本集简介
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作为创始人或CEO，没有人会来救你。
The thing about being a founder or CEO is there's no one there to rescue you.
你的父母不会来救你。
Your parents aren't gonna rescue you.
你的风险投资方也不会来救你。
Your VC is not gonna rescue you.
当你遭遇第一次危机时，这种感觉才会真正袭来。
That kinda hits you when you hit your first crisis.
创办一家公司从未如此容易。
Starting a company has never been easier.
但要把一家公司发展成持久且具有重大影响力的企业，却从未如此困难。
Scaling one into a durable, high impact organization has never been harder.
在未来十年里，新成立的公司数量将比过去十年激增。
The number of companies formed is going to mushroom over the next ten years relative to last ten years.
要想脱颖而出并真正实现加速发展，只会越来越难。
It's just gonna be hard to stand out and really accelerate.
十年前或二十年前当首席执行官，和现在最不同的地方是什么？
What's most different about what it was like to be a CEO maybe ten, twenty years ago versus today?
当你能如此快速地行动并尝试大量事物时，会带来巨大的税收优惠和选择权。
There's a massive tax and optionality when you can move this fast and try a lot of things.
这给首席执行官们带来了更大的压力，要求他们成为更快、更优秀的决策者。
It puts pressure on the CEOs to be faster and better decision makers.
世界上有很多人想成为创始人。
A lot of people in the world want to be founders.
他们想成为首席执行官。
They wanna be CEOs.
我认为没有人能做到。
I don't think anyone can do it.
人们经常谈论996工作制。
People talk about nine nine six.
那远远不止如此。
It's way more than that.
创始人一周七天都在工作。
Founders are seven days a week.
他们始终在线。
They're always on.
我周日晚上还会发短信。
I text Sunday nights.
这是全方位的投入。
It's full contact.
你觉得成功需要特定的背景或特质吗？
Do you feel like there are specific profiles or traits to be successful?
我关注四个方面。
I look for four things.
我称之为我的锁定算法。
I call it my lock algorithm.
今天，我的嘉宾是HubSpot的联合创始人兼长期首席执行官布莱恩·哈利根。
Today, my guest is Brian Halligan, cofounder and longtime CEO of HubSpot.
我邀请布赖恩来这个播客，是因为他比我认识的任何人都更像一位CEO职业的学者。
I asked Brian to come on this podcast because he is, more than anyone I've met, a student of the job of a CEO.
去年离开HubSpot后，他成为红杉资本的内部CEO教练，汇聚了数十位顶尖CEO相互学习。
After leaving HubSpot last year, he became the in house CEO coach at Sequoia, where he brings together dozens of top CEOs to learn from each other.
他为一些世界顶尖的CEO提供一对一辅导。
He does one on one coaching with some of the world's top CEOs.
他还主持一档广受欢迎的播客《漫长而奇异的旅程》，采访了全球最成功的多位CEO。
He also hosts a popular podcast called Long Strange Trip, where he interviews some of the world's most successful CEOs.
在这次对话中，我们深入探讨了在当今时代成为一名成功CEO所需具备的条件。
In this conversation, we unpack what it takes to be a successful CEO in today's era.
在我们开始之前，先简短感谢我们的精彩赞助商。
Let's get into it after a short word from our wonderful sponsors.
应用程序会以各种方式出问题：崩溃、变慢、回退，以及只有真实用户上线后才会出现的那些问题。
Applications break in all kinds of ways: crashes, slowdowns, regressions, and the stuff that you only see once real users show up.
Sentry能捕捉到所有这些问题。
Sentry catches it all.
查看错误发生的时间、地点和原因，甚至能追踪到引入错误的提交、负责发布该代码的开发者，以及具体的代码行，所有信息都在一个统一的视图中呈现。
See what happened, where, and why, down to the commit that introduced the error, the developer who shipped it, and the exact line of code all in one connected view.
我确实试过用五个标签页加Slack线程的方式来调试问题。
I've definitely tried the five tabs and Slack thread approach to debugging.
这种方式更好。
This is better.
Sentry会展示请求的流转过程、哪些代码被执行了、哪些部分变慢了，以及用户实际看到的情况。
Sentry shows you how the request moved, what ran, what slowed down, and what users saw.
SEER，Sentry的AI调试代理，会在此基础上继续深入。
SEER, Sentry's AI debugging agent, takes it from there.
它利用Sentry提供的全部上下文信息，帮你定位根本原因、提出修复建议，甚至自动生成拉取请求。
It uses all of that Sentry context to tell you the root cause, suggest a fix, and even opens a PR for you.
它还会审查你的拉取请求，标记任何可能造成破坏的变更，并提供现成的修复方案。
It also reviews your PRs and flags any breaking changes with fixes ready to go.
前往 sentry.io/lenny 免费试用Sentry和SEER，并使用代码Lenny获取100美元Sentry代金券。
Try Sentry and SEER for free at sentry.io/lenny and use code Lenny for $100 in Sentry.
那是 sentry.io/Lenny。
That's s entry.io/ Lenny.
本集由 Datadog 赞助，Datadog 现已整合 Epo，领先的实验与功能开关平台。
This episode is brought to you by Datadog, now home to Epo, the leading experimentation and feature flagging platform.
全球顶尖公司的产品经理使用 Datadog——与工程师每天依赖的同一平台，将产品洞察与错误、用户体验摩擦和业务影响联系起来。
Product managers at the world's best companies use Datadog, the same platform their engineers rely on every day to connect product insights to product issues like bugs, UX friction, and business impact.
它从产品分析开始，产品经理可以观看回放、分析漏斗、深入研究留存率，并探索增长指标。
It starts with product analytics, where PMs can watch replays, review funnels, dive into retention, and explore their growth metrics.
当其他工具止步时，Datadog 还能更进一步。
Where other tools stop, Datadog goes even further.
它能帮助你真正诊断漏斗流失、错误和用户体验摩擦的影响。
It helps you actually diagnose the impact of funnel drop offs and bugs and UX friction.
一旦你知道该聚焦哪里，实验就能验证哪些方案有效。
Once you know where to focus, experiments prove what works.
当我还在 Airbnb 时，我亲身体验到了这一点，我们的实验平台对于分析哪些方案有效、哪些环节出错至关重要。
I saw this firsthand when I was at Airbnb, where our experimentation platform was critical for analyzing what worked and where things went wrong.
构建Airbnb实验平台的同一团队也打造了Epo。
And the same team that built experimentation at Airbnb built Epo.
Datadog则让你通过会话回放超越数字本身。
Datadog then lets you go beyond the numbers with session replay.
通过热力图和滚动图，精确观察用户如何与产品互动，真正理解他们的行为。
Watch exactly how users interact with heat maps and scroll maps to truly understand their behavior.
所有这些功能都由与实时数据关联的功能标志驱动，使你能够安全发布、精准定位并持续学习。
And all of this is powered by feature flags that are tied to real time data so that you can roll out safely, target precisely, and learn continuously.
Datadog不仅仅是工程指标。
Datadog is more than engineering metrics.
它是优秀产品团队更快学习、更聪明修复、更有信心发布的地方。
It's where great product teams learn faster, fix smarter, and ship with confidence.
前往 datadoghq.com/lenny 申请演示。
Request a demo at datadoghq.com/lenny.
网址是 datadoghq.com/lenny。
That's datadoghq.com/lenny.
布莱恩，非常感谢你来到这里，欢迎来到这个播客。
Brian, thank you so much for being here, and welcome to the podcast.
谢谢你邀请我，伦尼。
Thanks for having me, Lenny.
这是我的荣幸。
It's my pleasure.
我想从一件事开始说起，我听你的董事会成员描述你时，说你总是处于一种建设性的不满状态。
I wanna start with something that I've heard your board members, the way they described you, is, someone with a perpetual state of constructive dissatisfaction.
你认为这是成功CEO、成功领导者的核心基础特质吗？
Do you think this is a core foundational kind of trait of successful CEOs, successful leaders?
顺便说一下，我喜欢这个描述。
By the way, I like that description.
当HubSpot的董事长洛里·诺林顿这么说的时候，我就觉得我喜欢这个说法。
I when she did a woman named Lori Norrington, who's HubSpot's chair, said that I like it.
我把这当作一种夸奖，而且我确实很喜欢。
I took it as kind of a compliment, and I and I liked it.
因此，我如今大部分时间都在辅导那些快速增长的首席执行官们。
And as I so I spend most of my time these days coaching very fast growth CEOs.
他们所有人基本上都这样。
They all are kinda like that.
他们都处于一种持续的、积极的完美主义不满状态。
They're they're all in kind of a state of perfection perpetual dissatisfaction, but in a positive way.
顺便说一句，我喜欢当前这批CEO的一点是，他们并不太看重自己已经取得的成就，也不会因此感到满足。
One of the things, by the way, I like about the current crop of CEOs, they don't really take stock of what they they've done and and feel it.
他们总是对自己目前所处的位置略有不满，并且非常专注于最终目标。
They're always a little bit dissatisfied with where they are and very focused on the end state.
我对这一代CEO的谦逊感到惊讶。
And I've been surprised at how humble this generation is of CEOs.
我这一代的CEO，我觉得用‘谦逊’这个词来形容可能不是第一反应，但这一代人确实不同，我对此印象深刻。
And I think of my generation of CEOs as being, I don't know, I wouldn't humble wasn't the first word that would come out of your mouth when you describe kind of my generation, but this generation I feel like is is different, and I've been impressed with it.
好的。
Okay.
我有很多类似的问题，因为一方面，你长期担任一家极其成功公司的CEO，大约二十年后才进入这个新阶段。
I have a bunch of questions along these lines, because one, you've been a CEO of an incredibly successful company for a long time for about twenty years before you moved on to this new chapter.
现在你与许多CEO合作。
Now you work with a bunch of CEOs.
你是红杉资本的内部CEO教练。
You're the you're Sequoia's in house CEO coach.
我听说过你做的一些事情。
There's a few things that I've heard you do.
其中之一是你召集一群CO们。
One is you gather groups of COs.
据我所知，你设有两张桌子。
And, what I've read is that you have kind of two tables.
一张是儿童桌，另一张是成人桌。
You have the kids table and the adults table.
儿童桌是为员工人数在100人以下的公司CO们准备的。
The kids table of COs that are companies that are about under a 100 employees.
成人桌是指员工超过100人的公司。
The adult table is over a 100 employees.
所以让我问你一下，当你看那些从儿童桌过渡到成人桌的CO时，除了公司规模扩大之外，这些CEO在从儿童桌晋升到成人桌时，有哪些不同的做法？
So let me ask you just, when you look at COs that move from the kids table to the adults table other than just, you know, they scale and grow, What is it that these CEOs that graduate from kids to adults table, do differently?
成人们真正关注的，以及他们只想讨论的，就是他们的高管团队。
The adults are are really focused on and all they really wanna talk about is their exec team.
他们的直接下属，如何打造我们的高管团队，以及下一层的组织架构。
Their direct reports, how do you build our exec team, that next level down, org design.
你会惊讶于他们对这个问题思考得有多深入。
You would be surprised how much they think about that.
平均而言，我会说这些成年CEO有一半的时间都在招聘和面试上。
And on average, I would say the adults are spending half their time just recruiting and interviewing.
这几乎占据了他们全部的精力。
It's pretty all consuming.
我记得在HubSpot成长的这个阶段也是如此。
And I remember that from that phase in HubSpot's growth.
这让很多人感到惊讶，原来我的工作就是不停地面试和招聘。
And it surprises people like, wow, my job is really just to interview and hire.
我没想到会是这样。
I didn't know that was gonna be the case.
所以这就是他们在完成这一转变时所做的事情。
So that is one that they kind of are making that transition.
总的来说，人们在这方面都很糟糕，HubSpot 也是如此。
And I would just say in general, people are very bad at this and HubSpot was too.
我认为，CEO 和其他人都严重高估了自己面试的能力，过分依赖直觉，却低估了高质量的匿名背景调查。
I think CEOs and everyone dramatically overrates their ability to interview and overrates their gut feeling and underrates a really high quality blind reference.
前几天我采访了 MongoDB 的 CEO Dave，他提到一个有趣的统计数据。
And I interviewed Dave, the CEO from MongoDB the other day, and he had an interesting stat.
在他担任 MongoDB CEO 的十年里，平均每年有两位高管离职。
On average over his, like, ten year lifespan as the CEO of Mongo, there were two c level two c levels turned over per year.
高层人员的流动率这么高，真是不少。
That's a lot of turnover at the top.
我没有像Dave那样详细记录，但我认为HubSpot的情况也差不多。
And I didn't keep track of it like Dave, but I'm think HubSpot was kinda similar.
所有这些初创公司的情况也都差不多。
And all of these startups are kinda similar too.
所以人们正在努力解决这个问题，而所有这些公司都有一个共同点。
And so people are working on that and struggling with it, as one thing in common, like, with all of them.
当你在指导某人这方面时，你会怎么做？
What do you do when you coach someone on that?
当你觉得：‘好吧，你觉得自己面试能力超强，觉得自己能判断谁会成功。’
When you're like, okay, you think you're amazing at interviewing, you think you know who's gonna work out.
你会给他们什么建议来帮助他们提升这项技能？
What advice do you give them to help them develop that skill?
我觉得即使是我，已经做了整整一百五十年的面试了，仍然会高估自己判断一个人是否合适的能力。
I think even me, I've been doing this for a hundred and fifty years, I still think I overrate my ability to interview someone, and really know if they're a good fit.
我会给出一些建议。
I give a couple pieces of advice.
帕克·康拉德有一个我很喜欢的小技巧。
Parker Conrad has a good hack that I like.
在他与CFO、首席产品官等高管进行面试之前，他会让他们签署一份保密协议，然后发送最新的董事会演示文稿、董事会备忘录或一些重要文件，并安排半小时的面谈。
Before he's got a C level interview with CFO, chief product officer, whatever, he has him sign an NDA and sends them the last board deck or the board memo or some important doc, and he schedules a half hour interview with them.
然后他只是和对方聊聊这些文件中的内容。
And he just has a chat about the debts.
如果对方只是一味地夸赞，说‘太棒了，你们做得真了不起’，这对他来说是个重大警示信号，因为他想要的是能挑战他的人，而不是只会附和的人。
And if they're just very complimentary and it's so great, you're doing this amazing thing, it's a major red flag to him because he wants someone that will challenge him and not a yes person.
我觉得这个小技巧非常好，能让你深入了解一个人的思维方式以及他们如何与你互动。
And I thought that was a pretty good hack to get inside someone's head and how they think and how they'll interact with you.
一起上白板解决问题，我认为总是很好的做法。
Getting on a whiteboard and working through a problem, I think, is always a good thing.
我认为那种常规的、简单回顾个人背景的面试方式，并没有多大价值。
I think the standard interview of walking through your background, I don't think is all that valuable.
我会指导人们去做匿名背景调查。
And I coach people to do blind references.
找一个你认识的、曾与他们共事过的人。
Find someone you know that work with them.
顺便说一下，风险投资人很擅长这一点。
VCs are good at this, by the way.
我收到很多这样的推荐，你能看出有些只是走个过场，而有些则会向我提出关于这个人的一些尖锐问题。
And I get a lot of these, and you can tell some of them are like, we've already decided we're checking the box versus they're asking me hard questions about this person.
我最喜欢的问题之一是：‘你是否会热情地再次雇佣这个人担任这个职位？’我认为这是一个非常好的问题。
And one of my favorite questions people ask is, would you enthusiastically rehire this person for that role, which I think is a really good question.
从1到10分，你有多大可能在未来再次雇佣这个人？
On a scale of one to 10, how likely is it that you'll try to rehire this person back from me down the road?
我认为这类问题很好。
I think those types of questions are good.
所以，认真对待这些背景调查，真的非常重要。
So not mailing in on those blind references, I think are is really good.
我的另一条建议，虽然没人听我的，就是：招聘要慢，解雇要快。
My other piece of advice, and no one listens to me on this, is is hire slow and fire fast.
人们招人很快，但解雇却很慢。
People hire fast and fire slow.
如果要我猜的话，Lenny，你在招聘一位高管十八个月后，至少有50%的概率他们会离开。
If I had to guess, Lenny, with eighteen months after you hire a c level exec, at least 50% of the time, they're gone.
这些高管的离职率非常高。
There's there's there's a high mortality rate on them.
这比人们想象的要难得多。
It's it's harder than people think.
所以你的意思是，你能做的其实有限，无法大幅提升这些概率？
And what so what you're saying here is there's only so much you can actually do to increase those odds.
我觉得你可以。
I think you can.
我觉得你可以，推荐信非常关键。
I I I think you can you can I think the bind references are key?
我觉得一起实际参与项目互动很有帮助，我再跟你们分享一个我们在HubSpot学到的其他经验。
I think doing, like, real interactive working on a project together He I'll tell you one other thing we learned at HubSpot about this.
比如，我们会让候选人来面试，假设是工程负责人。
Like, we would have a candidate come in, let's say, a head of engineering.
会有八个人来面试他。
It would have, like, eight people interview them.
我们的评分标准是一到四分。
And our scale's one one to four.
比如说，四个人给了四分，四个人给了两分。
And let's say four people were four out of four, and four people were two out of four.
这就是候选人A。
So that's candidate A.
然后下一个候选人来，八个人面试他，每个人都是三分。
And then the next candidate comes in, eight people interview them, and everyone's a three out of four.
几乎每次我们都雇佣了那个三分的候选人，也就是缺点最少的人。
Almost every time we hired the three out of four, like the person with the least amount of weaknesses.
但我们后来改变了做法，转而选择了那些表现更突出的人。
And we changed it, and we we went with the spikier people.
我们选择了有缺点的人。
We went with people with weaknesses.
我们希望人们能挑战现有做法，这效果非常好。
We want people to challenge stuff, and that has worked out quite well.
比如，我们在HubSpot的招聘成功率提高了。
Like, our hit rate at HubSpot's improved.
我们还将面试小组的人数从八人缩减到了四人左右。
We also have shrunk the the pool of people on that interview panel from eight to, like, four.
比如，我们最近聘了一位产品负责人，只有我们四个人面试了他。
Like, we just hired a head of product, and there were just four of us that interviewed him.
我觉得这也挺管用的。
I think that worked too.
所以我觉得肯定还有一些方法能让我们在这方面做得更好。
So I think there's things you could do to get better at it for sure.
好的。
Okay.
这非常具体且实用。
This is incredibly tactical and useful.
关于背景调查，最难的部分是让人们说实话，因为他们几乎没有动力去说别人的负面评价。
On the references piece, the toughest part is getting people to be honest because there's very little upside to them to say negative things about people.
你有没有学到什么方法，能帮助你在联系推荐人时获得更真实的回答？
Is there anything that you've learned to help get real honest answers from folks you call for references?
我可以这么说，因为我现在不太做这个了，但当别人打电话给我时，我能感觉到他们是否已经做出了决定。
Well, I can just say, because I don't do this a lot anymore, but when people call me, I can tell if they've already decided.
当他们只是想确认时，比如他们问我优点和缺点，我就知道他们其实已经决定了。
When they're really just looking for like, when they ask me for the strengths and weaknesses, I'm like, they've already decided.
当他们问一些棘手的问题，比如从1到10分，你有多大概率再次雇佣他们？
When they ask me something hard, like, on a scale of one to 10, how likely are you to hire them again?
像这种问题才能触及核心。
Stuff like that that kinda gets at the core.
或者，他们是你们员工中前1%的人吗？
Or were they the top 1% of your employees?
这是个好问题。
That's a good question.
哦，他们是前10%吗？
Oh, were they top 10?
哦，你知道，这种问题挺好的。
Oh, you know, that type of question is pretty good.
所以当我站在另一方时，我喜欢这类问题被提出来。
So when I'm on the other side of it, I like when those types of questions go out.
我告诉你大家常犯的另一个错误，我们现在的所有CEO都犯过：你在招聘比如工程总监这样的职位时，被对方的简历震撼到了。
I tell you the other mistake everyone makes, I made in all all the CEOs we're making now is you're hiring for that whatever, head of engineering, and you're blown away by the resume.
比如你公司只有50人，却雇了一个在微软工作了十年、头衔显赫、曾在微软重要部门任职的人，然后你就录用了他。
Like, you're 50 employees, and you're hiring this person who's been at Microsoft the last ten years and has a fancy title, and has a fancy division in Microsoft, and you hire them.
当他们对自身的期望和你对他们的期望之间存在巨大落差时，尤其是在你们公司还没完全理顺的情况下，这种错配会非常严重。
There's just a massive impedance mismatch when you hire them on what their expectations are and what your expectations are in the in the in the extent that you get your shit together.
你根本就没意识到这一点。
It's just you don't.
如果你只有50人或500人，而他们却期待你已经井井有条，那你就绝对做不到。
You definitely don't, if you're 50 or 500 employees, and they expect you to have your act together.
所以，另一个要点是：避免聘用大公司的人。
And so that is another like, avoid the big company hire.
我们雇了太多来自Salesforce、Google和Microsoft的人，结果这些人全部都走了，100%的流失率。
Like, we hired so many people from Salesforce and Google and Microsoft, like a 100%, you know, attrition rate on all those folks.
我看到很多公司都会经历这样的阶段：哦，现在该请麦肯锡团队来了，我们觉得这会是解决方案。
Something that I've seen that a lot of companies is there's like phases of like, okay, now it's like the McKinsey, a cohort comes in and we think that's gonna be the answer.
然后是苹果团队，结果没成功，接着又换成亚马逊团队。
And that's the Apple group, and then that didn't work out, then the Amazon group.
麦肯锡那一套从来不管用。
The McKinsey one never works.
从来不管用。
It never works.
从来不管用。
It never works.
从定义上讲，他们在我所认为的创始人特质谱系中一定会失败，因为大多数创始人和我一样。
Like, by definition, they would fail on my spectrum of, like most founders are like me.
他们对传统智慧持怀疑态度。
Like, they are skeptical of conventional wisdom.
他们对世界的运作方式在某些方面感到不满，因此在重新思考传统智慧这一谱系上走得非常远。
They're unhappy with the well world works in some way, and so they're kind of far on that spectrum of of rethinking conventional wisdom.
而几乎从定义上讲，去麦肯锡工作的人，其思维方式都非常保守。
And almost by definition, somebody who goes work for McKinsey is very conservative in their outlook.
所以我认为这几乎总是会失败。
And so I think that almost always fails.
我们正在讨论招聘这个话题，那我就继续深入这个话题。
We're on this hiring kind of thread, so let me keep following this conversation.
我读到过，你建议像2004年的红袜队那样组建团队。
I read somewhere that you recommend building your team like the 2004 Red Sox.
这指的是什么？
What does this mean?
我是个体育迷，特别喜欢波士顿红袜队。
I'm a well, I'm a big sports fan and big Boston Red Sox.
波士顿红袜队已经八十六年没有赢得世界大赛冠军了，自从他们交易走伦尼之后。
And the Boston Red Sox hadn't won, Lenny, a World Series in eighty six years since they traded the
更衣室。
band room.
他们最终打破了魔咒，在2004年赢得了冠军。
And they finally broke, and they finally won it in 2004.
他们夺冠的方式是拥有一支由大量自己培养的、高质量且低成本的球员组成的核心阵容，这些球员都是通过选秀和青训系统成长起来的。
And the way they won it was they had a team of a bunch of homegrown, really high quality, inexpensive talent that they drafted and came through the farm system.
然后他们也签下了几位像大卫·奥蒂兹这样的自由球员，虽然名气很大，但他们的薪资也相当合理。
And then they got a few free agents like David Ortiz that a lot of people have heard of that they paid a fair amount of money to.
佩德罗·马丁内斯和柯特·席林就像是那些经验丰富的老将，属于已经功成名就的‘大公司’型人物，但他们与团队融合得非常好。
Pedro Martini Pedro Martinez and Curt Schilling were kind of the canonical older been that been there, done that bigger company folks, and they mixed really nicely.
球队的文化真正发挥了作用，我认为这才是关键。
The culture really worked, and I think that's the key.
我认为人们低估了他们自己培养的人才。
I think people underrate their homegrown talent.
几乎可以说，他们普遍低估了这一点。
Like, almost across the board, they underrate it.
我认为你需要这种组合。
And I think you want that mix.
你不应该只雇佣一大堆有经验的老将。
You don't wanna hire a whole bunch of been there, done that.
你也不应该一个都不雇。
You don't wanna hire none
一个都不雇。
of them.
我觉得这可能不是秘密，但你现在已经是红袜队的合伙人了。
I don't I imagine this is public, but you're now part owner of the Red Sox.
是这样吗？
Is that right?
部分所有者
Part owner
红袜队的。
of the Red Sox.
是的。
Yes.
好的。
Okay.
关于这方面，我有一些问题，好的。
I have questions for you along those lines Okay.
泰勒。
Taylor.
好的。
Okay.
这真是很棒的建议。
That's, that's amazing advice.
我在这里的理解是，人们看到的都是那些花哨的标志、了不起的人物，比如在Salesforce、亚马逊、谷歌担任副总裁之类的头衔。
Kinda what I'm taking away here is people see all these fancy logos, amazing person, VP this, that at Salesforce, Amazon, Google, whatever.
而你在这里想说的是，不要低估内部员工临危受命的力量。
And what you're saying here is, don't underestimate the power of someone internal, rising to the occasion.
是的。
Yeah.
如果你看看HubSpot，一半的管理团队都是在那里工作了大约一百五十年的人，我很喜欢这一点。
If you look at HubSpot, like, half the management team are folks that have been there for approximately a hundred and fifty years, which I like.
苹果公司也是如此，很多高管都是内部培养起来的。
And same with, like, you look at Apple, a lot of those people are homegrown.
那么，有没有什么好的建议可以帮助我们做好这件事呢？
And so is there any tips here for doing this well?
就是简单地给人们一个机会吗？
Is it just, like, give people a chance?
我倾向于给人们机会。
I tend to give people a chance.
这就像是，当你面试一位内部晋升、担任高管职位的人时，却先从外部招聘一位C级高管。
It's like if you're interviewing someone that's homegrown and they're VP for that c level job, first is hiring someone from the outside.
从外部招聘一个人。
Hire someone from the outside.
他们非常擅长在大公司进行面试。
They're very good at interviewing from a big company.
他们看起来很出色。
They look fancy.
他们很光鲜。
They're shiny.
你没看到他们的缺点。
You haven't seen their warts.
除非你非常擅长匿名背调，否则很难发现他们的缺点。
Hard to figure out their warts unless you're very good at blind referencing.
因此你往往会高估外部招聘的人，而低估了内部培养的人才。
And so you tend to overrate them and underrate your homegrown.
所以如果差距不大，我觉得你应该给内部培养的人一个机会。
So if it's pretty close, I think you'd give your homegrown a shot at it.
让我觉得有趣的是，伦尼，布莱恩·切斯基重新思考了这些问题，他认为大家过度偏向于从外部招聘有经验的人才和管理团队，过度依赖委派。
What's interesting to me, Lenny, is, you know, Brian Chesky sort of rethought a lot of this stuff, and he's like, everyone's over over rotating to the homegrown to the, you know, experienced talent and management teams and delegation.
我的意思是，他对这一点的看法基本是对的。
I mean, I think he's mostly right about that.
但人们并没有真正遵循这一点。
People haven't really followed that.
人们还是在大量地从外部招聘。
People are you know, they're hiring people from the outside quite a bit.
这已经成为现在所有人遵循的标准做法。
That's kind of the standard part of the playbook that all of them are following now.
这有点不一样。
It's it's a little different.
实际上，这与布莱恩所倡导的非常不同。
It's actually quite different than what Brian's espousing.
回到关于CEO的讨论，很多听这个播客的人，世界上有很多人想成为创始人。
Going back to the conversation around CEOs, a lot of people listening to this podcast, there's a lot of people in the world want to be founders.
他们想成为CEO。
They wanna be CEOs.
同时，你看看埃隆，看看詹森，看看史蒂夫·乔布斯，看看你。
At the same time, you look at Elon, you look at Jensen, you look at Steve Jobs, you look at you.
很多人觉得：我做不到。
A lot of people are like, I can't.
我不是这样的人。
I'm not this person.
我不会像他们那么出色。
I'm not I'm not gonna be as good as them.
我根本不可能达到那样的水平。
How there's no world where I'm this good.
你认为成为一位成功的CEO，必须具备某些特定的背景或与生俱来的特质吗？
Do you feel like there are specific profiles or just like traits that you have to be born with to be a successful CEO?
还是你觉得这一切都是可以学会的？
Or do you think it's all learnable?
只要足够努力，任何人都能成功。
Anybody can be successful if they really work hard.
在红杉资本，我见过这么多创始人，我脑子里有个小算法，会寻找四个关键点。
In Sequoia, meet all these CEOs coming in, and I have a little root, like, algorithm in my head, and I look for four things.
我
I
称之为
call it
我的锁定算法。
my lock algorithm.
L 代表讨人喜欢。
L is for lovable.
你知道，史蒂夫·乔布斯可能看起来有点粗粝，不太讨人喜欢，但他能激发人们的追随。
And, you know, Steve Jobs, you would say is kind of rough and maybe not lovable, but he would inspire followership.
你会想追随他。
You would wanna follow him.
所以，我能想象28岁的我，刚从商学院毕业，去为这样的人工作吗？
And so could I envision a 28 year old me graduating from business school going to work for this person?
我会愿意爬过碎玻璃吗？
Would I crawl across broken glass?
这是第一个问题。
That's question one.
第二个是痴迷。
Two is just obsession.
他们是否对这个问题深深着迷？
Are they deeply obsessed with this problem?
我对那些六个月前才想到这个问题、就立刻创办公司的人有点负面看法。
Did they I'm a little negative on people who came up with this problem to solve six months ago and started a company.
我喜欢那些具有深刻创始人市场契合度的人。
I like people with deep founder market fit.
我们已经长时间思考过这个问题，并且在他们的生活中看到了他们深入、执着地钻进某个领域，因为这正是成为创始人兼CEO所需要的。
We've been thinking about it for a long time and have evidence in their lives of going deep obsessively down a rabbit hole because that's kinda what it takes to be a founder CEO.
C这一点是我原本不会想到的，但这是红杉资本的一种心态，就像肩上扛着一块石头。
The c is something I wouldn't have thought of, but this is a Sequoia thing, like chip on the shoulder.
他们中的绝大多数人都有一种类似负重前行的感觉，仿佛肩上压着一块巨石。
Pretty much all of them have a bitten be like a boulder on their shoulder.
而我自己的肩上也有一点这样的负担。
And I I have a bit of a chip on my shoulder too.
K则代表对这个领域有深刻的知识。
And the k is just for deeply knowledgeable about the domain.
所以我通常会寻找这样的特质。
And so I kinda look for that.
如果我要在后面加一个S，我会说是‘学生’。
If I were to stick an s on it, I would say student.
比如，我关注像Harvey的Winston Weinberg、ProFound的James，或者Rogo的Gabe这些新兴且快速增长公司的创始人，他们都是这个领域的学习者。
Like, I look at Winston Weinberg from, Harvey or James from ProFound or Gabe from Rogo, some of these new, very fast growing companies, they're students of the game.
他们不只是什么都会的人。
They're not just learn it alls.
他们是深入再深入、深入到骨子里的游戏学习者。
They're deep, deep, deep students of the game.
他们就像那些不断持续学习的大型语言模型。
And they're they're like LLMs that are constantly constantly learning.
他们学习的不只是为我或同行获取新知识，而是会追溯到很久以前，对很多事情都有深厚的历史积累。
And it's not just learning stuff for me and their peers, but they go way back in time and have a lot of history on stuff.
所以这些就是我在评估CEO时用的一些标准。
So those are some of the that kind of my little criteria I use when I'm evaluating CEOs.
顺便问一下，你通常看中什么？
What do you look for, by the way?
你已经采访过很多像我这样的人了。
You've interviewed 've interviewed a ton of folks like me.
你觉得他们有什么共同点？
What do you think's in common?
哪些成功的创始人？
Of what successful founders?
天啊。
Oh my god.
我希望我能给出一个简洁的答案。
I wish I had the, my succinct answer.
我会去 lennybot.com 问：这些人的共同模式是什么？
I would ask I would go to lennybot.com and be like, what is the common pattern across these folks?
你没提到的一个点，我觉得很有趣，我最近和特伦斯·罗汉做了一些这方面的研究。
One that you didn't mention that I think is interesting, I did some research on this recently with, Terrence Rohan.
一个是极其有野心，试图做些大多数人觉得疯狂的事情。
One is just extremely ambitious, just trying to do something really wild that most people are like, that's crazy.
你不可能为世界上所有的音乐提供订阅服务。
You're not gonna, like, get a subscription service for all music in the world.
你到底在干什么？
That's just what are you doing?
去做吧。
Do it.
你会去把它做出来的。
You're getting you're gonna build it.
我不会。
I do not.
而且，这个是可以学会的吗？
And like, is it learnable?
我注意到很多首席执行官在一些事情上很吃力。
I noticed some of the a lot of the CEOs struggling with a couple things.
比如说，你是温斯顿，二十多岁。
Like, let's say you're you're Winston, you're late twenties.
你从未管理过团队。
You've never managed a team.
你可能以前甚至从未当过体育队的队长。
You're probably never even captain of a sports team before.
为了扩大规模，你必须不断地给员工反馈。
And in order to scale, like, you have to give people feedback, like, constantly.
你知道，这非常不自然。
You know, it's very unnatural.
我就要给我新聘的这位副总裁大量反馈，包括正面和负面的。
It's just like, I'm gonna give this this VP I hired a bunch of feedback, positive and negative.
如果你不擅长这一点，以后会付出惨重的代价。
And if you don't get good at that, you pay really pay the price later.
我认为这是他们必须学会的东西。
That's something I think they have to learn.
他们都必须学会培养敏锐的辨别能力。
They all have to learn to get a good bullshit detector.
他们 constantly 被误导。
They're constantly being spun.
每个人都在试图向他们推销。
Everyone's trying to sell to them.
整个组织总在试图向他们推销。
The org is always trying to sell to them.
所以，这是一种他们需要随着时间慢慢培养的能力。
So that's sort of something they have to develop, you know, over time.
他们都需要逐渐掌握激励他人的技巧。
They have to all get good at the inspiration thing over time.
你就像是温斯顿。
Like, you're you're Winston.
你这一辈子从未需要激励过任何人。
You've never had to inspire anyone in your entire life.
你知道，你上学，当了几年律师，然后创办了这家公司，激励根本不是你的强项。
You know, you're a you went to school and you're a lawyer for a few years and you started this thing like inspiration wasn't your thing.
在创业并实现规模化的过程中，有些能力是你必须学会的，而最优秀的人学得最快。
So there's certain things you have to kinda learn on that startup to scale up path, and the best ones learn it very fast.
这非常有趣且有帮助。
This is extremely interesting and useful.
所以，lock后面加个s，只是为了呼应你刚才说的内容。
So lock, with an s at the end just to kind of mirror back what you're sharing.
所以，当你提到评估CEO时，这是为了投资吗？
So which and when you were saying you evaluate CEOs, is this for, like, investing as okay.
当你帮助红杉资本决定是否投资这家公司时，你关注的是LOC。
A So when you're helping Sequoia decide, should we invest in this company, what you look for is, LOC.
我喜欢这个s。
So I I like the s.
我不会被包括在内。
I won't get included there.
他们是否讨人喜欢？
So are they lovable?
他们是否具有感染力？
Are they inspiring?
他们是否对所追求的问题极度着迷？
O, are they obsessed with this problem they're going after?
他们是否心怀不满？
Do they have a chip on their shoulder?
他们是否对所追求的问题有极其深入的了解？
Are they extremely knowledgeable about the problem they're going after?
听起来不仅针对问题，还包括对公司商业策略的研究，比如S曾是个学生。
And it sounds like not just the problem, but just the studying company's business strategy, things like And then s was a student.
我想这就是S的意思，学生就是研究这个，当创始人、当CEO。
I guess that's what s is, student is studying this, being a founder, being a CEO.
好的。
Okay.
所以，回到刚才的问题，简单来说，你认为CEO是天生的，还是后天培养的？
So I guess going back just to to the question, do you think, just to put it very simply, do you think COs are born or do you think they're made?
任何人都能成为出色的CEO吗？
Can anyone turn into an amazing CO?
我不认为任何人都能做到。
I don't think anyone can do it.
我不觉得这是任何人都能做到的。
I don't think it's just anyone.
我想说的是，我注意到这一点，我还有一个小标准，虽然很少见到，但像布雷特·泰勒那样的，有一些在红杉资本的投资组合里。
I will say, I noticed that, so another little rubric I have, and I don't see a lot of these, but like Brett Taylor's one, there's a few out there that are in Sequoia's portfolio.
我称之为回归棒球的标准，五个方面评价一个球员。
I call them a back to the baseball thing, a five to a player.
在棒球中，当你评估一个球员时，首先看他会不会击球？
In baseball, when you rank a player, it's can they hit?
他有没有击出长打的能力？
Can they hit with power?
他跑得快吗？
Can they run?
他能接住球吗？
Can they catch a ball?
他能投球吗？
Can they throw the ball?
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他们会对每一项都打一到十分的分数。
And they they rate them kinda one to 10 at each.
拥有五项全能的球员非常罕见，极其罕见。
And it's very rare that you have a five tool player, like, extremely rare.
现在比较新颖的是，出现了五项全能的首席执行官，比如布雷特·泰勒就是其中之一。
And the thing that's kinda new now are there are five tool CEOs, like Bret Taylor's one.
你能写代码。
You can code.
你有品味。
You have taste.
你有远见。
You have vision.
你能推销产品。
You can sell the product.
你能说服员工。
You can convince employees.
就像这种超级CEO，现在有不少这样的人。
Like, this kinda super CEO, and there's a bunch of them now.
我不确定。
And I don't know.
我没见过太多这样的。
I didn't see a lot of those.
这肯定不是史蒂夫·乔布斯。
That certainly wasn't Steve Jobs.
他没写过代码，也没做过编程。
He wasn't writing pro he wasn't programming.
也不是杰夫·贝佐斯。
It wasn't Jeff Bezos.
我觉得出现了一种全新的、非常令人印象深刻的一类人。
You know, I think there's kind of a new breed that's quite impressive.
你提到的这些人，在AI出现之前就已经这么优秀了。
These folks you mentioned were this good before AI became a thing.
我想象AI能帮助更多CEO填补他们自身的不足。
I imagine AI helps more CEOs fill the gaps that they have.
我觉得AI很难填补这些缺口。
I think AI is it's hard to fill the gap.
你知道，这个人是个开发者。
You know, this guy's a developer.
他聪明到天才级别，还非常执着。
He's brilliant genius level obsessive.
但他能说服人吗？他能销售吗？
But can he convince can he sell?
他能让投资者给他大量资金和高估值吗？
Can he convince an investor to give him a lot of money and a high valuation?
他能让顶尖人才离开OpenAI来加入他吗？
Can he convince brilliant employees to leave OpenAI and join him?
他能让一些大型且持怀疑态度的财富500强企业购买他的产品吗？
Can he convince some big skeptical Fortune 500 enterprise to buy his product?
能够做到这一点，同时具备品味并且能在更高层次上编程，我认为这很罕见。
Like, be able to do that and have taste and be able to code really well at next levels, I think is rare.
但我其实觉得情况可能恰恰相反，像我这样只会一点编程的普通人，突然之间也能构建出东西了。
I actually think it might be the other way, though, where mere mortals like me who can kinda code, all of a sudden, we're gonna be able to build stuff.
我觉得情况其实是反过来的。
I think it kinda goes the other way.
我很喜欢你分享的这份关于CO们最需要学习的事项清单。
I love this list you shared of things that you find COs most have to learn.
辨别虚假信息、激励他人、给予严厉的反馈。
BS detection, inspiring people, giving hard feedback.
也许，对于成为CEO或创始人的大多数人来说，最常需要提升的是哪一点呢？
What's maybe, like, the one thing that most often people that become CEOs founders have to work on?
有没有一个最普遍的共同点，比如，你最需要改进的就是这个？
Is there, like, a most common thread of, like, here's the thing you probably need to work on most?
就是反馈这件事。
It's that feedback thing.
所有的首席执行官都在组建团队，很多人发现，他们有一位联合创始人负责产品和工程，但需要这位联合创始人退后一步，担任CTO、思考者和实验室角色，而他们则需要招聘一位真正能管理工程团队的人。
All of the CEOs are building their teams, and so many are like, I have a co founder that runs product and engineering, but I need that co founder to kind of step aside and be the CTO and the thinker and the labs person, and I need to hire somebody who can actually run the engineering machine.
现在有太多首席执行官正经历着这样的转变。
Like, so many of the CEOs are going through that right now.
这是一个棘手的过渡。
That's a tricky transition.
很多首席执行官都在不断添置人员。
So many of the CEOs are layering folks.
比如，你雇了那位早期的销售负责人。
Like, you hired that early head of sales.
他招了十个人，却始终搞不清楚销售人才的画像，理不清销售流程，也无法准确预测业绩，所以我们需要换人。
He hired 10 people, but just can't quite figure out the sales profile, can't quite unpack the sales process, can't quite forecast accurately, we need to lair the person.
你知道，这类对话对人类来说非常棘手，尤其当你只有25岁，从未经历过类似情况时。
You know, those types of conversations are very tricky and quite unnatural for homo sapiens to have if you're, you know, you're 25 and you've never done anything like that before.
所以我看到最优秀的那些人正在努力提升这方面的能力，深入研究它——虽然极其不舒服，但他们必须硬着头皮去掌握。
So I see the best ones getting really good at that and studying it, and it's it's super uncomfortable, but they have to kind of suck it up and get good at it.
你认为什么最能帮助他们培养这些技能，提升这方面的能力？
What do you find most helps them build these skills, get better at this?
你会给他们一些什么建议吗？
Is there some kind of tidbits of advice you give them?
他们是通过学习来提高的吗？
Is it something that they study to improve?
我觉得在这方面，痛苦的人喜欢找同伴。
I I think misery loves company on this.
所以我做的就是，让15位员工少于100人的公司CEO坐一桌，而员工超过100人的CEO坐另一桌，大约也是15位。
So what I do like, the kids table is 15 CEOs of companies under a 100 employees, and the adults table are CEOs of companies over a 100 employees, about 15 of them.
他们彼此之间会讨论这个问题。
They talk about this with each other.
这算是一种安全的环境。
It's kind of a safe space.
我也可以参与讨论，但当他们的同行们提出意见时，效果其实更好。
And I can weigh in, but it's actually much more effective when their peers weigh in.
我觉得，像这种事，确实有人陪着会好受些。
I think Misery really does like company on stuff like this.
他们能互相学习。
They learn from each other.
所以，本质上，有靠谱的同龄人聊聊、分享、倾诉很重要。
So, essentially, it's fine peers to talk to and share and be able crumble
一起分担压力。
on it.
我之所以把他们分开，是因为‘孩子桌’的问题和‘成人桌’的问题非常不同。
And the reason I break it out is, like, the problems with the kids table are very different than the problems at the adult table.
而且他们的问题都大同小异，高度相似。
And they all they all rhyme they rhyme a lot.
你在麻省理工学院教一门关于初创企业扩张的课程，而且专门讲扩张，而不是创业或创办公司。
So you teach a course at MIT around scaling startups, and it's specifically around scaling, not startups, not starting the company.
你的课程大纲里有一句引言。
And you have this quote in your, syllabus.
创办一家公司从未如此容易。
Starting a company has never been easier.
将一家公司扩展为持久且具有高影响力的组织，却从未如此困难。
Scaling one into a durable, high impact organization has never been harder.
为什么会这样呢？
Why is that the case?
我的意思是，创办公司有比现在更容易的时候吗？
I mean, has it ever been easier to start a company?
这确实是事实。
It's That's absolutely true.
与此相反的是，我想知道，在未来十年里，新成立的公司数量相对于过去十年会像蘑菇一样暴增多少。
And the flip side of that is I mean, how many companies is the the the the number of companies formed is going to Mushroom over the next ten years relative to the last ten years.
过去十年相比再之前的十年，公司数量也是像蘑菇一样暴增。
And the the last ten years pre compared to the previous ten years is Mushroom.
我只是觉得，在我这一生中，比如，我年纪大了。
I just think in my life, like, I'm old.
我小时候走进CVS药房，想买一支牙膏和牙刷。
And when I was a kid, I'd walked into CVS corn drugstore, and I wanna buy a toothpaste toothbrush.
那时候只有四到五种选择。
There are four or five there.
你随便挑一个就行。
You pick one.
到了九十年代或2000年，你上亚马逊，会有四五千种牙刷。
And, you know, in the '9 in, like, the nineties or 2000, you go to Amazon, there are four, five thousand toothbrushes.
有四五千家公司的产品比牙刷还多。
It's four, five thousand companies greater than toothbrushes.
制造产品，甚至开发技术，都变得容易多了。
It got much, much easier to make stuff and even technology.
AWS让创办软件公司变得更容易了，当年我们2006年创办HubSpot时已经是一个巨大的飞跃，但现在会是更大的飞跃。
AWS just made it easier to start a software company, so it's like a huge jump back then when we started HubSpot in 2006, but now it's gonna be an even bigger jump.
所以，创业现在更容易了。
So it's easier to start.
现在市场竞争和噪音太多了。
Now there's so much noise in in cons in, competition.
想要脱颖而出并真正加速和扩张，将会非常困难。
It's just gonna be hard to stand out and really accelerate and scale.
所以我才说，现在创业从未如此容易。
So that's why I say it's never been easier to start.
但竞争也从未如此激烈。
There's never been more competition.
而要实现规模化，也从未如此艰难。
It's never been harder to scale.
这其中很大一部分在于分销，也就是如何突破噪音，这正是我在问的。
And a big part of this is is distribution essentially, breaking through the noise is what I'm asking.
学会这一点很难。
It's hard to learn that.
你小时候并没有接触过分销这一块。
Like, you didn't grow up doing distribution.
你不知道。
You don't know.
所以他们都在学习，学得快的人就像在玩一场学习游戏。
So they they're all learning it, and the ones that learn fast it's like a learning game.
你学得越快，表现就越好。
The faster you learn, you know, the better you do.
在这方面，我最近看到你发了一条推文，人们讨论AI会取代哪些工作，而你说销售可能是AI最后取代的工作。
Along these lines, I saw you tweet this recently where, people talk about which jobs AI is gonna replace, and you, said that, sales is maybe the last job AI will replace.
你为什么这么认为？
What why do you think that's the case?
如果你看看一家典型企业内部，AI真正发挥作用的地方在哪里？
Well, if you look inside a typical enterprise, like, where is AI, like, really working?
比如说在HubSpot，软件开发做得非常好。
Let's say inside of HubSpot, software development's working incredibly well.
客户服务，也做得非常好。
Customer support, incredibly well.
法律部门也开始高效运作了。
Legal starting to work incredibly well.
但其他部门那种真正改变局面的应用，在这里却几乎没有。
But there really aren't apps like in the rest of the org that have really changed things a lot.
而市场推广方面则进展缓慢，实际上只有客服做得不错。
And then the go to market side has been kinda slow, really just support.
比如，目前还没有一个典型的营销或销售工具，也许BDR是第一个，但我认为，在企业销售中，那种由两个碳基生命体之间建立的真正信任，将在白领世界中非常、非常、非常晚才被取代。
Like, there isn't like a canonical marketing or sales or maybe the BDR is the first one, but I think ye old enterprise sales where there's actual trust built up between two carbon based life forms, I think will be very, very, very late to go in the white collar world.
我也经常思考市场推广的问题。
I also I think a lot about the go to market.
我认为市场推广方式将被彻底颠覆。
I think the go to market's gonna get turned on its head.
当我们刚开始做HubSpot时，如果回想起当时的销售漏斗，你希望在谷歌上被找到，有人点击一个蓝色链接，进入你的网站，深入探索，然后点击联系销售。
Like, when I when we started HubSpot, if I think of the way the funnel worked, you wanna get found in Google, someone clicks on a blue link, they land on your website, they go down the rabbit hole, they clicked on contact sales.
他们会一直等到销售代表有空为止。
They wait until that sales rep's ready.
深入这个兔子洞。
Go down that rabbit hole.
我认为这将被彻底颠覆，因为人们现在是在评估产品。
And I think it's gonna get turned on its head where people are evaluating a product.
他们从Gemini开始，或者从Anthropic开始。
They start in Gemini or they start in Anthropica.
他们从Chatchipati开始。
They start in Chatchipati.
比如，Chateappity了解你网站上的所有信息，甚至更多，还了解你所有的竞争对手，因此他们会留在那里进行大量研究，变得非常有见识。
And, you know, for example, Chateappity knows way about your knows everything on your website, everything beyond that, knows all your competitors, so they they will stay in there and do lots more research and be incredibly well educated.
所以你的网站重要性降低了很多。
So your website's a lot less important.
然后他们才会访问你的网站。
And they go to your site.
我认为网站会发生变化，你会拥有一个高质量的虚拟形象，它了解你所有产品、公司信息、定价和包装方案，你可以与这个虚拟形象进行高质量的对话。
I think sites will change where you're going to have a really high quality avatar that knows everything about your products, knows everything about your company and your pricing and packaging, and you can have a high quality conversation with that person.
这个人的信息会被存储在你的CRM系统中，并且会被打分。
That person that will get stored in your CRM in in will get, you know, scored.
这是一次高质量的对话，之后销售代表会跟进。
This is good quality conversation, and then the sales rep will follow-up.
但这个销售代表会在每次销售通话中以虚拟形象的形式陪伴他们。
But that sales rep will be an avatar with them on every sales call.
你不需要再等待他们的SC。
You won't have to wait for their SC.
他们会拥有一个全知的SC，全程跟随他们完成整个流程。
They'll have their own SC that's all knowing that will follow them through the process.
目前市场营销方式变化还不大，但我认为随着时间推移，它会发生巨大变化。
So go to market hasn't changed much yet, but I think over time, it's gonna change a lot.
这个虚拟形象，为了更清楚理解，是买家自带的一个小助手，还是说在HubSpot上，有一个虚拟形象引导你完成销售流程？
This avatar, just to understand, so this is, the buyer has their own little agent that comes with them, or on HubSpot, you have this avatar that walks you through the sales process?
我觉得两种情况都有。
I I I I I think both.
我认为，作为一个知识工作者，作为人类，我真正想要的是一个我特别喜欢的德尔斐克隆体。
I think me as a knowledge worker, like, what I really want as a Homo sapien is I have, like, a Delphi clone that I really like.
我也是。
Same.
它实际上相当不错。
It it's actually quite good.
是的。
Yeah.
你有一个 one.com。
You have one.com.
对。
Yeah.
人们在哪里能找到你的呢？
What's where where do people find yours?
他们在我的页脚处找到它。
They find it on my footer.
他们可以在Delphi上找到它。
They can find it on Delphi.
是的。
Yeah.
我们会提供链接。
We'll link to it.
好的。
Yep.
我希望把那个东西连接到我的邮箱、我的燕麦片、我的计划里，让它了解关于我的一切。
And what I want is, like, connect that that thing to my email, into my granola, into my plot, and it knows everything about me.
然后当我去开会时，Lenny，我想邀请那个东西参加我的会议，让它坐在Zoom会议里，不只是像燕麦片那样做笔记。
And then when I go to a meeting, Lenny, I wanna invite I wanna invite that thing to my meeting so it's sitting there in the Zoom meeting, not just taking notes like granola.
它是一个与会者。
It's a participant.
所以如果我忘记了什么，或者别人忘记了，我可以问它问题。
So if I forgot something, I asked it a question if somebody else forgot.
我觉得，每个知识工作者在三到五年内都会拥有一个这样的助手。
Like, I think every knowledge worker will have one of these in three, four, five years.
但我的想法更偏向市场推广方面，我认为每个网站都会发生变化，主页上会出现一个全知的虚拟形象。
But mine was more on the go to market side where I think every website will change and there'll be a an all knowing avatar on that homepage.
如果是需要深思熟虑的购买行为，我认为会转交给销售代表。
And if it's a considered purchase, I think it gets handed off to a sales rep.
销售代表会进行对话，但当他们在Zoom上时，会有一个全知的客户成功虚拟形象在场协助。
That sales rep has a conversation, but when that sales rep's on Zoom, they have their SE avatar that's kind of all knowing.
我觉得未来几年这些东西都会发生巨大变化，但目前还没有真正释放出潜力。
And so I think this stuff all changes a lot in the next few years, but it hasn't really unlocked yet.
在这个世界里，我们将会做些什么呢？
What are we gonna be doing in this world?
这两个机器人互相聊天。
These two bots chatting with each other.
这会很棒的，Lenny。
It's gonna be great, Lenny.
你和我将会坐在那里，
You and I are gonna be, like, sitting on
我们在做播客。
We're in the podcast.
在凯科斯群岛度假一个月，放松身心，派我们的虚拟形象去参加所有会议。
Working Caicos, relaxing on a month long vacation, sending our avatars to all the meetings.
请帮我买一些HubSpot的席位。
Go buy me some hub HubSpot seats, please.
我认为这就是Cloudbot如此受欢迎的原因。
I think this is why Cloudbot was so popular.
我认为他们本质上就是在构建这个理念，现在叫Moldbot，不过这个名字可能还会变。
I think this is essentially what they're building is this idea, which is now called Moldbot, which might be changing again.
它就是一个能替你办事的个人助手。
It's just like this personal agent that can go do stuff for you.
完全正确。
Totally.
所以你说的未来营销方式，就是这个世界里有这些小机器人和代理，能为你在双方都做事情。
So you're talking about the future of go to market is this world where there's these little bots and agents that are doing things for you both on on both sides.
当你观察如今你合作的那些表现良好的公司，尤其是那些AI驱动的公司时，它们在营销策略上有哪些真正有效的不同做法？
When you look at companies today that you work with that are doing well, that are especially AI driven companies, what are they doing differently in terms of go to market that is working really well?
老实说，今天唯一不同的地方，其实和过去一百年完全一样，只是他们把SCE或系统顾问改称为部署工程师了。
Honestly, the only thing that's different today, it's exactly the same as it's been for a hundred years, except they call their SCEs or their system consultants for deployed engineers.
其余的部分都是一样的。
The rest of it is the same.
我原本以为AI时代会完全不同。
I thought it would be totally different in AI.
我正在和这些公司合作。
I'm working with all these companies.
他们招聘的仍然是同一批人，执行着同样的企业销售流程。
They're hiring, like, all the same folks running the same enterprise sales processes.
所以至少在企业端，变化并没有那么大。
So it hasn't changed that much, at least on the enterprise side.
实际上并没有，我职业生涯的前十年是在一家叫PTC的公司度过的，那是一家企业销售机器。
It actually hasn't I spent the first ten years of my career at a company called PTC, which is like an enterprise sales machine.
自二十世纪九十年代以来，企业销售方式几乎没有改变。
Enterprise sales hasn't changed that much since the nineteen nineties.
好的。
Okay.
部署工程师这个术语现在非常流行。
And so for deployed engineer, very hot term.
他们的想法是，他们会与客户一起工作，帮助他们实施这个系统。
The idea there is they come work with the the cost the customer and help them implement this thing.
在本播客中，关于AI工具，这个话题已经多次出现。
And that that's come up a lot on this podcast just with AI tools.
这些工具很少是即插即用的。
Rarely are they just plug and play.
你不能只是简单地设置一个代理，就指望它能解决所有问题。
You can't you can't just, like, set up some agent that figures everything out.
这需要大量的入职培训和集成工作。
It takes a lot of onboarding and integration.
这和过去的销售工程师之类的工作真的有什么不同吗？
Is it actually a different thing at all other versus, like, sales engineering in the past, things like that?
或者它就是解决方案顾问、销售工程师。
Or is it a solutions consultant sales engineer.
他们是有技术背景的。
They're technical.
他们帮助你实现它。
They help you implement it.
他们连接你所有的系统。
They connect all your systems.
他们对其进行定制。
They customize it.
这不一样。
It's different.
我的意思是，你们是以不同的方式训练它，但不管怎样，我觉得这个术语没问题。
I mean, you're training it in a different way, but I well, anyway, I think the term is fine.
我之所以对此轻描淡写，是因为它看起来很相似，只是这个角色的名字不同而已。
I I I'm sort of being light on it because, boy, it looks similar except that role has a different name to it.
明白了。
Got it.
所以，我听到的建议是，干脆就继续推进这个想法，让员工帮助客户完成上线、实现成功并完成所有集成工作。
So if anything, the advice I'm hearing here is just lean into this, continue to lean into this idea of having your employees help the customer onboard, be successful, integrate all that stuff.
我认为最先发生变化的会是漏斗顶端——如何被发现，不再靠谷歌，而是要在这些平台中被找到。
I think the thing that will change first is the top of the funnel around getting found in instead of Google, you gotta get found in in in these.
是的。
Yeah.
AEO。
AEO.
是的。
Yeah.
这将会非常重要。
That's gonna be really important.
为了优化这一点，你构建网站的方式也会非常不同。
And the way you build your website is very different for that to optimize for it.
然后，我觉得你的首页也会完全不同。
And then your I think your homepage is totally different.
我觉得你应该直接针对一个用户画像进行对话，而不是让用户浏览你网站上的所有页面。
I think you land on an avatar and have a conversation with them versus you're going through all the pages on your site.
我觉得漏斗顶部即将发生很大变化。
I I think the top of the funnel is about to change a lot.
现在有人在这方面做得很好吗？这种用户画像的理念，是不是还只是
Is anyone doing this well yet, this idea of this avatar, is this just kind of a
未来？
the future?
HubSpot 就在这么做。
Working on HubSpot does it.
我们建了一个。
We built we built one.
它在运行中。
It's working.
好的。
Okay.
好的。
Okay.
我再问一个关于CO的问题，然后我就转到哈里根式话题。
Let me ask one more question around CO stuff, and then I wanna move on to Halliganisms.
好的。
Alright.
当CEO和以前有什么不同？
How is just being a CEO different than it was?
你已经做了差不多二十年了。
So you've been doing this for twenty ish years.
是的。
Yep.
十年前或二十年前当CEO和现在相比，最不同的地方是什么？
What's like most different about what it was like to be a CEO maybe ten, twenty years ago versus today?
我其中一个C，嗯。
One of my c yeah.
是温斯顿从哈维那里说的，大概一年前，我当时觉得这完全是胡说八道。
It's it's actually Winston from Harvey said this, like, a year ago, and I was like, that's bullshit.
但我现在觉得他其实说得对。
But I actually think he was right.
他说，你现在能做的事情多得多了。
He's like, you can just do a lot more.
我的意思是，现在有AI代理在帮你做事。
I mean, you've got AI agents doing stuff.
每个人的工作效率都更高了。
Everyone's more productive.
软件开发者的效率更高了。
The software developer's more productive.
以前需要一年才能完成的事情，现在两个月就能搞定。
Like, something that used to take you a year takes two months now.
因此，你能做的项目和事情的数量要多得多。
And so the amount of projects and the amount of stuff you can do is much, much more.
我觉得他说得对。
I think he's right.
我觉得这有点危险。
I think that's a little dangerous.
比如，你找到了自己的切入点市场，而且这个市场非常好，需求非常深。
Like, let's say you found your beachhead market, and that beachhead market is really good and it's very deep.
有很多工作要做。
There's a lot of work to do.
我认为对公司来说危险的是，他们过早地转向第二阶段，从而忽略了第一阶段。
I think what's dangerous for companies is they hop to that second act too quickly, and they lose focus on that first act.
这并不是一个完全完美的类比，但你可以想想OpenAI和ChatGPT，它们的消费者应用表现惊人，同时还在做大量其他事情。
And this isn't a completely perfect analogy, but, like, you think of OpenAI and ChetGPT and its consumer app is doing incredible, and they're doing lots and lots and lots and lots about other things.
然后Gemini发布了，它们又重新聚焦回核心业务。
And then Gemini comes out, and they've kind of focused back on the core.
我认为竞争非常激烈。
I think there's a lot of competition.
一切都进展得很快。
Everything is moving fast.
我认为人们能完成更多事情，而且这会影响方方面面。
I I do think people get more done, and I think that impacts everything.
以前的规划周期是一年。
Like, the planning cycles used to be a year.
我认为现在的规划周期是三个月。
I think the planning cycles now are three months long.
是的。
Yeah.
这是一个巨大的变化。
That's a big change.
我认为这给首席执行官们带来了更大的压力，要求他们更快、更明智地做决策。
I think it puts pressure on the CEOs to be faster and better decision makers.
比如，我想起HubSpot曾经有过一段时间进展缓慢，客户流失严重。
Like, I just think of times in HubSpot when things slowed down and there was churn.
这通常是我的责任。
It was usually my fault.
因为我的桌上堆着一些艰难的、不可逆的决策。
It was because there were some hard, you know, one way door type decisions on my desk.
也许每年我都会坐下来，打开或关上那扇单向门。
And, you know, maybe every year, I would sit down and I'd I'd open that one way door or close it.
这让大家一下子轻松了，我们的步伐也快了很多。
And it just freed everyone up, and we just started moving so much faster.
我认为人们现在需要比以往更快地做出这些决策，并迈过那些门槛。
I think people need to be making those decisions and walking through those doors much more quickly than they used to.
我觉得这是新的、不同的变化。
I think that's new and different different.
我曾经非常重视选择的灵活性。
I was someone who always valued optionality.
当你能如此快速地推进并尝试大量事物时，保持选择权其实会带来巨大的代价。
I think there's a massive tax and optionality when you can move this fast and try a lot of things.
所以我认为这份工作的性质正在发生巨大变化。
So I do think the job's changing a lot.
是的。
Yeah.
这种情况发生的原因有很多。
And there's so many reasons this is happening.
其中一个原因是技术每周都在发生变化，新的可能性不断涌现。
One is just technology is just like every week, there's a new shift in what is possible.
是的。
Yeah.
所以如果你花了好几个月的时间思考和规划，结果却发现这一切都白费了，因为变化实在太快了。
So if you're spending all these months thinking and planning, just like what a waste of time it ends up being because so much is changing.
我知道。
I know.
是的。
Yeah.
很难跟上步伐。
It's hard to keep up.
很难跟上步伐。
It's hard to keep up.
幸运的是，我们有一些很棒的播客可以听，以便及时了解最新动态。
Luckily, we got some sweet podcasts to check out, to keep up to date with what's happening.
当然，我们会链接到你的播客。
We'll link to yours, of course.
给你出个难题。
Here's a puzzle for you.
OpenAI、Cursor、Perplexity、Vercel、Platt 以及数百家其他成功公司有什么共同点？
What do OpenAI, Cursor, Perplexity, Vercel, Platt, and hundreds of other winning companies have in common?
答案是，它们都由今天的赞助商 WorkOS 驱动。
The answer is they're all powered by today's sponsor, WorkOS.
如果你在开发企业级软件，你一定经历过集成单点登录、SCIM、RBAC、审计日志以及其他大型客户所需功能的痛苦。
If you're building software enterprises, you've probably felt the pain of integrating single sign on, SCIM, RBAC, audit logs, and other features required by big customers.
WorkOS 将这些阻碍交易的难题转化为即插即用的 API，专为 B2B SaaS 构建了现代化的开发者平台。
WorkOS turns those deal blockers into drop in APIs with a modern developer platform built specifically for b to b SaaS.
无论你是正在争取首个企业客户的种子阶段初创公司，还是正在全球扩张的独角兽企业，WorkOS 都是最快实现企业级准备并释放增长的途径。
Whether you're a seed stage startup trying to land your first enterprise customer or a unicorn expanding globally, WorkOS is the fastest path to becoming enterprise ready and unlocking growth.
它们本质上就是企业级功能的 Stripe。
They're essentially Stripe for enterprise features.
访问 workos.com 开始使用，或者直接联系他们的 Slack 支持，那里有真正的工程师会迅速回答你的问题。
Visit workos.com to get started, or just hit up their Slack support where they have real engineers in there who answer your questions super fast.
WorkOS 让你能像顶尖团队一样构建，拥有出色的 API、详尽的文档和流畅的开发者体验。
WorkOS allows you to build like the best with delightful APIs, comprehensive docs, and a smooth developer experience.
立即访问 workos.com，让你的应用今天就具备企业级能力。
Go to workos.com to make your app enterprise ready today.
我们来聊聊哈尔吉安格言吧。
Let's talk halogenisms.
本质上，这些是你经常忍不住分享的智慧和建议。
Essentially, these are nuggets of wisdom and advice that you find yourself sharing often.
你已经在网上写了很多关于这些的见解。
You've written a bunch of these about a bunch of these online.
所以让我一一过一遍，然后总结一下这句哈尔吉安格言背后的建议和教训。
And so let me just go through them and then just share share kind of the synopsis of the advice and the lesson around this Halliganism.
第一条是：当你不得不吃一盘屎三明治时，别小口啃。
The first is when you have to eat a shit sandwich, don't nibble.
好的。
Okay.
这句话我完全是从谷歌的首席财务官露丝·波拉特那里借鉴来的。
Completely stole this from Ruth Porat, the CEO CFO of Google.
我在某处看到过她的这句话。
I saw her quote somewhere.
我当时就想，对，就是这样。
I'm like, that's it.
她把这个道理说得太完美了。
She's put put a perfect thing on it.
我来给你举个例子，我觉得在未来几年里这种情况会显现出来。
And I'll give you an example where I think this will play out over the next couple years.
我认为在未来几年里，估值会出现真正的回调，有些公司能配得上估值，但很多不行。
I think within the next couple years, there'll be a real retrenchment in valuations, and some some will live up to valuations a lot won't.
如果我看公开市场，现在它们非常紧缩。
And, like, if I look at the public markets, they're very tight right now.
这就像反泡沫。
It's like the anti bubble.
我再看看私人市场的估值。
I look at private valuations.
这简直就是一个真正的泡沫。
It's like a real bubble.
我认为未来某处终将迎来一次清算。
I think there's a reckoning somewhere down the road.
很多公司不得不大规模裁员。
And a lot of companies are gonna have to do layoffs a lot.
这从来都不是件好事。
It's never fun.
这通常是人生中最糟糕的事情，而人们总想把它做得完美。
It's usually the worst thing in the history of your life, and the temptation is to do it well.
不如现在就小规模地做一次，然后慢慢适应，再做一次，六个月后再来一次，接着又来一次。
Just do a little one now, and we'll grow into it, and then do another and then they do another one in six months and then another one.
我认为，包括这类事情在内，最好的做法就是直接撕掉创可贴，把坏消息告诉所有人。
I think with everything, including this type of thing, it's just rip the darn Band Aid off, tell everyone the bad news.
他们都是成年人。
They're adults.
他们能应对并完成任务。
They can handle it and get it done.
我认为人们都回避这一点。
And I think people avoid that.
我觉得露丝·波拉特给出的建议很好。
I I think that's good advice Ruth Ruth Porat's giving.
因为你迟早要传达坏消息。
Because you're gonna have bad news to deliver.
糟糕的事情会发生在你的公司。
Bad shit's gonna happen to your company.
即使现在看起来一切顺利，但奇怪的事情终究会发生，你必须去应对。
Even though it looks like it's going amazing right now, you're gonna weird stuff's gonna happen, and you're gonna have to deal with it.
我们在HubSpot就遇到过很多奇怪的事情，还有一位名叫迈克·克泽夫斯基的篮球教练。
And and we had a lot of weird stuff happen at hub HubSpot, and and there there's a basketball coach named, Mike Krzyzewski.
他是杜克大学的篮球教练，也是历史上胜场最多的大学篮球教练。
He's Duke's basketball coach, all time winningest college basketball coach ever.
如果你去看杜克大学的篮球比赛，你会听到场边的人大喊：下一回合。
If you go to a Duke basketball game, you can hear them yelling from the sidelines, next play.
下一回合。
Next play.
在大学篮球比赛中，当球员投篮不中、球砸在篮筐上弹出时，他们往往会过于激进地在后场防守，常常因此犯规或犯下更多错误。
And what's going on there is when a college basketball player is playing the game and takes a shot and clanks it off the rim and misses it, they have a strong tendency to go play overly aggressively on defense in the backcourt and many times compound their error by making a foul or something like that.
而他希望球员们在犯错后，立刻放下它，回到对方半场，重新执行战术。
And what he wants to do is people to make their error, forget about it, and move back down the other court side of the court and run the play.
所以我们曾在HubSpot的某些时期，把迈克·克泽泽夫斯基的照片放大成巨幅幻灯片，放在公司全体会议前，上面写着‘下一回合’，因为出现了非受迫性失误，我们必须面对它并继续前进。
And so we used we actually there were times in HubSpot's history where we had the Mike Krzyzewski's face on a huge slide in front of the company meeting saying next play because there was an unforced error, and we need to deal with it and kinda move on.
有没有哪件事让你印象深刻，值得讲一讲？
Is there a story of that that comes to mind that is, interesting and worth getting into?
这样的事有很多，但我记得2019年3月，我们经历了一次严重的系统中断，一整天都无法使用，这种事我们以前从没遇到过。
There's a lot of them, but I remember in 2000 it was the end it was the March in 2019, and we had a really bad outage, like all day, and we never really had one of those.
情况很糟糕。
And it was bad.
客户们很不满。
Customers were unhappy.
很多客户取消了服务。
A lot of customers canceled.
有很多客户对我大喊大叫。
I had a lot of customers yelling at me.
我记得那次公司会议。
And I remember that company meeting.
我在全体员工面前哭了。
I cried in front of the whole company.
我们不敢相信这种事会发生在我们身上。
We couldn't believe it happened to us.
我记得当时用了‘下一球’的幻灯片。
And I remember using the next the next play slide on that one.
是的。
Yeah.
我们在HubSpot犯了很多错误。
Most of the we made a lot of mistakes at HubSpot.
很多公司遭遇了糟糕的事情，而大多数都是自找的。
A lot of bad things happened to companies, and most of them are self inflicted.
很多情况都是老生常谈，比如公司更可能因为吃得太多而死，而不是消化不良。
And a lot of them are the old the old saw, like, companies are far more likely to die of of of overeating than indigestion.
通常，那些试图做太多事情的公司就会这样。
Usually, was who were trying to do too much.
我还没听过这个说法。
I haven't heard that version.
我总是听说，大多数公司是自杀而非他杀。
I've always heard most companies die of suicide versus homicide.
消化不良。
Indigestion.
这也对。
That's true too.
天啊。
Oh, man.
好吧。
Okay.
接下来，卤素症。
So, next, halogenism.
不要浪费一场好危机。
Never waste a good crisis.
这是人们常听到的一句话。
That's something that people hear.
我很好奇，这里的教训到底是什么？
I'm curious just just kinda like what's the what's the lesson here?
然后，有没有一个例子能说明你从中学到了这些教训？
And then is there an example of this with that that where you learn those lessons?
我接着说。
I'll just follow on.
HuffPike 中发生的大多数好事都源于危机，因为我们通常会采取非常严厉的措施来解决问题，确保不会再犯同样的错误。
Most of the good things that happened in HuffPike came out of a crisis because we would take, you know, pretty drastic measures to fix it and make sure we didn't do the same thing again.
因此，在这个特定案例中，我们彻底重新思考了软件的部署方式，以及如何以一种极其健康的方式开发软件。
And so in this particular case, we really rethought how we deployed software, how we thought about making software in a way that was incredibly healthy.
而且，说实话，自从那以后我们再也没有发生过严重的宕机。
And, I mean, we we haven't had a serious outage since.
质量也好了很多。
The quality is much better.
关于 HubSpot，有一个有趣的事情是我们最初是一家营销软件公司，后来进行了转型。
And it kind of an interesting thing with HubSpot is we started as a marketing software company, and we pivoted.
当时 Salesforce 进入了我们的市场。
We had Salesforce kinda came into our market.
我们转向了 CRM 领域。
We pivoted in CRM.
如果你们的营销软件宕机了，比如工作流中出现了 bug，那确实很糟糕，但你还能挺过去。
And one thing that we if if your marketing software goes down, like, your workflow if there's a bug in the workflows or something like that, it's bad, but you survive it.
你等一会儿。
You wait a little bit.
如果你的CRM系统在季度最后一天宕机，会严重影响客户开展业务的能力。
If your CRM goes down, particularly the last day of the quarter, you're really impacting your customer's ability to do business.
因此，这让我们经历了一次心态上的转变，我们才真正意识到自己对客户有多重要。
So that was like a mindset shift that we hadn't quite come to terms with of how important we were to our customers.
于是，我们根据这次危机做了大量调整。
And so we made a lot of changes based on that crisis.
你知道，好的事情往往源于危机，通常危机之后会带来非常好的结果。
You know, good things come out of cry usually very good things come out of crises.
所以这里面有一个教训。
So there's a lesson there.
有什么地方出问题了。
Something's going wrong.
这仅仅是过度纠正吗？
Is it just like overcorrect?
把它当作一种方式
Like, use this as a way
我们总是过度纠正。
to We always overcorrected.
是的。
Yeah.
我们几乎是有意地把钟摆大幅摆向另一端。
Swung the we almost we purposely swung the pendulum hard the other way.
这与第一点有关：如果你在吃一个糟糕的三明治，别小口啃。
Which connects to the first, halogenism of, if you're eating a shit sandwich, don't nibble.
简直就像是要彻底行动，甚至走得更远。
Just it's almost like go all the way, go even further.
对。
Yes.
让每个人都能清楚地看到发生了什么。
Make it really obvious to everyone what's going on.
好的。
Okay.
另一个极端主义。
Another halogenism.
如果你想杀死一株植物，就让两个人给它浇水。
If you wanna kill a plant, have two people water it.
我喜欢这个说法。
I love this one.
这非常真实。
It's very true.
假设，Lenny，你为办公室买了一株漂亮的新植物，然后你去了特克斯和凯科斯群岛度假一个月，因为你的AI助手在替你做播客。
Let's say, Lenny, you bought a new beautiful plant for your office, and then you went away for a month to Trix And Caicos because your AI agent's doing your podcast.
然后你问你的两个朋友，嘿。
And you ask two of your friends, hey.
你们能帮我给我的植物浇浇水吗？
Can you would you mind watering my plant?
而关于这株植物，只有两种可能的结果。
And there's one of two outcomes what happened to the plant.
这株植物要么被浇太多水而死，要么完全没浇水而死。
The plant would either be overwatered and die or not watered at all and die.
每个在成人组里的首席执行官都经历过这种情况，他们对DRI（直接负责人）非常虔诚。
And every CEO in the adults table has gone through this, and they are religious about the DRI.
就像在儿童组里，人人都在谈论DRI，但一旦进入成人组，人们就会对它产生近乎宗教般的执着。
Like, everyone talks about DRI in the in the kids table, but once it gets to the adults table, like, people get deep religion on it.
我觉得这很有道理。
And and I think it makes sense.
当你还小，处于创业阶段时，所有人都在同一个房间里。
Like, when you're small and you're in startup mode, everyone's in the room.
每个人都清楚正在发生什么。
Everyone knows exactly what's going on.
所以，假设你正在为一个大客户运行一个试点项目。
So let's say you're running a pilot project with a big account.
你去执行这个试点项目。
You run that pilot project.
所有人都步调一致，销售、服务、开发人员，每个人都清楚状况，你们一起出去执行并做得很好。
Everyone's on the same page, salesperson, service person, developer, everyone's on the same page, and you go out and do it and you execute it well.
当你扩大规模时，你会组建销售团队、前线工程师团队、产品管理团队，还有一些开发人员在处理它。
When you get it scale, you get a sales organization, you get forward deployed engineer organization, you get product management organization, you get some developers working
在做这件事。
on it.
每个人都变得各自为政。
Everyone's kinda separate.
没人真正了解其他部门在做什么。
No one knows really what's going on in the other departments.
所以，如果你想打造一个高效的试点流程，并且因为你在扩张而需要重新思考它。
And so let's say you wanna really have a good pilot process, and you wanna rethink it because you're scaling.
在公司规模化后，所有重要的事情都是跨职能发生的，你需要一个有影响力的人来主导它。
Everything important happens cross functionally inside a company at scale, and you need someone powerful, to own it.
假设这是一个销售人员。
So let's say it's a salesperson.
他们需要有权力去告诉其他部门的人该做什么，即使他们并不直接管理这些部门。
They need the power to, like, tell people in other divisions what to do even if they don't own it.
我接触过的每一位CEO几乎都对DRI理念非常执着，但直到你达到一定规模时，这个问题才会显现出来。
So almost every CEO I deal with is is like a zealot on the DRI idea, and it doesn't bite you until you get to some sort of scale.
为了明确这一点，我的建议是：一个人对某个目标、指标或你希望实现的结果负责，而不是感觉好像有两个人在共同负责。
And to be super clear about that advice here, it's one person is responsible for a goal, a metric, some outcome you want versus, it may feel like, okay, we have two people on this.
这会很棒。
It'll be awesome.
他们会一起合作。
They'll work together.
我的建议是，这种方式行不通。
Your advice here is that doesn't work.
委员会从来都无效。
Committees never work.
是的
Yes.
对
Yep.
对
Yep.
是的
Yes.
DRI指的是直接负责人。
It's in DRI's directly responsible individual.
嗯哼
Mhmm.
我一直以来的理解是，只要有人对某件事负全责，他们就会更有动力去完成，而不是把责任、收益和风险都分散开。
The way I always, thought about this is just having someone's ass on the line for something, makes them so motivated to get it done versus, like, spreading, you know, the responsibility and the up and the upside and the downside.
这根本行不通。
It just doesn't work.
我完全同意你的观点。
I totally agree with you.
太棒了。
Awesome.
好的。
Okay.
另一个比喻，我不知道你是不是这么讲的。
Another allegorism, I don't know if you put it this way.
在我看来，根本没有什么万能解法。
The way I think about it is this idea of there's no such thing as a silver bullet.
要完成一件事，真的需要很多普通努力的积累。
There just it just takes a lot of lead bullets to get something done.
我觉得你描述的方式是，总是前进一步，后退两步。
I think the way you wrote about it is it's always like one step forward, two steps back.
谈谈你在这方面的建议吧。
Talk about your advice there.
是的
Yeah.
我以前一直错误地认为，我们只要招一个人、找一个投资者、办一场活动或发布一个产品，就会成为一剂灵丹妙药——但我错了。
I always thought incorrectly that we would have one hire or one investor or one event or one product release that would, I was wrong about this, but it'd be a silver bullet.
而在HubSpot内部，从外面看，它似乎在很长一段时间里平稳地持续向上增长。
And and, like, the reality inside the HubSpot machine, the way it felt to me, it looks from the outside, like, over a long time up into the right and smooth.
但内部却是前进两步、后退一步，再前进两步、后退一步，再前进两步、后退一步。
But inside, it was two steps forward, one step back, two steps forward, one step back, two steps forward, one step back.
很多时候，正是危机导致了后退的那一步。
And a lot of times, it was a crisis that caused that step back.
所以我们根本没有那种所谓的灵丹妙药。
So we just didn't have that.
作为创始人兼CEO，当你二十多岁的时候，根本没有人能救你。
I the thing about being a founder CEO is there's no one especially when you're you're in your twenties, there's no one there to rescue you.
你的父母也不会来救你。
Your parents aren't gonna rescue you.
你的风险投资人不会救你。
Your VC is not gonna rescue you.
你的老师、论文导师，你基本上只能靠自己，得自己想办法。
Your teacher, your thesis adviser, you're kinda on your own, and you gotta figure it out.
当你遇到第一次危机时，这种感觉就会袭来。
And that kinda hits you when you hit your first crisis.
这全靠你自己。
Like, it's on you.
你可以得到一些帮助，但责任在你身上。
You can get some help, but it's on you.
有时候，如果他们运气好，在红杉资本，会有别人站在你这边。
Sometimes they have, you in their corner if they're lucky at Sequoia.
是的。
Yeah.
很多时候，这并不能怪谁。
Can't fault it oftentimes.
我可以做他们倾诉的肩膀，也可以给他们建议，但最终还是要靠他们自己。
I can be the shoulder they cry on, and I can give them advice, but it's still on them.
你觉得是不是太多人一有想法就想着创业？比如有人来找你，说‘布莱恩，我该不该创业？’
Do you feel like too many people start companies just like like, when someone comes to you like, hey, Brian, should I start should I start a company?
我有个点子。
I have this idea.
你是不是经常直接说‘不’？
Do you often just like, no.
你根本不知道自己会陷入什么样的境地。
You don't have no idea what you're getting into.
这会比你想象的痛苦得多。
This is gonna be much more painful.
我听说黄仁勋说过，如果重来一次，他不会创办英伟达。
I heard Jensen Huang say that, like, I wouldn't start an Nvidia if I had it to do over.
如果有人问我这个问题，我会说，我会再创办一次HubSpot。
I that if someone asked me that question, I would start HubSpot over.
这非常艰难。
It was very hard.
付出了很多牺牲。
There were a lot of sacrifices.
一点也不光彩。
It wasn't glamorous at all.
但归根结底，我对此感到无比自豪。
But in the end of the day, I'm incredibly proud of it.
而且你知道，等我临终时，我会回望这段经历，并真正享受它。
And, you know, you know, on my deathbed, I'm gonna look back and be and really enjoy it.
达赖喇嘛有个很好的说法，就是过好这一生，这样在临终时也能安然无悔。
And the Dalai Lama's got a good expression, like, live a good life so you can live it again on your deathbed.
我真的很高兴他坚持下来了。
And I'm really glad he did it.
但我确实经常劝很多创业者打消这个念头。
But I do talk a lot of a lot of founders out of it.
这种痴迷是真实的。
Like, the obsession is real.
你必须深深着迷。
It's it's you have to be deeply obsessed.
我接触的这些创始人和CEO们，人们常说996，但其实远不止如此。
And all these all these founders and CEOs I talk to I mean, pop people talk about 996.
这远远超过996。
It's way more than that.
创始人是每周七天都在工作。
I mean, the founders are seven days a week.
他们始终在线。
They're always on.
周日晚上我还会收到他们的短信。
I text from them on Sunday nights.
这是全身心投入。
It's full contact.
我认为，特别是现在，人们只是看到了这场巨大的平台变革和巨大的机遇。
And I think what's going on there particularly now is people just see this massive platform change, massive opportunity.
他们不想浪费这个机会。
They don't wanna waste the opportunity.
所以我觉得这种心态是正确的。
So I think that mindset's right.
但如今的人们比我们那一代要更加拼命。
But people today are much more much more hardcore than they were in my year.
比如，我工作得很努力。
Like, I worked hard.
我整个期间每周工作六十到七十个小时。
I was probably I was sixty to seventy wee hours a week for the entire time.
从没真正停下来过，但那时我就这么想的。
Never really turned it off, but that's kinda how I thought about it.
现在不一样了。
It's different now.
人们现在更加专注，我认为埃隆激励了像这样的人
People are much more focused, and I think Elon's inspired people like
我早年也创办过一家初创公司，但远没有HubSpot那么成功。
I had a starter back in the day, nowhere near as successful as HubSpot.
但我当时的想法是，让我倾尽所有，看看自己能做成什么。
But the way I thought about it is, let me just give it everything I have and see what I can do.
这可不是一次尝试。
This isn't a shot.
这是我的机会。
This is my chance.
让我全力以赴。
Let me just give it all.
别管什么平衡了。
Like, forget balance.
先连续七天全身心投入，拼一把。
Just go for it seven days a week for a while.
就是，你知道的，然后你再慢慢减负。
It's just, you know, and then you scale back.
而且这种全力以赴的感觉真的特别有力量。
And and it's just like such an empowering thing to do for a while.
就试试看吧。
Just like, let me just try.
我会全力以赴，但这不会是永远的。
I'll give it my this won't be forever.
是的。
Yep.
我知道你写过关于这个的话题，对于CEO来说，所谓的平衡根本不需要——如果你想取得非凡的成功的话。
And I know you've written about this, just like balance for a CEO is not You should not have work balance if you want to be incredibly successful.
我不知道这是否总是对的，但问题是，你怎么跟创业者们说这个呢？
I don't know if that's always true, but just what's I don't know how do you talk about that to founders?
我认识的那些创业者，没有一个是有工作生活平衡的。
I don't know any of the founders I work with that have work life balance.
顺便说一下，我不推荐这样做。
By the way, this is not something I recommend.
我没有过。
I didn't have it.
我不认为我的联合创始人达尔梅什有过。
I don't think my cofounder, Dharmesh, had it.
我认识的唯一一个CEO，他在这方面很特别，就是Clay的卡里姆。
None of the c the only c I CEO I know, and he's he's unusual in this way, is Kareem from Clay.
他说：不，不行。
He's like, nope.
你需要平衡。
You need balance.
要休息周末。
Take the weekends.
他的思维方式完全不同。
Like, he's got a different mindset.
我打算让他来我的播客聊聊他的心态，但他算是个异类。
I'm gonna have him on my pod to to talk about his mindset, but he's sort of the outlier.
其他所有人都非常、非常痴迷，几乎没什么生活可言。
Everyone else is really, really obsessed, and they really don't have much of a life.
他们花了很长时间才找到产品市场契合点。
It did take them a long time to find product market fit.
我喜欢这一点。
I like that.
我们确实是免费的AI。
We were definitely free AI.
并没有花更长时间。
It did take no longer.
我想知道这是否有相关性，但结果还不错。
I wonder if there's a correlation, but it did work out.
哦，太好了。
Oh, great.
所以这是一个很好的教训。
So it is a it is a good lesson.
好的。
Okay.
这里还有几个。
A few more here.
其中一个是一个数学公式。
One is, it's a math formula.
企业价值大于总价值，总价值大于最小企业价值。
EV is greater than TV is greater than MEV.
那是什么？
What is that?
好的。
Okay.
EV 是企业价值。
EV is enterprise value.
TV 是你团队的价值。
TV is your team's value.
MEV 是你的价值。
MEV is your value.
当 HubSpot 不断扩张时，我们有很多担任不同角色的副总裁，他们开始管理规模相当大的团队。
And as HubSpot was scaling, and we had a lot of people who were VPs in different roles, and they started to get good sized organizations.
他们出问题的地方在于没有考虑 MEV，而是只关注 TV 超过 EV。
Where they would fall down was they didn't solve for MEVY, but they'd solve for TV over EV.
这一切都是为了他们自己的团队。
It's all for their own team.
比如说，他们负责销售。
So let's say they ran sales.
假设我只想让成交额尽可能高，因为我的薪酬与成交额挂钩，而服务团队可以处理我制造的所有后续问题。
Let's say, I just want bookings to be as high as possible because get paid on bookings, and the service team can handle all the downstream problems I created.
市场到销售。
Marketing to sales.
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