宏声第500期 Lyn Alden：谁能阻挡这列火车？

这里是《宏观之声》，一档面向专业金融人士、高净值个人、家族办公室及其他资深投资者的免费每周财经播客。节目汇聚全球金融与宏观经济领域最睿智的声音，直言不讳地呈现多空观点。现在有请主持人埃里克·汤森和帕特里克·苏雷斯纳。

This is Macro Voices, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. Macro Voices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is. Bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Eric Townsend and Patrick Suresna.

《宏观之声》第500期录制于2025年10月2日。我是埃里克·汤森。本周节目迎来史上最受听众喜爱的嘉宾林恩·奥尔登，为我们五期'听众最爱回顾'系列画上震撼句点。林恩接续上周卢克·罗曼的话题，直言不讳地分享她对如何真正刹住这列火车的见解——这火车不仅是当前股市涨势的隐喻。

Macrovoices episode 500 was produced on 10/02/2025. I'm Eric Townsend. Macro Voice's all time listener favorite guest, Lynn Alden, rocks the house this week in the grand finale of our five episode all time listener favorites countdown. Lynn picks up where Luke Roman left off last week, sharing her views on what it would actually take to stop this train. And the train isn't a metaphor just for the current stock market rally.

她探讨的是以美元为核心的全球货币体系现状。这个选题早在知晓卢克·格罗曼上周访谈前就已确定。两位顶级嘉宾不约而同选择对全球金融体系做出严峻预测，这种默契再次向我传递信号：变革正从缓慢积累转向突然爆发。随后请关注我们的'赛后交易'环节，帕特里克将详解黄金投资者如何在规避回调风险的同时不错失牛市延续的收益。下周501期节目，我们将揭晓单期下载量冠军——

She's talking about the current incarnation of the dollar centric global monetary system. She chose that topic for this interview before she was even aware of Luke Gromen's interview last week. The fact that our two top ever guests both chose a rather dire prognostication for the global financial system without even being aware of the other person's intentions to really give a very similar topic interview really spoke to me as yet another signal that we're moving from slowly at first to then suddenly. Then stay tuned for our postgame trade of the week when Patrick will lay out how gold investors can hedge correction risk without giving up potential gains if this gold bull market stretches even farther from here. And be sure to tune in next week for episode five zero one when the single episode download count winner.

没错，确实有人单期下载量超越林恩·奥尔登，但林恩凭借多期节目的稳定表现成为本周总冠军。不过我们也为另一位选手保留了亚军席位，不妨猜猜看是谁。

Yep. There is somebody who's got more downloads even than Lynn Alden, but only in one episode. Lynn did it consistently across several episodes. That's the reason that she's our big winner this week, but we had to give a runner-up to someone else. See if you can guess who it is between this week and next week.

我是帕特里克·苏雷斯纳，带来截至2025年10月1日周三收盘的宏观周度数据：标普500指数上涨111个基点至6711点，市场在不确定性中顽强攀升；美元指数下跌10个基点至9770，维持四个月来的震荡区间；

And I'm Patrick Suresna with the macro scoreboard week over week as of the close of Wednesday, 10/01/2025. The S and P 500 index up a 111 basis points to sixty seven eleven. In spite of increasing uncertainty, markets resiliently climbing a wall of worry. We'll take a closer look at that chart and the key technical levels to watch in the postgame segment. The US dollar index down 10 basis points to ninety seven seventy remains embedded in the middle of a four month trade range.

11月WTI原油合约下跌411个基点至6178，突破尝试失败重回夏季波动区间；11月Arbob汽油跌308个基点至189；12月黄金合约涨342个基点至3897，连创新高距4000美元仅一步之遥；12月铜合约涨146个基点至488；铀涨6个基点至8305；美国十年期国债收益率跌4个基点至4.10%。本周重点关注政府停摆对非农等关键经济数据发布的影响。

That November WTI crude oil contract down 411 basis points to sixty one seventy eight failed to bullishly follow through on a breakout attempt sending it back into the trade range established throughout the summer. The November Arbob gasoline down 308 basis points, trading to one eighty nine. December gold contract up 342 basis points, trading at thirty eight ninety seven, punching new old time highs week after week, and now just a $100 away from the $4,000 mark. The December copper contract, up a 146 basis points to four eighty eight, uranium up six basis points to eighty three zero five, and The US ten year treasury yield down four basis points trading to four ten. The key news to watch this week is the ongoing government shutdown and impacts on release of key economic data like the jobs numbers.

下周将公布FOMC会议纪要及密歇根大学消费者信心与通胀预期数据。本期特邀嘉宾林恩·奥尔登将与埃里克探讨公共债务、经济周期、债务周期及美元储备地位等议题。访谈即将开始，《宏观之声》持续放送，尽在macrovoices.com。

And next week, we have the FOMC meeting minutes and the University of Michigan consumer sentiment and inflation expectation numbers. This week's feature interview guest is Lynn Alden. Eric and Lynn discuss public debt, economic cycles, debt cycles, the dollar reserve status, and more. Eric's interview with Lynn Alden is coming up as Macro Voices continues right here at macro voices dot com.

现在有请本周的特邀嘉宾，主持人埃里克·汤森。与我一同连线的是林恩·奥尔登，根据听众下载量统计，她是MacroVoices史上最受欢迎的听众。林恩，恭喜你荣登榜首。

And now with this week's special guest, here's your host, Eric Townsend. Joining me now is Lynn Alden, our number one MacroVoices all time listener favorite as measured by listener downloads. Lynn, congratulations on taking the number one slot.

非常感谢，实在受宠若惊。很荣幸能参与节目。

Well, thank you. I'm humbled. Happy to be here.

其实我对此感到有些抱歉。本意是想赞美和表彰你，结果我们却安排你在吉姆·比安科、安娜·萨尔·哈吉、路易·加夫和卢克·格罗曼之后出场。我们该如何超越卢克·格罗曼的表现呢？

The thing is I I actually feel bad about this. The whole idea was to flatter you and honor you. And what did we do? We set you up to follow Jim Bianco, Anna Sal Haji, Louie Gav, and Luke Groman. How are we gonna top Luke Groman?

我很高兴能参与这段旅程。从听众转变为嘉宾总是很有趣的——在上节目前我就是Macro Voices的听众。所以能加入并全程参与确实非常奇妙。衷心感谢你们多次邀请我，希望我能继续提供有价值的观点。

I I'm happy to have been part of the journey. It's always interesting when you start as a listener. So I listen to Macro Voices before I came on the show. And so it was it was, of course, fascinating to join it and participate along the way. So I certainly thank you for having me on all these times, and hopefully, I can continue to provide value.

至于要接在这些优秀嘉宾之后发言，确实很有挑战性。我想我能做的就是尝试补充和延伸他们的观点，而非刻意超越某个人——这些人都是我多年来学习的对象。

As far as, following all those people, that is certainly challenging. I guess the best I can do is try to add to it, try to build on top of it, so they're not really trying to top anyone in particular, and those are all people that I've I've certainly learned from over the years.

那我们直接进入主题吧。你说过对卢克上周访谈的某些部分既认同也有异议。具体说说看？你赞同哪些、反对哪些？为什么？你的不同见解是什么？

Well, let's dive right in. You told me that you agreed and disagreed with various different parts of Luke's interview last, last week. Tell me more. What did you agree with, disagree with, and why? What what did you see differently?

如我所言，我大体上是赞同的。我很少会完全反对卢克的观点，我们通常被正确地归类在相似的宏观分析阵营。主要差异可能在于关注重点——他在某些领域造诣更深，而我有自己侧重的研究方向。但整体而言，我认为那次访谈的大方向完全正确。

Well, I mentioned I pretty much mostly agreed with it. There there's rarely anything that I outright disagree with Luke on. We generally get, I think, correctly lumped together in kind of the same macro camp in some ways. Main area where I I differ, I guess, I would say from Luke is just areas of of emphasis or areas that he, has built up more expertise than I have on and other areas that I focus more on. But I I thought that entire interview was directionally correct.

我偶尔可能在某些方面与卢克·格罗门略有不同，可以说我是他的轻量版——我的时间框架往往比他稍长一些，有时判断正确，有时则不然。因此，我可能更像是卢克的温和版本，但除此之外非常相似。所以如果你想探讨某些领域，我很乐意展开多方面的讨论。

One way that I kind of maybe sometimes differ a little bit is that I'm, in some ways, Luke Gromen Light, which is that my time frames tend to be a little bit longer than his, sometimes correctly, sometimes incorrectly. And so I I tend to maybe be a somewhat more muted version of Luke, but otherwise, quite similar. So there if there's areas that you wanna touch on, I'm happy to go in multiple directions.

你刚刚提到了这一点。在我看来真正有趣的问题是：究竟是什么促使或促成了从最初的缓慢变化到突然爆发的转变？这当然是卢克访谈的核心主题。实际上，我更受外界反应的影响。记得2020年1月我们在《宏观声音》预警疫情时，连续数周收到大量仇恨邮件和愤怒指责，人们说我们是危言耸听的疯子。

You just alluded to it. What's really interesting in my mind is this question of what is it that causes or enables that change from slowly at first to then all at once? And of course, that was a major thrust of Luke's interview. I was actually affected more by reactions. You know, when we called the pandemic in January 2020 on macro voices, it was weeks and weeks and weeks of hate mail and angry people saying, you're alarmists.

说我们散布恐慌、精神失常。而卢克的访谈前景预测相当严峻，却获得了大量几乎全是正面的关注，再没人指责我们危言耸听。这让我感觉人们的态度已经转变——现在大家似乎接受了卢克·格罗门关于国际货币体系将因美元（作为核心却未达预期强度）出现重大崩溃的观点。

You're you're fear mongers. You're crazy. Luke's interview was pretty darn grim, frankly, with respect to its outlook. Lots and lots of attention, almost all of it positive, and we're not getting all of the accusations of fear mongering and so forth. It says to me that people's attitude has changed, and this Luke Gromen moment idea of a really significant breakdown in the international monetary system because the US dollar is at the center of it and the US dollar is not quite as strong as everybody hoped it would be.

这些观点几年前还极具争议，如今似乎所有人都准备接受了。这让我毛骨悚然，因为我认为这意味着危机正在加速。我这样解读对吗？你认为是什么导致了这种'突然爆发'的状态转变？

That was really controversial stuff a few years ago. It seems like everybody's maybe ready to accept it, and that scares the hell out of me because it I think it means we're accelerating. Is that am I right to interpret it that way? And what do you think causes that state transition to all at once? Yeah.

我觉得确实

I think that's

这是个合理的解读。首先要说，我确实记得你早期在播客讨论疫情的情景，当时我是听众。听到你和吉姆·比安科等人的分析对我很有帮助。正因如此，我才能在研究报告中记录相关内容并发出预警——很大程度上得益于在正确时间听取了正确人士的观点，并通过自我研究加以验证。

a reasonable interpretation. And I'll start by saying that I actually remember you talking about the pandemic early on your podcast. I was a listener back then. It was helpful for me hearing you and Jim Bianco and others cover it. And so, for example, I was able to have notes about it in my research service and also provide warnings, and that was in large part because of I was listening to the right people at the right time, and I was able to kinda dig into myself and help confirm it.

我非常感谢你们当时的工作。回到当前话题——我们是否正面临'渐变转突变'的临界点？其实我最初进入宏观领域就是为了解答这个问题。更准确地说，当初的问题是：公共债务将何去何从？何时会引发危机？听众可能知道，在此之前我长期担任工程师，主要投资股票市场多年。

So I certainly appreciate the work you did there at the time. Going back to kind of where this goes, or are we hitting kind of a gradually than than suddenly moment, part of why I got into macro in the first place was to answer that very question. Or more specifically, the question was, where is the public debt going, and when will it matter? And so I you know, I prior to that, listeners probably know I worked as an engineer for a long time. I had a long history of investing primarily in equities.

我认为自己更像是一名股票分析师。我开始意识到我们正在进入——某种程度上已经进入——一个宏观因素主导的十年。因此，比起选对个股，把握宏观趋势更为关键。比如股票会跑赢债券还是反之？经济会过热通胀，还是走向通缩收缩？这类重大问题。

I consider myself more of an equity analyst. And I started to realize that we were entering, and to some extent, had already entered a very macro heavy decade. And so more so than just getting individual stocks right, it was really important to get the macro right. Big questions like, are stocks gonna outperform bonds or vice versa? Are things gonna run hot and inflationary, or are things gonna have more disinflationary and contractionary type of things?

把握这些宏观大势至关重要，比如该配置哪些板块、追踪哪些主要趋势。我的研究起点是：随着公共债务占GDP比重持续上升，在2010年代这十年里，政治极化严重。保罗·瑞安与奥巴马时期的争论，共和党财政鹰派与奥巴马政府的对峙，关于赤字与公共支出的激烈辩论。到2010年代末，正如卢克和我早期观察到的，失业率持续下降的同时，赤字占GDP比重却开始攀升。

Getting those really big pieces right, you know, what sectors to own, these kind of major trends. And my my kind of starting question was basically so we have rising public debt to GDP. Throughout the twenty tens decade, there's lots of polarization. There was kind of the the Paul Ryan versus Obama era, that whole kind of, you know, the Republican more more fiscal hawks back then, and then and Obama on the other side of that, and kind of that that great debate around deficits and and public spending. And what we started to see at the end of the twenty tens decade, and Luke covered this early, I started covering it early, was that we started to get rising deficits as a share of GDP even as we had unemployment continue to fall.

这两者原本存在数十年的高度相关性，却在2010年代末持续数年脱钩。原因包括特朗普首任期的无资金支持的减税政策等战术性因素，但根本原因是婴儿潮世代大规模退休，导致巨额福利支出开始消耗财政。

So there's a multi, multi decade history of those being highly correlated, and they separated on a sustained multiyear basis in the late twenty tens. And that was a handful of reasons. There are some tactical ones. Like, for example, in Trump's first term, he did unfunded tax cuts, which, you know, around the margins contributed to the deficits. But the really big piece was simply demographics, that the baby boomer generation started entering retirement, in pretty significant numbers, and therefore, we started to draw down on some of these really big entitlement things.

斯坦利·德鲁肯米勒等人长期警告的福利体系问题终于显现。随后新冠疫情加速了这一趋势，暂时转移了人们对长期结构性问题的关注。但疫情过后，我们仍面临主要由福利体系导致的持续性高赤字。过去五六年，我以强调财政政策重要性著称——当人们紧盯美联储时，我认为巨额财政赤字才是关键。

Things that, you know, like Stanley Druckenmiller and others have been warning about for a long time started to really actually happen. So that whole top heavy entitlement system started to really matter. Then, of course, COVID kicked everything into high gear, and that distracted people a lot, I think, from the secular trend. But then after that all eventually subsided, we're still back on this more secular trend of structurally high deficits in large part because of the entitlement system, because of multiple other factors contributing. And so kind of what I became known for over the past five, six years is my emphasis on the importance of fiscal, which is that, you know, so many people are focused on what the Fed's gonna do, and of course, that is relevant.

2020-2021年间我曾预警通胀。当极端刺激政策的滞后影响消退后，我提出'不可阻挡的列车'理论：虽然赤字热度不及疫情期间，但这种持续高赤字环境会压制经济周期，使通胀长期高于目标值，抵消技术驱动的通缩压力。核心问题始终是：这场财政扩张将导向何方？公共债务何时会真正引发危机？

My view was the really hot fiscal deficits that were running matter. So back in in 2020, 2021, and all that, it was me kind of warning about inflation. And after that kind of hit and eventually, you know, somewhat cooled off from that really explosive period, it was more about this nothing stops his train thesis, which is, sure, it's not running quite as hot as the the hyper stimulus of 2020 and 2021 and and the lagged after effect, but it's more of the sustained, run it hot, large deficit environment that mutes economic cycles, keeps inflation generally above target, offsetting a lot of various kind of technology driven disinflation we would otherwise have, and keeps going. So then the question is, it goes back to my original thing, is where is this all headed? You know, when does the public debt truly matter?

我的第一层答案是：过去六七年影响已然显现。自进入财政主导型环境，经济周期规律改变，收益率曲线预测性下降。财政扩张加剧政治极化——受惠群体与承受货币紧缩政策的群体体验着截然不同的经济现实。

So my my first answer to that is that it has mattered for at least the past six or seven years. Ever since we've kind of entered this more sustained, fiscally dominant environment, the economic cycles have changed. Things like the yield curve have become less predictive than they historically have been. I think it's fueled some of the political polarization because those on the on the receiving side of the deficits are experiencing on average a very different economy than those not on the receiving side of the deficits, and they're instead more on the tight side of monetary policy. So all of this has been mattering, but it's not matter in any sort of, like, grand moment of crisis.

这种影响并非通过重大危机爆发，而是由一系列小型危机串联体现。我与卢克的分歧在于：我认为未来多年都不会出现真正意义上的巨型危机（尽管存在某些待讨论的例外）。在深入探讨前，我暂且说到这里，看您是否有评论。

It's more like a bunch of mini crises that string together. I think where I differ from Luke is that I I think it won't matter in the in the true mega crisis sense, probably for many years, with certain caveats that we could go over. So I'll I'll stop there for a second before we get into that, in case you had any any comment.

是的，我确实想从多个不同角度探讨这个问题。我最喜欢卢克·格罗门的一句话，他经常说，赤字无关紧要，直到它们突然变得至关重要，那时影响会非常大。这句话蕴含了深刻智慧，但关键问题在于时机——它们何时会开始变得重要？

Yeah. I definitely wanna go a lot of different directions with this. So one of my favorite Luke Gromen lines, he he very frequently says, you know, deficits don't matter until they do, and then they matter a lot. That's a lot of wisdom built into that, but of course, the question is the timing. When do they start to matter?

因为自上世纪七十年代以来，所有明白人都在讨论美国政府开始走向不可持续的发展方向。到了九十年代，罗斯·佩罗在92年总统大选中就谈及此事。显然这些人对美国财政政策不可持续性的判断是正确的。但尽管长期来看不可持续，这种状态却维持了几十年。现在再说'很快就要出问题了，你们要当心'反而变得危险，因为太多人已经被训练成只会回应'得了吧'。

Because all the grown ups have really been talking since the nineteen seventies about the fact that the US government was starting to move in a direction that didn't seem to be sustainable. By the nineteen nineties, you you had Ross Perot in the ninety two presidential election talking about it. Clearly, those people were right about unsustainable aspects of US fiscal policy. But, you know, even though they're not sustainable long term, they were able to sustain them for several decades, and it's getting dangerous to say, well, it's a it's gonna start to matter really soon, so you better be watch out. So many people have been conditioned to just say, oh, come on.

就像你说的，大家都知道这终将成为问题，但可能还要好几年。我们干嘛不先忽略它呢？不用说，正是这种态度让我们陷入当前处境。但如何判断临界点临近？又该如何评估距离'赤字突然变得至关重要'那个时刻还有多远？

It's you know, everybody knows someday that's gonna be an issue, but as you just said, probably not for several years. Why don't we just ignore it and not worry about it? Well, needless to say, that's what's gotten us here. But how do we know when we're getting close, and how do we assess how close we are to that moment where all of the sudden deficits do matter and matter a lot?

很好的问题。八十年代末九十年代初确实是公众债务议题的舆论高峰。国家债务钟在八十年代末设立，正如你提到的，罗斯·佩罗以此为主题发动了现代史上最成功的独立总统竞选。

Good set of questions. Yeah. So the late eighties, early nineties were the peak zeitgeist for the public debt being relevant. So the national debt clock went up in the late eighties. As you point out, Ross Perot really emphasized that, ran the most, successful independent presidential campaign in modern history, largely on that topic.

如果查看利息支出图表——即公共利息支出占GDP比重——那个时期正好达到峰值。二战后的几十年直到七十年代，我们的公共债务与GDP比率持续下降。不同的是八十年代开始债务/GDP重新攀升。经过五到十年这种趋势后，人们对此感到恐慌是合理的，毕竟我们首次触及万亿美元公共债务这样的天文数字。

And if you look at the chart of interest expense, so public interest expense as a share of GDP, it was peaking right around that time. You know, prior to then, for for, you know, decades after World War two into the seventies, we had falling public debt to GDP. And what was different is that in the eighties, we went back to a period of rising debt to GDP. So after, you know, five, ten years of that, people, I think, were rightfully kind of freaking out about that trend. We're also hitting giant numbers like, you know, a trillion dollars in public debt for the first time.

这种组合效应相当显著。我认为他们预判过早的重要原因在于：整个八十年代中国开始对外开放，随后几十年加速融入世界，接着苏联在九十年代初解体。于是东方劳动力和资源得以与西方资本大规模对接。

So that combination was pretty significant. I think, you know, a significant reason for why they were early is throughout the eighties, China started to open to the rest of the world. That really kicked into high gear, in the decades that followed. And then, of course, the Soviet Union fell by the early nineties. And so what we had was, you know, this this massive supply of eastern labor and resources was able to connect to Western capital.

我们因此进入新一轮全球化时期，这带来了通缩效应和生产力提升。代价是脆弱性增加——全球化供应链提高了效率却降低了稳定性。这造就了持续异常久的低利率周期，远超人们预期。四十年的利率下行抵消了债务/GDP上升的影响。而现在不同之处在于几个关键因素。

And so we kind of went into this period of renewed globalization, which was disinflationary and productive. Now it came at the cost of fragility, you know, when you globalize supply chains, you make them more efficient but fragile. And so that gave us a wave of disinflation, a very sustained wave, which allowed interest rates to keep falling for longer than people expected and lower than people expected. And so we basically entered we had a forty year period of falling interest rates, which was able to offset the rising debt to GDP. And so what's different now is a couple things.

其一是我们正进入福利体系支出压力更大的阶段。随着婴儿潮一代步入退休年龄，这是新情况。正如我所说，这仅在近些年才出现。另一个重要因素是我们不再处于结构性利率下降时期。我们基本上已触底反弹。

One is we are entering the more drawdown heavy period of our entitlement system. So with baby boomers entering their retirement years, that's new. That's only in the past, you know, like I said. And the other big factor is we no longer have structurally declining interest rates. We basically bounced off zero.

其他发达经济体甚至出现了负利率。高峰期时，全球约有18000亿欧元的负收益率日元和欧元债券流通。如今我们处于这样一个时期：既失去了部分缓冲因素，又面临棘手的人口结构问题，全球化进程也陷入停滞。即便不出现快速去全球化，仅失去生产力持续提升、国际联系日益紧密、经济灵活性不断增强这些顺风因素，转而重新重视本土化要素这一事实就足够关键。我们正在重新引入稳健性概念，而非仅仅追求效率。

Other parts of the developed world went negative. At that peak, we had something like $18,000,000,000,000 worth of a negative yielding yen and and euro bonds outstanding. And so now we're in this period where we no longer have some of the offsets, and we have troubling demographics, and we're no longer globalizing. Even if we don't rapidly deglobalize, just the sheer fact that we no longer have that tailwind of ever more productivity, ever more international connections, and ever more agility, where instead, we're kind of reintroducing local into the equation. We're we're reintroducing the concept of robustness rather than just efficiency.

问题不再是如何通过近乎零库存实现高效生产，而是如何为途中的冲击做好准备。你之前提到疫情前人们还不习惯重大事件发生，那时普遍存在'天下太平'的错觉。过去五年告诉我们，重大事件确实会发生——无论是疫情、俄罗斯入侵乌克兰及后续地缘政治连锁反应，还是持续加沙冲突引发的全球格局重组。我们已进入一个'黑天鹅频发'的新地缘政治阶段。

It's not how efficiently can we make things with near zero inventory, it's how can we prepare for shocks along the way. And you mentioned before the pandemic, people weren't yet really accustomed to really big things happening. It was kind of the the idea that nothing ever happens. If anything, that these past five years told us is that some really big things happened, whether it's, of course, the pandemic, whether it's Russia invading Ukraine and all the geopolitical stuff that followed there, of course, the, you know, massive ongoing conflict in Gaza and the world reorienting and emphasizing that whole situation. So we've entered a new kind of geopolitical situation where things do happen.

这个问题可从两个维度解答。从纯量化视角看（这里我借鉴Brent Johnson的'奶昔理论'），多数货币一旦失去投资者和公众信心——这种信心的丧失时机难以预测，但崩溃可能瞬息发生——就会迅速陷入灾难，因为这些货币在国际上几乎没有刚性需求。美元的特殊性在于，无论人们对其观感如何，全球存在大量基于合同义务（主要是债务形式）的美元需求，这既给我们带来长期优势，某种程度上也是潜在隐患。

I think there's two separate answers to the question. If we look at it from a purely quantitative mindset, and this is probably where I channel my Brent Johnson for a minute, the milkshake theory, with most currencies, as soon as investors and the public lose confidence in it so confidence is one of those things that it it's hard to predict ahead of time at what stage it will be lost, but once you lose it, it can happen very rapidly. With most currencies, if they lose confidence, they can quickly spiral into disaster because there's no or there's very little required demand for that currency outside of the country. What makes the dollar different, of course, and what gives us a longer runway, both to benefit from and to hang ourself with in some ways, is that there is a lot of entrenched demand for the dollar that has nothing to do with people's opinion of the dollar. It's just a bunch of contractual obligations for the dollar, which mostly takes the form of debt.

根据国际清算银行（最权威数据源之一）统计，离岸美元计价债务规模约18000亿美元。这些债务主要不在美国境内，而是分布于各国实体之间——比如巴西某企业欠中国某机构的债务等等。

So depending on what source you use, the Bank for International Settlements is is one of the better sources out there. They show something like $18,000,000,000,000 worth of offshore dollar dominated debt. And that's mostly not owed to The US. It's mostly owed, you know, between all entities in all these different countries. You know, some entity in Brazil will owe to some entity in China and so forth.

这种网络效应构成了美元需求的深厚基础。历史表明，即便公众对美元的信心可能像其他货币那样快速转变，这部分刚性需求变化会极其缓慢。量化来看，这些离岸债务规模超过美元基础货币量，虽小于但可比拟美国境内广义货币供应总量。如此庞大的刚性需求意味着，纯粹从量化角度，美国仍有很长的缓冲期——当然这不代表问题不存在。

And that's this big entrenched network effect of demand for the dollar. And so that's the part that that historically will likely move very slowly, even as public sentiment around the dollar and kind of the optional side of demand can change very quickly just like it does for any other currency. And so when we quantify that, when you have all that offshore debt, that I mean, that's a that's a bigger amount of debt than there is a monetary base of US dollars, and it's smaller than, but comparable to, the entire US onshore broad money supply. So that's a lot of entrenched demand. So I you know, going purely from a quantitative standpoint, I think The US still has a long runway ahead, which is not to say that it won't matter.

关键在于冲击程度将是可控的。例如1970年代石油危机和恶性通胀确实造成严重影响，但美国金融体系最终渡过难关并变得更加强韧。当前我们正具备类似的量化基础。

It's that that the magnitude with which it'll matter will be manageable. So for example, in the seventies, the oil crisis very much mattered. The high inflation very much mattered. But for a variety of reasons, The US, and its financial system was able to get through it and then even get stronger on the other side of it. And so at the current time, you know, we we we have that kind of quantitative basis.

这就是我形成‘没有什么能阻止这列火车’观点的来源，即从现在到2030年代，基于我们的货币供应量增长之快及可能持续增长的态势，加上途中遇到的一些物理限制，比如卢克·罗曼在你之前的采访中提到的稀土问题、我们去工业化的制造业基础等等。所以我们一边维持巨额赤字，一边扩张货币供应，但这被全球对其根深蒂固的需求所抵消。如果让我说，什么可能缩短这一进程？

That's where I get my kind of nothing stops this train view, which is from now into the twenty thirties, based on how rapidly our money supply is growing and is likely to continue to grow with a couple of these other physical limitations along our way, which, for example, Luke Roman covered in your prior interview, things like rare earths, things like our deindustrialized manufacturing base, all these things. So we're running these big deficits. We're growing money supply, but it's offset by this entrenched global demand for it. So I I if I were to say, okay. What could shorten it?

什么会让这种状态难以持久？实际上宏观因素影响较小，政治因素更大。我们身处大字标题时代，政治极化加剧的时代，也是意识到我们治理结构的相当部分并非基于法律而是基于规范的时代——而规范比法律更容易改变。

What can make this not last very long? It's actually less so the macro side and more the political side. We're in the era of big headlines. We're in the era of increased political polarization. We're in the era of realizing that a significant percentage of our kind of structure for how governance work is less so based on laws, is more based on norms, and norms can be changed easier than laws.

因此可能出现非线性的断层：原以为不可变更的合同被违约或修改，重大地缘政治联盟在短期内急剧重组。这些难以提前预测的变量可能会加速危机真正爆发的时点，而非一系列小型危机。例如2022年英国国债危机，三年后英镑并未崩盘——那是个被化解的小型危机，他们为此更迭了部分政府，但最终重回正轨。所以从纯量化角度看，我的基准预测是未来五到十年，美国及其他地区将持续出现若干小型危机。

And so you could have nonlinear dislocations where, you know, contracts that were thought to be, you know, immutable are defaulted on or changed, or major geopolitical alignments shift in a very rapid period of time, and that's the kind of hard to predict ahead of time variables that could move forward, kind of the the estimate date for when it it truly becomes a crisis rather than a series of mini crises. So, for example, in 2022, UK gilts had a crisis. Three years later, it's not as though The UK's currency is trash now. That was a mini crisis that they handled, and and they end up switching their government over it partially, but they got their wheels back on the track. So my kind of base case from a purely quantitative standpoint is that over the next five, ten years, we will continue to have a number of mini crises in The US and elsewhere.

这些火苗会被扑灭。由于巨额赤字持续存在，政治极化将延续：受益者继续处于K型经济上端，非受益者处于下端，我们就这样维持着'高温运行、缓慢熔毁'的状态，并面临政治驱动型突发事件的潜在风险。

Those fires will be put out. There will be ongoing political polarization because the large deficits will remain in effect. People will continue arguing about them. Those on the receiving side will continue to kinda have that higher side of the k shaped economy, whereas those not on the receiving side will be in the lower part of this k shaped economy, and then we're in this kind of sustained run it hot, slowly meltdown type of environment with the risk of more political driven disruptions along the way.

哇，信息量太大了。我想回到你最初提到的：婴儿潮一代退休后从缴纳福利金转为领取福利金，是许多问题的长期驱动因素。林恩，这才刚刚开始，还有更多婴儿潮世代即将开始支取——目前大多数人刚退休不久。

Wow. A huge amount to unpack there, I wanna go back to one of the first things you said, which is the secular driver of a lot of this is retiring baby boomers going from paying into our entitlement systems to drawing down from them. We're only seeing the beginning of that, Lynn. There's still a lot more baby boomer drawdowns to come. We've only, just gotten to the point where most of the baby boomers have retired.

这个周期远未结束，所以问题将长期存在。我们需要巨额资金来履行对婴儿潮世代的福利承诺。等等，美国已经存在严重政治分裂，一个重要主题就是Z世代（某种程度上也包括之前的千禧一代）对婴儿潮世代颇有微词。

We're not even through that cycle yet. So this is going to stay with us for a long time. There's gonna be a lot of money that has to be spent to service the obligations that we have through our entitlement system to baby boomers. Well, hang on a second. We've got huge political division in The United States already, and one of the big themes is a lot of generation z, and to some extent also the millennials who came before them, are kinda down on baby boomers.

他们倾向于将社会问题归咎于婴儿潮世代。这些观点是否合理并不重要，重要的是他们确实这么认为。随着政治分裂加剧，可能会爆发代际战争——正当婴儿潮世代意识到'我们的福利可能在财政危机中彻底不保，必须坚决捍卫社保权益'之时。

They tend to blame baby boomers for a lot of problems in society. Know, it really doesn't matter whether those beliefs are justified or not justified. They hold those beliefs, and we're coming into a period of extreme political division. It seems to me like you can get into a generational war out of that where just as the baby boomers are realizing, wow, all of our benefits could be subject to a complete reversal if we get into a fiscal fiscal crisis. We've gotta really stand up for our rights and make sure that nobody messes with our Social Security.

如果这种情况恰逢Z世代步入积极参与投票、开始关注政治并形成集体意识的年龄，他们会认为婴儿潮一代根本不配享受那些高额福利。没错，他们确实曾向社保系统缴费，但众所周知社保体系注定破产。我们不会为此买单。

If that happens just as the Zoomers are getting to the age where they're really voting actively and paying attention and feeling like, no. Actually, we don't think the baby boomers deserve all of those overpriced entitlements. Yeah. They supposedly paid into that system, but it was publicly discussed that Social Security was guaranteed to be bankrupt. We're not footing the bill for this.

我们将削减这些福利。坦率地说，这可能引发更严重的内乱风险——事实上这种苗头已经显现。如你所说，若此事引发国际社会对美国的担忧，可能演变成几种局面：可能是小型危机，不过我描述的这种情况持续时间会异常持久。但若导致全球开始质疑美元储备货币地位，特别是出现比美元更优越的数字货币替代方案时，那些人为制造美元需求的机制因素就可能迅速瓦解。

We're gonna cut those benefits. That could set up further civil war risk, frankly, and I think we've already got some of that. If that caused the rest of the world to get concerned about The United States, as you said, it could play out a couple of different ways. It could be a mini crisis, although the one I just described is awfully persistent in terms of its duration. But if that causes the rest of the world to start to doubt the US dollar's reserve currency status, and especially if we have a digital currency alternative that seems better than the US dollar, all of a sudden, you could see an unwind where all of those mechanical factors that cause the artificial demand for the US dollar could start to get unwound.

因此在我看来，这可能形成恶性循环导致灾难性后果，也可能分解为多次危机。只要间隔时间足够长，或许还能承受。但未来究竟如何发展实在难以预料，不是吗？

So it seems to me like there could be this massive vicious cycle that just causes horrible outcomes, or it could be broken into many crises. And as long as there's some time in between, maybe it's okay. It's really hard to figure out what's gonna happen, isn't it?

确实如此。作为每年在埃及生活一段时间的人，我亲历过官方通胀率达38%的时期——实际数字恐怕更高。相信其他听众也有类似经历。以埃及为例，尽管情况糟糕，但由于政局稳定，事态没有进一步恶化，目前问题已得到部分控制。

Oh, yeah. Absolutely. As someone who spends part of each year in Egypt, I've been there during 38% official inflation, let alone whatever the kind of the real inflation number was. I'm sure other listeners, have have kind of been in that environment as well. So one thing I think is that it takes a pretty bad as that was in Egypt, for example, because their political situation held together, it didn't spiral into something worse than it could have, and then they, at least for now, partially stabilized the issue.

你说得对，这种对美元的人为需求确实可能随时间蒸发。我常用一个比喻：健康经济体如同站立的人，而美国经济更像倚墙而立——我们依靠储备货币地位创造的额外需求支撑，通过长期贸易逆差向世界输出美元。一旦那面墙倒塌，我们失衡的程度将远甚于结构均衡的经济体。

You're absolutely right that there is this extra artificial demand for dollars, and that can, over time, evaporate. You know, the analogy I've used before is that, like, a a more balanced economy is like someone standing straight up, whereas The US economy is more like someone leaning against a wall and pushing on it, which is basically we have all this extra demand for our currency, for our reserve currency status, and, you know, we run these structural trade deficits with the rest of the world to supply them with that currency. And, you know, if that wall were to give out for one reason or another, we're unbalanced. We're leaning against it. So we can stumble harder than we can compared to economy that's more balanced.

这才是关键风险所在。分析什么可能抽走这面墙？可以从储备货币四大支柱入手：首先，全球百余种货币中，多数自由浮动货币间流动性极差。比如将埃及镑兑换成韩元，就缺乏深度市场——各种货币组合的交易通道实在过于庞杂。

That's basically the key risk there. Now when we analyze what could rug pull that wall away from us, or what could break that wall? Well, I mean, we can analyze the four major parts of of what the reserve currency status is. One is that, you know, with well over a 100 currencies, some of them are pegged, but, know, dozens and dozens of large free floating currencies, most of them are not very liquid relative to each other. So for example, if you wanna convert Egyptian currency into South Korean currency, that's not exactly the the super liquid deep market there because, know, the number of combinations between all those dozens of of large currencies would would, you know, be a huge number.

因此90%的外汇交易都通过美元中转：先兑换成美元，再兑换目标货币。这种流动性网络效应与其说依赖美元稳定性，不如说仰仗其规模优势。另一支柱是储备持有——央行等公共资本池仍将美元作为主要记账单位储存经常账户盈余，但这种趋势已在边际改变。

And so the way it usually works is that something like 90% of currency trades, dollars on one side of it. So you trade whatever currency you're starting with into the dollar, and then you trade the dollar for whatever currency you wanna get to. So you have that really big liquid network effect there that is less so about the stability of the dollar because, you know, you're you're potentially only gonna be in there for a short period of time, but it's more about the sheer scale and liquidity of it. The other big factor, and this one I would you know, I think it's already been changing, is the reserve holding of it, which is that central banks and other large pools of semi public capital, like large pension funds and sovereign wealth funds and things like that, that they will store a disproportionate share of their holdings in the dollar, for lack of anything better, as kind of the principal ledger for where to store their, you know, accumulated current account surpluses, for example. And that's, you know, around the margins already changing.

如今外国官方对国债的需求已大幅减少。一方面是黄金购买量的增加，另一方面是黄金本身的升值。我们大致处于这样一个节点：几十年来首次，各国央行的黄金持有量正逐渐超越国债持有量。而在边缘地带，甚至出现向其他法定货币缓慢多元化的趋势。我认为这种对美元更具选择性的需求可能会迅速消失，因为这大多是自愿的人类决策而非合约义务。

There's not a lot of foreign demand, official demand for treasuries anymore. There's a combination of increased tonnage of gold buying as well as the appreciation of gold. We're kind of roughly at the point where gold is flipping treasuries in terms of how much central banks hold compared to treasuries for the first time in many decades. And around the the margins, there's a very slow diversification even to into other fiat currencies. So I think that the kind of the the more optional thing, that's the more optional type of demand for the dollar that can evaporate on a fairly rapid basis, because that's a voluntary human decision rather than a contract, in most cases.

当然，储备货币地位的另外两大支柱：一是国际合约定价。当国家间买卖大宗商品或服务时，通常仍以美元计价——因其作为最大、最具流动性且可信的结算账本。另一个我之前提到的，是跨境借贷。所有这些未偿还的美元计价债务都是契约性的。当我们分析如何解开这个戈尔迪之结时，主要途径是：随着美国货币供应持续增长，总债务增长将逐渐停滞直至完成去杠杆化。

And, of course, the other the two other big pillars of the reserve currency status, one is international contract pricing. So if you're buying commodities from one country from another country or selling goods and services, often it will be priced in dollars, again, as the the biggest, most liquid trusted ledger to do things in. And then the other one, which I mentioned before, is cross border lending. So all of this dollar denominated debt that's outstanding, which is contractually owed. And the thing there is when we kinda analyze how how could that Gordian not be untied, the main way is, you know, that it can kinda slowly stop growing the total debt as The US money supply keeps growing until it gets delevered.

或者更激进些，部分债务可能被偿还并转为人民币等其他货币。确实存在多种机制可实现这种转换。但总体存在'先有鸡还是先有蛋'的困境：既有美元持有者、美元债务方，也有美元债权方。债权国在要求以其他货币偿还方面更具灵活性，但如果他们自身仍有大量美元债务，又如何向下游债权人支付美元呢？

Or more rapidly, some of that debt could be paid back and then switched over to, for example, Chinese currency. You know, there there are various mechanisms that can enable that. But generally speaking, there's a little bit of a chicken and the egg problem, because there are entities that have dollars, that owe dollars, and that are owed dollars by others. And so it's it's like the creditor countries are the ones that have a little bit more flexibility in terms of saying, okay, instead of paying me back in dollars, you can pay me back in this other currency, for example. But, you know, if they if they still have significant dollar obligations of their own, then, you know, how do they pay dollars to, you know, downstream who they owe?

这就是复杂的网络效应，其解构速度远比白纸推演要慢。这种现实世界的僵局极难化解。这些网络效应非常强大，其中最可择性的就是自愿持有超额货币，其他则具有不同程度的强制性。美国负值的国际投资头寸意味着数万亿美元外国资本涌入美股、美债，以及较小程度的美房地产和私募股权。

So that's kind of the complex network effect that usually takes longer to untangle than clean sheet of paper we might expect it to. That's kind of one of those real world standoffs that's really hard to unwind. And so, basically, these network effects are very strong, and the most optional one is that voluntary holding of excess currency. The other ones are are varying degrees of involuntary. There's tens of trillions of dollars of, you know, The US's negative net international investment position, so all this foreign capital stuffed into US equities, US bonds, to a lesser extent, US real estate and private equity.

这些边际资本一旦撤出，将引发剧烈货币贬值。今年早些时候的解放日我们已略见端倪，但未来可能以更大规模发生。即便美国出现代际政治对立或两极分化加剧，这些契约性需求仍将存在。我认为从美国立场看，更关键的问题是：何时会面临直接违约外国债务的风险？

Around the margins, that can be pulled out, and that that can give us a pretty significant currency drop when it happens. We saw kind of a a very tiny taste of it around Liberation Day earlier this year, but that can, of course, happen on a much larger scale. And so those are kind of the entrenched things that even if we do have a significant, you know, political feud that's intergenerational or widening between the the political poles that we have, a lot of that is still there. It's still contractually demanded for. I think the bigger factor is kind of from The US standpoint is, you know, at what point do we risk just outright defaulting on certain foreign obligations?

是否会实施资本管制，让那些以为可自由撤离的美国市场资金突然被困？这类非线性事件可能导致体系快速崩溃。这更多属于政治而非纯数字领域。就像疫情或战争，这些可能蛰伏一二十年，却在某个周末突然爆发，导致市场出现极端非线性反应。

Do we kind of put up capital controls and say that capital that you stuffed into US markets that you thought you could get out, well, actually, can't. Now those types of more nonlinear things is what can break things more rapidly. And so that's, again, back to the political realm more than the numbers only realm. And at that point, you can get these kind of big things that, you know, much like the pandemic or much like a war, things that, you know, could happen. You know, they might go a decade or two without happening, and then they can kind of happen all at once in a weekend, where you wake up to, like, very nonlinear reactions in markets.

防范之道是持有非证券类资产——如黄金或比特币等可自我托管的资产，它们处于所谓'体系'之外。最后补充一点：我确实认为持续的代际危机会恶化（这是我的预期）。但众所周知，婴儿潮世代投票率极高，而年轻世代的投票记录则相对不稳定。

And the defense against that is to own assets that are not necessarily securities, things like gold or Bitcoin, things that can be self custody, things that are outside of the, quote, unquote, system for those types of extreme events. And going back to the the one point, and then I'll stop, is I do think that the ongoing generational crisis will get worse. That's my expectation. But, you know, we've already generally seen that baby boomers do vote in pretty large numbers. The younger generation, of course, has a more spotty record with voting.

尽管那里的社会契约正在恶化，但人们普遍觉得，与几十年前相比，他们并不一定认为政府像支持前几代人那样支持他们，也不像前几代人那样真切感受到这种支持。他们并不觉得自己是一个紧密整体的一部分。他们认为，比如说，前几代人在全球金融危机中得到了救助，随后又获得了应对疫情的所有刺激措施，而大多数分析显示，尽管媒体大量报道了STEMI支票的发放，但这些措施的实际分配方式相当偏向顶层。实际上，大部分资金流向了大型企业和富裕的小企业主。在一系列此类事件之后，我确实认为年轻一代已经受够了，他们通过更激进的政治投票选择来表达不满，有时甚至不幸地诉诸暴力。

And while there is a deteriorating social contract there, people generally feel that, you know, compared to decades ago, they don't feel necessarily that the government has their back the way that it had prior generations and the way that prior generations really felt about it. They don't really feel part of a cohesive whole. They feel that, say, prior generations were bailed out with, for example, the global financial crisis and then all the stimulus that happened in response to the pandemic, which, you know, most analysis showed was actually pretty top heavy in the way that it was distributed despite the fact that headlines focused a lot on the, you know, the STEMI checks. A lot of it was actually funneled to big corporations, to wealthy small business owners. After a series of those types of things, I do think that the younger generation is fed up, and they do take it out in terms of more political voting selections, sometimes, unfortunately, violence.

可悲的是，我认为这种情况会进一步恶化。正是在这种情况下，你会遇到这些更为非线性的效应，相比之下，一张白纸般的起点——我倾向于认为——是一个相当漫长的过程。

And I sadly, I think a lot of that's going to get worse. And that's where you enter these these more nonlinear effects compared to what otherwise clean sheet of paper is what I would argue is a pretty long process.

你用了‘无法阻挡的列车’这个比喻。没有什么能阻止这列火车。请非常精确地说明你指的是什么。这列无法被阻止的火车究竟是什么？但接着看。

You've used this metaphor of an unstoppable train. Nothing can stop this train. Please be very precise at exactly what you mean by that. What is the train that can't be stopped? But then look.

然后，每列火车最终都必须停下，因为轨道会耗尽。最终什么能让这列火车停下，即便那是在遥远的未来？

Then every train has to stop eventually because you run out of tracks. What could stop this train eventually, even if that's a ways down the road?

是的，好问题。我所说的‘列车’特指美国的财政赤字，也就是说，我认为在可投资的时间范围内——比如五到十年——美国赤字显著缩小的概率非常低。在边缘上，你可以增加关税收入，削减医疗补助。

Yeah. Good question. So I I refer to the train as it's US fiscal deficits specifically, which is to say that I think there's very low probability in any sort of investable time horizon, let's call it five, ten years, that US deficits are going to meaningfully shrink. Now around the margins, you can add tariff revenue. You can trim Medicaid.

你可以……你知道，边缘上有些小调整。但目前，我们的赤字占GDP的6%到7%，名义GDP增长强劲，债务的名义规模持续显著扩大。‘无法阻止这列火车’的论点是指，在可投资的时间范围内，有极高信心认为它不会停止。那么最终什么会阻止它？

You can you know, there's there's little things around the margins. But right now, we're running six to 7% of GDP deficits, and, you know, we're running hot in terms of nominal GDP. We're continuing to grow the nominal size of the debt pretty significantly. And the nothing stops his train thesis is the idea that is not going to stop with very high level of confidence in an investable time horizon. Now what eventually stops it?

我会说，是烈火而非寒冰导致的终结。即他们不会很快控制住赤字，相反，赤字会迅速或严重地贬值，以至于债务义务被充分贬值，局势可能因政治原因变得足够混乱。然后问题在于，在那样的深渊中，美国能否成功软着陆？例如，二战后，我们通过通胀大幅贬值了大量债务，但随后转向了紧缩政策。在那些债务被急剧贬值后，我们处于与现在相反的局面。

I would say death by fire, not by ice, which is that they don't get the deficit under control anytime soon, but that instead, it it debases so rapidly or so significantly that the obligations are devalued enough. Things have become chaotic enough, likely politically. And then the question is, in those depths, does The United States manage to stick the landing? So for example, after World War two, you know, we devalued a lot of the debt through inflation, but then we pivoted more toward austerity. After those debts were sharply devalued, we were in the opposite situation we had now.

我们曾拥有非常强劲的人口结构优势。全球范围内，我们掌握着大部分王牌。我们基本上拥有唯一完整的制造业基础，持有全部黄金储备，GDP占全球比重超过40%。

We had very strong demographics. We, you know, we had a lot of the cards globally. We had the basically, the only intact manufacturing base. We had all the gold. We had 40 over 40% of global GDP.

因此在经历显著贬值后，我们得以通过增长摆脱困境。关键问题在于，经历大幅贬值后（可能表现为货币急剧贬值导致债券持有人违约），或者如你先前所言，最终可能表现为对部分社保或医保的违约——本质上就是通过收入审查或暂时冻结生活成本调整等方式，在名义上削减部分福利。这种购买力层面的违约存在多种实现形式。那么问题在于：违约到某种程度后，我们能否止住失血？

And so we were able to kind of grow our way out of it after a significant devaluation. The big question here is after we have a big devaluation, it could take the form of a significantly weaker currency, therefore defaulting on bondholders. And to your prior point, it could take the form of eventually defaulting on some portion of Social Security or Medicare, and basically saying that those are just gonna nominally be lessened to some extent, whether it's mean testing, whether it's, you know, cost of living increases for a period of time. There there's kind of various mechanisms that could be some type of default on basically purchasing power in that capacity. So after some degree of defaults, then the question is, can we stop the bleeding?

我们能否重新转向生产力增长阶段？这部分我认为尚待观察。这更多是政治问题而非宏观问题。在剧烈贬值后，数字本身当然可以修复。但核心在于：作为一个国家，我们是否具备重建所需的共同愿景？

Can we pivot toward a period of productive growth again? That's the part that I think that remains to be seen. That's more of a political question than a macro question. The numbers themselves are certainly fixable after a period of sharp devaluation. The question is, we, as a country, have enough of a shared vision, I I think, basically, to to rebuild from there?

我过去常强调从瑞·达利欧借鉴的长期债务周期概念，我认为其内涵深刻。你我都讨论过第四次转折的重要性。有人质疑第四次转折理论像是给投资者或人口学家的占星术——某种玄妙的周期理论。这种批评确有道理，但我如此重视它的原因在于：这个约80年的周期背后，存在若干可量化的具体事物在此消彼长。

And one thing I've kind of emphasized in the past, I've I've borrowed this from Ray Dalio, is the the concept of the long term debt cycle, which I think has significant aspects to it. And both you and I have discussed the importance of the fourth turning. And, you know, some of the pushback against the idea of the fourth turning is that it's kind of like astrology for investors or demographers. Like, it's kind of this woo woo cycle theory, and, you know, I think there's some truth to that criticism. But the reason that I give it so much credence is because behind that that cyclical aspect to it, that kind of roughly eighty year, cycle approach, there are a handful of specific things that grow and die or strengthen and weaken along the way, and some of those are quite measurable.

我想重点指出三点：其一是长期债务周期。几十年来我们经历多次衰退，每次央行都更趋鸽派——降息、量化宽松，动用当时可用的所有工具。

And so the three that I would highlight, one of them is the long term debt cycle. So, basically, we go through a period of of recessions over decades. Every time we have a recession, the central bank, you know, gets more dovish. They cut interest rates. They do quantitative easing, whatever the tool, of the day happens to be.

他们重新刺激债务增长。此外，每当私营部门在衰退中收缩信贷，我们通常就扩大公共赤字。随着利率越来越低，这种模式不断累积。2008年我们确实达到了顶点——利率降至零，私人债务极高。

They reinflate the growth of debt. In addition, you know, whenever we have private sector contraction in lending during those recessions, we generally blow out the public deficit, and that keeps building and building over time as we get lower, lower interest rates. And, you know, we've really hit the apex of that in in 02/2008. So we basically got interest rates all the way to zero. We got private debt very high.

于是我们开始将债务转移到公共账本上。随着银行债务和住房债务暴雷，我们运行巨额赤字，大规模救助系统。新冠疫情期间我们又重演了这一幕——债务再次从私营部门向公共部门转移。

So then we started rotating it onto the public ledger. So as, you know, as bank debt and housing debt blew up, we ran very large deficits. We bailed out large swaths of the system. Then we did it again, basically, during COVID, during the pandemic. There was another kind of shift from private sector debt more to public sector debt.

于是你不断累积这些债务，越堆越高，一旦进入公共账目，最终基本上就是通过通胀将其稀释。内战时期他们这么做过，上世纪四十年代期间及之后也这么做过，而过去五六年我们实际上也在重复这一模式。对债券持有者而言，这堪称最恶劣的环境之一，相较其他所有资产类别而言。我认为这轮周期尚未完全结束。

And so you kind of pile that debt up and up and up, and then once it's on the public ledger, you eventually basically inflate it away. They did that in the civil war. They did that during and after the nineteen forties, and we've really done it over the past five or six years as well. Mean, it's been one of the worst environments for bondholders compared to every other asset out there. I don't think it's fully done yet.

但本质上，这就是第四次转折期间发生的周期之一——当债务全面上升至主权层面，进入主权级购买力违约阶段时，即为第四次转折。这是可量化观测的三大支柱之一。第二项是法律体系的持续累加。在正常运作过程中，立法者每年都会制定新法，通常新增法律远多于废除的旧法。

But, basically, that's one cycle that happens along that fourth turning, which is basically once you get the when it's all in the sovereign level and you enter that more sovereign level purchasing power default phase, that's the fourth turning. So that's one of the three big pillars that's kind of measurable and watchable. The second one is kind of legal accumulation. So during a normal course of of operation, you know, every year lawmakers create new laws. They generally create more laws than they repeal.

于是我们逐渐形成这种层层叠加的官僚体系，就像油漆剥落后不断覆盖新漆——当新漆层再度剥落，就继续覆盖。三十年后，你会累积三十层油漆，国家法律体系正是如此演变。最终变得极度官僚化，难以运作。人们不解为何当年帝国大厦能在一年半内建成，而加州即使拥有近乎无限的时间和资金，却始终无法完成高铁建设。

And so we kind of get this layered bureaucracy that kind of builds up over time. It's kind of like if your paint scratches and you just kind of paint over it, and then that layer starts to scratch, so you paint over that. And, you know, after thirty years, you've got 30 coats of paint, and that's what happens to a country's legal system. So it becomes very bureaucratic, hard to operate in. People wonder why, you know, we could build the Empire State Building in like a year and a half, but California can't build high speed rail even given seemingly infinite amounts of time and money.

这正是影响因素之一。通常当进入第四次转折时，法律体系已复杂到引发打破常规的呼声——要么公然无视某些法规，要么通过重大政治运动重组重置部分法律。我们可以将此视为经济与治理的'护盾失效'时刻：重大变革期间，一方面能创造优化契机——如同电脑长期运行产生内存泄漏后必须重启——可借此精简法律体系，使其符合当代需求。

It it's that's one of the factors that goes into it. And so generally speaking, when you have kind of a, fourth hurting, you've entered such a complex phase of the law that there are calls for basically breaking of the norms of some of those laws, outright disregarding some of those laws, or big political movements to to reorganize and reset some of those laws. And that's we can kind of think of that as like a shields down moment for the economy and for governance, which is, you know, when you're undergoing major change, it allows for, on one hand, much better situations. You can clean out a lot of that. It's You kind of like if you leave your computer on and it gathers memory leaks and eventually you have to reset it.

当然这也意味着可能偏离轨道，滑向法西斯主义或共产主义——当失去常规运作环境中的制度保护时，容易走向这两种极端。

You know, it allows that kind of opportunity where you can streamline laws. You can reorganize things. You can make sure that the laws are kind of geared to the present day. But, of course, it also means that you can go off the tracks and wind up in either fascism or communism. You kind of go off on one of the the two sides where you're not kind of shielded in in the same way that you are in a more normal operating environment.

本质上，我们正进入这种法律重置时代，叠加长期债务周期的影响，二者相互作用。第三大支柱则是制度变迁。制度通常为解决特定时代的社会需求而建立，但根据'转折世代'理论——约四个世代（相当于人类完整生命周期）后，制度创建者早已不在。

Basically, we're we're entering that kind of era of some degree of legal resets going on in addition to that long term debt cycle. And and so, you know, we kind of have those kind of playing together. And then the third one would be institutions. So institutions are generally created to solve a set of problems or social needs in one era. And we know when you kinda look at the foreturning analogy is basically, you know, after after four human lifetimes or, you know, four generations, which is like one long birth to death human lifetime, the people that built those institutions are no longer around.

这些制度往往历经数代后已腐化，社会熵增效应显现。由于各种原因，它们不再发挥原有功能，或至少公众如此认为。当前无论具体机构还是整体领域（如媒体或国会），多数类型制度的公信力都大幅下滑。与此同时，新制度正在逐步构建。因此除了长期债务周期更迭和法律体系复杂化周期，我们还见证着制度的生死轮回。

A lot of times, those institutions have become corrupted over generations. Entropy, basically social entropy, has taken hold, And those institutions, for a variety of reasons, kinda no longer serve the way that they once did, or at least they're no longer perceived to serve the the way that they once did. And so and currently, when you look at, say, polls of, you know, whether it's organizations, whether it's whole sectors like the media or congress, there's been a major loss of confidence and trust in most types of institutions. There's been a gradual kind of building of new institutions. So in addition to the long term debt cycle rolling over and kind of the whole legal complexity cycle rolling over, you get that institutional birth and death.

所有这些因素都在当前环境中逐渐汇聚成形。而且，这并非仅局限于某一年份的问题。第四转折点并非指具体年份，而是指整个时代。正如那本书的作者所定义的，它实际上始于全球金融危机。

And so all those things are kind of culminating in this environment. And, again, it's not just one year. It's not like what year is the fourth turning. It's it's this whole era. It's basically the you know, as as they would the authors of that book would define it, it basically started with the with the global financial crisis.

这种态势延续至今，伴随着一系列不断升级的危机，直至我们触底反弹，并在某个特定方向上实现重大重组。这个方向可能更好，也可能更糟，但我认为未来五到十年内这种趋势将持续显现。这是可量化、可观测的，而非仅仅是玄乎的周期理论。在宏观分析中确实需要考虑这些超出常规奥弗顿窗口的因素，它们会彻底改变各类投资结果。

It continues through this day with this kind of rising series of of crises until we kind of hit rock bottom and there's some sort of massive realignment in a particular direction. And that could be a better direction, or it could be a worse direction, but I think that's going to continue to play out over the next five or ten years and that it's somewhat quantifiable and observable rather than merely, you know, woo woo cycle theory. And that that really actually does play a role in macro analysis because you do have to take into account these things that are outside of the normal Overton window and that can really shake up various investment outcomes.

Lynn，我认为你在本次访谈中出色地阐述了这场终将停止的财政列车，现在似乎是结束采访的合适时机。等等——我突然想到还有个同等重要的长期趋势，可能在你所说的未来若干年（或许超出可投资期限）内显现。我称之为'破碎货币遇上破碎能源'。具体而言，我们正面临严峻的能源问题。

Lynn, I think you've done an absolutely brilliant job in this interview of laying out this entire fiscal train that can't be eventually stops it and so forth feels like a logical time to wrap up the interview. Oh, wait a minute. I can't do that because I think there's something equally important, another major secular trend that I see probably playing out in about the same time frame that you're talking about over the next, you know, quite a few years, be probably beyond the investable time frame or well beyond the investable time frame. I'm gonna call that broken money meets broken energy. What I mean by that is we've got a serious problem with energy.

有些人在推特上反驳我说：'现在油价才60多美元，比起几年前根本不算什么'。别管这些，看本质。

You know, some people will say to me on Twitter, you know, oh, what are you talking about? We're back down to, you know, just above $60 on oil here. It's nothing compared to what it was a few years ago. Forget that. Look.

宏观来看，即便考虑多年通胀因素，化石能源价格已是我童年时的两倍多——而我的童年早已是很多年前的事了。Lynn，如果要解决这个问题，我确信化石燃料只会越来越贵。核能本是解决方案，但这需要漫长周期和巨额资本支出。

Big picture. Big picture. Energy from fossil fuels already costs more than double what it cost when I was a kid even after adjusting for inflation over all of those years, and it's been a lot of years since I was a kid. Well, Lynn, if we're gonna solve that problem, I'm convinced that the fossil fuel source is only going to get more and more expensive compared to what it was when I was a kid. The solution is nuclear energy, except that takes a long time and a huge, huge, huge amount of CapEx.

必须拥有极佳的借贷能力才能支撑核能建设的资本投入。而你刚刚解释了为何我们的借贷能力即将开始萎缩甚至最终崩溃。我们该如何解决这个关乎人类存续与繁荣复兴的关键能源问题？

You gotta be in a really good borrowing position in order to fund all of that CapEx investment in building out nuclear energy. I think you just explained all of the reasons why our borrowing ability is about to start shrinking and maybe eventually collapse. How are we gonna solve the energy problem that's really essential to the continuation of humanity and the restoration, I think, of of human prosperity?

很好的问题。这某种程度上涉及我提到的法律周期——如今核设施建设周期比过去漫长得多，成本也因此飙升，部分原因是相关法律环境变得极其严苛。我同意你关于化石燃料价格目前受控的观点，短期内确实看不到推动其上涨的催化剂。

Yeah. Good question. That that partially touches on the legal cycle that I mentioned, which is for the length of time it takes to build a nuclear facility is much longer and and therefore much more expensive than it used to be, in part because the legal situation just became so onerous to do that. And I agree with you that right now fossil fuels, hydrocarbons, are well under control in terms of price. I don't expect any kind of near term catalysts to pop them higher.

如果三年前你问我是否预期油价会比现在更高，我会说是的。但现实是它们正按当前轨迹缓慢前行。展望本世纪末至下个十年，沿着我们讨论的时间线，我认为碳氢化合物将迎来新一轮牛市周期，本质上就是供应短缺、价格高企、亟需增产的循环。正如你所言，核能是重要解决方案——我们曾共同制作了专题节目《破碎的能源》，建议听众们去听听。

If you asked me three years ago when I thought they'd be a little bit higher than they are now, I would say yes. But, you know, they're they're chugging along as they are. I do think that as we look out to the end of this decade and into next decade, kind of along along this kind of a time horizon we talked about, I do think we will have another bull cycle of hydrocarbons, basically another cycle of shortages, high prices, trying to get more supply to come online. As you mentioned, you know, nuclear is a major solution. We we had an we had a whole episode together, of course, called Broken Energy, that I would suggest listeners check out.

核能确实是强有力的解决方案，但实施周期漫长，尤其在人力资本薄弱的经济体中——包括技术人才短缺、法律环境导致建设成本高昂等问题。因此我认为我们将遭遇可解决的能源危机，但解决得越晚，能源供应持续稳定的时间越长，政治缓冲期就越久。试想当前政治格局下若油价飙升至150-200美元/桶，对国内外政治气候会产生何等冲击？

And, you know, nuclear is a very powerful solution to that, but it does take a long period of time, especially in an economy that has burdened itself with weaker human capital, like, basically know how to build them, you know, the the legal situation that makes it hard and costly to build them. So I do think that we'll have another energy crisis along the way, which is solvable. But, basically, the the longer that that is delayed, basically, the more that we have energy supply flowing well without disruption, that adds runway to the political situation. Whereas, I mean, you can imagine right now, if we had the current political sit situation where we had oil at a 150 or $200 a barrel, Imagine what that would do to the the political climate as it is now. And in in both domestically, in The US as well as, globally between nations, what would that look like?

未来数年我们很可能见证这种局面。以美国页岩油为例，能源价格走低有多重原因：2010年代大量亏损性钻井与低利率并存，加上页岩油开采技术突破。即便传统石油产量见顶，非常规石油及时填补了空缺。

And I think in the years ahead, we could certainly find out. I mean, if you look at at US shale oil so if we kind of back up the various reasons, and maybe you have something to add. But if you back up the reasons of why energy is cheap, there's a bunch of reasons. One is, of course, the twenty tens, you know, we had a lot of unprofitable drilling combination with low interest rates, and, you know, the application of technologies to get, you know, shale oil out of the ground. So even though we had peak conventional oil, kind of according to estimated timelines, we had all that unconventional oil come to market.

东欧战争也未能如预期般彻底阻断俄油供应——这是政治选择的结果。欧洲无力全面禁运俄罗斯石油，导致其仍通过各种渠道流入市场。当前价格水平下，美国页岩油产量基本维持横盘。

And the war in in Eastern Europe hasn't taken barrels totally off the market the way that that some feared that it would partially. That's a that's a political choice. I mean, Europe found themselves not really in a position to to really kinda get Russian oil off the market. So it still finds its way to market just through various frictions along the way. And right now at the current time, with current prices, US shale production is kind of rolling sideways to over.

现有油价不足以激励钻井活动，既无法抵消自然衰减率，也难以显著增产。能源部长比森原计划增产300万桶/日的目标未能实现，主因是价格支撑不足。更矛盾的是：政府既希望油价下跌，又要求增产——除非直接补贴（但未实施）。

The price is not significant enough to incentivize enough drilling to both offset the depletion rates as well as substantially add more. So so far, secretary Bessen's goal to, I believe, it was increase production by 3,000,000 barrels, is not really playing out. We're not really directly going in the way that he expected in large part because, you know, the prices don't support it. And in fact, some of the some of the kind of the goals conflict because they wanted cheaper oil, but they also wanted more oil production coming to market. And really, the only way that could work is if you just outright subsidize them, which they've not done.

未来页岩油供给疲软将产生影响，叠加潜在的地缘政治动荡。虽然更多非常规能源可入市，但这需要持续高价支撑——比如深海油田、北极项目等。在当今地缘政治复杂、制裁风险加剧的背景下，投资者只有确信能源利润可观时，才愿为长期项目融资。因此新一轮能源短缺和高价周期必将到来，这在财政主导、政治火药桶已就位的环境下，极易引发金融压制、通胀飙升却不敢加息、货币贬值等连锁反应。

And so, you know, basically, I think that in the years ahead, that kind of weaker supply from shale will impact things as well as, you know, any other geopolitical disruptions that could happen. And while there are more unconventional sources that can come to market, that generally requires both high prices and sustained prices. Basically, some of the some of the deeper water stuff, some of the Arctic stuff, the underwriters of those projects, especially in a in a geopolitically complex world where there's more kinetic risk, in various parts of the world and sanction risk, and geopolitical feuds over places, the willingness to kind of finance those longer term operations has to come with pretty high confidence that the energy prices are gonna support it profitably. And so I do think that we'll have another cycle of energy shortages, higher energy prices, which, you know, again, is solvable, but then when you have that hot political mix already happening, and you're already in fiscal dominance, that's where it's kind of a powder keg. That's where you get things like financial repression, like you get another inflation spike, but instead of raising interest rates, central banks are kind of captured, and they're just keeping interest rates low and debasing the currency anyway.

这类小型危机若处理不当可能演变成巨灾。虽然难以预判应对方式，但这类问题必将反复出现。越早未雨绸缪越好——比如全球若能早日达成「核能有益」共识，就能从源头缓解危机，而非事后补救。

And that's the I think an example of a mini crisis that can happen along the way. And of course, a mini crisis, poorly handled, can become a mega crisis. And so it's hard to predict ahead of time how that would be handled, but I do expect more of those issues along the way. And, you know, the earlier that people can get ahead of it, the better. Like, if we have a kind of a general global realignment that nuclear energy is good, then that can alleviate the eventual problem, you know, by starting earlier rather than responding to it as it happens or or after it happens.

听众朋友们，你们会在研究汇总邮件中找到《破碎能源》访谈的链接，林恩在讲述时已提及。林恩，你知道这里的惯例。在我们结束前，请介绍一下你在林恩·奥尔登投资策略公司的工作内容、提供的服务以及人们如何关注你的研究。

Listeners, you'll find a link in your research roundup email to the Broken Energy interview, which Lynn described as she was speaking. Lynn, you know the the drill here. Before we, we close, tell us about what you do at Lynn Alden Investment Strategy, what services are on offer, and how people can follow your work.

好的。我运营着一个低成本的研究服务供大家订阅。同时我也是Ego Death Capital的普通合伙人，从事风险投资相关业务。感谢邀请我参与节目，再次祝贺你们完成500期节目。这感觉如何？

Sure. So I have a a low cost research service that people can, follow. I'm also a general partner at Ego Death Capital where we do venture, related investments. And so thank you for having me on, and congrats again on having 500 episodes under your belt. What does it feel like?

林恩，如我之前所说，近十年的《宏观之声》对我来说，最珍贵的是遇到的人们以及他们对我思维的挑战。尤其让我感到欣慰的是能影响一些人的生活，我真心为你感到骄傲。希望这听起来不显得居高临下，但我认为我们为你的成功出了一份力，看到你取得这些成就真是太棒了。

Well, Lynne, as I said earlier, for me, almost ten years of Macro Voices, it's mostly been about the people that I've met and, the way that people have challenged my thinking. And particularly, the the reward for me is in touching a few people's lives, and I I really feel proud of you. I hope that doesn't sound condescending, but I'd like to think that we played a role in your success, and it's just fantastic to see you, doing all the things that you're doing.

非常感谢，希望未来能再次做客。祝愿你们在所做的一切事业中持续成功。谢谢。

Well, I appreciate that, and I'm hope hopefully to be back one day, and I wish you continued success, with everything you're doing. Thank you.

帕特里克·萨雷兹纳和我将在macrovoices.com继续为您带来《宏观之声》。

Patrick Sarezna and I will be back as Macro Voices continues right here at macrovoices.com.

现在交还给主持人埃里克·汤森和帕特里克·苏雷斯纳。

Now back to your hosts, Eric Townsend and Patrick Suresna.

埃里克，能再次邀请林恩上节目真是太好了。她一直是听众最喜爱的嘉宾之一。

Eric, it was great to have Lynn back on the show. She's always a listener favorite.

帕特里克、林恩·奥尔登，坦率地说，几乎所有我们其他天才级别的宏观嘉宾似乎都认为黄金的基本面再好不过了。但面对现实吧，自律的投资者会很难为不在这波惊人上涨后对未对冲的黄金多头获利了结找到理由。我也不介意承认，在这方面我自己也感到有些纠结。我不想放弃甚至减仓我的黄金期货多头头寸。我同意林·奥尔登和卢克·格罗门等房间里最聪明的人的观点，即做多黄金是正确的选择，但这个交易已经涨得太快太猛，需要某种对冲或不对称性，而我目前仍是杠杆做多且未对冲的状态。

Patrick, Lynn Alden, and quite frankly, almost every one of our other genius level macro guests seem to agree that the fundamentals for gold couldn't be better. But let's face it, disciplined investors would be challenged to justify not taking profits on an unhedged gold long after the amazing run that we've just seen. And I don't mind admitting that I'm feeling a little bit challenged myself in that regard. I don't want to abandon or even trim down the size of my long gold futures position. I agree with Lin Alden and Luke Gromen and all the other smartest guys in the room that long gold is the place to be, but this trade has run so far, so fast, it needs some kind of hedge or asymmetry to it, and I'm still levered long unhedged.

那么本周交易策略不妨聚焦于如何对冲大型黄金多头头寸？具体来说，我想对冲大幅下跌修正的风险。我认为这里很容易出现300美元的下跌，甚至不会破坏看涨逻辑。所以我更想听听如何进一步杠杆化上行潜力，而不是在此刻被迫降低风险。但帕特里克，显然在当前如此超买的市场中，除非你有某种不对称的下行对冲，否则很难为过高杠杆找到合理依据。

So how about focusing the trade of the week on how to hedge a big long gold position? Specifically, I wanna hedge the risk of a great big downside correction. I think $300 down here could easily happen, and it wouldn't even upset the bull story. So I'd love to hear how to even further lever upside potential as opposed to having to derisk here. But, Patrick, obviously, you just can't justify too much leverage here with this much of an overbought market unless you've got some kind of asymmetric downside hedge.

为便于讨论，假设我已持有100金衡盎司的黄金多头头寸，按录制时的价格计算约值39万美元。我想重新配置这39万美元，以表达我经过对冲的观点：看，这里随时可能发生300美元的修正。

Assume for the sake of round numbers in this conversation that I've already got a long position on on a 100 Troy ounces of gold, so that's about 390,000 at the price as of recording time. I want to redeploy that $390,000 to express a hedged version of my view that, hey. Look. There could easily be a $300 correction here. Could happen at any time.

头条新闻——谁知道会发生什么？但如果世界真的一团糟，未来一年我们可能看到3000美元的上行空间。坦率地说，我们刚有两期非我们选定的超级聪明人士的访谈似乎都暗示这个方向。好吧。

Headlines. Who knows what happens? But we could also see $3,000 of upside in the next year if the world really goes to shit. And frankly, we just had two interviews from super smart people not selected by us that seem to be suggesting that's the direction. Okay.

期权先生，该怎么做这笔交易？

Mister Options Man, what's the trade?

听众们，你们可以在研究汇总邮件中找到本周交易策略的下载链接。若未收到此邮件，说明您尚未在macrovoices.com注册。只需访问主页macrovoices.com，点击林恩照片上方标有'寻找下载内容'的红色按钮。好的埃里克，让我们更深入探讨你描述的黄金交易。

Listeners, you're gonna find the download link for the postgame trade of the week in your research roundup email. If you don't have a research roundup email, it means that you have not yet registered at macrovoices.com. Just go to our homepage macrovoices.com and click on the red button over Lynn's picture saying looking for the downloads. Alright, Eric. Let's go a little deeper into the gold trade you described.

首先要指出的是，在叠加期权策略前必须明确几个关键参数。例如，我们担心的下行风险是短期急跌还是长达数月的阴跌？在上行方面，虽然我们知道黄金长期潜力有数千美元空间，但考虑到当前市场超买程度，下一季度的现实短期上行空间是多少？这些细节至关重要，因为它们决定了对冲期限、行权价选择，以及是否能通过风险逆转等叠加策略通过卖出部分上行权利来降低持仓成本。关键点在于，基于不同假设可以设计出数百种不同的对冲方案。

The first thing I have to point out is that some really important parameters have to be nailed down before you even start overlaying option strategies. For example, is the downside risk we're worried about a quick air pocket or a multi month grind lower? On the upside, while we know the longer term potential for gold is in the thousands, what's the realistic short term upside in the next quarter given how overbought the market is right now? Those details matter because they dictate the tenor of the hedge, the strikes you choose, and whether you can use overlays like a risk reversal to reduce the carry cost by selling some of the upside. The key point is whatever these assumptions are, they can lead to creating literally hundreds of different iterations of this hedge.

一旦你确定了地平线、上行预期、对收益上限的容忍度以及持仓成本，就能设计出精确的对冲结构。现在让我们为这个示例设定参数。我要对冲的风险是第四季度8%的回调，约合每盎司300美元。上行方面，我认为第四季度还有约10%的空间，从当前高位再涨约400美元/盎司。假设核心头寸是通过COMEX的2026年2月黄金期货合约做多实物黄金。构建对冲的一种方式是采用看跌期权价差风险反转策略。

Once you pin down horizon, upside expectations, tolerance for capped gains, and the carry cost, then you can engineer the exact structure. So let's set the parameters for this illustration. The risk I'm hedging is a fourth quarter correction of 8% or roughly $300 an ounce. On the upside, I think the fourth quarter headroom is maybe another 10%, about $400 an ounce from these already lofty levels, and I'll assume the core position is long bullion through the February 2026 gold futures contract on the COMEX. One way to structure the hedge is with a put spread risk reversal.

通俗地说，就是买入看跌期权防范下跌风险，卖出较低行权价的看跌期权降低成本，并通过卖出看涨期权来融资剩余部分。这样能以更低成本获得两个看跌行权价之间的保护区间，同时在上涨10%被限制前保留可观的上行空间。现在我要叠加的操作如下——想跟进的听众可以在可下载幻灯片第3页看到详细的交易数据分解。第一步，我们买入3800美元看跌期权并卖出3600美元看跌期权。

In plain English, that means you buy a put to protect the downside, sell a lower strike put to reduce the cost, and finance the rest by selling an upside call. The result is cheaper carry defined by protection between the two put strikes with respectable upside before it's capped 10% higher. Now here's the overlay I'd run. Now if you wanna follow along, I clearly broke down the numbers on the trade on page three of the downloadable slide deck. So step one, we buy the $3,800 put and sell the $3,600 put.

这个看跌期权价差成本约47美元/盎司。第二步，我们通过卖出4300美元看涨期权（比现价高约400美元）融资31美元/盎司来覆盖大部分成本。最终净成本约16美元/盎司，相比直接购买看跌期权的69美元大幅降低。以你提到的39万美元黄金头寸计算，保费约1600美元。那么你获得了什么？

That put spread costs about $47 an ounce. Now step two, we finance most of that cost by selling the $4,300 call, which is roughly $400 higher from the current spot prices for a credit of $31 an ounce. The result, the net cost is about $16 an ounce instead of $69 for an outright put. Now on a $390,000 gold position like you alluded to, that works out to about a $1,600 premium. Now what do you get?

在3800至3600美元区间，你锁定了200美元的下行保护，足以抵消大部分潜在跌幅。跌破3600后虽不再受保护，但已缓解波动冲击。上行方面，在涨至4300美元（即上涨10%）前可完全获利，超过该点位才需放弃收益。记住这个上限仅适用于今年第四季度剩余时间。这个结构的精妙之处在于：我有效缓冲了下跌风险，为交易保留了充足上行空间，且成本仅为直接对冲的零头。

Well, between the 3,800 down to 3,600 level, you've boxed in $200 of downside protection, enough to neutralize most of the likely drawdown. Now below 3,600, you're unhedged again, but then you've already softened the volatility pain. On the upside, you are fully long up to $4,300 or 10% higher, and only beyond that do you give up your gains. And remember that the cap only applies to the remainder of the fourth quarter of this year. So the beauty of this structure is I've meaningfully muted the downside, left plenty of room for the trade to keep working, and I've done it at a fraction of the carry cost of an outright hedge.

高杠杆交易者常用这种风险可控的叠加策略来保持高确信度交易，同时避免保费损耗。如果你认为以16美元/盎司的成本换取年内剩余时间的安心是值得的，这个结构确实值得考虑。当然，若无法接受收益上限，也可以单独运行3800至3600美元的看跌期权价差，成本约47美元/盎司但保留全部上行空间。选择很简单：要么超低成本带收益上限，要么支付更高保费换取无限制收益。

That's the type of risk controlled overlay highly leveraged traders use to stay in high conviction trades without bleeding premium. Now if paying about $16 an ounce for peace of mind over the remainder of the year makes sense to you, this certainly is a structure worth considering. At the same time, if the capped upside is a turn off, you can always just run the 3,800 to $3,600 put spread on its own. It costs about $47 an ounce, but leaves all of the upside open. So the choice is simple, ultra low cost with a cap or a higher premium with no limits.

这个解释对专业人士很受用，当然零售投资者可通过参加帕特里克每周一的网络研讨会获取完整简报——该会议总是详细剖析当周交易策略。Macro Voices听众可前往bigpicturetrading.com获取免费试用。上周帕特里克已预警Big Picture Trading将于10月1日涨价。但当我听完节目发现他们要在我们第500期节目前一天涨价超一倍时，我致电帕特里克提出异议：何不延至周末以免破坏五百期庆典？经过协商，现在通过bigpicturetrading.com/macrovoices订阅仍可以不到新定价一半的价格获得服务，但该优惠仅持续至10月5日周日。

That explanation worked for the pros, and, of course, our retail audience can get the full briefing by attending Patrick's Monday webinar, which always dissects the trade of the week in detail. Macro Voices listeners can get a free trial at bigpicturetrading.com. Now Patrick warned you last week that big picture trading's prices were going up on October 1. But when I realized after listening to that show that these guys were more than doubling their prices one day before our five hundredth episode, I gave Patrick a call and pushed back a little bit and said, Patrick, how about if we extend that through the weekend so you don't screw up the five hundredth episode? So, after a little bit of pressure, it is now possible to subscribe to Big Picture Trading for less than half of the new price that already took effect on October 1, but that's only if you go to bigpicturetrading.com/macrovoices, and that expires Sunday, October 5.

这是获得原价的最后机会——他们基本上要涨价超一倍。所以如果你喜欢Big Picture Trading且不想错过交易机会，现在就是行动时刻。

That is the absolute last chance to get the old pricing, and they are basically I think it's more than doubling it. So if you like big picture trading and you don't wanna miss the trade, now is the time.

好的，埃里克。我们继续来看图表分析。你对当前股市有什么看法？

Alright, Eric. Let's move on to the chart deck. What are your thoughts here on the equity markets?

要知道，所有有头有脸的人物都在预测市场见顶——毕竟标普指数已经从2009年金融危机后6.66美元的低点上涨了十倍多。但市场始终在忧虑之墙上攀爬，对看涨论调置之不理。根据我的经验，这类行情总会比所有人预想的持续更久、涨得更高、耗时更长，然后在无人预料时突然终结。听着，我们现在还没到那个'无人预料'的阶段。

Well, everybody who's anybody has been calling for a top after all the S and P is now more than 10 times the $6.66 low that we saw in 2009 in the wake of the great financial crisis. And the market just keeps climbing that wall of worry and shrugging off all those bullish arguments. In my experience, these things always go longer, go higher, last longer, take more time than anyone thought possible, and then they suddenly end when nobody expects it. Look. We're not in the nobody expects it stage.

目前仍处于'多数人预期中'的状态。正因为他们做了对冲保护，崩盘反而不会发生。所以我认为市场很可能继续走高。我完全承认熊市论据有其道理。

We're still in the most people expecting it or lots of people expecting it. They're hedging because they're hedged. It basically can't happen. So I think market probably continues higher from here. I definitely think the bear arguments are real.

这些论据终有一天会被证实。市场可能变得非常糟糕，但谁知道呢？在真正迎来大调整或熊市之前，我们说不定还能再涨一千点。我知道这听起来很疯狂，但别忘了我们正处在长期通胀的起点。在长期通胀初期，股市总是表现得出奇地好。

They're gonna be proven real someday. Could get really ugly, but who knows? We could go another thousand points higher before we actually get that great big correction or bear market. Now I know that sounds crazy, but remember, we're at the beginning of a secular inflation. At the beginning of secular inflations, the stock market always overperforms incredibly well.

大家都认为这是经济向好的标志，觉得未来一片光明。其实这只是通胀现象，而那些对股市真正有害的反馈循环尚未开始发挥作用。所以我认为这很可能就是当前行情的驱动力。至于接下来会发生什么，我就不确定了。

Everybody thinks it's a great sign of the economy improving and everything's gonna be wonderful. It's really just inflation and the feedback loops that are really bad for the stock market haven't kicked in yet. So I think that's most likely what's driving this. As far as what happens next though, I'm not sure.

埃里克，不可否认多头仍牢牢掌控着趋势。我多次在节目中指出，这不仅是本十年来持续时间最长（期间回调未超5%）的牛市，也是幅度最大的（未出现5%回调）牛市。单凭这两个指标虽不能保证回调必然发生，但当前市场确实处于该指标的百分位极值。虽然回调终将到来，但令人惊叹的是市场至今对利空消息完全免疫，持续在忧虑之墙上攀爬。

Well, Eric, there's no denying that the bulls remain decisively in control of this trend. Now I've been saying episode after episode that this has been, not only the longest, rally that we've had with a out of 5% correction this decade, but also the largest in magnitude that we've had without a 5% correction. Now by either of those two metrics, that in itself doesn't guarantee a correction, but this market is definitely in the hundredth percentile on that metric. Now at some point, a correction will happen, but what has been amazing is that this market is completely resilient so far to bad news. It continues to climb a wall of worry.

最终总会有因素打破这个市场，但目前毫无迹象。就连政府停摆这类事件都未能动摇市场。究竟会是什么突发新闻引发回调会非常有趣，但眼下完全看不到苗头。好了，我们接着讨论美元走势。

Inevitably, something will break this market, but there is zero sign of it right now. Not even the government shutdown or anything like this seems to be rattling these markets. It'll be very interesting to see what ultimately will be that news that comes out of left field that kinda surprises the markets to begin a correction, but right now, there is zero sign of that. Alright. Let's move on to the dollar.

嗯，目前的情况是

Well, there's

涌现出许多抄底呼声，声称现在是买入美元的时机。美元肯定跌无可跌了。但我在图表上看到的只是一个完全正常的横盘整理形态，且正处于交易区间的中位。在跌破96或突破100之前，这里并无明显信号。

lots of bottom callers emerging saying it's the time to buy the dollar. Surely, it can't go lower than this. But all I see on the chart is a perfectly normal sideways consolidation pattern, and it's right in the middle of its trading range. Nothing to see here until we get a breakout below 96 or above 100.

埃里克，美元显然已找到新的公允价值区间。我们在四月测试过97这个水平，六月又测试了一次，此后就一直困在这个交易区间。虽然从移动平均线等指标来看，主要下跌趋势仍未改变，但这种横盘格局恰恰反映了交叉货币对的混乱——美元对某些货币走强，对另一些走弱，导致美元指数陷入这种胶着状态。

Well, Eric, the dollar has clearly found a new fair value zone. We tested this 97 level once in April. We tested it again in June, and we've been stuck in this trade range ever since. Now the primary downtrend is intact if just measured by something like a moving average, But the sideways trade range is simply a reflection of the fact that there is a lot of confusion in the different cross currencies. Some of them, the US dollars rallying against, others, the US dollars weakening against, leaving an index like this to be stuck in this model.

终有一天美元会亮出底牌，那将成为重要的技术节点。从痛苦交易的角度来看，目前有大量交易员坚定看空美元，这确实有充分的宏观理由。但想想2025年至今表现最佳的资产（包括新兴市场），若出现短期美元反弹，将对众多趋势造成巨大冲击。我们究竟会见证美元上演这种痛苦交易，还是空头继续主导、宏观因素推动下一轮下跌？这确实是待解的谜题。

At some point, the US dollar will show its hand, and that's going to be an important technical event. Now when I think of it from a pain trade perspective, there is a decisive amount of traders that are outright bearish to dollar, and rightfully so, there's a lot of macro reasons behind that. But when you think about what have been the best performing assets, including emerging markets throughout the 2025 year, thinking of it from a pain trade perspective, a short term US dollar rally would be incredibly disruptive to so many different trends. So will we see this kind of a pain trade emerge in the dollar, or will simply the dollar bears prevail and the macro driver drives the next leg down? It is certainly the puzzle to solve.

眼下我们正处于交易区间的绝对中轨，很难做出高确信度的判断。埃里克，我们接着来看

Right now, we are in the dead center of this trade range, and there's no real high conviction call to be made here. Now, Eric, let's move on

原油市场。截至录制时，我们仍勉强守住9月5日61.50美元附近的低点。特朗普想要更低油价，且不惜采取强硬手段。虽然具体发展难以预料，但短期内特朗普有很大操作空间。不过正如安纳斯·阿尔哈吉所言，最终我们很可能迎来油价大涨。

to crude oil. As of recording time, we're still holding the September 5, low print right around $61.50, but just barely. Trump wants lower oil prices and isn't afraid to play hardball to get them. Now I don't know exactly what's gonna happen, but I think there's plenty of room for Trump to, push his way, at least in the short term. I think, ultimately, we see much higher oil prices as Anas Al Haji recently described.

我认为那显然是必然结局，但或许在发动战争之类的事件前会先打压油价。具体如何让我们拭目以待。嗯，目前

I think that that's clearly where we have to get to, but maybe we're gonna push the prices down before we start the war or something like that. I'm not sure. Let's see how it plays out. Well, there

这是一次技术性的突破尝试，我总喜欢告诉我的会员们，单日行情无法确立新趋势。当那次冲向66美元的突破发生时，几乎立刻就被打回夏季区间的底部。这本身就表明这是一次技术性假突破，实际上这里并不存在看涨趋势。但与此同时，这并不意味着原油将转为看跌。整个夏季，原油对利空消息展现出惊人的韧性，数月来始终顽强坚守在60多美元区间。

was a technical attempt to break out, and I always like to tell my members that one day doesn't make a new trend. When that breakout towards $66 happened, almost immediately, we faded right back down to the bottom end of the range of the summer. Now this in itself signifies that this was a technical false start, and really that there is no bull trend to be found here. But at the same time, doesn't mean that oil's going to be bearish. Over the summer, oil's been incredibly resilient to bad news and has held the line in the 60 some odd dollar range relentlessly for months.

这使得原油与美元同样陷入混沌状态，既未显现疲软趋势，也未形成看涨突破。终将会有趋势性行情出现，届时从技术面上绝对不容错过。我们必定会在发生时及时研判，但眼下你只能假设这种震荡格局至少短期内仍将持续。埃里克，现在让我们谈谈黄金。

This leaves oil very similar to the dollar in a big muddle, basically, with no conviction showing neither a trend to weaken nor a bull breakout. At some stage, we're gonna get a trend move, and technically, it will be impossible to miss. We'll we'll definitely make the call when it happens, but right now, once again, you just have to assume that this trade range will continue to prevail at least over the short term. Now, Eric, let's touch on gold.

其实我在本周交易推荐中向帕特里克提问时已隐含了我的观点。在如此超买的市场里，包括我在内的专业投资者都无法合理解释为何要像我当前这样超配黄金头寸。这样做的人根本称不上是负责任、有纪律的投资者。因此我认为解决方案不是去风险化——因为涨势可能还有很大空间——而是要通过不对称对冲头寸重新配置风险，帕特里克本周的交易分析完美展示了具体操作手法。

Well, you basically heard my view embedded in my question for Patrick in the trade of the week. That view is that no professional investor, including me, could possibly justify holding as overweight of a gold position as I currently have, in a market that's this overbought. You just can't call yourself a responsible, disciplined investor if you're doing that. So the solution, as far as I'm concerned, is not to derisk because I think this could still have a long way to go. I think it's time to rerisk into an asymmetric hedged position, and I loved Patrick's trade of the week analysis for how to do exactly that.

埃里克，黄金当前测算目标仍指向4000美元/盎司。短期上行仍是阻力最小的路径，每次回调都被迅速买入。没有任何迹象表明获利了结或短期派发周期已经开始。所以必须承认当前趋势完好，但正如你所言，未来数月短期走势的不对称性最多算中性——上行潜力与即刻回调风险基本相当。因此我认为，当前新建黄金头寸必须配合期权策略，构建具有凸性特征或非对称收益结构的交易组合。

Well, Eric, the measured moves on gold here are still up towards the $4,000 an ounce. So some short term upside remains the path of least resistance, and there's every single dip has been bought. There's no sign that they're and some sort of profit taking or short term distribution cycle has begun. So you have to respect that this prevailing trend is intact, but the like you were suggesting, the asymmetry on the short term over the next few months is at neutral at best, where the upside potential is probably equal to the immediate downside correction risk. And so to me, any new trades put on gold here do need to be done with some sort of an option strategy that creates either convexity and or some sort of a a payoff structure that is asymmetric in the way it's constructed.

埃里克，铀行情自四月启动至今，你如何看待后续发展？

Now, Eric, that uranium run's been going since April. What's your thoughts here on how this is playing out?

我长期和中期依然极度看涨。当然短期在如此超买状态下较难判断。本周有个绝大多数人会忽略的关键信号——千万别错过——长期合约价格（即远期价格）才是核心指标。记住，铀市场的主要交易并不发生在现货价格层面。

I remain uber bullish long term, medium term. Of course, short term's a little bit hard to call when we're this overbought. The thing that's a really, really important signal that most people will miss this week, don't miss it, The long term contracting price, the term price. That's the one that counts. Remember, the spot price is not where most of the action is in the uranium market.

问题在于现货价格每日都被报道，而远期数据每月才更新一次。在80-81美元横盘十五个月后，远期价格终于开始上涨。当前最大问题是技术指标严重超买，看来需要通过横向整理消化超买状态，才能迎来下一波上涨。

The problem is the spot price is the one that gets reported every day. Term data only comes out once a month. Term is finally moving higher after a fifteen month plateau between 80 and $81. The one big problem is massively overbought technicals. Now it looks like we'll shake those overbought technicals off with the sideways consolidation again before the next move up.

我不介意等待。我还在计算上次大涨带来的收益。

I don't mind waiting. I'm still counting my gains from the last surge.

现在，埃里克，我想强调两点。首先，我们要区分铀和铀股票，因为当我们看到铀价格走强时，我们关注的是像Sprott实物信托单位这样的指标，它们正处于初步回升阶段，开始反映出铀需求增加和价格改善。但当我们观察那些铀股票时，它们刚刚经历了史诗般的半年上涨，几乎所有股票价值都翻了一番。这有点超买的情况。我们已经看到一些阻力，当这些股票上涨或反弹时，立即会遇到一些抛售。

Now, Eric, there's two things I wanna highlight. First of all, we wanna split up uranium versus that of uranium equities because when we're looking at the prices of uranium strengthening here, we look at things like the Sprott physical trust unit, you know, they are in the early stages of turning up and starting to reflect higher demand for uranium and the prices are improving. But when we take a look at those uranium equities, they've just had an epic half year run where almost all of them have doubled in their value. The this is a little bit more of an overbought condition. We're already seeing a little bit of resistance where as we see advances or rallies in these, they're immediately met with a little bit of selling.

这本身并不是反转模式，也不意味着这波上涨已经结束。显然，长期基本面仍然非常强劲，前景很好，但会出现一些获利了结，而且我们已经开始看到这种情况。对我来说，主要牛市趋势仍然完好，可能还会有一两次上涨。我们将寻找动量减弱或价格走势转向的迹象，或者开始形成强大阻力，但这可能需要整个十月份才会真正显现。现在，埃里克，铜一直在波动。

That in itself is not a reversal pattern nor an indication that this impulse is done. Obviously, the long term fundamentals remain incredibly strong and a great story, but some profit taking will happen, and and we've already seen the beginning of it. To me, the primary bull trend is still intact, and there could be one or two more bull impulses to the upside. We'll be looking for signs where there's momentum loss or something that's pivoting the price action or heavy resistance starting to form, but that might take them a whole month of October to really start emerging. Now, Eric, copper's been moving.

让我们——让我们来

Let's let's have a

聊聊这个。帕特里克，HGZ5图表上的明显模式，也就是美国铜期货图表，那个被特朗普和贝桑特以及关税政策的反复折腾得来回震荡的图表，基本上显示即将出现5,200点的死亡交叉，即使市场现在看起来非常强劲，也很难避免。要阻止50日均线向下穿过200日均线（当然，这就是所谓的死亡交叉），市场必须比现在强劲得多才行。帕特里克，这超出了我的技术分析能力范围，因为你知道，如果这个图表出现死亡交叉，普遍的看法是，这是一个非常看跌的信号。但是，我不认为LME铜图表会显示任何类似的模式或接近的模式。

chat about this. Patrick, the glaring pattern on the h g z five, that's The US copper futures chart, the one that got whipsawed by Trump and Besant, and all of the back and forth on tariff policy. That that is basically showing an impending 5,200 death cross, which it would be hard to avoid even if it market's looking pretty darn strong right now, but it would have to be a whole lot stronger in order to prevent the 50 from crossing down below the 200, which, of course, is known as a death cross. Patrick, this is above my technical analysis pay grade because, you know, if this chart death crosses, the popular wisdom is, well, that's a super bearish signal. But look, I don't think the LME Koppers chart would show any such pattern or anything close to it.

这个丑陋的模式出现在HG图表上，是因为这个图表是特朗普关税动荡的附带损害。帕特里克，投资者应该如何解读这种情况，当你对同一件事有两个不同的图表，仅仅因为一个被关税折腾得来回震荡，而另一个没有，就显示出相反的信号？

The ugly pattern is on the h g chart, and it's because that chart is collateral damage from the tump tariff turmoil. Patrick, how should investors interpret a situation like this when you got two different charts for the same thing showing opposite indications just because one got whipsawed by tariffs and one didn't.

埃里克，你观察特朗普关税动荡及其对图表的影响绝对正确。是的，通常作为技术分析师，你希望看到一个展示正常流动的图表，显示投资者如何用钱投票。COMEX铜图表的问题在于，我们经历了由短期头条新闻驱动的巨大跳涨和灾难性跳跌，关税开征又取消的情景，这真的打乱了图表的价格走势，使得很难对像移动平均线交叉这样的信号赋予任何有效性。因此，我会给它赋予更少的权重。

Eric, you're absolutely right in observing the Trump tariff turmoil and its impact on the charts. Yeah. Usually, as a technical analyst, you wanna be able to look at a chart that is demonstrating proper flows, something that is showing the way investors are voting with their money. The problem with the copper chart on the COMEX is that we went through a substantial gap higher and a devastating gap lower driven by short term headline news as tariffs on, tariffs off scenario, which really disrupts the chart's price action, making it very challenging to give any validity to something like a moving average crossover. Therefore, I would put a lot less waiting on it.

总体而言，死亡交叉（一种技术分析信号）的质疑点在于，无论是200日还是50日移动平均线都具有显著滞后性，当出现有意义的交叉时，形成该交叉的潜在趋势往往已处于超卖状态，此时信号出现后常会遭遇剧烈回调。我认为它虽能有效反映牛熊市大周期，但若仅将其作为择时工具——比如在交叉发生时立即执行交易——我始终持保留态度。值得强调的是，观察伦敦金属交易所铜期货走势，当前价格已突破一年新高，明显呈现看涨态势。因此我对这个铜信号持高度怀疑态度，更关注铜价是否持续显现资金吸纳迹象。毕竟自Freeport McMoran事件后，铜价确实呈现持续吸筹与关键突破。此刻我反而倾向于逆势操作，观察这轮趋势能否真正延续。

In general, a death cross, one of the skepticisms is simply that both the two hundred and the fifty day moving averages are such laggards that by the time you have a meaningful crossover, the the embedded trend that's been in place to create the crossover is quite oversold, and often you can get caught in some violent retracements when the signal arises. Generally, I think it is a good signal that depicts major bull and bear market cycles, but I'm always suspect of using it solely as a market timing tool, like there's some edge in starting to execute your trades when the actual crossovers are happening themselves. The observation I wanna really highlight is that when we go to look at the LME futures in copper in London, we have them breaking to a one year high, very clearly bullish at this moment. So I would be very suspect of this copper signal, and I would focus a lot on actually whether or not copper continues to show new signs of accumulation because definitely ever since that Freeport McMoran event, copper has been very well accumulated and making key advances. And so I'm actually looking to fade that signal at this point and seeing whether this trend can actually persist.

Patrick，在结束前我们来看下十年期国债收益率图表。

Patrick, before we wrap up, let's hit that ten year treasury note chart.

我们看到年初一月份收益率在4.8%附近见顶后持续回落至4%。即便美联储会议后出现20个基点的反弹，也在触及斐波那契阻力区后迅速回落。十年期收益率下行趋势非常明确，目前没有迹象显示该趋势被破坏或逆转。我认为第四季度收益率跌破4%的可能性很大，这也是我当前交易布局的重点方向。

What we have literally seen is that at the start of the year in January, we peaked out with yields near four eighty. And since then, yields have been deteriorating down to 4%. And even this little rally or bump that we saw in the post FOMC that saw almost 20 basis points pop on the upside faded out of Fibonacci zone and is already rolling over. Overall, I think the pattern of lower yields on the ten year is a very clear trend, and no reason to believe it's being disrupted and or having reversed. I would still think that there's a very reasonable chance here that we're gonna see a trip under 4% on the ten year here, in this fourth quarter, and that's, what I'm gonna be continuing to trade looking, for that breakdown.

各位若喜欢Patrick的图表分析，可通过bigpicturetrading.com免费试用获取每日更新。详情见幻灯片末页，若想以低于半价订阅，10月5日周日是最后机会，过期不候。唯一获取旧价途径是访问bigpicturetrading.com/macrovoices。

Folks, if you enjoy Patrick's chart decks, you can get them every single day of the week with a free trial of big picture trading. The details are on the last pages of the slide deck or just go to bigpicturetrading.com. But if you want big picture trading for less than half of their new prices, your last chance to sign up is Sunday, October 5. So act now or miss the trade. The only way to get the old price is to use the link bigpicturetrading.com/macrovoices.

本周研究汇总包含本期访谈文字稿与'每周交易图表集'（含多篇精选文章链接）。欢迎听众通过researchroundup@macrovoices.com投稿您的市场分析，我们将择优纳入每周推送。

Well, in this week's research roundup, you're gonna find the transcript for today's interview and the trade of the week chart book we just discussed here in the post game, including a link to a number of articles that we found really interesting. You're gonna find this link and so much more in this week's research roundup. So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com, and we will consider it for our weekly distributions.

请关注我们的X平台主账号@MacroVoices获取最新动态，Eric账号为@EricKTownsend（Eric拼写含k），我的账号是@PatrickSarezna。代表Eric Townsend与我自己感谢收听，下周再见。

If you have not already, follow our main account on X at Macro Voices for all the most recent updates and releases. You can also follow Eric on X at Eric s Townsend. That's Eric spelled with a k. You can also follow me at Patrick Sarezna. On behalf of Eric Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.

本期《宏观之声》到此结束。每周我们将继续带来金融与宏观经济领域顶尖专家的深度访谈。节目由顶级交易教育平台bigpicturetrading.com赞助支持，注册免费账号请访问macrovoices.com。

That concludes this edition of Macro Voices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Is made possible by sponsorship from bigpicturetrading.com, the Internet's premier source of online education for traders. Please visit bigpicturetrading.com for more information. Please register your free account at macrovoices.com.

注册后，您将收到我们免费的每周研究摘要邮件，内含特邀嘉宾支持文档的链接，以及我们志愿者研究团队每周在互联网上能找到的最优质免费金融内容。您还将获得免费听众讨论论坛和研究图书馆的访问权限。注册用户越多，我们就越能为未来节目邀请到更多知名专题访谈嘉宾。因此，若您尚未注册，请立即在macrovoices.com上创建免费账户。您可在iTunes订阅《宏观之声》，每周免费自动接收节目推送至移动设备。

Once registered, you'll receive our free weekly research roundup email containing links to supporting documents from our featured guests and the very best free financial content our volunteer research team could find on the Internet each week. You'll also gain access to our free listener discussion forums and research library. And the more registered users we have, the more we'll be able to recruit high profile feature interview guests for future programs. So please register your free account today at macrovoices.com if you haven't already. You can subscribe to Macro Voices on iTunes to have Macro Voices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week free of charge.

节目问题可发送至mailbagmacrovoices.com邮箱，我们将在邮件问答环节不定期解答。《宏观之声》仅供信息参考，所提供内容不应视为投资建议。投资决策前务必咨询持牌投资顾问。节目中表达的观点仅代表参与者个人立场，未必反映主持人或赞助商意见。

You can email questions for the program to mailbagmacrovoices dot com, and we'll answer your questions on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. MacroVoices is presented for informational purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors.

《宏观之声》节目制作方、赞助商及主持人Eric Townsend与Patrick Suresna，对基于节目信息或观点作出的投资决策所导致的损失概不负责。本节目由bigpicturetrading.com赞助及Fourth Turning资本管理有限责任公司资助播出。更多信息请访问macrovoices.com。

MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Eric Townsend and Patrick Suresna, shall not be liable losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on Macro Voices. Macro Voices is made possible by sponsorship from bigpicturetrading.com and by funding from fourth turning capital management LLC. For more information, visit macrovoices.com.