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在未来,产品经理这个概念毫无意义。
Idea of a PM makes no sense in the future.
现在的技能更像是一位CEO,我们要构建什么?为什么构建?
The skill is more like being a CEO now, which is what are we building and why?
就业市场充满了焦虑。
There's a lot of anxiety in the job market.
人工智能将彻底改变许多人的职业道路,也许也包括我的。
AI is gonna radically reorient lots of people's careers, and maybe including mine.
我在一些顶尖组织中注意到,消耗令牌最多的角色是首席营销官。
What I've noticed in some of the best organizations is the number one consumer of tokens is the CMO.
他们不需要依赖一层层的副手来完成实际的工作成果。
They don't need to rely upon deputies and deputies and deputies to get actual work product.
我想聊聊你一些反直觉的观点。
I wanna hit on some contrarian takes that you have.
你的建议是,你其实不希望直接与客户交流。
Your advice, you don't actually want to be talking to customers.
我讨厌和客户交谈。
I hate talking to customers.
我拒绝让同事去和客户打交道。
I refuse to allow colleagues about and talk to customers.
你有一个观点,是关于公开批评和私下批评的。
You have this idea of criticizing in public versus in private.
高性能的团队不需要心理安全感。
High performance machines don't have psychological safety.
它们的目标是赢。
They're about winning.
你在帮助公司打造世界级团队方面特别出色。
You're uniquely great at helping companies build world class teams.
如果一位创始人在职业生涯早期就能无情而准确地评估人才,那么即使没有其他能力,他也能走得很远。
If a founder shows the ability early in his or her career to assess talent ruthlessly and accurately, here she can go very far with no other abilities whatsoever.
感觉好像永远都不会
It feels like it's never
吸引更多顶尖人才变得更加困难。
been harder to attract the best talent.
真正有才华的人。
Really talented people.
当事情进展顺利时,他们并不开心。
When things are going well, they're not happy.
当人们得过且过时,士气实际上会下降。
The morale actually does go down when people are skating.
CEO的唯一职责就是对抗这种自满情绪。
The single role for the CEO is offsetting that complacency.
你做得越好,CEO就越应该推动前进。
The better you're doing, the more the CEO should push.
今天,我的嘉宾是基思·拉博伊斯。
Today, my guest is Keith Rabois.
基思作为管理者和投资者的履历简直令人难以置信。
Keith's resume both as an operator and investor is absurd.
他曾是Stripe、Palantir、Airbnb、YouTube、DoorDash、Ramp以及数十家其他公司的早期投资者。
He was an early investor in Stripe, Palantir, Airbnb, YouTube, DoorDash, Ramp, and dozens of other companies.
他是著名的PayPal黑帮成员之一,曾担任业务发展与政策执行副总裁。
He's part of the famous PayPal Mafia, where he was executive vice president of business development and policy.
他还曾担任Square的首席运营官和LinkedIn的企业发展副总裁。
He's also been chief operating officer at Square, VP of corporate development at LinkedIn.
他还联合创立了两家公司,目前是Khosla Ventures的管理合伙人。
He's also co founded two companies, and he's currently managing director at Khosla Ventures.
可以说,Keith在识别人才、组建团队和运营世界级公司方面处于前99.9百分位。
It's safe to say that Keith is in the ninety nine point ninth percentile at identifying talent, building teams, and operating world class companies.
在开始之前,别忘了访问Lenny的productpass.com,那里为Lenny通讯订阅者提供了独家的绝佳优惠。
Before we get into it, don't forget to check out Lenny's productpass.com for an incredible set of deals available exclusively to Lenny's newsletter subscribers.
接下来,有请Keith Rabois。
With that, I bring you Keith Rabois.
Keith,非常感谢你来到这里,欢迎来到本播客。
Keith, thank you so much for being here, and welcome to the podcast.
能和你在一起非常愉快。
It's a pleasure to be with you.
好的。
Okay.
所以当我们开始录制时,你告诉我你正在用iPad进行这次对话,而我从未用过iPad,你还分享了一个惊人的事实:你已经好几年没用过电脑了。
So when we were starting this recording, you told me you're doing this from an iPad, which I've never had, and you shared a crazy fact that you haven't used a computer in, like, years.
聊聊这是怎么回事吧。
Talk talk about what's going on there.
是的。
Yeah.
当我刚开始在Square工作时,杰克·多西正用iPad管理公司,于是我立刻在2010年9月跟着换了,现在回头看,真是明智之举。
So, when I when I started working at Square, Jack Dorsey was running the company off an iPad and so, I immediately converted in September 2010 and have a look back.
自2010年9月以来,我就再没碰过电脑。
I haven't touched a computer since September 2010.
我生活中所有事情都是通过手机、手表或iPad完成的。
Everything I do in my life is either done from my phone, my watch, or my iPad.
你这么说的时候,有趣的是,现在越来越多的工程师开始用手机写代码了。
What's so interesting about this as you're talking is just there's this trend of engineers starting to code from their phone.
比如,我请过鲍里斯·尤里和西蒙·威尔逊做客,这两位都是TEDx级别的工程师,他们纯粹用手机和AI编程。
Like, I had Boris Journey on and Simon Wilson, these two engineers that are, like, TEDx engineers, they're just, like, coding from their phone talking to AI.
我觉得你其实早就为这种趋势做好了准备。
And I feel like you've you've been preparing for this for a long time.
是的。
Yeah.
一直在努力走在潮流前面。
Trying to be ahead of the curve.
杰克非常擅长走在潮流前面。
Jack's very good at being ahead of the curve.
只要你留意杰克在做什么并跟着学,他在科技领域就始终处于领先位置。
If you just watch what Jack's doing and follow, he's in pretty good shape in technology.
为了理解这样做的好处,是为了避免干扰吗?
And just to understand the benefit, is it just avoid distractions?
是的。
Yeah.
部分是为了避免干扰,部分是因为灵活性。
Partially distractions, partially just the flexibility.
比如随身携带一台iPad,简直太方便了。
Like taking an iPad with you anywhere is just super easy.
你知道,有些笔记本电脑后来确实改进了,比如屏幕的灵活性和角度,但主要是重量。
You know, some of the some laptops have improved since then, but, like, the screen flexibility, angles, but, like, just the weight.
我随时随地都带着我的iPad。
Like, I carry my iPad with me everywhere.
所以,没有任何理由。
So, there's no reason.
除非你从事高强度的工程工作,而那显然不是我的专长,尽管我可能得开始做了,否则没什么是你无法完成的。
There there's nothing you can't perform unless maybe if you're doing heavy duty engineering which obviously has not been my forte in life although I may have to start.
没有理由非要使用更强大、更重、更不灵活的设备。
There's no reason to use a more powerful, heavier weight, less flexible machine.
哇。
Wow.
iPad Maxing。
IPad Maxing.
基思·拉博伊斯。
Keith Rabois.
看看你有没有我的苹果。
See if you got my Apple.
只要是苹果产品,就能用。
As long as it's an Apple product, it works.
这太贴切了。
It was so appropriate.
本集由本季的特约赞助商WorkOS冠名赞助。
This episode is brought to you by our season's presenting sponsor, WorkOS.
OpenAI、Anthropic、Cursor、Vercel、Replit、Sierra、Clay以及数百家其他成功公司有什么共同点?
What do OpenAI, Anthropic, Cursor, Vercel, Replit, Sierra, Clay, and hundreds of other winning companies all have in common?
它们都由 WorkOS 驱动。
They are all powered by WorkOS.
如果你正在为企业市场开发产品,你一定经历过集成单点登录、SCIM、RBAC、审计日志以及其他大型企业所需功能的痛苦。
If you're building a product for the enterprise, you've felt the pain of integrating single sign on, SCIM, RBAC, audit logs, and other features required by large companies.
WorkOS 将这些阻碍交易的难题转化为即插即用的 API,专为 B2B SaaS 构建了现代化的开发者平台。
WorkOS turns those deal blockers into drop in APIs with a modern developer platform built specifically for b to b SaaS.
我作为投资人所支持的每一个开始拓展高端市场的初创公司,最终都会选择 WorkOS。
Literally every startup that I'm an investor in that starts to expand upmarket ends up working with WorkOS.
这是因为它们确实是最棒的。
And that's because they are the best.
无论你是正在争取首个企业客户的种子期初创公司,还是正在全球扩张的独角兽企业,WorkOS 都是让你快速达到企业级标准、打破增长瓶颈的最快路径。
Whether you are a seed stage startup trying to land your first enterprise customer or a unicorn expanding globally, WorkOS is the fastest path to becoming enterprise ready and unblocking growth.
它本质上就是企业级功能的 Stripe。
It's essentially Stripe for enterprise features.
访问 workos.com 开始使用,或直接加入他们的 Slack,那里有真正的工程师等待回答你的问题。
Visit workos.com to get started or just hit up their Slack where they have actual engineers waiting to answer your questions.
WorkOS 让你通过出色的 API、详尽的文档和流畅的开发体验更快地构建产品。
WorkOS allows you to build faster with delightful APIs, comprehensive docs, and a smooth developer experience.
前往 workos.com,立即让您的应用具备企业级能力。
Go to workos.com to make your app enterprise ready today.
在准备这次对话时,查德,我真的觉得我们本可以朝无数个方向展开讨论。
As I was preparing for this, Chad, there's just, like, so many directions we could have gone with this.
你太聪明了,有太多东西可谈了。
You are so smart, so many things.
我想聚焦在你特别擅长的一件事上,那就是帮助公司打造世界级的团队。
I want to focus on something that I think you're uniquely great at, which is helping companies build world class teams.
我想特别从吸引最优秀的人才开始谈起。
And I want to start in particular with attracting the best talent.
据我观察,如今一个有趣的现象是,很多人在找工作时遇到了困难。
And what's really interesting these days from what I can tell is there's just like a lot of people that are struggling to find a job.
找到工作所需的时间变得长多了。
It's taking a lot longer to find a job.
就是现在到处都在裁员。
It's just there's all these layoffs.
另一方面,感觉从未有这么难吸引到最优秀的人才。
On the other hand, it feels like it's never been harder to attract the best talent.
有太多了不起的公司正在做着了不起的事情,大量资金在流动,还有上亿美元的报价之类的东西。
There are so many amazing companies doing amazing things, much money flying around, these $100,000,000 offers and things.
所以,从你最接近、看到的最擅长吸引顶尖人才的公司来看,他们到底发现了什么诀窍?
And so from the companies that you are closest to that you see are best at attracting the best talent, what have they figured out?
他们做了哪些不同的事情?
What are they doing differently?
他们有哪些富有创意的做法?
What are some creative things they do?
我们先从基本原理说起。
Well, let's start with first principles.
我在Square工作时,从我的董事会那里学到的最重要的一课是,维诺德·霍斯拉是我的董事会成员,他说,你打造的团队就是你打造的公司。
The most important lesson I learned when I was working at Square from my board was Vinod Khosla was on my board, and he said, the team you build is the company you build.
当你创建初创公司时,这句格言是最重要的。
And that adage is the most important thing when you're creating a startup.
人们常常被市场、客户、产品和技术分散注意力。
People get distracted with the market, with customers, with the product, with technology.
归根结底,核心是团队。
Ultimately, it's a team.
如果你有对的人,其他一切都会变得简单。
If you have the right people, everything else will be easy.
如果你有错的人,其他一切都会变得困难。
And if have the wrong people, everything else is gonna be difficult.
所以我实际上是从我在PayPal的日子中学到了这一点,虽然这是Vinod总结的。
So I actually learned this Vinod distilled it, but I actually learned this back in my PayPal days.
所以,你知道,在2000年代初,PayPal为什么如此成功?
So, you know, in the early two thousands, why was PayPal so successful?
为什么此后二十五年里,出现了这么多成功且有趣的新公司?原因在于Peter Thiel和Max Levchin聚集了惊人的顶尖人才密度。
Why were there such a you know, some subsequent generations of successful and interesting companies for twenty five years now, it's because Peter Thiel and Max Levchin marshaled an incredible density of talent.
因此,这使得 PayPal 能够在可能无法成功的地方取得成功。
So it allowed PayPal to succeed where possibly we wouldn't have.
这些人才带着远大的理想、抱负和才华,继续在各个领域创建了非凡的公司。
And these people went on with interesting ideas, ambition and talent to build epic companies in all kinds of verticals.
所以从我技术生涯的第一天起,我就一直专注于关键人才密度的重要性:如何识别、留住和提拔拥有这种才华的人。
So from day one, I've always been, day one of my technical career, technology career, I've always been focused on how the importance of critical density talent, how do you identify, retain, and promote people with that talent.
在 PayPal 时代,我刚踏入科技行业时,说实话,我在这方面并不擅长。
Back in the PayPal days, when I first started my career in technology, I actually truthfully was not very good at this.
幸运的是,彼得和马克斯很擅长。
Fortunately, Peter and Max were.
马克斯基本上负责招聘了公司里所有的技术人才。
So Max basically hired all the technical talent in the organization.
彼得则主要负责招聘其他人。
Peter pretty much hired everybody else.
他们主要依靠人脉网络,因此除非你与工程团队或通过斯坦福大学与彼得有直接或间接的联系,否则很难进入 PayPal 工作,这是一种不同的招聘模式。
They used their network primarily, so it was very difficult to get a job at PayPal unless you had a first degree or second degree connection to the engineering team or to Peter through Stanford, which is a different type of recruiting model.
如果你有强大的人脉网络,这种方法会非常有效。
It works really well if you have a strong network.
我不建议每个人都这么做,但如果你的人脉中拥有独特的人才,那就无可替代。
I wouldn't recommend it for everybody, but if you have a network that has, you know, unique talent, there's no substitute.
无论你面试技巧多好,面试本身都不是一个很好的替代方案。
Interviews are not a great substitute regardless of how strong you are at interview.
但当我刚开始那一年时,我在招聘人员方面只是中等水平。
But when I started back for a year, I was mediocre at, let's say, hiring people.
大概五五开吧,一些不错的人,一些平庸的人。
Probably fifty, fifty, you know, some good people, some mediocre people.
这无法让你的团队获得不公平的优势。
That doesn't allow you to scale a team with an unfair advantage.
但我学会了一件事,就是成功地从PayPal内部其他人的团队中挖人。
But what I learned to do is steal people from other people's organizations within PayPal very successfully.
所以我从当时的COO大卫·萨克斯那里得到了反馈,他说除非我能展现出领导力的杠杆效应,否则不会再晋升我,他有一个公式:一加一必须等于三或更多。
So I got feedback from David Sacks, who was the COO at the time, that I wasn't gonna get promoted again until I until I could demonstrate leverage, like leadership leverage, he had an equation for of one plus one has to equal three or more.
因此,每增加一名员工,你都必须证明自己带来了不成比例的回报,非线性的回报。
So for every incremental person you hire, you have to show that you produce disproportionate returns, nonlinear returns.
因为我招聘得不够好,所以在这种杠杆效应上并没有真正成功。
And because I wasn't hiring that well, I wasn't really succeeding at that leverage.
于是我四处走访,认真考虑了反馈,并告诉自己:好吧,我真的很想得到晋升。
So when I went around, took the feedback into account and said, okay, I really wanna get promoted.
那我该怎么做?
What do I do?
于是我找到了公司内部一些我认为有才华、却未被充分挖掘潜力和野心的人。
So I found people within the organization that I felt had talent that were were not being leveraged to the highest potential and ambition.
我将他们招募到了我的团队。
And I recruited them to my team.
这非常成功。
And that was very successful.
然后我确实很快得到了晋升,因为这些人的能力很快就上手了。
And then I did get promoted actually fairly quickly because the people actually were up to speed.
他们能够迅速推进工作,为我们公司带来了大量重要的成果。
They were able to run really fast and we produced a lot of really important results for the company.
但我从中吸取的教训是:这很棒,因为它向我证明了我确实有能力识别人才。
The lesson though that I took away was, well, that's great because what it showed to me is I actually could identify talent.
我只是无法识别那些陌生人中的人才。
I just couldn't identify strangers with talent.
对于那些和我一起吃午饭、吃晚饭,或在PayPal园区一起跑步的人,我能准确判断他们的能力。
So people that were in the building that I have lunch with or dinner with or go for a run around the PayPal campus with, I was accurate at diagnosing their abilities.
但我无法在二十分钟、三十分钟或四十五分钟的面试中做到这一点。
I just couldn't do it, you know, in a twenty minute, thirty minute, forty five minute interview.
所以第一招就是全力重用我认识的人。
So the first hand is just double down on people I know.
这并不能完美地规模化,但值得精通。
That doesn't scale perfectly, but learn to be excellent at.
如果我能了解人们的能力、优势和弱点,那就好了。
And if I had context, assessing people's abilities, superpowers, and, you know, weaknesses.
接下来的若干年里,我发展出了一种不同的方法,用于识别和评估陌生人能力。
Then over the next X years, to identify ability, a different technique for identifying, assessing random people.
因为最终,如果你想建立一个组织,或者想成为一位风险投资人,你不能只投资你认识的人。
Because ultimately, if you're gonna build an organization, also if you're gonna be a VC, you can't just invest in people you already know.
这花了我几年时间,也需要一些训练。
So that took some years and required some training.
无论如何,我认为这些技能是可以教给创始人的。
Anyway, I think you can teach some of this to a founder.
但一个创始人如果能在职业生涯早期就展现出无情而精准地识别人才的能力,那么即使没有其他任何能力,他也能走得非常远。
But one advantage a founder has that's gonna thrive is if a founder shows the ability early in his or her career to assess talent ruthlessly and accurately, here she can go very far with no other abilities whatsoever.
招聘就像一块肌肉。
Hiring is like a muscle.
你需要不断锻炼它。
You need to exercise it.
你需要不断尝试,总结哪些方法有效、哪些无效,你本该知道什么、错过了什么、为什么错过,然后不断反思,努力提升自己。
You need to try, learn what worked, what didn't, what what could you have known, what what you missed, why, and, you know, riff on that and try to get better at it.
你可以学习一些技巧。
There are tactics you can learn.
我认为这些技巧在正态分布的中段效果不错,能让你在其中移动十到二十度。
I think the tactics work pretty well within the middle of a bell curve distribution of moving yourself ten, twenty degrees within that bell curve.
我不认为这些技巧能真正教会你如何识别顶尖的千分之一、百分之零点五的人才。
I don't think the tactics can really teach you how to identify, call it, like, top 10 basis points, top 50 basis points of talent.
在那里,你必须偏离常规。
There you have to deviate from the norm.
我认为这实际上适用于生活中大多数经验。
And I think that's actually true of most lessons in life.
如果你想在任何技能上出类拔萃,就不能照搬手册。
If you're gonna be extraordinary in any skill, you can't follow a playbook.
否则,按定义,其他人也会成为顶尖的千分之一。
Otherwise, by definition, lots of other people would be, you know, the top 10 basis points.
但通过学习技巧,你可以取得很大进步。
But you can get a lot better by learning techniques.
所以,举个例子,我们来谈几个。
So for example, let's share a couple.
我认为你可以学会的一件事是精通背景调查。
One thing I think you can learn to do is be excellent at references.
这对于直接招聘应届毕业生效果不大,因为背景调查的参考依据会有些偏差。
It doesn't work for hiring people right out of college or something because the reference context is gonna be a little off.
但我觉得,如果你不提升面试和评估能力,至少可以通过彻底的背景调查来获取关键信息——比如,对我而言,彻底的背景调查意味着DoorDash的Tony在每个高级职位的招聘上都会做20次背景调查。
But I think without getting better at interviewing and assessing, if you just learn to extract the right information from ruthless referencing So for example, ruthless referencing to me means Tony at DoorDash does 20 references on every single senior hire.
20次。
20.
哇。
Wow.
我打赌他一定非常擅长。
I bet you he's pretty good.
我打赌她也相当准确。
I bet she's been pretty accurate too.
所以我认为你可以学会这一点。
So I think you can learn that.
这是一种可传授的技能,只要你对你的事业无比专注,就能不断进步。
That's like a a skill that's teachable that being absolutely, you know, incredibly dedicated to your craft, you can just get better at.
过去,Gray Lock有一位投资者是我的领英董事会成员,叫大卫·斯泽,他是一位非常成功的投资者,以投资领英和脸书而闻名。
Back in the day, there's an investor at Gray Lock who's on my board at LinkedIn, David Sze, a very successful investor, notable for both LinkedIn and Facebook investments.
他曾经在Gray Lock授课。
He used to teach at Greylock.
在找到负面评价之前,你不能停止对创始人进行背景调查。
You couldn't stop referencing a founder until you hit a negative reference.
所以你知道,当你终于找到一个负面评价时,就说明背景调查已经全面了。
So you would know you'd exhausted the reference when you finally hit a negative reference.
因此,我认为这其中有一些提升能力的策略。
And so I think there are tactics there in muscle building.
你如何从正确的人那里获取正确信息?
How do you get the right information from the right people?
你该怎么提出问题呢?等等。
How do you frame the questions, etcetera?
这会引导你走向正确的方向。
That will lead you in the right direction.
不过,你得小心。
Now, you have to be careful.
比如,我来给你举个例子,说明这种情况可能出错。
Like, let's say, I'll give you an example where this can go wrong.
我一直是Faire这家公司的早期投资者,这家公司由我在Square的两位同事创立。
I've been a longtime investor from the seed round of a company called Faire founded by two of my colleagues at Square.
Max Levchin和Jeff Culberson曾在Square为我工作,另外两位联合创始人也曾在Square工作。
Max Levchin and Jeff Culberson worked for me at Square, then the two other co founders also worked at Square.
当人们对Max进行背景调查时,大多数风投问的问题都是错的,比如:Max是个好员工吗?
When people were reference checking Max, often most VCs asked the wrong question, which was Max was Max a good employee?
这个问题的答案褒贬不一。
The answer to that is very mixed.
因此,一些风险投资者,包括一些非常优秀的投资者,在投资时感到不安。如果他们稍微改变一下问题,比如问:马克斯是否有能力成为世界级的企业家?
And so some venture capitalists, including some very good ones, were nervous about investing in If they frame the question slightly differently, which is, is Max capable of being a world class entrepreneur?
答案是肯定的。
The answer was yes.
所以,这就像一种策略。
So again, it's like a tactic.
你必须明白,我究竟想从中获取什么信息?
You have to understand like what exactly am I trying to extract?
同一个人,错误的问题,错误的结果。
Same person, wrong question, wrong result.
很多人错过了机会,现在感到后悔。
And many people passed unfair and they regret it.
这些其实都是很有才华的投资者。
And these are actually quite talented investors.
他们只是在给杰克·多西这样的候选人做背景调查时,没有正确地提出问题。
They just didn't frame the question correctly when they were calling someone like Jack Dorsey up for the reference.
还有其他你觉得在获取正确信息时非常有用的问题吗?
Any other questions you find really helpful in extracting the right information?
当我面试担任领导职位的高级候选人时,我总是问他们:看看他们所在的公司,说说如果你是CEO,你会有什么不同的做法?
When when I interview candidates for senior people in leadership positions, I always ask them, look at whatever company they're at, and say, you were CEO, what would you have done differently?
你能从中感受到他们的战略思维:他们是否能推动价值创造?
And you get a feel for their strategic mindset of, can they drive value creation?
因为几乎可以肯定的是,他们来自一家已经取得一定进展和成功的公司。
Because almost by definition, they've come from a company that's had some traction and success.
所以,他们是否具备调整能力?
So can they edit?
所以对你的情况,我会问你:如果你是Airbnb的CEO,你会有什么不同的做法?
So for your case, I would have asked you, if you were CEO of Airbnb, what would you have done differently?
从这个问题中,你能学到很多东西。
And you learn a lot from that question.
关于背景调查,我认为一个比较好的通用思路是问这个人:什么因素会最有助于这个人取得成功?如果事情没有顺利发展,你能识别出的主要根本原因是什么?
On references specifically, I think the a general arc that's pretty good is asking the person, what would lead to this person being most successful and if something were not to work out, what would be the primary root cause that you can identify if something going wrong?
我认为,围绕这两个方面进行提问通常能带来很多洞察。
I think generally programming on those two arcs leads to a lot of insight.
第一个问题是针对候选人的吗?还是说
And that first question is for the candidate or or is that in
是针对推荐人?
the reference?
是针对候选人的。
For the candidate.
这专门是针对候选人的。
That's for the candidate specifically.
明白了。
Got it.
因为我不想让他们批评Airbnb。
Because it's not like I I don't want them to criticize Airbnb.
我不认为那样做会有什么成效。
I don't know that I don't think that's that productive.
但你能看出他们对当前商业模式的理解程度有多深,他们对权衡取舍的理解有多少,以及他们能否创造出不公平的优势,因为他们对后燃器有深入的洞察。
But you can tell how much of the current business model have they absorbed, how much they understand trade offs, and then they can they create an unfair advantage, you know, because they they have they have insights into afterburners.
然后我还有一个跟进问题,这通常是关键问题:假设我问了你关于Airbnb的这个问题,你给了我一个很棒的回答。
And then I have a follow-up question, which is usually gold, which is, let's say, I ask you this question about Airbnb, and you give me this great answer.
我会问:那你为什么没能说服布赖恩采纳这个方案呢?
I'm like, well, why didn't you why weren't you able to persuade Brian to do it?
你提出了一个有趣的观点,即有一些策略可以帮助你更好地发现和识别人才。
So you made this interesting point that there's, like, tactics that can help you get better at finding and identifying talent.
这听起来很大程度上只是通过反复实践积累的反馈循环。
A lot of this is just the feedback loop of doing it a bunch, it sounds like.
我发现这个反馈循环非常关键,但大多数人面试、招聘后,却很少从结果中学到东西。
I find the feedback loop is so, it's hard to actually like most people interview, hire, and then don't really learn much from how it ends up going.
他们会有一种直觉反应,但却没有真正去思考它。
There's this gut thing that happens, but they're not really thinking about it.
你有什么建议,能让人从观察事情结果的过程中最大程度地汲取经验教训吗?
Do you have any advice for just how to make the most out of the lesson of seeing how something went?
所以我读过一些关于这个主题的研究,如果你在任何一次招聘后三十天问自己:还会做出同样的决定吗?
So I've read some research on the topic, and if you ask yourself thirty days after any hire, would you make the same decision?
这个三十天的反馈周期非常有用,它的准确度几乎和一年或两年后衡量的结果一样。
That thirty day loop is pretty pretty useful, and it it basically, it's as accurate as measuring it a year or two years out.
所以你有一个非常紧密的反馈循环,可以询问整个招聘团队。
So you got a pretty tight feedback loop, you can ask the entire hiring team.
我认为这是一种每家公司都应该采用的方法。
So I think that is, like, just a technique that every company should use.
我想谈谈你提出的这个框架——‘桶和弹药’,因为这真的让人眼界大开,帮助人们理解该招什么样的人。
I wanna talk about this framework that you have, barrels and ammunition, because this is really mind expanding and helping people understand who to even hire.
所以,大多数公司都会融资。
So, look, most companies raise money.
他们有一些初步的成果。
They have some traction.
他们,你知道的,只是看到了布朗。
They you know, just see Brown.
他们获得了一些启动资源。
They get some launch.
他们取得了一些进展,并筹集了大量资金,无论是A轮还是B轮。
They get some traction, and they raise a lot of money, whether it's a series a or a b.
然后他们大量招聘人员,通常是毫无章法的,或者至少从历史经验来看是如此。
And then they hire a lot of people infallibly or at least historically.
接着,几乎毫无例外地,CEO会感到沮丧,因为他们雇了太多人。
And then the CEO, almost without exception, gets frustrated because they've hired a lot of people.
支出速度大幅上升,但他们感觉不到每天、每周、每月、每季度的产出有相应增加。
The burn rate has increased a lot, and they don't feel like that's more get more is getting accomplished per unit of time, per day, per week, per month, per quarter.
他们感到非常沮丧。
And they get frustrated.
于是,他们在晚餐时与其他CEO、像我这样的人,或与我一对一交谈时,极度不满和失望,抱怨自己花了这么多钱雇这么多人,却做得更少、或一样多,为什么,为什么,为什么。
And so then they sit around at a dinner with other CEOs or people like me or one on one conversation with me and are incredibly unhappy and disappointed that I'm spending all this money on all these people, but we're getting less done or the same done or why, why, why, why.
在多年参加这些与其它CEO或COO共进晚餐时的对话后,我意识到,这一问题的根本原因是:在任何公司中,能够独立从零开始推动一项计划并取得成功的人数非常有限。如果你在不增加我所说的‘能从开端推动到成功’的‘桶’的数量的情况下继续招聘,你只是在为同一项计划堆砌人手。
After years of sitting through these conversations at dinner with other CEOs or COOs, I realized that the fundamental driver of this is that the number of people that can independently drive an initiative from beginning, from inception to success is very limited with any within any company and if you hire more people without expanding the number of what I call barrels that can drive from inception to success, all you're doing is stacking people behind the same initiatives.
因此,你正在浪费时间、精力,并增加了协作成本和协调成本。
And so you're wasting time, energy, and increasing your collaboration tax, your coordination tax.
这就是造成阻力系数的原因。
And so that's what causes the drag coefficient.
例如,在PayPal被收购时,我们在山景城有大约254人。
So for example, at PayPal, we had about two fifty four people in Mountain View when we were acquired.
在这些人中,根据你要求的严格程度,他们被认为是科技史上最具人才密度的网络之一,组织内有12到17个能独立推动项目从零到成功的‘桶’。
Of those people, depending on how strict you really want to be, it is considered one of the best talent rich networks of all time in technology, There is between 12 to 17 barrels in the organization.
这简直是一个无限的数量。
That's like an infinite number.
我曾经在Lattice的一档播客上问过杰克·阿尔特曼,他是一家相当出色公司的创始人,问他们公司有多少个‘桶’?
I once asked Jack Altman on a podcast at Lattice, who's a pretty damn good company, how many barrels of company?
他的回答是:两个。
The answer was two.
对于一家非常优秀的企业来说,这是更常见的答案。
That's a more common answer for a very good company.
所以,一家公司通常有两到十五个‘桶’。
So, you have between two and let's say 15 barrels at a company.
这决定了你能并行或依次开展的独特工作数量,单纯增加人手并不会改变这一点,反而会增加协作或协调成本,导致你实际能完成的工作更少。
That defines unique number of things you can do in parallel over sequentially and just hiring more people is not going to change that and if anything, it's just going to cause a collaboration or coordination tax and you're going to have a track provision, you're going to do less.
因此,对我来说,关键在于:如果你想要做更多,或者市场要求你做更多,你的商业模式要求你做更多,风投要求你做更多,你就需要更多的‘桶’。
So, the key is to me is if you want to do more or need to do more, your market requires you to do more, your business model requires you to do more, VCs require you do more, you need to have more barrels.
那么问题来了,如何以及何时增加?这其中有很多细节,但从根本上说,‘桶’与‘弹药’的比例决定了可以同时推进的重要项目数量。
Now, the question is how and when and you know, this, there's a lot of details there, but fundamentally, the ratio of barrels to ammunition is what dictates the number of important initiatives that can be pursued simultaneously.
你并不是说你不想要弹药。
And you're not saying you don't want ammunition.
弹药是有价值的。
Like, it's valuable.
它能产生影响力。
It's a make an impact.
你需要在‘桶’之外还拥有弹药。
You need ammunition in addition to the.
是的,你确实需要弹药,这取决于项目的类型。
Yeah, you definitely need ammunition and depends on what kind of project.
有些项目,单个团队可能在极少甚至没有额外资源的情况下也能成功。
There are types of projects where an individual barrel may be able to succeed with very limited or no, you know, ammunition.
有时候,他可能是一个设计师、一个工程团队、一个产品经理、一个数据分析人员,等等。
Sometimes, he may be a designer, an engineering team, a PM, a data analysis, blah blah blah.
这取决于项目是什么,你要解决的问题是什么,以及合适的资源量是多少。
To depends on what the project is, what the problem you're trying to solve is, what's the proper amount of ammunition.
但一旦你开始思考资源与问题之间的比例,就能更建设性、更有意识地规划团队结构。
But once you think about the ratios of ammunition to the problem, you can be much more constructive and deliberate and intentional about the team construction.
听到这些的人,大多数人都认为自己是团队核心。
Most people hearing this assume they are barrels.
有什么方法能帮助你判断一个人是否真的是团队核心?
What helps you understand if someone's truly a barrel?
他们能否将一个想法变为现实?
Can they take an idea and make it happen?
基本上,我们正朝着那边那座山丘前进。
Basically, we're going up that there's a hill over there.
那就是那座山丘。
That's the hill.
把我们带到那座山丘上去。
Get us over that hill.
无论用什么方式,如果需要,他们都会激励人们。
And one way or the other, they will motivate people if they need to.
如果需要,他们会聚集资源。
They will accumulate resources if they need to.
他们会衡量所需的一切,并且一定会带领你的公司越过那座山丘。
They will measure what they need to and they're going to get your company across that hill.
这才是真正的‘桶’。
That's a barrel.
任何低于这个标准的都不算‘桶’。
Anything less than that is not a barrel.
所以这就像内部组织的技能、资源、战略之类的,总之就是所有这些要搞定的事情的集合。
And so this is skills like internal poly org stuff, resource, like strat, like, whatever, yeah, it's kind of the collection of all the things to get.
所有这些事情的集合。
Collection of all those things.
这本质上就是一种结果。
It's just basically, there's an outcome.
嗯。
Mhmm.
CEO或创始人想要一个结果,不管遇到什么困难,这个人一定会交付这个结果。
CEO wants, CEO, founder wants an outcome, and come hell or high water, this person is gonna deliver that outcome.
起初,这个结果可能相当具体且不那么复杂,然后你逐步扩大范围、增加复杂性和难度,把这些任务托付给你的‘桶’,而有时候你一开始他们根本看不到解决办法。
Then the outcome can be, you know, fairly narrow and not that difficult in the beginning, and then you expand the scope, you know, the complexity, the difficulty that you basically entrust to your barrels and and sometimes they have no line of sight on how to solve it when you start.
有时候,你可能会有一个初步的想法。
Sometimes, you have a preliminary idea.
所以,情况各不相同,但最终,这种能力就是:我把这事从你手上接过来,你可以放手不管,这事一定会办成。
So, it ranges but ultimately, it's that skill of I'm gonna take this off your plate, you can fire and forget, and this is gonna happen.
如果事情无法推进,我会主动回来向你说明我遇到的问题、我已经尝试过的方案、对根本原因的分析,并在有足够时间让你介入、与我一起头脑风暴以找到正确解决方案之前寻求你的帮助。
And if it's not gonna happen, I'm gonna come back to you proactively with the issues I'm confronting, what I've already tried, the diagnosis of the root causes, and ask for your help with sufficient time for you to intervene and try to brainstorm with me to get us to the right answer.
当你谈到这个角色时,‘自主性’这个词浮现在我脑海中。
Agency is the word that comes to mind when you talk about this role.
是的。
Yeah.
我认为‘自主性’这个说法很准确。
I think agency is accurate.
我对‘自主性’这类术语的问题在于,它有点像‘战略’——前一年很多人谈论这个词,但去年他们其实并没有真正理解会议的实质。
The problem I have with terms like agency is it's like a little bit like strategy because in one year, a lot of people went out the other year and they don't really process the meeting.
对。
Yeah.
有哪些具体的例子能体现这种‘桶’的角色,让人们更好地理解你所说的?
Who are some examples of barrels that make this real so people can understand what you're talking about?
我记得在2014年的一次YC讲座中,我谈过如何运营。
You know, I talked to my YC lecture in 2014 about how to how to operate.
它们可以很简单,比如现在在科技界 somewhat 著名的奶昔测试——你知道,我们以前让工程师在 Square 工作得很辛苦,经常加班到很晚,我一直希望他们能有食物,这样就不会饿着肚子工作。
They can be as simple as the now somewhat famous in technology smoothie test which is, you know, we used to have engineers work pretty hard at the Square and pretty late and I always wanted them to have like food so they wouldn't be famous.
他们不会分心,我也不希望他们吃垃圾食品,因为我真的认为垃圾食品对身体不好,对大脑也不好,等等。
They wouldn't be distracted and I didn't really want them to eat like junk food because I I actually think junk food is bad for you, bad for your brain, etcetera.
所以,我们决定提供外卖,特别想在晚上9点提供冷饮奶昔。当时,Square 的办公团队、执行助理团队规模相当大,这可不是一个精简高效的组织,于是我尝试通过办公团队和执行助理来解决,但都没成功。
So, settled on delivery and really wanted to provide like a 9PM like cold smoothies and we had a, at that time, a pretty substantial team at Square, office team, EAs, you know, this was not a lean, mean organization and so I tried through the office team, EA's, and nothing.
我们从未能在晚上9点准时送达健康、美味又冰凉的奶昔。
We never got healthy, delicious, and cold smoothies delivered at 9PM.
就一直保留着这个想法。
Just kept that one.
这让我很沮丧,因为如果奶昔不够冰,就没人愿意吃。
It's getting frustrates because they, if you, at the end, if the smoothies aren't cold, then, no one's gonna eat them.
它们不会在九点准时送达,也没人能真正关注到refresh rate和茶点供应的问题。
They don't arrive at nine and no one can really bake on, you know, the refresh rate, the refreshments.
一切都不顺利,后来我有个叫泰勒·弗朗西斯的实习生,我向他倾诉了我的挫败感。
Everything went wrong and then I had this intern named Taylor Francis and I was explaining just my frustration.
我的意思是,这才第二天,他就说:‘我来解决它。’我当时想:好吧,小子。
I mean, it's like a second day or and he's like, I'll solve it And I was like, okay, kid.
祝你好运。
Good luck with that.
我当时想:行啊。
Like, I was like, sure.
继续试试。
Keep try.
试试看。
Try.
不管怎样,一天过去了。
Anyway, day goes by.
晚上九点到了。
09:00 arrives.
结果你猜怎么着?九点整,奶昔准时送到了工程师们聚集的站立式办公桌上。
And low and behold, smoothies show up at 9PM, delivered on the standing desk table where the engineers would congregate.
我尝了一下。
I sample them.
它们是冷的。
They're cold.
味道很棒。
They taste great.
我当时想,天哪。
And I'm like, oh my god.
我找到了一个宝藏。
I found a barrel.
后来我把几乎所有的活都交给他了。
And I later gave him almost everything to do.
我想回到第一个问题。
I wanna go back to actually the first question.
你分享了一些关于如何识别优秀人才的精彩建议,但我还是好奇,当你找到那个‘宝藏’时,比如当所有人都在争相追捧他们的时候。
We did you shared some amazing advice for how to identify great talent, but I'm still curious when you find that barrel, for example, when, like, everyone's throwing money at them.
有这么多优秀的团队可以加入。
There's all these amazing teams to join.
公司有哪些做法来吸引并说服他们加入自己的团队?
What are some things that companies do to attract and convince them to join their team?
那些常规的做法依然有效。
The the standard stuff is still true.
传达使命和愿景是不可或缺的。
Mission, selling the vision of mission is indispensable.
大多数已经证明自己才能的人,至少在当今世界,总会收到多个机会的邀约。
Most people who have proven talent anyway, at least in the current world, are gonna attract offers for multiple opportunities.
因此,你必须让他们相信你的机会非常特别。
And so you've gotta convince them that your opportunity is very special.
我认为一种更微妙的方式是,让他们相信自己的特定技能正好契合公司当前的关键瓶颈,也就是说,他们在为自己下注。
I think one way to do that that's a little bit more nuanced is convince them that their particular skill overlaps with the critical blockers to the current company, meaning they're betting on themselves.
例如,如果他们在营销方面非常出色,而公司当前成功最大的瓶颈不是技术,也不是产品,而是我们认为是营销。
So for example, if they are superb at, let's say marketing, if the biggest blocker of the company in the company's current success is not technology, not the product, but we believe it's marketing.
对于一位世界级的市场营销专家来说,很容易这样说:不仅这家公司正在打造一些真正酷炫、让你感到自豪的产品,而且你独特的技能正好能解决这个问题。
It's really easy to go to a world class marketing person and say, not only is this great company building something really cool and interesting that you'll be proud of, but your particular ability is very unique and differentiated and you can solve this.
这实际上就是我加入Square的原因。
This is actually how I wound up at Square.
早在2010年,我刚被谷歌收购入职,原本计划在谷歌的股权成熟后转行做风险投资。
Back in 2010, I was actually, I just been aqua hired into Google and was planning on being a VC actually next after I was kind of like vesting whenever Google is going to compensate us.
然后Square的投资者给我打了电话,说:嘿,我们差不多找了一年,想找一个既懂金融服务又具备创业精神的人。
And then the investors in Square called me up and they said, Hey, we've been looking for almost a year now for someone who knows something about financial services yet is still entrepreneurial.
他们说:嘿,当时全天下这样的人只有三个,我们觉得世界上真正符合的人也就两三个。
And they're they're they're like, hey, there's only three of these at the time 2,000 and was like, there's only really two or three of you in the world.
你知道吗?你有兴趣吗?
You know, so would you be interested?
我说:嗯,也许吧。
And I said, well, maybe.
但正是这个理由让我在入职谷歌两周后就提前离开,惹恼了所有人,也放弃了原本计划的三年风险投资生涯,因为他们告诉我:你是全世界仅有的三个人之一,能胜任这份工作。
But that was the argument to me that made me leave Google early like after two weeks and infuriate everybody and bypass, you know, venture for another three years which had been my plan was because they made the argument that, hey, I was one of the three people in the world that could actually do this job.
所以,这有点像,我不知道是不是自尊,但更多是关于影响力。
So, there's like a, I don't know if it's ego but it's also just like impact.
是的。
Yep.
没错。
Well, exactly.
影响力。
Impact.
你拥有才能,你想运用它们,希望每天都能感受到挑战,并且你所做的事情真的、真的很重要。
Like, you have, you have talents, you wanna use them and you wanna feel that you're challenged every day and that what you're doing really, really matters.
所以,我认为这会非常有帮助。
So, that I think that can be extremely helpful.
更重要的是,我认为你必须基于未被发现的人才来建立一家公司。
You know, my more important arc in this is I think you have to build a company on undiscovered talent.
我不认为你真的应该去争夺所有人都想要的人,对吧?
Like, I don't think you really want to compete for the people that everybody else wants, right?
我知道这一点是在PayPal学到的。
And you know, I learned this at PayPal.
彼得在我刚加入PayPal的第一天、第一周就亲自教我,建立一家公司的方法——当时我们正在斯坦福校园里慢跑——就是要找到这些未被发掘的人才。
Peter taught me this literally the first day, the first week of my job at PayPal that the way to build a company, we were jogging around the Stanford campus is you've gotta find these undiscovered talent.
这是唯一能让你的组织对抗那些资金无限的大型 incumbent 的方式。
That's the only way to scale organization against these large incumbents with infinite money, etcetera.
而且,我为此奋斗了二十五年。
And, you know, I've been on that crusade for twenty five years.
对感兴趣的人,你们可以点击链接查看。
For those who are interested, you can link to it.
我在Ramp做过一次演讲,详细讲述了如何招聘。
I gave a speech, at Ramp, you know, how to hire the talks in detail.
我也推荐Ramp的CEO Eric的演讲,内容非常相似。
I also recommend Eric, CEO of Ramp's speech which is fairly similar.
这两段视频都可以在网上找到。
Both videos are online.
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嘿,这些建议太有意思了,而且非常有道理。
Hey, that's such interesting advice and it makes so much sense.
你不可能负担得起那些在顶级公司做过事情的人,而且他们很可能也不适合加入早期团队。
You're not gonna be able to afford the people that have done the thing at top companies, and, also, they're just probably not the people to join early.
而且,他们可能也不是你真正想要的人。
Well, they're also not maybe the people you want.
这存在逆向选择,但你知道,这就像薪资帽。
There's adverse selection, but, you know, it's like a salary cap.
如今大多数体育项目都有薪资帽。
Most sports these days have salary caps.
当你是一家初创公司时,你不仅有薪资帽,而且你的薪资预算可能只有竞争对手的十分之一。
And when you're a startup, not only do you have a salary cap, you probably have one tenth the salary cap of the people you're competing with.
所以你必须想办法用更少的资源取得更大的成功。
So you've gotta figure out how to leverage, you know, less assets to more success.
当你寻找未被发掘的人才时,有什么简单的判断标准能让你看出这个人真的很特别吗?
What's just one tip when you're looking at when you're looking for undiscovered talent, that's a sign of, okay, this person is really special.
我知道你有很多要说的,但能不能就给一个建议?
I know you have a lot to talk about here, but just like, what's one tip?
我认为关键是弄清楚为什么其他人不会正确地评估他们。
I think it's basically isolating why other people aren't going to process them correctly.
比如,大公司里的招聘往往变成一种同质化的过程。
Like, most recruiting at large organizations becomes sort of a homogenous function.
所以,如果你能理解为什么这个人会被扔进这个黑箱里而得不到准确评估,那就很简单了。
And so if you understand why this person is gonna get thrown into this black box kind of thing and not get processed accurately, it's pretty easy.
所以我总是想,假设这个人正在面试Meta、Google、Block或者Coinbase这样的公司。
So I always think about, let's say this person was interviewing at Meta or Google or Block these days or Coinbase.
他们会错过什么?
What are they gonna miss?
为什么?
And then why?
然后这就引出了:完美。
And then that leads to, oh, perfect.
所以,有时候只是信息不足。
So, sometimes it's just lack of information.
比如,一个原因——你知道,说这个可能有点争议,但未被发现的人才带来更大净影响的原因之一,是你最终会使得人群年龄更偏年轻。
Like, one of the reasons why, you know, sometimes it's controversial to say this but one of the reasons why the net impact of by higher undiscovered talent is you wind up skewing younger.
这并不是因为你需要年轻人。
It's not because you need young people.
而是因为年轻人在定义上拥有的数据更少。
It's that younger people have by definition less data.
这就像我们使用信用评分,比如FICO评分。
It's like a, you know, we use credit scoring, FICO scores.
雇佣领域也是同样的道理。
It's the same thing for employment.
当你超过30岁,有太多关于你的信息了,这个黑箱系统通常会把你和其他许多人一样处理。
By the time you're over 30 some odd things, there's so many data points about you that this black box machine is usually gonna process you like many other people.
如果没有数据点,一个进行同质化评估的黑箱系统就很难对你做出评估。
If there's no data points, it's very hard for a black box machine that does homogenous evaluation to evaluate you.
因此,从定义上讲,那些没有任何数据点的人确实存在超额收益。
So there is alpha, so to speak, by definition for people who have no data points.
这和作为投资者挑选初创企业进行投资的技能如出一辙,真有意思。
It's interesting how this is the same skill as being an investor, picking startups to invest in.
是的,完全正确。
Yeah, absolutely.
好的。
Okay.
我想聊点别的。
I want to talk about something else.
我问了几个熟悉你、曾在不同公司与你共事的人,该和你聊些什么。
I asked a few people that know you well, that work with you at various companies, what to talk to you about.
有个人告诉我,当我问他该和你聊什么时,他的第一反应是:他是个提升标准的人。
And one person said that, when I asked him what to talk about, said, My immediate reaction is that he is a bar raiser.
无论我们取得什么样的成绩,他都会推动我们做得更多。
No matter what kind of numbers we put up, he pushes us to do more.
事实上,往往我们表现得越好,他推得越狠。
In fact, often, it seems like the better we do, the harder he pushes.
这有共鸣吗?
Does that resonate?
是的。
Yeah.
我觉得这是真的。
I think that's true.
我的意思是,你看。
I mean, I think look.
最终,我会转述别人的反馈,但其实是一回事。
Ultimately, I'll I'll I'll channel someone else's feedback, but it's it's the same thing.
我有一位朋友是CEO,他曾问迈克·莫里斯:最优秀的CEO最共同的特质是什么?
So a friend of mine who's a CEO once asked Mike Morris, like, what's the most common denominator of the best CEOs ever?
他说,就是不懈地施加压力。
And he said it's the relentless application of force, quote.
我认为这就是CEO的职责。
I think that's the job of the CEO.
人们最终会变得安逸、自满。
People eventually get comfortable, complacent.
你越成功,组织就越容易陷入自满。
The more success you have, the more complacent the organization tends to get.
而CEO的唯一职责就是抵消这种自满情绪。
And the single role for the CEO is offsetting that complacency.
所以,正如刚才所说,你越成功、表现越好,自满情绪就越自然地出现。
So, per the point, the more success you have, the better you're doing, the more complacency naturally kicks in.
除非你已经建立了网络效应,否则你绝不能变得自满。
Unless you've a net erected a network effect, you do not wanna get complacent.
即使如此,也值得讨论你是否应该如此。
And even then, debate whether you should.
但从根本上说,大多数企业都不是网络型或银行型业务。
But, like, fundamentally, most businesses are not network or bank businesses.
它们不可能长时间自己持续运转下去。
They are not gonna run on, you know, on their own for a long time.
所以我认为这是一个洞察:你做得越好,CEO就越应该推动。
So I think that's one insight, is the better you're doing, the more the CEO should push.
其次,这有点像你成长过程中的体育运动。
Secondly, it's a little bit like sports when you're growing up.
人们在获胜时,通常比失败时更能善用反馈。
People, when they're winning, take advantage of feedback better than when they're losing, usually.
所以现在我主要做风险投资,主要担任董事会成员,主要是创始人的顾问。
So for example, now what I do is mostly VC, mostly a board member, mostly a consigliere to founder.
当公司陷入困境时,可能有些不太直观,也许你在研究中,或者在了解我的人访谈中已经注意到了这一点。
And when the company's struggling, maybe what's less intuitive and you may have picked up on this in your research and you know, interviews of people who know me.
当公司陷入困境时,我实际上会采取非常非批判性的态度,更像一个教练和支持者,因为公司和创始人自己都知道他们正处于困境。
When a company's struggling, I'm actually using a very non critical and more like a coach and supporter because the company, the founder knows they're struggling.
一味批评并不能真正帮助他们解决问题。
Being critical doesn't really help them solve their problems.
这时,支持性的态度反而可能出人意料地更重要;而当公司蓬勃发展时,保持批判性就尤为关键——要敏锐地发现那些最终会成为问题的细节,尽管公司上下都十分开心,甚至有些自满。
That's when being supportive can actually somewhat counter intuitively more important but when the company's thriving, it's really important to be critical and isolating things that will eventually be problems, while everybody in the company is really happy and borderline complacent.
所以,你通常应该反其道而行之。
So you kind of want to be the opposite as a default.
这就像是一个优秀的体育教练那样。
And that's is it like a sim a really good sports coach.
当你赢的时候,正是打磨一切、精进细节的最佳时机。
When you're winning is when to polish everything and really master the details.
当你输的时候,你也必须激励团队,拥抱未来,并描绘未来的愿景。
When you're losing, you definitely also have to be exciting people and embracing the future and selling the future.
所以,如果有人在听,比如创始人或产品负责人,这里的建议是:即使情况已经很好,也要继续加压,把标准定得更高。
So, is the advice say someone's listening, a founder, a product leader, the advice here is just keep pushing harder, set the bar higher as things even if you're
做得很好时,更要如此。
doing great.
是的,当你做得很好时。
Yeah, if you're doing great.
另外,你得记住,我记得有一次在Square演讲时说过,当你达到某个临界点时,就会出现一个转折。
Well, also, you have to remember like I I I remember giving a speech once at Square is like, you get to a certain threshold, it creates an inflection.
势头能带你达到某个估值水平以及各种其他特质,但这就像赢得超级碗一样。
Momentum gets you to certain, you know, valuation and all the all these like attributes but it's kind of like winning a Super Bowl.
去年表现很棒。
You get the last year was great.
过去四个季度都非常出色。
Last four quarters were wonderful.
这就像是赢得了超级碗。
It's like winning the Super Bowl.
你得回到明年,重新从0-0开始。
You gotta come back next year and start your record zero zero again.
你得记住这一点。
And you gotta remember that.
实际上,就像那样的冒险。
Actually, adventures like that.
你知道吗,我只取决于我上一次的投资表现。
You know, I I'm only as good as my last investment.
我过去十三年左右的投资都相当出色,但说实话,我每天都要醒来,寻找一位尚未被发现的创业者,他将改变世界。
I've had like thirteen years or whatever of pretty damn good investments, but like, truth is I have to wake up every day and find some undiscovered founder that's gonna change the world.
如果我不这么做,我过去十三年做过什么都无关紧要。
And if I don't do that, it doesn't matter what I've done the last thirteen years.
公司也是如此。
And a company's kinda like that.
如果一家公司可以暂时靠自动驾驶运行,但风投领域你永远不能靠自动驾驶。
If the company can skate on autopilot for a while, venture, you really can't ever skate.
我确实从布莱恩·切斯基身上看到了这一点。
I definitely saw this with Brian Chesky.
他总觉得一切都很顺利。
He just felt like things were going great.
我们不断推出出色的产品,增长也在上升。
And we just shipped amazing products and growth is up.
无论发生什么,他总是全速前进。
And he's just just always like pedal to the metal no matter what.
来吧,加油。
Just like, come on.
我们什么时候能稍微休息一下?
When are we gonna take a little break?
这很有趣,因为当我们偶尔休息时,士气反而下降了,因为人们会想:我到底在做什么?
And it's interesting because when we did have the little breaks here and there, morales actually went down because people are like, what am I working on?
我不知道。
I don't know.
没那么让人兴奋。
It's not that exciting.
我和布莱恩通常想法很一致。
Brian and I are usually in sync a lot.
有一段很棒的采访,我在同一场会议上也采访过他,谈到了如何招聘,他主要讲的是创始人状态,但基本上完全认同布莱恩的所有观点。
There's a really good interview where I interviewed him also at the same conference of how to hire when he talks mostly about founder mode but it generally subscribed to virtually all of Brian's views.
他甚至亲自教过我一些这些道理,但我觉得你指出的这一点更为重要,而且非常微妙:那就是真正有才华的人,或者像顶尖运动员那样。
He even taught me some of these things himself but the the the more important point I think you identified which is very subtle is really talented people or like superb athletes.
当一切顺利、人们处于轻松状态时,他们反而不开心。
And when things are going well and people are really kind of coasting, they're not happy.
他们内心有一套自己的节奏。
They have an internal clock tempo.
他们只是想创造东西、创造价值、不断前进。
They just wanna create things and create value and drive.
前进。
Drive.
当人们在敷衍了事时,世界上最好的那些人,他们的士气确实会下降。
And, like, you know, like, the morale actually does go down for the best people in the world when people are skating.
好的。
Okay.
实际上,沿着这个思路,当前就业市场对职业未来充满了焦虑。
So actually along those lines, there's a lot of anxiety in the market, in the job market about the future of careers.
我会有一份工作吗?
Are am I gonna have a job?
我会怎么样?事情会往哪里发展?
Am I gonna like, where are things going?
感觉人们都在非常非常努力地工作。
And it just feels like people are working very, very hard.
他们投入了大量时间,尤其是那些搞AI的人。
They're just putting a lot of hours, especially the most AI people.
感觉他们比以往任何时候都更努力。
It just feels like they're working harder than ever.
我不知道你有没有看到泰勒·科恩发布的那个东西,就是说要更努力工作。
I don't if you saw this thing Tyler Cohen put out of just like, work harder.
现在是时候更努力了,因为AI正在侵蚀你的价值。
Now is the time to work harder because AI is eating away at your value.
你 probably 听过很多寻求职业建议的人说,这感觉很可怕,我觉得自己工作太辛苦了,我该怎么办?
You probably talk to a lot of people looking for career advice of just like, this feels scary and I feel like I'm working too hard and what should I do?
我不知道。
I don't know.
你有什么建议给这些人吗?
Do you have any just like advice for folks?
嗯,我认为AI将会彻底改变许多人的职业,也许也包括我的职业。
Well, do think AI AI is going to radically reorient you know, lots of people's careers and maybe including mine.
所以我认为这确实是事实。
So I think that's actually true.
我认为在快速发展的科技世界中生存下去的方法是保持求知欲。
And I think the way to thrive in a rapidly emerging technology world is to be intellectually curious.
比如,我过去是个商人。
So for example, you know, I'm a business person historically.
其实我年轻时做过别的,但 professionally,基本上就是个商人。
Know, did actually could when I was really young but like, basically, professionally, just a business person.
我注意到,在一些顶尖的组织里,消耗token最多的是首席营销官。
What I've noticed in some of the best organizations is the number one consumer of tokens is the CMO.
首席营销官。
CMO.
因为这些人富有求知欲。
Because these people are intellectually curious.
所以他们会说,哇。
And so they're like, wow.
现在我可以用自己的双手做这么多酷炫的事情。
There's all these cool things I can do now with my hands.
以前我不得不依赖其他团队,或者根本无法按自己想要的方式获得资源,诸如此类的事情。
Either I had to rely on other teams or never got access the way I wanted and blah blah blah or vibe.
而他们直接就去做了。
And they just do it.
这在Opendoor公司确实如此。
This is actually true at Opendoor.
在我担任董事的另一家优秀公司也是如此。
It's true at another great company that I'm on the board of.
这太不可思议了。
That's incredible.
所以我认为,你可以通过保持求知欲来让自己更具前瞻性,而不仅仅是靠努力工作、从不休息、一直工作这些方式。
And I so I think you can be intellectually curious and future proof yourself more than just yes, you can work harder and a a big subscriber to, like, no days off and working all the time and all that stuff.
但从根本上说,求知欲能让你学习新事物,这才是你拥抱未来的方式。
But fundamentally, the intellectual curiosity is able to learn new things, and that is how you embrace the future.
所以,你刚才说的CMO,指的是谁的CMO?
So, and you said CMO is who's CMO.
这两家公司都是。
Both of these two companies.
真有意思。
So interesting.
都是规模庞大、非常出色、拥有大量工程师的公司。
Massive, you know, awesome companies with lots of engineers.
我觉得这非常令人鼓舞。
And I think that's that's very encouraging.
你知道吗,对于高管来说,尤其是这位,绝对是公司里最出色的高管。
You know, for for the executive particularly, like, this this is definitely, like, the best executive in the company.
他们在打造什么呢?
And what are they building?
是那种着陆页和付费测试吗?
Is it, like, landing pages and pay tests?
其实并不完全是,有时候更像是我们过去所理解的分析工作。
It's not well, sometimes it's, like, more, like, what we would have thought of analytics.
有时候其实是真正的营销活动,实实在在的活动。
Sometimes it's actually campaigns, like actual campaigns.
他们不需要依赖层层下属来完成实际的工作成果。
It's just like they don't need to rely upon deputies and deputies and deputies to get actual work product.
所以他们直接在交付产品,或者一点点地推出成果,亲自向CEO提供洞察。
And so they're just like shipping things and like or shipping, you know, drops of things or giving the CEO insights into things themselves.
我想听听你对产品三元组未来发展的看法。
I wanna get your take on the future of specifically the product triad.
你和很多产品人员、工程师、设计师合作。
You work with a lot of product people, engineers, designers.
每个人都在想知道自己的职业生涯接下来会怎样。
Everyone's always wondering what the hell is gonna happen in my career.
还有就是这三个特定角色的未来。
Also, just the future of those three specific roles.
我看过一档播客,是彼得·蒂尔做的,他让我相信,未来产品经理这个角色根本毫无意义。
Well, I saw this podcast or listened to this podcast that Peter Thiel did, and he convinced me that the idea of a PM makes no sense basically in the future.
如果你想想分解一下逻辑,产品经理通常做些什么呢?
If you think about decomposing the logic is what does PM usually do?
他们从客户那里获取这些需求。
They take these inputs from customers.
他们制定出一个井然有序的、覆盖未来一年的路线图。
They create this sequential road map that's well organized over the next year.
诸如此类,乱七八糟的。
Blah blah blah blah.
那个世界简直荒谬。
That world is like ridiculous.
就现在而言,基础模型的能力,像Lovable这样的公司,还有类似的东西,进步速度如此之快,根本不可能制定一年期的产品路线图,它们完全不合逻辑。
Like right now, the capabilities of foundation models or companies like Lovable and you know, things like that are just so improving such a rapid rate that it makes no sense to have a year long road map And they're just like incoherent.
在十一月还无法实现的事情,现在三月却变得相当容易了。
There are things that were impossible to do in November that are actually pretty easy to do right now in March.
所以,你需要打造一个极其灵活的组织——人们常说‘敏捷’,但真正需要的是能几乎随时调整路线图的能力。
And so, think you need to build an organization that's incredibly adapt at you know, people say nimble and all this stuff, but incredibly adapt at changing the road map almost on the fly.
我认为,像传统产品经理这样的中间角色意义不大,更重要的是在智力上做好准备,拥抱、利用并敏锐察觉变化。
And I think intermediaries like conventional PMs don't make a lot of sense versus being prepared intellectually, embracing and exploiting, noticing.
所以,有人需要注意到:哇,我们其实能做到这一点。
So someone needs to notice that, oh wow, we can actually do this.
但在这个星期就去利用它,才是高增长、卓越初创公司的未来。
But then exploiting it this week is the future of a very a high growth stellar startup.
我们会在本周注意到某件事现在变得可能了,然后在下周就为客户提供新的功能和新价值。
We'll notice that something's now possible this week and create new features and new value for customers next week.
这是一个非常有趣的话题。
That's such an interesting area of discussion.
很多听这个RPM的人。
A lot of people listening to this RPM.
我想为这个角色辩护一下,看看能不能说服你改变看法。
So I wanna try to defend that role just to see I see can convince you otherwise.
顺便说一句,我认为马克·安德森对当前发生的事情有一个非常生动的比喻:这三个职能就像对峙一样,各自都说:未来属于我的领域。
And by the way, I will say Marc Andreessen had this really good visual of just what's happening here, is like every, all those three functions, it's like the standoff where they're all like, I'm taking, the future is my role.
未来是设计,未来是工程。
The future is design, that's engineering is the future.
所以在我看来,随着AI让构建变得更容易,并逐渐吞噬软件开发流程的中间环节,任何人都可以说‘这是我想要的’。
So the way I see it is, as AI makes it easier to build and kind of eats the middle of the software development process, just anyone can build detailed AI, here's what I want.
目前的难点,至少在现阶段,是弄清楚该构建什么,然后让所有人就该构建什么达成一致。
The hard part, the gap at least for now is figuring out what to build and then aligning everyone around what to build.
我同意这一点。
I agree with that.
我实际上认为,无论你谈论的是前产品经理、前设计师还是工程师,现在的关键技能更像是一名CEO:我们要构建什么?为什么?
I actually think whether you talk about someone who used to be a PM or someone who used to be a designer or called an engineer, the skill is more like being a CEO now, which is what are we building and why?
没错。
Exactly.
要成为一名成功的工程师,这种特质至关重要。
And to be a successful engineer, that trait's critical.
要成为一名成功的设计师也是如此,因为工具和实际创建东西的能力会变得越来越容易。
To be a successful designer, because the tools and the ability to actually create the thing, an object, is gonna be easier and easier.
但真正的艺术在于知道该构建什么。
But the art is knowing what to build.
你知道吗,我的另一位竞争对手、Square的Alfred Lin喜欢用厨师来打比方。
You know, another competitor of mine, Alfred Lin at Square likes to talk about being a chef.
当你在一家顶级餐厅当厨师时,你其实并不亲自下厨做菜。
When you're a chef at like a a prime restaurant, you're not actually cooking the dish.
你更多的是品尝同事的作品,稍作调整,但本质上,这有一半是商业角色。
You're sampling your colleagues and editing their work a little bit, but fundamentally, it's half a commercial role.
在一家著名餐厅当厨师,我们的价值主张是什么?
Being a chef in a famous restaurant is what's our value proposition?
我们如何与别人区分开来?
How do we differentiate ourselves?
我们如何塑造自己的品牌?
How do we brand ourselves?
我们的目标客户群体是什么?
What's our segment?
我们的定价是多少?
What's our pricing?
你知道的,诸如此类的问题。
You know, etcetera.
我们的选址又是什么?
What's our location even?
这些才是造就一位著名厨师的关键。
That's what makes, you know, a famous chef.
并不是他们真的一直在亲自烹饪这道菜。
It's not they're literally cooking the dish all the time.
好的。
Okay.
我完全同意。
I 100% agree.
有趣的是,产品经理经常被称为微型CEO。
Interestingly enough, PMs are called mini CEOs often.
我认为重点不在于你怎么称呼这个人。
And I think the important thing is it's not like, what do you call this person?
我认为真正的问题是,哪些技能仍然是人类大脑必须具备的?
I think the question is, what skill will be most, like, human brain's still gonna be necessary?
商业敏锐度。
Business acumen.
这本质上就是商业敏锐度。
It's basically a business acumen.
对。
Right.
比如,什么能帮助这家公司成长和成功,
Like, what will help this company grow and succeed and
我理解公司的商业逻辑,我们目标是什么,以及输入和输出之间的关系。
I understand the company's business equation, where we're trying to go, and what the inputs and connection outputs are.
而且我可以独立创造出能产生影响,或者可能产生影响的东西。
And I can, on my own, create things that move the needle or potentially move the needle.
这非常令人兴奋,因为现在作为个人,你实际上更容易产生实质性的影响力。
It's very exciting because, you know, you can actually drive impact, like, much more easily now as an individual.
根据你刚才分享的内容,我的结论是,在这三个角色中,哪个角色最擅长这一点?
My conclusion based on what you just shared is, of the three roles, which role is best at that?
历史上看,是产品经理。
And historically, it'd be PMs.
显然,这里重要的是,优秀的产品经理、工程师或设计师都会表现得很好。
Obviously, think the important thing here is it's like the best, you know, it's like great PMs or great engineers, designers will do well.
但有趣的是,你向我描述的,正是一个优秀的产品经理应该非常擅长的事情。
But I think interestingly, what you're describing to me is what it sounds like what a great PM would be really good at basically.
如果他们非常出色,我认为是对的,但我认为我合作过的许多顶尖工程师也都具备这种能力。
If they were if they were exceptional, I think that's right but I think the best, a lot of the best engineers I've worked with have.
是的。
Yeah.
商业直觉,就像马克斯·列夫琴那样,简直到了极致。
Commercial instincts like Max Levchin has this on steroids.
杰里米·斯托普尔曼,他在创办Yelp之前曾和我紧密合作,在PayPal担任工程师时就被提拔为工程总监和副总裁,他从作为个体贡献者时就具备商业直觉。
Jeremy Stoppelman, he he's worked with me very closely at PayPal before he started Yelp and got promoted to be engineering director and vice president of PayPal, has commercial instincts, you know, back when he was an individual contributor.
所以我认为,有些技术非常出色的工程师,一直都能理解如何构建业务。
So I think there are great engineers who are technically proficient that have always understood the business building.
对。
Yeah.
我认为,最理想的独角兽人才是既技术过硬又极具商业头脑的工程师。
I think that's like the ultimate unicorn is an engineer that is also very business minded.
这将带来巨大优势。
It's gonna put a premium.
我认为在人工智能时代,这一点将变得极其重要,因为他们不需要庞大的团队。
I I think that this will at the age of AI, we'll put an incredible premium on that because they're not gonna need a large team.
你不需要再调动大量人力。
You're not gonna be marshaling the forces.
举个例子,我一个好朋友是Ramp公司的工程总监。
Like, you know, another example is a good friend of mine is director of engineering at Ramp.
他个人编写的代码量依然很多。
He ships as much code personally.
他手下大约有20个人的团队。
So he he has a team of about 20 people.
尽管他现在管理着一个20人的团队,但他个人编写的代码量依然和当年作为个体贡献者时一样多,因为工具太强大了,而且他已成为AI应用的先行者。
He personally ships as much code as he used to as an individual contributor while he's managing a team of 20 because the tools are so great, and he's become a leading pioneer in the usage of AI.
他基本上把AI当作第二支团队在使用。
And he's basically using AI as a as a second team.
他基本上就是说,好吧。
He's basically like, okay.
你是团队负责人。
You're the team manager.
你来做这个。
You do this.
你来做这个。
You do this.
你来做这个。
You do this.
把这些拼起来。
Stitch this together.
看看这个。
Check this out.
blah blah blah。
Blah blah blah.
我认为这绝对是未来的趋势。
And I think that is definitely the future.
我完全同意。
I 100% agree.
非常擅长这方面的人才更加宝贵。
Engineers that are very good at that are just extra valuable.
你对设计和设计的未来、设计的价值有什么看法?
What's your take on design and the future of design, the value of design?
嗯,这很有趣。
Well, you know, it's interesting.
我感觉设计和编码正在融合,但我不清楚最终是谁胜出——是代码变成了设计,还是设计能自动转化为代码?这取决于那些同时押注两方的投资。
I design and code are merging, and it's not it's not clear to me who triumphs of, like, is it code becomes design and or design just translate automagically into code, based on investments that bet on both in some ways.
但我认为,它们正在以一种不再互为独立领地的方式融合。
But I I think they're merging in a way where they're not separate, you know, fiefdoms anymore.
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I am so excited to tell you about this season's supporting sponsor, Vanta.
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Every security leader that I talk to is feeling the increasing weight of protecting their organization, their business, and not to mention their customer data.
由于一切变化太快,他们不得不不断应对,猜测优先级,并勉强使用过时的解决方案。
Because things are moving so fast, they are constantly reacting, having to guess at priorities, and having to make do with outdated solutions.
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This helps companies get compliant fast and stay compliant.
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我注意到设计领域正在发生一些非常有趣的变化。
What I'm seeing is something really interesting happening with design.
我刚刚对设计领域的就业市场做了一些分析,过去三年里,开放的设计职位数量基本持平。
On the one hand, just did some analysis on the job market for design, and it's basically plateaued in terms of the number of open design roles over the past three years.
它根本没有变化。
It just hasn't gone anywhere.
它处于停滞状态。
It's flat.
我们曾邀请Claude的设计负责人Jenny Wen做客播客,她指出,在当前的流程中,根本没有时间进行传统的设计流程。
We had the head of Claude design, Jenny Wen, on the podcast, and she had this of insight that the design process, there's no time for the design, the traditional design process.
工程师们每天要上线17个功能,根本没时间坐下来做原型设计和各种传统设计工作。
There's like, engineers are shipping 17 things a day, There's no time to sit there and help mock and prototype and all these things.
让我给你几个具体的例子。
Well, me give you a couple concrete examples.
在Shopify,他们已经这样做了两年多。
So at Shopify, the way they developed, they've been doing this for over two years now.
这可能看起来很正常,但他们两年来一直不允许产品经理提供关于产品的PPT或Keynote演示。
So this may seem normal, but they have not let PMs provide PowerPoint or Keynote presentations on product for two years.
所有关于产品的演示都必须是可运行的演示版本,他们只是期望产品经理亲自开发产品。
Every presentation on product has to be a workable demo, And they just expect the PMs to create the products.
这些高管坚决拒绝查看静态的、我们即将推出这个功能的演示。
And these execs just refuse to look at static, we're gonna have this feature.
不,我想要的是所有功能都能正常运行。
No, I want everything working.
这种情况已经持续两年了。
This is for two years.
所以我认为,就像一切都在逐渐融合一样。
So I think that, you know, again, like everything's just merging together.
这太有趣了。
That's so interesting.
不过你会觉得,因为每天都有这么多产品发布,有无数东西需要关注。
You would think though, because there are so many products launching every single day, like there's just endless things to pay attention to.
你认为设计会越来越成为差异化因素。
You think design would be a differentiator more and more.
我同意这一点。
I do agree with that.
实际上,我确实同意这一点。
I I do agree with that, actually.
我认为,设计的突破口就像营销一样。
I think the alpha is in design just like in marketing.
不是工具的问题。
It's not the tools.
也不是渠道的问题。
It's not the channels.
不是那些指标。
It's not the metrics.
而是讲故事。
It's the storytelling.
是如何以最简洁、最具吸引力的方式从纷繁信息中脱颖而出。
It's how do you cut through the clutter in the snappiest, most compelling possible way.
这有点像是一个NP问题。
There's an it's kind of an NP problem.
你可以用无数种不同的词语来表达同一个概念,但谁能说出‘这才是正确的表达方式’,那在你这个市场里,就像拥有一千首歌一样宝贵,胜过世界上所有的工具。
There's so many different words you can use to express the same concept but the person who can say, this is the way to frame it, you know, the proverbial thousand songs in your market is worth, like, all the tools in the world.
是的。
Yeah.
所以,我最近的另一个洞察是,随着AI让构建变得更容易,它正从中间向外扩展。
So that's the other part of my insight recently is just as AI makes it easier to build, it's kind of expanding from the middle out.
而剩下的挑战就是决定要构建什么,并不断迭代这个想法。
And what remains is figuring out what to build and making it iterating on the idea.
而在光谱的另一端,是分发。
And then it's at the other end of spectrum, is distribution.
让任何人注意到你到底做了什么,因为每天都有太多事情在发生。
Getting anyone to pay any attention to what the heck you've done because again, there's so much happening every single day.
是的,突破信息干扰。
Yeah, cutting through the clutter.
我的意思是,这一直都很关键。
I mean, that's always been critical.
当人们向我这个投资人做提案时,我立刻关注的一点就是:这东西到底怎么才能突破信息干扰?
I mean, one of the time when people are pitching me as an investor is one of the things I'm dialing into, you know, immediately is how the how the hell is this gonna cut through the clutter?
这正是我不太愿意采纳客户反馈的原因,因为当你把东西展示给客户时,这并不能代表真实世界。
It's one of the reasons why I don't like to take like customer feedback into account because by definition, when you put something in front of a customer, that's not a proxy for the real world.
在真实世界中,你必须在他们去巴里健身课、上班、带孩子等等时候,突破信息干扰。
In the real world, you have to cut through the clutter while they're going to their Barry's boot camp, while they're doing their job, while they're raising their kids, you know, etcetera, etcetera.
而且在他们走路、坐地铁的时候,像这种孤立的虚假实验并不能提供可操作的洞察,往往方向还是错的。
And while they're walking, while they're on the subway, like that, like, you know, an isolated fake experiment doesn't give you actionable insights and often is directionally wrong.
有趣的是,在这方面,有一些公司正在推出产品,Simile 就是其中之一,它在模拟人类行为。
Interestingly on that line, there's a few companies that are launching, Simile is one that is simulating humans.
我不知道你有没有听说过这家公司。
I don't know if you heard about this company.
它们基本上是在构建真实人物的 AI 模型,以便在产品发布前模拟你的营销推广和产品体验。
They basically are building AI models of the actual people so that you can simulate your marketing launch and your product experience with people before you launch.
我不确定我有没有看过这家具体的公司。
I don't know if I've seen that specific company.
我见过一两个类似的创业项目演示。
I have seen one or two sort of pitches.
我对这类公司一贯的疑问是:它们用什么数据进行训练?
My my general question as a refrain on those type of companies is what are they training on?
因为如果它们没有使用正确的数据,就说自己在模拟人类,那是很危险的。
Because like again, if they're not training on the right data, it's dangerous to say you're simulating humans.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
这正是问题所在。
That is the question.
天啊。
Oh, man.
这个世界真奇怪。
What a weird world.
实际上,关于这一点,我知道你可能觉得这是个激进的观点,即AI生成的内容将超越人类内容,这就是未来。
Along these lines actually, you have this I know if you call it a hot take that AI content is gonna surpass human content, and that's just the future.
明白了。
See.
不可避免。
Inevitable.
这是不可避免的。
That's inevitable.
嗯。
Mhmm.
我之前和一个人聊天,她说在中国版的抖音上,现在全是AI生成的视频,而且做得非常好。
Someone was I was talking to someone, and then she was saying in, like, the Chinese TikTok app, it's just, like, all AI videos now, and it's, like, very good.
她真的喜欢看这些视频和故事。
She like actually enjoys watching these videos and these stories.
我觉得这可能会变成一种二元分化。
I think it'll be like a binary sort maybe.
我能想象,那些明显是人类创作的产品和内容会蓬勃发展,因为人们渴望真实性。
I could see products and content thriving that is clearly still human generated and that there's some desire for authenticity.
就像,举个例子,这件艺术品是沃霍尔的作品。
Just like for example, you know, this piece of art is a Warhol.
现在任何人都能以高保真度复制出这样的作品,但人们依然欣赏这是安迪·沃霍尔创作的。
Anybody could create this now, high fidelity, but there's still an appreciation for this was created by Andy Warhol.
我认为会出现一种有溯源溢价的精选体验,也就是你能明确知道是人类创作的;同时,还会有一种排名筛选机制,来判断什么内容最优秀,无论它是AI生成的还是人类创作的。
I think there's gonna be a curated experience with a premium of providence, you know, that you know is human created and then, there's just gonna be a a sort of a rank filtering of what's the best content and whether it's AI generated or not.
这有点像本·汤普森所说的关于策展与算法的轨迹问题。
It's a little bit like the Ben Thompson's trajectory thing of curation, you know, versus algorithm.
在人类创作的内容方面,策展可能会形成两个极端,而算法则只关注什么是最优秀的。
There's gonna be two poles in the curation maybe for human created stuff and then there's gonna be the algorithm which is just what's the best.
我完全同意这一点。
I 100% believe that.
这真的很有道理。
That makes so much sense.
我前几天就在想,AI在视频方面变得非常出色,AI生成的视频真的很好看,图像质量也在大幅提升,但AI生成的文字仍然很差劲,这很讽刺,因为它被称为大语言模型。
I was just thinking the other day, it's so interesting that AI is getting very good at video, like videos are actually fun to watch that are AI generated, and then like images are getting really good, but writing is still really bad that is AI generated, and it's ironic that it's called a large language model.
它完全是基于文本上下文训练的,而偏偏这是它最不擅长的,这真的很奇怪。
It's all context, text, text trained, and it's just like, that's the thing it's least good at, which is really weird.
我认为部分原因在于语言模型对令牌配额的经济性考量。
Well, I think part of it is economic decision of token rationing by the LMs.
当你输入提示时,它们基本上是在尝试让自己的经济模型符合正态分布。
Like, they they basically are when you prompt, they're kind of trying to make their economics work within the bell curve distribution.
例如,我曾用提示词让大语言模型写一段非常简短的内容。
And so for example, I've used prompt an LLM to write something that's very short.
如果内容只有一两句话,其质量远优于一整页、一段话,甚至一章或一本书。
The quality is significantly better than if it's a page, paragraph, I mean, page to chapter to book.
我认为这其实是令牌配给的问题,而不是模型本身的质量问题。
I think it's token rationing ratioing versus versus actual quality.
但你可能会想,比如海明威,如果他有更多时间,是不是也会把作品改得更短?
You would think, though, you know, like, don't know if it was Hemingway of just, like, if I had more time, would have made it shorter.
确实需要花更多功夫。
Like, it takes Yeah.
更费劲。
More work.
但我觉得,目前写作效果最好的方式是提供大量简短示例,然后提炼出三点。
But then you have I think the writing right now, what works best is short, many short examples and then Three things.
选择和编辑,确实如此。
Picking, editing Yeah.
重新提示。
Repomping.
这有点像我25年前当诉讼律师的时候。
It's a little bit like when I used to be a litigator 25 ago.
写诉状时,最难的部分,也是所有技巧和精髓所在,就是第一段。
The hardest part of writing a brief or all the art and all the magic was the first paragraph.
如果我能把第一段写得非常好,我赢得案件、说服法官的可能性就会大幅提高。
If I could write that first paragraph really well, the chance I would win the case and convince the judge would go through the roof.
所以,我实际的做法是,我可能有三周时间来写一份诉状。
So what I would actually do is I might have three weeks to write a brief.
我可能会花第一周甚至更长时间,在办公室里走来走去,思考如何写出那前三句话的精髓。
I might spend the first week or more walking around the office, thinking through how am I gonna nail the first three sentences?
一旦我想清楚了如何构建那前三句话的框架,我就能在两天内写出三十页的内容。
Once I figured out how I wanted to frame those first three sentences, I could write 30 pages in like two days.
但要把这一点做好,可能需要一两周的时间。
But getting that right could take a week or two.
有时候,我会在淋浴时突然想到,或者真的在跑步中途想到。
Sometimes it would occur to me in the shower or literally the, you know, shower or in the middle of a run.
我心想,天啊,这就是我要提炼的核心。
It's like, oh my god, here's how I distill it.
然后,我就能坐下来迅速完成剩下的部分,我觉得这有点类似。
Then, I could just sit down and power through the rest of the brief and I think it's a little bit like that.
虽然迅速完成剩下的部分很有效,但你仍然需要那前三句话。
The power through the rest of the brief works well, you still need the first three sentences.
你职业生涯中有没有什么有趣的故事可以分享?
Is there a story from that time in your life that would be interesting to share?
我之前根本不知道这件事。
I didn't even know about that.
所以,是的,并不是每个人都知道。
So, yeah, not everybody knows.
我职业生涯的前四年半是担任法律书记员,然后成为诉讼律师。
I spent the first four and a half years of my professional career as a law clerk and then litigator.
说实话,这偶尔真的很有用,比如在商业风险和法律风险之间做权衡是很有价值的。
Which occasionally comes in handy truthfully, like sometimes trading off business risk against legal risk is a valuable thing to do.
很多时候,我最好的投资都集中在金融服务和高度监管的领域,这并非偶然,因为我觉得自己能在脑海中完成法律风险评估。
Sometimes it's not accidental that many of my best investments are in financial services and heavy heavily regulated areas because I think I can sort of do the legal risk assessment in my own brain.
这一点在我当年投资YouTube时确实成立。
This is definitely true back in the day when I invested in YouTube.
但我认为,律师所学的大多数东西都与创业精神格格不入。
But I think most things that lawyers learn are very inconsistent with being entrepreneur.
当你作为律师接受评估时,你会发现法学院的几乎每一场考试都是在考察问题识别能力。
So when you're graded as a lawyer, you learn every exam in law school virtually is issue spotting.
因此,你会因为识别出某种思维模式而获得分数。
So you get credit for identify there's, like, a thought pattern.
识别出所有问题,然后逐一解决。
Identify all the issues and then resolve them.
所以你学会的是去发现所有可能出错的地方。
So you learn to identify everything that can go wrong.
有点用,但作为创业者就非常没用。
Moderately useful, but very not useful as an entrepreneur.
我的意思是,当然,你能列出公司可能失败的所有原因。
I mean, sure, you can identify all the reasons a company could fail.
做起来并不难。
Not that difficult to do.
所以,解决这些问题的RTs,你知道的。
The RTs, you know, solving those.
所以,这并不是最好的训练,而且你还用工作小时数来衡量生产力。
So, you know, not the best training and then, you also measure your productivity by hours worked.
你 literally 每小时都在创造成果。
You know, literally, you build per hour.
我花了两年,也许一年半,才在转向科技行业后停止记录我所有的时间。
It took me two years and maybe a year and a half after converting to technology to stop tracking all my time.
我以前真的会写在我的笔记本里。
I used to literally write down in my notebook.
哦,这个会议花了半小时,这件事花了二十分钟,你知道的, blah blah blah。
Oh, half hour of this meeting, twenty minutes on this, you know, blah blah blah.
就是没法从脑子里摆脱掉。
Just couldn't get it out of my brain.
这太有趣了。
That is so funny.
而且大卫·萨克斯也是一名律师。
And David Sacks was a lawyer too.
挺有意思的。
It's like interesting.
没错。
That's true.
彼得,彼得也是律师。
Peter, Peter was a lawyer.
彼得足够聪明,五个月零四天后就辞职了,我想是这样。
Peter was smart enough to quit after five months and four days, I think.
大卫从未执业,也许甚至比我们俩都更聪明。
David never practiced or maybe even smarter than both of us.
好的。
Okay.
我要说一些你持有的激烈观点、反主流的看法。
I'm gonna hit on some hot takes, contrarian takes that you have.
你有不少这样的观点。
You have a number of these.
我最近听说你在播客上分享过。
I heard you share on a podcast recently.
他们问你,为什么你最近没有那么多反主流观点了?
They asked you why don't you have as many contrarian takes these days?
你回答说,嗯,它们全都被证明是对的。
And you're like, well, they just all all been proven right.
问题就在于,你知道,如果你有好点子,最终你还是希望它们被采纳。
And that's the problem is, you know, if you have good ideas, eventually, you want them to be adopted.
这有点像,当你是个投资者时,你希望持反主流观点。
It's a little bit like, you know, when you're an investor, you wanna be contrarian.
所以,像Airbnb这样的公司,你一开始持反主流观点,但最终,如果公司要成功,就必须变成共识——全世界的人都要使用它、相信它、信任它。
So, Airbnb, you start with a contrarian take but eventually, if the company's gonna succeed, it has to become consensus like everybody in the world has to use it and believe in it and trust it.
所以,你希望看到这种转折点,你不想只是持有反主流观点,却没人相信。
You So, want that inflection like you don't wanna just have contrary takes and then nobody believe it.
因此,你需要一个更新频率,问题是,你如何找到新点子,但又希望真正把它们彻底探索清楚。
So, you do need a refresh rate and then the question is, how do you have or you know, how do you find new ideas but you want to actually exhaust them.
好的。
Okay.
我认为人们仍然会不同意的一点是,除非你在打造一家企业级公司,否则你其实不希望去和客户交流。
So one that I think people still would disagree with is that your advice is for, unless you're building an enterprise company, you don't actually want to be talking to customers.
是的。
Yeah.
我不喜欢和客户交谈。
I hate talking to customers.
我拒绝允许我的同事去和客户交谈。
I refuse to allow colleagues of mine to talk to customers.
你知道,有那个著名的说法,比如史蒂夫·乔布斯讲过的马和更快的马之类的东西。
You know, there's the the famous you know, you can talk with the famous stuff and the Steve Jobs, you know, the horses and the old faster horses and all this stuff.
但我认为更重要的是,这种想法常常在方向上是错的。
But I think it's more important is it's often directionally wrong.
客户并不知道自己想要什么,而且他们非常不靠谱,因为这往往是潜意识的决定,尤其是对消费者而言。
Customers don't know what they want and they're very bad because it's a subconscious decision, especially for consumers.
比如我买什么、穿什么,都不是有意识的决定。
Like what I purchase, what I wear is not a conscious decision.
当你试图有意识地回答一个潜意识的决定时,即使你很认真,给出的信息也往往是误导性的。
And when you're consciously trying to answer a subconscious decision, you actually give misleading information even when you're trying.
我常举的那个经典例子很有启发性:问问任何开豪华跑车的人,比如保时捷或兰博基尼,他们为什么买这辆车。
You know, the proverbial example I like to use, but it's instructive, is ask anybody who drives a super fancy car, like a Porsche or a Lamborghini, like why they bought the car.
99%的情况下,他们会说出所有可能的理由,唯独不会说出真正的原因。
99% of the time, they will tell you every reason except the real reason.
一旦你意识到这一点,你就会想:我再也不会去问客户想要什么了。
That once you realize that, you're like, I'm never asking customer gain.
不过,在企业级市场中,客户开发是有效的,因为那里有明确的书籍,也有决策者。
Now, as hardcore enterprise, customer development does work because there is a book, there is a decision maker.
而决策者主要做出的是实用型决策。
And the decision maker is mostly making utilitarian decision.
当然,组织内部存在政治因素,你可能能利用,也可能无法利用。
And yes, there's political forces within the organization and you may or may not be able to tap into those.
但从根本上说,获取这些信息是有价值的。
But fundamentally, extracting that information is valuable.
但对于面向消费者、中小微商户的产品来说,盲目依赖客户反馈是彻底的灾难。
But a consumer SMB micro merchant product, unmitigated disaster.
因此,这里的暗示是,你需要依赖自己的直觉、经验和判断。
And so the implication here is you need to rely on your instincts and gut and experience.
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是,人都是人。
I mean, humans are humans.
我还有另一句话很喜欢:关于人类你需要了解的所有重要事情,莎士比亚都已经写过了。
I have this other line I like, is everything important you need to learn about humans was written by Shakespeare.
去读莎士比亚吧。
Just read Shakespeare.
这比所有的客户调研都更有效。
Like, that's better than all the customer research.
现在你在拍一部电影,而这部电影最终不仅需要获得好评。
Now you are producing a movie, and ultimately this movie doesn't just need to be critically acclaimed.
你还需要卖票。
You have to sell tickets.
所以如果你卖不出票,就得反思一下:是不是预告片有问题?
So if you're not selling tickets, you have to question, okay, is the trailer wrong?
是不是我们的发行策略出了问题?也就是我们试图接触观众、让他们了解这部电影的方式?
Is our distribution, you know, where we're trying to meet people to let them know about the movie?
这有错吗?
Is that wrong?
幸运的是,与电影不同,你可以回头审视:我是不是选角有些不当?
Fortunately, unlike a movie, you can go back and say, Have I casted this somewhat incorrectly?
剧本是不是有点问题?
Is the script slightly off?
诸如此类的问题。
You know, etcetera.
但目标是卖票,而这正是你们希望我们优化的方向。
But the goal is selling tickets, and that's what you want us optimize for.
但如果你没能成功、经济、高效地卖票,那你 definitely 要回到循环中,重新调整方向,以确保能卖票。
But if you don't sell tickets successfully, economically, efficiently, you definitely want to go back in a loop and try to reorient things so that you are selling tickets.
所以,我听到的就像是那种‘猫牛电视’之类的东西。
So this is like cat cow TV kind of stuff is what I'm hearing here.
因此,你的见解是,这不仅不会帮上忙。
And so your your insight here is just like it's not only like it's like it's not gonna help you.
你的意思是,这实际上是有害的。
You're saying more so it's actually harmful.
这是有害的。
It's harmful.
然后人们会说,是的。
And then people will say, yeah.
比如,我参加过那么多会议,这让我很抓狂,但人们会说:我访谈了八个客户, blah blah blah,我知道这在统计上不具代表性。
Like, the I've sat in so many meetings, and this would be furry at me, but people would be like, I talked to eight customers, blah blah blah blah, and I know that this isn't statistically representative.
但他们却能滔滔不绝地讲上一个小时,然后又说:哦,我知道这其实不算什么, blah blah blah。
But then they pontificate for an hour, and then they're like, oh, I know this is not, you know, blah blah blah.
但一旦你听过这些话,就再也无法从脑子里抹去。
But once you hear this stuff, it's like, you can't take this out of your brain.
于是之后的每一次会议,都觉得这些东西已经牢牢刻在客户脑子里了。
And then every other subsequent meeting is like, this stuff is just locked in the customer's brain.
所以,是的,在企业环境中,比如我合作的一家AI公司,有30个必须赢得的客户。
So, yes, in the enterprise, when you have like I I work with a company in AI that has 30 must win accounts.
这正是公司未来两年的目标:确保全部30家客户都使用我们的产品,而我们目前进展非常顺利。
That's like the goal for the company over the next two years, make sure all 30, and we're doing really well, get all 30 using our product.
很好。
Great.
我们实际上可以与全部30位客户交流。
We actually can talk to all 30 customers.
我们还能直接接触到这30位客户的决策者。
And we can actually meet the decision maker, all 30 customers.
我们甚至能影响这30位客户的首席执行官,对吧?
And we can influence the CEO, right, all 30 customers.
这是一项很有价值的练习。
That is a useful exercise.
如果你的目标是全球十亿人,你不可能获得具有代表性的反馈。
If you're targeting a billion people on the planet, you are not getting representative feedback.
作为一个反主流的观点,很多人不会认为这是好的建议。
Being a contrarian take, many people would not believe this is good advice.
你有没有一个故事,比如某个例子,有人和客户交流时发现,我们之前的方向完全错了。
Do have a story, maybe an example of just like, wow, this, like someone talking to a customer saying, we're going in the wrong direction for a while.
经常发生。
All the time.
那些被称为失败的公司。
They're called failed companies.
你知道,这其中有一种达尔文式的效率,就是说,有些事情你能不能做?比如,做X、Y或Z是否可行?
Know, there's a reason why, I mean, there's a Darwinistic efficiency to this too, which is just like, hey, there are things you can that, like, it feasible to do X, Y, or Z?
举个例子,我们来看看DoorDash。
So for example, let's go to, like, DoorDash.
我不认为客户曾告诉我们,他们想要在手机上点一个按钮来点餐配送。
I don't think customers told us that we want a button on our phone to click to deliver food.
但你可以去和餐厅聊聊,说:嘿,你们能不能在店里放个告示牌,让未来走进来的顾客知道,他们可以下单配送?
But you could talk to restaurants and say, hey, would you put this placard here so that people walking into your store know in the future that they can get delivered?
明白了。
Okay.
是的
Yeah.
也许吧
Maybe.
那么,你能做一个实验,看看每小时需要完成多少单配送才能盈亏平衡吗?
Then could you run an experiment of how many deliveries per hour would you have to do to, you know, break even?
而且,这种密度够不够?你知道,有一些方法可以提高业务成功的概率,但我不认为创业时可以说:嘿,我们在帕洛阿尔托找到了10个人。
And is there enough density, you know, within this like, there are ways to improve the odds that you can make the business work, But I don't think launching the company saying, hey, we found 10 people in Palo Alto.
你知道,你想要手机上有个这样的按钮吗?
You know, do you want this button on your phone?
所以,当托尼和埃文最初走进我办公室时,我突然意识到:他们有一个数据——美国93%的餐厅不提供配送服务。
So, you know, when Tony and Evan walked into my office originally, the epiphany I had was, well, they had a stat which is 93% of the restaurants in The United States don't deliver.
我当时想,好吧。
I was like, okay.
这个比例似乎应该远高于7%。
Seems like it should be a higher percentage than seven.
说服了。
Convinced.
当他们描述他们想创造的东西时,Groupon的创始人安德鲁·梅森曾 famously 说,这些手机、这些设备应该只有两个按钮:我无聊了和我饿了。
And then when they were describing what they wanted to create, Andrew Mason of Groupon fame had famously said, these phones, these devices should have two buttons, I'm bored and I'm hungry.
我当时想,天啊,你们就是那个‘我饿了’按钮。
And I was like, oh my god, you're the I'm hungry button.
然后,这个想法突然在我脑海中清晰了。
And then, so it just clicked in my brain.
接着,我想,好吧,现在我们需要让这件事在经济上具备规模化实施的可行性。
And then it was like, Okay, now we need to make it economically possible to scalably do this.
祝你们好运,伙计们。
Good luck, guys.
而且这些建议不仅仅针对消费者。
And this advice is not just consumer.
你还会被教导说,DoorDash也有类似中小企业的业务。
You're also taught, like, DoorDash has like SMB ish.
是的,像Square这样的公司。
Yeah, like Square and things like that.
Square,对。
Square, yeah.
Square是个很好的例子。
Square is a good example.
任何低于中端市场的领域,我认为方向上都存在风险。
Like, anything sub mid market, I think, directionally dangerous.
这里的建议基本上是相信你的洞察力。
And the advice here is basically trust your insights.
你需要自己拥有这种洞察力。
Like, you need to have the insight yourself.
你无法从别处找到它。
You can't find it.
我认为通常来说,最优秀的企业。
I think typically, the best companies.
是的。
Yeah.
存在基础性的洞察,你知道,人们不一定想听这些,但确实有逻辑可循。
There's foundational insight and you know, people don't necessarily wanna hear that but like, there's logic.
你可以通过实证和压力测试来验证这种逻辑。
You can acid test and pressure test the logic.
比如,当布莱恩最初向我介绍Airbnb时,他已经有一些有趣的证据表明这会成功。
Like, there are, like, you know, to some extent, like when Brian first pitched me on Airbnb, there was some interesting evidence he already had that this was gonna be successful.
当时让我印象最深的是,他告诉我Craigslist上有多少条帖子写着‘我想租别人的卧室’。
The number one that one stuck with me at the time was he gave me the exact number of Craigslist listings that said, I want to rent someone's bedroom.
而且这个数字其实相当合理。
And it was actually a reasonable number.
在湾区大约有30条。
It was like 30 in the Bay Area.
但考虑到你必须亲自输入搜索,然后自己产生顿悟。
But given that you had to literally type it in and, you know, sort of have the epiphany yourself.
我当时就想,这其实已经不少了。
I was like, that's a lot actually.
这说明那里很可能真的存在一个市场。
That's like a probably a real market there.
他一说完,我就已经感兴趣了。
And I was already like, as soon as he said that, I was already leaning in.
但当他讲完这三分钟的陈述后,我觉得这简直太酷了。
And by the time he finished his three minute monologue, though, it was like, this is the coolest thing ever.
我必须投资。
I need to invest.
是的,我认为Airbnb是个很好的例子,他当时是在解决自己的问题,发现了机会,而不是去问别人:‘你们愿意做这种事吗?’
Yeah and I think Airbnb is a good example where he's was solving his own problem, saw an opportunity, wasn't like talking to people, hey, would you do this sort of thing?
而且如果去问别人,你可能会找错人,肯定会得到‘不’这样的反馈。
And and people would have said, you know, you'd sample the wrong people, definitely would have got feedback that was like, no.
这风险非常高。
Like, very, very high risk.
比如,这是一个很好的例子,如果你随机调查了十个人,有很大可能有九成以上的人会说:不,我永远不会做这种事。
Like, that's a good example where you had sampled 10 random people, good chance at nine plus percent would say, no, I wouldn't ever do that.
你知道吗,这真的很有意思。
You know, it's really interesting.
我刚刚看了泰勒·斯威夫特在某个颁奖典礼——I Heart Media——上的获奖感言,她发表了一段非常有力的演讲,说她刚起步时,只是在家独自创作歌曲、学习钢琴,一个人在房间里花了成千上万小时不断打磨、学习和提升。
I was just watching Taylor Swift's acceptance speech at this award show, I Heart Media, something rather and and she gave this really powerful speech that when she was starting out, she was just kind of at home working on songs, learning piano, in a room on her own, and had thousands of hours to just iterate on, learn and get better.
而今天,如果你这么做,你会立刻发布出来、分享出去,不断有人给你反馈。
Versus today, if you were to do this, you'd be posting it, sharing it, people giving you feedback constantly.
她的建议是,想办法在很长一段时间内不要让自己暴露在他人面前。
And her advice is just, like, find ways to just not expose yourself to people for a long time.
我有几个朋友是音乐行业的艺术家。
So I have a couple of friends who are, like, in artists in the music industry.
我认为她所说的,正是为什么有些艺术家在取得首次成功后,很难再次复制成功的原因之一。
And I think what she's saying is one of the reasons why it's sometimes difficult for artists who had success to recreate the success.
因为他们的首次成功并不是基于数据驱动,也不是基于用户反馈。
Because the first success was not data driven, was not customer feedback driven.
我当时只是在创作,然后它引起了共鸣。
It was like, I'm creating this and it's resonating.
然后,因为他们有了观众,有人——无论是他们自己、经纪人还是唱片公司之类的——希望他们获得反馈。
Then, because they have an audience, someone, either they or their manager or whoever, the label, blah blah blah blah, wants them to get feedback.
这就催生了衍生作品,你知道的,不是严格意义上的法律意义上的衍生,但更像是缺乏灵感的衍生品。
And it creates derivative, you know, sort of works, not strictly legally, but, like, derivative works that are less inspired.
杰克·阿尔特曼和我的朋友、链式反应乐队的亚历克斯做过一期播客。
There's a podcast that Jack Altman did with, my friend Alex from The Chainsmokers.
他详细谈过这一点:他们创作了一首歌,这首歌其实没有引起他们核心听众的共鸣,反而引起了另一群听众的共鸣,这很有趣。
He actually talks about this at some length that they created this song that actually didn't resonate with the core their normal audience, but actually resonated with a different audience, which is interesting.
所以我认为,如果你陷入成功,就很容易被困住——这其实是个很好的例证。
So I I think you can get trapped with success if you it's good illustration actually.
《创意公司》里还有一个概念,叫‘丑宝宝’。
There's also this concept of the ugly baby in Creativity Inc.
我不确定你有没有读过卡特穆尔写的那本书,书中提到,皮克斯的每一个伟大创意最初都像个丑宝宝,没人愿意去帮助它、关注它,只想赶紧把它赶走。
I don't know if you read that book at Catmull about every idea at Pixar like every great idea starts as this ugly baby that no one wants to, like, help and pay attention to and just, get this out of here.
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