MacroVoices #524 西蒙·怀特：战争 + 通货膨胀 = 更高的通货膨胀

请详细说明一下。

Elaborate on that, please.

但我也认为，如果我们把类比对象定为20世纪70年代，私人持有黄金直到1974年才被重新合法化。

But, also, I think it's it's relevant to point out, if we're looking at the analog as being the nineteen seventies, private ownership of gold wasn't relegalized until 1974.

因此，当时有一个非常重大的转变催化剂——黄金实物再次成为合法持有品，这很可能扰乱了数据。

So there was a a very big transition catalyst there where it became legal once again to own gold bullion, which probably disrupts the data.

我们该如何看待2020年代的这种情况？

How should we think about this in the twenty twenties?

是的。

Yeah.

这是个很好的观点。

That that's a good point.

我认为LSI层面也存在另一个干扰因素，因为这张图表的数据可以追溯到20世纪20年代末。

I think I think there's also another disruption at the LSI as well, because the data in this chart goes back to the late twenties.

而在30年代，美国实际上没收了私人持有的黄金。

And back in the thirties was when essentially The US confiscated private gold ownerships.

所以他们没收了黄金。

So they confiscate gold.

我认为他们以每盎司20美元的价格收购，然后重新估值为35美元。

I think they paid $20 and then revalued it at $35 an ounce.

因此，在那段通胀时期，黄金的价格很可能上涨得更多。

So quite possibly, gold could've went up a lot more in that inflationary period of the.

我认为黄金之所以被误解，是因为在某种程度上它确实是一种通胀对冲工具。

I think I think that's why gold's misunderstood though, was that it it is to some extent an inflation hedge.

但它并不是完美的通胀对冲工具。

It's not a perfect inflation hedge.

它并不依赖于路径。

It's not path dependent.

但在极端情况下，当通胀在那种环境中飙升时，黄金表现良好，因为当时人们热议高通胀议题，黄金也起到了对金融体系的普遍保障作用。

But in extremes, when inflation goes very, very high during that sort of environment, it does a good job because you've got the debates on high angle things and just a general kind of insurance against the financial system.

但人们没有意识到，它也是一种下行尾部风险的对冲工具。

But it's not appreciated that it's also a downside tail hedge as well.

我认为最近推动金价上涨的主要原因是缺乏其他替代选择。

And I think what has been driving a lot of the rally recently in Go is this is the lack of alternatives.

如果你开始思考，我不知道会发生什么。

If if you start thinking about, I don't know what's gonna happen.

我不确定我们是否会进入一个高通胀的世界，也不知道是否会爆发大规模信贷事件，从而导致通缩。

I don't know whether we're gonna be in a debatesment world where there's a lot of inflation, or I don't know whether there's gonna be a massive credit event, and and that's gonna be deflationary.

这些都可能是对金融体系的潜在威胁。

These are potential threats to the financial system.

在这样的环境下，我能持有哪种资产，才能证明其保护投资组合的能力？

What can I own that has, you know, proven record of protecting a portfolio in such an environment?

除了黄金，真的没有太多其他选择了。

And there's really not much else other than gold.

我认为人们已经把所有其他选项都试过了，没有。

I think people sort of ran through all the options, No.

对吧？

Right?

这样会有效。

That would work.

这样会有效。

That would work.

比特币还没有经过检验，因此他们选择了黄金。

Bitcoin, that hasn't been tested, and they landed upon gold.

而且，你知道，很多通常公开表示从未真正重视过黄金的人。

And, you know, a lot of people that generally, they've, like, openly admitted they've never ever really tapered gold.

他们从来不是黄金的粉丝。

They've never been a fan of gold.

他们从未理解过黄金。

They've never understood it.

但他们还是开始增加或已经增加了对黄金的配置。

Are nevertheless starting to add or have started to add some exposure to their portfolios.

所以我认为，作为一种无可争议的抵押品，这才是推动这一走势的根本原因。

So I think as an unimpeachable form of collateral really is what's driving driving this move.

尽管过去几周略有挣扎，但我认为现在就说主要的牛市趋势已经结束还为时过早，因为推动这一趋势的主要原因如今依然成立。

And although, you know, struggled a little bit over the last few weeks, I think it's premature to say that that's the end of the primary bull trend, because kind of a lot of the main reasons that we're driving are still valid today.

我的意思是，从美元体系中寻求多元化的需求依然存在。

I mean, there's still a need for diversification from the dollar system.

我认为地缘政治的动荡依然显著。

I still think there's obviously a lot of geopolitical volatility.

这一点并没有改变。

That hasn't changed.

你知道，央行——我认为新兴市场央行最初在几年前率先启动了这波涨势。

You know, central banks, I don't think are suddenly like, emerging market central banks, they were the ones that initially picked off the rally a few years ago.

我不认为他们会突然转身，大规模抛售。

I don't think they're gonna turn tail start selling in any great size.

他们确实买了一些，也许还会继续买入，但我看不出他们为何会突然转身，大规模抛售。

You know, they they bought some, and they may shop buying it, but I I don't see why they would suddenly turn tail, start selling it en masse.

有报道称波兰正在考虑出售部分黄金储备。

There was a story that Poland was mooting, selling some of its holdings.

他们考虑出售的原因是为了最好的结果。

There were the reason why they were thinking of selling them was for the best.

这在我看来并不是一个强有力的看跌黄金的理由。

That doesn't really strike me as a great sort of a gold bearish kind of reason for selling you gold overall.

所以我认为，是的，整体环境仍然非常有利于黄金，黄金总体上仍维持其主要趋势，目前可能只是因为短期利率上升、美元出现小幅反弹等原因而有所挣扎。

So I I think, yeah, the general environment is still very conducive to gold still still generally keeping to its primary gold trend, and it's struggling right now perhaps because we see some marking up of short term rates, and the dollar's had a little bit of a rally, things like that.

但总体而言，我不认为会有一个大的卖家出现，从而迫使市场进入大规模的熊市，我仍然看不到这样的卖家会从哪里来。

But overall, I I don't see why know, you it would take a big seller to come around to really force into massive bear market, and I still don't see where that's gonna come from.

正如你所说，不幸的是，地缘政治的紧张局势并未消退，姑且这么称呼吧。

As you said, unfortunately, what has not gone away is geopolitical excitement, for lack of a better word.

我最近几周注意到的是，之前存在非常强的正相关性。

The thing that's I've noticed just in the last few weeks is there was a very strong positive correlation.

你知道，每次有炸弹爆炸，黄金就会飙升。

You know, next time a bomb drops, gold spikes upward.

但最近几周我们看到的情况是，当地缘政治因素导致油价大幅上涨时，黄金反而下跌了。

And what we've seen just in the last few weeks is a breakdown where when oil is up hard because of geopolitical, you know, bombs are dropping, gold's actually moving down.

那里发生了什么？

What's going on there?

是的。

Yeah.

正如我所说，我认为这实际上是因为英国的实际收益率。

As I say, I think I think, actually, it's because of the real yields in Britain.

这可能是美元走强的部分原因。

That could be part of by the this is a little bit in the rally in the dollar.

如果中东地区有任何资本回流的情况，这也应该考虑在内。

It should also be in times of if there's any capital repatriation going on, maybe in The Middle East.

我不确定。

I don't know for sure.

但你知道，黄金在短期内经常受到打压。

But, you know, gold could often get hit in the shorter term.

人们需要变现。

People need to liquidate.

不幸的是，这正是拥有保险资产的问题所在。

That's unfortunately the problem with having an insurance asset.

它有时也可能是一种非常流动的资产，往往是最先被抛售的那一个。

It's also can sometimes be a very liquid asset, is it's often the one that's first to go.

因此，它可能会发出一些反直觉的信号。

And so it can give kind of counterintuitive signals.

但总体而言，正如我所说，我不知道有什么理由能说这不仅仅是——当然，我们必须记住，近期市场已经大幅上涨，所以现在出现这样的盘整完全是合理的。

But overall, I I just as I say, I I I don't know what the narrative or the argument would be to say that this is anything more than just Obviously, we've to remember the market has rallied stormably much in recent months, so it's perfectly respectable for it to have you know, the kind of pause that it's having right now.

这并不意味着趋势会无限持续下去，但我也并不认为这代表趋势已经结束。

Like, it adds to continuing that sort of trend indefinitely, but I don't think that means that the trend is over.

所以，是的，我的意思是，白银显然更加波动，但对这种整体贸易观点的反应却更加令人质疑。

So, yeah, I mean, think silver is a far more obviously volatile, but a far a far more questionable kind of response to that kind of overall idea on trade.

但对我而言，黄金显然更安全，因为正如我所说，支撑其上涨的理由目前看来大多仍然有效。

But gold to me seems certainly more secure just because, as I say, the reasons underpinning its rally all seem to be mostly intact still now.

西蒙，我们在幻灯片里跳来跳去的。

Simon, we've been jumping around in the slide deck.

让我们回到第四页，因为你基本上说你在重写《风险规避操作手册》。

Let's go back to page four, because you've basically said you're rewriting the Risk Off Playbook.

这似乎是一本值得阅读的重要书籍。

It seems like an important book to read.

给我们多讲讲它吧。

Tell us more about it.

嗯，我当然不会亲自重写它，但我的观点是，我们之前讨论了一些历史类比。

Well, I I I'm certainly not gonna rewrite it myself, but my point here is really that, you know, we talked about some historical analogs.

它们是有用的参考。

They're useful guides.

我认为你必须保持开放的心态，因为规则可能会改变。

I think you have to keep an open mind as the the rules can change.

所以，像你看到的那样，传统的风险规避操作手册表现为美元走强、国债走强、风险资产抛售，但随着时间推移，这种情况可能不会以同样的程度持续。

So I think standard, you know, risk off playbook as you can see the dollar rally and treasury rally and risk assets sell off, and that might not be the case to the same extent as time.

比如，以美元为例。

So for instance, take the dollar.

所以典型的避险时刻确实是GSE，然后GSE期间美元走强。

So the kind of quintessential risk moment really was the GSE, and then the GSE, the dollar rallied.

所以我认为这对很多人来说是这样。

So I think that's for a lot of people.

就像，你知道吗？

It's like, well, you know what?

那就是最大的一次，美元当时走强了。

That that was the big one, and the dollar rallied.

因此美元是一种避险资产。

The dollar is therefore a safe haven.

但如果你仔细看看当时推动这一现象的原因，再与今天对比，就不能简单地认为美元现在还能像当年那样强劲上涨。

But really, if you look at what drove that and then you compare it to today, don't think you can necessarily say that the dollar is gonna be in a position to rally quite as hard as it did back then.

所以左边的图表显示，蓝色线条代表外国投资者对债券的资金流入。

So the chart on left there, you can see that the blue line shows the bond inflows from foreigners.

但这些资金流入已经放缓了。

So they they slowed.

当时股市规模很小。

Equities are tiny back then.

如今，对于外国投资者而言，股市规模要大得多。

Equities are much bigger today as far as foreigners are concerned.

这一切实际上推动了美元走强。

It all actually drove the dollar.

这场上涨是资金回流的结果。

The rally was repatriation of flows.

美国的共同基金和银行向欧洲各类实体提供了资金，正是这些机构的资金回流导致了美元上涨。

So The US basically mutual funds and banks have led to various European entities, and it was these guys repatriating that led to the dollar rally.

这并不是外国投资者将资金注入美国，或创造美元来应对结构性冲击。

So it wasn't the case of foreigners channeling money in or making dollars to cover structural shocks.

这纯粹是美国实体的资金回流，从而推动了美元上涨。

It was really just US entities repatriating and that led to the dollar rally.

而这一次，资金流动的结构则有所不同。

Now, this time around, the cash flows are are the structure of this is different.

因此，债券流动现在小得多，因为美国现在不再购买国债。

And so, bond flows are much smaller now because we've had because The US is now not seeing treasuries.

他们对美国国债的需求也减少了。

They're not seeing as much of the state even.

股票流动现在规模巨大。

Equity flows are now massive.

美国的资本外流规模不像2008年时那么大了。

And The US outflows are not as large as they were back in 2008.

因此，净影响意味着美国对股票外流的敞口大得多。

So the net impact means The US is much more exposed to equity outflows.

所以在当前这种避险环境中，有可能会有更多资本回流，其中一部分是美国的股票资产。

So in a sort of risk off environment that we're in right now, it's conceivable that more capital is repatriated, and some of that is equities in The US.

国家的股票流动通常是未对冲的。

Equity flows of the state tend to be unhedged.

这对美元是负面的，而且你没有之前那种美元回流的缓冲。

That is a dollar negative, and you don't have that cushion of the same cushion of dollar repatriation.

所以，是的，你并不会预期美元会大幅走强，如果你看右边的图表，这种趋势可能更加明显。

So and, yeah, you you wouldn't expect to see the dollar necessarily rallying as much, and that could be seen even more if you look at the chart on the right.

所以，在巴塞尔协议之后，关于美元受关税冲击的种种讨论，确实没有导致抛售美国资产，但我认为这确实让人们对美元敞口有了更多顾虑。

So after the, you know, Bar Lago accord, you know, all the talk of the dollar disruption to tariffs, You know, that that didn't lead to sell America trade, but I certainly think it made people think twice about their exposure to dollars.

这一点可以从这张图表中看出来，美元似乎一直被压制。

And that can be seen, let's say, in this chart, just kinda like the dollars have been barked.

所以，白线显示的是美元的反向走势，而你通常看到的蓝线是以美元计价的储备资产。

So the white line shows the the dollar reverse, and what you tend to see is the blue line, which is reserves and denominated in dollars.

当美元走弱时，也就是白线上升时，储备管理者往往会买入美元。

So when the the dollar weakens, I e, see the white lines rise, the reserve managers have tended to buy dollars.

他们通常会利用美元的疲软来增加美元储备。

They tend to use the weakness in the dollar due to ads for dollar reserve.

但这一次，这种情况并没有显著发生。

And that significantly hasn't happened this time around.

因此，我们看到了美元的大幅走弱，但美元储备至今尚未作出任何反应。

So we've seen a big weakening of the dollar, but there's been no response yet from dollar reserves.

所以我认为这表明了全球对美元需求态度的普遍变化。

So I think that shows like a general change in attitude to to global demand for dollars.

因此，我不认为这次美元的反弹会那么强劲。

So I don't necessarily see, and I think the dollar rally will be as big this time.

到目前为止，DXY指数自战争爆发以来已上涨了约1.5%至2%。

And thus far, the DXY, I think, is up about one and a half, 2% since the war started.

我们来看第五张幻灯片，谈谈大宗商品。

We go to slide five, looking at, say, commodities.

作为一类风险资产，大宗商品通常被认为在经济衰退时会明显回落，这是普遍的看法。

So commodities as a kind of risky asset is sort of seen as well, it should certainly settle off in a recession, I think, the general interpretation.

但情况也并不总是如此。

That isn't always the case either.

如果是由于大宗商品引发的衰退，而如果我们确实将陷入衰退，那么在接下来的几个月里，只要战争持续且负面影响持续蔓延，这种情况几乎不可能改变。

If you have a commodity induced recession, and if we are going to get recession, there's very little chance that in the next few months that that could change if the war continues and the negative effects spiral.

通常发生的情况是，大宗商品价格会在经济下滑前就开始下跌，但这种大宗商品价格的下跌在一定程度上缓解了增长冲击。

What often happens then is that commodities start to sell off before the slump and growth, but that sort of sell off in commodity prices kind of eases the growth shock.

实际上，这使得大宗商品在衰退的其余时间里还能上涨。

And actually, that allows commodities to rally through the rest of the recession.

所以这种情况很可能再次发生。

So that might may well happen again.

如果我们在今年晚些时候或明年遭遇由大宗商品引发的衰退的话。

We got commodity induced recession, say, later this year or next year.

这并不是一个预测。

That's not a prediction.

但如果我们真的遭遇这样的衰退，我不会自动假设大宗商品会在此期间持续下跌。

But if we were to get one, I wouldn't automatically assume that commodities are gonna sell off through that.

西蒙，我们继续看第九页。

Simon, let's move on to page nine.

这页幻灯片的标题是：只有战争才能拖垮如此强劲的经济。

The title of that slide is it takes a war to bring down an economy this strong.

我们先来看看经济有多强劲，但随后你又提到，这需要一场持久的战争。

Let's start with how strong the economy is, but then later you say, it would take a protracted war.

所以我想问题是，要让经济衰退到我们目前这种强劲程度，这场战争需要持续多久？而这场经济走势最终会走向何方？

So I guess the question is how protracted does it need to be in order to take down the strength of economy that we already have, and where is this thing headed?

考虑到经济周期的持续时间，它的韧性实际上非常惊人，我在研究这一点时感到非常意外。

It's actually remarkably strong, given I think the length of time of the cycle, and that really surprised me when I was looking at this.

这多少有点讽刺的是，在战争爆发前，美国经济正处于全面发力的状态。

And it's also a little bit ironic, I guess, that coming into this war, The US was firing on all cylinders.

正如他提到的，我也说过，这场战争或许正是足以让经济脱轨的那根导火索。

And, you know, as he mentioned as I mentioned, the war is perhaps just what it would take to to derail it.

美国经济存在多个周期。

And you have a number of cycles for The US economy.

人人都知道商业周期。

Everyone knows about the business cycle.

还有流动性周期。

There's also the liquidity cycle.

还有房地产周期。

There's the housing cycle.

还有库存周期。

There's the inventory cycle.

还有信贷周期。

There's the credit cycle.

而所有这些周期目前都处于相当不错的状态。

And all of them are actually in pretty good shape.

因此，如果观察领先指标，商业周期已经开始回升。

So the business cycle, if you look at leading indicators, have been turning up.

流动性周期，也就是左边那张图。

The liquidity cycle, so that's the chart on the left there.

我关注的是超额流动性，即实际货币增长与经济增长之间的差额。

And I look at excess liquidity, which is the difference between real money growth and economic growth.

这能很好地衡量流动性对市场的影响程度。

So that really gives you a measure of what impact this liquidity is going to have on markets.

因此，流动性与经济增长之间的差距越大，意味着经济所需越少，而更多资金将流入风险资产。

So the bigger the gap between liquidity and economic growth, that means the economy needs less, but that more to go into risk assets.

正如你在这张图表中看到的，这一指标一直在波动，但最近又回升了。

That has been vacillating around, as you can see in the chart, but it turned back up again.

即使考虑到自战争以来金融状况出现了一些收紧，

And even even taking into account, we've seen some tightening in financial conditions since the war.

但总体来看，这种收紧并不剧烈。

But overall, they've not been massive.

正如我前面提到的，美元的涨势到目前为止也并不强劲。

As I alluded to earlier, the dollar's rally hasn't been huge either thus far.

因此，流动性状况依然良好。

So liquidity is in in pretty good shape.

而且，目前来看，整体商业周期也处于良好状态。

And at this you know, the general business cycle is in pretty good shape.

即使考虑到就业市场已经放缓，我认为仍有可能出现无就业增长的情况。

Even taking into account that the job market's slowed down, I think it's possible to have a a jobless group.

而我用来判断是否即将出现经济放缓的一些指标，比如临时援助实际上正在上升，而非下降。

And some of the things that I would look at to see if there was a slowdown in group coming, such as temporary help is actually rising, not falling.

平均工作时长基本保持稳定。

Average hours worked is kinda static.

通常情况下，人们在裁员之前会先减少工时，你本应看到这一趋势下降。

You would normally expect to see that fall as people cut hours before they start sacking people.

我认为你必须记住，许多公司仍然拥有非常强劲的利润率。

I think you've got to remember that we have companies that still got very strong margins.

它们的资产负债表总体上状况良好。

Their balance sheets are generally in pretty good shape.

而且，还有大量政府资金仍在系统中持续流入。

And then you've got this massive amount of government money still filtering through the system.

因此，至少在短期内，可能并没有迫切需要大规模裁员。

And so there's maybe not the same acute needs in the short term, at least, for heavy layoffs.

全球经济体也处于良好状态。

And that global the global economy is also in a good shape as well.

所以，这就是右边的图表。

So that's the chart on the right there.

你可以看到，我们正处于全球周期性上升阶段。

You can see that we're in the midst of this global cyclical upswing.

如果你看一下来自世界各国的经合组织先行指标，几乎全部都在六个月基础上出现回升。

If you look at OECD leading indicators from different countries around the world, almost all of them are turning up on six month base.

再看库存周期，似乎也正在转向上升。

And then if you look at the inventory cycle, that looks like to be turning up as well.

先行指标表明，这一趋势将继续上升。

Leading indicators are pointing in it to continue to rise.

销售与库存比率已经开始上升。

Sales to inventory ratios have started to rise.

房地产周期状况不太好，但你知道的，还行。

The housing cycle is not as in good shape, but, you know, it's okay.

房地产销售增长已经放缓，诸如此类的情况。

The housing growth sales growth has slowed down and things like that.

但衡量房地产的最佳先行指标之一是建筑许可。

But one of the best leading indicators for housing is building permits.

建筑许可情况尚可，实际上是由抵押贷款利差推动的。

Building permits are doing okay, and they're actually led by mortgage spreads.

由于多种原因，例如债券波动性下降，我们看到了抵押贷款利差的显著收窄。

We've seen quite a significant compression in mortgage spreads for various reasons, such as falling bond volatility.

因此，你也不能说房地产周期特别糟糕。

And so you can't see that the the housing cycle is in particularly bad shape either.

然后我们来看信贷周期。

And then we have the the credit cycle.

如果我们看第10页幻灯片，从基本面角度看，左侧图表中的我的领先指标显示，基本面仍指向利差收窄。

So if we go to slide 10, the listed credit market from a fundamental perspective, my my leading indicator there on the chart on the left shows that on there, fundamentals are still pointing to tighter spreads.

目前，银行的贷款条件正在以非常迅速的方式收紧。

So things like banks, lending conditions are particularly tightening in a particularly rapid way right now.

个人储蓄仍然很低，这意味着还有更多可支配资金，这些资金会流向消费。

Personal savings is still quite low, which means there's more money to be spent, which goes into yeah.

回到企业，来看它们的利润。

Back to corporates, to their to their profits.

所以你面对的是这种普遍的上市信贷市场，你需要为此付费。

So you've got this general kind of listed credit markets that you pay.

但最薄弱的环节是私人信贷。

The weakest link, though, is private credit.

而私人信贷，我认为是你最需要关注的。

And private credit, I think, is what you do probably have to be most aware of.

显然，私人信贷规模巨大，与上市市场不同。

Obviously, it's very big, unlike the listed markets.

但我们看到，一些问题正以比大多数人希望的更频繁的方式浮现出来。

But we've seen a number of cockroaches seem to be popping up with a little bit more frequency than probably most people would like.

在Cliff Water旗下的一只基金中，出现了12笔大规模赎回，高盛贷款也在限制其对私募基金的放贷规模。

We had 12 redemptions redemption big redemptions in one of Cliff Water's funds, JPMorgan loans, and there was limiting the amount of lending it's doing to its private funds.

而这次最新一波疲软的触发因素，实际上是私人信贷公司可能暴露于其中的软件公司高度集中。

And, really, what kinda triggered this latest little bout or weakness of was the concentration of software companies that private credit companies probably have exposure to.

而这背后，是AI编码代理性能的跨越式提升，这种提升支撑了许多软件公司的商业模式。

And that was on the back of this massive kind of, like, quantum leap in the performance of AI coding agents, which leads a lot of software companies' business models.

也许对很多公司来说这并不是生存危机，但确实意味着它们可能无法像以前那样收取高价或获得如此高的利润率。

Maybe none of them are it's not existential for a lot of them, but it certainly means that they may not be able to charge as high or get as high margins on their businesses than they have before.

因此，我们看到了它们股票估值的下调，显然这一点也反映在了贷款上。

So we've seen this markdown in valuations in their stocks, and obviously that's been reflected in the loans as well.

而且这种情况正在变得显而易见。

And we're getting this visible.

我们当然看不到贷款本身，因为它们看起来还行。

Can't see the loans themselves, obviously, because they are they're okay.

这正是市场的卖点，也就是它的独特优势。

That's kind of a selling point, the USP of the market.

但我们能看到BDCs（商业发展公司）的股价，它们显然在下跌，因为市场明显意识到，这些公司所持有的底层资产或贷款状况可能并不理想。

But we can see the shares of BDCs, the business development companies, and they've obviously been falling because the market is obviously wide to the fact that perhaps what they have underneath or the loans that they have aren't particularly in good shape.

你生命中的关键年份，因为过去曾有一种观点认为，这是私人信贷，出问题也能被控制住，因为这些机构会保护金融体系的其他部分，但事实并非如此。

And the vectored year of your life because there used to be I remember there's been an argument that was like, well, it's private credit.

某种坏事发生时，可以被控制住，因为这些机构会隔离金融体系的其他部分，但情况并非如此。

Something bad happens that can be contained because these guys are gonna insulate the rest of the financial system, but that's not the case.

如果你看看那些向私募基金放贷的银行，以及向非银行金融机构放贷的情况，就会发现过去几年这类贷款规模急剧膨胀。

If you look at the banks that have been lending to private funds, and if you look at lending to non bank financial institutions, that has mushroom in over the last couple of years.

你确实看到银行系统向大量私募信贷基金提供了巨额贷款。

You're really seeing huge number of loans has been, you know, extended from the banking system to a lot of private credit funds.

所以，风险的传导路径就在这里。

So there is your kind of vector of risk right there.

而且，如果私募信贷领域发生了什么问题，

And, you know, if if there is something well, Series happens in private credit.

它会迅速传导至整个信贷市场。

It it quickly transmits into the holistic credit markets.

当然，这对整个经济来说可能是不利的。

And then it's feasible, of course, that that that's bad for the rest of the economy.

我们显然已经经历过这种情况。

We've obviously been here before.

信贷市场规模庞大，足以造成巨大破坏，并迅速引发经济下行。

Credit markets are big enough that they can do a lot of damage and get the turn down very rapidly.

所以，就整体经济而言，我们现在的情况是强劲的。

So that's where we are in terms of the overall economy is strong.

信贷市场，再次强调，基本面很好，但最薄弱的环节是私人信贷。

The credit market, again, fundamental Google cake, but the weakest link is private credit.

这显然是需要密切关注的，甚至尽可能多地关注，因为其缺乏透明度。

That's obviously the one to watch or watch as much as you can because of its opacity.

除了关注不断出现的红色标题，告诉我哪个基金在赎回方面如何运作之外，很难有其他办法。

It's kind of difficult other than just watching Red Banner headlines coming up, telling me which fund is doing what with their redemptions.

除非你自己就身处这个领域，否则很难真正掌握到底发生了什么。

Otherwise, it's very difficult to really get a proper handle unless you're in that particular space yourself of really what's going on.

但毫无疑问，这是最大的风险之一。

But certainly, that's one of the biggest risks.

但撇开这一点，美国经济目前处于相当不错的位置。

But take that away, The US economy is in a pretty good spot.

而我认为可能真正拖垮它的，是一场旷日持久的战争。

And the one thing I think that could really derail it would be a protracted war.

我的意思是，你会问这场战争要持续多久。

I mean, you'd ask how long it's protracted.

我不知道。

I don't know.

但如果我们持续被封锁的时间越长，重启经济所需的时间就越长。

But the longer that we have straight up our moves blocked, the more the longer it takes to switch things back on.

所以，事物停摆的时间越长，重启所需的时间就越久。

So the longer things are off stream, the longer it takes to switch back on.

比如，如果你关闭了炼油厂，或者炼油厂受损，或者像冶炼厂这样的设施，一旦关闭六个月，再想重启就非常困难。

So whether that's if you power down refineries or refineries that damage or a thing like smelters that you switch them off six months to bring them back on.

因此，许多这种滞后效应将开始显现。

And so there's many of these hysteresis effects that will start to kick in.

我认为这也是为什么很多质量领域的人更看空，因为他们正在看到这些情况，却看不到任何上行空间。

I think that's also one of the reasons why a lot people in the quality space are more bearish because they're kind of seeing this, and they can't see any upside.

他们看到的中断可能持续到明年甚至更久，而且这是基于即使战争在短期内结束的情况。

They're looking at disruptions going way out probably well into next year, and that's on the basis that even if the war stopped in the quite short term.

因此，我认为这确实会影响你的判断，一场持久的战争肯定会对经济造成巨大破坏。

And so I think that does have to color your view, and a protracted war would definitely do a lot of damage to to the economy.

西蒙，正如你提到的私人信贷，这让我感到担忧，因为坦白说，它让我想起了2007年，当时我们也在讨论一个不透明、金融界普遍不了解的信贷市场小部分，根本不可能影响其他领域。

Simon, as you talked about private credit, it was kind of concerning to me because, frankly, it it echoes in my mind to about nineteen years ago, the 2007 when we were also talking about an opaque, not well understood in the broader finance community, small little piece of the credit market that couldn't possibly disturb anything else.

当时人们安慰我们说：别担心。

And the reassurance at the time was, don't worry.

这只限于次级贷款。

It's contained to subprime.

没什么好担心的。

There's nothing to worry about.

这会不会是另一个类似的陷阱？

Is this another setup like that?

看起来非常像。

It looks very much like it.

我认为这始于本·伯南克本人。

I think it started with Ben Bernanke himself.

他说房地产是可控的，我想是这样。

He said that housing is contained, I think.

听好了。

Look.

我回到我的一个基本观点：唯一不变的是人性。

I I go back to my kind of axiom that the one thing that doesn't change is is human nature.

我认为，即使在私人信贷领域，我们也能看到这一点：当人们有机会赚钱时，越是脱离监管、远离常规体系，贪婪和恐惧这些基本情绪就会浮现——首先是贪婪，人们会开始承担过度的风险以迅速获利，那么这些风险是什么？

I think we're sort of seeing that even within the private credit space in terms of when people have opportunities to make money and the more kind of off grid they are, away from regulation, the standard kind of emotions of greed and fear will kick in, greed initially, and people will start to take inflated risks to essentially earn money now what are risks there?

希望他们能在大难临头时置身事外。

Hopefully, they can not be around when the proverbial hits the fan.

所以我不明白，我们为什么不需要它们呢？

And so I I don't see why why wouldn't we need them?

我的意思是，今天甚至还有一个故事。

I mean, there's even a a story today.

在私人信贷基金中，有一个信贷基金，没错，它是个黑箱，但在这个黑箱里面，还有更黑的黑箱。

One of the the credit funds, if you look in the private credit fund, there's, yeah, it's a black box, but within it, there's even more black boxes.

我的意思是，这立刻让我想起了CDO平方。

I mean, that straightaway reminded me of CDO Square.

我们原本就有CDO这种已经很小众的衍生品，但人们开始自己创造出CDO的CDO。

So we had CDOs that were already niche derivative products, but people started making up these CDOs of CDOs themselves.

我敢肯定，西蒙的很多员工都在想，这大概不会有什么好结果。

And, you know, I'm sure a lot of people at Simon are thinking, this probably can end well.

而你看，我们又回到了这里。

And, you know, here we are again.

金融界根本没有什么新东西。

There's nothing new in finance.

西蒙，非常感谢你带来这么精彩的访谈。

Simon, I can't thank you enough for a terrific interview.

在你离开之前，我肯定很多听众都想关注你的工作。

Before I let you go, I'm sure a lot of listeners are gonna want to follow your work.

你得是个特别的人，还得有彭博终端，才能接触到大部分内容。

You kinda have to be somebody special and have a Bloomberg terminal in order to access most of it.

告诉那些有幸拥有这种访问权限的人，他们在哪里可以找到你的文章。

Tell them for those who are lucky enough to have that access where they can find your writings.

当然。

Sure.

再次感谢你邀请我参加这个节目，埃里克。

And and thanks again for for having me on the show, Erik.

在终端上，我有一个名为 MacroScope 的专栏。

So on the terminals, I have a column called MacroScope.

每周发布两次，周二和周四。

Comes out twice a week, Tuesday and Thursdays.

我还为市场动态博客撰稿，这是一个24小时、每周五天更新的市场滚动资讯，你可以随时追踪最新的市场动态。

And I also write for the market slide blog, which is the a kind of twenty four hour, five days a week market scroll that you can follow all the latest market development.

帕特里克·塞雷萨和我将在《宏观之声》继续回来，敬请关注 macrovoices.com。

Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at macrovoices.com.

很高兴再次邀请西蒙·怀特做客我们的节目。

It was great to have Simon White back on the show.

接下来是罗里·约翰逊的第二次特别访谈，讨论正在发展的伊朗冲突及其对石油市场的影响。

Rory Johnson is next on deck for a special second interview on a developing Iran conflict and what it means for the oil markets.

然后埃里克和我会回来，继续我们的常规赛后图表分析和本周交易策略。

Then Erik and I will be back for our usual postgame chart deck and trade of the week.

由于这种额外报道形式深受听众欢迎，只要中东局势需要，我们会尽力持续下去。

Since the extra coverage format seems to be a hit with our listeners, we will do our best to continue it as long as the situation in The Middle East warrants.

现在，让我们直接进入埃里克对能源市场专家罗里·约翰逊的访谈。

Now let's go right to Erik's interview with energy markets expert Rory Johnson.

现在加入我们的是商品背景公司创始人罗里·约翰逊。

Joining me now is commodity context founder Rory Johnson.

罗里，你和阿纳斯·阿尔哈吉博士，以及所有最可信的专家都持相同看法，那就是：霍尔木兹海峡被封锁的可能性其实并不现实——我回想起几个月甚至几年前的几次访谈。

Rory, you, doctor Anas Alhaji, really all of the most credible experts felt the same way, which was, look, the the Strait Of Hormuz getting shut down is probably not that realistic of a scenario, and I'm going back to previous interviews, you know, months or years ago.

天啊，所有人都被泼了一盆冷水。

Boy, everybody got thrown a curveball.

那么，到底发生了什么？

So what happened?

为什么包括你自己在内的所有专家都认为这根本不可能被封锁，是因为保险问题吗？

How come all the experts, including yourself, who thought this really couldn't be shut down, is it just about insurance?

是因为水雷吗？

Is it about minefields?

还是其他原因？

Is it about something else?

为什么船只现在没有通过霍尔木兹海峡？首先我们来谈谈这个，然后再讨论这意味什么。

How come the traffic is not flowing through the strait, first of all, And then we'll get into what does it mean.

谢谢你再次邀请我回来，埃里克。

Thanks for having me back on, Erik.

正如你所说，我长期以来一直对这个问题持相对乐观的态度。

As you note, I've been relatively kind of Pollyanna ish about this for a long time.

我之所以这么认为，是因为我从未想过这种情况会发生，我要明确一点：我这辈子从没想过会发生这种事。

That it and the reason for it, the reason I didn't think this would happen, and to be clear, I never thought this would happen in my career.

之所以这样，是因为这会带来巨大的冲击。

And the reason for that is because it is such a big shock.

如果这种情况持续下去，将会让上世纪七十年代显得微不足道。

It's, you know, it make it'll make the if this continues, it'll make the nineteen seventies look like child's play.

这正是我所担心的，也是我认为现在发生这种情况的部分原因。

And that is my concern here, and I think part of the reason that it is happening now.

我当初没料到会发生，不是因为我认为伊朗无法关闭海峡——尽管我确实有所怀疑，因为我们从未见过这种情况真正发生，而且后果实在太严重了。

And the reason I didn't think it would happen is is not that I didn't think that Iran could close the strait, although I had my doubts because we had never seen it realized, and again, the consequences are so intense.

但我从未想过，美国总统会在没有计划、没有准备好应对方案的情况下，就与伊朗开战。

But I never thought a US president would engage in a war with Iran without a plan, without something in his pocket kind of ready for this moment.

到目前为止，我们所看到的是，至少这是我对于当前局势以及特朗普政府如何陷入这一局面的理解。

And what we've seen so far is that, at least here's my my read of what's happening and how the Trump administration got into this.

我不认为特朗普政府预料到自己会陷入对伊朗战争的第三周。

I do not think that the Trump administration expected to be in its third week of the Iran war.

我认为他们根本没有做任何你本该做的准备，如果他们原本计划要持续数周甚至数月的这场冲突的话。

I do not think they did not do any of the things you would do if you had planned to be in this engagement for weeks, and potentially months now.

比如，我们上周看到了国际能源署协调释放战略石油储备。

We saw, for instance, the IEA's coordinated strategic petroleum release last week.

这很好。

That was good.

在这种情况下的确应该这么做，但这已经是战争开始两周后了。

That's absolutely what we should be doing in this in this situation, but it was two weeks after the war started.

如果你在计划这件事，你早就该安排好国际能源署的释放行动了。

Like, if you were if you were planning this, you would have an IEA release lined up.

比如，我们在海湾战争前就看到过这样的例子。

You know, we saw that ahead of The Gulf War as an example.

你本该提前准备好像贝桑特在财政部宣布的海上保险机制这类措施，而且早就该安排妥当。

You would have had things like the marine insurance facility that that Besant announced at Treasury, you would have had that lined up.

你可能还会提前做更多工作来补充战略石油储备。

You probably would have done more work to refill the strategic petroleum reserve ahead of this.

我的意思是，所有这些措施都表明，我们竟然在毫无准备的情况下卷入了这场战争——我说的‘毫无准备’，是指特朗普政府在没有计划的情况下进入了这场冲突。

I mean, all of these things are such that it just seems insane that we entered this without kinda or and and by me, I mean, the Trump administration entered into this without a plan.

我认为，从特朗普政府的表现来看，我原本预期会看到一些行动，毕竟自2003年入侵伊拉克以来，中东地区从未有过如此大规模的军事集结，这本应带来某种结果。

I think that what we've seen from the Trump administration, and very frankly, my expectation was that we're gonna see something, that clearly the largest military buildup in The Middle East since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was going to lead to something.

好吧。

Alright.

今年早些时候或去年年底，我们在委内瑞拉海岸外也看到了类似的军事集结，当时有封锁，还有其他各种行动，但到了今年一月的那个周末，当特朗普政府绑架了尼古拉斯·马杜罗和他的妻子时，一切终于发生了。

We saw the same kind of buildup off the coast of Venezuela earlier this year or late last year, and in that moment, you know, there was blockade, there was everything else, but when it finally all went down that first weekend in January when the Trump administration, you know, kidnapped Nicolas Maduro and his wife.

基本上，这件事发生在周六或周六早上，我想。

Basically, that happened on a Saturday or Saturday morning, I guess.

当时大家都在问，发生了什么？

There was all this, you know, what's happening?

发生了什么？

What's happening?

发生了什么？

What's happening?

到了周一，我们已经任命德尔西·罗德里格斯为临时总统。

And then by Monday, you know, we had Delsy Rodriguez in as the interim president.

她正在与特朗普总统谈判，整个过程非常迅速地就结束了。

She was making a deal with president Trump, and it was kind of it was wrapped really quickly.

去年六月，当我们上次讨论直新闻的担忧时，特朗普政府采取了与美国对伊朗军事政策截然不同的做法，即直接出动14枚钻地炸弹，袭击了伊朗三个主要核设施——福特ow、纳坦兹和伊斯凡。

The same thing happened last June when we last talked about the worry with straight form news was that the Trump administration embarked on what at that stage was a fairly stark break from US military policy towards Iran, which is, you know, it directly engaged in 14 dropping 14 bunker buster bombs on three the three main Iranian nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Issaan.

而且，如果你还记得的话，埃里克，我相信你记得，那个周末过后，亚洲市场周一开盘时，价格如预期般飙升。

And again, if you remember, I'm sure you remember this, Erik, like the Monday when the or Asian markets opened at the end of the weekend, prices spiked higher as you would expect after this kind of event.

但到了周一中午左右，我们看到了伊朗象征性的报复行动，随后特朗普宣布我们达成了停火协议，我认为当天原油价格下跌了10美元。

And then by mid mid you know, by the middle of Monday, we saw this kind of symbolic retaliation from Iran, and then Trump saying, we've got a we've got a cease fire deal, and then I think crude ended the day down $10.

这正是我预测这场冲突走向的框架。

That was kind of my framework for what I was expecting out of this conflict.

因此，我原本认为，古巴显然是下一个被推翻的政权目标，我认为特朗普本计划现在就已经推翻古巴政权了。

And by that token, I had expected that, you know, it was very clear that Cuba was next up on on the list of kind of regimes to roll over, And I think Trump planned to basically be rolling over on Cuba by now.

而这里的问题是，如果他们期待伊朗会出现类似德尔西·罗德里格斯那样的人物，出来表态，给他们一个宣布胜利的机会，我想他本该这么做的。

And the wrinkle here is that if they were expecting some kind of Delsky Rodriguez character to emerge in Iran, someone to say someone to give them the opportunity to declare victory, I think he would've.

但到目前为止，我们看到的是，伊朗方面并没有这么做。

And I think what we've seen so far is that the Iranians have not done that.

我认为，如果特朗普误以为委内瑞拉的政治文化与伊朗的政治文化相同，那这可能是白宫最大的误判。

And I think if Trump expected the political culture of Venezuela to be the same as the political culture of Iran, that I think is probably arguably the biggest miscalculation here from the White House.

至于究竟是什么阻止了这一点，也就是通过霍尔木兹海峡的通行，因为从历史上看，这个海峡从未被关闭过。

As for what's actually preventing this, the, you know, passage through the Strait, because again, when we look historically, the Strait has never been closed.

即使在我们经历激烈暴力和袭击的时候，比如上世纪八十年代两伊战争期间的油轮战争，我们也看到数百艘船只遭到攻击。

Even when we've had acute violence, acute attacks in the Strait, back in the nineteen eighties during the Iran Iraq war, during the tanker wars, we saw hundreds of ships hit.

根据我看到的计算，共有450艘船遭到袭击。

We saw by by the calculations I saw, it was 450 ships attacked.

其中250艘是油轮，有55艘油轮被彻底击沉、凿沉或被船员遗弃。

You had 250 tankers attacked, and 55 of those tankers were basically either sunk or scuttled and otherwise abandoned by crews.

比我们现在所看到的还要严重得多，但即便在那时，海峡的航运也从未中断。

Like, we, more than we've already seen now, and during that time, you never had flow halt through the strait.

因此，这是我们最好的历史参照，坦白说，我原本预期这里也会发生类似的情况。

So that was our best historical parallel, and quite frankly, I expected something similar to be happening here.

但到目前为止，我们看到的是：没有。

And what we've seen so far is that no.

极少，极少——我的意思是，各种估算不一，但目前这种激素贸易的运输量实际上已下降了90%到95%。

Very, very few I mean, the the estimates vary, but basically, like, a ninety and ninety five percent reduction structurally now through this trade of hormones.

至于保险之类的问题，我认为最初人们预期可能是缺乏保险。

And with things like insurance, I think there was this expectation that, okay, maybe at the beginning it was a lack of insurance.

我们一直在等待这些油轮所有者和保险公司想办法，比如，我们得找到一种方式来恢复承保。

We were waiting for these, you know, these tanker owners to and the insurance providers to figure out a way to say, okay, you know, we're gonna figure out a way to lift.

显然，风险增加了，所以我们取消了保险，然后打算重新启动。

Obviously, the risk is increased, so we're canceling coverage and we're going to kind of reinstitute.

但事实上，这种情况根本没发生。

But but there was just, you know, that never happened.

实际上，你看到的情况是，最近我们收到的报告表明，战争保险费用飙升了。

You ended up actually seeing, and we've seen reports more recently that, you know, the war insurance has skyrocketed.

在战争爆发前的一个月，保险费用大约是船舶价值的0.25%，而根据我最近看到的彭博社发布的最新数据，现在已经涨到了5%。

If it was basically point 25% of a vessel's value kind of in the month before the war, that is now by the latest estimates that I've seen published by Bloomberg jumped to 5%.

所以我们说的是一个巨大的、巨大的涨幅。

So we're talking a massive massive increase.

也就是说，一艘价值一亿美元的船舶，仅穿越海峡的保险费就高达500万美元。

That's like $5,000,000 insurance premium on a $100,000,000 vessel just across the strait.

但问题是，即使在这些疯狂的水平下，海峡两岸的套利价值似乎仍然能够出清。

But the issue is that even at those insane levels, the arbitrage value across the strait still seems to clear.

也就是说，海峡一侧的价格实际上已经为负，而在迪拜，实物价格已超过每桶150美元。

That you know, we now have effectively negative prices on the bad side of the strait, and we have on a physical basis on Dubai, over a $150 a barrel.

用这笔保险费用完全可以覆盖，但他们却没有这么做。

You can very easily cover that with this insurance, and they're not.

我认为，这背后还有其他事情正在发生。

And I think that is where something else is happening.

我认为，对此最合理的解释——也是我将在后续讨论中反复提到的——即市场仍持续预期，基本情景是特朗普会在此退缩，我们会看到另一个‘ taco ’（指类似关税政策的突发措施）。

And I think my best explanation for this, and I think it's also an explanation you're gonna hear me talk about through the financial, the relatively sanguine financial impacts that we've seen so far, is that the market continues to expect, the base case expectation is that Trump backs out here, that we see another taco.

如果真是这样，如果明天这场危机就结束了，或者至少他宣布结束了，那为什么还要花500万美元，冒着船舶和船员的风险呢？

And if that's the case, if there's the chance that tomorrow this ends, or at least he declares it done, Why spend the $5,000,000 and risk your ship and crew if this could be over tomorrow?

我认为，人们始终抱有这种希望，认为这场危机终将结束，因为正如我们接下来要讨论的，如果危机持续下去，后果将极其严重，以至于我无法想象美国总统会承担由此带来的政治代价。

And I think there's this continual hope that this is going to end, because as we will talk about, the consequences of it not ending are so extreme that it is unthinkable to me that a US president would bear the political cost of what's coming down the pipe.

那我们接下来就具体谈谈这一点吧。

Well, let's talk about that specifically next then.

我认为你和我很容易达成一致，我就说极端一点吧，如果这种情况持续一年，霍尔木兹海峡完全或基本停止航运，那将引发比2008年更大的全球金融危机，因为这会彻底瘫痪全球经济。

I think you and I could easily agree that, and I'll just go to an extreme here, if this continued for a year, if there was no transit or no significant meaningful transit of the Strait Of Hormuz for a year, that would result in probably a bigger than 2,008 global financial crisis because it would shut down the entire global economy.

没有能源。

There's no energy.

没有经济。

There's no economy.

故事到此为止。

That's the end of the story.

好的。

Okay.

如果我们不能撑一年，但可能撑到下周呢。

If it's you know, we can't go a year, but we could go into next week.

哦，明白了。

Oh, okay.

这根引信还有多长？

How long is that fuse?

有哪些临界点，一旦越过，就会因为积压太多而造成无法修复的破坏？

What's are there tipping points where after a certain point, things are broken that can't be fixed because the backlog is too long?

这种情况还能持续多久，才会进入一个不可逆转的境地？

What does the timeline look like of how long this can continue before you get into a situation where it's not reversible?

埃里克，我想说的第一点是，我完全同意你的看法。

The first thing I wanna say Erik is I completely agree with you.

我认为，如果这种情况持续一年，我简直无法想象会带来多么严重的经济灾难和人道主义危机，那后果是难以想象的。

I think that if this goes on for a year, and again, I cannot imagine, like the level of economic calamity, of human catastrophe that would rot is unimaginable to me.

我会简单地在这里分析一下，因为我认为尝试想象这种情景很重要。

I mean, we'll walk through it briefly here because I think it's important to try and imagine it.

但再次强调，我实在无法想象任何政治家会承受这样的政治后果。

But again, I just can't imagine the political any politicians kind of, you know, bearing that political consequence.

因为，正如你所说，我们所谈论的，我通常不是一个动不动就给出大幅价格预测的人。

Because what we're talking about, to your point, like, I mean, I'm normally not a guy that comes, you know, comes with, like, big price calls.

我通常不喜欢做这种预测。

I typically I don't like them.

但我觉得，我已经说过，在这种情况下，原油涨到200美元是很轻松的。

But, like, I've been saying, like, yeah, $200 crude is easy in this scenario.

如果我们谈论的是一年或更长时间，那么200美元只是你预期的最低水平，我一直在试图量化我们实际讨论的内容。

If we're if we're talking a year or more, like 200 is the bare minimum of what you'd expect, we need to I've been trying to parameterize what we're actually talking about.

假设就这个启发性估算而言，我们谈论的是每天有2000万桶石油通过海峡。

And if let's say, just for this heuristic here, we talk about 20,000,000 barrels a day of oil flow through the strait.

甚至我们可以降到1500万桶，因为也许东西管道、延布以及其他所有设施都能顺利运行，沙特的分流计划也奏效了。

Let's even just knock it down to 15, because maybe we get, you know, the East West pipeline and Yanbu and everything else, everything works well with the Saudi diversion plan.

我们就假设是1500万桶。

Let's say 15.

这大致相当于2020年3月和4月新冠疫情期间需求崩溃的峰值，当时所有人都被封锁在家，天空中没有飞机，主要机场实际上都关闭了。

That is, ballpark, the peak of the demand destruction we experienced in March and April 2020 during COVID, when everyone was locked in their homes, you had not an airplane in the sky, you know, major airports were effectively shuttered.

我们需要这种程度的需求萎缩来平衡这个市场。

That's the kind of demand destruction we would be needing to balance that market.

但在没有疫情的情况下，仅靠价格机制就实现如此大规模的需求萎缩，那将是异常高昂的价格。

But with no pandemic, and just just purely through price mechanisms, that is an extraordinarily high price to clear that kind of demand destruction.

我基本上一直在说，像我这样的人，对汽油价格的敏感度极低，因为每天早上我得送孩子上学。

I've been basically just kind of saying that like, you know, me, I have an extraordinarily low price sensitivity for gasoline to get my kids to school in the morning.

但很多人，无论在富裕国家还是其他地方，这显然会变成一种巨大的累退税；我认为在发达经济体中，我们会普遍经历这种毁灭性的经济衰退，甚至接近萧条的价格冲击，它会严重抑制消费支出，并带来我们通常所预期的所有连锁反应。

But a lot of people, both in wealthy countries, obviously, this, you know, it's going to be effectively a massive regressive tax, but I think in wealthy economies, we will generally experience this as a debilitating recessionary, you know, nigh depressionary price shock that will sap consumer spending, that will have all of the normal repercussions we would think about.

但仅仅价格上涨是不够的，因为你仍需从全球系统中削减如此庞大的需求。

But a price spike isn't enough because you still need to shed that much demand from the global system.

那么，这种削减会在哪里发生呢？

And where is that going to happen?

它将发生在全球南方的贫困新兴市场国家，每当出现价格冲击时，这些国家就会面临物资短缺。

It's going to happen in poorer emerging market countries in the global South, that when we see price shocks, they will see shortages.

我们在2022年就曾以一种臭名昭著的方式目睹过这种情况：一艘原本承诺运往巴基斯坦的油轮，违背了承诺，支付了违约金，转而将汽油运往欧洲，因为即使扣除违约费用，套利利润依然惊人。

We saw this in kind of notorious fashion now in 2022, when the kind of the infamous example of the committed tanker to Pakistan, that they broke their commitment, they paid the rakeage fee, and they shipped that gas to Europe, because they could make a, you know, a king's ransom on the arb, even factoring for the breakage fee.

这就是市场出清的方式，也是系统中本应发生的方式。

And that's how markets are gonna clear, that's how they're supposed to clear in the system.

所以，我并不是说这有什么错，但这里将付出巨大的人道代价。

So I'm not saying that's wrong per se, but there is going to be an enormous human cost here.

我认为当你谈论这些燃料时，你谈的是电力、取暖、烹饪，甚至是生命。

And I think when you're talking about these fuels, you're talking about electricity, you're talking about heat, you're talking about cooking, you're talking about life.

我认为，如果这种情况持续下去，我们不得不设法削减15%到20%的用量，这简直荒谬至极。

And I think what we're going to have to try and trim back by 15 to 20% if this persists, and that is just insane.

让我们试着为这种情况设定一些具体的时间框架，我知道这很难，抱歉让你面对这个问题。

Let's try to put some specific time frames on this, which I know is difficult, and I apologize for doing this to you.

但正如你所说，大多数人现在都在想，这肯定快结束了。

But as you said, what's going on here is most people are thinking, well, surely this is about to be over.

我的意思是，继续下去太疯狂了，马上就要结束了。

I mean, it's it's crazy to continue, it's about to be over.

它一定快结束了。

It must be about to be over.

为了以防万一它不会结束，我们来设想一下：一种是再持续三周的情景，另一种是再持续三个月的情景。

Just in case it's not, let's imagine, say, both a three weeks more scenario and a three months more scenario.

如果必须猜测的话，接下来再持续三周——就像过去这三周那样，或者无论已经持续了多久——会带来什么影响？再延长三个月，这两种情景在你看来会是什么样子？

What are each of those if you had to guess the impact of three more weeks just like the last three weeks or however long this has been, and then three more months, what do those scenarios look like in your mind?

那我们先从一个更乐观的情景开始吧。

So let's actually start with an even more sanguine scenario.

如果今天就结束，会发生什么？

What happens if it ends today?

因为我认为已经造成了持久的损害。

Because I think there's already durable damage.

而且我认为很多人假设，只要明天结束，一切就能恢复正常。

And I think a lot of people just assume that we could end this tomorrow and everything goes back to normal.

即使今天停止，我们至少也需要三个月才能让系统恢复正常。

We're probably talking three months minimum to to renormalize the system even if it stops today.

目前所有在波斯湾的油轮都已紧急撤离，它们都成功离开了，我们恢复了满负荷运输，仿佛什么都没发生过。

And every tanker currently in The Gulf made a break for it, they all made it out, and we just resumed full flow and it like, nothing ever happened.

即便如此，我们仍需要数月时间来恢复供应链，因为这些船只将堆积在一起。

Even in that case, we're talking about months of supply chain recovery because these ships are gonna be piled on top of each other.

你已经造成了大约4亿桶，或者说3.3至3.4亿桶的缺口，这源于中东——主要是向亚洲——的石油正常流动中断。

You've had you've already had roughly a 400,000,000 barrel gap or three hundred and three hundred and forty million barrel gap that's emerged in these, basically, the normal flow of oil into out of The Middle East, largely to Asia.

目前，我们还没有感受到这一冲击的全部影响，因为三周前，仍有满载石油的油轮离开波斯湾。

Right now, we're still we still haven't felt the brunt of that because three weeks ago, we still had tankers laden with oil leaving The Gulf.

这些油轮将继续前往目的地，需要三到四周才能到达，当这批油料缺口最终在亚洲落地时，我们将开始以每天一千五百万桶甚至更多的速度消耗库存，而这此前从未发生过。

Those tankers will continue to their destinations, takes three, four weeks to get where they're going, and when that air pocket finally hits land in Asia, that's when we're gonna start drawing inventories at ten, fifteen plus million barrels a day, which again has never happened before.

我们已经看到亚洲炼油厂试图提前行动，抢在危机前延长其库存周期。

We've already seen Asian refineries attempt to short basically front run this to extend their runways.

他们已经降低了运行率。

They've reduced operating rates.

他们削减了产品产量。

They've cut product output.

因此，我们看到迪拜原油价格已涨至每桶150美元，而亚洲新加坡的航煤价格甚至超过了每桶200美元。

So we're talking we've seen a $150 crude in Dubai and physical crude, but we've seen over $200 a barrel jet fuel in Asia, in Singapore.

我认为，仅这一情况就需要数月时间才能缓解。

And I think that is, that alone would take months to sort out.

但让我们来看看三周后的情景。

But let's go to that three week scenario.

好的。

Okay.

所以假设我们已经处于这种情况三周了，那就翻倍吧。

So let's say we're already in this for three weeks, so let's say it's double.

现在你面对的是高达三分之二十亿桶的气囊在系统中，而这同样需要被解决。

Now you're looking at two thirds of a billion barrels of air pocket in the system that, again, needs to get sorted out.

到那时，我们已经看到波斯湾地区每天有超过900万桶的原油产能被关停。

By that stage, we've already seen upwards of 9,000,000 barrels a day of crude oil production capacity shut in through The Gulf.

关停时间越长，海峡关闭时间越久，这种减产情况就会越严重。

The longer that's off, the longer the strait is closed, the more we're gonna see that cut back.

而且，任何熟悉这个行业的人都知道，关闭这些油井并不简单，重新启动也绝非易事，且必然带来负面后果，而这些问题会随着时间推移不断恶化。

And again, as anyone familiar with this industry, it's not trivial to shut in these wells, it's not trivial to get them back on without any kind of negative repercussions, and all that stuff just gets worse with time and time and time.

我认为，就价格预测而言，再过三周，我们很可能已经突破每桶150美元了。

I think, you know, in terms of price call, I think in three more weeks of this, I think we could well, I think we would already be over a $150 brand.

我们目前在迪拜现货市场上显然已经到达这个价位了，我想人们会问：为什么没人买这种原油呢？

We're already obviously there at the kind of physical Dubai cash market, and I think people are like, well, why wouldn't, you know, why would anyone buy that crude?

你为什么不直接买西德克萨斯中质原油（WTI）呢？

Why wouldn't you just buy WTI?

它便宜了大约50到60美元。

It's like $50 or $60 cheaper.

答案是，它在错误的时间出现在了错误的地点。

And the answer is that it's in the wrong place at the wrong time.

如果你购买的是即期WTI期货，交付要等到下个月，而你需要把它从库欣运到海岸，再从海岸运到中东和亚洲。

You know, if you're buying the prompt WTI futures, it's not for delivery until next month, and you need to get it from Cushing to the coast, and you need to get it from the coast to The Middle East to Asia.

这得花上好几个月。

That, we're talking months.

人们今天就需要这些原油，这就是为什么我认为亚洲炼油厂仍抱有这种不切实际的希望，他们说：好吧，这种情况正在发生，但肯定不会持续下去。

People need these barrels today, And that is why I think there was still this kind of hopium, if you will, from Asian refineries saying like, okay, this is going on, but like surely this can't last.

过去几天你开始看到，今天早晨彭博社有一篇报道，亚洲炼油厂开始竞购布伦特原油现货，试图采购其他类型的原油，这意味着他们现在担心这种情况会持续数月，同时也意味着中东地区原油和亚洲成品油的局部紧缺状况，将开始向全球其他地区蔓延。

And what you started to see over the last couple days, there's a Bloomberg report this morning where Asian refineries were starting to bid into the Brent basket, and they're starting to kind of try and buy these other barrels, which means that they're now worrying that this is going to be going on for months, and it also means that that kind of acute local scarcity in crude in The Middle East and products in Asia is also going to begin spreading out to all the rest of the world.

对于美国人和美国总统来说，说‘中东紧张的石油市场关我什么事？’真是太容易了。

And I think it's really easy for Americans and the American president to say, who cares about tight oil markets in The Middle East?

我们在这里，但油价仍然相当低。

We're here and oil prices are still pretty low.

这是因为这种冲击波在系统中传播开来需要时间，才能激励并推动所有这些原油转移。

It's because this shockwave kind of moving out through the system takes time to kind of incentivize and bid all those barrels over.

我还觉得，回到为什么船只不通过的问题，因为他们觉得特朗普会退出。

And I also think, back to this why aren't ships going through because they, you know, they think Trump's gonna taco.

我也认为期货市场正处于完全相同的情况。

I also think that the futures market are in the exact same situation.

我们看到的不是两周前的那个周一，而是那个周末，当时每个人都以为他会在这个周末结束。

What we saw not, you know, two Mondays ago, the the, you know, the the second weekend that, again, everyone thought he was gonna end on the weekend.

但他并没有。

He didn't.

油价飙升至更高水平。

Prices spiked higher.

你几乎看到布伦特原油涨到每桶120美元，但随后特朗普说战争快结束了，价格就暴跌了。

You hit almost a $120 a barrel Brent, but then you got the first kind of Trump said, you know, the war's almost over, and prices cratered.

布伦特原油日内价差达到了35美元，我认为这以前从未发生过。

You had a $35 barrel intraday spread in Brent, which I don't believe has ever happened before.

许多交易员在这次波动中损失惨重，因为在这种环境下，推高原油价格显然是明显的方向性判断。

And a lot of traders kinda lost their shirts in that, because again, bidding crude higher was the obvious directional call in this environment.

但这种持续的口头干预，那些人被自己的仓位彻底击垮，甚至可能丢了工作。

But the kind of constant jawboning, you know, those people got blown to their positions, maybe even lost their jobs.

现在人们对于提前布局要谨慎得多。

People are much more wary now to kind of front run.

因为通常情况下，你预期期货市场会提前反映实物市场的紧张状况，因为市场是前瞻性的。

Because normally you expect futures markets to front run the tightness in physical markets because markets are forward looking.

但我认为，现在我们必须等待实物市场的紧张状况在西方充分且剧烈地显现出来，之后期货价格才会真正收敛。

But I think now we have to wait for that physical market tightness to kind of fully and aggressively manifest in the West before those future prices are going to actually converge.

你之前说过，你认为特朗普政府根本没想到这种结果已经发生，甚至根本不可能发生。

Now, you said earlier that you thought the Trump administration had no idea that this outcome, has already occurred, was even possible.

我想稍微反驳一下这一点，问问你是否有可能，他们其实也意识到这种可能性，只是不像你我这样对此感到担忧。

I wanna push back slightly on that and ask you if it's possible that maybe they did see it as a possibility, but just were not as concerned by it as you and I are.

我想读给你听特朗普总统周三在Truth Social上发布的一条帖子，他说：‘如果我们彻底终结伊朗这个恐怖国家，然后让使用霍尔木兹海峡的国家自己负责，会怎样？’

I wanna read you a truth social post from president Trump on Wednesday where he says, I wonder what would happen if we finished off what's left of the Iranian terror state and just let the countries that use the Strait Of Hormuz, we don't.

让他们自己负责所谓的海峡。

Let them be responsible for the so called Strait.

这会促使一些不作为的盟友迅速行动起来，签名者：唐纳德·J·特朗普。

That would get some of our non responsive allies in quotes in gear and fast, signed president Donald J.

特朗普。

Trump.

在我看来，他似乎并不认为这对美国来说是个大问题，因为他认为美国已经实现能源独立，如果霍尔木兹海峡被封锁，他觉得这只是其他国家的问题，与我们无关。

It sounds to me like he doesn't think it's a big deal for The United States since he perceives The United States to be energy independent, that if the Strait Of Hormuz is closed down, it sounds like he thinks that's a problem that affects other countries but doesn't affect us.

所以，管他呢。

So, you know, the hell with it.

让他们去操心吧。

Let them worry about it.

我不会问你我们是否应该为此担忧，因为我认为你和我都同意，为了全球贸易，海峡必须保持畅通。

I I don't I'm not gonna bother asking you whether we should be concerned about it, because I think you and I agree that we should be concerned about the strait needs to be open for the sake of global commerce.

油价是全球设定的，等等，但似乎总统对这一结果不太担心的原因，并不是他没有预见到，而是他不像你我这样为此感到忧虑。

Oil prices are set globally and so forth, but it does seem like there's room that the reason the president's not so concerned about this outcome is not that he didn't foresee it, but that he's just not as worried about it as you and I are.

我认为有这种可能性，而且我认为，再次强调，我没想到他会走这么远，所以我绝不敢声称自己完全了解特朗普的想法。

I think there's a chance of that, and I think, again, I didn't expect him to go this far, so I can't pretend perfect knowledge of Trump's mind by any means.

但我觉得，在过去两个半月的这些言论中，我们看到了目标显著转移的证据。

But I think what we've seen in those comments over the past two and a half weeks now is evidence of remarkable goal shifting.

这周我们看到了那条推文。

We had that tweet this week.

上周末，我们还有一条推文说，实际上，高油价对美国有利，因为美国是世界上最大的石油生产国。

End of last week, we also had a tweet about how actually, high oil prices are good for The United States because The United States is the largest oil producer in the world.

但这与特朗普早些时候的一些言论形成了强烈对比，他说，别慌张。

But that contrasts strongly with some of the earlier comments out of Trump about, you know, basically, don't be a panicking.

别把油价推高。

Don't bid up the price of oil.

你知道，这会没事的。

You know, this is gonna be fine.

战争快要结束了。

The war's almost over.

很明显，他当时试图压低油价，但随着油价基于我们之前讨论的现实情况不可避免地逐步上涨，他开始找到新的说法，表示这其实对我们有利。

Like, it definitely felt like he was trying to keep the oil prices lower, and then as oil prices started to inevitably, based on this kind of physical reality we've been discussing, as those prices started to grind higher, he started to find new ways to say, oh, okay, this is actually good for us.

实际上，我认为这可能是最令人担忧的发展，因为我的思维框架一直认为，石油市场将是唯一能够迫使特朗普退缩、阻止他长期持续这种行为的因素。

And I actually think in some ways, that's actually the most worrying development in this, because I think at least my mental framework here has always been that the oil market would be the single, the singular thing that would end pushing Trump back from the edge, from really going through for a prolonged period of time, months or or longer.

如果我们开始看到他试图改变这一叙事，甚至说服自己，那么情况就更糟了——毕竟唐纳德·特朗普是个极其公开的人。

And if we're starting to see him attempt to to change that narrative, to almost convince himself, and again, like Donald Trump is an extremely public person.

从上世纪八十年代起，他就一直反对高油价，并努力压低油价。

He's been for He's been against high oil prices and trying to drive them lower since the nineteen eighties.

低油价总统几乎成了他的个人品牌。

Like, low oil president is kind of like his brand.

所以我不确定自己能相信这种说法到什么程度。

And I would say that, so I don't know how much I can really buy this.

就连他自己能相信到什么地步，我也拿不准，这要看这种情况持续多久。

I don't even know how much he can really buy this, depending how long this goes.

我仍然认为他的核心倾向是支持低价石油。

I still think his core bias is towards low oil prices.

再说一次，他当选时被视为一位关注民众生活成本的总统。

Again, he was elected as kind of a pocketbook cost of living president.

我认为这就像我当初当选时承诺要让美国退出中东战争，但我们现在所处的时间线显然已经和当初选举时大不相同了。

And I think this is just I was also elected as as a president that would get out of wars in The Middle East, but we're very we're obviously in a very, very different timeline now from that election.

所以，我认为你可能是对的，我觉得他很多言论都是在事情不如他所愿之后才说出来的。

So again, I think there's a possibility that you're right, I do think that a lot of this is him saying things after things don't go his way.

比如，他那番直白的评论，主要是在他要求所有北约盟国和亚洲石油消费国帮忙之后才出现的，但这些国家却都婉拒了。

For instance, the comment of the straight came mostly after he asked all of the kind of allied NATO nations and and Asian nations that that consumed the oil to kinda come help them, and they were kinda like, no.

因为我认为，世界上许多消费国如果100%确信这场冲突会持续多年针对伊朗，那他们肯定会派遣海军，因为这局面根本无法持续。

Because again, I think the world, a lot of the consuming world, like, I think if they knew a 100% that this was going into Iran for years, yeah, they're gonna send their navies, because again, this is untenable.

但我认为，这种担忧确实存在。

But, I think there's this worry.

我甚至最初在战略石油储备释放时就听到过这种担忧：任何试图缓解油价冲击的举措，都在某种程度上切断了特朗普自身的反馈机制——他只有在看到市场崩盘时才会退让，这和关税问题如出一辙。

I think there I even heard this worry initially with the SPR releases that like anything you do to ameliorate the oil price consequences, to a degree short circuits Trump's own feedback mechanism, that the only way he was going to back down, and this is similar to the tariffs, that when, you know, the S and P was crashing, that's when he talk out.

人们原本以为现在会看到同样的机制，只不过对象换成了石油。

There was an expectation that this was the same mechanism that we'd be seeing now, but with oil.

我担心这种机制正在失去其敏感性，因为现在的问题变成了特朗普如何能找到一种方式宣布胜利。

And I worry that is beginning to lose its sensitivity, given that I think now it's a question of how can Trump figure out a way to declare victory.

因为除非他能说自己赢了，否则他不会停止这一切。

Because again, he's not gonna stop this unless he can say he won.

所以我认为他正在寻找各种方法，试图找到可以宣称胜利的突破口。

So I think he's trying to find ways, trying to find something that he can declare victory on.

而且一开始，我认为机会已经足够充分了，对吧？

And again, I thought at the beginning there was enough out the gate, right?

我们清除了他们的领导层，杀死了大阿亚图拉，所有这些事情。

We wiped out the leadership, you killed the Ayatollah, all of this stuff.

我认为他本可以在那个星期一就宣布胜利。

I think he could have declared victory on that first Monday.

而我觉得他可能会想：好吧，那就再拖久一点。

And I think he's like, oh, well, do this a little bit longer.

而现在我们深陷其中，感觉需要更宏大的举措，而且伊朗政权似乎正在进一步巩固。

And now we're in so deep that it feels like you need something much bigger, and if anything, the Iranian regime seems to be entrenching.

一开始你确实听到过，我的意思是，当缺乏集中领导时，出现了不同派别，有的更倾向于谈判或缓和立场。

At the beginning you did hear, I mean, when there was a lack of centralized leadership, you had different elements that were being more negotiating or kind of conciliatory.

但这种迹象似乎正在消失，我甚至一度希望伊朗每天发射的导弹和无人机数量会随着时间推移而减少。

And that it seems is beginning to fall by the wayside, and I think even for a while there was some hope that the number of missiles and drones that were being launched every day by Iran were dwindling over time.

比如，伊朗的导弹是不是快用完了？

Like, oh, is Iran running out of missiles?

我们是不是进入终局了？

Are we entering the end game?

但在过去两天里，数量又飙升了。

And over the last two days, they've shot back up.

而且今天尤其如此——我们在开始录制前还聊过这个话题，以色列袭击了南帕尔斯气田后，布伦特原油价格突破了每桶110美元，而在此之前，我们一直没针对上游设施，特别是伊朗的石油和天然气资产。

And again, today, particular, we were chatting about this before we started recording, but like, Brent popped above a 110 following Israel's attack on the South Par's gas field, which up until now, we hadn't been hitting upstream and kind of Iranian oil assets, oil and gas assets specifically.

所以直到现在，大多数生产设施都还没被击中。

And that's why up until now, most of that production assets hadn't been hit.

你们那里曾经有几家炼油厂。

You've had you had a couple refineries there.

你们有拉斯特德诺拉。

You had Rasdinora.

你们在富查伊拉也征过税，但总的来说，整个中东还有更多非常具有吸引力的目标。

You had you've had a tax on Fujairah, But overall, there are a lot more targets across The Middle East that were very, very tempting targets.

我的意思是，我们都记得2019年的阿卜盖格。

I mean, we all remember Abcake in 2019.

显然，伊朗人有能力打击它。

Clearly, the Iranians can hit it.

他们至今尚未这么做，因为对他们来说，我认为他们仍然认为存在不同程度的升级。

They have chosen not to yet because it, again, for them, I think that they still have this conception of different degrees of escalation.

我们已经看到，一旦南帕尔斯气田遭到袭击，他们就立刻反应了。

And what we saw already was, you know, as soon as the South Powers gas bill was hit, they were like, okay.

现在，这些大量的石油化工设施和上游设施，都成了合法目标。

Now these bunch of petrochemical facilities and upstream facilities, they're all legitimate targets now.

他们还警告说，如果特朗普轰炸卡格岛，他们会说，好吧，如果你这么做了，那我们就把该地区所有其他港口都视为合法目标。

And they also warned that if Trump bombed Carg Island, they're like, well, if you do that, then we view all other ports in the region as fair game.

我认为他们仍在试图界定自己的升级或报复性螺旋的范围。

I think they are still trying to kind of parameterize their own escalation or retaliatory kind of spiral here.

但再说一次，我认为到目前为止我们看到的是，在以色列对南帕尔斯气田和德黑兰中部燃料库的两次袭击中——据我所知，这两次都是以色列的行动——这些行动实际上违背了白宫的意愿。

But and again, I think what we've seen so far is that in both cases where Israel, and to my knowledge, these were both Israeli attacks specifically, on the South Pars gas field and the fuel depot in Central Tehran, that those were kind of against the wishes of the White House.

也就是说，以色列方面似乎仍在自行其是，决定他们要走多远、想把局势升级到什么程度。

That, you know, there is still some kind of freelancing here on the Israeli side about, like, how far they were going to go and how much they wanna escalate this.

显然，他们希望进一步升级。

Clearly, they want they want more escalation.

对吧？

Right?

我认为，到目前为止我们看到的显然就是这种情况。

I think that's clearly what we've seen so far.

但老实说，我不禁怀疑，这种做法会不会惹怒特朗普。

But I do I do wonder whether or not that's the kind of thing that's gonna piss off Trump, very frankly.

我们看到，去年六月，他对内塔尼亚胡政府非常生气，因为当时人们担心他们不会配合停火协议或其他安排。

We we saw this he got really upset with the Netanyahu government last June, when, you know, there was worry that they weren't gonna play ball with the ceasefire or whatever else.

当时有个著名的评论，我只是想登上海军陆战队一号。

There was like that famous comment, I was just trying to get on Marine One.

但我确实担心，我们现在正陷入这样的局面。

But I do worry that that's the kind of situation we're ending up in now.

通常情况下，罗里，从事宏观市场的人，也就是那些不专精于石油领域的投资者，只会关注两个基准价格。

Normally, Rory, people who are in macro markets and, you know, investors who are not specialists in oil only pay attention to two benchmarks.

布伦特原油，基于北海石油产量，是全球基准，而西德克萨斯中质原油则是美国基准。

Brent Crude, which is based on North Sea oil production, is the global benchmark, and then West Texas Intermediate is The US benchmark.

通常，只有专业的石油交易员才会关注石油市场中的其他价格。

Normally, it's only professional oil traders who pay attention to any of the other prices in the oil market.

不过我们还是来谈谈其他一些价格吧，因为实际上布伦特和WTI的价格，我记得WTI曾达到119美元。

Let's talk though about some of the other prices because really Brent and and WTI only got I guess WTI was a 119.

但在这次波动中，两者都没有突破120美元。

Neither one of them has gone above 120 in this.

你知道，它们涨了不少，但也没涨那么多。

That's you know, they've gone up a lot, but they haven't gone up that much.

我觉得阿曼原油本周交易价超过了1.85美元。

I think it was Oman traded above $1.85 this week.

正如你所说，新加坡的航空燃油价格已经超过了200美元。

As you said, there was jet fuel prices above 200 in Singapore.

我们是否应该把这些局部市场出现的极高价格视为仅仅是物流问题？

Should we be thinking about these really high prices that are occurring in some localized markets as, oh, well, that's just a a logistics thing.

它们并不算数，还是说这些价格信号预示着布伦特和WTI即将发生的变化？

It doesn't really count, or are those price signals that could portend what's coming for Brent and WTI?

这些正是布伦特和WTI即将面临的情况，因为我觉得我之前稍微提到过这一点，我们现在讨论的这些市场，埃里克，你很清楚，期货和基准价格既有地域因素，也有时间因素。

They're exactly what's coming for Brent and WTI because I think that I was kind of talking around this point a little earlier, but what we're talking about right now is again, these markets, and you will know this well, Erik, that futures and benchmarks, there is both a locational element to it and a time element.

而目前最紧张的市场基本上是大量满载或空载的油轮正在等待进入波斯湾装货。

And where the current tightest market is right now is basically there's all these laden tanker or unladen tankers waiting to go back into The Gulf to fill up.

它们心想：我可以从阿曼沿海买些原油，然后直接掉头回去。

And they're like, well, I could buy some crude off the coast of Oman and just basically turn around and head back.