哈佛判断力教授：选择权的诅咒，以及培养更好判断力的一个习惯

我

My

最大的错误就是太晚才解雇人。

biggest mistakes have been waiting too long to fire people.

毫无疑问。

Like, no question.

而且这不仅仅是你能想到的那些原因。

And it's not just what you think.

不只是因为那个人表现不佳，你可以用更优秀的人来替换他。

It's not just that that person is underperforming and you could replace that person with a higher performer.

当创始人或领导者容忍低绩效时，还有更严重的问题，那就是这会极大地、负面地影响整个团队文化。

There's something much more sinister when a founder or a leader accepts underperformance, which is that it massively, negatively impacts the entire culture.

文化。

Culture.

这是哈佛商学院高级讲师、六次创业的创始人雷扎·萨丘，分享他职业生涯中最艰难的一课。

That was Reza Satchu, Harvard Business School senior lecturer and six time founder on the hardest lesson of his career.

我是Motley Fool的分析师，瑞秋·沃伦。

I'm Motley Fool analyst, Rachel Warren.

上周的第一部分，我和雷扎讨论了为什么在人工智能时代，判断力比智力更重要，判断力能否被教授，以及他在学生住房领域放弃十亿美元交易的故事。

Last week in part one, Reza and I covered why judgment beats intellect in the age of AI, whether judgment can be taught, and his billion dollar walk away deal in student housing.

这周的第二部分，我们会深入探讨如何在不自欺欺人的情况下筹集资金，为什么资本配置是检验CEO判断力最严格的标准，选择过多的诅咒，以及雷扎希望每位投资者养成的唯一习惯，来锻炼自己的判断力。

This week in part two, we'll get into what it actually takes to raise capital without fooling yourself, why capital allocation is the sharpest test of a CEO's judgment, a curse of optionality, and the single habit that Reza wants every investor to build to train their own judgment muscle.

希望你们喜欢。

We hope you enjoy.

你既是连续创业者，也是创始人、投资者。

You are both a a serial entrepreneur as well as, you know, founder, investor.

你学到的最艰难的教训是什么？

What are some of the hardest lessons you've learned

作为创始人？

As a founder?

我会告诉你，这甚至不是接近，虽然说起来很残酷，但这就是我的真实想法，我最大的错误就是等太久才解雇人。

So I will tell you, and this is it's not even close, and it's a harsh thing to say, but it's it's just my truth, which is my biggest mistakes have been waiting too long to fire people.

毫无疑问。

Like, no question.

而且这不只是你个人的看法。

And it's not just what you think.

不只是那个人表现不佳，你可以用表现更好的人替换他。

It's not just that that person is underperforming, and you could you could replace that person with a higher performer.

当创始人或领导者接受低绩效时，还有更严重的问题，那就是这会极大地、负面地影响整个团队文化。

There's something much more sinister when a founder or a leader accepts underperformance, which is that it massively, negatively impacts the entire culture.

对吧？

Okay?

突然之间，大家就会觉得，他对所有人不是一视同仁的，或者，嗯，所以我想说的是，当然，解雇人是一件很难的事情。

Which is suddenly people are like, well, he's not holding everyone to the same standard, or well, you know so so so I'd say to you that but but, of course, firing someone is a hard thing to do.

你不想这么做。

Like, you don't want to do it.

我的意思是，每次我解雇人，我都记得他们眼中的神情。

Like, I mean, every time I fire someone, I I I remember the look in their eyes.

我记得我会想到他们的家人。

I remember thinking about their family.

我记得我自己在其中的责任，比如我可能看错了这个角色或者招错了人，诸如此类。

I remember the part I would have played in it, that I misjudged the role or the hire or whatever it may be.

所以这确实是一件非常痛苦的事情，但又非常必要。

So it's it's it's something that's very painful, but it's so necessary.

而不去处理、一直拖延的代价，远比大多数人想象的要大得多。

And the cost of not doing doing it and waiting is far greater than I think most people, calculate it to be.

所以，如果要说我最大的错误，那就是等得太久，为了等一个完美的信息才去做一个显而易见的决定，尤其是在解雇这件事上，就是不想面对解雇人的困难。

So certainly, if I think about my my greatest mistakes, it's been waiting too long, waiting for waiting for perfect information to make an obvious decision when it comes to firing, like not wanting to deal with the difficulty of firing someone.

而且就像我说的，这不仅仅是那一个人的表现问题，更是对整个文化的影响。

And and as I said, it's not just the singular person's performance, it's the cultural impact of that.

所以你看，这显然属于一个更大的范畴，就是人类有一种本能，在做决定之前会等太多的信息。

And so look, this obviously falls under a broader bucket, which is, like, human beings have an instinct to wait for too much information before they make a decision.

但我觉得在解雇这件事上，我个人的看法是，我确实在这些事情上等得太久了。

But I think when it comes to firing, I'd say my personal, view is I've waited too long on those.

而且很多时候，我在那些纸面上看起来完美的人身上，拖了太久才下决心。

And oftentimes, I've waited too long to pull the trigger on people who, on paper, looked perfect.

就是说，他们简历上看起来确实很优秀。

Like, meaning they they looked great on paper.

所以你就会想，好吧。

And so you just were like, okay.

他们应该能搞定这件事。

They're gonna figure this out.

而且，你知道，很多时候你看。

And, you know, oftentimes look.

我的世界就是创业，但我从大公司招过很多人。

My world is founding businesses, but I've hired lots of people from larger organizations.

不是每次，但经常，他们在资源更受限的环境里很难适应。

Not always, but often, they've had a very hard time working in a more resource constrained environment.

有意思。

Interesting.

回到讲故事这个话题，它对于融资显然至关重要，但在某些情况下也可能有点危险，如果领导者或公司高层开始相信自己编造的神话。

You know, going back to this idea of of storytelling, it's obviously vital for raising capital, but it it can be a bit dangerous in some cases if leaders or company leaders starts believing their own hype.

那你如何判断一个领导者是否具备足够的理智，能把宏大愿景和当前运营现实区分开，无论是业务、行业，还是其他方面？

So how how do you assess whether a leader possesses, say, the intellectual honesty to separate their grand vision from a current operational reality, whether that's the business, the industry, you

两个方面都说说吧。

know, both.

那我从两个方面来谈。

So let me take both sides of it.

先说说融资需要什么条件。

Let let me sort of say, what does it take to raise capital?

对吧？

Okay?

需要具备哪些特质？

Like, what are the traits that it takes?

作为投资者，你如何确保自己不会被这些故事所迷惑？

And how do you, as an investor, make sure that you're not being, hoodwinked by it?

对吧？

K?

所以让我来，我两边都说说。

So so let me and I play both sides.

我的意思是，我希望我没骗过任何人，但我两边都见过。

I mean, I I hope I haven't hoodwinked anyone, but I've seen both sides of it.

对吧？

Okay?

所以，我就说我有三个词，这是专门给创始人的，但我觉得你也可以把它推广到其他人身上，就是当你融资的时候，你需要什么。

So so let's just say I I have three words I use, and this is specifically for founders, but I I think you can you can extrapolate it for others, as to when you're raising capital, what you need.

首先，你需要的是真诚。

So the first thing you need is authenticity.

如果别人不信任你，没人会把钱给你。

No one's gonna give you their money if they don't trust you.

对吧？

K?

也就是说，你不能假装成别人。

Meaning, you can't pretend to be someone else.

你需要保持纯粹，需要真实。

You need to be pure you need to be authentic.

明白吗？

Okay?

第二点，你需要有势头。

Two is you need to have momentum.

要有事情在快速推进，别人能看到你在行动，你在获取客户，或者别的什么。

There needs to be things that are happening fast, and there's people can see that there's action and you're getting customers or whatever it may be.

第三点可能是最重要也最难的一点，尤其是对创始人来说，就是你需要传达出一种必然成功的感觉。

The third one is perhaps the most important and the hardest, especially for a founder, is you need to convey a sense of inevitability.

对吧？

K?

所以就是：真实、势头和必然性。

So authenticity, momentum, and inevitability.

那必然性是什么意思呢？

So what does inevitability mean?

必然性不是傲慢。

Inevitability is not arrogance.

必然性意味着你打心底相信，这个生意无论有没有你面前这个投资人，都会成功。

What inevitable inevitability means is that you believe in your heart that this business is gonna fly with or without whoever you are pitching.

明白吗？

K?

也就是说，你的心态不是去求钱，而是你本身就是那个有价值的人，你是在给投资人一个赚钱的机会。

Meaning, you have a mindset, which is not that you are begging for money, but a mindset that you are the prize and that you're giving your investor an opportunity to make money.

对吧？

Okay?

而且，这本质上就是必然的。

And that that effectively this is inevitable.

明白吗？

Okay?

好的。

Okay.

但回到你的问题，你可以想象，这种心态可能会导致某些人推销时做出不道德的行为。

But you can now to your question, you can imagine why that could lead to, you know, someone pitching something that that framework can lead to nefarious behavior.

明白吗？

Okay?

所以，我一直看重的是——我确实认为领导者应该具备这三个特质。

So so what I say what I what I'm always looking for so I I do think leaders should have those three traits.

也就是说，如果你要向别人要钱，你最好真的相信这事能成。

Meaning, I do think if you're gonna ask people for money, you better believe that it's gonna happen.

对吧？

K?

如果你连自己都说服不了，那就有问题了。

If you haven't convinced yourself, that's a problem.

好的。

Okay.

所以我寻找的是，在那种必然性的框架下，还能保持谦逊的态度。

So what I'm looking for is a sense of humility within that inevitability framework.

而且，我也很喜欢看到创始人和领导者主动去谈他们业务中不可避免的负面因素，比如那些必然存在的风险，并且从这些开始讲起。

And, also, what I what I love what I love seeing is founders leaders addressing the inevitable negatives in their business, like the inevitable risks and starting with that.

说实话，当创始人或领导者这样做的时候，并不会削弱那种必然性，因为每个业务都有与之相关的风险。

Like, I love it when a founder or leaders, and you don't lose any inevitability when you do that, frankly, because every business has risks associated with it.

作为创始人，你能做的就是真正把关于这些风险的叙事讲清楚。

And and and what you get as a founder is you get to actually articulate the narrative around that risk.

所以从我的角度来看，我一直在寻找这样的人。

So so from my perspective, I am always looking for someone.

因为当我听到的推销全是阳光和玫瑰的时候，我就会觉得，这太荒谬了。

Because when I get pitched and it's all, you know, sunshine and roses, I'm just like, this is ridiculous.

对吧？

Okay?

但如果向我推销的人，虽然相信事情是必然的，但同时也在谈论所有的竞争威胁、技术难题，以及他们打算如何应对，他们的计划是什么，并且知道计划可能会变。

But if I'm getting pitched by someone who, yes, believes it's inevitable, but is also talking about all the competitive threats and the technological issues and how they're gonna deal with it and how what their plan is, knowing that it might change.

对我来说，那才是更真实的主张，也让我觉得更可信，因为他们知道问题在哪里。

That to me is a much more authentic, proposition, and for me feels, much more believable because they know what the issues are.

所以直接告诉我问题是什么，然后我们一起想办法解决，因为没有哪个企业是没有问题的。

So just tell me what the issues are, and let's figure out how you're gonna solve them because there's no business without issues.

所以我觉得，我不想把它说得太俗套，像什么“先报坏消息”之类的。

So so I think I think I don't wanna make it as trite as lead with the bad news.

我只想说，我确实很尊重那些能清晰地说出自己面临的必然风险，并且抓住机会去应对、去认真讨论这些风险的领导者。

I would just say that that I I do respect leaders who articulate in a very clear manner the inevitable risks that they're facing, and take the opportunity to address them and have a real conversation about it.

你知道吗，我记得沃伦·巴菲特曾说过，作为CEO，资本配置是最重要的——对。

You know, I think it was Warren Buffett who once said that capital allocation as a CEO is the most important Yeah.

工作。

Job.

当你回顾一个领导团队或领导者的资本配置历史时，有什么模式能说明他们是在玩长期游戏，而不是只顾着管理短期——

When you when you look at a leadership team's or a leader's capital allocation industry history, what is a pattern that maybe tells you they're playing a long term game rather than just, you know, managing short term

预期？

Expectations?

所以你看，我觉得挺有意思的，对吧？因为资本配置本质上就是判断力的体现，也就是说，这是CEO最能展现判断力的地方。

So so look, I think it's funny, right, because capital allocation at the core is the sharp edge of judgment, meaning that is where judgment is most shown by a CEO.

也就是说，当我们讨论怎么评估它的时候，你刚才指出的正是从CEO的角度来看，它是如何体现的。

So meaning, when we talk about how you evaluate it, what you've just identified is how is it demonstrated from a CEO's perspective.

对于CEO来说，评估一个CEO的判断力，最好的方式就是看他做的资本配置决策。

There's no better way for a c o for you to evaluate a CEO's judgment than to see the the capital allocation decisions they've made.

对吧？

Okay?

所以我觉得你正好说中了我们评估的关键点。

So I think you've hit on exactly the point as to how we evaluate.

比如，如果我们想评估一个CEO的判断力，我们应该看什么指标？

Like, what is the metric we should look at, if we wanted to sort of evaluate judgment for a CEO?

其实就是这些关于资本配置的决策。

It's really these decisions around capital allocation.

这可能是最重要的决策。

It's probably the most important decision.

所以我觉得你的观点完全正确，那就是必须有一个时间框架，不是只为了保住我下个季度的职位或者达成短期目标，而是更关注如何真正建立一个长期能成为优秀资本复合器的企业，对我自己、对CEO、对他的投资者都是如此。

And so so I think I think your point is exactly the right one, which is there has to be a time frame that is not about keeping my job for the next quarter or hitting short term results, but much more about how do I actually build a business that long term is gonna be a great compounder of capital for myself, for the CEO, and for his or her investors.

所以我觉得看待这个问题的方式是，没有比回顾他们过去做的决策更好的评估判断力的方法了。

And so I think the way to to look at it is I mean, there's no better way to evaluate judgment than to look at previous judgments that they've made.

所以我觉得，Rachel，看待这个问题的方式就是，好。

So I think I think the way to look at it, Rachel, is to say, okay.

我会问这个问题。

I would ask the question.

告诉我你做过的最重要的三个成功的资本配置决策，以及三个失败的。

Tell me what the three most consequential capital allocation decisions that you made that worked and the three that didn't work.

而且，你知道，通过这个视角，你会很快明白，他们是从短期角度还是长期角度来思考资本配置的。

And, you know, I think through that lens, you would quickly understand, are they thinking about capital allocation from a short term perspective or a long term perspective?

因为如果他们突然谈论一个以月而不是以年衡量的资本配置决策，那就能说明一些问题。

Because if they're suddenly you're talking about a capital allocation decision that, you know, was measured in months rather than years, that tells you something.

但我也认为，他们从那些不成功的决策中能传达出的经验教训也极其重要。

But I also think that the learnings that they can convey from the ones that didn't work out are also critically important.

所以我觉得你提到的这一点非常重要，就是让他们用评估时间跨度的方式来回答。

And so and I think the thing that you're hitting on, which I think is very important, is what let them let them answer it in a way where they're evaluating the time horizon.

所以，我会关注的是他们用多长的时间跨度来衡量这些决策。

And so, you know, what I'd be looking for is what time horizon are they looking for to measure these decisions.

在你自己的创业经历中，你是如何平衡保留现金和积极投入资本以促进增长之间的这种矛盾的？

In in your own ventures, how have you balanced the tension between conserving cash and aggressively deploying capital into growth?

说实话，这确实是个很让人纠结的点。

I mean, look, it's such a it's such a tension point.

我给你举个例子，比如有个业务，是这样的。

And, you know, I'll I'll give you an example of a business where, okay.

我们之前谈过学生公寓业务。

So we talked about the student housing business.

学生公寓业务当时有人出价11亿，我们最后以17亿卖出，那一年我们实际上做了大约3亿美元的收购，对吧？

So the student housing business was one where where when we had that offer for a billion 1, and we sold it for a billion 7, we actually made about $300,000,000 of acquisitions in that year, okay?

最终这非常值得，因为整体上我们额外创造了4亿美元的股权价值。

Which ultimately was well worth it because we generated an additional $400,000,000 of equity value as a whole.

对吧？

Okay?

但那年我们确实需要快速投入资金，才能达到那个估值。

But we needed to deploy capital quickly in that year to get to that valuation.

所以这就是一个例子，我们当时做了正确的决定，并且果断去做了。

So that's an example of where we just we made the right call, and we decided to do it.

而且当时有很多国际学生涌入。

And there was a number of, you know, there were international students that were coming in.

学生住房的资本化率和多户住宅之间还有差距，我们觉得这个差距会缩小。

There was still a spread between student housing cap rates and multifamily that we thought was gonna compress.

学生住房市场正在大规模机构化，很多养老基金、Brookfield、CPP、淡马锡都进来了。

There was a massive institutionalization of the student housing market with lots of pension funds, Brookfield, CPP, Temasek coming in.

所以当时有很多有利因素，我们觉得接下来一年左右会对我们很有帮助。

So there were there were lots of tailwinds that we thought were gonna be helpful to us over the next year or so.

对吧？

Okay?

我们再讲个故事吧。

Let's take another story.

其实我之前和我哥哥一起创办过一个仓储公司。

So a business that I had founded beforehand with my brother, actually, was a storage business.

实际上，还有凯文·奥利里，我们三个人一起创办的。

Actually, and Kevin O'Leary, the three of us founded it.

一个仓储公司。

A storage business.

然后呢，说实话，我们做得非常好。

And, there, look, we did very well.

我的意思是，我们在2007年以1.1亿美元的价格把公司卖了。

I mean, we we we we sold the business for a $110,000,000 in 2007.

我们是2003年创办的。

We started it in 2003.

但我要告诉你，我们犯了一个大错。

But I would tell you, we made a massive mistake.

对吧？

Okay?

我们当时应该继续投入资金的。

We should have kept deploying capital.

我们当时有个很棒的想法。

Like, we had a brilliant idea.

我们是第一个做那种多层、城市里、面向高收入人群的仓储业务的，这是在加拿大。

We were the first people to do sort of multistory, urban high household income focused storage in Can this was in Canada.

当时没人做这个。

No one was doing it.

大家都在偏远地方做单层的，而我们有了这个想法。

Everyone was doing sort of single story in the middle of nowhere, and we had this idea.

我们当时应该加倍投入的。

And we should have tripled down.

这个业务本可以做到十亿美元的规模，但我们做了一个错误的决定，就是觉得应该把钱落袋为安，而不是继续投入更多资金。

Like, we this should have been a billion dollar business, but we made an inaccurate decision, which was we thought that we should have taken the money off the table as opposed to deploying more capital.

所以我想说的是，Rachel，当我进入学生住房领域时，我就想，我不能再犯同样的错误了。

So I think what I'd say, Rachel, when I got to student housing, I was like, I am not gonna make that mistake again.

我要从那个错误中吸取教训，好好思考这个问题。

Like, I'm gonna learn from that mistake and and and and really think hard about this.

但我觉得这里没有科学可言。

But I think this is where there's no science.

这真的就是靠对各种问题的判断。

It's it's really a judgment call around all the various issues.

所以仓储就是一个例子，我们做了一个我认为有缺陷的判断。

So storage is an example of one where we made a judgment that I would say is flawed.

我的意思是，我们做得还不错。

I mean, we did fine.

我想我们赚了四五倍的钱，但本来可以赚二十到三十倍的。

I think we made four or five times our money, but we could have made 20 or 30 times our money in that business.

那本来应该是一个十亿美元的业务。

That should have been a billion dollar business.

但我们吸取了教训，在学生住房方面，我觉得我们对风险的把控是合适的。

But we learned and in student housing, think we calibrated the risk appropriately.

就像生活中任何事情一样，结果也可能相反，但基于当时的情况，这是正确的决定。

Now, like in anything in life, it could have gone the other way, but it was the right decision based on the factors at the time.

你刚发现你的销售团队可能完不成业绩指标。

You just found out that your sales team is at risk of missing quota.

别慌。

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你知道吗，你曾经和Tim Ferriss一起做过一个哈佛商学院案例研究，主题是“选择过多的诅咒”。

You know, there was a an HBS case study session you did with Tim Ferriss where you focused on the curse of optionality.

我想就这个话题问你一些问题。

I wanted to ask you a bit about that.

就是说，面前的路太多，反而会让人陷入分析瘫痪。

This idea that having too many paths forward can cause analysis paralysis.

跟我聊聊这个吧。

Talk to me about that.

瑞秋，我这么看。

Rachel, so I look.

我在播客《创始人思维》里经常聊这个，你会发现，不管是瑞茜·威瑟斯彭、马克·库班，还是米歇尔·扎特林，他们能产生那么大的影响力，那种每个人都想有的影响力，都是因为他们认准了一条路。

I talk a lot about this in my podcast, the founder mindset, where where, you know, you invariably see that folks on my podcast, whether it's everyone from, you know, Reese Witherspoon to Mark Cuban to Michelle Zatlin, what you see is ultimately the impact that they've been able to have, the impact that, you know, every human being wants to have, has come about because they have committed to a certain path.

对吧？

Okay?

然后他们关掉了其他很多选择。

And they've shut off a bunch of options.

所以我开始深入思考这个“选择过多的诅咒”，因为在哈佛，这些学生就是靠收集各种荣誉过日子的。

So I started thinking a lot about the curse of optionality because here at Harvard, you have these students who collect gold stars for a living.

真的，他们本科都是斯坦福这种级别的。

Like, literally, you know, they've gone to, you know, Stanford undergrad.

他们在高盛工作过。

They worked at Goldman Sachs.

然后去了KKR，接着来到哈佛商学院。

They then go to KKR, then they come to HBS.

真的，每一步都走得完美无缺。

Like, literally every box is checked.

对吧？

Okay?

很多人你见到他们，你会觉得，哇。

And many of them, you meet them, you're like, wow.

真不敢相信你出身于阿拉巴马州伯明翰的单亲妈妈家庭，或者你出生在印度的某个家庭，不管怎样，你竟然能考上哈佛商学院。

I can't believe you were born to this single mother in Birmingham, Alabama, and or you were born in this family in India or wherever it is, and you managed to get to Harvard Business School.

这条上升轨迹太陡了。

The trajectory was so steep.

太不可思议了。

It was so improbable.

然后你来到像这样的学校，做的却全是些理所当然的事情。

And then you come to a school like this, and you do entirely probable things.

你去麦肯锡上班，或者去高盛上班。

You go take a job at McKinsey or you go take a job at Goldman.

就是说，你选的那些工作，我们的学生全都唾手可得。

Like, you take these jobs that are entirely available to our students.

当然，之所以会这样，是因为他们只是在保留选择余地。

And, of course, the reason that's happening is because they're just preserving options.

对吧？

Okay?

他们就是在保留选择余地。

They're preserving options.

因为他们觉得，以后再说吧，现在这样能让我多学点东西，多见见世面，等到某个时候，我自然会去做我真正想做的事。

And so because they're like, well, we'll commit to something in the future, and this just allows me to learn more, see different things, and at some point in my life, I will commit to the thing that I really want to do.

瑞秋，这其实引出了一个更广泛的社会问题，我正打算写本书来探讨这个。我觉得，我们社会面临一个巨大的生存危机，那就是人们把承诺看作一种牺牲，而不是一种超能力。

I mean, it actually raises a much broader societal point, Rachel, and I'm actually writing a book about this, which is, I think society there is a massive existential risk to our society, which is that people view commitment as a sacrifice and not as a superpower.

对吧？

Okay?

所以你会看到，各种形式的承诺在我们生活的方方面面都在大幅减少。

So what you see what you're seeing is that forms of commitment are declining dramatically across all across all sec all all of our lives.

结婚的人少了。

So there's a decline in marriage.

生孩子的人也少了。

There's a decline in people having kids.

买房的人少了。

There's a decline in home ownership.

去教堂的人也少了。

There's a decline in people going to church.

不管以前人们承诺的是什么，现在都在减少，取而代之的是各种选择。

Whatever the thing is that people used to commit to is being declining, and it's been replaced by options.

对吧？

Okay?

最明显的就是，你左滑一下，右滑一下。

Most acutely, you swipe left, you swipe right.

你知道的，任何时候都有很多选择。

You know, there's lots of options at all times.

我想说的是，在你生命的尽头，有很多研究都证明了这一点。

And my argument to you is that at the end of your life and there have been lots of studies.

实际上，哈佛做过一项研究，虽然只针对男性，但他们有800名男性参与者。

In fact, Harvard did a study, and, fortunately, it's just of men, but they had 800 men.

这是过去六十年里关于幸福的最长的纵向研究。

It's the longest longitudinal study of happiness over the past sixty years.

他们追踪了400名在三十年代、四十年代从哈佛毕业的男性，那是六十年前的事了。

They they tracked 400 men who graduated from Harvard in the '19, thirties, forties, sixty years ago.

不对。

No.

应该是六十年代毕业的，还有400名来自市中心的男性。

Guess it would be the sixties, and 400 men who were in the inner city.

对吧？

Okay?

现在他们中有550人还活着，都已经八十多岁了。

They're now 550 of them are still alive in their eighties.

他们被问到：你觉得你的满足感来自哪里？

And they said, to what do you attribute your contentment?

结果，最常被提到的答案是：我有没有长期稳定的关系？

And by a long shot, the thing that came up was, did I have long term enduring relationships?

但长期稳定的关系，关键在于它们都会经历危机。

Now the thing about long term enduring relationships is they all go through crises.

对吧？

Okay?

这需要承诺。

And it takes commitment.

所以我相信，承诺是一种超能力。

And so commitment is sort of this superpower, I believe.

这种情况跟所谓的"选择过多诅咒"也是一样的，也就是关于创业这件事。我觉得每个人都应该去当创始人。

And it's the same thing with this curse of optionality, which is around, you know, founding, which is I think everyone should be a founder.

我的意思是，在人工智能时代，每个人都该具备创始人的思维模式。

Like, everyone should have a founder mindset in the age of AI.

我是真心这么认为的。

Like, I really believe that.

我之所以这样想，是因为我们真正要培养的是判断力。而判断力最重要的应用场景，就是你真正投身其中、切断其他退路，并在全力以赴的过程中看清自己真正潜力的时候。

Like, I think of everyone because because it's judgment that we're trying to build, and where judgment matters most is when you're actually stepping into the arena, commit cutting off other options, and seeing what you're truly capable of when you commit.

所以我觉得，我们要看看选择权。

And so I I think optionality look.

每个选项都有价值，但在这个世界里，承诺的价值被严重低估了，你知道的。

Every option has value, but what's being massively underpriced in this world is what commitment does, which is you know?

我对瑞秋说，关于承诺，它不仅仅是显而易见的这一点：当你真正投身于某件事或某个方向时，你才会发现自己能做到什么。

And what I say about commitment, Rachel, is it's not just the obvious thing, which is you learn what you're capable of when you truly commit to something, to a path.

还会发生一种次级效应，我称之为奇迹。

There's a second order thing that happens, and I call it magic.

对吧？

Okay?

而奇迹就发生在人们因为你已经投入了，所以他们也愿意投入到你身上。

And the magic happens when people commit to you precisely because you've committed.

我无法告诉你我经历过多少次这样的情况，第一个投资人出现，第一个客户出现，我的第一个员工出现，正是因为他们看到了你的投入。

So I can't tell you how many times I've experienced this, where the first investor shows up, the first customer shows up, my first employee shows up, precisely because they see the commitment from you.

所以这真的很神奇。

And so it's a magical thing.

所以，我在核心课程里想教的是，在面对大量选择时，你怎么去投入一件事？

And so, what I try to teach at the core is how do you commit to a thing in the face of massive options?

因为我认为正是通过这种投入，你才能产生你最想要的影响。

Because I think it's through that commitment that you will have the impact that you most wanna have.

我在你的播客《创始人思维》上看到你做的一些事情。

Something that I've seen you do on on your podcast, The Founder Mindset

嗯，谢谢你观看。

Well, thank you for watching it.

让公司创始人和领导者重新审视那些让他们恐惧的怀疑时刻。

Asking asking company founders and leaders to revisit the moments of doubt that terrify them.

所以我也得反过来问问你，在你创办六家公司的过程中，

So I I've gotta turn that around and ask you, you know, in your in your journey building, you know, six companies.

哪个决定是你必须在不知道会不会成功的情况下，最害怕去执行的？

What what is the most terrifying decision that you had to execute before you knew it would work?

好的。

Okay.

我妻子有个玩笑，她说，Reza，如果事情太顺利，你就会搞出点事来。

So so my wife has a joke where she says, Reza, if things are too calm, you blow things up.

其实我确实喜欢这样，我觉得这不算什么病态之类的。

Like, I actually like, it's I think it's I'm not like, it's a pathology or something.

但我要告诉你，我其实想要一个非常不舒服、充满不确定性的生活。

But I will say to you that I actually want a really uncomfortable, uncertain life.

我真的很渴望不确定性和风险。

Like like, I actually crave uncertainty and risk.

对吧？

Okay?

不是因为我想要跳崖，而是因为我还没自大到认为自己可以不冒风险就实现想要的影响力。

Not because I wanna jump off a cliff, but because I'm not arrogant enough to believe that I can have the impact I wanna have without taking risk.

就像，想要真正有影响力又不冒风险，那相当于买一堆国债却想拿到标普500的回报。

Like, the equivalent of having real impact and not taking risk is investing in a bunch of t bills and getting S and P 500 returns.

那是不可能的。

It doesn't happen.

对吧？

Okay?

所以我想先提出一个观点：我认为，一个确定无疑、没有风险的人生，在很多方面其实没什么意义。

So so I wanna just start with the proposition that I think a life of certainty and a life without risk is in many ways quite inconsequential.

对吧？

Okay?

也就是说，我觉得我们需要重新审视对风险、不确定性和逆境的看法。

Meaning meaning, I think we need to reframe how we think about risk and uncertainty and adversity.

这是好事，不是坏事。

It is a good thing, not a bad thing.

对吧？

K?

真正的学习就在这里，因为判断力就是在这个过程中建立起来的。

It is where learning really lies because that's where judgment built is built.

明白吗？

Okay?

所以我想先从这个框架说起，就是我不把危机或逆境看作坏事——虽然当下可能会觉得难受，但我知道它们是学习和旅程的一部分，是为了让我能够获得我想要的资源、信心、信誉等等，从而产生我想要的影响。

So I just wanna start with that the just framework, which is I don't view the the crises or the adversity as I mean, in the moment, maybe they feel bad, but I know they're part of the learning and the journey to have the imp to be able to generate the resources that I wanna have, the confidence, the credibility, etcetera, to have the impact that I want.

对吧？

Okay?

所以我一开始就抱着这样的心态：这些事一定会发生。

So so I start with a a mindset, which is this is going to happen.

对吧？

Okay?

这是好事。

It's good.

就是说，逆境和危机总会有的，关键是我能不能保持坚定。

Like, there will be adversity, there will be crisis, And the question is is, can I stay committed?

你知道，在这些时刻我该怎么应对？

You know, how can I respond in these moments?

对吧？

Okay?

但你看，这毫无疑问。

But but look, there's no question.

有些时刻确实会让人彻底恐惧。

There are moments where there is complete terror.

对吧？

Okay?

所以，我不知道“恐惧”这个词是否准确，但我想说的是，作为创始人，那种你永远对一切都有把握的想法，其实根本不存在。

And so, and I don't know if terror is the right word, but what I'd say is, like, I as a founder, this idea that you're ever certain about anything is just not true.

对吧？

Okay?

就是说，这些决定就像五十一比四十九，六十比四十那样。

Like, meaning, these decisions are, like, fifty one forty nine, sixty forty.

不是九十九比一。

They're not ninety nine one.

对吧？

Okay?

但你会发现，你有权重新站起来，即使在失败中，也有真正的价值，但好吧。

And so but what you realize is you have a right to recover, and even in in sort of failure, there's real but I'll okay.

我做过的最艰难的决定，是创办了一家最终失败的公司。

I'll you know, the hardest decision I made was a business that I started that ultimately failed.

而且，你知道，我一直在个人投资一些对冲基金。

And, you know, I had been investing personally in a bunch of hedge funds.

所以，我是Pershing Square、Lone Pine这些很厉害的对冲基金的投资者。

So, you know, I was an investor in Pershing Square, Lone Pine, some very fancy hedge funds.

我遇到了一位学者，他基本上在讲如何最好地评估对冲基金，这跟我的直觉不谋而合。

And I met a fellow, who was an academic, who basically was talking about how the best way to evaluate hedge funds, and it sort of married up with my own instincts.

所以我们创建了一家公司，叫星座。

So we created a company, Constellation.

我们很快就筹集了几亿美元，用来投资全球最顶尖的对冲基金经理。

We very quickly raised a few $100,000,000 to invest in the world's best hedge fund managers.

对吧？

K?

在危机期间，我做出了一个非常艰难的决定，在还没有出现大规模赎回之前，就把资金退还给了投资者。

And I made a very difficult decision during the crisis to give back the capital to my investors before we had any meaningful redemptions.

我这么做是因为我非常担心我们合伙关系的稳定性。

And I did that because I was very concerned about the stability of our partnership.

我也担心我们的规模，担心我们能不能撑过去，结果证明这个决定是对的。

And I was worried about our scale, whether we could get now it turned out to be the right decision.

对吧？

Okay?

而且我觉得我的投资者们也很感激这一点。

And I think my investors appreciate it.

但你可以想象，从我的角度来看，那是一个非常艰难的决定，因为那是一次公开的失败。

But you can imagine, from my perspective, it was an incredibly difficult decision because it was a public failure.

对吧？

Okay?

现在我要告诉你关于失败的事，结果发现，我是说，你看。

Now what I'll tell you about failure is it turns out I mean, look.

关于失败，我要说的最后一件事是，我们作为人类不仅高估了失败有多糟糕，而且我还想说，市场其实很看重那些敢于做出判断并经历失败的人。

I'll tell you one last thing on failure, which which not only do I think we as a human being sort of overestimate how bad failure is, but I'd also say the market values people who actually exercise judgment and fail.

所以，很快，我在哈佛的一位同事做了一项研究，他们看了500万个数据点，只关注两类人：一类是走传统路径的人，另一类是创业失败的人。

So quickly, one of my colleagues here at Harvard did a study where they looked at 5,000,000 data points, and they only looked at two types of people, people who went and did traditional paths and people who founded and failed.

对吧？

K?

所以，一类是去了麦肯锡、高盛、谷歌、亚马逊之类的人，另一类是创业失败的人。

So stoop people who went to McKinsey, Goldman, Google, Amazon, whatever, others who founded and failed.

先别提那些创业成功的人。

Forget about founded and succeeded.

然后他们根据之前相似的教育和职业背景进行分组。

And then they grouped them in terms of, similar prior historical educational and professional experience.

结果发现，那些创业失败的人重新进入职场时，比走传统路线的人多了两年半的资历。

And what they found was the failed founders reentered the workforce with two and a half years of seniority above the traditional folks.

哇。

Wow.

所以想想这说明了什么。

So think what that tells you.

这说明市场看重他们的判断力，即使这种判断力有缺陷。

What that tells you is the market values their judgment even though it was flawed.

市场看重的是他们敢于在竞技场上做决策、承担后果、评估风险，即使有失误，也能带着两年半的优势回到传统职场，因为即使你判断错了，你也在积累判断力。

They valued the fact that they were in the arena making decisions, feeling the consequences of it, calibrating risk, however flawed, such that they came back into the traditional world with two and a half years to me because even if you're getting it wrong, you're building judgment.

你在摸索什么是错的。

You're skiing what's wrong.

所以我觉得，这些都是很重要的时刻，当然也是重要的教育目标。

So I think, you know, these are important sort of moments and and certainly important educational objectives.

你知道吗，你写过也谈过，事后看起来不可避免的事情，在当时往往显得完全不合理。

You know, something that that you've written and talked about is that what looks inevitable in hindsight usually look completely irrational in in real time.

因为可能市场信号还没有形成。

Because maybe the market the market signal hadn't formed.

所以我想知道，你怎么区分一个管理团队是在做一个聪明但非理性却正确的赌注，还是可能正在偏离方向？

So I wonder how can one tell the difference between, say, a management team making a brilliant, irrational but correct bet versus one that might be drifting

偏离方向？

off course?

这很有意思，因为当然，我是从创始人的角度来看的。

So it's interesting because, of course, I see it from the framework of a founder.

我几乎觉得，当你想到一个创始人时，对吧，创始人实际上是在想象一个今天还不存在的世界。

Like, I almost when you think about a founder, right, effectively, what a founder is doing is they're imagining a world that doesn't exist today.

对吧？

K?

他们在试图说服你相信那个世界，但几乎所有人都看不到。

And they're trying to convince you of that world, then almost everyone can't see it.

他们看不到也是合理的，因为如果每个人都能看到，机会就不存在了。

And it's logical that they can't see it because at least if everyone could see it, the opportunity wouldn't be there.

所以，正因为别人看不到，这个机会才这么大。

So the fact that they can't see it is why the opportunity is so large.

但往往需要一个人，第一个投资人、第一个客户、第一个员工，我可以说，表现得几乎不理性。

But but it often takes one person, and first investor, first customer, first, employee to, I say, behave almost irrationally.

就是真的第一个来加入的人。

Like, to actually be the first person to come and join.

所以问题是，他们为什么要这么做？

And so the question is, why do they do that?

你怎么区分一个创始人或CEO，是那种卖狗皮膏药的销售，还是真的看到了你看不到的东西？

Why does someone how do you differentiate between a founder or CEO who's, you know, sort of a snake oil person salesperson versus someone who actually can see something that you can't see?

我觉得，这又回到了我一直在说的，我看重的是诚信、谦逊，还有我所说的那种X因素，就是你能想象这个人，如果他是对的，那他会非常正确，非常正确。

And I think, again, it it just goes to this you know, what I look for is sort of integrity, humility, and then also what I'd call sort of this x factor, which is you could imagine this person, if they're right, being really right, like being really right.

就是说，他们身上有某种特质，如果他们是运气好和能力强某种结合的话，这可能会带来一百倍的回报。

Like, they have something about them where if they are either some combination of lucky and or good, this could have a 100 x outcome.

值得赌一把。

And it's worth taking a shot.

所以我觉得，在公开场合，这很有意思，因为从某种意义上说，你会说看看他们过去的判断结果如何，但我们也知道，我们现在生活的世界大不相同，变化太快了，人们必须立刻想出新的框架。

And so I think I think in the public context, it's it's so interesting because in in in some senses, you, you know, you'd say look at their previous judgments to see how they turned out, but we also know that we're living in such a different world now where things are changing so quickly that people have to come up with new frameworks immediately.

所以我又回到这一点，是的，我希望你描绘一个愿景，我也希望对这个愿景感到兴奋，但我真正想做的是确保你告诉我所有的风险，并且你能清楚地表达出来，告诉我你将如何应对这些风险，而且让我觉得确实有道理。

And so so again, I go back to, you know, I'm much yes, I want you to paint me a vision, and I wanna be excited about the vision, But what I really wanna do is make sure you tell me what all the risks are, and that you articulate them and tell me how you're gonna defend against them in a way that makes real sense to me.

作为创始人，你觉得你从成功中学到的多，还是从失败中学到的多？

As a founder, do you think you have learned more from your successes or from failures?

确实。

True.

嗯，这是个好问题。

Well, it's a great question.

你知道吗，挺有意思的。

You know, it's funny.