignificance of your launch?
你有没有想过，你投入了这么多精力去打造一个你相信能实现产品市场契合的产品？
Are you think about all the effort you're putting into building a product that you believe is gonna have product market fit?
如果你认识到市场是不可改变的，那么无论你发多少推文、领英帖子或做多少广告，都无法改变市场是否想要你的产品。
Well, if if you recognize that the market is immutable, no amount of tweeting, LinkedIn posting, advertising is gonna change whether the market wants your product.
这或许能提高你产品的知名度，但不会改变别人是否真的需要它。
It's not it might raise awareness about your product, but it's not gonna change whether somebody wants it.
那么，你就得换一种心态。
Then you take a different mindset.
你必须把你的初创公司看作是在宇宙中进行一项实验，看看你能从中得到什么回报。
You have to view your startup as running an experiment in the universe to see what you get in return for that.
就像药物研发和受体结合的类比一样，基因泰克的任何人都不会认为，他们能通过营销来改善药物在你体内的表现。
And this analogy of, like, drug discovery and binding receptors is, nobody at Genentech thinks they can market their way to better performance inside your body.
那种药物的受体结合，是存在的，还是不存在的。
The binding receptors for that drug, they exist or they don't.
当他们开发产品时，他们的目标是找出这些结合受体是否存在。
And when they build their product, their goal is to find out whether the binding receptors exist.
但命运早已决定了结果。
But fate already has decided the outcome.
这一点对于你开发的任何软件产品来说都绝对正确。
This is absolutely true, very software product you build.
命运早已决定了结果。
Fate has already decided the outcome.
市场要么会接受你的产品并大力推广，要么就不会。
The market's either gonna latch onto your product and run with it or it's not.
不要先发布产品，等到失败后再试图通过营销来扭转局面，因为很可能根本不存在这些结合受体。
Do not ship the product, find a lack of success, and then try to market your way through that because the binding receptors likely don't exist.
对我来说，这是一种非常解放的心态，因为现在我只需要找到正确的药物，而无需再费力去说服身体为我所开发的东西产生结合受体。
And I for me, it was a very liberating mindset because now I just have to find the right drug, and I can forget trying to convince the body to develop the binding receptors for whatever it is that I'm building.
嗯。
Mhmm.
我喜欢你这里的建议，因为你是在Notion早期就投资的人，而Notion正是经典案例之一，他们花了大约四年时间才做出成果。
What I love about your advice here is you were an early investor in Notion, which is one of the classic stories of it took them I think it was four years to get to something.
他们搬到了日本。
They moved to Japan.
他们一直在全力开发整个产品。
They worked on the whole thing.
那么从中能学到什么教训吗？
And so is there a lesson from there?
这是否是一个真正成功的罕见例子？
Like, is that a rare example where it actually worked?
这并不是一个值得效仿的例子，因为它极其罕见。
And that's not an example to be inspired by because it's extremely, truly rare.
我们再来谈谈α和β阶段。
Let's talk about alpha beta again.
好的。
Okay.
作为投资者，你可能会建立一份清单，列出你希望确认的关于一家公司的真假事项，希望这样能带来你所期望的投资成功。
As an investor, you might build a checklist of things you wanna make sure are true or false about a company and hope that that's going to yield the kind of, like, investment success you're looking for.
它是否有这样的创始人？
Does it have this kind of founder?
它是不是一家在特拉华州注册的C型公司？
Does it have know, is it a c corp in Delaware?
比如，砰砰砰砰砰砰。
Like, you know, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom.
这些清单究竟关注的是什么？
And these checklists are all about what?
它们全都关于抑制贝塔值。
They're all about suppressing beta.
它们旨在避免可以避免的错误。
They're about avoiding avoidable mistakes.
它们旨在带来稳定性。
They're about bringing stability.
杰夫·刘易斯是一位投资者，对很多事情都有独特的见解。
Jeff Lewis is an investor who has many angular views on things.
我认为他最持久的一句话是‘叙事违背’。
And I think one of his most enduring phrases is narrative violations.
这个观点认为，每一个取得巨大成功的公司，都必须以某种方式违背主流共识。
This idea that, like, the common wisdom must be violated in some way by every company that has an outsized success.
这绝对是正确的。
It is absolutely true.
当我对硅谷的模式做出这些一般性观察时，最成功的企业 inevitably 以某种重要方式违背了清单上的某一条。
And when I give these general observations on the patterns in Silicon Valley, the most successful businesses inevitably violate something on that list in some really important way.
因此，你作为创业者无法复制 Notion 的成功。
And so Notion, you can't replicate Notion's success as an entrepreneur.
你无法复制它，因为你不是伊万。
You can't replicate it because you're not Ivan.
你无法复制它，因为你不是 Notion。
You can't replicate it because you're not Notion.
你无法复制它，因为他们创业时并不是2010年。
You can't replicate it because it's not 2010 when they started the company.
算算这笔账吧，或者说是2011年，实际上。
Do the math on that or 2011, actually.
这些人坚持了下来。
These guys stuck with it.
他们经历了地狱般的磨难。
They went through hell.
他们进行了转型。
They pivoted.
他们去了日本，穿着和服，冥想自己该打造什么。
They went to Japan and sat in kimonos and meditated on what they were gonna build.
他们不择手段，最终成为了如今一家极其成功的公司，在生产力领域这样一个几乎不可能创业的艰难市场中站稳了脚跟。
And by hook slash crook, they got to where they are today as a really wildly successful business in an extraordinarily difficult market where building businesses is virtually impossible in productivity.
这个市场由谷歌和微软主导。
It is dominated by Google and Microsoft.
在那个市场中开辟自己的细分领域是难以想象的。
Carving out your own niche in that market is just unthinkable.
因此，我认为Notion的成功源于其对坚持这一叙事的违背。
And so I look at Notion as having succeeded by virtue of the narrative violation of persistence.
我认为这对大多数人来说并不是个好主意。
I don't think it's a good idea for very many people.
他们恰好成功了。
It happened to work for them.
我认为这取决于创始团队及其独特的个性，特别是伊万对工艺的绝对执着。
And I look at it as being a function of the founding team and their specific idiosyncrasies, the the absolute insistence on craftsmanship from Ivan.
这就是他。
This is him.
这是他的风格。
That's his thing.
从中得出的教训不是放弃或不放弃。
The takeaway lesson is not give up or don't give up.
从中得出的教训绝对不是去效仿Notion的做法。
The takeaway lesson is certainly not go do what Notion did.
从中得出的教训是，每家公司都因其创始人的独特个性而取得成功。
The takeaway lesson is that every company succeeds on the foundations of the idiosyncrasies of the founder.
创始人的独特个性。
The idiosyncrasies of the founder.
Rippling成功的理由几乎与Notion完全相反，但在这两种情况下，公司都因创始人的独特个性而取得成功。
Rippling succeeds for almost the polar opposite reasons that Notion succeeds, But in both cases, the companies succeed on the idiosyncrasies of the founder.
因此，接纳并认识到这些独特个性，正是优秀投资者所做的事情。
And so embracing that, recognizing those idiosyncrasies, that's what great investors do.
他们能发现潜在投资对象身上那种独特而卓越的特质，并将其转化为投资承诺。
They spot that element of spikiness and greatness in a candidate investment, and they convert that to a commitment.
然后，当然，投资者或优秀的投资者会接受从宇宙中获得的回报。
And then, of course, the investor or the good ones accept what they get in exchange from that for the universe from the universe.
我很高兴我们走到了这个方向。
I love that we went in this direction.
我本来没打算谈你的投资生涯。
I wasn't planning to talk about your investing career.
只是想给听众一个理由来听这段内容，也许还会倒回去重听，我想再问一个关于投资的问题。
Just to give people a reason to listen to this and maybe rewind, and I wanna ask another question around investing.
你还早期投资过哪些公司？
What are some other companies you invested in early?
首先，好吧。
First of all, okay.
所以，我其实不太喜欢这个问题。
So I I I sort of hate the question.
比如，你投资过哪些其他公司？
Like, what are some other companies you've invested?
这是个合理的问题，但问题是，我会列出一堆我投资过且大获成功的公司，你知道的，那些非常知名的公司。
That's a fair question, but the problem is, like, I'm gonna give you a bunch of companies I've invested in that that won, you know, that are, like, really notable.
所以，我不想直接回答这个问题，而是想在这里说一下。
So what I would like to do instead of answering that question is I'm gonna give here.
让我给你一些线索。
Let me let me give you some some, like, some bait.
我是Notion的首批投资者之一。
Like, I I was one of the first investors in Notion.
我可能是第一个，我不确定。
I was perhaps the first I don't know.
去问Ivan吧。
Ask Ivan.
Clever这家公司，你知道的，有很好的退出回报。
Clever, which, you know, had a great exit.
如果你听说过的话，我是Zenefits的首批投资者之一。
I was one of the first investors in Zenefits, if you've heard of it.
听说过。
Heard of it.
在我加入之前，我是Rippling的首批投资者之一，而最近，有个有趣的事例。
I was, before I joined, one of the first investors in Rippling, and then more recently, like, in here's a funny one.
我是Deal的早期投资者之一，如果你听说过他们的话。
I was one of the first investors in deal, if you've heard of them.
你知道，我成功退出了那个投资，然后，希望这家公司因为他们的犯罪行为最终归零，但不管怎样。
I You know, I I was able to exit I was able to exit that position, and then, you know, hopefully, that company's going to zero with their criminal behavior, but whatever.
但更近一些时候，比如，如果你知道Decagon这家公司，它在AI领域做了一些非常酷的事情。
I was but more recently, like, you know, if you've if you know, like, Decagon, which is doing some really cool stuff on the AI front.
表现非常出色。
Killing it.
我的意思是，LangChain，很棒。
I mean, LangChain, like great.
所以这些是一些你可能听说过的企业。
So those are some companies that you maybe have heard of.
但比如，我投资了Macro这家公司？
But, like, how about, like, I invested in macro?
创始人是德里克·李。
The founder was Derek Lee.
Macro已经倒闭了。
Macro's out of business.
我投资了Debrief，创始人是内德·罗岑。
I invested in debrief, Ned Roczen.
它也倒闭了。
It's it's out of business.
你知道，我投资了Verb Data，大卫·赫茨的公司，也倒闭了。
You know, I invested in verb data with David Hertz out of business.
我正在照着列表念。
I'm reading from a list.
根据这份列表，我投资了大约70家公司，其中大多数都归零了。
I invested in what's the number, 70 companies according to this list where I track things and most of them went to zero.
这些创始人都非常出色。
And all of those founders were awesome.
这些创始人都超棒。
All those founders were kick ass.
这些创始人全都投入了大量精力去经营他们的企业，但最终都归零了。
And all those founders put a shit ton of energy into building their businesses and they went to zero.
而且他们至今仍保持着联系。
And they're enduring relationships.
我可以随时联系其中任何一个人，我想，除了Deal之外。
I can call on any of those people, I think, maybe with the exception of deal.
你可以找他们帮忙，我也确实找过几次，你知道的，我后来又创办了几家公司，实际上，很多人加入了Ripley，你可能不信。
And, you know, call in a favor and and and have and I've, you know, I've got a few subsequent and actually, a lot of them joined Ripley, believe it or not.
所以我也说不准。
So I don't know.
我投资过的公司名单很长。
Companies I've invested in is a long list.
我特别喜欢告诉你那些已经不存在的公司名字，因为这既自我吹嘘，又充满糟糕的幸存者偏差。
And I love to give you names of companies that don't exist anymore, because it's self serving and a horrible survivorship bias.
你只会列出那些成功的公司。
You just list the good ones.
关于 Bayt 播客
Bayt 提供中文+原文双语音频和字幕，帮助你打破语言障碍，轻松听懂全球优质播客。