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欢迎收听伦敦政治经济学院举办的LSE活动播客。
Welcome to the LSE events podcast by the London School of Economics and Political Science.
准备好聆听社会科学领域最具国际影响力的专家学者们的见解。
Get ready to hear from some of the most influential international figures in the social sciences.
晚上好。
Good evening.
能听清楚我说话吗？
Can you hear me okay?
嗯，很好。
Yeah, that's great.
我想欢迎各位今晚来到LSE参加本次讲座。
I want to welcome everyone to LSE for this evening's lecture.
我是彼得·特里波维茨。
My name's Peter Tribowitz.
我是国际关系系教授，同时担任今晚活动主办方法伦美国中心主任一职。
I'm a professor in the International Relations Department and the director of the Fallon United States Center, which is hosting tonight's event.
今晚是我们年度系列讲座《美国在世界舞台上的角色变化》的第三场。
So tonight is the third in our yearlong series entitled America's Changing Role in the World.
本系列讲座基于这样的前提：美国正在对其外交政策、目标及优先事项进行某种程度的反思，其结果充满不确定性。
The lecture series is premised on the idea, that America is having, something of a rethink about its foreign policy, its purposes, its foreign policy purposes and priorities, which is very uncertain, the outcome of which is very uncertain.
为了帮助我们更好地理解这一现象及其国际影响，我们邀请了来自美国、欧洲和亚洲的多位外交政策专家参与讨论。我非常高兴地欢迎拉贾·马汉重返LSE，他是德里战略与国防研究委员会的杰出研究员，同时兼任新加坡国立大学南亚研究所的客座研究教授。
So to help us get some perspective on this, what's happening and what it might mean internationally, we decided to bring in a series of foreign policy experts from The United States, from Europe, from Asia to join the discussion, and I'm very pleased to welcome back to LSE Raja Mahan, a distinguished fellow at the Council on Strategic and Defense Research in Delhi and a visiting research professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore.
除了在CSDR和NUS的职务外，拉贾还身兼数职。
Raja wears many, hats in addition to his roles at CSDR and NUS.
他是《外交政策》杂志和《印度快报》的专栏作家，曾任卡内基印度中心和德里亚洲协会政策研究所创始主任，印度国家安全委员会前成员，并担任过美国国会图书馆亨利·基辛格外交政策讲席教授。
He is a columnist for Foreign Policy, Magazine and Indian Express, was a founding director of Carnegie India and the Asia Society Policy Institute in Delhi, former member of India's National Security Board, and the Henry Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy at US Library of Congress.
他在印度外交安全政策、亚洲地缘政治、先进技术全球治理等领域著述颇丰。
He's published widely on India's foreign and security policy, Asian geopolitics, global governance of advanced technologies.
他出版过众多著作。
He has a number of books.
这本名为《印度与亚洲再平衡》是他的最新作品。
This is the most recent one that, is called India and the, rebalancing of Asia.
我们非常渴望了解拉贾对特朗普外交政策的看法，以及‘美国优先’对欧亚大陆意味着什么，他非常友好地同意来这里就此进行讨论。
We were very keen to get Raja's perspective on what Trump's foreign policy, what America first meant for, Eurasia, and he was very kind to agree to come here and talk about it.
拉贾，很高兴你能再次来到伦敦政治经济学院。
Raja, it's great to have you back here at LSE.
今晚的安排是这样的。
Here's the drill for tonight.
拉贾会先进行一段时间的演讲，然后我们将转向讨论环节。
So Raja will lecture for a while, then we will turn, move towards discussion.
我可能会向他提出几个问题，之后会开放给大家提问。
I'll probably put a few questions to him, then we'll open it up to all of you.
我会尽力让尽可能多的问题得到解答。
I will do my level best to get in as many questions as possible.
在线的观众只需使用问答功能即可参与。
For those of you online, you just need to use the Q and A function.
我不知道为什么我要往上看。
I don't know why I'm looking up there.
使用问答功能时，请务必同时注明您的姓名和所属机构。
The Q and A function, and just make sure you put your name and affiliation, in as well.
现场观众请举手示意，工作人员会递上麦克风。
And for those of you here in the theater, just raise your hand and they'll come around with a microphone.
请将手机调至静音模式，本次活动正在进行录音。
If you haven't put your cellphone, your mobile on silent, please do that now since this is being recorded.
请大家和我一起热烈欢迎拉贾·马汉先生。
And please join me in giving Raja Mahan a very warm LSE welcome.
谢谢。
Thank you.
感谢特鲁博维奇教授如此热情的介绍。
Thank you, Professor Trubowicz for that generous introduction.
今晚能与各位在伦敦政治经济学院相聚，我感到非常荣幸。
It's wonderful to be here this evening with all of you at the London School of Economics.
我看到现场有很多老朋友，也期待结识更多新朋友。
I see a lot of friends here and hopefully we'll make some more.
我确信大家现在谈论的都是美国和美国优先，那么为什么还要再举办一场讲座呢？
I'm sure everyone is only talking about America and America first, so why another lecture?
我认为彼得已经回答了这个问题——距离或许能带来某种清晰度，或者说至少提供了一个视角。因为特朗普是个极具争议性的人物，无论在美国还是大洋彼岸，分歧都如此深刻。
I think Peter answered that question, which is maybe distance gives you some clarity in terms of, or at least a perspective, because Trump is such a polarizing figure that whether it is in The United States or across across the pond, it is so intensely divided.
我的意思是，这些争论几乎已经演变成个人化的攻击了。
I mean, it's almost personalized the arguments that have become.
对我们这些人来说——与美国不同，因为那是他们的国家，他们自然会争论不休；而美国、欧洲和英国是盟友关系，至少我们这么认为，所以他们有理由就此展开辩论。
For those of us, because unlike the Americans, because it's their country, so they're going to argue about it, and US, Europe, and UK are allies, so they have some influence, at least we think so, and so they have a reason to be argumentative on that.
对于我们这些身处跨大西洋世界之外的人来说，我认为我们根本无法影响美国的决策。
For those of us who are outside the Transatlantic world, we I mean, I believe that we have no influence on what America does.
我们不得不适应美国的所作所为，因为美国是头号强国。
We we have to adapt to what America does because America is number one power.
因此我认为从这个角度出发，保持距离观察这个问题，能比那些深陷当今美欧激烈争论中的人们看得更客观些，也更具有历史视角。
So therefore, I think from that perspective, looking at this from a distance, and see it a little more objectively and a little more historically than those who are involved in the heat of the argument today within The US and across the Atlantic.
我必须说明，选择这周举办讲座并非刻意安排——毕竟乌克兰和谈正处在风口浪尖。
I must tell you the timing was not planned for this week when you have Ukraine peace talks in the front and center.
台湾问题也重新回到了新闻视野中。
You also have the Taiwan question back in the news.
因此，特朗普与俄罗斯和中国的关系，我认为无论走向如何，都将从根本上重新调整欧洲和亚洲的政治关系，或者更广泛地说，欧亚大陆的格局。
So the Trump's relationship with Russia and China, I think today promise whichever way they go to fundamentally reorder the relationships, the politics of Europe and Asia, or more broadly you can say, Eurasia.
所以我认为，这正是我要阐述的核心前提——我们正处于美国...
So I think that is the core assumption of what I'm going to say that we are today at a phase in The U.
（对世界）
S.
的接触阶段，这将对欧亚地区产生重大影响。接下来我将尝试探讨其中部分影响。
Engagement with the world, which will have significant consequences for the Eurasian region, and I think what I'll try and do is explore some of that.
谈及欧亚大陆时，不得不提到哈尔福德·麦金德——但愿他尚未被学界除名——这位伦敦政治经济学院第二任院长。
I think when we talk about Eurasia, I think Halford Mackinder, I hope you not cancelled him out, Halford Mackinder was the second director of the London School of Economics.
通常人们不会将麦金德与悉尼·韦布夫妇联系起来，
Normally, you don't associate Mackinder with Sydney and Beatrice Webb.
他虽非费边社成员，但确为第二任院长。他将地理学引入政治经济学研究的贡献，虽迟但终成显学——如今他不仅是地缘政治思想家，更成为时髦的地缘经济学先驱。
He's not a member of the Fabian Society, but the fact is he was the second director, and I think his contribution in bringing geography into the study of politics and economics, Late, of course, he is well known as a geopolitical thinker, but he is now geoeconomics too, he is currently in fashion.
因此我认为，当我们今天谈论欧亚大陆时，我指的是萨哈尔·福特所论述的那个区域——心脏地带与内新月地带，他称之为内新月，而斯皮克曼则称之为边缘地带。
So I think so when today we talk about Eurasia, I mean, I think it's really the region that Sahal Ford talked about, the heartland and the inner crescent, what he called inner crescent, what Spickman calls the Rimlands.
所以在我看来，当今这个地区将真正见证特朗普行动带来的最大影响。
So it is that region today, I think, is really to see the biggest consequences of what, Trump does.
我认为还存在另一个与麦金德世界相似的时期，那就是二十世纪初。
I think there's also another parallel to a MacKinder's world that's early twentieth century.
正如当下，关于西方衰落的讨论甚嚣尘上，人们对西方发展前景深感悲观，恐惧其他大国的崛起及其可能对西方历史主导地位造成的冲击。
Then as of now, I think there's a lot of talk about the decline of the West, a sense of profound pessimism in terms of where the West is going, the fear of the other powers rising and what they might do to the historic, primacy of the of the West.
实际上我们面临的是：无论西方是否在衰落，特朗普都被视为加速这一衰落进程的推手。
So what what we have is actually Trump, whether the West is declining or not, Trump is seen as accelerating that decline.
或许有人曾以为西方会优雅地衰落。
Some people might have thought the West will decline elegantly.
但在特朗普任内，这种衰落绝非优雅，而是充满混乱与狼藉。
Certainly, under Trump, it's not going to be an elegant decline, but it's going to be a lot of confusion, a lot of mess.
这种局面将如何自我调适，我们拭目以待。
How this sorts itself out is something we're going to we're going to see.
但我认为关键在于美国内部的重新定位，其国内政治及对世界的态度将对欧亚大陆产生重大影响，而欧亚大陆被普遍视为国际政治和地缘政治的主要舞台。
But I think the the key point is the internal reorientation of The United States, its domestic politics, and its approach to the world will have significant bearing on Eurasia, which widely seen as the principal arena, for international, politics and geopolitics.
接下来半小时里，我打算先剖析构成'美国优先'意识形态的诸多要素，再审视这一意识形态的内在矛盾及其现实影响。
What I thought I'll do in the next half an hour or so is really one, to look at the many strands that constitute the America First ideology, then look at some of the contradictions of that ideology and how that is playing out.
其次，探讨欧亚大陆概念的演变及其在当今时代的重要性。
Two, look at the idea of Eurasia and how that has come about and why it's important today.
最后，分析'美国优先'政策对欧亚地缘政治格局造成的后果。
And then three, look at the consequence of America First for the Eurasian geopolitical situation.
我要阐述的核心观点是，美国优先政策正在欧洲和亚洲引发深度动荡，其结果——尽管这一点可以商榷——很可能是欧亚之间必然形成更紧密的相互联系，或者说欧亚地区本身将演变成一个更具竞争性但又更趋融合的格局。
The central claim that I'll make is that America First policies are producing deep turbulence within Europe and Asia, and the outcome of that is really, we can argue about this, the deeper interconnections that are bound to emerge between Europe and Asia or the Eurasian theater itself emerging into more contested but more fused structure.
这听起来可能是个极其新颖的概念——欧洲与亚洲的融合。
Now this might sound like a radically new idea, Europe and Asia coming together.
但若回溯到殖民时代，当美国人还远在天边时，欧洲殖民者掌控亚洲，以及两大洲的整合，在当时是无人质疑的常态。
But if we go back to the colonial era, when Americans are far away, Europeans were the colonialists, that no one thought a second thing about Europe European colonialists taking over Asia and the integration between the two.
毕竟在二战期间，我们印度就曾派出200万士兵参战，而一战时也有100万印度士兵。
After all, Indians, we had 2,000,000 soldiers in the second World War, but 1,000,000 in the first World War.
因此当我们讨论欧洲内部冲突时，殖民地无论好坏都发挥了巨大作用。
So when we talk about the intra European conflicts, the colonies had a great role, good or bad.
所以欧亚两洲融合的理念本是自然的，但因其间存在霸权关系，这种融合并未以平等形式呈现。
So this idea of the integration between the two continents was natural, but but it was not seen in that form because it was a hegemonic relationship between Europe and Asia.
但如今亚洲部分地区的快速崛起意味着，美国任何战略调整（若非收缩）都将重新激活这片欧亚大陆核心板块的互动关系，其相互关联性将变得至关重要。
But today, I think parts of Asia have risen risen very rapidly, and you're going to see the consequence of any American rearrangement, if not retrenchment, would be bringing back the key entities of this large Eurasian landmass, how they relate to each other then becomes very, very important.
现在让我们进入第一部分，剖析'美国优先'的意识形态内核及其内在矛盾。
So let me go into the first section and look at what is the ideology of America first and what are its contradictions.
虽然'美国优先'常被视为特朗普的专属标签，但我们知道它在美国历史中渊源深厚——最近可追溯到上世纪三四十年代试图阻止美国参战的'美国优先运动'。
Now often, I mean, I think the idea of America first, of course, is seen as specifically something Trump has brought about, but of course, we know that it has a deep tradition within the American history, not most recently the America first movement of the nineteen thirties and forties, which wanted to prevent America from getting into the second world war.
但我认为这一思想的根基要深远得多。
But I think this idea itself is much much deeper.
它可追溯至乔治·华盛顿的首次演说，当时他就提出'应避免卷入盟约纠缠'，不应被拖入全球冲突。
It goes back to George Washington, when his first speech, where he says, look, we should avoid entangling alliances, or we should not get drawn into the conflicts of the whole world.
自华盛顿以降，这种植根于开国元勋的理念始终存在：美国应成为'山巅闪耀之城'，通过榜样引领世界，而非强行将世界改造成自己的模样。
And along after George Washington as well, this notion, which goes back to the founding fathers, that America must be a shining city on a hill as a beacon for the rest of the world, not one that is engaged directly, that that America should lead by example rather than making the rest of the world in its own image.
但我认为这两者之间的张力，当然人们可以反过来解读。
But I think the tension between the two and of course, people can flip it around.
同样的人可以用'山巅之城'的比喻来主张我们应该在世界上做更多事情。
The same people can use the shining city metaphor to actually say, let's do more things in the world.
但我认为这种张力存在于一个对自身民主原则高度自觉的共和国理念，与一个想要建立全球秩序并担任领导角色的帝国野心之间。
But I think this tension between the idea of a republic, acutely conscious of its own democratic principles, and an empire which wants to establish a global order and take the leadership role.
我认为这两种理念始终存在争议。
I think these two notions have always been contested.
它们从未真正达成和解，我认为我们在不同时期反复见证这一现象。
They've never been fully reconciled, and I think we see this play again and again different different points of time.
基于这一背景，我将提出关于'美国优先'的四个主要主题。
So given that background, I would suggest four broad themes about the America first.
首先是当然是对全球化的否定。
One is the, of course, the repudiation of globalization.
特朗普认为全球化掏空了美国的工业基础，壮大了中国、墨西哥等许多国家，削弱了美国中产阶级，美国被全球主义精英主导的全球化政策所掠夺，这是核心论点。
Trump argues that globalization hollowed out America's industrial base, empowered China, Mexico, and a whole lot of other countries, weakened American middle class, and America was robbed by the policies of globalization led by a globalist elite, so which is the core argument.
因此，需要更多的经济民族主义、更高关税、更严格的科技流动管控。
So therefore, you need more economic nationalism, more tariffs, more reassuring, tighter controls over technology flows.
所有这些现在都成为恢复美国昔日辉煌的手段。
All these now become ways of restoring America to its old glory.
我指的是，至少这是为关税政策辩护的理由。
I mean, at least that is the case that is being made for the tariffs.
但这显然无关乎其能否成功。
But this is clearly whether this succeeds or not.
本届政府上任仅九到十个月，我们就清晰地看到这期间发生的转变——背离了二战结束后我们习以为常的开放市场模式，也不同于1990年后世贸组织成立时的格局。
It was only nine months or ten months into this administration that we're going to see quite clearly that what's happened in the last nine to ten months is a break from the open markets, the kind that we got used to at the end of the second world war and in 1990 and beyond when the WTO got formed.
因此，由于美国的政策导向，全球经济正在发生根本性变革。
So so the global economy as a result of American policies is in fundamental change.
但对现实主义者而言，若规则不服务于头号经济体，那么它就不符合基本假设——世贸组织并非摩西法典。
But then for a realist, if the principles don't work for the number one economy, a rule that's not contrary to the assumption, w two was not Moses' code.
它并非一成不变。
It's not set in stone.
这是由美国设计的。
It was devised by The US.
如果对美国不利，他们很乐意重写规则。
If it doesn't work for The US, it's quite happy to rewrite it.
当所有人都认为美国对进口的依赖是软肋时，特朗普却将其转化为优势，使其成为迫使全球重新谈判美贸易条款的主要杠杆。
The fact that it has when everyone thought America's dependence on imports was a vulnerability, what Trump has done is to flip it, make it the principal leverage to force renegotiation with the rest of the world on the terms of trade between US and the rest of the world.
这种做法最终是否会奏效，或是引发国内反弹——我们已经看到部分影响开始显现。
Whether this will actually pan out in that form or the domestic reaction, we're seeing some of it already unfold.
我们将拭目以待其最终效果。
We're going to see whether that will work out or not.
但核心论调确实正在对世界其他地区产生影响。
But the fact is the core arguments that were made are having effects on the on the rest of the world.
其次，我认为'美国优先'运动强调的原则是：国家不是经济效率的单位。
Second, I think, the principle which he which the America First Movement emphasizes, countries are not units of economic efficiency.
国家归根结底是共同体。
Countries in the end are communities.
因此，这种认为华尔街精英或伦敦金融城精英将决定资本最佳利益的观点——即经济效率应成为组织国家间关系的机制——是不可取的。
Therefore, this notion that the Wall Street elites or the city of London elites will decide the best interest of capital are the ones, so therefore economic efficiency becomes the mechanism for organizing relationships between states.
这种观点不可接受。如果美国是一个共同体而非单纯的经济效率单位，那么俄亥俄州、美国热线或铁锈地带发生的事就至关重要。如何看待全球化因此成为极其重要的问题，而他们正是高效动员了这一点——看看2016、2020和2024年三次大选便知。
That that is not acceptable, and that what happens in Ohio, what happens in the American hotline or the Rust Belt, that if America is a community as opposed to mere unit of economic efficiency, then the question of how you think about globalization becomes a very, very important one, and I think this is what they mobilized with great efficiency and one if you see last three elections, 2016, 2020, and 2024.
在这些选举中，这一论点都引发共鸣，我认为这正是将特朗普推向权力巅峰的核心机制。
In all these, this argument had a resonance, and I think was the principle, mechanism to push Trump to Trump to power.
此外，我认为伴随国家即共同体理念的，是特朗普对主权的新强调。
There's also, I think, along with the idea of a nations or communities, a new emphasis on sovereignty by Trump.
过去，主权曾是我们的惯用论调。
In the old days, sovereignty used to be our argument, stock and trade.
所有所谓发展中国家都曾高喊主权、主权、主权——谁都不该干涉我们的主权。
And all the so called developing countries went to the sovereignty, sovereignty, sovereignty, nobody should disturb us sovereignty.
如今却是特朗普在谈论主权，一种被全球主义精英通过损害美国人民主权的国际体系所妥协的主权。
Today's Trump who talks about sovereignty, a sovereignty that's being compromised by the globalist elites under an international system that is undercutting the sovereignty of American people.
这堪称一场彻底的观念颠覆。
So it's a quite an quite an inversion.
仅凭这一点，就非常非常有趣。
Now for that reason alone, it's very very interesting.
第三个论点，其实是关于美国领导力的概念。
A third argument, I mean, is really the notion of American leadership.
我们的自由主义朋友们很喜欢这个。
Our liberal friends love it.
对吧？
Right?
对特朗普的许多批评都集中在他放弃了美国的领导地位。
Much of the criticism of Trump is he's abandoning American leadership.
这种领导力对于战后美国精英阶层——至少是东海岸建制派——来说至关重要，他们认为美国注定要领导世界，必须继续领导。或者如约翰·F·肯尼迪所说，我们必须不惜一切代价捍卫美国的理念和利益。
That leadership with the postwar American elites, at least the East Coast establishment, was so central, the notion America was destined to lead, it must continue to lead, Or as John f Kennedy put it, we must pay any price or bear any burden to defend what we as the American principles or interests.
特朗普却说：不。
Trump is saying, no.
我们根本没有义务不惜一切代价。
There's no obligation here to actually pay any price, bear any burden.
事实上，这种观点认为付出代价和承担负担已经影响了美国人民，因此需要扭转这一局面。
And in fact, the argument is that paying this price and the burden has affected American people, and therefore, this needs to be reversed.
所以这再次成为一个非常强有力的论点——无论是反对联盟、反对多边机构的这一论点（所有这些都被视为对美国主权的限制），是否会持续下去或再次发生变化。
So it's again a very, very powerful argument whether this argument against alliances, against multilateral institutions, all of which are seen as constraining American sovereignty, is is is going to last or is going to change again.
我们将在未来看到一些变化。
We'll we'll see something down the road.
第四点（我认为争议较少，但当下正在被讨论），不仅是对所谓自由国际秩序的反对，也是对国内自由主义的反对。
The fourth, and I think it's less debated, but I think it's being debated now, is not only in opposition to the so called liberal international order, it's also in opposition to liberalism at home.
如今针对欧洲人（包括英国人）发表的关于言论自由的演讲。
Today, the kind of speeches that are made against the Europeans, including the Brits, on free speech.
当我们在慕尼黑看到JD·万斯的演讲时，是不是美国人在嘲讽欧洲人？
Is an American stealing the Europeans when we saw JD Vance's speech in Munich?
而今天MAGA支持者们的论调是：看，欧洲人反对言论自由，他们在审查言论自由。
And the the today, what the MAGA people say, look, the Europeans have are against free speech, the censor free speech.
所以这实际上是我们过去在民主国家与共产主义国家之间——或者说是民主国家与专制国家之间的争论，但今天这已成为西方内部的论战。
So this is actually, it's a contest we used to have between democracies and communists or democracies and autocracies, if you will, but this is an intra western argument today.
这是MAGA与欧洲社会之间的争论。
It's an argument between MAGA and the European societies.
当然，他们在欧洲也找到了共鸣。
And, of course, they're finding resonance in Europe.
因此，这里是否存在美国右翼与新兴新右翼之间的跨大西洋联系。
So whether there's, again, a transatlantic link here between the American right and the new right that's emerging.
所以，这场针对自由主义价值观的内部争论——甚至强调的重点，过去是中国、印度等国。
So, therefore, this internal argument against liberal values and even the emphasis I mean, those to be it used to be China, India, and others.
哦，我们是一个伟大的文明型国家。
Oh, we are a great civilizational state.
现在一些MAGA支持者也在说，没错。
Now some of the MAGA people are saying, yeah.
我们也是一个文明型国家。
We are a civilizational state too.
我们是基督教文明型国家，需要重新强调西方本质，而非仅宣称我们是个共和国。
We're a Christian civilizational state, and that we need to reemphasize the essence of what is being western as opposed to simply saying we are just a republic.
因此，这里再次出现了对西方社会本质的非常深刻的质疑，当然，这些假设正在被验证。
So so here again, I think very deep questioning, of course, assumptions about what the western societies are are being are being played out.
这种意识形态中至少存在四个矛盾，因为构建一套自洽的原则是一回事。
Now there are at least four contradictions in this ideology, because it's one thing you can construct a nice self contained set of principles.
但围绕这些原则进行动员的政治活动，以及更复杂的是，实施这些理念的政策，会与你构想的意识形态产生巨大差距——实际发生的情况因动员政治、政策执行和实施政治而产生截然不同的结果，而真正被授权实施这些的人，比如特朗普本人就是个典型例子。
But then the politics of mobilization around those principles, and even more complicatedly, the policies of implementing those ideas create a vast set of distance create a vast set of distance from how you frame the ideology, what actually happens because there is politics of mobilization, there's policy, the implementation, the politics of implementation, which produces a very, very different set of outcomes, and the individual who is actually empowered to make that implementation, like Trump, who is himself quite a figure.
所以，情况就是这样。
So therefore, here you are.
这些矛盾在过去十个月里已经显现。
These contradictions unfold even in the last ten months.
我们正在目睹这一点。
We're seeing that.
例如特朗普一方面谴责无休止的战争主张克制，但同时用同样的框架谈论'以实力求和平'。
Trump, for example, when denounces endless wars, restraint, but yet we see simultaneously with the same framing, he talks about peace through strength.
美国国防开支并未削减，仍接近1万亿美元。
There's no cutting of the American defense expenditure, close to $1,000,000,000,000.
其他所有国家加在一起，排名前十的国家总和也赶不上。
All the other countries put together, the top 10 can't match it.
他谈论核现代化，以及他们对其他国家领土的单方面要求，包括非常亲密的盎格鲁-撒克逊国家如加拿大。
He's talking about nuclear modernization, and their demands for unilateral demands for territories of other countries, including of very close Anglo Saxon countries like Canada.
那么这实际上是一种收缩，还是对单边主义的重新主张？
So this is actually is this a retrenchment, or is it actually a reassertion of unilateralism?
因此我认为，无论关于克制的言辞如何，实际上你们看到的是对美国力量的深刻主张，因为美国仍是世界第一。
So therefore, I think whatever the rhetoric of restraint might be, what you're having is actually a deep assertion of American power because US is still number one.
其次，我认为这种关于不干预的言论与正在发生的尖锐干预过程之间的矛盾。
Second, I think this contradiction between the talk about non intervention and the process of sharpening interventions that is actually taking place.
正如我们所说，特朗普拒绝自由国际主义、干预主义、政权更迭和国家建设。
As we said, Trump rejects liberal internationalism, interventionism, regime change, nation building.
如果你读过这些，我们很多西方以外的人，如果你读过他在利雅得的演讲，非常精彩。
If you read them, lot of us in the outside the West, if you read a speech in Riyadh, brilliant.
他说，伙计们，知道吗，我们犯了很多错误。
He says, guys, you know, we made a lot of mistakes.
我们曾不必要地试图改造其他社会。
We, know, needlessly tried to build other societies.
我们真的搞砸了。
We really messed it up.
我们不会再这么做了。
We're not going to do it do it anymore.
不再干预。
No more interventions.
这是他在利雅得首次外访时的演讲，告诉中东美国干预主义的危害，并表示将让你们自主决定什么对你们有利。
That is the first speech he made, the first visit abroad in Riyadh, telling the Middle East American interventionism was bad, and we're going to let you decide what's good for you.
看看迪拜、韩国这些美丽的城市多么令人赞叹。
Oh, look at these beautiful cities like Dubai, Korea, that how wonderful.
你们做得非常出色。
You guys are doing very well.
不需要我们来指手画脚。
You don't need us to tell you what to do.
但你们就在那里。
But there you are.
同一个特朗普却在委内瑞拉使用炮舰外交。
The same Trump is using gunboat diplomacy in Venezuela.
所以不干涉的规则从未适用于拉丁美洲。
So non intervention of the rules never applied for Latin America.
拉丁美洲是一个不同的领域。
Latin America was a different sphere.
美国对待拉丁美洲的方式总是与众不同。
How you America deals with Latin America was always different.
因此，无论阿拉伯半岛上关于不干涉主义的讨论如何，拉丁美洲的情况都将不同。
Therefore, whatever the talk of non non interventionism in the in the Arabian Peninsula might be, the situation in Latin America was going to be different.
直到现在，拉丁美洲人还在抱怨他们得不到太多关注。
And until now, the Latin Americans were complaining, look, they don't get much attention.
现在我不确定他们是否真的想要特朗普给予的这种关注，但事实是干涉主义相当猖獗。
Now I don't know if they really want attention of the kind Trump is giving them, but the fact is that interventionism is quite rampant.
伊朗核设施遭受袭击。
You have attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities.
尼日利亚受到威胁。
You have threats against Nigeria.
这叫什么行为？
What do you call it?
没错。
Yeah.
意思是，一个国家的基督徒受压迫，我们就要来攻打非洲最大的国家。
Mean, a country because Christians are being oppressed, We're to come and attack you with the biggest country in Africa.
这就是你们的说话方式。
So this is the way you talk.
我是说，别提实际干预了。
I mean, forget actual intervention.
仅仅是对大国使用暴力语言，这种美国拥有权力的观念。
Just the violent use of language against large countries, this notion that The US has the power.
基督徒在尼日利亚遇到问题，因此我们要介入干预。
Christians are having a problem in Nigeria, therefore, we're to interfere.
我不认为他真的会这么做，但这就是你们国内政治的玩法，不过这会引发自身的连锁反应。
I don't think he will actually, but that's the way you play your domestic politics, but then it creates resonances of its own.
第三组矛盾是：美国总统长期以来一直受到批评。
The third third set of contradictions is American presidents have long been criticized.
帝国总统制主要集中在外交政策上。
The imperial presidency focused largely on foreign policy.
所以上次竞选时的承诺之一就是：不。
So one of the promises of the last campaign was, no.
我们将专注于美国，这就是'美国优先'的含义。
We'll focus on America, and that is what the meaning of America first is.
但过去十个月我们看到的是，一位声称自己解决了七八场战争的总统在外交政策上异常活跃。
But what we've seen in the last ten months is hyperactive foreign policy by a president who claims he's solved eight wars, seven or eight wars.
他已经解决了这些战争。
He's fixed them.
他正在全球各地进行和平调解，而且对大国峰会有着特别的痴迷。
He's doing peacemaking around the world, and he's got this special, know, obsession with the great power summitry.
刚刚宣布特朗普总统和习近平主席今年可能举行四次峰会。
Just announced there might be four summits between president Trump and Xi this year.
要知道，沃尔特·拉塞尔·米德——这位伟大的美国人常说，特朗普就像西奥多·罗斯福。
You know, Walter Russell Meade, mean, he was a great American who often says, look, Trump is like Teddy Roosevelt.
他希望成为所有事情关注的焦点。
He wants the center of attention of everything.
他想成为每次婴儿洗礼的主角。
He wants to be the baby at every shower.
他想成为每场婚礼的新娘。
He wants to be the bride at every wedding.
他甚至想成为每场葬礼上的警察。
He won't be the cops at every funeral.
世界上发生的任何事要引起关注，都必须与他有关。
Getting attention of anything that happens in the world, it has to be because of him.
因此我认为，关于外交政策或外交政策前沿活动减少的说法，过去十个月的实际记录已经相当清晰地展现出来。
So I think, this again so so the the claim of reduced foreign policy or reduced activism on foreign policy front, an actual record of last ten months we've seen unfold quite quite well.
最后要指出，这种对美国帝国的批判并非左翼独有。
And finally, would say this whole critique of American empire is not used on the left.
我的意思是，如果你观察右翼，MAGA运动也采用同样的框架说：看，美国在全球到处插手，尽管有种种关于减少这种政策的言论，我们实际上看到的是更多制裁、威胁使用更多制裁。
I mean, if you see the right, MAGA uses the same framing saying, look, The US messes around the world, that, despite all the talk about reducing that kind of a foreign policy, we've actually seen more use of sanctions, more threats, more bullying of other countries through economic means or military means.
那么，我们是否看到了帝国的轻量化？
So therefore, are we seeing empire light?
我们是否看到了从帝国收缩？
Are we seeing retrenchment from empire?
因此有充分理由认为，所有关于美国衰落、美国收缩和美国撤退的言论，实际上都是同一个帝国试图通过新手段来维护自身。
So there are enough reasons to argue for all the talk about American decline or American retrenchment and American withdrawal is actually the same empire trying to assert itself through through new means.
我的意思是，你可以根据立场不同而选择不同论点。
I mean, you could argue whichever depending on where you where you sit.
因此我认为这些矛盾是真实存在的，我认为这些矛盾在未来几个月的演变，将对特朗普总统任期本身产生重大影响，也将决定我们实际会看到什么。
So I think the contradictions are real, and I think how these contradictions play out in the next few months, I think we'll have a lot of bearing on the Trump presidency itself and what we're going to see actually.
但我们这些关注美国的人都知道，政府开局的方式往往并非其收场的方式，所以这三年将会很漫长。
But many of us who follow The US know how an administration begins is not how it concludes, so three years is going to be long.
但我认为已定的基调未必就是最终结果，不过在未来三年里，我们必须持续关注这一态势。
But I think the tone that has been set need not be the one that actually we'll end up with, but I think but this is something we have to engage continuously over the next three years.
这就引出了我标题的第二部分——欧亚大陆的概念。
That brings me to the second part of my title, which is really the idea of Eurasia.
我认为欧亚大陆不仅是为欧洲和亚洲取的统一名称，如今它已承载了全方位的政治含义。
I think Eurasia is not just merely about a single name for Europe and Asia, but I think today it has acquired a whole range of political meanings.
正如我所说，回溯希腊时代，'亚洲'这个概念的内涵是不同的。
As I said, look, if the Europeans if you're going back to the Greek times, the notion Asia was something different.
如何想象地中海彼岸的土地，这始终是个问题。
How you imagine the land beyond the Mediterranean, that was always an issue.
因此在某种意义上，将亚洲构建为'他者'的框架——这种差异性的构建并非天然带有敌意，但确实意味着'与你不同的存在'。
So in a sense, the framing of Asia as the other, different, there was not a automatic framing of as a hostile other, but there was another different from you.
这种观念在不同时期以不同形式起伏消长。
That notion, you know, went up and down in different forms.
当然，在殖民时代，你们看到这样一种观念：亚洲人尚未开化。
And, of course, in the colonial era, you saw the idea that, look, Asians were not civilized.
他们需要被文明教化。
They need to be civilized.
因此，崛起的欧洲对亚洲的认知框架再次以这种方式构建。
Therefore, the framing of a rising Europe, how we thought about Asia, were again framed in such a manner.
与此同时，也存在着与之完全对立的观点。
And then there was the opposite of this as well.
我们许多亚洲人曾认为自己是不同的。
Many of us in Asia thought we are different.
欧洲是帝国主义的。
Europe is imperialistic.
欧洲是霸权主义的。
Europe is hegemonic.
因此欧洲与亚洲截然不同，正如泰戈尔等亚洲主义者或众多中国民族主义者将亚洲视为一体时所构建的认知框架。
Therefore, Europe and Asia are different, or as people like Asianists like Tagore or a whole lot of Chinese nationalists to frame Asia as one.
亚洲与欧洲不同。
Asia is different from Europe.
我们更具精神性。
We are more spiritual.
我们不像西方那样物质主义。
We're not materialistic like the West.
因此这种将彼此视为不同实体的持续框架是一个悠久的传统，但后来部分观点被奥地利地质学家爱德华·瑞士所打破。
So this constant framing of each other as different entities is a long long tradition, but then some of it was punctured by Austrian geologist, Edward Swiss.
大约在19世纪中叶，他说，实际上看，你们都同属一个地方，这实际上是一个大陆，而非如假设所言是两个不同的世界。
Somewhere around the mid nineteenth century, he said, actually, look, you guys all belong to the same place, that it is actually one continent, that this is not two different worlds as the assumptions were being made.
事实上，后来他的观点被板块构造理论所证实，即存在一个欧亚板块。
And actually, later his arguments were confirmed by the tectonic theory, tectonic plate theory that you have a Eurasian plate.
但地质学论据并不足够有力，因为政治已被差异所渗透——对差异的强调，以及将差异用于各种政治及其他目的的需求。
These are not but then the geological argument was not good enough because the politics had been invested with the difference, the emphasis on the difference, and the need to use the difference for various political and and other purposes.
因此，地质统一性是思考欧亚大陆的一种方式。
So geological unity is one way of thinking about Eurasia.
第二，欧亚大陆是战略欧亚大陆之一。
The second, Eurasia is one of strategic Eurasia.
你可以引用麦金德著名的欧亚大陆心脏地带理论，即这片广袤、铁路贯通、资源丰富的土地，能够孕育出足以挑战盎格鲁-撒克逊或西方海洋强权的陆上帝国。
You can say MacKinder's famous formulation of the Eurasian hot land, that it is vast, rail rail connected, resource rich, could produce a land empire that was capable of challenging the Anglo Saxon or the maritime powers of the West.
因此这一论点基于地缘政治论据，而非文化、政治等方面的差异。
So that argument premised on the geopolitical arguments and not on any difference in terms of culture, politics, and other things.
但有趣的是，麦金德的心脏地带理论与俄罗斯民族主义者同期发展的'中间地带'理念产生了共鸣。
But there was an interesting resonance between MacKinder's heartland and the idea of a middleland that Russian nationalists developed over the period.
俄罗斯的欧亚主义思想。
The Russian Eurasianist idea.
十九世纪中叶的俄罗斯思想家将欧亚大陆描绘为一个以俄罗斯为中心的文明空间——既非亚洲也非欧洲，而是具有独特使命感和命运观、拥有独立特质的空间。
Russian thinkers in the mid nineteenth century cast Eurasia as a civilizational space with Russia as the center, neither Asia nor Europe, but a uniquely independent space that had its own sense of mission and destiny and its own independent features.
俄罗斯部分欧亚主义思想与斯拉夫派的主张存在呼应，后者当时正抵制俄罗斯的西化与现代化进程。
Some of the Eurasianist ideas in Russia are parallels with the Slavophiles who were assisting the westernization and modernization in Russia.
但俄罗斯欧亚主义思想如今在普京执政下非常盛行。
But the Russian Eurasianist idea is very popular today under Putin.
你无法相信就在五十年前还是同一个苏联。
You can't believe there's the same Soviet Union, just fifty years ago.
让我们谈谈最纯粹的国际主义。
Let's talk about internationalism in its purest sense.
但如今，俄罗斯的论点框架是基于欧亚理念的，我认为如何解决这个问题是我们需要观察的。
But today, the framing of Russian arguments are premised on the Eurasian idea, and I think how this gets settled is something we got to see.
然后在冷战等时期，比如布热津斯基，他在世纪之交所著的《大棋局》一书中将欧亚视为单一战区，认为美国战略必须坚持不让单一强国或强国联盟主宰这片广袤土地。
And then in the Cold War and others, Brzezinski, for example, his book on the grand chessboard at the turn of the century where he talked about Eurasia as a single theater and that the American strategy must remain not to allow a single power or a coalition of powers dominate this vast land.
我认为这当然是长期以来的主题——西方理论关于如何应对欧亚地标的策略。
And I think that that that is the theme, of course, this long run the western theories about how to deal with the Eurasian landmarks.
但我认为如今出现了一种不同的论点形式，即中国的崛起以及通过铁路网络实现的欧亚一体化，这种网络俄罗斯在十九世纪末二十世纪初几乎未曾建立。
But I think today, see a different form of argument that is emerging, which is the rise of China and the integration of Eurasia through rail networks of the type Russia barely had done in the late nineteenth century or the early twentieth century.
现在有列车从上海直达德国的杜伊斯堡。
You have trains running from Shanghai to Duisburg in Germany.
货物正通过中国东海岸制造业热线被运往欧洲港口城市，从波罗的海一直延伸到大西洋。
You have goods being carried deep inside the Chinese manufacturing hotline on the East Coast all the way into the European port cities from the Baltic to the Atlantic.
因此，这实际上是中国崛起或中国资本在寻求市场过程中实现的一种整合形式。
So this is actually a form of integration that Chinese rise or the Chinese capital has done in search of its markets.
所以在某种意义上，如今的这种整合比五十年前任何人所能想象的都要深入得多。
So in some senses today, this integration is much deeper, a far more deeper than, anyone could have imagined, fifty years ago.
这就是现实。
That's a reality.
我们还看到‘一带一路’倡议的推进，中俄关系日益紧密，两国联手对抗西方的支配地位。
We've also seen reinforcing the Belt and Road, the deepening ties between China and Russia of China and Russia coming together to counter the domination of the of the West.
因此实际上，当前关于欧亚大陆的讨论核心在于为何中美必须合作应对西方霸权，我认为这强化了上述观点。
So therefore, in fact, much of the argument of Eurasia today is why US China must come together to deal with the hegemonic West, and I think that has reinforced this idea.
而且这不仅仅是中俄两国的联手。
And it's not just China and Russia coming together.
看看乌克兰战争。
Look at the Ukraine war.
我们甚至看到朝鲜军队出现在俄罗斯。
We had North Korean troops in Russia.
因此，任何认为欧洲与俄罗斯截然不同的人，我们见证了韩国武器的介入。
So anyone who thinks Europe and Russia are very different, we had the South Korean weapons.
战争期间，韩国向波兰交付了更多武器，而日本则向乌克兰提供了大量人道主义援助。
South Korea has produced delivered more weapons to to Poland during the war, and you had Japan deliver significant amount of humanitarian assistance to the to Ukraine.
由此可见，亚洲的崛起已在欧洲腹地创造了新的地缘条件。
So you have already the rise of Asia has already produced conditions under which you're in the heart of Europe.
这场战争中，亚洲国家正扮演着重要角色。
There's a war, and Asians have a role in it.
因此，继续将这两个地区视为泾渭分明，我认为是不明智的。
So therefore, to keep thinking that these two regions are different, I think will be an unwise.
事实上，拜登政府正积极推动将美国在亚洲的盟友与欧洲盟友联合起来的政策。
And then you had actually the Biden administration actively support a policy of bringing America's Asian allies and the European allies together.
英国通过AUKUS协议被拉入印太地区。
You had the the British being dragged into the Indo Pacific with the AUKUS agreement.
北约印太四国机制下，新西兰、澳大利亚、韩国和日本领导人参与北约峰会，而欧洲国家也在过去几年纷纷出台各自的印太战略。
You had the NATO Indo Pacific four, where you had the New Zealand, Australia, South Korea, and Japan leaders participating in the NATO summits, and the European countries outlined their own Indo Pacific strategies all within the last few years.
从某种意义上说，你已经看到这两个地区正在融合，我认为这种逻辑根植于亚洲崛起的本质，可以这么说。
So in some senses, you already see the two regions coming together, and I think is I think its logic is in the inherent in the rise of Asia, if you might say so.
如果美国确实撤出或减少其角色，我们可能会看到什么样的后果？
And if The US does withdraw or US does reduce its role, what are the kind of consequences that we might see?
我想这就是我演讲最后一部分要探讨的内容。
And I think that's where I come to the last part of my of my presentation.
在这里我要说，基本上当美国遇见欧亚大陆时——美国优先遇见欧亚大陆时——大致可以归纳为五种正在被讨论的主要结果。
Here, I would say, basically, when America meets Eurasia, America first meets Eurasia, you can roughly think of five broad outcomes that that are being debated, you can say.
其一是大家都熟悉的'反向基辛格'辩论。
One is all of you are familiar with the reverse Kissinger debate.
这个观点认为，就像当年美国利用中国孤立苏联一样，如今也可以用俄罗斯来孤立中国。
The idea that just as US use China to isolate the Soviet Union, you can actually use today Russia to isolate China.
因此通过分化两者或阻止任何两个欧亚大国形成合力，这种战略是长期性的。
So separating the two or preventing the consolidation of Eurasian power by any two powers, that strategy is a long one.
这种策略由来已久。
It's it's been around.
但我认为，在特朗普政策的背景下，这个长期被讨论的观点如今获得了新的现实意义。
But I think today, that idea which has been debated acquires a new, relevance in the context of Trump's policy.
虽然乌克兰和平政策并未以此为由进行辩护，但这一论点过去一年半在共和党圈子内流传甚广，我们可以探讨这是否真是‘美国优先’政策将采取的方向。
Now this policy of Ukraine peace has not been justified on these grounds, but this argument has made rounds over the last year and a half within the Republican circles, and we could argue whether this is really the one direction in which America First is actually going to go to.
第二个我认为是势力范围划分的诱惑。
The second, I think, is the the temptation of spheres of influence.
我们经常听到关于美国半球政策的讨论。
We talk we hear a lot about hemispheric policies by The US.
如今部署在委内瑞拉附近的航母战斗群比在欧洲或亚洲的还要多。
More carrier groups are off Venezuela these days than in Europe or Asia.
这是否会成为美国的长期特征——宣称‘我们将固守自己的半球’？
So is this going to be a permanent feature where America says, look, we're going to stick to in our own hemisphere.
我们必须消除对中俄的恐惧，允许美中俄各自发展势力范围。
We've got to get rid of the Russians and the Chinese from this fear, and that we're going to let US, China, and Russia develop spheres of influence of their own.
虽然这种划分在理论上看似清晰，但实际操作中划分势力范围绝非易事。
While this looks neat on the paper, it's just not going to be easy to do spheres of influence.
我们已经看到在欧洲，西欧国家会接受俄罗斯势力范围的想法根本行不通。
Already we're seeing in Europe, the idea that Europeans are going to accept West Europeans are going to accept the Russian sphere of influence is just not going to work.
或者说日本、印度等国会在中国主导的亚洲下从此幸福生活的想法。
Or the idea that Japan, India, or others will be happy to live happily ever after under a Chinese dominated Asia.
这是行不通的。
It's not going to work.
但我认为这种大国外交理念——即你可以与其他主要大国合作建立某种秩序的想法。
But I think this notion that a great power diplomacy that you could work with other major powers to produce some kind of an order.
我认为这一点对当前的特朗普来说显然很重要。
I think that quite clearly is important for Trump at this point of time.
这种做法能否真正成功还有待观察。
Whether this will actually succeed or not is something we're going to we're going to see.
第三个方面，我认为我们必须考虑的后果是：如果美国发出混乱信号，盟友会作何反应？
The third aspect, think, the the consequence we have to is what do the allies do if The US is sending mixed messages?
如何应对这个立场不确定、对自身安全承诺摇摆不定的新美国？
How do you deal with the new US which is uncertain, which is not sure about its security commitments?
我认为这使美国的大多数盟友和伙伴都面临一个非常严峻的问题。
And I think that brings us into most of the America's allies and partners into real serious question.
他们都在谈论战略自主的语言，不仅是今天的印度和欧洲，但问题在于此。
All of them talk about the language of strategic autonomy, not just India today and Europe, but then here is the problem.
正如圣奥古斯丁所说：'主啊，让我变得高尚吧，但别太快。'
As Saint Augustine said, oh lord, make me virtuous, but not just yet.
谈论战略自主固然很好，但未来十年、二十年你们都无法真正实现。
It's alright to talk about strategic autonomy, but you're not going to be able to do it ten years, twenty years.
在这二十年里，当你们需要美国继续驻军时该怎么办？
What do you do in those twenty years when you got to keep Americans in?
因此，在欧洲和亚洲维持任何合理稳定结构都需要美国驻军，但与此同时你们又必须对冲美国的不确定性。
So that problem of keeping the Americans in for any reasonable stable structure in Europe and Asia is there with us, but at the same time, you've got to hedge against American uncertainty.
所以你们现在看到欧洲和亚洲都在同时做着两件事：既要取悦霸主，又要试图发展替代方案。
So what you're seeing happening in both Europe and Asia is simultaneously trying to please the master, but at the same time, try and develop alternatives.
我认为我们正目睹大量此类现象发生——经济层面的多元化、安全层面的多元化，无论是欧盟试图在亚洲达成更多贸易协议，还是日本与欧洲合作发展经济军事能力。
And I think we're seeing a lot of that happen, diversification on the economic front, diversification on the security front, whether it is the EU trying to do more trade deals in Asia or whether it's Asians, Japanese connecting with Europe to develop economic military capabilities.
总的来说，这套横跨欧亚大陆、贯穿欧洲与亚洲的经济与安全联系网络是一个新特征，我认为这一现象将持续存在一段时间。
So broadly, this set of intra Eurasian cross cutting Europe and Asia economic and security links is is a new feature, and I think that's going to be with us for a while.
第四个问题，过去几个月发生的事或许让人想起那个著名的缩写RBIO——基于规则的国际秩序。
The fourth issue, what's happened in the last few months might be remember the famous abbreviation RBIO, rules based international order.
它还存在吗？
Is it there still?
如果乌克兰和平协议达成，这意味着什么？
If the Ukraine peace deal goes through, what does it mean?
即便俄罗斯通过武力获得一小片领土，我们所说的基于规则的国际秩序核心原则就是禁止通过武力获取领土。
Even if Russia gains a sliver of territory by use of force, the core principle of what we say is the rules based international order is that you don't acquire territory by use of force.
因此，近年来宣称我们需要基于规则的秩序这种观念——在我看来其实能否真正存续尚不明朗。
So therefore, the the notion of the last few years that we need a we have a rules based order was proclaimed you know, it's not very clear to me whether that'll actually survive.
这里要记得日本首相在2022年说过'乌克兰就是亚洲的未来'。
And here, remember the Japanese prime minister in 2022 said Ukraine is the future of Asia.
现在你可以把这句话反过来说了。
You can flip that now.
如果乌克兰的领土损失以更高和平的名义被合理化，那么台湾问题是否也能如法炮制？
If Ukraine's territorial loss is justified as a in the in the name of higher peace, can Taiwan be done the same thing?
我们早已无法阻止中国在南海获取领土。
Already, we've not been able to stop China from acquiring territory in the South China Sea.
因此，若基于规则的国际秩序不复存在，这是否等于给大国发放了为所欲为的许可证？
Therefore, if the RBIO is not there, does it give license to large countries to do what they want?
而如果主导性大国不愿真正捍卫领土现状。
And if the the the dominant power is not willing to really defend the territorial status quo.
第五个正在浮现的问题，我认为实质上是军备重整。
And the fifth set of issues that are coming up, I would say, is really rearmament.
欧洲已在讨论重新武装欧洲的计划。
Europe is already talking about rearm Europe.
我们的国防开支占比是5%。
We have 5% defense expenditure.
虽不确定能否奏效，但承诺既已作出——我认为亚洲的日本同样需关注其2%的军费目标。
I don't know if that will actually work, but the fact is the promise has been made, and I think that's something we got to see similarly in Asia to Japan, 2%.
韩国正在扩展其国防能力。
South Korea expanding its defense capabilities.
因此，我认为在美国政策不确定性的背景下，主要大国增加军费开支、提升军事能力将成为未来局势的一部分。
So therefore, I think rearmament in the given the American uncertainty, more military spending, more military capabilities among the major powers is going to be part of the part of the story.
我们还将看到核焦虑的回归，如果你愿意这么称呼的话。
We also have the return of nuclear anxieties, if you will.
你看到英国和法国讨论《兰开斯特宫协议》，他们表示：如果美国的核保护伞不存在，法英两国将如何应对？
You saw the British and the French talk about the Lancaster House Agreement to where they say, look, if American nuclear umbrella is not there, what do French and British do?
所以，这实际上是在讨论协调、合作与磋商。
So, I mean, it's really talking about coordination, collaboration, consultation.
当然，他们所做的仅限于此，但《2025兰开斯特宫核问题协议》被讨论这个事实本身就很有意思。
Certainly, they're not doing anything more than that, but the fact is that the Lancaster House 2025 agreement on nuclear issues, is being talked about that itself is interesting.
我认为波兰近期对核问题很感兴趣。
Polish, I believe, are interested in the nuclear issues these days.
德国国内对此争议不大，但关于德国是否应该拥有核按钮的讨论，让我们回想起1960年代的多边核力量计划（MLF）。
Germany, there's not much of a debate, but I think the question of Germany having a finger on the trigger, that takes us back to the nineteen sixties, the MLF, the multilateral force.
在亚洲，尤其是韩国，关于核问题的讨论相当激烈。
In Asia, of course, South Korea, there's a pretty serious discussion on the nuclear issues.
日本方面讨论较少，但我认为这只是时间问题。
Japan, much less, but I think the debate is a matter of time.
如果中国变得更加自信，周边国家会作何反应？
If China gets more assertive, what do the peripheral countries do?
与此同时，我们看到美国实际上支持了AUKUS协议。
Meanwhile, we saw The US actually support the AUKUS.
特朗普重申了向澳大利亚提供核推进技术的承诺。
Trump has reinforced the commitment to giving nuclear propulsion technologies to Australia.
现在我相信他已同意对韩国采取同样措施。
Now I believe he's agreed to do the same with South Korea.
因此我们将看到超越常规军备的更多核力量，而且我认为这将在我们所在地区持续存在。
So you're going to see more nuclear beyond the conventional armament, and I think that's going to be around, in our in our region.
最后我想说，一个对自身安全承诺不确定的美国，让我们回到了核心问题：这个地区该怎么办？
So finally, I would I would say the that a US that is uncertain about its security commitments brings us to the core question of what do the region do?
各区域该如何威慑俄罗斯和中国？
What do the regions do to deter Russia and China?
因此，我认为关键问题在于——是否可以通过军事手段、联盟关系来实现，但如何阻止俄罗斯进一步侵略、防止中国采取冒险行动，已成为区域安全的核心议题，而具体实施方式还有待观察。
So here, I think the principal question I mean, I think whether you can do it through military means, alliances, but the problem of deterring Russia from further aggression, deterring China from being adventurous, become the principal questions for regional security and how they get pursued is something we we got to we got to see.
接下来，作为总结，我想简要提出一两个更广泛的议题。
So then that brings me to the the to wrap up just to say five one or two broader broader themes.
我认为我们正从1991年后自由主义秩序的理念，转向一个更具地缘政治和地缘经济特征的格局——那种认为会有主导力量承担全球安全和国际机构责任的观点已不再确定。
I think we're moving from a idea of post '91 liberal order to one which is far more geopolitical, geoeconomic as well, if you will, that this notion that there is a a dominant power that will take responsibility for global security, global institutions, that doesn't that's not so certain.
因此，未来将更强调地缘政治，各国需要把更多事务掌握在自己手中。
So therefore, you're going to see a lot more emphasis on geopolitics where nations have to take a lot of the things into their own individual hands.
我认为一个欧亚大陆新格局将会显现。
You have an Eurasia, I think, that will emerge.
正如我所说，欧亚大陆各地区——即亚洲与欧洲之间——将产生更多联动，加强彼此合作将成为对冲美国承诺收缩或弱化的策略之一。
As I said, there's going to be lot more interconnections between the different parts of Eurasia, that is between Asia and Europe, and I think doing more with each other is one way of hedging against American retention or American dilution of American commitments.
这将成为欧亚大陆核心特征的重要组成部分。
And I think this is going to be part of the story, which again, that is the central feature of Eurasia.
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最后，我想说欧亚大陆的未来，正如我们所说，将围绕如何威慑俄罗斯和中国、以及我们能建立哪些跨区域、跨地理的联系而展开竞争。
Finally, would say that Eurasia's future, as we said, is going to be contested in terms of how we deter Russia and China, in terms of what are the cross regional, cross geographic linkages that we can set up.
这不会容易，但我认为要做到这一点，意味着我们需要在欧洲人与美国人之间，以及亚洲与欧洲之间，更多地从地缘政治、战略和安全层面进行互动。
It's not going to be easy, but I think doing this, that means we need to engage lot more between geopolitically, strategically, and security wise between the Europeans and the American between rest of the and and the Asians.
但从历史上看，欧洲的重心一直在大西洋彼岸。
But historically, Europe's weight has been to the Transatlantic.
日本和韩国则完全与美国立场绑定。
The Japanese and the Koreans totally tied to the American debates.
但鉴于当前形势，我认为我们需要进行更多区域内协商，以保障这片新大陆的安全。
But now I think given the situation that we have, we need to do a lot more intraregional consultations to be able to secure this new continent.
如果美国确实减少对该地区的支持。
If The US does dilute its support for this region.
作为对冲策略的一部分，我们别无选择，只能寻求更多合作伙伴。
We have no choice in the part of that hedging to real more cells.
我认为这种情况正在发生。
I think that's happening.
但更重要的是，发展区域合作机制，至少能就如何稳定该地区形成一些初步构想。
But more importantly, developing regional collaboration mechanisms that can actually at least some idea of how to stabilize the region can be developed.
我就说到这里，我们拭目以待。
So I'll stop here, and we'll look for it.
嗨。
Hi.
我打断一下本次活动，想向您推荐另一个精彩的LSE播客节目，相信您会喜欢。
I'm interrupting this event to tell you about another awesome LSE podcast that we think you'd enjoy.
《LSE IQ》邀请社会科学家和其他专家回答一个智慧问题，比如人们为何相信阴谋论，或者我们能否承受超级富豪的存在？
LSE IQ asks social scientists and other experts to answer one intelligent question, like why do people believe in conspiracy theories, or can we afford the super rich?
快来收听我们的节目吧。
Come check us out.
只需在您获取播客的平台搜索'LSE IQ'即可。
Just search for LSE IQ wherever you get your podcasts.
现在让我们回到活动。
Now back to the event.
那么，拉贾，那真是太棒了。
So, Raja, that was that was terrific.
你涵盖了很多方面。
You covered a lot of ground.
我有几个问题想先请教你。
I've got a couple questions for you maybe to just start things off.
我的意思是，在某些方面，你已经，你知道，美国。
I mean, in some ways, you've, you know, U.
对欧亚大陆的政策，正如你指出的，
S.
核心思想是要保持这片大陆的多元性，防止任何单一势力或势力集团取得霸权。
Policy towards Eurasia, as you pointed out, I mean, the core idea was to maintain pluralism on on the landmass to prevent any single power or group of powers from gaining hegemony.
所以并不是说美国应该控制欧亚大陆。
And so it wasn't that The US should control Eurasia.
只是要确保没有人能做到这一点。
It should just make sure that nobody did.
但这是通过接触和前沿部署实现的，美国必须同时存在于欧亚大陆的两端。
But that was through, like, engagement through, like, forward deployment and that The US had to be present on both ends, both bookends of the Eurasian landmass.
某种程度上，你提出的论点可能类似于美国战略收缩后的多元主义观点。
In a way, you're kind of making an argument that we might see from American retrenchment pluralism.
在我看来是如此。
It seems to me.
如果你讨论的是以某种方式将欧洲和亚洲联系起来，同时让多方参与其中。
If you're talking about it somehow bringing Europe and in Asia in a sense, together, with a lot of players involved.
这是个非常有趣的提议。
So that's a very kind of interesting proposition.
我想或许可以请你就此展开谈谈。
I think maybe I'd like to hear you just kind of maybe riff on that.
呃，也许我该先停一下。
And, well, maybe I should just stop there for a second.
是的。
Yeah.
从很多方面来看，这正是英国人在欧洲两百年来所做的，即不让任何一个强国主宰欧洲。
In in many ways, think this is the Brits were doing, right, in Europe for two hundred years, not to let any one power dominate Europe.
如果说这是核心结构性特征，那么在美国登场前，主要是通过欧洲联盟体系实现的。
Now, if that was a, you know, a logical core structural feature, Then before the Americans came on the scene, it was done through alliances, mostly European.
但正如我所说，我们这些欧洲外部势力在其中都扮演了角色。
But in all of which, as I said, look, we all had a part in it when those of our outside in Europe.
亚洲资源在塑造欧洲内部战争（特别是两次世界大战）中起到了关键作用。
The resources of Asian resources had a critical role in shaping those intra European battles, but there's the two world wars.
甚至更早时期——对研究海权史的学者而言——卡纳蒂克战争与美洲战事之间的关联也是如此。
Or even before, for those of you who talk to maritime historians, those who talk about world history, the connections between the Carnatic Wars and what was happening in America.
因此英国帝国防御与欧洲安全之间存在关联性。
So the relationship between Britain's imperial defense versus the European security.
这两者始终相互交织，其他帝国势力亦是如此。
There were always interconnections between those two things, and I think that's true of the other imperial powers as well.
所以我们实际上是在假设没有美国参与的欧亚格局，但这不可能完全实现。
So this is actually we're going back and assuming in Eurasia without America, I mean, it's not gonna fully happen.
这并不意味着世界就此终结，我们过去有过需要合作的经验。
That that doesn't bring the world to a close, that we've had experience from the past where we need to collaborate.
我们曾以不同形式相互合作，我认为这种合作能产生合理的稳定，实际上意味着更多的互动。
We did collaborate with each other in different forms, and I think that collaboration between to produce a a reasonable stability, which means actually a lot more engagement.
我随机举些例子，比如韩国向乌克兰出售弹药武器，或朝鲜派遣部队。
We saw I'll give you some examples randomly what South Korea was selling ammunition or weapons to Ukraine or North Koreans sending troops.
我认为未来我们会看到更多这类情况，届时需要动用亚洲的资源。
I think we'll see a lot more of this, I think in the future where you need to use the resources of Asia.
亚洲也需要欧洲的资源。
Asia needs the resources of Europe.
这里有个问题是特朗普告诉欧洲人：嘿，伙计们，别管亚洲了。
Here, one of the problems is Trump is telling the Europeans, hey, guys, forget Asia.
你们就待在自己地盘。
You stay where you are.
管好欧洲的事就行。
Look after yourself in Europe.
我们不希望你们涉足亚洲。
We don't want you in Asia.
事实上，埃尔布里奇·科尔比的故事告诉英国人：你们真的需要向印太地区派遣航母吗？
In fact, the story of Elbridge Colby telling the British, do you really need to send a a carrier to Indo Pacific?
所以我认为这里存在一个问题。
So I think there's a problem.
这是特朗普-拜登政府首次积极鼓励盟友与伙伴国携手合作。
The first time Trump Biden administration actively encouraged bringing the allies and partners together.
如今他们却在阻挠这种合作。
Today, they're discouraging.
那么问题在于——至少对我们而言——如果我们关注印度与英国，或是日本与英国（它们已有相当程度的合作）。
So the question then for for us at least, if we are interested on India and Britain or Japan and Britain already do quite a bit.
因此，欧亚大陆的主要实体必须加强彼此联系，才能共同审视我们在威慑力、军事能力和技术验证方面能实现什么。
So the main entities of the Eurasian landmass will have to connect with each other a lot more to be able to see what is it that we can do, both in terms of deterrence, military capability, and the technological proofs.
验证。
Proofs.
是的。
Yeah.
我也许同样...我喜欢你描述美国政策矛盾的方式——既有收缩的趋势，同时又有某种扩张正在发生。
If I'm I might also so I I I like the way that you characterized the contradictions in US policy that there's retrenchment going on, but at the same time there's kind of expansion, happening.
所以我想，从某种意义上来说，是在试图以更有利于美国的方式重新谈判国际秩序的条款。
And and so I I guess, you know, in the sense of trying to renegotiate terms of the international order in ways that are more favorable to The United States.
你知道，贝桑特正是用这些术语讨论并阐述过这一点。
And you know, Besant has talked in precisely those terms and has laid it out.
你如何理解这种紧张的根源？
How do you understand, like what's the source of that tension?
我的意思是，如果你从现实主义者的角度剖析问题，你如何理解美国...
I mean if you cut into problems as a realist, how do you understand The U.
美国...
S.
同时存在的这两种情况？
Simultaneously?
从某种意义上说，美国正在后退一步，有关于半球性收缩的讨论等等，但同时又在推进并试图重新平衡国际体系或重新谈判条款。
In a sense taking a step back, there's talk about hemispheric retreat and so forth, but at the same time pushing forward and trying to of rebalance the international system or renegotiate the terms.
我认为核心问题在于成本...我不是那种...嗯...
I think the core of it is are the costs of I'm I'm not one of those Mhmm.
帝国论调的支持者，但我要说，美国外交政策的成本实在太高了，而且已经引发了政治反弹。
Empire argument, but I would say, look, the cost of American foreign policy is so high, and there is a political backlash.
那么问题就在于如何管控国内的反弹？
The question then is how do you manage the domestic backlash?
嗯...
Mhmm.
以及你们...
And what do you
抱歉。
Sorry.
你说什么？
What's that?
请靠近麦克风说话。
Talk a bit closer in the mic.
因此你必须在应对国内反弹的同时，全球利益并未就此消失。
So then the you you have to manage the domestic backlash, while at the same time, your global interests have not just disappeared.
比如，你可以看到美国科技公司与欧盟之间的斗争。
That is, you see the fight between American tech companies and the European Union.
在我看来，'规范帝国'正在科技监管领域遭遇阻力，因为一方面有MAGA势力，另一方面还有GAFA——无论你怎么称呼这些美国七大科技巨头。
The Empire of Norms, I see, is being pushed back on the tech regulations because the power of the, you know, there's MAGA on one side, there is also the GAFA, whatever you call them, the seven magnificent American companies.
所以我认为这些领域的利益并未消失。
So I think the interest of that sections has not disappeared.
如何重新调整这个等式：一方面需要在国内避免过多介入，同时又要保住核心利益。
How you rearrange this equation that one, you need domestically to avoid too many engagements, while at the same time preserve the core.
从某种意义上说，理想的结局可能有两个。
In some sense, can say an ideal outcome of this will be two.
一是美国政策的理性化，不再让华盛顿的精英阶层自以为完全脱离美国国内政治，可以永远只搞外交政策。
One, a rationalization of American policies, and you do not have this an elite in Washington which thinks it is completely detached from American domestic politics, can just doing foreign policy all the time.
但那是不可能的。
But that is not possible.
但至少必须有所取舍，在某些重点领域采取行动，而不是简单地说——从达尔富尔到斐济的每个角落——我们都有义务扮演世界救世主的角色。
But it has to pick and choose at least some priorities where you do those things rather than simply say, I'm in every corner from Darfur to Fiji to you know, that this that we have an obligation to play God in the world.
这一直都不现实。
That was always unrealistic.
嗯。
Mhmm.
我认为从某种意义上说，克制可能是其中一种合理的结果。
And I think in some sense, a tempering of it could be one outcome, which is a rational outcome.
另一方面是对欧洲盟友和亚洲。
Other is to European allies and Asia.
我的意思是，你们必须为自己的安全承担更多责任。
I mean, you've got to do more for your own security.
我认为这其中的逻辑是：需要分担实施方式的责任，而不是永远由美国纳税人为欧洲和亚洲的安全买单。
I think there is a logic to that that you need to distribute the burden of how you do this rather than simply the American taxpayer will forever pay for European security and for Asian security.
但是，我再次认为，一位优秀的总统本可以重新协商这些条款。
But, again, I think a good president could have renegotiated these terms.
在某种程度上，你看到了拜登或特朗普时期最初的尝试，即表明你可以在不破坏整个体系的情况下重组它。
In some sense, you saw initial attempts at it under Biden or under the Trump, of saying that, look, you can restructure this without disrupting the whole system.
但我认为在特朗普领导下，存在一种危险，即在试图重组和合理化的过程中，你可能会彻底摧毁整个体系。
But I think under Trump, there's a danger that in an attempt to reorganize, rationalize, you might actually destroy the system as a whole.
要不我来打开它吧。
Why don't I'll open it up.
我们为什么不从这里开始呢？
Why don't we start right over here?
吉迪恩，第一个问题由你来提问。
Gideon, I'll give you the first question.
就在前排这里。
Right here in the front.
好的。
Yeah.
这位穿粉色衬衫的先生。
This gentleman with the pink shirt.
谢谢。
Thank you.
你好。
Hi.
我是《金融时报》的吉迪恩·拉赫曼。
Gideon Rachman from the Feet.
你的演讲内容丰富，有很多有趣的观点。
There's so much in your lecture, lots of interesting points.
尤其让我印象深刻的是你最后提到，如果俄罗斯成功以武力夺取领土，这将意味着基于规则的国际秩序终结，并可能导致其他国家，特别是中国，效仿此举。
What I thought that struck me particularly towards the end was where you said, if Russia succeeds in taking territory by force, that's the end of the rules based international order, and that could, lead to other countries, particularly China, attempting to do the same.
我对此很感兴趣，因为过去三四年里欧洲一直在试图用这个论点说服印度，但收效甚微。
And I was kind of interested because that is the argument the Europeans have been trying to make to India with with very little success for the last three or four years.
这个论点现在终于能打动新德里了吗？还是说印度仍然不真正认同乌克兰战争中的这些利害关系？
Is that argument finally getting through in Delhi, or do you think, India still doesn't really kind of accept that that those are the stakes in the Ukraine war?
即便他们现在意识到了，是不是已经有点晚了？
And even if they do now, isn't it a bit late?
因为这似乎正是即将
Because that seems to be what's about
发生的事情。
to happen.
我我并没有说美国人要占领领土。
I I didn't say the Americans taking territory.
他们还没占领加拿大呢，不过这是不可能的。
They have not yet taken Canada, but it's No.
不。
No.
我是说，俄罗斯占领领土。
I mean, the the Russians taking territory.
是的。
Yeah.
抱歉。
Sorry.
中国人已经占领了。
Chinese have already taken.
美国人、俄罗斯人正在占领。
Americans, Russians are taking.
不。
No.
我我认为，我并非代表印度政府发言。
I I think and I'm not speaking for the government of India.
我认为我们中有些人在德里主张过，原则上，我认为我们应该反对俄罗斯入侵乌克兰。
I I think some of us have argued in Delhi that, look, in principle, I think it is something we should have opposed, Russian invasion of Ukraine.
因为我们自己在克什米尔或其他地方的立场，实际上，通过武力征服领土然后进行虚假公投，根本不符合印度的核心利益。
Because our own position on Kashmir or various other places, Actually, conquering territory by use of force and then doing a fake referendum were just not acceptable to India's own core interests.
但我想，你知道各国都是如此，但在这种情况下，因为俄罗斯是我的朋友，所以我不会批评俄罗斯人。
But then I think, you know, how countries are, but here in this case, because Russia is my friend, so I'm not going to criticize the Russians.
从现实主义角度看，印度并非欧洲在乌克兰问题上的症结所在。
Now what my view is is from, again, from a realist point of view, India is not Europe's problem on on Ukraine.
共和党整年阻挠援助，现在特朗普本人也如此。
The Republican Party, blocked aid for whole year, and now Trump himself.
若特朗普要与俄罗斯达成协议，我们虚伪的沉默对欧洲的伤害，比他说'我们要与俄罗斯做交易'更小。
So if Trump is going to cut a deal with the Russians, our silence, hypocritical silence, has done less damage to the Europeans than a Trump that says, look, we're to cut a deal with the Russians.
接受或放弃。
Take it or leave it.
如果现在不行动，你们将失去更多领土。
If you don't do it now, you're going to lose even more territory.
所以现在你们就处于这种争论境地。
So now you are in that territory of argument.
因此我认为印度没有在联合国安理会投票支持欧洲，并未对欧洲安全造成多大损害。
So so I don't think India has done much damage to European security by not, you know, raising you know, voting with the UN and the security council.
大多数发展中国家都没有支持。
Most developing countries did not.
再说，如果你去非洲，大多数非洲国家会说，俄罗斯在反种族隔离运动中支持了我们。
There again, if you went to Africa, most of the African countries said, look, Russia stood with us on the anti apartheid moment.
欧洲当时并不在场。
Europe was not there.
美国直到最后一刻才介入。
America was not there till the last moment.
所以我认为这确实是一种肤浅的外交手段。
So I think that is really a shallow diplomatic play.
真正的问题是，如果今天美国说乌克兰的最佳选择是放弃领土，那么这对基于规则的秩序意味着什么。
The real question is if today America says, look, for Ukraine, the best option is to give up territory, then that means something for the rules based order.
对吧？
Right?
我的意思是，无论出于什么原因，你们不得不牺牲东乌克兰来确保欧洲的和平。
I mean, for whatever reasons, you had to sacrifice Eastern Ukraine to ensure peace in Europe.
中国的情况也是如此，事实上，如果把乌克兰视为亚洲的未来，台湾问题的论点也会类似。
And Chinese case too, in fact, this if you apply Ukraine as the future of Asia, Taiwan argument will be similar.
因此我认为这些问题远比印度的含糊其辞要广泛得多。
So I think so these issues here are much broader than the Indian prevarications.
我曾想，我们本可以效仿土耳其的做法。
I thought, you know, we could have done what Turkey had done.
土耳其虽对俄罗斯的干预持批评态度，但他们也站在和平前沿，并实际提出解决方案。
Turkey was critical of Russian intervention, but they're also at the forefront of peace and actually producing solutions.
我希望我们当时也能采取类似行动。
I think I wish we had done that same thing, something similar.
其他观点？
Other hands?
非常感谢您富有洞见的演讲，莫兰博士。
Thank you very much, for your insightful talk, doctor Moran.
您提出的特朗普总统所推行的交易政治理念让我深感兴趣。
I was very drawn to your kind of, idea of transactional politics that, president Trump has kind of folded down.
我特别想了解关于向沙特阿拉伯出售F35战斗机的相关情况。
I'm just curious if about for kind of especially to the sale of f 35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia.
美国的中东政策历来都将以色列纳入其中。
America has kind of always included Israel in its kind of Middle East policy.
现在你看到特朗普总统更倾向于关注沙特阿拉伯和那些犯罪君主国。
Now you're seeing President Trump kind of focusing more towards Saudi Arabia and and and the the crime monarchies.
我很想听听您对此的看法。
I'm just interested in what your thoughts are on that.
谢谢。
Thank you.
这倒是件更有趣的事。
That's more interesting thing.
特朗普并没有说‘我不会’，他说的是‘听着’。
Trump is not saying, I won't he said, look.
‘买我的，买我的’。
Buy buy buy from me.
‘别从法国人那里买’。
Don't fight from French.
你想要什么我都可以卖给你。
I'll sell you anything you want.
过去受政治调控的东西，我不确定沙特人真能拿到手。
So what used to be a politically regulated I'm not sure Saudi's will actually get it.
我们看看以色列人在美国国会会怎么做。
Let's see what Israelis do in the US Congress.
他们肯定还是会阻挠这事。
They must still block it.
这种情况已经反复发生多次了。
This what repeatedly it's happened.
但事实是特朗普并没有说：看，我要搞核扩散，我要断供你们的武器。
But the fact is Trump is not saying, look, I'm proliferation, I'm going to deny you weapons.
为了和平稳定，我要断供你们的武器。
Peace and stability, I'm going to deny you weapons.
他只是在说：看，买吧。
He's saying, look, buy.
事实上，整个贸易论点的核心是减少赤字。
In fact, the whole trade argument is reduce the deficit.
多从美国购买。
Buy more from America.
而在欧洲的案例中，当然是为了阻止欧洲真正建立自主能力，我认为这也将是战略的一部分。
And in the European case, course, is to prevent Europe from actually building its own will also be part of the strategy, I presume.
所以我不认为韩国会这样。
So I so I don't think South Korea.
他告诉韩国人，哦，你们想要核推进技术？
He told the South Koreans, oh, you want nuclear propulsion?
请便。
Be my guest.
更有趣的是，尽管华盛顿的反核扩散派长期辩称，1992年在朝鲜半岛曾有一项协议。
Even more interestingly, while the nonproliferationists in Washington have long argued, there was a nineteen ninety two agreement in the Korean Peninsula.
韩国人不能进行后处理或浓缩活动，而日本人却可以进行后处理。
Koreans can't have reprocessing or enrichment while Japanese do reprocess.
韩国人一直希望废除这个歧视性条款。
The Koreans always wanted the discriminatory clause to go.
你看，特朗普似乎已经同意说，你们想要不同的东西？想自己制造钚？
You know, it looks like Trump has agreed to say, you want different you want to make your own plutonium?
我无所谓，只要你们在费城建造核潜艇就行。
That's fine with me as long as you build nuclear subs in in Philadelphia.
所以我认为这是经济、商业优先的组合，放松了许多旧的所谓基于自由国际主义规则的约束。
So I think this was the combination of economy, commercial, commerce commerce first, loosens a lot of the old, shall we say, the liberal internationalist rules based.
有个防扩散体系，所以我们不能这样对你。
There's a non proliferation system, therefore we can't do this to you.
你签了协议，所以我们不能给你破例，听着
You signed an agreement, so we can't give you to one by saying, look.
好吧。
Okay.
你们自己发展可以，只要从我这里采购就行。
You build yourself up as long as you buy from me.
所以这是一个新情况。
So this is a this is a new situation.
现在，好坏暂且不论，但我认为他对军售相当开放。
Now now, it's good or bad is a different story, but I think he's quite open to selling arms.
事实上，他不断声称我们制造的武器是最好的。
In fact, he keeps saying we are we make the best.
谢谢。
Thank you.
补充说明一下，目前有来自中国、肯尼亚、西班牙、土耳其、印度、巴西、德国、意大利和美国等国的约80人在线观看。
Just to say there are about 80 people watching online from countries including China, Kenya, Spain, Turkey, India, Brazil, Germany, Italy, and The US.
我们的第一个线上提问来自LEC Ideas的校友努拉明·阿巴斯。
Our first online question comes from Nuralamin Abbas, who is an alumnus of LEC Ideas.
他问道：您认为欧亚一体化会仅限于自由民主国家的范围吗？
They ask, do you think the Eurasian do you think Eurasian integration will be limited to the extent of liberal democracies?
欧盟是否会因其价值观而在与亚洲建立更务实的关系时受到限制？
Will the EU be restrained by its values from more pragmatic relationships with Asia?
谢谢。
Thank you.
我我不确定。
I I'm not sure.
你能...我也不确定我是否听清楚了。
Can you I'm not sure I caught it either.
只需保持距离。
Just keep you distant.
当然。
Sure.
你认为欧亚一体化会局限于自由民主国家的范围吗？
Do you think that you Eurasian integration will be limited to the extent of liberal democracies?
我认为美国人在讨论这个，而俄罗斯人和中国人根本不会谈论这个话题。
I think the Americans are talking about it, not Russians and Chinese don't talk about it anyway.
但我认为现阶段，核心问题是经济和安全考量。
But I think at this point, look, the core economic and security considerations.
欧洲人谈论这个话题，但今天的欧洲人也必须摆脱作为规范帝国和过去所持纯粹立场的角色。
Europeans talk about it, but Europeans today also have to walk away from being the empire of norms and the pure positions they've taken in the past.
我的感觉是多元化已经在进行中。
My sense is diversification is already taking place.
我是说，你去布鲁塞尔，主要目标就是在经济层面实现多元化。
I mean, you go to Brussels, the principal objective is diversification on the economic front.
印尼、日本都与印度签署了新贸易协定，能争取的地方都在争取。
Indonesia, Japan, right, signed new trade agreements with India wherever you can get.
军事方面，他提到要在印度洋加大行动力度，或与例如日本、意大利和英国合作研发第六代战斗机。
Military wise, he was talking about doing more in the Indian Ocean or working with, for example, Japan and Italy and Britain are trying to make a sixth generation fighter aircraft.
所以我认为变化正在发生。
So I think things are happening.
这些是否最终会形成真正的架构体系，我们还需观察。
Whether this will all add up into into a real architecture is something we have to see.
但变化在于：如果美国人都举棋不定，那么主要行动者是谁？压力又落在谁身上？
But the change is if Americans are uncertain, the pressure on so who are the main actors?
有英国、欧洲、土耳其，中间还有印度，如果算上海湾地区、伊朗，再加上中国、俄罗斯、日本、澳大利亚。
There's Britain, there's Europe, there's Turkey, there's India in between if you count The Gulf, Iran, you you take China, Russia, Japan, Australia.
所以说，大概有10个主要参与者。
So these are, say, 10 top actors.
那么这些盟友以及对手将如何应对美国可能出现的规模缩减和战略收缩，无论你怎么称呼这种现象。
So how they're going to relate those allies as well as adversaries have now to react against potential American downsizing, retrenchment, whichever you want.
因此我认为这是一个结构性的新局面。
So I think that is a structurally new situation.
即使没有特朗普，鉴于中国军事实力的增长，特朗普对中国进行前沿部署的能力也面临挑战。
Even without Trump, Trump's ability to forward deploy forces against China has become challenging given China's growing military capabilities.
问题是，八十年来美国人一直驻守在第一岛链，但鉴于中国军事实力的变化，这对美国人来说代价将更高。
The question of how do you for eighty years, Americans were sitting on the first island chain, But that's going to be costlier for the Americans today given the material change in the Chinese military capabilities.
所以在某种意义上，西，西太平洋地区必须重新思考其战略。
So in a sense, the Western Pacific had to rethink its strategies.
不。
No.
曾几何时，有个可能是杜撰的著名奥赛图姆语录，他说在五十年代台湾危机期间
There was a time, you know, famous quote from Ossetum, I mean, probably apocryphal where he said in the nineteen fifties when all this Taiwan crisis was going on.
他说，看啊，美国人就在我床边打鼾
He said, look, Americans are snoring next to my bed.
这让我很困扰，我不喜欢这样
It disturbs me, I don't like it.
美国人的鼾声非常吵人
Very noisy snoring by Americans.
但总有一天，我会对美国人说：先生，您能挪个位置吗？
But someday, I'm going to tell the Americans, sir, could you just move a bit?
所以如果你观察中国过去十年的战略，核心就是让美国人挪位
So if you see the Chinese strategy last ten years, the strategy is about getting the Americans to move.
两种方式
Two ways.
一是告诉邻国：看啊，山姆大叔远在天边
One, telling the neighbors, look, uncle Sam is far away.
如果你认为可以依赖山姆大叔，那就再想想吧。
If you think you can depend on uncle Sam, think again.
但我就在这里，我在成长，只要你接受我的主导地位，我可以给你优厚的条件。
But I'm here, I'm growing, I can give you benign terms as long as you accept my domination.
同时告诉美国人，听着，别让那些小角色插在我们中间。
And telling the Americans at the same time, look, don't let the small guys come between us.
我们来谈谈G2吧。
Let's talk about the g two.
我们来谈谈世界秩序的大事。
Let's talk about the big things of the world order.
所以我认为中国现在处于相当有利的位置，因为他们的实力已经增强了。
So I think Chinese are sitting in a pretty place because their power has grown.
他们可以告诉美国人，我们一起合作，然后告诉邻国，看吧，美国人不会保护你们的。
They can tell the Americans, let's work together and tell the next tell the neighbors, look, Americans are not going to defend you.
而我认为特朗普实际上直接印证了这个论点，正中下怀。
And that I think Trump is actually playing into that field straight away by proving that argument.
是啊。
Yeah.
我的意思是，顺着这个思路，美国优先运动中有一种普遍观点认为，美国无需再前沿部署到第一岛链甚至第二岛链。
I mean, just along those lines, I mean, there's a whole train of thought, let's say in the American first movement that The US does not need to be forward deployed to the first island chain or even the second.
由于军事技术进步，它可以撤回第三岛链，基本上实现半球防御。
That it can pull back to the third island chain because of the advances in military technology that it could basically have a hemispheric defense.
所以这某种程度上...如果你是对的，这对另一方来说简直是诱惑。
So I mean this is kind of, and if you are right, this is like catnip on the other side.
你可以回忆下维韦克·拉马斯瓦米竞选时的言论。
Well, you can remember the the comment by Vivek Ramaswamy when he was in the campaign.
他说，我们对台湾的政策应该是——先把半导体制造业搬回本土，这样我们就真的不需要保卫台湾了。
He said, look, our policy to Taiwan should be the American policy should be get the semiconductor manufacturing back home, then we really don't need to defend the Taiwanese.
所以某种程度上，无论这是否会成为实际政策，都存在疑问。
So in a sense, you know, whether this will actually the policy or not, you know, there are questions.
但我认为问题在于，国际主义者关于美国应该做什么、能够做什么的假设，这些根本前提正在受到质疑。
But I think the the the issue is that the assumptions that the internationalists have made of what America ought to do, what America can do, those assumptions have been questioned fundamentally.
因此，针对这一新形势的调整，既包括中国军事实力的崛起，也包括国内对前沿部署的反对。
And therefore, the adjustment to that new situation, both to the rise of Chinese military capabilities as well as a domestic opposition to forward deployment.
所以我认为他们可能会达成一个新的，我们可以称之为折中方案。
So somewhere I think probably they'll come at a new, shall we say, mean or new point of compromise.
但目前而言，这个问题仍是开放性的。
But at this point, it's open ended.
但就这种情况发生的程度以及美国正朝此方向发展的趋势而言，我的意思是，这对你提到的对冲策略有何影响？
But to the extent that that happens and The US is moving in that direction, I mean, does it do to, you you were talking about hedging.
我的意思是，如果你处于中国周边，那时对冲的理由是什么？
I mean what's the incentive to hedge like if you're on the periphery of China at that point?
我的意思是，如果美国不驻守并后撤，似乎只会削弱这种策略。
I mean if you, if The US is not present and is pulling back, it would seem to just kind of undermine that.
对于小国而言（可能不包括印度这样规模的国家），但对其余小国来说，似乎更明智的做法是随大流并采取绥靖政策。
You the least for smaller states, maybe not a a country the size of India, but for smaller states it would seem that it's it's much smarter to bandwagon and appease.
这就是我认为那些有能力讨论核议题的国家，在某种程度上建立核能力的理由——某种自力更生的论据。
That's what we look, I think those who are capable of debating nuclear issue nuclear capabilities to some sense build up, you know, bootstraps argument.
你必须发展自身实力。
You've got to build your own capabilities.
与此同时，只要能让美国人留下——这是日本的策略，印度人也希望美国人能尽可能久地驻留。
While at the same time, see as long as you can keep the Americans, which is a Japanese strategy is to keep the Americans, even the Indians would like to Americans to stay as long as they can.
因为至少能为你争取准备时间，正如你所说。
Because for you at least to get prepared, as you said, by time.
但是，其他更小的国家会选择随大流。
I mean, but but others but the smaller even the smaller countries, bandwagoning will be.
但即便是泰国这样1亿人口的国家，菲律宾这样1亿人口的国家，也不会轻易屈服——要知道，亚洲各国都有强烈的民族主义。
But even a country like Thailand is a 100,000,000 people, Philippines is a 100,000,000 people, that they will simply roll over and play dead because look, Asia, everybody's a nationalist.
认为只有中国人才有民族主义观念，这种看法是错误的。
This notion only Chinese are nationalist, I think is wrong.
因此各国都将不得不寻找出路。
So people will will have to find a way.
但如果你是马尔代夫这样的小国，说实话，你还有什么选择呢？
But if you're a small country, Maldives or somewhere, I mean, what choice do you have?
从中国人那里能拿多少就拿多少。
Take what you can get from the Chinese.
看看能否找到一个远方的大国来制衡。
See if you can get a distant power, someone to balance it.
但除此之外，尽量在现有局面下争取最佳结果。
But otherwise, make the best of the situation.
所以会出现一些跟风现象。
So there'll be some bandwagon.
会有一些军事能力的重建，以及寻找所谓的非对称战略来应对中国的力量。
There'll be some rebooting of military capabilities and some finding, shall we say, asymmetric strategies to deal with Chinese power.
那我们再回答几个问题。
So we'll take some more questions.
我想看看在场有没有哪位举手的女士被我忽略了？
I'm looking for do we have any are there any women in the room who've got their hands up that I'm missing?
我这里还有学生。
I have students here.
好的。
Okay.
让我们来回答这个问题。
Let's, we'll take this.
我不确定，你指的是谁。
I don't, you're pointing to someone.
哦，好的。
Oh, okay.
最近我们看到迪克·切尼去世时，JD·万斯最近发言称，自二月以来共和党在外交政策上采取了不同方向，不再希望回到开放边境和卷入战争的老路。
Recently, we saw when Dick Cheney died that JD Vance spoke recently and said that since the February, the Republican Party sort of took a different direction in his foreign policy, and it doesn't wanna return to the sort of open borders getting involved in wars.
但你是否认为特朗普采取的新外交政策方向真的比布什提出的'其他国家的问题就是我们的问题'危险得多？
But do you think really that the new direction of foreign policy that Trump's taken is that much more dangerous than what Bush proposed of other countries' problems are are our problems?
与美国优先政策相比，这种新外交政策比新保守主义2000年代共和党提出的政策危险程度高出多少？
And how much more dangerous is the sort of new foreign policy that Trump's taken on with America first compared to sort of what the neoconservative two thousands Republican party sort of proposed?
我
I
不知道是不是这里的音响效果有问题。
don't know what there's something about the acoustics in here.
我们很难听清问题。
It's hard for us to hear the questions.
再试一次，你听到了吗？
Give it give it one did you hear it?
好的。
Okay.
好问题。
Great question.
我认为，这非常有趣。
I think see, it's very interesting.
我的意思是，当你回顾2000年布什竞选时，他使用同样的说辞——美国必须谦逊，不应干涉全球事务，我们应该关注中国，你知道的，所以我们不搞国家建设，因为民主党人愚蠢，他们才搞国家建设。
I mean, I think when you see the Bush campaign two thousand, when he uses the same tropes, America must be humble, America should not mess around the world, we should focus on China, we should you know, so so there was this we don't do nation building, that because, you know, democrats are stupid, they do nation building.
我们不会这么做，结果却深陷伊拉克和阿富汗。
We're not going to do it, and you end up actually in Iraq and Afghanistan.
所以我认为这种说辞很熟悉——我们想要保持谦逊，我们不想搞国家建设，但实际上又被拉回去做同样的事。
So I think there is that familiar thing of saying we want to be humble, we don't want to do nation building, but actually sucked back into doing exactly the same thing.
当前的中东辩论也是如此。
Same thing in the current Middle Eastern debate.
我是说，如果你听史蒂夫·班农的言论，他们从根本上反对像特朗普那样大力支持以色列。
I mean, if you listen to Steve Bannon, I mean, they're thoroughly opposed to supporting Israel to the extent that Trump has done.
为什么以色列要把美国拖入中东冲突。
That why is Israel dragging in US into the Middle Eastern conflicts.
冲突。
Conflicts.
整个MAGA阵营都强烈反对对伊朗发动攻击。
The whole MAGA was very opposed to attacks on Iran.
所以存在这一派别，但美国总统——我们不是在谈论他的对外权力，但他在国内有极大的自主行动空间。
So there is that section, but but the but the president of America, we're not about his power externally, but he has internally has so much room to autonomy to do things.
所以最终对我们这些局外人来说...
So in the end for us, we're all outside.
我是说，只能看他们做了什么，而不是说了什么。
I mean, can only go by what they do, not by what they say.
你可以像研究美国外交政策话语的人类学家那样观察。
You can see as if you're a anthropologist of American foreign policy discourse.
有趣的论点，但归根结底，真正重要的是美国的实际行动。
Interesting arguments, but in the end, it's really about what America does.
因此，尽管国内存在持续反对，这种不断行事的诱惑依然存在，但这是否是永久特征，我们无法断言。
So that temptation to do things constantly despite opposition at home that endures, but whether this is a permanent feature or not, we can't say.
所以与特朗普存在一些耐人寻味的相似之处。
So there are some interesting similarities with with Trump.
但如今从某种意义上说，中国面临的挑战和中国的影响力要大得多。
But today, in a sense, the challenge that China faces China presence is much bigger.
2000年时，特朗普·布什曾说中国是问题所在。
In 2000, Trump Bush said China is the problem.
我们本要处理这个问题，结果却把重心转向了中东。
We're going to deal with it, and ended up actually focusing on The Middle East.
但如今，中国已是全球第二大经济体，拥有20万亿美元的经济总量和2500亿美元的国防预算。
But today, is second, you know, $20,000,000,000,000 economy, $250,000,000,000 defense budget.
他们正在生产芯片。
He's producing chips.
他们正在研发人工智能软件。
He's producing AI software.
所以布什当年面对的中国并非真正意义上的强国。
So China is not Bush didn't have to deal with the China that was a real power.
事实上，他们当时的主张是什么来着？
In fact, they were the ones who argued, what is it?
‘负责任的利益相关者’，要把中国纳入体系。
Responsible stakeholder, let's bring in China in.
这又是布什政府的论调。
That was again Bush Bush argument.
那么，这位先生怎么看？
So, how about this gentleman right here?
谢谢，医生。
Thank you, Doctor.
拉吉莫汉。
Rajmohan.
希望我的声音听得清楚。
I hope I'm audible.
那么，我的问题是关于摇摆国家，比如印度、印度尼西亚和土耳其。
So, My question is regarding the swing states, countries like India, Indonesia, and Turkey.
那么，是否可以说摇摆国家寻求集体削弱西方，从而为它们争取更多谈判空间和表达观点的机会？
So would it be okay to say that the swing states seek a collective weakening of the West so that it gives them more space to negotiate and more space for their views to get expressed?
这种信心又从何而来？
And to from where does this confidence come from for them?
就欧洲局势而言，红线究竟在哪里？
Because where is the red line as far as what's happening in Europe is concerned?
要知道，这些国家很多确实拥有自主权。
You know, see, the states, a lot of them have agency certainly.
但以关税问题为例。
But take, for example, on the tariffs issue.
这对大多数亚洲国家来说是个问题。
Here's a problem for most Asian countries.
美国是唯一的进口国。
America is the only importer.
中国进口量并不大。
China doesn't import import too much.
因此你们需要美国人。
Therefore, you need the Americans.
你看到东盟峰会时他们竭力讨好特朗普。
You saw the ASEAN Summit where they they went out of the way to please Trump.
但实际上中国正在摧毁他们的许多中型产业，因为中国的产量太大了。
But China is actually China is destroying a lot of their medium industries because China is, you know, is producing so much.
所以在地缘政治上你可以随意评论，但在经济领域，美国仍是主要市场。
So so you can say what you want about geopolitics, but on the economic front, The US remains the principal market.
所以他们都从中国进口，再出口到美国。
So all of them import from China and exporting to The US.
所以我认为这个问题你无法回避。
So I think that problem you can't take it away.
因此短期内，你们必须维持对美国市场的准入。
So near term, you got to preserve that access to the American market.
这就是为什么当特朗普公开挑战世贸组织时，没人去世贸组织投诉的原因。
And that's the reason why when Trump is openly challenging the WTO, nobody went to WTO to complain.
对吧？
Right?
他们全都排队去华盛顿争取双边协议。
All of them queued up in Washington to get their own bilateral deals.
但这就是美国市场的力量。
But that's the power of The US market.
现在你可以说特朗普在挥霍这种优势，特朗普正在摧毁它，但事实是目前，即使是欧盟也因为需要美国对乌克兰的支持而达成了协议——至少这是他们的说辞。
Now you can say Trump is squandering it, Trump is destroying it, but the fact is at this point, whether EU which went and did a deal because they needed American support for Ukraine, that was at least the argument.
但印尼希望保持其市场准入。
But Indonesia that wants to preserve its access.
对印度而言，美国是我们最大的市场。
For India, that US is our biggest market.
所以我认为特朗普实际上是在利用市场规模来玩游戏，但长期来看是否有利，那就是另一回事了。
So I think this way Trump actually leveraged the market size to play the game, but whether it's good long term or not, it's a different story.
但除此之外，他们可以联合起来，但事实是在金砖国家内部。
But otherwise, they can come together, but the fact is in BRICS.
我不确定仅仅靠团结一致就能成功。
I'm not sure by just coming together you can make it.
就拿两周前以13比0通过的加沙决议来说，那是一项彻底亲以色列、完全一边倒的决议，而俄罗斯和中国代表直接离席。
Let take the Gaza resolution that was passed two weeks ago with Thirteen zero, on a resolution thoroughly pro Israel, completely one-sided, and Russians and the Chinese simply walk away.
他们没有行使否决权。
They don't veto.
他们甚至没有留在会场。
They don't even sit there.
俄罗斯和中国投了弃权票。
Russians and Chinese abstain.
为什么他们这么做？
Why why did they do that?
因为大多数穆斯林国家，甚至在特朗普去联合国之前，就发表声明说我们对此没有异议。
Because most of the Muslim countries, even before Trump went to the UN, issued a statement saying that we are fine with it.
当然，他们被骗了。
Of course, they were cheated out.
那是另一回事。
That's a different story.
所以这种伟大的团结在哪里？如果你去马来西亚、印尼，过去几天他们唯一谈论的就是加沙、加沙、加沙，看看美国人，种族灭绝。
So where is this great I know if if you go to Malaysia, Indonesia, the last few all the only thing they had was Gaza, Gaza, Gaza, look at Americans, genocide.
但当关键时刻来临，没有一个金砖国家投票反对这项决议。
And when it comes to a crunch, none of the BRICS countries voted against the resolution.
没有一个穆斯林国家投票反对这项决议。
None of the Muslim countries voted against the resolution.
因为对他们所有人而言，再次强调，与美国保持同一立场至关重要。
Because for all of them, again, keeping The US on on side is important.
我认为这种方式下——虽然我不是衰落论者——但美国仍拥有如此大的影响力，以至于能动员穆斯林国家支持一项彻底亲以色列的决议。
And I think this way, I'm not a declinist, but I think Americans still have so much power that you can actually mobilize the Muslim countries in a resolution that was thoroughly pro Israel.
唯一反对的人是以色列大使，他在决议通过后声称‘反正我们不会执行这个’。
And the only guy who opposes it is the Israeli ambassador after the resolution said that we're not going to implement this anyway.
你们爱怎么说都行。
You can say what you want.
所以我认为这就是力量所在，短期内让美国继续参与仍是各方的核心关切。
So I think that's where the power is and and in the near term then, keeping Americans in remains a key concern for everyone.
我们来看下一条线上提问。
Let's take another online here.
好的。
Yeah.
呃，我们收到了不少问题。
I well, we got a bunch.
让我们
Let's
谢谢。
Thank you.
我的声音清楚吗？
Am I coming through?
好的。
Cool.
这个问题来自罗伯特·卡特勒，他问：能否请您讨论一下中亚、南高加索和跨里海走廊在当前以大国视角为主的讨论中的定位？
This question comes from Robert Cutler who asked, can you please discuss the place of Central Asia, the South The South Caucus, and the Trans Caspian Corridor in relation to the largely great power perspective that has been discussed so far?
谢谢。
Thank you.
我想这里称之为特朗普走廊。
I think here it is called the Trump Corridor.
可以说，在美国因惯性大幅撤退的地方，他正试图以某种形式重返。
So you can say he's actually where Americans have largely retreated from inertia, he's trying to come back in some form.
因此我认为，美国仍有巨大的可能性去尝试新事物。
So I think this way, I think The US still has enormous possibilities where to do new things.
我认为特朗普正在利用其中一些机会，而且有土耳其站在他这边，他在中亚地区已经取得了不少进展。
Some of the things I think Trump is taking advantage of, and with the Turks on his side, he's been able to do quite a bit in Central Asia.
这是历史上首次举办美国-中亚峰会。
For the first time, you had The US Central Asia Summit.
否则，中亚国家几乎很难有机会见到美国总统。
Otherwise, the Central Asians who quite barely got to meet The US President.
现在的情况是，主导中亚地区的不仅限于俄罗斯和中国，还包括美国。
Now you have that where actually not just Russia and China that dominate Central Asia, but US.
美国缺乏地理上的直接通道。
US doesn't have the physical access.
它在军事上能做的有限。
It can't do too much military.
但我觉得这种方式下，各方都存在自身的矛盾。
But I think this way, everyone has their contradictions.
并非所有人都在为美帝国失眠。
It's not all of us are losing sleep over the American empire.
印度人不会，因为他们有中国问题。
Indians are not because they have a China problem.
比如说日本也有中国问题。
You have let's say the Japanese have a China problem.
所以那些希望看到美国制衡的人，会继续支持美国发挥作用。
So those who want to see The US balance would continue to see want to support The US playing a role.
但问题是当今这种个性化、粗放式的外交方式，让人很难进行这种投资。
But the problem is today, personalized, rough and ready diplomacy that's going on, which makes it very hard for people to do that investment.
好的，后面那位先生请说。
Okay, the gentleman way in the back there.
好的。
Yeah.
谢谢。
Thank you.
我有个问题与上一个关于南高加索地区的问题相关，中亚作为欧亚大陆概念的核心地带，您认为其定位如何？
I have a question related to the last one about South Caucasus, what extent to Central Asia, which is the sort of like continental core of this concept of of Eurasia.
您认为未来是否存在某种地理或地缘政治架构来定义欧亚大陆？
Where do you think it's positioned and if there is any geographic construct or geopolitical construct for Eurasia in the future?
您认为中亚将处于什么位置？
Where do you think Central Asia would be?
特别是在俄罗斯战略收缩的背景下，我们看到中国、土耳其等国更加活跃。
Also, especially that the Russians are retrenching, we see more activism for China, Turkey.
印度曾通过伊朗恰巴哈尔港制定过一些规划愿景。
India was planning, had some visions through the Iranian Port Chabar.
您认为在这些发展背景下，中亚将何去何从？
Where do you think like is going to be amid this development?
谢谢。
Thank you.
我再接一个问题。
I'll take another question.
你。
You.
来自伦敦国王学院。
From King's College London.
我对你演讲中提到的地缘政治框架也有个问题，我觉得非常有趣。
I have a question also on the geopolitical framework that you mentioned during your talk, which I found very interesting.
麦金德的同代人卡尔·肖夫勒首次定义了印太概念。
So another contemporary of Mackinder, Karl Schauffer, defined for the first time the Indo Pacific.
你如何看待当今欧亚大陆与印太地区的关系？
How do you see the relationship between Eurasia and the Indo Pacific today?
它们是相互替代的关系吗？
Are they alternative to one another?
它们处于竞争状态还是... 是的。
Are they in competition or Yeah.
由于德国国内政治因素，阿育王项目已被取消。
Ashoka has been canceled because of German domestic politics.
但实际上，我认为阿育王实际上是德国驻东京的武官。
But actually, I think Ashoka was actually He was German military attache in Tokyo.
所以他以当时大多数欧洲人未能从战略角度认识的方式，看到了亚洲的重要性。
So he saw the importance of Asia in a way that the most Europeans did not at the time on a strategic sense.
所以我认为在今天，欧亚大陆和印太地区实际上一个是陆地，一个是水域。
So I think they're really today, I would say Eurasia and Indo Pacific are really one is land, one is water.
如果我们把印太地区视为欧亚大陆的水域——当你离开大西洋，未来北极航道开通后——但除此之外，亚洲周边的水域就是印太地区的范围。
So if we think of Indo Pacific actually as the waters of of Eurasia, when you leave the Atlantic and the someday Arctic will open, but but otherwise, much of the water around Asia, that's what is the Indo Pacific.
因此它们是互补的概念，这让我们回到同样的二元性：大陆对海洋，心脏地带对边缘地带，欧亚对印太。
So they're really complementary ideas, and I think that takes us back to the same duality, continental versus maritime, heartland versus rimland, Eurasia versus Indo Pacific.
那么为什么俄罗斯人和中国人讨厌'印太'这个词？
So why do Russians and Chinese hate the word Indo Pacific?
对他们而言，这实际上是一种制衡手段，所以他们对此持反对态度。
For them, this is about actually balancing them, therefore they're opposed to it.
所以这其实也是一种方式——马汉也曾论述过这一点，对吧？
So it's actually, a way, Mahan was also talking about that, right?
亚洲水域对美国长期而言至关重要。
The waters of Asia were important for The US over the longer term.
因此，我认为这仍是核心所在。
So, remains I think at the core.
关于中亚，我认为其内陆性质使其处境极为艰难。
And I think on Central Asia, would say, look, I think the landlocked nature of Central Asia makes it very hard.
土耳其凭借其民族纽带，如今正采取引人注目的举措。
Turkey, because of its ethnic links, today is doing interesting things.
它正在积极接触所谓的土耳其理事会。
It is reaching out to the you know, there's something called the Turkey Council.
韩国人能够带来资金，他们是重要参与者。
Koreans who can bring in money, Koreans are big players.
日本人正在开展多项活动。
Japanese are doing a lot of things.
我认为印度仍非常受限，因为我们被巴基斯坦和阿富汗双重阻隔。
I think India is still very limited because we are double we are both Pakistan and Afghanistan between us.
所以我不认为印度会在那里扮演如此戏剧性的角色。
So I don't see India playing such a dramatic role there.
实际上，如果你身处中亚，面对着中国人和俄罗斯人，你会想要寻求某种程度的自治。
It's really if you're sitting in Central Asia and you have Chinese and Russians, you want to seek seek some autonomy from them.
这就是土耳其人提供解决方案的地方，而从长远来看，美国人可能会提供更好的解决方案。
That's where Turks offer a solution, Americans might offer even a better solution over the longer term.
那位穿蓝色毛衣的先生有什么看法？
How about the gentleman in the blue sweater?
非常感谢。
You very much.
我做了很多笔记。
I took a lot of notes.
你和格兰特，来自英国国防论坛。
You and Grant, UK Defence Forum.
我确实为查塔姆社写过一篇关于马歇尔·金《地理囚徒》原版的评论。
I did write a review for Chatham House of the original edition of King Marshall's Prisoners of Geography.
我是说，这书太棒了。
I mean, what a book.
它传达的信息多么有力。
What a message it says.
我的问题是，部分基于本周有关美国星座级护卫舰计划的新闻。
My question for you is, and it's only partly based on the news this week about The US Constellation Frigate Program.
我的问题是，你认为中国多久会拿下台湾，是通过武力进攻还是更可能通过封锁？
My question is, how long do you think it will be before China takes Taiwan, either by assault or more likely by throttling?
能把麦克风递给你左边的人吗？
Can you hand a mic to the person right to your left?
嗯，好的。
Well, yeah.
谢谢你的演讲。
Thank you for the talk.
最近我们看到中国宣布在雅鲁藏布江上修建水坝。
Recently, we saw China announce construction of a dam along the Brahmaputra River.
如你所知，那是印度的一条主要河流，而印度本身已是一个水资源匮乏的国家。
As you know, that's a major river for India and it's a already water a country with less available water capacity.
我的问题是，鉴于美国从亚洲撤出而中国日益崛起，我们看到中国实际上并未宣布在印度河上建设水坝，因为该河流主要流经中国的盟友巴基斯坦。
And my question, I guess, to you was given The US withdrawal from Asia and China's increasing rise, We saw that China did not actually announce construction along the Indus River, because it runs primarily through Pakistan, which is a Chinese ally.
你是否认为中国的邻国将更有可能按照对中国更有利的条件重新协商双边关系？
Do you believe that China's neighbors will be more likely to renegotiate the relationship on terms that China finds more favorable?
好的。
Okay.
很好。
That's great.
你能把麦克风递给你正前方的女士吗？
Can you hand it up to the woman right in front of you?
就在那儿。
Right there.
完美。
Perfect.
你好。
Hi.
我是一名高中学生。
I'm a sixth form student.
我想问您的问题是，哦，抱歉。
My question to you is, oh, sorry.
您认为中国与非洲和拉丁美洲的关系是互利共赢的，还是更倾向于像美国那样出于自身利益？
Do you think that China's relationships with Africa and Latin America are mutually beneficial or more leaning towards self interested like US involvement?
很好。
Great.
我想让这位年轻的学生提出最后一个问题，然后就可以结束了。
I think that we'll let this younger student down here get the last question in, and then I'll let you take it home.
罗杰，感谢您精彩的演讲。
Roger, thank you for a brilliant talk.
关于印度，我有个简短的问题。
Just a quick question about India.
我是说，印度显然一直主张多边结盟和铁路政治塑造世界格局。
I mean, India obviously has always argued that multi alignment and rail politic shapes the world.
现在我们似乎就处在这样的世界中。
Now we seem to be in a world like that.
您精辟描述的这种情况对印度外交政策利益意味着什么，尤其是对中国和巴基斯坦而言？
What does this, what does this, situation that you've described so well mean for Indian foreign policy interests, particularly vis a vis China and Pakistan?
好的。
Okay.
不。
No.
关于台湾问题，我认为我的意思是...我是少数派观点，但我的看法是中国会继续挑衅。
On Taiwan, I think my I mean, I I'm an outlier on this, but my sense is Chinese will keep rattling the cage.
他们认为可以在不动用武力的情况下达到目的，就像利用南希·佩洛西访台事件升级施压那样，他们也会利用塔卡尔吉·孙的声明继续加大压力。
They think they can do this without actually use of force, take advantage of, just as they took advantage of Nancy Pelosi's visit to ramp up pressure, they're going to take advantage of Takarji Sun's statement and they're going to keep ramping up the pressure.
在台湾内部，我认为政府和民主党派之间存在分歧。
Internally, in Taiwan, I think it's divided between the government and the democratic parties.
因此在如何应对中国的问题上会存在分歧。
So there will be differences in terms of how to deal with China.
这再次给了中国很多选择，可以继续施压并采取渐进策略，而非大规模入侵。
That again, I think gives China a lot of options to keep pushing and salami slicing rather than do a big invasion.
因为看到普京的所作所为及其失败后，军事干预若不能100%获胜将是一场灾难。
Because the problem after seeing what Putin has done and failed, to do military intervention and not win 100% will be a disaster for.
所以时间站在他们那边。
So the time is on their side.
他们不需要做太多。
They don't have to do very much.
只需持续施加压力。
Just keep keep up the pressure.
美国人会开始行动。
Americans will start.
特朗普已经帮他们完成了一半的工作。
Trump is doing half the job for them.
因此，如果你制造不确定性，特朗普已经制造了太多不确定性。
So if you create uncertainty, Trump has generated so much uncertainty.
所以我认为中国实际上不需要太费力就能在台湾问题上加温。
So I think China has really don't have to do work too hard to raise the temperature on on on Taiwan.
关于水坝问题，中国之前在湄公河就做过类似的事。
I think on dams, look, China has done this before on Mekong.
中国实施这类行动而遭遇很少抵抗的能力已有明证。
So Chinese capacity to do these kind of things without much resistance has been in evidence.
问题是美国人不会介入，联合国也不会有人来说：'你们在干坏事'。
The question is Americans are not going to come in and somebody UN is not going to come and say, guys, you're doing a bad thing.
因此我认为MIT（麻省理工）在这方面的观点是正确的。
So I think this way, MIT is right.
比尔的研究成果。
Bill work.
这套方法在湄公河一直很奏效。
It's always worked on Mekong.
当然，至少在雅鲁藏布江上，我不确定，喜马拉雅山脉以南也有大量集水区或降雨。
Certainly, it's going to at least on the Brahmaputra, I don't know, much of the there is a large amount of catchment or rain takes place South of the Himalayas as well.
所以他们不可能阻断所有水源，因为部分水源实际上是在喜马拉雅山脉南侧收集的。
So it's not as if they can block all the water, because some of the water actually is collected below the South Side Of Himalayas.
不过这挺有意思的。
But but it's interesting.
我是说，中国共产党曾被称作工程师的政党。
I mean, think Chinese Communist Party has been called Communist Party of Engineers.
这些大型项目，我是说，我不知道你是否看过最近那本书，美国是由律师管理的，而中国是由工程师管理的。
So these big projects, I mean, I think I don't know if you've seen the recent book, America is run by lawyers and China is run by engineers.
鉴于中国的整体实力，那些实力较弱的国家很难对这些大型项目提出异议和挑战，这种诱惑非常强烈，我认为我们会看到中国在很多这类事情上得逞。
That the temptation to do these big projects is very difficult for lower repairing states to contest and challenge it given the overall power of China, and I think we're to see China get away with a lot of those.
其中一个问题就是关于中国与非洲的关系。
One, which is the the question on China, Africa.
对吧？
Right?
听着，我再次认为特朗普的所作所为实际上是在帮中国。
Look, think here again, I think what Trump is doing is actually helping China.
特朗普一方面说，看，我们必须重返非洲。
Trump on one side talks about, look, we got to go back to Africa.
让我们专注于贸易而非援助。
Let's focus on trade and not aid.
让我们与他们合作。
Let's work with them.
结果第二天早上，你又说尼日利亚是个可耻的国家。
And next morning, you tell the Nigeria is a disgraceful country.
你实际上已经停止了与拉丁美洲和非洲的这种接触。
You have actually stop go kind of engagement with Latin America in Africa.
过去二十年里，中国与非洲的贸易额已达3000亿美元，但也制造了很多问题。
Well, has steadily Last twenty years, China today has a $300,000,000,000 trade with Africa, but it has created a lot of problems as well.
但考虑到美国自身的不可预测性，以及中国在资源、资本、技术等方面的投入能力，我想...
But but I think given where The US own unpredictability and China's capacity to bring in resources, capital, technology, you name it.
因此我认为他们将继续增长。
So I think they're going to continue to grow.
而欧洲在非洲本应发挥历史性作用的地方却作为甚少。
And this way, Europe has not done much in Africa, where it should be actually historic role.
实际上，他们仅存的那点影响力也正在逐渐丧失。
Actually, what little role they had is also they're losing some of it.
法国人已经被大幅排挤出非洲。
The French have been pushed out of Africa quite a bit.
所以我认为，在任何未来的欧亚战略中，如果其他参与者不关注非洲，中国在非洲现有地位若不受挑战，其收获将非常惊人。
So I think if in any Eurasian strategy for the future, I think the other actors, if they don't pay attention to Africa, I think the Chinese gains would be phenomenal if they're uncontested their current positions in Africa.
拉丁美洲情况不同，虽然那里本是美国的天然势力范围，但美国当前的策略我认为会引发反弹。
Latin America is a different story, where actually, again, America's though it's a natural space for The United States, the way US is playing its cards today will, I think, create some backlash.
你看巴西与中国的贸易往来非常可观。
You see Brazil has a fantastic trade with China.
巴西能顶住美国压力的一个重要原因是中国市场对大豆等农产品有着巨大需求。
One reason why Brazil could withstand American pressure was there a huge Chinese market for the soybeans for a whole lot of other things.
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