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如果你能在接下来的十五分钟里告诉我一件事，让我成为一个更好的投资者，你会最先往我脑子里灌输哪一点？
If you could tell me something in the next fifteen minutes that would make me a better investor, what's the first point you would just hammer into my head?
天哪。
Oh my god.
把手机放下。
Put the phone down.
别再交易了。
Stop trading.
我感觉自己都能统治世界了。
I feel like I could rule the world.
我觉得我们可以从一个有意思的地方开始讲起——我们请过几位来自投资智慧学派的嘉宾，算是价值投资的传承脉络吧。
I think the interesting place to start is we've had a few different people from the school of investing wisdom come on, sort of the value investing genealogy.
我和萨姆虽然不是专业投资者，但首先我们是创业者，投资嘛，更像是种业余爱好。
And me and Sam, although we are not investors, we're definitely like entrepreneurs first and then, you know, investing as a sort of hobby sport type of thing.
我们对它真的特别着迷。
We're so attracted to it.
我们特别喜欢这种投资智慧，尤其是你那种朴实无华、接地气的风格——不是教你多聪明、多高深，而是怎么比现在的自己少犯点傻。
We love the sort of investment wisdom, especially especially the your version, which is the the aw shucks common sense version of investing, which is less about how to be super smart and do advanced things and just how to be less stupid than you already are.
别担心，你肯定会好起来的。
And don't worry, you'll be fine.
所以我特别期待和你聊聊。
And so I'm excited to talk to you.
你有个很精彩的故事。
You have a cool story.
你最早是做内容、做媒体的，早年就在GeoCities上写博客，后来做播客，最后创办了一家以你名字命名的投资咨询公司。
You started off really in the content game, in the media game, blogging back in GeoCities early on with podcasting and built a large investment advisory shop called named after yourself.
我记得你们当时做到多大了？
I think you guys got to what?
那个只是临时用的名称。
That was a placeholder, by the way.
本来就没打算一直用那个名字。
That was not supposed to be permanent.
咱们就先叫它Ritholtz吧，是别人提的建议，说以后再找更好的名字，结果一直没找到。
Like, let's just call it Ritholtz for now, someone else said, and we'll find a better name, and then we never found a better name.
原本的计划是去法学院读书，成绩优异，然后讨厌当律师。
The background is go to law school, do really well, hate being a lawyer.
有个客户在经营一个交易台，那是E*TRADE的前身。
A client is running a trading desk that was a predecessor shop to E Trade.
于是我开始在交易台工作，发现那里简直一团乱。
And so I started on a trading desk and found it was just mayhem.
混乱又波动剧烈，我更感兴趣的是，为什么身边的人，有时候表现极佳，有时候却惨败不堪。
It was just random and and volatile, and I was more fascinated by why the people around me, some days were killing it, some days were getting killed.
他们的操作流程到底出了什么问题？
Like, what's going on with their process?
这让我深入研究了行为金融学。
And that sent me down the rabbit hole of behavioral finance.
这是我唯一能找到的解释：同一个人，用同样的方法，这周大获成功，下周却一败涂地。
It just was the only explanation I found as to why the same person could be doing really well one week and applying the same process gets shellacked the next week.
这跟决策有关。
It's decision making.
这跟情绪有关。
It's emotions.
这跟认知偏差有关。
It's, cognitive biases.
你能解释一下你用圣诞树来构建投资组合的比喻吗？
Can you explain your Christmas tree analogy for for constructing a portfolio?
当然可以。
Sure.
这其实很简单。
That's really easy.
我们知道，历史上很少有人能持续跑赢大盘。
So we know that historically, very few people beat the index on a regular basis.
每年能跑赢指数的主动基金经理都不到一半。
In any given year, less than half of active managers beat their index.
如果看五年期，成功率大概只有21%。
You take that to five year, it's something like 21%.
延长到十年，那就不到10%了。
You take it to ten years, it's it's less than 10%.
十个人里只有一个能胜出。
One out of 10 people.
那包括那些大型机构吗？
So that includes, like, huge firms?
所有类型的都算在内。
Includes everybody.
不管是主动型共同基金、ETF，还是对冲基金，统统算上。
Any active mutual fund, ETF, hedge fund, whatever.
再拉到二十年，能脱颖而出的就只剩寥寥几个名字了，比如彼得·林奇、沃伦·巴菲特这些人。
And then go to twenty years, and it's a handful of names you know, Peter Lynch, Warren Buffett, etcetera.
所以，如果你的投资组合核心是宽基指数，那你就得先拥有市场收益，才有可能谈超越市场。
So if the core of your portfolio is a broad index, you know, you can't get alpha, meaning outperformance, if you're not at least starting with beta.
当说人们跑不赢指数时，意思是他们不仅没拿到市场该给的回报，反而拿得更少。
And when we say people don't beat their index, it means not only are they not getting what the market gives them, they're getting less than that.
别想着跑赢市场了。
So forget beating what the market gets.
他们连市场该给的那份都拿不到。
They're not even getting what the market gets.
随便选个数吧，你投资组合的五成、六成、七成，都该放在核心部分。
So pick a number, fifty, sixty, 70% of your portfolio is that core.
我说的核心指数，指的是美国全市场宽基指数。
And by core index, I mean US broad based market indexes.
上周末，先锋的VOO成了首个资产突破一万亿美元的ETF，这只是一个成本极低的宽基指数。
Vanguard's VOO last week became the first ETF over a trillion dollars, and that's just a super low cost broad index.
你想配置一些海外股票，买海外指数基金，没问题。
You wanna own some overseas stocks that overseas indexes?
这完全可以。
That's fine.
现在，这棵树就是那些装饰品——彩灯、彩带、闪片这些。
Now the tree is the the garland, the decoration, the lights, the tinsel.
这些都是你愿意在投资组合上加的个人风格。
That's whatever stink of your own you wanna put on your portfolio.
如果你喜欢动量策略，那很好。
So if you like momentum, great.
你想多配一点科技股吗？
And you want a little more tech?
你怎么装饰都行。
However you wanna decorate it.
我们研究过各种不同的投资组合配置。
You know, we've we've looked at these assortments of different portfolios.
但它们最后差不多都会走到同一个地方。
They all more or less end up in a similar place.
有的稍微好一点，有的稍微差一点。
Some are a little better, some are a little worse.
它们最后都跑输大盘。
They all end up trailing the index.
如果你三分之二的资金都放在宽基指数里，至少你有个基准在那里。
If two thirds of your money is in a broad index, well, at least you know you're starting with that basis point.
而且呢。
And, hey.
我觉得日本挺不错的。
I think Japan is great.
我会买EWJ，或者我觉得印度是继韩国之后下一个大机会，所以我也会买那个ETF。
I'm gonna own EWJ, or I think India is the next big con country after Korea, so I'm gonna own that ETF.
如果你想在树上加点装饰，那也没问题。
If if you wanna have a little bit of decoration on the tree, that's fine.
但你要明白，你目标是跑赢市场，但结果很可能是跑输。
Just recognize you're aiming to outperform, and the odds are very much that you're gonna underperform.
这有点像你节食的时候，人家会说，对啊。
So so is this a little bit like when you do a diet, and they're like, yeah.
我们周日会吃一顿放纵餐。
We're gonna do a cheat meal on Sunday.
并不是说这顿放纵餐对你有好处。
And it's not that the cheat meal is good for you.
而是因为它可能是让你在其他六天坚持计划的唯一动力。
It's just that it's probably the only thing that's gonna keep you on the guardrails of of the other six days of the week being on track.
所以你之所以搞这些额外投资，是因为这个原因吗？还是干脆全仓被动指数，别折腾了？
Is that why you even have the decorations, or would it just be better to be a 100% in the passive index and call it a day?
我的放纵餐就是那个投机账户。
So my cheat meal is the cowboy account.
我们有些客户会听我说这些。
I we have clients listen.
什么更有趣呢？
What's more fun?
还有什么比聊投资初创公司、追热门科技股更让人兴奋的？
What's sexier than talking about investing in startups, investing in the hot new publicly traded technology?
你看看我们平时聊的那些东西，媒体、电视、报纸、网页上全是这样。
You look at all the things that we talk about, the media, television, print, web.
从来没人说：买一个低成本的广泛分散指数基金，隔几年再调一次仓，坚持几十年。
It's it's never about own a broadly diversified portfolio of low cost indexes, rebalance every few years, seen a few decades.
那你一天剩下的二十三小时五十九分钟，总得找点内容填满吧？
Now what do you do with the other twenty three hours and and fifty nine minutes a a day if you have to fill it with content.
所以这些看起来很酷的新闻、这些激动人心的消息，其实占了信息洪流的九成。
So all this sexy news, all this exciting stuff, that's that's 90% of the fire hose
你要是想做最棒的财经频道？
you be the best finance channel?
他们就在每小时开头说一句漂亮话，然后剩下的五十九分钟就放《小鬼当家》重播。
They just say that at the top of every hour, and then they just play, like, home alone reruns for fit for the next fifty nine minutes.
结果这些不看节目的投资者，反而比盯着我们频道的人赚得更多。
And and actually those investors would do way better than anybody watching I USBC.
我常打个比方，说有个小园艺频道，他们装了个树上的摄像头。
I tell the metaphor of this little gardening channel, and they have a tree cam.
他们种了一棵树，画面特别宁静，让人放松。
They plant a tree, and it just it's very bucolic and relaxing.
树就在那儿，大家都觉得挺好的。
And it's just there, and everybody is happy with it.
后来这个频道被私募股权收购了，于是他们得把它包装得更吸引人。
And then the channel gets bought by private equity, and now they gotta sex it up.
于是每件事都变成了虚假的冲突。
So everything becomes a fake conflict.
这棵树种在这儿根本不合适。
That's the wrong tree for this area.
水分太多了。
Too much water.
你种得太深了，可又没种够深。
You planted it too deep, and, it's not deep enough.
它得不到足够的养分。
It's not getting enough.
而与此同时，那棵树根本不在乎他们怎么说。
And meanwhile, the tree could not care less about what they're saying.
它只是静静地生长。
It just quietly grows.
这正是我对媒体和大盘指数的看法。
And that is how I think of the media and and the broad index.
你想怎么说都行。
Say what you want.
先锋和贝莱德两家加起来管理着整整25万亿美元的资产，就因为他们主导了低成本的指数投资。
Vanguard and BlackRock have between the two of them have $25,000,000,000,000 in assets because they've dominated low cost indexing.
我觉得金融危机就是让普通投资者彻底放弃的最后一根稻草。
And I think the financial crisis was very much the last straw for mom and pop investors.
现在新一代人都在DraftKings和Robinhood上投机，但所有40岁以上的人，都亲身经历过那段日子，心里明白得很。
Now you have all new generation of people on DraftKings and Robinhood speculating, but everybody who's over 40 kinda lived through this and said, you know what?
我不玩了，我要走人。
I'm gonna take my ball and go home.
我说的‘球’，指的是资金；‘家’，指的就是贝莱德和先锋。
And by ball, I mean capital, and by home, I mean BlackRock and Vanguard.
在2009年之前，先锋的资产还不到一万亿美元。
And, you know, before 08/00/2009, Vanguard was under $1,000,000,000,000.
现在他们已经涨到十一二万亿美元了。
They're, like, 11 or $12,000,000,000,000.
贝莱德则到了十三四万亿美元。
BlackRock is 13 or 14,000,000,000,000.
这些都是规模巨大的公司。
These are giant, giant firms.
所以事情就是这么发展的。
And so that's kinda what happened.
这就是根基，而那棵树，一直在默默生长。
That's the base core, and, you know, the tree just keeps growing.
你们客户里，有人通过他们的‘牛仔账户’赚得最多的是多少？
What's the biggest return one of your clients has had via their cowboy account?
所以，我们有些客户在比特币暴涨的时候持有比特币。
So we've we've had people that have had some Bitcoin when it skyrocketed.
我们也有客户在2021年持有大量特斯拉股票，结果股价飙升。
We've had clients that had a lot of Tesla that blew up, you know, in 2021.
股价直接飞涨了。
It it exploded.
在疫情爆发前，那些账户里有Teladoc、Zoom和Peloton这些股票的客户，他们的资产也直接飞涨了。
Heading into the pandemic, the people that in their account had, like, Teladoc and Zoom and Peloton, and they just exploded.
但事情总是这样，卖东西太难了，因为大多数人都记得，在iPod（不是iPhone，是iPod）刚出来的时候，我们就已经持有苹果的股票了。
But what always happens, it's so hard to sell something because most of ourselves like, owned Apple when the iPod, not iPhone, iPod came out.
那时候股价才15美元，现金储备13美元。
It was $15 a share, 13 cash.
几乎没有下行风险，结果股价翻了三倍。
There's no downside, and it tripled.
涨到了45美元，我还觉得自己卖得特别聪明，像个天才一样。
It went up to 45, and I thought I was a genius selling it.
然后它又涨了九千倍。
And then it proceeds to gain another 9000%.
但我们早就见过这种事了。
But we've seen that.
书里我最喜欢的一个故事，是Peloton的CEO没得到什么好建议。
You know, one of my favorite stories in the book is the CEO of Peloton wasn't getting especially great advice.
有段时间，他账面上的身家高达二三十亿美元，还疯狂加杠杆，买了一大堆东西。
At one point on on paper, he was worth, I don't know, 2 or $3,000,000,000 and just leveraged himself to the hilt, bought a whole bunch of stuff.
后来疫情缓和，疫苗普及，大家开始看到曙光，Peloton的股价就崩了。
Then, of course, as the pandemic starts to as the vaccine starts going around and we start to see the light at the end of the tunnel, Paladin crashes.
他肯定拿那些股票做了大量抵押贷款。
He must have taken a whole bunch of stock loans against that capital.
他在东汉普顿有栋六千万美元的豪宅，最后不得不卖了，到处套现。
Had a $60,000,000 place in East Hampton, had to sell that, was just liquidating everything.
看到这种事，确实挺让人惋惜的。
And just, you know, you it's always a shame when you see that.
我的意思是，得经历多少次这样的灾难，你才会明白任何股票都可能归零？
I mean, how many disasters do we have to live through before you realize any stock can go to zero?
所以每次你买卖个股的时候，亚利桑那州立大学商学院的亨里克·贝森宾德做过几项研究，他发现整个市场的价值其实只来自大约12%的股票。
So anytime you're trading an individual name, the odds Henrik Henrik Besenbinder at Arizona State Business School did a couple of studies, he basically found out that the entire value in the market comes from between 12% of stocks.
那你觉得，50比1，甚至100比1的概率，你特别喜欢、今年涨得这么猛的这家公司，真能再持续十年、二十年吗？
So what are the odds, 50 to one, a 100 to one, that the company that you love so much that's run up so much this year is gonna do it for another ten or twenty years?
你想听件有趣的事吗？
You wanna hear something funny?
Shaan，我们前几天刚和劳埃德·布兰克费恩做过一期播客。
Shaan, I we we did a podcast with Lloyd Blankfein the other day.
你知道，
You know, the
对的。
Yeah.
他刚出了一本书。
He's got a book out.
是的，这本书写得真不错。
Yeah, it's a great book.
他就是高盛的前首席执行官，你知道的。
And he's, you know, for listening, he's the former CEO of Goldman.
他地位很高，人也特别棒。
He's a big shot, a great guy.
我问他：你都退休了，现在平时都干点啥？
He told me, I was like, You're retired, what do you do now?
他说：我特别喜欢做日内交易。
He's like, I love to day trade.
他还说，一知道要录这个两小时的播客，我就有点紧张，因为老想拿手机看股票。
He goes, in fact, I knew I was gonna do this podcast for two hours and it kind of made me anxious because I'm always grabbing my phone to look at like my stocks.
所以我提前把所有交易单都安排好了，免得录的时候分心。
So I had to put all my orders in advance preparation because I'm not gonna be available.
他现在就想着，真想立刻拿手机看看。
I, he's like right now, wanna look at my phone right now.
播完之后，我就问他：那接下来你打算干嘛？
And then after the podcast, I was like, well, what are gonna do now?
他说：市场都收盘了，我也没别的事可做。
He's like, well, market's closed, so I don't have anything else to do.
我想我就走回家吧。
I guess I'll walk home.
我不太记得他具体怎么说的，但好像提到过，他七成的净资产都在股市里。
And I don't know how his portfolio how he said 70% of his net worth.
我觉得他是这么说的。
I I think he said that.
别当真啊，反正他最近的交易情况大概就是这样。
Don't quote me, but something like that is in his pickings.
他说自己过得不错，但听起来真挺搞笑的。
And so he said he's doing good, but it was just so funny.
有意思的是，我敢肯定他现在过得非常好。
And what's interesting is that I'm sure he's doing great.
如果真有人能成功，那肯定就是他这样的人。
If anyone's gonna do great, it's probably someone like him.
话说回来，就算你是行业巨头，站在世界之巅，认识所有人，名满天下，也还是可能犯下和那个18岁叛逆的罗宾汉交易员一模一样的错误。
That said, it's like, even if you're a titan of industry, you're on top of the world, you know everyone, you're a who's who, there's probably a world where he's gonna make every single mistake, the same mistake that an 18 year old degenerate Robin Hood trader is going to make.
我觉得有意思的是，我们每个人都会犯这种错。
And I find that's interesting that we all still do these things.
洛伊德，你听我说。
Lloyd, listen to me.
把电话放下。
Put the phone down.
别再交易了。
Stop trading.
你净资产的70%应该放在市政债券上，能让你免税获得高额收益。
70% of your net worth should be in muni bonds paying you a huge tax free yield.
你真想拿几百万美元瞎折腾？
You wanna dick around with a few million dollars?
你尽管去吧。
Knock yourself out.
但如果你真拿七成净资产去主动交易，那可是几十亿美元啊，我不得不告诉你，这是你职业生涯中最愚蠢的风险决策，连当年管高盛的人都该明白这个道理。
But if you're actively trading 70% of your net worth, which is a couple of billion dollars, I am disappointed to tell you that you are making the biggest risk adjusted mistake of your career, and the schmuck that used to run Goldman Sachs should know better.
别再做日内交易了。
Stop day trading.
看来我不用再去参加安息日晚餐了，谢谢啊，巴里。
Looks like I'm not invited to I'm not invited to Shabbat dinner anymore, so thanks, Barry.
天哪。
Oh my god.
我希望，我希望你的记忆或者你的数字搞错了。
I I hope I hope your memory your numbers are wrong.
这背后其实有个特别有意思的行为心理学角度。
So so here's the fascinating behavioral side of that.
在这档节目里，我们已经花了好几个小时，采访了当今一些最顶尖的投资者。
On this show, we have spent hours talking to some of the best investors alive.
幸运的是，HubSpot 的团队已经提炼出最重要的原则，整理成一份简单易读的财富指南。
Well, lucky for you, the team at HubSpot, they have pulled out the principles that matter most and turned it into a very simple, easy to read wealth guide.
里面包含了顶尖投资者总结的 35 条原则。
It's 35 principles from the top investors.
这些人都上过我们的节目，比如霍华德·马克斯、马尼什·帕尔·布雷、摩根·豪塞尔、凯西·伍德，还有好多其他人。
We're talking guys who have been on the pod like Howard Marks, Manish Parr Bray, Morgan Housel, Kathy Wood, and a ton others.
这些都是他们的投资框架、思维模型和准则，说白了就是怎么玩长线、怎么避免破产。
So these are all their frameworks, their mental models, their rules, basically how to play the long game and how to avoid ruin.
你可以在下面的链接里获取这份指南。
You can get it in the link below.
这种事我们见得太多了。
We see this all the time.
我刚才提到过那些客户。
I mentioned the clients.
喂。
Hey.
我该不该买辆法拉利？
Do I buy a Ferrari or not?
那些真正努力工作的人，比如洛伊德，我这话是认真的。
The folks who are and I mean this in all seriousness to to Lloyd.
像他这样的人，一辈子勤勤恳恳，不断奋斗、储蓄、投资，积累股票期权，经历这一切，哪怕你是掌控全局的亿万富翁，也很难停下来真正承认：我赢了。
People who a guy like him works really hard his whole career, constantly striving and saving and investing and putting money away and accumulating stock options and going through all this, it is really difficult even for people who are, you know, masters of the universe, billionaires, to recognize and just stop and say, I won.
是的。
Hey.
我赢了。
I won.
我不必再把这么多资金拿去冒险了，因为几十年来，我亲眼见过太多这样的故事，结局都不好。
I don't have to put this much capital at risk because over the decades, I have just seen that story play out and end badly.
是的。
Hey.
我相信洛伊德会没事的。
I'm sure Lloyd will be fine.
他当然不用听我这么个小人物的理财建议，但任何带着大笔资产走进办公室的人，真正的挑战是怎么让他们明白：你已经赢了，该怎么帮你打造一个最有可能实现目标的投资组合？
He doesn't have to take financial advice from little old me, but anybody who walks into the office with a giant portfolio, the the challenge is how do we convince you that you've won, and how do we make you create a portfolio that is highest probability of reaching whatever your goals are?
另外，如果你的目标只是不断赚更多，那不管是投资组合还是人生，你都会失望。
And PS, if your goal is just more, well, then you're gonna be disappointed both in your portfolio and your life.
你提到过卖出的事，我读你书的时候对其中两点特别感兴趣。
You mentioned something about selling, and I thought there was two interesting things in your book about selling.
一点是关于恐慌性抛售，以及相关数据揭示了恐慌抛售会带来什么后果。
One was about panic selling and the data around what happens with panic selling.
另一点是关于对冲基金经理的研究，发现他们买入的决策其实不错，但卖出的决策却糟糕透顶。
The other was that hedge fund there was some study about hedge fund managers where their buys were actually good, but their sells were terrible.
我想请你解释一下这两个关于卖出的观点。
And I wanted can you can you explain those two So ideas around
这背后其实有大量的行为金融学研究支持。
so again, a lot of behavioral finance research behind this.
结果发现，人们总是在市场崩盘时恐慌性抛售。
It turns out that people panic sell into a market crash.
他们中有将近三分之一再也没回到股市。
Something like a third of them never return to equities.
我们不妨以2020年疫情引发的34%市场下跌为例，或者更典型的2008到2009年57%的崩盘。
So let's just use either the twenty twenty, 34% pandemic sell off or more likely the 'eight, 'nine, 57% market crash.
想象一下，你跌了57%就割肉离场，之后眼睁睁看着市场每年复合增长15%，整整持续这么多年。
Imagine selling down 57%, not getting back into equities and watching 15% a year compound over that entire period.
这简直让人难以置信。
It it it it's shocking.
假设你有一百万美元的投资组合，一割肉就只剩四十五万美元了。
You so you take a a a million dollar portfolio, you're out at, like, of 450,000 net worth.
如果你没卖，现在这笔钱早就涨了十倍。
If you never would have sold it, it would be worth 10 x today.
那会是四十五亿美元。
It would be 4,500,000,000.
当然，公平地说，在2022年之前，你还是赚了点百分之一二的收益。
And to be fair, you are getting a percent or two up until 2022.
现在货币市场能拿到4%的收益，今天是3.7%，但这跟十倍回报没法比，也跑不赢通胀。
Now you start to get 4% in a money market, 3.7% today, but that doesn't compare to a 10 x, and it doesn't keep up with inflation.
所以这是第一个让人震惊的数据点。
So that's the first data point that's shocking.
恐慌性抛售之后，每三个人里就有一个人再也没回股市。
Panic sell into a portfolio, one in three people never get back into equities.
对冲基金的买入操作还不错，但他们的卖出决策比随机抛售还要糟糕。
The hedge fund, the buys are good, but the sells are worse than just if they sold at random.
我特别喜欢这项研究。
So I love this study.
它是芝加哥大学教授亚历克斯·阿莫斯做的。
It's by Alex Amos, who is a University of Chicago professor.
他们分析了大量交易记录，专门研究这些买入行为。
But they did this study where they looked at all these buys.
我的理解是，这些买入决策都是理性的，基于表格和数据库的分析。
And my explanation is the buys are rational spreadsheet database.
卖出的时候总是受情绪驱动。
The sells are always emotional.
但这位艾米斯教授的聪明之处在于，他提出一个问题：
But the clever thing that professor Eemis did was, hey.
我们怎么判断这些卖出操作到底好不好呢？
How can we tell how good these cells were?
我知道，与其让经理卖掉他想卖的公司，不如随机选他投资组合里的其他任何一只股票来卖。
I know instead of selling the company that the manager wanted to sell, let's randomly pick anything else this that's in this manager's, portfolio and when sell that instead.
结果发现，随机卖出的表现比经理自己选的卖出高出大约150到200个基点。
And it turned out that the random sells outperformed the manager selected sells by something like a 150 to 200 basis points.
也许甚至更高。
Maybe it was even more.
那差距真是大得惊人。
It was some crazy amount.
这其实很合理——买入时往往是深思熟虑、有逻辑的，但卖出时却常常受情绪和急躁支配。
And it's like, it makes sense that the buys are thoughtful and logical, but the sells very often are emotional, impatient.
你知道，有时候股票不会马上见效。
You know, sometimes the stock doesn't work out right away.
即使当初的投资逻辑没错，人们还是把它卖了。
People sell it even though the underlying thesis was correct.
有时候冒出个更吸引人的机会，你不得不卖点别的，好凑钱去买它。
Sometimes something else bright and shiny comes along and you gotta sell something so you have money to buy that.
这个数据太惊人了，充分说明我们大部分的决策其实都不怎么样。
It's an amazing data point, and it just goes to show you most of our decision making is bad.
所以一个解决办法就是：少做决定。
And so one solution, make fewer decisions.
嘿，我能跟你打个友好的擂台吗？
Hey, can I I'm gonna I'm gonna pick a friendly fight with you?
当然。
Sure.
你说要买低成本的指数基金。
So you say buy low cost index funds.
对。
Mhmm.
我完全同意你的观点。
I'm on board with you.
听这个播客的人都知道，你说的正是我想听的。
Anyone who's listening to this pod knows you're you're speaking my language.
但既然这样，我为什么还要付你费用呢？
But why would I pay you a fee then to do that?
你没必要付。
You don't have to.
从一开始，我们的整个商业模式就是公开分享——我和我的合伙人一直写文章说：其实你自己就能做到。
The our whole business model from day one has been so we've been writing in public, myself and my partners, Hey, you could do this yourself.
你根本不需要任何人。
You don't need anybody.
你只需要组合一个低成本的指数基金组合，管好自己的行为，别乱折腾
You just need put together a broad portfolio of low cost indexes, manage your own behavior, stay out of your
自己管
own
定期每年检查一两次就够了。
way, and check-in on it once, twice a year.
就这么简单。
That's it.
有不少人说，我喜欢这些建议，但我的投资组合稍微复杂一点。
And there are a bunch of people who said, Well, I like the advice, but I have a little more complexity in my portfolio.
我有税务问题，有州税问题，各种情况都有。
I have tax issues, I have state issues, I have whatever.
我需要有人帮帮我。
I need some help with this.
我们没有最低门槛。
We don't have minimums.
我们设了两个数字服务平台，一个针对二十五万美元以下的，另一个针对二十五万到一百万之间的。
We set up different levels of we have two digital platforms, one for under a quarter million dollars and one for a quarter million to a million.
但我们一直以来的核心观点就是：自己动手就行。
But our whole our whole, you know, line of bullshit has always been, do it yourself.
你根本不需要我们的帮助。
You don't need our help.
结果发现，大概只有百分之零点零一的读者说：我没时间。
And it turned out something like point o 1% of our readers said, I don't have the time.
我没那个自律。
I don't have the discipline.
我对这些玩意儿没兴趣。
I'm not interested in this crap.
我请人帮我报税。
I I pay someone to do my taxes.
我请人帮我割草。
I pay someone to mow my yard.
那我也愿意付钱给你们，帮我打理钱。
I'm gonna pay you guys to manage our our money.
几周前我发过一篇关于组织性阿尔法的文章。
I did a post a couple of weeks ago about organizational alpha.
如果你的收益比市场高或低五十个基点，客户根本不在乎。
And if you beat the market by 50 basis points or or below the market by 50 basis points, clients could not really care less about that.
但如果你能像我们的税务团队那样，帮客户有效降低资本利得税，那就不一样了。我们用了一些复杂的工具，但我一直觉得，简单比复杂更好，除非真能解决棘手的问题。
However, if you manage to quarterback their finances in a way that our tax team has done a great job minimizing capital gains taxes, we use a couple of complex products, and I always think simple is better than complex unless it really solves a sticky problem.
所以直接指数投资在这方面确实很有帮助。
So direct indexing really helps with that.
萨姆，你做直接指数投资吗？你了解这个吗？
Sam, do you direct index, or do you know what that is?
是的。
Yeah.
我知道这是怎么回事。
I know what it is.
但我自己不做。
I don't do it.
Shaan团队在节目里总拿我开玩笑，Barry，因为我现在投资配置特别死板，几乎就是九成股票、一成债券。
Shaan's people make fun of me, Barry, on the show because I am a very strict like, at this point, it's a little bit like ninety ten equities and bonds.
但
But
我觉得你连那百分之十都不需要。
I don't even think you need the 10.
你还有三十年才用得上这笔钱。
You got thirty years before you need the money.
干嘛非得用债券拖累投资组合呢？
Why drag the portfolio down with bonds?
直接全投股票就行，
Just Which,
话说回来，
by way,
这观点有点争议。
is somewhat controversial.
这能带来一些帮助。
It just helps.
这更多是出于情感上的考量。
It's a it's a mostly emotional decision.
不过也是。
But Yeah.
直接指数投资。
Direct indexing.
简单说就是，不买指数基金，而是通过一个程序直接买入指数里所有成分股。
It's summarized as instead of buying an index fund, you have a program that basically buys the stocks of the The components.
对。
Right.
按指数里各成分股的相同比例买入。
The components of the index in the same proportion.
就拿我个人的财务安排来说，我其实并不打算靠投资收益生活。
It seems like over the course of, like, for example, the way that my personal finances are set up, I I don't intend I live off my income.
我从来没打算卖掉我的直接持股或指数投资组合，除非是遇到紧急情况。
I don't ever intend to sell my direct or my index portfolio in case I guess I would sell emergency.
但如果我不打算卖出，那为什么还要做直接持股呢？
But why would I do direct indexing if I don't intend to sell it?
这个问题我喜欢。
I I love that question.
你们俩都卖过初创公司，最后都获得了可观的资本收益。
So you guys have both sold startups and ended up with substantial capital gains.
所以不管市场行情如何，每年总有一部分股票会下跌，大概占百分之二十、三十，甚至百分之四十。
And so in any given year, even when the markets are up, there's some twenty, thirty, 40% of stocks that are down.
而在这些下跌的股票里，有些跌幅还特别大。
And of that group that's down, there are some that are down substantially.
如果你持有的是VOO——我记得它包含七八百只股票，标普500是五百只——你看看表现最差的那百分之十，比如某家小型生物科技股跌了百分之四十。
So if you have VOO, I think is 700 or 800 positions, the S and P 500 is 500, you look at the bottom decile, the bottom 10% of stocks, and, alright, this this small cap biotech is down 40%.
我会把它卖了，然后换成另一家同样领域、同样处于下跌状态的小型生物科技股。
I'm gonna sell it and replace it with something that looks very similar, another small cap biotech that's down in the same space.
我利用这个亏损来抵税。
I harvest that loss.
投资组合的总价值并没有变化。
The portfolio value doesn't change.
组合的交易方式也没有改变。
The way the portfolio she trades doesn't change.
但如果你每年都这么做，每年能多出75到85个基点的收益。比如2020年第一季度，市场下跌了34%，奥肖内西做过一项关于直接指数投资的研究。
But if you do that every year, you could pick up 75, 85 basis points In q one of twenty twenty when the market was down 34%, O'Shaughnessy did a research study on direct indexing.
他们的研究发现，通过卖出亏损资产并换成相似公司，总共实现了超过400个基点的税务损失抵扣。
Their study said that it was 400 plus basis points of losses harvested and replaced with very similar companies.
等到市场反弹时，表现就跟指数几乎一模一样，因为本质上你持有的还是同样的东西。
And when the recovery happened, it it matched the performance of the index because effectively, it's the same thing.
创始人股票、IPO股票、企业出售、继承资产，这些都会带来高度集中的持仓。
So founder stock, IPO stock, sale of a business, inheritance, high concentration positions.
时不时会有人过来跟我说：嘿。
Every now and then someone comes in and says, hey.
我有个一千万美元的投资组合，持有苹果股票十五年了，现在它占了我整个组合的90%。
I have a $10,000,000 portfolio when I've owned, fill in the blank, Apple for fifteen years, and now it's 90% of my portfolio.
你怎么才能在不交一大笔资本利得税的情况下退出这个仓位？
How do you get them out of that position without paying a giant cap gains tax?
所以，这种方法在这方面非常有效。
And so this has been like a very effective way to do that.
但这不是适合每个人的做法。
It's not for everybody.
它会增加一些复杂性。
It adds complexity.
也会带来一点成本。
It adds a little bit of cost.
不多，但确实有。
Not much, but some.
不过对于这种情况来说，它确实很有用。
But it's definitely useful for that.
对大多数人来说，我觉得没必要。
For most people, I don't think it's necessary.
嘿。
Hey.
咱们休息一下，稍微停一停。
Let's take a quick break.
你有没有过这种感觉？策略定了，brief写好了，大家都达成一致了，结果才发现还得有人坐下来把所有内容真真切切地做出来？
You know that feeling when strategy is done, the brief is written, everyone's aligned, and you realize someone still has to sit down and actually create all the content?
这个人通常就是你，而且明天就要交稿了。
That someone is usually you, and it's due tomorrow.
不过，HubSpot的Breeze助手能帮上忙。
Well, the Breeze assistant from HubSpot can help.
它直接集成在HubSpot里头。
It works right inside HubSpot.
你可以用你自己的品牌语气，结合真实的客户数据，快速生成营销文案、博客文章、邮件内容。
You can draft campaign copy, blog posts, emails, all in your brand voice, all using your actual customer data.
所以你做的不只是内容。
So you don't create just content.
你做的是能带来转化的内容。
You create content that converts.
去看看 hubspot.com，专为成长型企业的智能客户平台。
Check out hubspot.com, the agentic customer platform for growing businesses.
我能跟你聊几个故事吗？
Can I ask you a bunch of stories?
当然可以。
Sure.
我想讲几个故事，因为你做内容这行已经很久了，肯定认识不少特别有意思的人。
I wanna I wanna do a story time thing because the cool thing about you is you've been doing the content game for so long, and so I know you've met some incredibly interesting people.
我想来个快速问答环节。
I wanna do a little rapid fire bit.
在你做过的播客访谈、会议交流或工作中，见过那么多人，你觉得我们听众最该去了解的是谁？就是你特别欣赏的那个人。
But of all the people you've had on the podcast or interviewed at conferences or or through work, who's the person who you think our listeners should research and some like someone you admire.
你刚才提到雷·达里奥和霍华德·马克斯。
So you mentioned Ray Dalio and Howard Marks.
这些名字确实挺常见的。
Those are obvious.
我给你说几个特别有意思的人。
I'll give you I'll give you a couple of really interesting names.
理查德·巴顿以前是微软的员工，创办了Expedia和Zillow，一个接一个地搞出惊人公司。
Richard Barton is this former Microsoft employee who who founded Expedia and Zillow and just one crazy company after another.
他有一套特别独特的思路。
He's got this crazy framework.
我觉得山恩和我聊过这个。
I think Shaan and I have talked about it.
我这么总结应该没错吧，山恩？
His whole, I think I'm summarizing this correctly, Shaan.
他说自己整个职业生涯，就是把一堆乱七八糟的数据整理清楚。
I think he said his whole career is taking messy data and organizing it.
或者他说得更直接，我是让数据自由。
Or I think he even said, I free the data.
对。
Yeah.
他称之为把权力交给民众。
He calls it give the power to the people.
其实就是把那些本来就存在、但不透明、不易整理和获取的数据，变得透明、容易整理、容易获取。
It's basically take data that exists that is just not transparently, easily structured and available and make it transparent, easily structured, and available.
如果你看看他在房地产领域做的事，就知道了，那套房产数据原本是MLS的数据。
And so if you look at what he did with housing, you know, the housing data, that's the MLS data.
他通过Zillow让这些数据更容易获取。
He made it more easy to access through Zillow.
Expedia也是这么做的。
They did it with Expedia.
Glassdoor也是他这么做的。
He did it with Glassdoor.
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他的这个理念，已经在至少四家不同的公司里反复实践过了。
And it's the same thesis he's just played out in, like, four, you know, plus different companies at this point.
我再给你提几个名字，虽然没那么出名，但在业内其实大家都听说过。
I'll give you a couple other names that are a little below the radar even though they're they're all kinda known to the industry.
我觉得卡莱尔集团的大卫·鲁宾斯坦，可能是我这辈子见过最棒的人。
I I think David Rubenstein of the Carlyle Group could be the best human being I've ever met in my life.
这人真的了不起。
That guy's awesome.
你看过那个节目吗，肖恩？
Have you seen the show, Sean?
看过了。
Yeah.
那当然。
Of course.
我刚看过这个。
I've just seen this.
我都不知道他这么有名。
I didn't know he was such a legend.
我只以为他是个采访者，因为我一直只看到他在做访谈。
I just thought he's an interviewer because I just only ever seen him doing interviews.
我根本没想到他是黑石的创始人，这可是他的事业。
I didn't realize he was the founder of Carlyle, which is his junk.
他这个人呢，我一直当他是个历史学者。
And he's like a he's a I knew him as like a historian.
他写过好多了不起的书。
He has these amazing books.
我正在读他写的关于华盛顿、林肯和其他总统的书。
I'm reading one of his books on Washington and Lincoln and the rest of the presidents.
我压根儿没把他当成搞钱的人。
I I don't even think of him as a money guy.
黑石刚起步的时候，他在华盛顿特区，组织了一些不对外公开的对话，邀请各领域的专家讨论国会正在争论的问题。
So he started out in the DC area when Carlisle started, and he would put together these off the record conversations with experts in spaces that were being debated by Congress.
然后他会邀请一大批来自两党的国会议员、参议员和工作人员。
And then he would invite a whole bunch of congressmen and senators and staffers from both sides.
他的想法是，这跟党派无关。
And the idea was this isn't partisan.
这也不是政治活动。
This is isn't political.
这只是为了让你们有机会听到一些平时很难接触到的专家意见。
This is just a way for you guys to hear from an expert who you may not come across
那他为什么要这么做呢？
as And why did he do that?
他从政吗？
Was he was in politics?
没有。
No.
他只是希望他所生活的国家的国会能获得更多信息，做出更明智、更有见识的决策。
He just wanted the congress of the country he lived in to be better informed and make better, more knowledgeable.
但他当时算不算
But was he a
个大人物呢？
big shot when he did that?
不算。
No.
他所在的卡莱尔集团当时只是个很小的公司，专门做电信业务，所以他们总部设在华盛顿，后来才慢慢扩展到其它领域。
He was Carlyle was a tiny little company that was specializing in telecom, and that's why they were based in DC and eventually expanded to everything else.
后来他事业有成，变得非常富有，而华盛顿纪念碑开始出现裂缝。
So later on his career, he's super becomes wealthy, and the Washington Monument starts falling apart.
水泥开始开裂。
The cement starts cracking.
这纪念碑已经有几百年的历史了。
It's a couple 100 years old.
国会当时瘫痪且无能，他是个傻瓜，也是个国会议员，但我这话有点重复了，这是马克·吐温的名言。
And congress being paralyzed and incompetent, he's an idiot and a congressman, but I repeat myself, is the Mark Twain quote quote.
他们根本没法把事情办成。
They couldn't get their shit together.
于是他出面对国会说：嘿。
So he steps in and says to Congress, hey.
我来搞定这个。
I'm gonna fix this.
你们这些笨蛋能不能抽空通过个法案？
See if you idiots can get around to passing legislation.
我就先简单修一修。
I'm just gonna patch it up.
你们要是能搞个永久解决方案，那就再好不过了，改天记得把钱还我。
See if you can do a permanent fix, and I'd appreciate if you pay me back one of these days.
行吧。
Okay.
他 basically 让国会羞愧得不得不去修缮所有国家纪念碑。
And he basically guilted them into fixing all the national monuments.
这事儿发生在八九十年代。
This was in, like, the eighties and nineties.
后来他从小在巴尔的摩长大，那座城市当时日子挺难过的。
And then he's a kid who grows up in Baltimore, and Baltimore's a city that's having a hard time.
他买下了巴尔的摩金莺队，向市民保证未来二十年球队绝不搬走。
He buys the Baltimore Orioles, promises the city that it will not move over the next twenty years.
我记得他还说，未来十年啤酒和热狗的价格都不涨。
And I think he said, and I'm gonna keep the beer and hot dog costs the same for the next ten years.
这跟你印象中他做私募股权的样子完全不一样。
Not what you think of when you think of his private equity.
你觉得他身上哪些性格特质让他在商业上这么成功？
What personality attributes do you think made him great as a business person?
听着像是个特别温暖友善的人，可私募股权这行，通常跟温暖友善沾不上边。
Because he sounds like a warm and lovely guy, but he's in PE, which is not particularly a warm and and lovely industry.
他特别擅长找到那些被市场忽视、而且被严重低估的领域。
He is really, really good at finding a a a space that is being ignored by the rest of the market, and not just ignored, but undervalued.
八十年代，电信行业根本不算时髦。
So telecom wasn't sexy in the eighties.
里根时代后期有些放松管制，但之后一段时间没人太在意。
There was some post Reagan deregulation, and it kinda got ignored for a while.
不只是那些大公司，连那些基础的、实实在在的环节也都被忽略了。
So and not just like the the big names, but the, you know, the block and tackling or all of the fundamental pieces.
他不是那种能看透未来的人，
Just the ability to it's not even see around corners.
而是能发现市场忽略掉的机会。
It's identify a spot that the markets have missed.
他在事业上升期热衷于各种业余活动吗？还是发了财之后才开始的？
Was he prolific in his extracurricular activities in the upswing of the business, or was this like a post wealthy thing?
我觉得这两件事是同步进行的。
I think they were on parallel tracks.
你怎么会这么想
Don't How think does
怎么做得到呢？
one do that?
我刚刚投资了卡莱尔。
I just lit up Carlisle.
顺便说一下，卡莱尔的资产管理规模是五千亿美元。
By the way, Carlisle has $500,000,000,000 AUM.
一个人怎么能做到这一点？
How does someone fill
把空缺填满。
one away.
他们总有一天会做到的。
They'll they'll get there someday.
一个人到底怎么才能做到这一点？
How how how does one do that?
你早年就知道他吗？
Like, did you know when he was younger?
你到底是怎么做到这么多精彩事情的？
How on earth do you do all these amazing?
我见过他。
I met him.
我认识一个为他工作的人，就跟他说：你告诉你老板，他抢了我在彭博的活儿。
I met someone who worked for him, and I said, Hey, tell your boss he's stealing my gig at Bloomberg.
这怎么可能？
What the hell?
我从2013年就开始做这个播客了。
I've been doing this podcast since 2013.
他突然出现，像大脚怪一样把视频版的节目给占了，我当时是开玩笑的。
You know, he comes in and Bigfoot's in and takes the video version of it, and I was joking.
这话传到他耳朵里，他给我发了封邮件，我就说：你干脆来上我的节目吧。
It got back to him, and I got an email, and I said, Why don't you come on the show?
聊聊你的职业生涯吧。
Let's talk about your career.
他确实来了。
So he did.
那极端的另一端呢？
But what about the other end of the spectrum?
你知道，金融和金钱吸引了很多其他人，他们说的话要么不准确，要么是糟糕的建议，甚至可能是出于私利的。
You know, finance and money attracts a lot of other people who will say things that are either inaccurate or bad advice, maybe self interested advice.
你觉得谁给这个领域造成了伤害？谁散布了大量错误的建议，或者传播了一种不该被追随的糟糕理念，哪怕它很流行、很显眼？
Who do you think has done some damage to the space, put a lot of bad advice out there, or a bad philosophy that is not one that somebody should follow even if it is popular or visible?
那些人根本不会收到上节目的邀请。
So those people don't get the invites to show up on the podcast.
我一直跟Zero Hedge较劲。
I've been having an ongoing fight with Zero Hedge.
Zero Hedge是博客还是社区？
Zero Hedge is is that a blog or is that a community?
我觉得不是
I I don't think
它有点像Reddit和博客的结合体。
It's a it's a it's sort of a cross between Reddit and a blog.
它有很多投稿人。
It's it's got a lot of contributors.
后来他们开始聚焦比特币和黄金，这成了他们的核心观点。
Eventually, they tapped into Bitcoin, into gold, and, you know, that that was their their argument.
听好了。
Listen.
书里引用了泰德·斯特金的一句话。
The the there's a Ted Sturgeon quote in the book.
斯特金是五十年代的一位科幻作家，常被人问：为什么这么多科幻作品都不怎么样？
Sturgeon was a science fiction writer in the fifties, and he used to get this question, how come so much of science fiction is not good?
他的回答是：百分之九十的东西都是垃圾。
And his answer was 90% of everything is crap.
于是这就成了斯特金定律。
And so that's become Sturgeon's Law.
所以你看到的那些印刷品、电视节目、社交媒体和Substack上的内容，大部分都不值得花时间去碰。
And so most of the stuff you see in print, on television, on social media, on Substack, most of this stuff isn't worth the time or effort to get it.
老有人给我寄各种订阅链接，简直没完没了。
You know, people send me subscriptions to stuff all the time.
嘿。
Hey.
我给你订阅了我的Substack。
I signed you up for my Substack.
你。
You.
快给我退订。
Unsubscribe me.
把我拉黑吧。
Block me.
我可没让你这么做。
I didn't ask you to do that.
别再给我发那些乱七八糟的数字内容了。
Stop sending me your digital shit.
原因很简单。
And the reason for that is simply this.
我妈妈从小就教我，别随便接受陌生人给的东西，这包括研究、文章、评论和观点。
You know, my mom taught me never take candy from strangers, and that includes research, writing, commentary, opinion.
在读一个我不熟悉的人写的东西之前，我得先花时间判断：这个人值不值得我花精力去看？
Before I read something from somebody who I'm not familiar with, it's a research lift to decide, is this person worth the time, effort, energy?
他的过往表现怎么样？
What's their track record?
他的方法论是什么？
What's their process?
他是不是只是碰巧走运了一次，还是真有一套经得起推敲的思路？
Did they just get lucky once and that's it, or do they have a defendable approach to this?
他有没有经历过几个完整的周期？
Have they lived through a few cycles?
他们经历过起起落落吗？
Have they seen ups and downs?
他们情绪稳不稳？
Do they have a good temperament?
还是说只要纳斯达克跌了4%，他们就慌得团团转？
Or every day like Friday where Nasdaq is down 4%, they run around with their hair on fire.
这才是关键。
This is the big one.
完全没戏。
It's all over.
如果他们真是这种心态，我根本没法接纳。
Like, if they have that sort of attitude, I don't have room for them.
我觉得你大概会对那个《富爸爸穷爸爸》的作者有看法吧，不管是正面还是负面，他叫什么来着？
I I think I think you would probably Jesse, you have an opinion, either positive or negative on the the, what's his name, the Rich Dad Poor Dad guy?
我一时想不起他名字了。
I forgot what his name is.
天哪。
Oh my god.
基约萨基。
Kiyosaki.
他算是书里的一章，但我从来没读过那本书。
He's he's been he's a chapter in the book, and I I never read the book.
我对这个人一无所知。
I didn't know anything about him.
我同事本·卡尔森十年前写过一篇帖子，分析过他的一些推文，内容简直糟透了。
And my colleague, Ben Carlson, does a post about some of this is like ten years ago about some of his tweets, and they're terrible.
抛售股票。
Sell sell equity.
卖了这个。
Sell this.
卖了那个。
Sell that.
整个2010年代都特别看空。
Like, is just super bearish the whole 20 tens.
他最让我印象深刻的一条推文是2018年说的：赶紧退出美国房地产市场。
And then my favorite tweet of his, which I reference in a chapter in the book on him, was 2018, get out of US housing.
美国独栋住宅市场，金融危机已经是个预警信号了，赶紧抛售房产。
US single family home market, the financial crisis was the warning shot, sell housing.
讽刺的是，最近几十年里，现在反而是买美国独栋住宅最好的时机。
And ironically, there has never been a better time in recent history to buy single family homes in The US.
有人问我，他怎么可能提前知道疫情会发生，房地产市场会变成这样？
When I I someone asked me the question, they said, well, how could he he have known the pandemic was gonna happen and all these things happening in housing?
这正是关键所在。
And that's the point.
没错。
That's right.
他根本不可能提前知道。
He couldn't have known.
你这是什么意思？
What are you telling me?
你拿他没法预知未来来替他糟糕的预测辩护？
You're defending his shitty forecast by saying he couldn't know the future?
所以你才不该做预测。
That's why you don't make forecasts.
没人能预知未来。
You don't know the future.
从这件事能看出，整个华尔街和金融圈都缺一份谦逊。
And the takeaway from this is all of Wall Street, all of finance has a humility problem.
我说这话是有依据的，我书里记了不少自己的重大失误。
And I say this, I have a lot of my biggest mistakes in the book.
我当年 famously 错过了 Robinhood，那是 2014 年，估值八千万美元。
I famously passed on or infamously passed on Robinhood in 2014 at an $80,000,000 valuation.
一个让千禧一代免费交易的App。
An app that lets millennials trade for free.
这真是我这辈子听过最蠢的想法了。
That is the dumbest idea I've ever heard in my life.
而且这跟指数投资的理念完全背道而驰，年轻人根本就没多少钱。
Aside from the fact that it's totally off brand with the indexing thing, millennials don't even have money.
这所谓的订单流支付，天啊，真是我听过最蠢的点子了。
What is if this is, you know, payment for order flow, the dumbest idea I've ever heard.
我朋友霍华德，琳赛靠这笔投资赚了一亿美元，而我也是霍华德其他项目的投资人。
My buddy Howard, Lindsay made a $100,000,000 on on that investment, and I'm an investor in in other things Howard has done.
我当时就只想说，唉，太蠢了。
And I was just like, ugh, so stupid.
我不是在说别人都蠢，就我聪明。
So I'm not just saying everybody's dumb and I'm smart.
我也跟大家一样傻，但至少我明白这一点，开始意识到我们都得有点谦逊，因为我们根本不知道未来会发生什么。
I'm as dumb as everybody else, but at least I'm kind of aware of it and starting to from the place of we all need a little humility because we don't know what's gonna happen.
我们连今天正在发生什么都搞不太清楚。
We barely know what's happening today.
我们对昨天发生的事的记忆，总带着一层玫瑰色的怀旧滤镜。
Our recollection of what happened yesterday is always tinged with a a a little glow of rosy nostalgia.
我们对未来的期待，多半只是美好的愿望和幻想。
The our our expectations for the future is mostly hopes and wishful thinking.
说到底，人类这种状态，更需要一点谦逊，承认我们对眼前发生的事其实知之甚少。
Like, the whole human condition requires a little more humbleness in admitting how little we know about what's going on.
你能再帮我解释一下吗？
Help me a little bit here.
我特别喜欢你那篇帖子，真的超爱。
I love, like you have this post that I love.
那篇叫《没人知道任何事》。
It's called Nobody Knows Anything.
你那篇讲SpaceX的，其实你很多帖子的套路都是这样——讲那些大机构、大人物，比如高盛之类的，老爱做预测。
And you basically like, say this one's about SpaceX, but the premise of a lot of your posts is like Goldman, whatever, the big the big shots, they make these predictions.
但说实话，预测真的太难了。
And the truth is is it's just so hard to forecast.
你还说过，市面上90%的信息都是垃圾。
And you said that 90% of information out there is garbage.
对。
Right.
那剩下的10%是什么？
What's what's your 10%?
我现在该读谁的内容、从哪儿获取信息，不管是新闻还是经典常青的内容，在你看来才是那10%？
Who can I read right now and get my information from, whether it be news or Evergreen stuff, that is the 10% in your opinion?
好的。
Sure.
那我就把我的名单给你，但有个前提，你自己去琢磨该把谁列进去，这个过程本身特别有帮助。
So I'll give you my list, but the caveat is the process of you figuring out who should be on your list is very helpful.
你经过这个思考过程，想想自己到底需要什么。
Going through the process, thinking about it, what do I need?
你有哪些地方需要别人帮忙？
What do I need help for?
我先报几个名字给你。
So let me throw out a bunch of names.
我们想了解完整的资讯来源。
We want the whole information diet.
对。
Yeah.
顺便说一下，我整个团队在这方面也占了很大一部分。
And and by the way, obviously, my whole team is a big part of this.
乔什·布朗、迈克尔·巴特尼克、尼克·马吉利、本·卡尔森、布莱尔·杜卡斯尼。
Josh Brown, Michael Batnick, Nick Maggiulli, Ben Carlson, Blair Dukasney.
把整个名单都过一遍。
Go through the whole list.
写东西的人太多了，我可不想光提我们自己人。
There's a lot of us writing, so I don't wanna just talk about my group.
那样就太自吹自擂了。
It's a little too self promotional.
我来聊聊其他人。
Let me talk about others.
那我先从宏观经济分析说起。
So let me start with just broad economic analysis.
在这一块，没人比埃德·亚迪尼做得更好了。
It's hard to do better than Ed Yardini.
他思考非常深入，数据驱动，特别严谨。
He is very thoughtful, very data driven.
在这轮市场中，他一直持建设性的乐观态度。
He's been very constructive and bullish during this market.
他很中肯地指出：
He very constructively said, hey.
美国市场已经表现得相当不错了。
You know, The US has had a great run.
现在我们开始看到海外经济体逐渐回暖的迹象。
We're starting to see signs of overseas doing better.
他一直是个非常靠谱的人。
He's just been a solid, solid guy.
他已经干了四十年了。
He's been doing it for forty years.
他最早是在德意志银行起步的。
He started at Deutsche Bank.
真的非常稳重。
Really solid.
看起来埃德·亚迪尼是收费的吧。
It looks like Ed Yardini's paid.
对吧？
Right?
这可不是免费的。
That's not a free one.
是的。
Yeah.
埃德·亚迪尼是付费的。
Ed Yardini is paid.
如果我想了解市场动态和结构，那就得看萨姆·罗。
If I wanna look at market dynamics and structure, that's Sam Rowe.
萨姆·罗，你可以选免费版。
Sam Rowe, you could do the free version.
也可以选完整版，就是贵一点。
You could do the full version and is a little more expensive.
在行为金融这块，没人比摩根·豪塞尔更出色了。
On the behavioral finance side, it's tough to beat Morgan Housel.
他特别会讲故事，总能带来很多深刻的见解。
He just is a great storyteller, really gives a lot of insight with that.
房地产方面，推荐乔纳森·米勒。
Real estate is Jonathan Miller.
我关注乔纳森已经很多年了。
I've been tracking Jonathan for forever.
我和他本人是朋友。
I'm friends with him personally.
这个人对住宅房地产和行业价格走势都有深刻的理解。
Here's a guy that really understands what's happening with with both residential real estate and and the state of of prices in the industry.
越往深处走，越能发现：吉姆·钱诺斯专精做空，迈克尔·刘易斯则把华尔街的文化和心理讲得透彻。
You know, as you go further and further into the weeds, so Jim Chanos for all things short selling, Michael Lewis for all things Wall Street culture and and psychology.
他秋天要出一本新书，讲的是狗狗币。
He has a new book coming out in the fall on Doge.
我特别期待这本书。
I'm really looking forward to it.
顺便说一句，迈克尔·刘易斯这个人，你读他的书以为自己了解他了，可一听他说话，才发现他幽默得不得了。
By the way, Michael Lewis is one of these guys that you think you have an idea of who he is from his books, and then you hear him speak, and he is just hilarious.
迪克·塞勒是另一个。
Dick Thaler is the other one.
理查德·塞勒，芝加哥大学的，做行为金融学的硬核研究。
Richard Thaler, of of Chicago on on the real hardcore research on behavioral finance.
人太多了。
There's so many people.
我漏掉的人实在太多了。
I'm leaving so many so many
自闭症之都。
autism capital.
他的推特账号到现在还没上榜。
The Twitter handle hasn't made the list yet so far.
其实有一些学术研究发现，神经多样性人群在市场择时上表现更好，因为他们不受同样的社会压力和情绪化交易影响。
You know, there's actually some academic research that has found neuro atypicals do better at market timing because they are not subject to the same social pressure and emotional trading.
说到SpaceX，你读过他传记里讲埃隆短暂涉足金融、做实习的那段故事吗？
Speaking of SpaceX, have you read the story in his biography of Elon's quick foray into finance, his internship?
没有。
No.
后来怎么了？
What happened?
这真是个精彩的故事。
This is a great story.
他是这样的，我试着回忆一下，他当时在加拿大上学。
So he goes I mean, I'll try to recall it off the top of my head here, but he's in school in Canada.
他开始直接打电话，想找个实习或者工作。
He starts cold calling, like, to get an internship or to get a job.
打给那些投资银行或者大银行的首席执行官。
Calls, like, you know, the CEO of some some investment bank or some bank out there.
结果他真就找到了一份工作。
And he goes and he gets a job.
本来他该做自己的本职工作，但他却深入研究起一些南美石油公司之类的东西。
And he's supposed to be doing whatever he's doing, but he he starts going really deep on, like, some South American oil companies or something like that.
当时有政治因素，他看出这些资产被严重低估了，就像巴菲特那种眼光。
Something where there was, a political issue, and he saw almost, a Buffett style thing where he's like, look, they've completely mispriced.
这些资产的价格完全不对。
These assets are mispriced.
它们的交易价格不对，因为就算最坏的情况，你也安全，更何况要是真打开了，还有巨大的上涨空间。
They're trading at the wrong levels because even in the worst case scenario, you're safe, and then there's all the upside of if it if it actually gets opened up or whatever.
他跟对方一说，对方就答应了。
He pitches the guy, and the guy's like, okay.
你去查查我们能做点什么。
Go find out what we can do.
于是他打了电话。
So he calls.
他说：嗨。
He's like, hey.
我是埃隆·马斯克，我想下单交易。
I'm Elon Musk, and I would like to place an order or a trade.
我最多能交易多少量？
Like, how much volume can I do?
对方说：你想交易多少都行。
And they were like, you can do whatever you want.
他问：‘那我现在就能买五百万美元的这个吗？’
And he's like, so I could buy $5,000,000 of this right now?
对方说：‘小伙子，你想买五千万美元都没问题。’
They're son, you could buy $50,000,000 of this if you want.
于是他回去告诉CEO：‘我觉得咱们该做这笔大交易。’
So he goes back and he tells the CEO, hey, I think we should make this huge trade.
但结果因为团队太保守，这提议直接被否了。
And then basically, it gets shot down for just like because they're just risk averse.
他看到要是做了这笔交易，结果肯定会很好，于是心想：这整个事太荒唐了。
And he sees that it it would have played out well, and he just decides, like, this whole thing is stupid.
我想，我再也不给他人打工了——我提出的完全是合乎逻辑的建议，却被毫无道理地驳回了。
Like, a, I'm never gonna work for other people because I presented a completely logical argument, and it got shot down for illogical reasons.
所以我再也不想陷入这种境地了。
And so I just never wanna be in that position again.
我还不如自己去搞点实际的东西，别再玩这些金融套利的把戏了。
And, also, I should just go build things instead of just do this financial engineering stuff.
我该去干点真正的工程活儿，说完他就走了，再也没回来。
I should go do actual engineering, and he leaves, and he never never comes back.
他以前是个做零售股票经纪失败的人。
He was a failed retail stockbroker.
你之前是这么跟我说的吗？
Is that what you told me?
那根本算不上什么金融工程。
There's no financial engineering there.
他没有任何业绩记录。
He had no track record.
他就是个新手。
He was a rookie.
谁会听他的？
Why would anyone listen to him?
最让人惊讶的就是这一点。
That that's that's the amazing thing.
你回头看1967年的沃伦·巴菲特。
You look back at Warren Buffett in 1967.
我觉得，听过他演讲的一半人心里都会想：我干嘛要听这个人的？
I think half the people who who heard his pitch would like, why do I wanna listen to this guy?
我刚上大学时在石溪分校读数学和科学。
I started out as a math and science student at Stony Brook undergraduate.
当时的数学系主任叫吉姆·西蒙斯，他后来离开创办了文艺复兴科技公司——历史上最成功的对冲基金。
The outgoing department chair, mathematics department chair was this guy named Jim Simons, leaves to form Renaissance Technologies, the most successful hedge fund in all of history.
如果你在1979年遇到他，你肯定也会问：凭什么？
If you would've met this guy in 1979, you you would say, why?
这人看起来像个流浪汉。
This guy looks homeless.
是的。
Yeah.
我见过他。
I saw him.
他看起来就像个邋遢的学生，整天都在抽烟。
He looked like he was he looked like a messy student, and he was smoking cigs all the time.
他简直像个脏兮兮的野兽。
He kinda looked like a filthy animal.
你肯定会想，这人我怎么可能把钱交给他？
You you would think this guy I'm like, I'm not giving this guy my money.
他肯定把钱都拿去抽烟了。
He's gonna smoke it.
Shaan，你这是在翻什么书？
Shaan, what are you what are you pulling up here?
你都把教科书拿出来了。
You're breaking out the textbook.
我有这个故事。
I got the I got the story.
好吧。
Alright.
这讲的是拉丁美洲债务问题。
This is about Latin American debt.
银行曾向巴西、墨西哥等国家贷出了数十亿美元。
Banks had made billions in loans to countries such as Brazil and Mexico.
这些贷款根本还不上。
They could not be repaid.
当时的财政部长尼古拉斯·布雷迪，把这些债务打包成了一种叫布雷迪债券的东西。
The secretary, Nicholas Brady, had packaged those debt obligations in something known as Brady Bonds.
是的。
Yes.
没错。
Exactly.
它们由美国政府担保。
They were
由美国政府提供 backing。
backed by the US government.
马斯克认为这些债券至少值五毛钱，但有些竟然跌到两毛钱就卖了。
Musk believed they would always be worth at least 50¢ on the dollar, but some were selling as low as 20¢.
他觉得，如果加拿大丰业银行能低价买进，就能赚上几十亿。
He figured that Scotiabank could make billions if they bought these at a cheap price.
于是他给交易台打了电话，说了自己刚才的想法。
So he called the trading desk, and he asked, you know, the stuff I said.
他心里想，这下发财了，稳赚不赔。
He thought to himself, jackpot, this is a no lose proposition.
我立刻跑去告诉彼得——也就是CEO——这件事。
I run, and I tell Peter, the CEO, about it.
结果银行拒绝了这个提议。
The bank ends up rejecting the idea.
他们说，已经持有太多拉美债务了。
They said they already had too much Latin American debt.
他感叹道，天啊。
He said, wow.
这太疯狂了。
This is insane.
大银行就是这样想的吗？
Is this how big banks think?
他说，这反而是件好事。
He goes, it was a good thing.
它让我对金融行业产生了健康的怀疑态度，也让我有胆量去创办后来变成PayPal的东西。
It gave me a healthy disrespect for the financial industry, and that gave me the audacity to eventually start what became PayPal.
他其实并没有创办PayPal。
He didn't really start PayPal.
他创办了一个竞品，后来才和PayPal合并了。
He started a competitive product, and eventually it was merged to PayPal.
但咱们别让这些细节影响了故事的精彩。
But let let's not let that get in the way of the story.
好吧。
Alright.
所以他有个好点子。
So he had a good idea.
你啊
You
你树敌很多吗？
do you have a lot of enemies?
有几个。
A few.
我没办法，真的没得选。
I don't I I have no choice.
我也是身不由己。
I I I can't help it.
你一来就火气冲天啊，老兄。
You just came here spitting fire, man.
你根本不用
Like, you don't
忍一忍。
hold back.
这纯属胡扯，我也没办法，但我明白明哲保身才是上策。
That's bullshit, I can't help, but I know discretion is the better part of valor.
但当外面有人散布那些毫无根据的言论，最终让人亏钱的时候——
But when people are out there saying stuff that is nonsense that ultimately leads people to lose money
你觉得你有必要请安保吗？
Do you think you ever have to get security?
不用。
No.
你听我说。
Listen.
如果真有人想对付我父亲，我早就没命了。
If someone wants to meet dad, I would have been dead a long time ago.
那根本不是回事，谁愿意过那种日子？
That's that's not a and who wants to live their life that way?
等等。
Wait.
天啊，这么说你觉得你需要安保？
Oh my say that makes you think you need security?
提防谁？
From who?
盖伊·川崎？
Guy Kawasaki?
不用。
No.
我没那么夸张。
I'm not that nerd.
我只是说，当你手握大笔资金、面对大量观众，还牵涉到别人的钱时，我偶尔会想，出门去城里时，身边带个人，这风险和回报值不值得。
But I'm just saying that, like, when you deal with big numbers and you have a big audience and you're dealing with people's money and stuff, I'd sometimes I think of, like, the risk reward of just, like, having someone on, you know, around you when you go to the city,
我从来没——我得告诉你个坏消息。
I never I I got bad news for you.
没人那么在意我。
Nobody cares that much about me.
我没那么重要。
I'm not I'm not that important.
你瞧。
And look.
现实是这样的。
Here's the reality.
是的。
Yeah.
我有
I've got
八十亿。
the 8,000,000,000.
我的意思是，这确实很惊人，但你有没有麦克风？
I mean, that is impressive, but it what's I mean, do you have a you have a microphone?
你有观众吗？
You have an audience?
是的。
Yeah.
在当今世界，各种声音吵成一片。
So in the modern world, it's a cacophony of voices.
没有哪一种声音能占主导地位。
No one voice is dominant.
你知道，埃隆·马斯克收购了推特。
And and, you know, Elon Musk bought Twitter.
所以当他过去创造的价值被看到时，他的声音自然就被放大了。
And so his voice is amplified when you look at the value he's created over the years.
好吧。
Alright.
不管贝宝合并后来怎么样，接着是特斯拉，现在是太空探索技术公司，他根本不需要夸大其词。
So whatever the PayPal merger ended up being, and then Tesla, and now SpaceX, he doesn't have to exaggerate.
这人彻底改变了世界。
This guy has changed the world.
对吧？
Right?
特斯拉彻底重塑了整个汽车行业。
Tesla completely changed the automobile industry.
SpaceX也彻底改变了多个行业——航天、进入地球轨道的方式，还有卫星技术。
SpaceX completely changed a number of industries, aerospace, the the concept of getting anything into Earth orbit, satellite.
他的影响真的太大了。
I mean, he's had such a giant impact.
你根本不需要再添油加醋地吹捧他。
You you don't need to polish the hagiography.
你的成就自己会说话。
Your accomplishments speak for themselves.
所以我还得美化自己那段平平无奇的本硕求学经历。
So I have to burnish my crappy undergraduate and graduate career.
那时候我真没什么好吹的。
I I I don't have that much to brag about from then.
看到这样的人，我就会想，他根本不是特斯拉的创始人。
When I see a guy like that like, he didn't found Tesla.
他是后来才加入特斯拉的。
He joined Tesla later.
他的厉害之处在于看明白了——等等，不对。
His genius was recognizing, oh, no.
你得卖一辆跟所有车都完全不一样的车，别按传统汽车公司的思路想。
What you need to do is sell a car that's just miles away from everybody else, and don't think like a traditional car company.
这根本不是内燃机汽车，而是一个科技产品。
This is a technology appliance, not an internal combustion engine.
他那些真正推动了行业进步的事，我给他点个赞。
I give him credit for the stuff he's done that's moved the needle.
我不看好SpaceX上市，但我绝对不敢赌他会失败。
I I'm not a fan of the SpaceX IPO, but I sure as hell don't wanna bet against him.
他一次又一次地证明了自己。
He's just proven himself time and time again.
你知道吗，跟他打对台可不是件容易的事。
You know, he's a tough guy to be on the opposite side of the trade front.
今天的播客由我的朋友Mercury赞助。
Today's podcast is brought to you by my friends at Mercury.
他们推出了全球最好的银行产品。
They make the world's best banking product.
我想你早就知道了。
I think you know this already.
我所有的生意都用Mercury。
I use Mercury for all of my businesses.
我大概有七八个生意吧。
I think I have, like, maybe seven or eight businesses.
我们所有生意的对公账户都用Mercury。
We use Mercury as our business banking across all of them.
现在他们还推出了个人银行账户。
And now they actually just launched a personal banking account.
所以我的个人账户也开在他们那儿。
So I have my personal account there.
我已经把账户从富国银行和摩根大通转过来了。
I moved off of Wells Fargo and Chase.
我现在完全用 Mercury 了。
I'm just all in on Mercury.
为什么呢？
Why?
我喜欢好用的产品。
I like products that are easy to use.
我喜欢那些真正懂我、懂我痛点的产品。
I like products that get me and the problems that I have.
比如，和我老婆一起开个联名账户，特别简单。
So, like, very easy to make a joint account with my wife.
创建虚拟卡片特别简单。
Very easy to spin up virtual cards.
点一下就能获得储蓄收益。
One click, and I get savings yield.
所有我需要的功能都集中在一个地方。
It just has all the stuff that I need in one place.
如果你在找市场上最好的银行产品，那绝对是Mercury。
So if you're looking for the best banking product on the market, it's definitely Mercury.
谁要是不同意我这观点，我敢跟他打一架。
I will fist fight anybody who disagrees with me on that.
去 mercury.com/personal 了解更多。
Go to mercury.com/personal and learn more.
Mercury 是一家金融科技公司，并非受FDIC保险的银行。
Mercury is a fintech, not an FDIC insured bank.
银行服务由Choice Financial Group和Column, N.提供。
Banking services are provided through Choice Financial Group and Column, N.
A，成员受FDIC保障。
A, members FDIC.
我想再回过头来聊聊炫耀的问题。
I wanna go back to the bragging question.
我想问是因为我知道你做这一行已经很久了。
I wanna because I know you've been doing this forever.
我听过你的播客，也读过你的博客，但作为创业者，我还是想了解这家公司的具体情况。
I've listened to your podcast and read your blog, but I still wanna know as an entrepreneur, the business.
你能简单说说，公司规模大概有多大吗？比如一些关键数字？
So can you give, like, a short answer to, like, just some of the numbers about how big the firm is?
我们最近一次向美国证券交易委员会提交的ADV报告截止日期是去年12月31日。
So the last ADV update we did with the SEC was December 31.
当时管理资产达到76亿美元，而我们2013年刚成立时，正好赶上了历史上第三长的十五年增长期。
That was $7,600,000,000 But when we launched in 2013, that was the start of the third best fifteen year run-in history.
那是不是说，公司每年的收入大约是五千万美元？
Does that mean, like, it's a $50,000,000 a year company?
我们不公开，因为是私营公司，不披露收入之类的，但我们的收费平均大约在70个基点左右。
We don't because we're private, we don't disclose our revenue and stuff, but, you know, we average somewhere around 70 basis points in terms of our our fees.
当我们管理的资产是一亿美元的时候，团队大概有35个人。
When we were a billion dollars, we had like 35 people.
在大型机构里，管理十亿美元的团队通常只有两个销售，一个销售助理，
The typical billion dollar group at a big bracket firm is two salespeople, a sales assistant,
还有
and
一个帮忙做投资组合的人。
someone helping on portfolio.
所以他们那边也就四个人。
So they that would be four people.
而我们那时候几乎是他们的十倍。
We were almost 10 x that.
我们一直按增长会持续下去的方式来建设团队，自成立以来，每年大概增长30%。
So we've always been building as if our growth rate is gonna continue, and we've been growing about 30% a year since we launched.
你之前说过，你早就预见到了房地产危机。
So you said you famously called the housing crisis.
据我了解，这里面有个挺有意思的故事。
And from what I understand, there's an interesting story there.
首先，说起来有点傻，我妈妈是做房产中介的。
So first, and this is so dumb, my mom was a real estate agent.
所以在2003年、2004年、2005年，我们经常聊起房地产市场有多不正常。
And so in 'three, 'four, 'five, we were having all these conversations about how weird the real estate market was.
通常的周期是，经济走出衰退后，开始复苏。
And the normal cycle is come out of recession, the economy begins to expand.
但我在金融危机前看的所有数据，完全对不上常规模式。
And when I'm looking at all that data pre financial crisis, nothing lined up with what you typically see.
那根本就是个倒过来的、由房地产驱动的经济。
It was very much a backwards real estate driven economy.
换句话说，房地产不是经济扩张的受益者——不是因为就业增加、收入提高才带动楼市，反而是反过来的。
In other words, instead of real estate being the beneficiary of an expanding economy, more hires, better income, it was the opposite.
所以每次买房后，过几年就能以更低的利率再融资，有些人甚至用房屋净值贷款套现，补贴日常生活。因为在2000年代中期，中产阶级工人几十年来实际收入几乎没有超过通胀的增长。
And so anytime you bought a house, you could refinance a few years later at a lower price, and some people were doing home equity lines of credit and taking cash to subsidize their lifestyle because in the mid two thousands, middle class workers hadn't really seen raises above inflation for decades.
于是大家就开始花掉自己房子的净值。
And so people were spending the equity in their homes.
于是我开始找数据，查学术研究。
And so I started hunting for some data and for some academic research.
2006年，莱因哈特和罗格夫发表了一篇白皮书，后来扩展成了《这次不一样：八百年金融荒唐史》这本书。
And in 2006, Reinhart and Rogoff did a white paper that eventually became the book This Time Is Different, eight hundred Years of Financial Folly.
那篇白皮书指出，当泡沫由信贷驱动时，房价平均会下跌32%。
And the white paper said, when you have a bubble driven by credit, on average, we see real estate dropping 32%.
我就以此为起点想，算了，我懒得分析标普500的所有股票，不如先看看道琼斯30只成分股。
And I use that as a leaping off point to say, all right, I'm too lazy to do all 500 S and P stocks, but let's look at the 30 Dow stocks.
房价跌32%会对它们的业务和收入造成什么影响？
And what does a 32% drop in real estate mean to their business, to their revenue?
简而言之，我大概估了个数字——6800点。
And long story short, I kinda spitball a price of 6,800.
这个观点有多反主流？
How contrarian of a belief was that?
我之前写的所有内容——关于住房、次级贷款和衍生品——全都发布在我的博客上。
All the stuff I had been writing about, housing and and subprime and derivatives, it was all up on the blog.
都是公开的。
It was all very public.
所以你知道的。
So you know?
我花了差不多一年时间，成了华尔街最傻的人，还挺有意思的。
And I spent about a year being the dumbest man on Wall Street, which was kinda fun.
整个2007年，大家都觉得你明显是个傻子。
All of o seven, it's like, you're obviously an idiot.
就连那篇提到6800点的文章也说：看吧，市场还在上涨趋势中。
And even the piece that talked about 6,800 said, look, the market is in an uptrend.
我们依然看到估值倍数在扩大。
We continue to see multiple expansion.
你不会去放空。
You don't put on a short.
作为机构交易员，只要趋势线没破，你就不会退出股市。而那条趋势线整整一年都没破。
You don't get out of stocks if you're an institutional trader until that trend line breaks, and that trend line didn't break for a solid year and change.
所以我整整一年都成了华尔街最傻的人。
So I spent a year being pretty much the dumbest person on Wall Street.
从八年的一二月开始，库德洛每周都请我上节目，后来变成每周两次，最后简直乱套了——因为没人料到这事，准确说，几乎没人看出来。
Starting in January, February, March of 'eight, Kudlow started having me on every week and then twice a week, and then it just got to be mayhem because, you know, nobody saw it com I should say very few people saw it coming.
我记得有一次在CNBC和彼得·布克瓦尔一起做节目，我们谈到潜在的下跌空间，那应该是七年底，他们直接笑出声了。
I I recall being on CNBC with Peter Bookvar, and they literally when we talked about, you know, the potential downside, and I wanna say this was late o '7, they literally literally laughed at us.
我记得当时走在公司办公室里。
And I remember walking our offices.
我们离真相没多远。
We're not that far.
我当时就想，要么我们完全对了，要么完全错了，中间没有第三种可能。
And I'm like, either we're really right or we're really wrong, but there's nowhere in between.
你记得那本关于沃伦·巴菲特的《雪球》吗？
Do guys you remember the book Snowball about Warren Buffett?
当然记得。
Sure.
没错。
Absolutely.
我刚读这本书，开头第一幕就是沃伦·巴菲特在艾伦大会上。
I just started reading it, and the very first scene is basically Warren Buffett at the Allen Co.
那个大会可是业内顶尖人物的聚会。
Conference, which is the who's who.
每次都是新崛起的明星加上元老级人物聚在一起。
So it's always like the hottest new kids plus like the old guard in the in the room together.
那时候到场的全是那些最火的互联网公司。
And at this time, it was all the best.com companies.
大家都觉得自己牛得不行，就跟现在搞AI的公司一样。
And they're all there thinking they're the hot shit, sort of like how AI companies are now.
他们觉得自己是最棒的。
They think they're the best.
沃伦有一句名言。
And Warren has this famous line.
他说，别批评具体公司，要批评整个行业，但可以夸具体的公司。
I think he says, only criticize a category, never criticize, like, a particular name, and I'll compliment particular names.
他说话很客气，但意思很明确：互联网泡沫这事儿，最后肯定要崩。
So he tries to be the point is he tries to be really polite about it, but he basically says, the .com thing, it's gonna be bad.
你要是看看上世纪二十年代的汽车公司，那时候人人都觉得汽车是未来，必须赶紧开一家车厂。
And if you look at, like, car companies in the nineteen twenties, you would have thought that, you know, like, cars are gonna end, the place to be is in cars right now.
得赶紧搞个汽车公司。
We gotta start a car company.
可当年那两千多家汽车公司，最后活下来的就三家，其余全倒闭了。
But of the 2,000 car companies who launched right when the boom was happening, basically, like, three still exist and most went out of business.
他就说，互联网泡沫也会是同样的结局。
And he basically said, this is what's gonna happen with .coms.
他试图表现得非常有礼貌，但还是让台下的人觉得被冒犯了，毕竟他们就在现场。
And he tried to do it very respectfully, but it was still very insulting to the audience because they were there.
我觉得他还讲了一堆笑话。
And I think he even made, like, a bunch of jokes.
他说你们这些人，可能现在都有情妇吧。
He was like, you guys I think he even said something like, you guys all even have mistresses probably right now.
你们觉得自己最厉害，但大难就要来了。
You think you're you think you're the best, but it's gonna come.
大难就要来了。
It's gonna come.
挺有意思的是，当一个人看到这么一点信息，就敢做出一个完全相反的判断，连沃伦·巴菲特当时都为此感到不安。
And it's sort of interesting to figure out inside of someone's head when they see this one bit of data and they're and they make this very contrarian bet and how even Warren Buffett was like quite nervous about that.
他说我知道自己会是对的，但如果没很快应验，我就真成笑话了。
He goes, I know I'm going to be right, but if I'm not right soon, then I'm really going to look stupid here.
我觉得这种敢于下这种赌注的行为，其实特别耐人寻味。
And I think that's like that behavior of like making that call is actually quite fascinating.
上世纪二三十年代有个著名的技术交易员叫理查德·威科夫，他写过一本书，叫《我是如何交易和投资股票与债券的》。
There's a famous technical trader from, you know, the 1920s and nineteen teens called Richard Wyckoff, and he wrote a book, How I Trade and Invest in Stocks and Bonds.
如果你回头去读那本书，把里面提到的‘实习生’换成‘AI’，‘电报’和‘.com公司’换成‘铁路’，简直就像去年刚写的一样。
And if you would go back and read that book, everything he talks about, just substitute AI for intern for for Telegram and .coms for railroads, and it could have been written last year.
这本书都一百多年了，读起来却感觉好像什么都没变过。
It's over a 100 years old, and it's as fresh as nothing ever changes.
太阳底下无新事。
There's nothing new over the sun.
是的。
Yeah.
技术确实不一样了。
The technology is is different.
但关键在于，
But what's the takeaway,
就是说，新东西很容易被过度炒作？
which is that, like, new stuff can get overhyped?
不是‘可能’被过度炒作，而是永远都会被过度炒作，不过顺便说一句，这也不是坏事。
Not can get overhyped, always will get overhyped, which isn't, by the way, a bad thing.
这是特点，不是缺陷。
That's a feature, not a bug.
有一本特别棒的书叫《泡沫：为什么经济泡沫其实有益》。
There's a great book called, Pop, Why Bubbles Are Great for the Economy.
想想互联网泡沫那会儿。
And think about the .com era.
想想当时铺了多少光纤。
Think about all of the fiber that was laid.
Global Crossing、Metro Media Fiber，还有成百上千亿美元投在了光纤建设上。
Global Crossing and Metro Media Fiber and hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars, billions of dollars in fiber laid.
那时候，我记得每英里的成本高达一千多美元。
At one point in time, I wanna say it was like over a thousand dollars a mile.
互联网泡沫破裂后，这些公司纷纷倒闭，然后传统的有线电视公司和电信公司以每英里几美分的价格把它们收购了。
The .com collapse comes, all these companies go belly up, and then the the legacy cable companies and the legacy phone companies buy it up for pennies per mile.
因为那时候铺设成本低得离谱，后来出现的YouTube、Facebook、Instagram这些带宽密集型技术，要是每英里还得花一千美元铺光纤，根本不可能发展起来。
And because it was so cheap to own at that point, all the things that came afterwards, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, all of the bandwidth intensive technology, well, they wouldn't have been viable if it was a thousand dollars a mile to lay fat pipes.
但当时这些资产破产后，每英里才几美分就被老牌有线和电信公司收走了。我不是说AI一定会这样，但铁路当年就是这么发展的。
But for pennies a mile out of bankruptcy, and so I'm not predicting this is gonna happen with AI, but it happened with railroads.
电视行业也是这样。
It happened with televisions.
广播、互联网、电子公司、半导体、移动通信、汽车，你随便列一列，哪个不是这样？
It happened with radio, Internet, electronics companies, semiconductors, Internet, mobile, cars, go down the list.
每一种新技术出现，似乎都会经历这么一个过程。
Every new technology that comes along seems to go through this process.
新来的技术没有历史包袱，也不用背负旧平台的沉重成本，所以能跑得更快、更便宜、更好。
Every new technology is innovative things that are not stuck with all the sunk costs and all the legacy platforms, and so they get to move forward faster, cheaper, better.
我不确定AI领域最终谁会胜出，但二十年后回头看，就像现在的计算机行业一样。
So I don't know what who are the winners in AI are gonna be, but when we look back at it twenty years from now, look at the computer industry.
惠普、Gateway，还有那些曾经估值数十亿美元、如今却几乎归零的公司，你数一数就知道了。
HP, Gateway, go down the list of companies that had billion dollar valuations and effectively went down to zero.
手机也是同样的情况。
Could do the same thing with mobile phones.
你那个爱立信手机现在怎么样？
How's that Ericsson phone do you have?
你打算换成新的诺基亚吗？
Are you gonna replace it with the new Nokia?
等等。
Oh, wait.
现在没人再买那种手机了。
Nobody buys that shit anymore.
摩托罗拉也是。
Even Motorola.
因为有了iPhone和安卓，其他所有品牌都被淘汰了。
They're gone because between the iPhone and Android, everything else has been replaced.
能跟你说说话真好，巴里，你说话从不拐弯抹角。
It's nice to talk to someone, Barry, who doesn't hold back.
我觉得我们真的特别享受这个过程。
I think you're you're we we thoroughly enjoy that.
而且，Shaan 和我这些年一直关注着你的内容。
And, you know, Shaan and I have been, seeing your stuff pop up for years.
我们很高兴。
We're happy.
我们终于能聊上天了。
We were able to talk.
谢谢你来参加。
Appreciate you coming on.
顺便提一下你的书。
Shout out the book.
当然。
Sure.
别像那样投资。
How not to invest right over there.
精装和平装两种版本。
Hardcover paperback.
你知道吗，上一本《救助国家》是十五年前写的，那真是一段煎熬的经历。
You know, the last book was bailout nation was fifteen years ago and I just, it was a slog.
写起来特别吃力。
It was tough to write.
但这本书写得特别开心。
This book was just a joy.
重新翻看这些年我跟人聊过的所有对话、做的所有研究，那时候还没人知道我是谁，现在回想起来特别有意思。
It was so much fun to go back over all these conversations I've had and all this research I've done over the years and published when no one knew who the hell I was.
你真是个难得的好人。
You're a gem of a guy, man.
我们真的非常感谢你。
We appreciate you so much.
非常感谢你们邀请我来。
Well, thanks so much for having me.
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