第一部分：如何在企业欺诈登上头条前发现它

你可能觉得，审计师、律师事务所和董事会这些机构都是为了保护你这样的散户投资者而存在的。

You think that people like auditors and law firms and a board of directors is there to protect you, the individual investor.

但你懂的越多，就越会意识到，他们的主要目标其实是让公司满意。

But the more you learn, the more you realize that their main incentive is keeping the company happy.

这一点到今天依然没变。

And that's still true today.

这是调查记者贝瑟尼·麦克莱恩，她在华尔街之前就揭发了安然丑闻，是金融界最敏锐的头脑之一。

That was Bethany McLean, the investigative journalist who exposed Enron before Wall Street did and one of the sharpest financial minds in the business.

我是富达分析师瑞秋·沃伦。

I'm Motley Fool analyst Rachel Warren.

贝瑟尼几十年来一直追踪现代金融史上每一次重大繁荣与崩盘背后的资金流向，对当前的形势有很多见解。

Bethany has spent decades following the money through every major boom and bust in modern financial history, and she has a lot to say about where we are right now.

在我们对话的第一部分，我们会深入探讨企业欺诈背后的心理机制，教你如何在问题登上头条前就发现预警信号，以及为什么一位富有远见的CEO和一个骗子之间的界限，可能比你想象的要模糊得多。

In part one of our conversation, we dig into the psychology behind corporate fraud, how to spot a red flag before it becomes a headline, and why the line between a visionary CEO and a fraudster may be thinner than you think.

希望你会喜欢。

We hope you enjoy.

欢迎回到《富比士对话》。

Welcome back to Motley Fool Conversations.

我是富比士分析师瑞秋·沃伦。

I'm Motley Fool analyst Rachel Warren.

今天，我邀请到了资深调查记者、《名利场》特约编辑贝瑟尼·麦克莱恩。

Today, I'm joined by veteran investigative journalist and Vanity Fair contributing editor, Bethany McLean.

贝瑟尼是《最聪明的傻瓜们》这本书的合著者，这本书被誉为关于安然事件的权威记录，多年来她一直追踪各种隐藏的金融风险，从次贷危机到《所有魔鬼都在这里》所揭示的问题，再到疫情期间的企业救助，这些都在她的著作《大失败》中有深入剖析。

Bethany is famously the co author of the Definitive Enron Chronicle, The Smartest Guys in the Room, and has spent decades exposing hidden financial risks from the o eight financial crisis and All the Devils Are Here to the pandemic corporate bailouts in her book, The Big Fail.

今天，我们将借助她标志性的调查方法，为你上一堂课，教你如何识别企业隐患、评估魅力型首席执行官，以及发现下一个潜在的市场风险。

Today, we're using her legendary investigative toolkit to give you a masterclass on spotting corporate red flags, evaluating charismatic CEOs, and finding the next hidden market risks.

贝瑟尼，欢迎来到节目。

Bethany, welcome to the show.

谢谢邀请我来参加。

Thanks for having me on.

你总能率先发现那些后来轰动一时的重大事件。

You have a remarkable record of being early on massive stories, that later blew up.

我们得聊聊恩龙公司的事。

And, you know, we have to talk a bit about Enron.

回头看看恩龙，二十五年前的事，你觉得它的崩溃更多是数字出了问题，还是那些本该把关的人不敢问关键问题造成的？

I mean, when you look back at Enron now, twenty five years ago or so, how much of that collapse was a failure of the raw numbers versus a failure of the gatekeepers who were were simply afraid to ask the hard questions?

我觉得两者都有。

Well, I think it's both.

数字本身确实有问题，但根源在于那些把关的人失职了。

The raw numbers were a failure because the gatekeepers failed in in their job.

在我看来，恩龙倒闭最值得警惕的教训就是：你原本以为审计师、律所、董事会这些人都在为你这样的散户投资者保驾护航。

And that to me is still the most instructive lesson from Enron's collapse, which is that you think that people like auditors and law firms and a board of directors is there to protect you, the individual investor.

但你了解得越多，就越明白，他们真正的动力其实是让公司满意。

But the more you learn, the more you realize that their main incentive is keeping the company happy.

今天的情况依然如此，这不光是钱的问题，不光是谁付钱给他们。

And that's still true today, and it's not even so much a question just of your greed and who pays them.

这更是人性使然。

It's also just human nature.

当你的好评依赖于别人说你干得不错，你就开始盼着他们这么说。

When your approval rests on somebody else saying good job, you start to want them to say good job.

这种情况一再发生。

And that happens time and time again.

自安然事件以来，我们看到审计师多次辜负了投资者的信任。

We see that the auditors have failed investors many times since since Enron.

所以，关键是要明白，就算审计师、律师和董事会说没问题，也不代表真的没问题。

And so it's just a really important lesson to know that just because the auditors and the lawyers and the board of directors say it's okay.

就算银行家给这只股票贴上‘买入’评级，也不能说明它就安全。

And just because the bankers have a buy rating on the stock that that doesn't mean it's okay.

对于那些只把安然当成一个历史名词的观众来说，

For members of our audience who might only know Enron as the historical buzzword.

也许你可以简单讲讲，

Maybe you can go through a bit.

管理层是怎么利用复杂的财务结构和公允价值会计，把未来的预期收益包装成虚假的当期利润的？

How did management use complex financial structures, mark to market accounting to turn future projections into fake, current profits?

你能给我们讲讲这个故事吗？

Maybe you can walk us through that story a little bit.

这挺有意思的。

It's funny.

我以前在《财富》杂志工作的时候，写过关于安然的文章，那时候杂志刚把安然评为过去七年最具创新力的公司，我当时还开玩笑说。

So I joked, when I wrote about Enron way back when Fortune magazine where I worked at the time had labeled Enron its most innovative company for the previous seven years.

直到现在，二十五年后的今天，我依然觉得安然确实是美国企业界最具创新力的公司，因为他们用尽了各种手段，让财报上的利润看起来比实际情况好得多。

And I still think that Enron was the most innovative company in corporate America even twenty five years later because they used all of those tools in order to make their reported earnings look much better than than they were.

很多人一提到安然，就觉得它是个巨大的骗局。

And one of the fascinating things about Enron is that people think of it as this giant fraud.

但其实并不是。

It actually wasn't.

他们的业务里有很多真实的东西。

There was a lot of reality to their to their business.

真正的欺诈在于，他们把会计准则的边界推到了极限，只在几个关键点上越了线，但大部分行为其实都是合法的。

The fraud lay in just pushing the boundaries of generally accepted accounting principles past the breaking point in a few key ways, but most of what they did was legal.

他们所做的，就是即便经济实质不存在，也能创造出看似盈利的报表数字。

And what they did was figure out how to create reported earnings even when the economic substance wasn't there.

他们用了一整套工具，比如公允价值会计——说到底，会计其实是一种语言。

And they used a whole variety of toolkits from mark to market accounting, which is and the reality is accounting is a language.

公允价值记账并不一定比使用历史成本更好或更差，后者是另一种主流方法。

Mark to market isn't necessarily any better or any worse than using historical prices, which is the other the other way of doing things.

这两种方式都可能被操纵。

Both can be manipulated.

而安然的做法，是利用公允价值会计来虚增他们能报告出来的利润。

But what Enron did is they used mark to market to increase their the reported earnings they they they could produce.

他们还设立了特殊目的实体，由首席财务官操控，把投资卖给这些实体，然后把出售收益记入账目——本质上就是自己人玩自己的游戏。

They used special vehicles that their CFO had set up in order to sell at investments to that vehicle and be able to record of the gain on the investment they had sold what was effectively a captive a captive vehicle.

他们还用了大量其他手段。

They used a whole host of other techniques.

这真正揭示的是：会计准则如何在不违法的前提下，被用来操纵企业最想提升的指标。

And so what it really shows is the way in which accounting laws can be manipulated without breaking the law in order to increase the metric that a company wants to increase.

当然，监管环境和整个行业都从安然事件中学到了不少教训。

Well, and, you know, obviously, the regulatory environment, you know, the industry, there were a lot of lessons learned from Enron to be sure.

但我认为，自那以后，人们一直担心这些情况在未来还会重演。

But I think that there has been and continued to be since that time concerns about how those dynamics can repeat in the future.

你后来报道过这么多丑闻，有没有发现企业欺诈从第一天就开始有预谋？

You know, in your career covering scandals since, have you found that corporate fraud is planned from day one?

还是说，这更像是一步步滑向深渊——高管们为了掩盖一个糟糕的季度，结果越陷越深，最终彻底失控？

Or is it more of a slippery slope where they're sort of, you know, executives are trying to cover up one bad quarter and then it just kind of completely spirals out of control?

几乎都是后者。

It's almost always the latter.

我刚开始写关于安然的书时，年纪还轻，学的是数学。

When I first started working on my book about Enron, I was young and I was a math major.

所以那时我对世界的看法特别简单。

So I have this very simplistic view of the world.

我以为，坏人做坏事，他们自己心里清楚这是坏事。

And I thought if bad people are doing bad things, then they know they're doing bad things.

但事实根本不是这样。

And that's just not the case.

前高盛CEO、后来的财政部长汉克·保尔森说过，好人做好事没什么好研究的，坏人做坏事也没什么好研究的。

Hank Paulson, the former golden CEO and turned treasury checkers secretary said at one point, it's not that interesting why good people do good things, and it's not that interesting why bad people do bad things.

真正值得琢磨的是，好人为什么会做坏事。

But what's interesting is when good people do bad things.

企业激励机制加上人性的弱点，会让人一步步走上这条道路——他们会自我开脱，觉得不把真相全说出来，其实是在为投资者着想。

And the system of corporate incentives combined with human nature can lead people down this path because they rationalize that, oh, I'm doing the right thing by my investors by not quite telling the truth about this.

因为一旦说实话，股价就会崩盘。

Because if I did, my stock price would crash.

股价一崩，反而会伤害投资者，或者让公司再也融不到钱，到时候坏结果就板上钉钉了。

And if my stock price crashed, it would hurt investors, or it would make it so that I couldn't raise any more money, in which case the bad outcome would be guaranteed.

所以我就稍微做点手脚吧，他们甚至都不是故意要这么做的。

So I'm just gonna fudge this a little bit, and they don't even really mean to do it that way.

这其实是自我合理化和自我欺骗的结合。

It's this combination of rationalization and self delusion.

几乎所有企业出问题的案例都有这个共同点，唯一的可能例外是伯尼·麦道夫。

And almost every story of business gone wrong has that in common with a possible exception of Bernie Madoff.

关于他到底有多深陷其中，以及他从一开始就是蓄意策划，还是因为亏损后不敢向投资者坦白，才慢慢掉进陷阱，觉得自己能翻身，这些至今还在争论。

You know, there's still a raging debate about how much he diluted himself and whether he planned the whole thing from the beginning or slowly fell into the trap after losses made him not wanna confess the truth to investors and believe that he believe that he could could dig himself out of it.

是的。

Yeah.

这正是问题的关键。

I mean, that's the question.

对吧？

Right?

每当企业出大事，我们常常争论，高管们到底是心怀恶意的骗子——这种说法很容易让人接受。

I mean, when a corporate disaster happens, I think we often debate whether the executives were malicious fraudsters, which it's sort of easy to paint them as such.

对吧？

Right?

还是只是极度无能又自我欺骗？

Or or just incredibly incompetent and delusional.

你几十年做报道，见过哪种情况更常见？

You know, in your in your decades of reporting, which which have you seen be more common?

是故意作恶，还是企业集体陷入幻觉，完全脱离现实？

Active malice or or just mass corporate delusion that that overtakes the reality?

真的是集体幻觉吗？

Really mass corporate delusion?

几乎没人会认真想：我要故意骗投资者。

Almost no one thinks it through and thinks, I'm going to set out to deliberately defraud investors.

如果搞砸了，我可能会登上新闻头条，甚至被起诉。

And if this goes badly, I could find myself in the headlines and possibly being prosecuted.

人们根本不会这样一步步推理。

That's just not that's just not the chain of logic that people use.

要是真这么想，这种事根本不会发生。

If they did, then this would never never happen.

所以，几乎都是后一种情况。

So it's almost always the latter.

每周二，我们都在《Security Now》节目中讨论网络安全。

Every Tuesday, we cover cybersecurity on Security Now.

大家好。

Hi.

我是TWIT播客网络的莱奥·拉波特，邀请你和我以及我们的专家史蒂夫·吉布森一起，聊聊那个关于AI突破限制、入侵Hugging Face的惊人故事。

This is Leo Laporte from the TWIT Podcast Network inviting you to join me and our guru, Steve Gibson, as we talk about that amazing story of the AI that escaped containment and hacked Hugging Face.

他会为你详细解读，还会带来Linux内核的重大修复和其他内容。

He's got all the details for you, plus a huge Linux kernel repair and more.

每周二，别忘了收听《Security Now》。

Security now every Tuesday.

你可以在twit.tv/sn，或者你常用的播客平台找到我们。

You'll find it at twit.tv/sn and wherever you get your podcasts.

你近距离见过不少公开的公司欺诈案，但也研究过像Theranos这样的私人丑闻。

You've obviously seen public corporate fraud up close, but you've also looked at private scandals like Theranos.

我想知道，在风险投资支持的私营企业里，一个有魅力的创始人，是不是比在监管严格的公开市场更容易掩盖系统性的腐烂？

I'm wondering, is it actually easier for a charismatic founder to hide systemic rot in a venture capital backed private company that it is in a heavy regulated public market?

你对此有什么看法？

What are your thoughts on that?

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得确实容易得多，不过有个前提。

I think it is much easier with with a caveat.

从技术上讲更容易，因为财务报表不公开，也没有做空者。

It's much easier in a technical way because the financial statements aren't public and there are no there can't be short sellers.

所以，公开的财务报表和做空者这两种机制，其实都是重要的预警信号。

And so those two things, publicly filed financial statements and short sellers are are helpful signs.

它们是关键的警示指标。

They're helpful red flags.

你可能在公开财报里找不到任何问题，做空者也可能判断失误。

You may not be able to find anything in the publicly filed financial statements, and the shorts may not be right.

但如果一只股票被大量做空，那多半是有原因的，至少你该弄清楚那原因是什么。

But if there's a heavy short interest in a stock, chances are there's a reason, and you should at least understand the reason.

然后你完全可以不认同，觉得他们错了，但你至少得弄明白他们的理由。

And then feel free to dismiss it and say they're wrong, but you should understand it.

所以你能看到这一点。

And so you can see that.

但如果是私营公司，这些情况你全看不到。

Whereas with a private company, you you can't see any of that.

我唯一要提醒的是，在眼下这种市场环境下，我们正经历一场近乎疯狂的牛市，感觉更像赌博，而不是投资。

The only caveat I'll offer is that in times like this where we're in this raging crazy bull market that almost feels more like gambling than it does like investing.

当一种看似荒谬的信念占据主导时，你可能会忽略那些明显的警示信号。

The preeminence of of belief or the preponderance of belief in things that seem to be crazy can make you overlook red red flags.

因为你看到警示信号，心想：这肯定是个坏兆头。

Because you see the red flag and you think, this must be a bad sign.

但年复一年，这些警示信号始终没出现，股价却一路上涨。

But then year after year, the red the red flag doesn't materialize and the stock keeps going up.

于是你开始怀疑：难道是我自己想多了？

And so you start to think, well, I must be crazy.

所以在这种狂热的牛市里，你会开始忽视这些红色警报，因为它们在出事之前看起来都不重要。

And so you start to dismiss these red flags in a raging bull market because they don't matter until they do.

我们其实能举出很多例子，但当你怀疑一家公司的宣传和实际财务状况对不上时，最先引起你注意的信号通常是什么？可能是公司行为，或者其他方面。

You know, we probably have many examples to pull from, but when you have suspected a company's corporate narrative doesn't match its financial reality, what are some of the key signals, whether it's corporate behavior or otherwise, that that tip you off first?

我觉得这是投资者特别值得深入探究的一个问题。

I think that's something important that that investors would wanna explore.

确实。

Yeah.

从财务报表里各种奇怪的矛盾开始，方方面面都有。

So it's everything from odd disconnects in the financial statements.

拿安然公司来说，回头一看，其实问题简单得可笑——根本没人搞得清他们到底是怎么赚钱的。

I mean, in Enron's case, looking back, it was just laughably simple because no one actually understood how they made money.

如果你去问那些狂热看多这只股票的人，这家公司到底靠什么盈利？

And if you ask people who were raging bulls on the stock, how does this company make its money?

有个人甚至笑出来，跟我说：‘我不知道。’

One one person actually laughed and said to me, I don't know.

如果你弄明白了，记得告诉我。

If you figure it out, let me know.

我们没必要为此担心。

We don't have to worry about it.

这些人可是房间里最聪明的专家。

These are just the best smartest guys in the room.

你心里清楚，最终的数字肯定跟他们说的一样。

And you always know that the bottom line is gonna be what they say it's gonna be.

谁还真的在乎那些细枝末节呢？

So and who really cares about about the details?

我觉得有一件事就是，当人们根本搞不懂这家公司的业务时。

So I think that's one thing is when people don't really understand the company's business.

还有就是财务报表里那些明显的异常迹象。

Another is just grungy clues in the financial statements.

你知道，如果你买了指数基金，就根本没法去深究这些事。

You know, if you have a big you can't do it if you own an index fund.

如果你的投资组合规模太大，就做不到这一点。

You can't do it if you have a gigantic investment portfolio.

但如果你把大部分资金押在一家公司上，你就必须熟悉他们财务报表的每一个细节。

But if you have a concentrated bet in a certain company, you should be familiar with every aspect of their financial statements.

你该看过风险因素部分。

You should have seen the risk factors.

你该看过关联方披露的内容。

You should have seen the related party discussions.

你得确保自己真正理解了。

You should make sure that you understand.

比如安然公司的情况，它的现金流量表和利润表根本对不上——利润表显示收益一路稳步攀升，线条漂亮又可预测，可现金流量表却乱七八糟。

For example, in Enron's case, the cash flow statement didn't make sense relative to the income statement because the income statement showed earnings going straight up marching upwards on this beautifully predictable line, and the cash flow statement was all over the place.

这两张表根本没法相互印证。

And you couldn't really reconcile the two the two statements.

所以，如果你的投资组合中有很大一部分集中在某一家公司上，这些就都特别重要。

And so that's all important if you have a big portion of your portfolio exposed to a certain a certain name.

我还会留意那些过度炒作的迹象。

I'd also watch for signs of hype.

一旦看到管理层开始脱离业务的实际状况，就要小心了——这一点在今天尤其隐蔽，我待会儿会说明我的意思。

Whenever you see a management team start to disconnect from the reality of the business and and this one is a little bit tricky today too, and I'll explain what I mean.

比如在安然公司，杰夫·斯基林从说‘这是全球领先的能源公司’，变成了说‘这是全球领先的公司’。

But, you know, in Enron's case, Jeff Gilling went from saying this is the world's leading energy company to world's leading company.

当你看到CEO越来越多地谈论市值，而不是他们创造了什么实际价值，我总是把它看作一个危险信号。

And when you see a CEO start to talk too much in terms of market value rather than in terms of value provided, I always see that as as a red flag.

今天的情况和以前不一样了，去年秋天我为《华盛顿邮报》写过一篇文章，讲的是CEO如何把炒作变成资本。

The difference today and I wrote a piece for The Washington Post last fall about when CEOs turn hype into capital.

如今的区别在于，你为股票制造的炒作越多，就越容易接触到市场，也越容易融到钱。

And the difference today is that the more hype you can generate around your stock, the more access you have to the markets, the more ability you have to raise money.

如果你现在正在亏钱，那反而可能意味着你有更大的成功机会。

And if you are losing money today, then potentially the more opportunity you have to succeed.

所以，今天的规则比过去复杂多了。

And so the rules are a little trickier today than they used to be.

我想再深入聊聊这一点。

Well, and I wanna dig into that a bit more.

我们现在确实处在一个炒作盛行的时代。

This, you know, we are in an age of hype.

毫无疑问，人工智能革命以及更广泛的领域里，有不少令人兴奋的公司。

Obviously, are a lot of very exciting companies and businesses amidst the AI revolution and beyond.

但也有很多公司，它们的增长前景看起来并不明朗。

But there are many others that might seem uncertain in terms of their growth story.

我很想听听你的看法：作为普通投资者，我们该怎么分析这些公司的基本面，来判断呢？

And I I'd love to hear your thoughts on how as individual investors we can be analyzing these company fundamentals to see.

管理层到底是在经营一家真正优秀的企业，还是仅仅在操控股价？

Is management running what is a really great business or just managing the stock price?

没错。

Right.

我觉得有一件事特别重要，虽然听起来很老派，但一定要搞清楚这家公司的债务情况。

Well, I think one really important thing, and it's such an old school thing, but really understand the company's debt.

有多少债务，以及它对资本市场的依赖程度有多深。

How much there is and how much access it needs to the capital markets.

那些依赖资本市场的企业，一旦投资者对它的故事失去信心，或者遭遇资本市场的重大危机，融资渠道一断，就全完了，这一点你必须清楚。

Because companies that are dependent on the capital markets, should that access go away either because investors lose confidence in that particular narrative or because there is a capital markets cataclysm, that's it's a risk factor, and you should you should understand that.

我最近为《纽约时报》写了一篇关于SpaceX的文章，这恰恰是这场争论的典型代表。

So I just recently wrote about SpaceX for The New York Times, and that's the that's kind of the epitome of this debate.

对吧？

Right?

有分析师预测，SpaceX每年需要筹集大约800亿美元，才能支撑它的雄心壮志。

But SpaceX, one analyst predicted, needs to raise some $80,000,000,000 of capital each year to continue to fund its aspirations.

这是一笔巨款，风险也极高。

That's a lot of money, and that's a lot of risk.

所以你得明白这一点，并把它纳入你的考量。

So you you have to understand that and take that into account.

如果你相信它的故事、炒作和宏大愿景，那你也要搞清楚它究竟是靠什么机制实现这些目标的。

And if you're believing the narrative and the hype and the huge story, you also have to understand the mechanism about how the company is going to get there.

然后我就静静看着。

And then I just watch.

CEO说的那些事，真的发生了吗？

Do things that the CEO says happen happen?

现实有没有按照那些宏大的宣言，以某种可衡量的方式跟进？

Does reality follow the grand pronouncements on some sort of in some sort of measurable way?

我觉得这一点也特别重要。

And I think that's really important too.

另外，我们常常会想，不只是听公司高管说了什么，更要留意他们没说什么。

Well, and I think another thing as well, that we often think about is, you know, not just listening to what company executives are saying, but what they might avoid saying.

你知道的。

You know?

我想知道，有没有一些语言上的回避、拐弯抹角，或者高管频繁换人这样的迹象？

And I'm curious if there's you know, whether it's linguistic pivots or you know, dodges or could be patterns of executive turnover.

哪些迹象会让你起疑，想要进一步深挖？

What are some of these elements that make your antenna go up and and want to probe a bit further?

高管离职确实是个重要信号。

So for sure, executive departures are a big one.

如果一家公司没人愿意留下，管理层频繁换人，这明显说明公司缺乏稳定性，也可能意味着员工看到了他们不喜欢的东西。

If you see a company where nobody seems to wanna stay and where there's constant turnover in the management ranks, that's a sign of it's a sign of a lack of stability for sure and possibly a sign that people are seeing things they don't they don't like.

我觉得这一点非常值得重视。

So I think that is is a big one to understand.

另外，听CEO说话的方式也特别重要。

I think it's also really important to listen to how a CEO talks.

我总想起《爱丽丝梦游仙境》里矮胖子说的那句话。

And I always think about that wonderful line from, Alice in Wonderland and it's Humpty Dumpty.

他说，一个词是什么意思，根本没那么重要。

And he says, just because a word means this doesn't mean anything.

我想让它是什么意思，它就是什么意思。

I can make a word mean whatever I want it to mean.

我这算是转述，但确实有些CEO说话就是这个调调。

And I'm and I'm paraphrasing, but there are CEOs who who talk like that.

你可能会被误导，觉得天啊，这个人给了我这么多信息，答案肯定藏在某处。

And so and you can fall victim to it because you think, oh my goodness, this person just gave me this enormous amount of information buried in there somewhere.

这一定就是我要的答案。

It must be my answer.

所以我就不再追问了。

So I'm not gonna ask again.

或者我只是觉得信息太多，有点招架不住，但既然这么聪明的人说了这么多，答案肯定就在里面。

Or I just you know, it's it's I'm overwhelmed, but it must be in there somewhere because somebody so smart just shuffled a lot of words at this answer.

你得真正学会看透这些话，问自己：这里到底有没有答案？

And you have to really be able to decipher the language and say, is there an answer here?

这个人真的回答了问题吗？

Did this person actually answer the question?

还是说，他其实是在回避问题？

Or or or did or did they actually dodge the question?

正如你提到的，你之前做过大量关于马斯克财务和公司结构的报道。

As you alluded to, you've done a lot of work reporting on Elon Musk as finances and and corporate structures.

显然，其中一些问题就连最看好他理念和成长故事的散户投资者也会感到困惑。

Obviously, some of which raise questions that retail investors, even those who are the most bullish on his ideas and and and growth stories.

这些正是很多投资者一直在面对的难题。

These are these are questions that I think a lot of investors contend with constantly.

这引出了一个关键问题。

So I think that raises the point.

什么时候，一位富有魅力的首席执行官能为公司带来巨大的增长潜力？

When does a a charismatic CEO represent massive upside for a business?

或者，不管你怎么称呼它——个人崇拜，什么时候会成为一家创始人主导企业的风险？

Or when does the, you know, whatever you wanna call it, cult of personality otherwise, when can that become a risk for a founder led company?

这完全是个未知数。

It is a huge unknown.

我的意思是，我以前一直觉得骗子和远见者是两种完全不同的人。

And what I mean by that, I have this way of thinking that I used to think that a fraud and a visionary were two different things.

骗子在一端，远见者在另一端，他们不可能是同一个人。

That the fraudster sat on this end of the spectrum and the visionary sat on the other end of spectrum and they were not the same person.

后来在我的职业生涯中，我逐渐意识到，这两者其实是在圆圈的两端相接的。

And I started to realize over my career that they are actually where the ends of the circle meet.

骗子可能是远见者，而远见者也可能是个骗子。

The fraudster could be the visionary and the visionary could be the fraudster.

只是因为一些细微的差别，才让两者有了天壤之别。你仔细想想，他们其实有不少相似的特质。

But for a few quirks that make that make all the difference, I mean, if you think about them, they have some of the same characteristics.

比如制造 hype，极强的说服力，能让别人相信他们说的话；还有那种坚定的自信，能顶住质疑，坚持说‘这事儿不可能成’，但最终一定会成。

Hype, a massive ability to get people to believe in whatever they're saying, an ability to believe in themselves, that to persevere through the doubters and the people who say it can never be so to say, but it will be so.

但正是这些特质，也最容易让远见者栽跟头。

But those are the very same characteristics that can get the visionary into trouble.

我常开玩笑说，有时候我觉得，两者唯一的区别就在于：远见者在需要资金、还靠融资来掩盖错误、夸大承诺和宏大愿景的那段时期，运气好，能持续融到钱，撑到了最后。

And I've joked that sometimes I think the only thing that separates them is that the visionary gets lucky through that period of time when he or she still needs access to capital and is able to keep raising money to sort of paper over the mistakes and overstatements and grand promises and to get to the other side.

而骗子呢，往往就在最需要资金的时候被揭穿，再也融不到钱了。

Whereas the fraudster is one who gets caught in the middle and can't raise capital right when he or she most needs it.

于是谎言曝光，大家才发现原来这是个惊天骗局——不是因为骗局本身多高明，而是因为谎言被揭穿了。

And then the the lies are exposed and it becomes known as this gigantic fraud because because the lies were exposed.

我不确定伊丽莎白·霍尔姆斯是不是个完全不适合用来说明这一点的例子，毕竟人们还在争论她的技术到底有没有可能成功。

I'm not sure Elizabeth Holmes is totally inaccurate figure through which to see this because there's a debate about whether her technology ever would have worked.

但可以肯定的是，她自己是相信的，我觉得她真觉得那技术能成。

But for sure, she believed I think she believed it would.

所以，如果她真挺到了最后，那在过程中对投资者说的一些不完全真实的谎言——比如夸大技术效果——还重要吗？

And so if she had gotten to the other side, then would it matter that there had been lies in the run up to it, to investors that weren't entirely true, lies about how well the technology worked?

不重要。

No.

大家只会记得她是个有远见的创业者，因为她成功了。

Everyone would remember her as a visionary she made it to the other side.

所以我觉得，要分清这两种人真的特别难，除非事后诸葛亮， hindsight is 20/20。

So I think it's really, really difficult to tell the difference between the two figures until the old saying hindsight is 2020.

但再说回来，还是得盯住那个关键点：看看资金需求。

But, again, back back to that key question, just pay attention to the capital needs.

如果一家公司必须不断让人相信它，因为它完全依赖市场或持续融资，那这就是在赌一个风险预算。

If the company needs people to continue to believe because the company is dependent on the markets in order to or on continued fundraising from investors, that's a risk budget.

所以你觉得，有时候 visionary 创始人和 corporate 幻象制造者之间，并没有那么明显的界限？

So you would say there's not necessarily a huge delineation sometimes between a visionary founder and a corporate illusionist?

我觉得确实没有。

I don't think so.

埃隆·马斯克就是个绝佳的例子，说明要分清这两者有多难。

I think Elon Musk is a perfect example of how difficult it is to tell the difference.

从一开始，就有人对马斯克持怀疑态度，而且说实话，他们确实说中了不少事。

There have been skeptics, about Musk, obviously, since the get go, and they have, by the way, been right about a lot of things.

但同时，他们也错了很多事。

They've also been wrong about a lot of things.

可市场对马斯克的信心，以及他筹钱的能力，从来都没动摇过。

And the confidence of the markets in Musk, his ability to raise money has not cracked.

这才是最关键的地方。

So that's the most important thing.

对吧？

Right?

只要这一点不崩，他就会一直被视为一位远见卓识的人。

And unless that cracks, he will continue to be to be a visionary.

每周二我们都在《MacBreak Weekly》节目中讨论苹果。

Every Tuesday, we cover Apple on MacBreak weekly.

你好。

Hi.

我是TWIT播客网络的里奥·拉波特，邀请你和我、杰森·斯内尔、克里斯蒂娜·沃伦以及安迪·恩隆一起聊聊。

This is Leo Laporte from the TWIT Podcast Network inviting you to join me, Jason Snell, Christina Warren, and Andy Enron.

今天我们来谈谈苹果新推出的租赁转购买计划。

We're gonna talk about the new Apple lease to own plan.

这个计划划算吗？还是不划算？

Is it a good deal or maybe not?

哪些人应该避开它？

Who should avoid it?

我们还会聊一聊，据八卦专栏作家马克·古尔曼说，今年年底将要推出的一系列新品，以及为什么你必须立即升级你的Mac。

We'll also talk about a whole bunch of new stuff coming at the end of the year according to a gossip columnist Mark Gurman and why you absolutely must upgrade your Mac.

本期《MacBreak Weekly》就到这里。

That's Mac break weekly this week.

你可以在 Twitter TV/MBW，还有你常用的播客平台找到我们。

You'll find it at Twitter TV slash MBW and wherever you get your podcasts.

每周日，我们会在《This Week in Tech》里回顾一周的科技新闻。

Every Sunday, we cover the week's tech news on this week in tech.

大家好。

Hi.

我是TWIT播客网络的Leo Laporte，邀请你和我一起，与Devindra Harnouar、Larry Maggett以及Alan Malefantano共同送别一位传奇人物。

This is Leo Laporte of the TWIT Podcast Network inviting you to join me, Devindra Harnouar, Larry Maggett, and Alan Malefantano as we say goodbye to a legend.

这位帮助我创办TWIT的导师、挚友，本周刚刚离世的John C.

The man that helped me start TWIT, my mentor and dear friend who passed away this week, John C.

Dvorak。

Dvorak.

我们还会聊聊有史以来最离奇的AI小技巧。

We'll also talk about the weirdest AI hack ever.

这就是本周的TWIT节目。

That's this week on TWIT.

你可以在twit.tv以及各大播客平台收听。

You'll find it at twit.tv and wherever you get your podcasts.

我想聊聊你那本《群魔齐聚》。

I wanna talk a little bit about your book on the February, All the Devils Are Here.

这本书堪称教科书级的示范，揭示了风险是如何被掩盖、重组，然后卖给不懂行的人的。

It's, it's a masterclass in how risk gets hidden and repackaged and sold to people who don't understand it.

这也让我想到当下AI时代涌向市场的私人信贷热潮。

I think that also brings up the current era of private credit that's currently flooding the market in the age of AI.

你能不能谈谈这方面的情况？

So I would love if you could talk a bit about some of that.

你有没有发现，它和2008年那些抵押贷款证券一样，藏着同样的风险？

I mean, you see it carrying some of the same risk as what mortgage backed securities did back in o eight?

我很想听听你的看法。

I'd love to hear your thoughts on that.

对，我确实写过。

So I I do.

我在《Inc.》杂志上发表过一篇文章。

I wrote a piece for Inc.

文章写的就是私人信贷，以及我为何对此感到担忧。

Actually about private credit and why I was worried about it.

我认为它确实存在类似的风险，因为私人信贷的核心逻辑是‘我们造出了更好的捕鼠器’——现在这种贷款是期限匹配的，也就是说，投入私人信贷的投资者要求还款的时间表，与企业偿还贷款的时间表是一致的，所以不会出现银行挤兑的风险。

And I do think it carries some of the same risks because the whole premise of private credit is that we built a better mousetrap because now that lending is match funded, meaning that the investors who are putting money into private credit are asking for their money back on the same schedule that the companies are repaying it so you don't have the risk of a run on the bank.

但华尔街毕竟是华尔街，他们想出了各种办法，未必是杀鸡取卵，但至少是在给自己这只下金蛋的鹅贴牌。

But, of course, Wall Street being what it is, they have come up with ways to not necessarily kill their own golden goose, but potentially name their own golden goose.

通过搞这种永续基金，向投资者承诺半流动性的待遇，号称你可以按特定时间表赎回部分资金，他们实际上破坏了那种期限匹配的根本原则。

So by doing these, evergreen funds that promised semi, semi liquidity to to investors where you could supposedly get some of your money out on this specific schedule, they undermined that whole premise of of match funding.

我觉得这次华尔街的贪婪跟金融危机时如出一辙，当时华尔街心想，天哪。

And I think that's where Wall Street's greed is is similar this time around to what it was in in the financial crisis, which was Wall Street saying, oh my goodness.

那些根本还不起钱的人也能拿到房贷，然后被打包成高收益证券，卖给全球那些只看AAA评级、根本不清楚自己到底买了什么的投资人。他们就这样不停地加速运转，直到机器彻底崩盘。

Mortgage is made to people who can't pay them back can be packaged up into these really high yielding securities and sold to investors around the globe who just look at the triple a rating and don't really understand what it is what it is they're buying, and they just cranked the machine and cranked the machine until it broke.

在这种情况下，这些贷款——也就是私人信贷贷款——也被切割成各种不同的证券。

And so in this case, these loans, these private credit loans are also being sliced and diced into different types of securities.

其中很大一部分卖给了保险公司，有些买家甚至是放贷的私人信贷公司自己的关联方。

A great portion of which are being sold to insurance companies and to buyers in some cases are captive of the private credit firms that are that are that are making the loans.

这里面潜藏着太多可能出问题的风险。

There's just a lot of potential in there for for for bad things to happen.

华尔街还出现了一个变化：一些从事私人信贷的公司，以及进入这一领域的私募股权公司，现在自己也上市了。

There's also been a change on Wall Street in that some of these private credit firms and the private equity firms that have gone into private credit are now themselves publicly traded.

因为它们是上市公司，所以有强烈的动机把尽可能多的资金投出去，因为它们的股价是根据管理资产规模来估值的。

And because they're publicly traded, their incentive is to put as much money to work as possible because their their stock is valued based on fees on the assets they have under management.

因此，扩大管理资产规模比从自己发行的产品中赚取业绩报酬更重要。

So growing the assets under management is more important than earning an incentive fee on the products they've created.

这彻底改变了整个激励机制。

So it's changed the whole incentive structure.

把这些因素综合起来看，让我感到非常担忧。

And these things taken together make me make me worried.

你知道吧，还是有人觉得，最后一切都会没事的。

You know, there still is an argument that it will all be okay in in in the end.

而且因为这么多人——包括我在内——都在盯着，也许真能化险为夷。

And just because so many people, including me, are looking at it, it might be okay in

但危机往往爆发在没人注意的地方，所以最后能不能平安，还真不好说。

the end because the crises tend to erupt where nobody is looking.

对吧？

Right?

但这里的风险因素已经够多了，我觉得确实让人担忧。

But there are enough risk factors here that that I think it's concerning.

其实这事儿还挺有意思的。

Well, it's interesting as well.

私人信贷和私募股权市场本来就很不透明。

I mean, private credit and and private equity markets are are pretty opaque.

我想听听你的看法：如果这两个领域出现压力，会怎么波及到普通投资者持有的那些流动性很强的上市公司股票？

And I'm curious your thoughts on how a potential stressor in those sectors could expand to the very liquid publicly traded equities that a lot of retail investors own.

是的

Yeah.

确实有可能，因为现在的私募股权规模太大了。

Well, it could because private equity is so big now.

它在市场中占了很大一部分，如果私募股权下跌，私募市场和公开市场之间已经不再是相互抵消的关系了。

It makes up so much of the market that if there is a decline in private equity, the the private equity market and and the publicly traded market are now they're not, they're not an offset to each other.

它们实际上关系非常紧密。

They're actually quite they're quite related.

比如现在，私募股权公司手里积压了大量投资，根本卖不出去，因为它们的估值太高，没法在公开市场出手。

Because right now, for instance, private equity firms are sitting on this giant backlog of investments that they can't sell because they have them marked at levels that are too high, and they can't be sold into the public market.

但如果公开市场崩盘，这个积压的问题就会越来越严重。

But if the public markets are to crack, that that backlog gets worse and worse and worse.

所以私募股权公司其实高度依赖公开市场的表现。

And so private equity firms are dependent on the performance of the public market.

这两者之间的这种联动关系，实在让人担忧。

So there's this interplay between the two that is just not great.

我认为我们应该取消私募市场和公开市场的区别，因为这两者的底层投资者其实是一样的。

My view is that we should end the distinction distinction between private markets and public markets because the underlying investors in each are actually the same.

那些大型投资者和私募基金，背后都是养老基金，它们掌握着我们大部分人的退休金。

The big investors and the private equity firms are pension plans who hold all of our retirements or many of our retirements in their in their grasp.

既然底层投资者都一样，那为什么还要分什么公开市场和私募市场呢？

So if the underlying investors are the same, why are there public markets and private markets?

为什么不干脆用统一的规则来监管所有市场呢？

Why not just regulate it all the same thing all the same way?

再问一个关于私募股权的问题。

One more question on on private equity.

虽然跟我们刚才聊的不直接相关，但值得提一下。

Little unrelated to what we're talking about, but it's worth touching on.

你写过很多关于私募股权渗透到日常生活的文章，比如宠物医院、养老院、住房这些领域。

You've written extensively on private equities expansion to everyday life, you know, vet clinics, nursing homes, housing.

这显然不仅影响大量私营企业，也影响到上市公司。

Obviously, this impacts a lot of, you know, privately held entities, but publicly traded ones as well.

这种整合，显然有一些说法，比如好吧。

Is this consolidation obviously, there's the the arguments that, okay.

嗯，这能带来运营效率的提升。

Well, this creates operational efficiency.

还是说，这其实只是那种掠夺性的金融操作？消费者、个人，当然还有投资者，都应该对此保持警惕。

Or is this really just, you know, predatory financial engineering and something that, you know, consumers, individuals, of course, investors should be aware of?

我觉得得看具体情况，需要具体分析。

I think it depends on each situation, and you have to look at it.

我觉得确实有一些很优秀的私募股权公司，它们真的能为收购的企业创造价值，打造出更好的东西，并把资金带到那些服务不足、急需支持的地方。

I think there are really good private equity firms out there that really are adding value to the businesses they acquire and are creating something better and are bringing capital to areas that are underserved and need it.

但另一方面，也存在一些纯粹掠夺性的操作。

And then I think there are purely predatory operations.

我认为这甚至不能简单地按公司来一刀切地看。

And I don't even think it's as simple as each looking firm by firm.

我觉得你几乎得针对每一笔交易单独审视。

I think you almost have to look at each each each deal.

我觉得这两种激励机制结合在一起，变得非常危险。

I do think that these these two incentives have combined in a really dangerous way.

一种就是我刚才提到的，私募股权公司变成上市公司之后的情况。

One being the one I just mentioned about private equity firms being publicly traded.

它们有动力把尽可能多的资金投出去，这就导致它们会做那些其实没带来多少价值的交易。

They have an incentive to put as much money to work as possible, which means doing deals where they may not be adding adding that much value.

另外，几十年来极低的利率让私募股权公司能轻松地在交易中加杠杆，借入的债务远远超出了实际承受能力。

The other thing that that happened was that the decades of very, very low interest rates made it very efficient for private equity firms to add debt to to deals that they were doing more debt than was really sustainable.

但这同时也让私募股权公司的收益和底层企业的命运脱钩了。

But it also separated private equities outcome from that of the underlying investment.

比如几年前破产的那家叫Stewart的医院公司，私募股权公司自己赚了数亿美元，但那家许多人都依赖的医院网络却倒闭了。

So the private equity firms like in the case of this hospital company called Stewart, that ended up bankrupt a couple of years ago, They can actually make a great deal of money, hundreds of millions of dollars in the case of Steward, while the underlying company, in this case, a hospital chain that many people depended on, goes bankrupt.

这种利益分离，根本不是私募股权本来该有的样子。

And so that split is not what private equity was supposed to be.

传统意义上的私募股权，是企业好了，我们才能好。

Old school private equity was, we do well because the company does well.

这倒也说得通。

And that makes a kind of sense.

这可能是种很残酷的资本主义，但至少还是双赢的局面。

It can be a brutal form of capitalism, but at least a win win form of capitalism.

我真正反感现代私募股权的地方在于，它变成了零和博弈。

What I really dislike about modern private equity is that it can be a win lose.

这是我们讨论的第一部分。

That was part one of our discussion.

下周请继续收听第二部分。

Tune in next week for part two.

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所以别光听节目就去买股票。

So don't buy yourself stocks based solely on what you hear.

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我是拉切尔·沃伦，代表富途基金隐藏宝石投资团队。

For The Motley Fool hidden gems investing team, I'm Rachel Warren.

感谢收听。

Thanks for listening.

我们下次再见。

We'll see you next time.