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你能对之前的数字给出一个大概的估计吗？
Are you able to give any ballpark for previous numbers?
我们就说荒谬吧。
Let's just say ridiculous.
我觉得这已经是个不错的估算了。
I think that's a that's a good ballpark.
对吧？
Right?
当你们自我介绍时，你们到底会怎么说？
When you are introducing yourselves, what do you even say?
因为你做过这么多不同的事情，我都不知道你最引以为傲的是什么，或者你最看重的是什么。
Because you've done so many different things that I don't even know, like, what you take credit for most or what you, like, hang your hat on.
这取决于听众是谁。
Well, it all depends on the audience.
如果我面对的是一群汽车迷，我会谈赢得拉马尔的事。
If I'm talking to a bunch of car nerds, I talk about winning Lamar.
如果我跟一群程序员聊天，就会重点讲Ruby和Rails。
If I talk to a bunch of programmers, it's all about Ruby and Rails.
如果对方是一群创业者，通常就会讲打造Basecamp和37signals的事。
And if it's a bunch of entrepreneurs, it's usually about building Basecamp and 37 signals.
所以你有没有提过Basecamp的收入？
So Did you have you ever said Basecamp's revenue?
没有。
No.
我们从未公开过完整的收入或利润数据。
We've never disclosed the full revenues nor full profits.
我想我们只提过几千万美元左右之类的。
I think we've said tens of millions or something.
我也不太记得了。
I don't even know.
这正是作为一家私营公司的巨大优势之一。
That's one of the great privileges of being a private company.
当我们独占整个SaaS项目管理市场时，这确实为我们带来了多年的巨大收益，我们一路笑到银行，因为显然早有人意识到，这不仅仅是一个利基市场，而是一个极具盈利能力的软件品类，但足足花了十年，才有人意识到这会是个好生意，然后我们就有了竞争对手。
It certainly served us well for many, many years when we had the entire project management space in SaaS to ourselves, and we were laughing all the way to the bank because clearly someone else must have realized this was a highly profitable, not even niche, but category of software, and it just took a decade until anyone else woke up to the idea that this could be a good business, and then we had competition.
所以，能作为一个美国私营公司，完全不用披露任何东西，我真的很享受这种特权。
So, very much enjoy the privilege of being a US private company and not having to disclose a goddamn thing.
萨姆，你有没有去过37signals的网站？萨姆，你有没有点过页面底部的那个地方？
Sam, have you ever been to so if you go to thirty seven Signal's website, Sam, have you ever clicked at the bottom?
那里有个小标签，上面写着‘1999’。
There's this little tab that just says 1999.
你见过这个吗？
Have you ever seen this?
没有。
No.
我现在就去看看。
I'm going to it now.
上面写着什么？
What's it saying?
说吧。
Go ahead.
太棒了。
It's amazing.
总的来说，我觉得你们在确立自己的立场方面做得非常出色。
So in general, I feel like you guys have done an amazing job of planting your flag in the ground.
嘿，这就是我们所相信的。
Yo, this is what we believe.
《Rework》是一本非常出色的书。
And Rework was a fantastic book.
你们现在的网站基本上就像是《Rework》的延伸。
Your website right now is basically kind of like Rework.
它就是30章你们所坚信的观点，而不是试图向你们推销我们的软件。
It's just 30 chapters of shit we believe rather than trying to sell you on our software.
让我跟你们说说我们作为创始人和企业家的哲学。
Like, let me tell you our philosophy as founders and entrepreneurs.
但如果你点击1999年，萨姆，你看到了吗？
But if you click 1999, Sam, do see?
我看到一个网站，页面看起来像是1999年的风格，全是白色的。
I see a website that a page that looks sort of like it's from the year 1999, and it's all white.
上面写着‘37信号宣言’，是一本由37章纯文本组成的书。
And it says 37 signals manifesto, and it's a 37 chapter book in plain text.
还有像第24章这样的章节，标题是‘我表弟的朋友’。
And there's chapters like chapter 24, my cousin's buddy.
它写着：‘我表弟的朋友是个网页设计师。’
And it says, my cousin's buddy is a web designer.
然后你们就说，行，让他来弄吧。
And then you guys are up, then let him do it.
你因为让表弟的朋友帮你建网站而省下的钱，根本无法与纠正他错误所花费的时间和金钱相比。
The money you'll save having your cousin's buddy build your website will nothing compare to the cost of time, money to undo his mistakes.
所以，这就像是一次来自过去的回响——你们已经这样做了将近二十七年，毫不掩饰地表达自己的观点，始终以理念为先，而不是一上来就说：‘看，我们的功能和产品。’
And so like very much just like this blast from the past of you guys have been doing this for like, you know, whatever, twenty seven years or something of saying what you feel unapologetically and having that be something that like leading with the philosophy rather than leading with like, hey, here's our features and here's our products.
请使用我们。
Please use us.
是的。
Yeah.
所以，很多内容其实源于杰森和我都无法闭口不谈我们所相信的东西。
So, lot of it is simply based in the fact that neither Jason or I can shut up about what we believe.
因此，我们存在和工作本身就会自然地不断产生对行业不同话题的看法：如何建立公司、如何运营公司、如何做技术、如何做设计。
So, it is a natural byproduct of us existing and working that we keep coming up with takes on different topics in our industry: how to build a company, how to run a company, how to do technology, how to do design.
在我看来，如果我们不尝试记录并广泛传播这些观察和经验，那将是巨大的浪费。
And it would be an awful waste, in my opinion, if we didn't try capture some of those observations and lessons and distribute them more broadly.
但其中当然也有更经济的一面。
But there's certainly also a more economic side to it.
我们刚起步时，我想是在《返工》一书中，有一章讲的是如何通过教学而非花钱来超越竞争对手。
When we got started, I think it's in rework, there's a chapter about how to out teach rather than outspend the competition.
从一开始，这便是我们的运营理念，因为我们从未融资过风险投资。
And that was really our operating paradigm since the beginning because we never raised VC.
我们从未比别人有更多的钱。
We never had more money than anyone else.
我们总是必须先赚到想花的钱，这就带来了一系列限制，影响了我们经营业务的方式，当然也影响了我们做营销的方式。
We always had to earn the money we wanted to spend first, and that meant a whole host of constraints on how we could run our business, and certainly how we could run marketing.
因为如果你没有一大笔钱用来购买广告和知名度，你就必须靠自己争取。
Because if you don't have a bunch of money to buy ads and awareness that way, you have to earn it.
而争取的方式很简单，就是要有趣。
And the way to earn it is simply to be interesting.
不过，我并没有把‘变得有趣’当作一个明确目标。
Now, I don't set out to be interesting as an objective.
我努力在所有我学到的事情上保持彻底诚实和直率，而这反过来在某些时候让一些人觉得有趣，因为商业建议大多来自那些并未亲身实践、只是观察和推断的人，还有一整类建议被刻意扩展到刚好300页，也许还加了个搞笑的感叹号。
I try to be ruthlessly honest and very forthright in everything that I learn, and that in turn turns out to be interesting to some people some of the time, because so much of business advice is either being given by people who aren't doing, who are observing and deducing, and there's an entire category of that usually padded to fit exactly 300 pages, and maybe it has a funny exclamation point in the word instead.
比如，我认为现在最流行的类型就是‘如何辞职’之类的。
Like, I think that's the most popular genre right now of how to quit my job or something.
现在我在机场看到的全是这类书。
That's what I see at the airports all the time right now.
或者这些 advice 来自那些活跃的创业者，但他们往往有很多限制，因为有投资者，或是上市公司之类的因素。
Or it is from entrepreneurs who are active, but very often have all sorts of liabilities in terms of what they can say because they have investors or they're publicly listed or whatever.
而基本上，杰森和我没有任何这些限制。
And basically, Jason and I had none of those constraints.
我们身处其中，至今仍在经营自己的生意，必须赚得比花的多。
We were in the thick of it, are in the thick of it, running our own business, having to make more money than we spend.
而且，我们也没有任何这些约束。
And it also, we don't have any of the constraints.
我们没有任何人能对我们说不。
We don't have anyone who can tell us no.
当然，有些时候我真希望有人能在我发些愚蠢的推文或写些荒唐的东西时告诉我别这么做。
Now, some days I wish there were people who could tell me no when I tweet out something stupid or write something hair brained.
但总体来看，这种安排——做一件足够成功、让人关心你说了什么的事，同时又没有那种粗暴的过滤机制，比如‘我不知道投资者会怎么想’——在过去二十五年多的时间里，持续产生了一系列的观察、使命宣言、各种疯狂的尝试，这些尝试常常与别人的做法不同，部分原因是我们喝的水不一样。
But at the net sum, the moving average of that arrangement of doing something that is successful enough that people care about what you have to say, and then not having that coarse filter of, oh, I wonder what my investors are going to think about this, has produced over the last twenty five plus years a steady stream of observations, mission statements, crazy attempts to do this, that, or the other thing that very often ended up not being what everyone else was doing, partly because we weren't consuming the same water.
杰森和我都从未在硅谷待过。
Now, neither Jason or I have been in Silicon Valley.
我们并不是那个地方的产物。
We are not products of that.
尽管我对那个地方产出的一切都充满敬意，但它确实容易在众多重大议题上产生趋同的思维。
However much I have tremendous respect for everything that's come out of that place, it does have a tendency to produce uniform thinking around a whole host of big topics.
37signals诞生于芝加哥，当时那里根本没有值得一提的科技社群。
And thirty seven Signals was born in Chicago at a time where that had zero tech community of note.
直到后来，随着Groupon和其他一些公司的出现，芝加哥的科技生态才逐渐活跃起来。
It wasn't until much later and Groupon and all these other things that some life was bred into the Chicago tech scene.
但当我们起步时，那里什么人都没有。
But when we were coming up, there was no one there.
因此，我们有幸与所有人的回音室保持距离，这使得原创思维成为可能。
So we just had the luxury of distance to everyone else's echo chamber, which meant that original thought was possible.
我不会声称所有原创思维都是好的，但我可以肯定的是，如果你回看我们二十年前写的一些东西——比如《Getting Real》这本第一本书、1999年的那份宣言、2010年的《Rework》，很多内容至今依然成立，因为它们聚焦于根本原则，专注于从我们的工作中提炼经验，创造出有价值且持久的东西。
I didn't I'm not gonna claim that all the original thought was good, but I will claim that if you look back upon some of the things that we wrote now twenty years ago, Getting Real, the first book, that manifesto from '99, rework from 2010, a lot of that stuff still holds up because it's focused on fundamentals and focused on extracting lessons from our work, producing something that was worthwhile and lasted.
好的。
Alright.
所以这一期的主题是卓越。
So this episode is all about excellence.
不久前，我分享了自己构建卓越生活的个人框架，HubSpot 团队将它做成了一个为期三十天的操作系统，你现在就可以查看。
A while back, I shared my personal framework for building excellence in my own life, and the team at HubSpot turned it into a thirty day operating system you can check out right now.
它拆解了我花了十年才摸索出来的系统，并展示了我如何在日常中实际运用它们。
It breaks down the systems it took me ten years to figure out and shows how I actually use them day to day.
这些系统真正地改变了我的生活。
These are systems that genuinely changed my life.
所以，如果你想打造一种美好的生活，扫描二维码或点击描述中的链接。
So if you wanna build a good life, scan the QR code or click the link in the description.
好了，我们回到节目本身。
Now, let's get back to the show.
二十年前，你二十多岁，我不确定那时你有多成功。
So twenty years ago, you were in your twenties and I don't know how successful you were.
我猜你算小有成就，但依然前路漫漫。
I would imagine mildly successful, but still had a lot to go.
但你当时却在提供建议。
And yet you were giving advice.
我认为很多听众，包括我自己，当你谈到教学 versus 消费时，我觉得这真是很好的建议。
I think a lot of people listening, myself included, when I hear you talk about teaching versus spending, I think that's great advice.
但我心想，有那么多比我成功的人，我干嘛要去提建议呢？
But I'm like, I don't wanna give advice when there's so many people that are more successful than me.
他们才应该去提建议。
They should be giving advice.
你知道的，这种冒名顶替综合症之类的东西。
You know, this sort of imposter syndrome stuff.
当你才二十多岁，而可能有一千个人比你更优秀时，你怎么能有底气去教授基础、提供建议，甚至写一本关于工作的书？他们肯定会想：这家伙懂什么？
How did you justify teaching fundamentals, teaching advice, and writing a book on work when you're still in your twenties and there was probably a thousand people that were above you that could have been like, what the hell does this guy know?
我觉得其中一部分是基因决定的。
Part of it, I think, is genetics.
我天生就有一种毫不拘谨的性格，特别适合在这种环境下成长。
I've been blessed with a completely irreverent personality that thrives in exactly those kinds of circumstances.
我不在乎别人认为我该说什么或不该说什么。
I don't give a damn what people think I can and can't say.
我看到什么就说什么，不管我是19岁、15岁、46岁还是37岁。
I'm going to call it like I see it, when I see it, whether I'm 19 or 15 or 46 or 37.
另一方面，杰森和我都花了相当长的时间为别人工作。
And the other aspect of that is that both Jason and I did spend quite a long time working for other people.
从长远来看，这确实算长，但我们真的工作了二十年吗？
Now, long time in the grand scheme of things, but did we spend twenty years?
没有，但我从15岁就开始工作了。
No, but I'd been working since I was 15.
甚至更早之前就开始了。
Well, even earlier than that.
但自从15岁起，我就一直在为别人工作，也就是说，我有老板。
But I'd been working for other people directly in the sense of I have a boss since I was 15.
所以到我26岁的时候，我已经在商业领域工作了十年，无论以雇员身份还是自己创业。
So by the time I'm 26, I've been in business to whatever degree that is, either as an employee or running myself for a decade.
现在，我甚至不认为你需要那样。
Now, I don't even think you need that.
我认为你需要的是接触一些新颖的领域，受到足够多的影响，并一定程度上了解别人的想法，然后，如果你像我这样的人，你的‘观点生成机器’就会开始运转——而我试图内化所经历的一切的最佳方式，就是分享它们，这正是那句老话：没有什么比试图教授别人更能让你深入理解一个主题了。
I think what you need is exposure to novel terrain with enough sort of influences and being informed somewhat of what other people think, and then, like, your token generation machine will start producing if you are of the kind of constitution that I am, which is one of the ways I try to internalize the best lessons from what I'm going through is to share them, is the old adage that nothing makes you learn a subject better than trying to teach it.
对。
Right.
在这方面，这确实非常真实。
It's very much true when it comes to this.
另一个事实是，存在一种关于流体智力与晶体智力的伟大范式。
Now the other fact of that is there's this great paradigm of liquid versus crystallized intelligence.
如果你看看在物理、化学、数学等领域获得诺贝尔奖的人，他们几乎都是在二十多岁时完成了最具开创性的工作。
If you look at Nobel Prize winners who win in physics and chemistry and math and so on, they all do their formative work in their twenties, basically.
然后在三十多岁期间进行应用，到了四十多岁才因为二十多岁时所做的工作而获得诺贝尔奖。
Then there's a a decade of application in their thirties, and then they get the Nobel Prize for that work they did in their twenties in their forties.
这其中一部分只是生物学因素。
Part of that is just biology.
我的意思是，我记得马克·扎克伯格说过这话，当时引起了巨大争议。
I mean, I remember when Mark Zuckerberg said this, and it was hugely controversial.
我想这应该是二月份的事。
I think this was in the February.
他说了类似这样的话：年轻人就是更聪明。
He said something to the effect of young people are just smarter.
大家都说：你不能这么说。
And everyone was like, you can't say that.
这简直太错了。
Like, that is just so wrong.
但其实也没错。
Well, it's not wrong.
在某种类型的智力上，也就是这种流动智力，反应快、行动迅速的年轻人确实更聪明。
In a certain category of intelligence, this form of liquid intelligence, smart, fast sign ups, firing stuff, young people are smarter.
就像他们跑得更快一样。
Just like they run faster.
对吧？
Right?
比如，你不会看到很多100米短跑选手或者马拉松选手是40多岁的人。
Like, you don't have a lot of, I don't know, 100 meter sprinters or 42.
这根本不是人类追求的方向。
That's just not part of the human pursuit.
不过，当你年纪大了，就会获得回报，因为你拥有更多的晶体智力，能建立更多的联系。
Now, you get the payoff when you get older that you have more of the crystallized intelligence, you can make more connections.
如果你看看历史上的诺贝尔奖得主，我认为平均年龄大约是80岁。
If you look at Nobel Prize winners in history, I think the average age is like 80.
对吧？
Right?
这些联系是在后期才形成的。
Like, those connections come later.
因此，我非常尊重这种液态智力——它既聪明又迅速，但同时也完全无知。
So, I have tremendous respect for that liquid intelligence that's at once both very smart, very quick, and also totally ignorant.
对更广阔的世界毫无概念，不知道什么可以做、什么不可以做，也不明白别人懂得更多，因此自己应该闭嘴。
Has no sense of the broader world, has no sense of what you're allowed to do and not allowed to do, have no sense of someone knows more, therefore, I should shut up.
对吧？
Right?
回首那段时光，我很庆幸自己当时带着二十岁的傲慢，全然拥抱了那种无知。
I look upon back upon that time and go, like, I am so glad I embraced all that ignorance with the hubris of 20.
正是这种状态，从字面意义上改变了世界。
Like, that's how we change the world in a very literal sense.
新的想法往往就来自这个方向。
The new ideas very often come from that vector.
没人会喜欢一个谨小慎微的二十岁年轻人。
That's no nobody loves a cautious twenty year old.
HubSpot的创始人兼联合创始人来过这个播客，他说在自己的第一家创业公司里，他完全是凭空捏造一切。
The founder of cofounder of HubSpot came on this podcast, and he talked about in his first company, he was making everything up.
而在他的第二家公司，他说：‘哦，现在我知道该怎么完全不同地做每件事了。’
And in his second company, he said, oh, now I I know how I'm gonna do everything differently.
结果彻底失败了。
And it totally failed.
他说，正因为我不懂，所以并不意味着我错了。
And he goes, just because I was ignorant doesn't mean I was wrong.
这个观点确实有道理，你完全可以既无知又正确。
And there's there's something to the to to that idea of, like, you can be both ignorant and correct.
我甚至可以说，对于大量问题而言，无知其实是一种优势，一旦你经历过一遍，反而成了诅咒。
I'd go so far as to say that ignorance is a benefit for a huge class of problems, that you are cursed when you've been through the loop once.
当你懂得太多，就无法再像以前那样天真地发想了。
When you know too much, you cannot unseed in the same way.
你会被固有的范式和思维模式所束缚。
You will be locked into paradigms and thought patterns.
如果你想打破这些范式和思维模式，你就得从一张白纸开始。
And if you want to break those paradigms, if you want to break those thought patterns, you kind of got to start from a clean slate.
当然，这并非在所有情况下都成立，但我认为它确实描述了杰森或我所经历的情况。
Now, that's not universally true in all cases, but I do think it describes the case that Jason or I went through.
我们当时有一些经验，这些经验在其他人的身上也有效，尤其是在我们行业最疯狂的时期之一——可以说是仅次于现在的第二个最疯狂的时期，也就是互联网泡沫的兴起与破灭。
That we had some input, which was working for other people, working at a crazy time in our industry, maybe second craziest time next to right now, which was the .com boom and bust.
我们俩都经历了这个过程，从上升期到下降期，亲眼目睹了所有动态的展开。我认为，如果把从1997年到2001年这短短四年压缩来看，
Both of us went through it, both on the way up and on the way down, and saw all the dynamics play out where I think if you compress those years from, let's say, '97 to 2001, like, that's only four years.
这相当于十年甚至二十年的教训，因为当时发生的事情实在太多了。
That was instruction worth a decade, at least, maybe two, because there was just so much happening.
你见证了互联网的全面爆发。
You got all the explosion of here's the Internet.
我们该拿它做什么？
What are we gonna do with it?
于是人们建造起空中楼阁，而这些泡沫在2001年互联网泡沫破裂时轰然倒塌。
Build it into the wild castles in the sky that came tumbling down in 2001 as the .com boom burst.
所以我们经历了所有这些经历。
So we had all those inputs.
对吧？
Right?
所有这些经历。
Like, all those experiences.
然后我们差不多从一片荒漠中起步。
And then we kinda started in the desert.
当杰森和我开始做Basecamp时，那是2003年，我们开始着手开发。
When Jason and I got going with Basecamp, this is back 2003, we start working on it.
那时依然是一片荒芜。
It's still a wasteland.
对吧？
Right?
互联网泡沫破裂彻底摧毁了一切。
Like, the dot com bust have exploded everything.
程序员们纷纷转行去当厨师、园丁，或者干别的。
You got programmers going back to being chefs or gardeners or whatever.
根本找不到工作，因为整个行业把自己炸毁了。
There was simply no work to be had because the whole industry blew itself up.
在这片废墟中，我们就想，你知道吗？
And in that wasteland, we just go like, Do you know what?
我们现在必须变得勤俭节约。
We now have to be scrappy.
我们现在必须依靠自己。
We now have to rely on ourselves.
我们必须极其高效，因为我们雇不起五十人的团队。
We have to be tremendously productive, because we can't hire a team of 50.
我们买不起大量的服务器。
We can't buy tons of servers.
我们必须使用开源软件，因为我们负担不起Oracle数据库的许可证费用。
We have to use open source, because we can't afford licenses for Oracle databases.
所有这些限制都适用于我们的处境，反而激发了创造力的爆发。
All of those constraints apply themselves to our situation, and then just produces an explosion of creativity.
因为这通常就是会发生的情况。
Because that's what very often happens.
当你在正确的方面被剥夺时，你会意识到，哦，其实有更好的方法来做这件事。
When you are deprived in all the right ways, you will find out, oh, there's a better way to do this.
你会发现这些优化手段。
You will find out the optimizations.
比如，今天的一个类似情况是，当DeepSeek发布R1时，美国AI行业经历了一个令人恐惧的时刻。
Like, a parallel to today is the big scary moment for The US AI industry was when DeepSeek put out R1.
这其中有些是神话，有些是胡扯，但当时流传的说法是，他们因出口限制无法购买NVIDIA的芯片。
And some of this is mythology, some of this is bullshit, but the storyline at the time was they could not buy NVIDIA CPUs due to export restraints.
他们用五百万张卡训练了整个模型。
They trained the whole thing on 5,000,000.
我知道这里面还有保留意见和附加说明。
I know there's reservations and asterisks behind that.
但核心原则是，他们开发出了一些全新的技术，用少得多的计算资源依然取得了显著成果。
But the fundamental principle was they came up with some novel new techniques of using vastly less compute to still get quite far.
我认为这非常适用于我们当时的情况。
And I think that applies very much to our situation at the time.
我们根本没有数百万美元的资金。
We just didn't have millions of dollars.
我们有一家咨询业务，必须靠它来支付所有我们想体验的开销，因此我们不得不变得极其高效。
We had a consulting business that we had to make pay for all these experiences we wanted to do, and therefore we just had to be radically more productive.
对我来说，从技术层面来说，这直接催生了Ruby on Rails。
I mean, this, in my case, on the technical side, was the birth of Ruby on Rails.
我无法使用其他人所用的相同技术，因为我的资源只有他们的十分之一、百分之一，甚至千分之一。
I could not use the same technology as everyone else was using, because I had a tenth, a hundredth, a thousandth of the capacity, if I had to use something else.
我必须使用某种技术，或者自己创造一种方法，让我这个单独的程序员和技术人员，能够独自完成Base Camp的技术开发。
I had to use something or come up with something that allowed me as an individual programmer and technical person in the whole operation to build Base Camp by myself on the technical side.
我永远感激我们当时所面临的这些限制。
I am forever grateful that these were the constraints we were under.
如果我们当时融了两千万元，雇了一百个人，我们只会跟别人做同样的事，根本不可能创造出Ruby on Rails。
If we had raised, I don't know, $20,000,000 and hired a 100 people, we would just do the same shit as everyone else, and we would never have come up with Ruby on Rails.
你们想听个疯狂的数据吗？
Do you guys wanna hear a crazy stat?
获得诺贝尔奖的科学家参与某种表演类活动的可能性高出22到25倍。
Nobel winning prize scientists are 22 to 25 times more likely to be in some type of performing class.
比如表演、魔术、唱歌，或者某种艺术形式，如绘画之类的。
So acting, magicians, singing, or some type of like art, like drawing or whatever.
这不对。
It's not right.
高出22倍。
22 times more likely.
我是在比尔·格雷利的书里读到这个的，然后我查了一下，发现这确实是一项研究。
I read about that in Bill Gurley's book, and then I just looked it up, and it's like a it's like a a study.
我提起这个是因为我一直对这个事实着迷。
And the reason I'm bringing this up is I've been I've been obsessed over that fact.
这看起来简直不可思议。
That just seems astronomical.
然后你提到了固化知识和流动知识的概念，这进一步证实了这一点。
And then you brought up the idea of crystallized versus liquid knowledge, and it just solidifies that.
这进一步印证了这一点。
It kinda adds to that.
这数据是不是太疯狂了？
Ain't ain't that a crazy stat?
这太惊人了。
That is wild.
你知道有趣的是什么吗？
And do you know what's funny?
我的意思是，我们都会根据自己想相信的东西去解读这样的事实。
I mean, we all read in whatever we want into factoids like that.
但小时候，我最享受的角色是地下城主。
But when I was a kid, what I really enjoyed being was the dungeon master.
我玩过《龙与地下城》和其他角色扮演游戏，大多数人只想扮演一个角色。
So I played Dungeons and Dragons and other role playing games, and most people, they just wanted to be a character.
我想掌控整个世界。
I wanted to run the world.
所以我认为，早在那时就有一些迹象表明我喜欢构建世界。
So I think there were some sort of early indicators that I like to sort of world build.
另外，在游戏中，我最爱的游戏是《文明I》，也就是最初的席德·梅尔游戏，这显然是一款关于世界构建的游戏。
Also in game, my favorite game of all time is Civilization I, the original Sid Meier's game, which is obviously about world building.
所以，这些因素很早就出现了，而通过与他人积极合作、在还没有钱支付薪水的情况下说服他们加入并共同推进某个项目，邀请他们进入我的地下城，这种经历无疑是经营社区、开源项目或公司的绝佳准备。
So, some of those things were present early on, and having positive experience building and bootstrapping with others, having to convince others before you even have money to pay them salaries that they should go direction, and we should work on this thing together, and you should come into my dungeon, is, I think, exceptionally good preparation for running communities, running open source, running a company.
你知道还有谁最爱玩《文明》吗？
You know who else's favorite game was civilization?
马克·扎克伯格。
Mark Zuckerberg.
你知道还有谁吗？
You know who else?
不会吧。
Oh, no way.
是的。
Yeah.
他们两人都多次谈到早期玩《文明》的经历。
Both of them have talked a lot about playing civilization early on.
我觉得当公关变得糟糕时，他们几乎不得不暂时停止谈论这个话题，因为他们想稍微扮演一下上帝的角色。
And I feel like they almost had to stop talking about it for a while when the PR got kinda bad, and it's like they wanna play, you know, play God a little bit.
但现在这又变得很酷了。
But now it's it's cool again.
今天的节目由HubSpot赞助。
Today's episode is brought to you by HubSpot.
你知道吗？大多数企业只使用了20%的数据？
Did you know that most businesses only use 20% of their data?
这就像读一本书，却撕掉了五分之四的页面。
That's like reading a book but then tearing out four fifths of the pages.
关键是，你错过了很多东西。
Point is you miss a lot.
除非你使用HubSpot——这个客户平台能让你获取推动业务增长所需的数据，那些藏在邮件、通话记录、转录文本中的洞察，这些非结构化数据至关重要。
And unless you're using HubSpot, the customer platform that gives you access to the data you need to grow your business, the insights that are trapped in emails, call logs, transcripts, all that unstructured data makes all the difference.
因为你知道得越多，成长得就越多。
Because when you know more, you grow more.
所以，如果你想读完整本书，而不是只读一部分，请访问 hubspot.com。
And so if you wanna read the whole book instead of just reading part of it, visit hubspot.com.
说到Facebook和扎克伯格，你确实做对了很多事情。
Speaking of Facebook and Zuckerberg, you you've gotten a lot of things right.
我觉得你们在远程办公这个概念上非常超前，而且，你们将盈利作为战略，这在当时某种程度上是反主流的。
You know, I think you guys were really early to remote work as a concept and, you know, obviously, you know, being profitable as a strategy is that is, you know, was, you know, somehow contrarian at the time.
但你们曾经明显犯错的一件事是，你写过一篇名为《Facebook不值330亿美元》的文章。
But one thing you got wrong famously was you wrote this post called Facebook is not worth 33,000,000,000.
你在2010年写下了这篇精彩的文章。
And you wrote this great post in 2010.
我认为那时Facebook刚刚上市或即将上市。
I think Facebook had probably just gone public or was close to it.
你基本上说，Facebook是一个巨大的成功。
And you basically said, Facebook's a great success.
有五亿人使用它，但它不值三百三十亿美元。
500,000,000 people use it, but it's not worth 33,000,000,000.
你详细阐述了为什么这个说法不成立。
You laid out this case as to why that was not true.
现在回头看，你是觉得我只是搞错了呢？
Looking back on this now, I guess, is it do you just look at that as I got it wrong?
还是说，我当初说的核心观点其实是对的？你觉得现在该怎么看待这篇博客文章？
Is it actually, I think the kernel of what I was saying was right, but, you know, I guess how do you think about this blog post now?
我非常喜欢那篇博客文章。
I love that blog post.
有趣的是，人们经常拿它来嘲讽。
And it's funny because people often pull it forward to dunk.
对吧？
Right?
比如，嘿，看啊，十七年前你搞错了一件事。
Like, hey, look, seventeen years ago, you got a thing wrong.
而且
And
我更喜欢的是，这通常是风险投资家，对吧？
what I love even more is that it's often VCs, right?
你可能会说，等等。
You're like, hey, wait a minute.
难道你们的业务不就是十次中有九次犯错吗？
Isn't your business to be wrong nine out of 10 times?
你们上一只基金不是在绝大多数投资上都判断错了吗？
Wasn't your last fund just wrong on the vast majority of all the investments that you made?
哦，原来如此。
Oh, okay.
那我们就从这个前提开始吧。
Well, let's start from that premise.
但我其实根本不关心。
But I don't even care.
我根本不在乎。
I don't even care.
我喜欢那篇文章，因为它既很好地展示了犯错并接受结果，又试图得出比‘我在赌桌上输了’更好的结论。
I love that article because it's both a good example of being wrong and accepting that in terms of outcomes, yet trying to draw better conclusions than just like, I got it wrong at the gambling table.
对吧？
Right?
比如，我本该押注Facebook的。
Like, I should have bet on Facebook.
如果我当时买了那支股票，而不是说它们不值得投资，我早就赚大钱了，对吧？
If I'd bought stock at that time, rather than say they weren't worth it, I would have made so much money, right?
我从这本扑克书中学到的一个很好的术语叫‘结果导向’。
And a great term that I learned from this poker book is called resulting.
在扑克中，有一种概念是你要很好地分析，不只是分析，还要知道概率。
And in poker, there's this concept of you analyze well, not just analyze, you know what the odds are.
根据你手中的牌和桌面上的牌，你完成目标牌型的概率是多少？
Given the cards that you have, the cards on the table, what are the odds that you're going to make whatever hand you're trying to do?
对吧？
Right?
如果你欺骗自己，认为我应该继续玩16%的手牌。
And if you delude yourself into thinking, I should keep playing 16% hands.
我应该直接all in 16%的手牌，因为你知道吗？
I should just go all in on 16% because do you know what?
我最近赢了三把。
I won the last three.
你真是个傻瓜，迟早会输光所有钱。
You're idiot, and you're gonna lose all your money.
这不是赢得扑克比赛的方法。
That's not how to win in poker.
赢得扑克比赛的方法是确保你主要玩那些胜率最高的牌。
The way to win in poker is to make sure you predominantly play hands that have the best odds just as much.
如果你拿了一手胜率87%的牌选择all in，结果输了，那你如果因此得出结论说你不该all in，那你才是傻瓜。
If you go all in on a hand that has 87% odds of success, and you lose, you're an idiot if you draw the conclusion that you shouldn't have gone in on that hand.
那手牌绝对应该全压。
Totally should have gone in on that hand.
所以，你只是根据结果来评估你的决策。
So, is evaluating your decision on the basis of the outcome alone.
当然，你不能完全把这两者分开，但你必须从更长的时间维度来看。
Now, obviously, you can't divorce those two things, but you've got to do it on a longer trend line.
每个人都会投丢球。
Everyone is going to miss a shot.
不只是丢一球，他们的职业生涯中会丢掉一百球、一千球、甚至一百万球。
Not just one shot, they're going to miss a 100 shot, a thousand shot, a million shots over the course of their careers.
事实上，这就是为什么风投的类比如此重要。
In fact, this is why the VC parallel is so important.
风投人士只要10%的判断正确，就能变得极其富有。
VCs have gotten tremendously rich being right 10% of the time.
我的意思是，你能靠如此频繁地犯错却积累如此巨大的财富，这难道不令人惊叹吗？
I mean, isn't that I mean, that's an incredible stat for me that you're able to build such wealth on being so wrong so often.
但让我们深入分析一下这个案例的优点，因为我也很喜欢这个例子。
But let's even dig into the merits, because I love the case of that too.
当我对Facebook进行分析时，他们还没有盈利模式。
When I did that analysis on Facebook, they did not have a monetization strategy.
他们拥有的是大量流量，我将这些流量与另一个时代的东西进行了模式匹配——我记得当时有个叫Blue Mountain的网站，大概在
What they had was a lot of traffic, and I pair or I pattern matched that traffic on under this is two World, but there was something called Blue Mountain, I think back in
2000年的网站？
2000 website?
是的。
Yes.
对。
Yes.
当时他们非常受欢迎。
They were tremendously popular at the time.
他们拥有海量流量，但这些流量带来的只是浪费，因为他们没有将流量转化为收益的机制。
They had a ton of traffic, right, and all the traffic brought them was ruined, because they did not have a mechanism for turning that traffic into gold.
那简直就是垃圾。
It was just trash.
那是垃圾流量。
It was trash traffic.
就是一些人想要一张电子贺卡，那你又能拿这个做什么呢？
It was just people who wanted an e card, and what are you going to do with that?
也许今天你能让它行得通。
Maybe today you could make it work.
但当时他们肯定做不到。
They certainly couldn't at the time.
我的分析是，Facebook 的流量就是垃圾流量。
My analysis was Facebook is trash traffic.
这只是一群人在谈论各种无意义的东西，不像谷歌搜索那样具有明确意图。
It's just a bunch of people talking about all sorts of shit that isn't intentional in the way that a Google search, for example, is.
当时，监控资本主义的模式可能已经初具规模，但尚未广泛普及，而这种模式正是将绝对的垃圾流量点石成金的炼金术，因为监控资本主义彻底颠覆了这一逻辑：是否具有意图根本不再重要。
At the time, the surveillance capitalism paradigm was probably already well under construction, but not widely distributed, like that this was the alchemy that was going to turn absolute trash traffic into gold, because surveillance capital flipped it on its head that it did not matter whether intent was there.
如果我们随时了解每个人的全部信息，那么唯一重要的就是眼球停留时间，因为现在我们可以根据用户的身份来决定是否展示广告，而不是根据他们在谈论什么。
If we know everything about everyone at all times, all that matters is eyeball time, Because now we can pinpoint whether an ad should be shown or not shown on the basis of who they are, not what they're talking about.
所以，即使他们正在谈论最疯狂、最愚蠢的内容，我们也能通过精准定位这些个体来投放更好的广告，这比在线高尔夫杂志针对高尔夫爱好者的广告还要有效。
So they could be talking about the most deranged, stupid stuff, and we can make better ads happen because we can target those individuals than a golf magazine online can do on golf ads.
对吧？
Right?
比如，我不确定这个人现在是否有购买新球杆的购买意向。
Like, I don't know if that person is currently having buyers' intent for buying a new set of clubs.
但你知道吗？
But you know what?
Facebook 可能知道你此刻是否在黄金店十英里范围内，正朝那里开车，是否可能被说服采取某种行动。
Facebook probably knows whether you're within 10 miles of the gold store right now, you're driving towards whether you could be swayed one way or the other.
我当时没看到这一点。
So I didn't see that.
我并没有意识到这种炼金术的力量。
I did not realize the power of that alchemy.
顺便说一句，其他人也没意识到。
And by the way, nobody else did either.
因为如果他们意识到了，肯定会说：天哪。
Because if they did, they would have gone like, holy shit.
Facebook发明了点石成金的本事。
Facebook has invented alchemy.
为什么它们只值三千三百亿美元？
Why are they only worth 33,000,000,000?
它们应该值五万亿美元才对。
They should be worth half 1,000,000,000,000.
我们干脆all in，把家底都押上吧。
Let's just go all in, bed the house.
没人这么做过。
No one did that.
对吧？
Right?
所以，不管怎样，我就是因为这些原因而喜欢它。
So, anyway, I love it for all these things.
我喜欢它带来的成果。
I love it for resulting.
我喜欢这个炼金术的例子：当有人真的发现了彻底改变整个互联网商业模式的方法，而那时他们恰好拥有大量原本毫无价值的垃圾流量。
I love it for this example of alchemy when someone really does figure out, like, a complete unlock on the entire Internet business in that right moment when they also have all this trash traffic that would otherwise have been worthless.
然后我就只想知道一件事？
And then I just love do know what?
我错了。
I was wrong.
我会时不时提醒自己这一点，至少每年一次，有时更频繁，尤其是当某个风投想打压别人，翻出十六年前的博客文章时。
And I remind myself about that on, like, at least a yearly basis, sometimes more often than that when some VC needs to dunk and pulls out a sixteen year old blog post.
只需坐下来，微笑着就好。
Just sit back and smile.
是的。
Yes.
你对自己的预测应该保持一些谦逊。
You should have some humility about your predictions.
我能跟你们讲讲我和你们的商业伙伴杰森的一次有趣互动吗？
Can I tell you guys about a funny interaction I had with your business partner, Jason?
所以是 hey.com。
So hey.com.
如果你们在听，就去 hey.com 看看。
So if you guys are listening, go to hey.com.
这是我最喜欢的着陆页之一。
That's one of my favorite landing pages.
你们在文案撰写方面非常出色。
You guys are wonderful at writing copy.
你们显然在设计上很厉害，但像文案这种在互联网领域被忽视的技能，文案写作简直像一门失传的艺术。
You're obviously great at design, but like copy, which I think is like the forgotten skill set in internetting, copywriting is sort of like a lost art.
你们并没有丢掉这门技艺。
You guys have not lost it.
你和Jason都具备这种能力。
You and Jason both have it.
我给他发了条短信，说：嘿，我正在为我的项目做一个新的着陆页。
And I texted him and I go, Hey, I'm working on a new landing page for my thing.
我以hey.com为灵感。
And I'm using hey.com as inspiration.
你们着陆页的转化率是多少？
What's the conversion rate of your landing page?
因为它看起来很棒。
Because it looks great.
听起来也很棒。
It sounds great.
它有效果吗？
Is it effective?
他回答说：你知道吗？
And he goes, You know what?
我其实没怎么关注过。
I haven't really looked at it.
我当时就说，你什么意思？
And I was like, What do you mean?
你不看转化率吗？
You don't look at the conversion rate?
你不知道它有没有效果？
You don't know if it's working?
他说：不，我从来没认真想过这个问题。
He's like, No, I've never really thought about it.
只是觉得感觉不错，我认为它很好。
Just know that like it felt good and I think it's good.
所以我们就这样继续推进了。
Therefore, we just ran with it.
我对他的这个回答感到非常惊讶。
And I was in awe of that reply.
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这完全出乎我的意料。
That was the opposite of what I would have expected.
你能谈谈好品味（我觉得你很有品味）与遵循数据之间的张力吗？毕竟你得付账单，想要好的结果，也想做到卓越。
Can you talk a little bit about the tension between good taste, which I think you have, and also following data because you have bills to pay and a good outcome and you want to be great.
你知道，你开赛车时，要考虑数据，还有车子的重量。
You know, you race race cars, data and, like, the weight of your car.
我对赛车一窍不通。
And I don't know anything about racing.
精准很重要。
Precision matters.
数据很重要。
Data matters.
但你似乎更看重品味优先。
And yet you seem to be a follower of taste first.
这就是有利润空间的好处。
This is the luxury of margins.
自从第一天起，我们就享有丰厚的利润空间，因为我们打造了人们喜欢的产品，并没有为了迎合这种兴趣而盲目扩张公司。
We have had the luxury of margins since day one because we built something people liked, and we did not balloon the company to follow that interest.
我们根据实际需求逐步发展公司，刚好达到不会因自身创意进展缓慢而感到极度沮丧的程度，这意味着从早期开始，甚至在一段时间内，我们的利润率都高得离谱。
We grew the company as we needed, exactly to the point where we were not deadly frustrated by our lack of progress on the ideas that we had, which meant that right from the early days, and through some period of times, we had ridiculous margins.
我的意思是，当我私下向别人透露我们的利润率时，他们都说：‘不，不，你一定是说毛利润吧？’
I mean, truly, when I was telling in confidence others about our margins, they were like, no, no, you've got to mean gross, right?
我回答：‘不是的。’
And I'm like, no.
这是净利润。
That's net.
他们问：‘你什么意思？’
And they were like, what do you mean?
我从来没听说过这样的企业
I've never heard of a business like
。
that.
如果你觉得合适的话，能大致给出之前的数据范围吗？
Are you able to give any frame or any ballpark for previous numbers if you're comfortable?
至少让我们有个概念。
At least so we understand.
不太行。
Not really.
我的意思是，就说很夸张吧。
I mean, let's just say ridiculous.
我觉得这已经是个不错的估算了。
I think that's a that's a good ballpark.
对吧？
Right?
而且，如果你把它和任何一家公开的SaaS公司相比，比如我们当时处于一个不同的行业，对吧？
And certainly, if you compare it to any of the public SaaS companies, like as we were in a different industry, right?
通常行业会趋向于围绕某个利润率聚集，而公开市场的SaaS似乎已经聚集在了大约负10%或负20%左右。
Like often industries have a tendency to coalesce around a certain profit margin, and it seems like public market SaaS has coalesced around, like, I don't know, minus 10% or something, minus 20%.
极其漫长且无盈利的增长期，部分原因是存在各种手段从企业中抽走资金，却让股东一无所获，比如股票期权补偿等。
Ridiculously long stretches of unprofitable growth, partly because there's all these other hacks of how you get money out of the business while leaving nothing for the shareholders, like stock based compensation and so forth.
但这又是另一个话题了。
But that's a different discussion.
从一开始，我们的重点就是：利润率越高，我们就越自由。
Our focus from the beginning was the more margin we have, the more freedom we have.
我们越自由，就能把更多时间投入到我们真正喜欢的事情上。
The more freedom we have, the more we could just focus our time on what we like to do.
你知道吗？
And you know what?
恰好就在今晚，杰森或我喜欢运行一些细微的A/B测试，只为挤出0.01%的提升。
It just so happens to be the night that Jason or I love running minutiae AB test to squeeze out 0.01.
如果你想要微调某些东西，这通常是必需的。
And that's very often what's needed if you want to tweak something.
你要运行成千上万次这样的实验，对吧？
You run a thousand of these experiments, right?
不是两个。
Like, not two.
你就坚持下去，不断努力。
You just stick to it and you keep grinding away.
我认为‘努力’这个词其实很贴切，因为这是我经常听到创业者带着自豪的语气谈论的内容。
And I think grind is actually a good word here, because this is something I often hear entrepreneurs talk with such pride in their voice.
是的，我在努力。
Yeah, I grind.
这就是为什么我每周工作一百小时、一百二十小时。
Like, this is why I'm working one hundred hours a week, hundred and twenty hours a week.
我就是不停地努力，努力，再努力。
I'm just grinding, grinding, grinding.
我想，好吧。
I'm like, okay.
我不想那样做。
I don't wanna do that.
我的生活太有趣了，才不想浪费在没日没夜地苦干上。
Like, my life is far too interesting to waste it grinding.
苦干就是你在《魔兽世界》里当小兵时干的蠢事。
Grinding is the stupid shit you do in World of Warcraft when you're a peon.
不了，谢谢。
No, thank you.
我不想做那种事。
I don't want to do that.
我们能不能直接达到一种状态，让我们的直觉带来成功，让我们能随心所欲地做任何想做的事？那才是理想的状态。
So can we just get to a place where our intuition affords us the success of our intuition affords us to just do whatever the hell we want, whenever the hell we want it, that'd be a great place to be.
我们在公司生命周期的早期就达到了这种状态。
And we arrived at that place very early on in the life cycle of the company.
但我也想说，有趣的是，我喜欢数字。
But I will also say what's interesting about this is that I like numbers.
我其实很喜欢统计分析。
I actually like statistical analysis.
我喜欢严谨。
I like rigor.
我喜欢置信区间，但还没到想亲自运行这些A/B测试的地步，只是我对统计学传统有着极大的尊重。
I like the confidence intervals, not to the point that I want to run these AB tests myself, but to the point that, like, I have great respect for the statistical tradition.
多年来，我们基本上一直有一位数据科学家在团队中。
And we, for many years, had essentially a data scientist sort of on staff.
有人会处理这些数据、做这些报告，努力挖掘出有用的信息。
Someone who would crunch those numbers, do those reports, try to eke it out.
经过十多年的尝试，杰森和我最终诚实得出结论：我们从未按照数据的建议去做。
And after trying that for over a decade, Jason and I finally came to the conclusion, in honesty that we never did what the numbers told us to do.
我们总是做自己想做的事，然后如果数据支持了我们的决定，我们就会说：这些数据真不错。
What we would do was we would do whatever the hell we wanted to do, and then if the numbers supported that, we'd go like, those are good numbers.
如果数据不支持我们的决定，我们就会说：是的。
And if the numbers didn't support that, we'd go like, yeah.
我不知道。
I don't know.
可能你还没考虑到某些因素。
There's probably some factor you haven't calculated in.
最后我们只是想，我们为什么要这么做？
And we just thought at the end, why are we doing this?
我们之所以这么做，部分原因是我们太过于听信别人告诉我们的那些所谓正确做法。
Well, partly why we're doing this is because we listened a little too much to other people telling us this is how you're supposed to do things.
我并不是说这种方式在某种定义下不奏效。
Now, I am not saying that this doesn't work for some definition of work.
我的意思是，我们根本不需要它，而能够达到这种状态要好得多，如果你能做到，就应该全力以赴地拥抱它。
I'm saying we didn't need it, and that is a much nicer place to be, and if you are able to get there, you should embrace it with full gusto.
如果你有足够的余地，不必浪费你此生有限的宝贵时间去做那些让你无聊至极的事情，那就别做。
If you have the margin to not waste the precious hours you have allotted on this earth doing shit that would bore you mindless, don't.
我们从来就没有义务要把柠檬榨到最后一滴。
Like, we never had the obligation to squeeze the lemon for its last drop.
我们从来就没有投资者跑来跟我们说，嘿。
We never had the investors going like, hey.
为什么本季度是14.79%？
Why is this quarter 14.79%?
你答应过我16.25的。
You promised me 16.25.
帮我把最后两个百分点拿回来。
Go get the last two percentage points for me.
我们从来没有过那种压力。
We never had that.
我们从来没有过那种压力。
We never had that pressure.
因此，我们在某种意义上的审慎商业运营中，得以表现得肆无忌惮。
And therefore, we got to act reckless in some definition of prudent business operations.
我为这种肆无忌惮感到无比自豪。
I'm immensely proud of that recklessness.
首先，因为我们已经挺过了SaaS领域大约七代竞争对手和其他人，他们都做了那些事，对吧？
First of all, because we have outlasted about seven generations of competitors and others in the SaaS space who did all of that, right?
谁做了所有的统计分析，把柠檬彻底挤干，为了短暂提升转化率而贬低了文案内容。
Who did all the statistical analysis, who squeezed the lemon in all the way, who debased their copy because for a hot second it converted slightly better.
而我们没有这么做，但我们依然存在。
And we didn't, and we're still around.
因此，我从中得出的第一点是：A，这真是一段精彩的历程。
So part of what I take away from that is, A, what a nice run.
B，也许所有这些统计分析都有点玄乎。
B, maybe all this statistical analysis is a bit of hocus pocus.
我这么说，并不是因为数据不对或者数学不成立，而是因为要接近真正的真相，往往缺失的那些要素是未知的。
The reason I say it is not because the numbers aren't right or the math does math, but because very often the missing ingredients to getting to the capital T truth is unknown.
当你不断深入挖掘一组高度有限、无法反映真实世界的数据时，你最终会在这条路上迷失方向。
When you keep drilling down on a set of data that is highly limited and does not describe the world as it exists, you're going to steer yourself blind on that.
你会以为自己找到了真相，却听不到那些没有注册的客户的声音。
You're going to think you found the truth, and you're not hearing from all the customers who's not signing up.
你听不到需要十八个月才能显现的口碑传播，因为这些东西是无法被计算的。
You're not hearing from the word-of-mouth that takes eighteen months to materialize because those things can't get computed.
但这难道不是绝对的吗
But isn't that an absolute
我的意思是，我觉得你的方法非常好，我非常认同，也想向你学习。
I mean, I think your way works wonderfully, and I identify with it, and I wanna copy you.
但你是Shopify的董事会成员。
But you're on the board of Shopify.
他们可能违背了你所信奉的许多教条或规则，但结果却非常好。
They probably break so many dogmas or rules that you believe in, and it's worked out really well.
完全正确。
Totally.
这正是很棒的地方。
This is the great thing.
齐泽克，这位可能是波兰人或捷克人的哲学家，有一段精彩的独白，讲他多么厌恶智慧。
Cizek, the is this Polish or Czech, I think, philosopher, has this great monologue about how he hates wisdom.
我心想，怎么可能有人讨厌智慧呢？
I'm like, how can anyone hate wisdom?
他说的原因是，对于每一个智慧的格言，你都能找到另一个恰恰相反、听起来同样有智慧的格言。
And the reason he says that is, for every wise axiom, you can find another that says the opposite that also sounds wise.
这两个格言都是从个人在特定情境下取得成功时的经验中提炼出来的。
And both of them were extracted from moments of success for that individual in those circumstances.
这有点令人泄气，因为它很容易演变成一种‘一切都不重要、一切都不真实、一切都是后现代’的观念。
And that's a bit of a deflating thing because it can very easily sort of descend into nothing matters, nothing is true, and everything is just postmodern.
我完全不认同这些观点。
I don't believe those things at all.
但我确实相信，智慧是非常依赖情境的。
But I do believe that wisdom is very contextual.
这可以追溯到牛顿和爱因斯坦以及相对论。
This is all the way back to Newton and Einstein and the theory of relativity.
当你运动得足够快时，那些原本对计算苹果砸到你头上非常有用的物理法则，就开始失效了。
When you go fast enough, like, all the neat physic rules that are really helpful for calculating the apple dropping on your head, they just start breaking.
突然间，时间、空间，一切变得都是相对的。
And suddenly, time and space and everything is relative.
所以你得了解自己的宇宙。
So you gotta know your universe.
你得专注于自己的处境和在你这个环境中有效的方法。
You gotta focus on, like, your set of circumstances and what works in your context.
适用于初创公司和向其他小公司销售产品的做法，和适用于Shopify的做法是不一样的。
And what works for a startup and a small company selling to other small companies is not gonna be the same as what works for a Shopify.
你在Shopify业务中或和Toby一起工作时，学到的最有趣的事情是什么？
What what's the most interesting thing you've learned from being in the Shopify business or Toby?
你知道，如果我只是问，当你让一个聪明的人进入一个全新的环境时，最大的教训或收获是什么？我总是很好奇，有什么一两件事特别让你印象深刻？
You know, if I just said, what are the biggest kinda, like, lessons takeaways that anytime you let a smart person go experience kind of a new novel environment, I'm always curious, like, what's the one or two things that stand out to you?
好问题。
Good question.
其中一些只是令人敬畏。
Some of it is just awe.
比如，Shopify去年的年增长率接近30%。
Like, Shopify last year grew almost 30 year over year.
我觉得，如果在我们早期阶段就能实现30%的年增长率，我就已经非常满足了。
I'm like, I would have been happy to go 30% year over year, like, I don't know, very early on in our life cycle.
他们是在一个根本无法想象的基数上做到这一点的。
They're doing it from a base that's just unfathomable.
大数定律真的有点离谱，对吧？
Like, the law of big numbers gets kind of wacky, right?
当你已经做到数千亿的规模，还能保持这样的增长率时，感觉就像发现了矩阵里的一个漏洞。
When you're already doing billions and billions and you're growing at that rate, it just it feels like you found a glitch in the matrix somehow.
我更喜欢的是，你可以为这一切找出各种各样的理由。
And what I love even more about it is you can come up with all sorts of reasons for why that is.
但你知道吗？
But you know what?
就连董事会，甚至托比，我们其实也不太清楚。
Even not the board, even Toby, we don't really know.
为什么Shopify花了整整二十二年，才迎来这个时刻——它有了自疫情最高峰以来最好的一年？
Like, why did it take Shopify what is it going to be twenty two years to get to this moment where it just had its best year since the craziest of the peak COVID years.
这难道不令人着迷吗？
Isn't that fascinating?
从很多方面来看，这家公司自Topi创建Snow Devil以来一直在做同样的事。
Like, in many ways, the company is doing what it's done since Topi created Snow Devil.
我只是想要一套工具，让我能创建一个美观的店铺，而不是陷入亚马逊的集市里。
I just want a toolkit for me to create a great looking store rather than be in the bazaar of Amazon.
对吧？
Right?
简单的使命，他们就这样一点一点地坚持了二十多年。
Like, simple mission, and they've just been chipping away that for, like, twenty plus years.
突然间，图表就像这样，别别别。
Suddenly, the charts just go like, don't don't don't.
所有这些理论都只是理论而已。
And all these theories are just that.
我们其实并不知道。
Like, we don't actually know.
人们不知道的东西真是多得惊人。
The amount of stuff that people don't know is amazing.
我的意思是，我之前写过一篇博客文章，基本上就是想说明：没人真正知道任何事。
I mean, I wrote a blog post a while back basically putting that to the point of nobody knows anything.
我认为，对于这些重大问题，这是一个很好的总体看法。
And I think that's a good general take on the big questions.
没人知道任何事。
Nobody knows anything.
无论是谈论气候变化，还是两年后人工智能会是什么样子，又或者为什么Shopify能在2022年实现每年30%的增长。
Whether we're talking about climate change, or what AI is going to look like in two years, or why Shopify is able to grow 30% year over year in year 22.
没人知道任何事。
No one knows anything.
我们可以有各种各样的理论。
We can have all these theories.
但其中极少能像数学公式那样被还原为无可辩驳的证据。
Very, very little of it gets to be reduced to irrefutable proof in the sense of a math equation.
我们可以永远讨论Shopify的董事会。
We could talk about this board of directors of Shopify forever.
这太有趣了。
It's so fascinating.
在Toby的董事会简介中，最后一句提到他曾是Ruby on Rails核心团队的成员。
On Toby's bio for board of directors, the last sentences, he says that he was on the core team for Ruby on Rails.
所以我猜你认识他已经将近二十五年了。
So I assume that you've known him for close to twenty five years.
你有没有关于他的有趣故事，或者我们可以学习的领导经验？
Is there any cool stories that you've had about him or leadership lessons that we can learn?
因为这非常罕见，我的意思是，他打造了全球第17大公司。
Because it's very rare I mean, building he's built like the 17 largest company in in the world.
这很罕见。
That's rare.
而且他整个过程中一直掌舵，这也非常罕见。
It's also very rare where he's been at the helm the whole time.
从一个电脑极客成长为一家上万人公司的首席执行官，这个过程中有什么有趣的地方吗？
Is there anything anything cool about, like, the evolution of, like, a computer nerd to being, like, a proper CEO of a 10,000 person company?
有没有什么值得我学习的有趣经历？
Is there anything cool that you can I can learn about that?
有趣的是，你认为他从一种身份转变成了另一种身份。
What's funny to me is that you posit that as he went from one form to another form.
根本不是这样。
Not true at all.
他依然是个电脑极客。
He's still a computer nerd.
绝对是的。
Absolutely.
我虽然也是个电脑极客，但其实他大多数时候比我更像个电脑极客。
As much as I'm a computer nerd, actually, he's more of a computer nerd than I am most days.
他给我发酷炫科技玩意儿，我给他发酷炫科技玩意儿，我觉得这趋势对他更有利。
The direction of travel of him sending me cool tech stuff and me sending him cool tech stuff, I think it's in Toby's favor.
所以他还是那个人。
So he's still that person.
当然，他现在也是这家庞大企业的负责人，这家公司负责了大约15%的全球电子商务，占全球GDP的显著份额。
Now, obviously, what he is also is now the head of this giant corporation that is responsible for, I think I saw something like 15% of, I mean, world e commerce, a notable share of world GDP.
这在某种程度上令人震惊，而我很高兴的是，托比至少没有让这些头衔渗透进他的性格中。
I mean, that's mind blowing in a way that I'm really happy that Toby at least doesn't give any appearance of internalizing into his character composition.
他依然是那个计算机极客，而我们当前所处的AI和智能代理爆发阶段，恰恰完美地证明了这一点。
He's very much still the computer nerd, and I think this current phase that we're in with the AI and the agent explosion just demonstrates that to a tee.
他在这些领域起步非常早。
He was incredibly early on this stuff.
你可以查一下Shopify发布的那些公开备忘录的日期，再对比一下托比的预测。
Some of the public memos that are out from Shopify, you can check their dates, and then you can check Toby's predictions.
我必须对这一点表示极大的敬意，因为我没那么早进入这个领域。
And I just gotta give immense respect to that, because I was not that early.
事实上，托比曾拉着我一起走进了这个领域。
In fact, Toby helped drag me into the light on some of this.
而且，有些部分是因为我必须亲眼看到这些智能体现在能做什么，才真正完全认同这一点。
And some of it was also just like I had to see with my own eyes the agents do what they're now capable of doing before I fully flipped on it.
但他在这件事上确实非常早入局，而这一切都源于那种极客视角。
But it was just really early on it, and so much of that came from that nerd perspective.
我们这里请过很多非常出色的人，比如HubSpot的Darmesh，他们都会提到Toby，说他是那种能稍微看透未来、行为方式总能屡屡正确的家伙。
Most we we've had a lot of really amazing people on here and, like, the, like, ballers, like, Darmesh from HubSpot, they will reference Toby as, like, he's the guy of doing that, of, like, being able to see a little bit into the future and behaving in such a way that is he's just right a lot.
完全正确。
Totally.
而且，部分原因是他真的非常聪明。
And, I mean, some of it is because he's really smart.
部分原因是他拥有那种极客式的坚定信念，我觉得这和我有点像。
Some of it is because he's got that nerdy conviction, I think similar to what I have.
我愿意相信我们在很多方面都很相似，这正是我们相处得这么好的原因。
I'd like to believe that we're similar in many ways, and that's why we get on so well.
我们已经认识二十多年了。
We've known each other for twenty plus years.
这种些许的孤立感，会不会正是源于你那种极客式的成长经历——全世界都在告诉你X，而你却偏偏想亲自掀开盖子看看？
Is that a little bit of isolation may be because of that nerd upbringing that you have the whole world telling you X, and you actually go like, let me just check under the cover.
你知道吗？
Oh, do you know what?
它写的是Y。
It says Y.
即使全世界都押注在X上，我还是要赌Y。
I'm gonna bet on Y even if the whole world is in on X.
而看到这种连续性，我应该说，是极其罕见的。
And to see that continuity, I should say, is incredibly rare.
我认为，这正是如今Shopify之所以如此的原因之一。
And I think part of that is the answer to why now with Shopify.
你知道吗？
And you know what?
二十多年来的复利式坚定，往往会累积出意想不到的效果，有时需要很长时间，才会突然迎来转折点。
Compounding determinism over twenty some plus years has a tendency to add up, and it adds up in irregular ways where it sometimes takes quite a long time before, boop, the inflection point comes.
现在，我的意思是，我们这么说，但Shopify早在十多年前就上市了。
Now, I mean, we say this, but Shopify went public, I mean, over a decade ago.
当时估值10亿美元，这可以说是一次名人堂级别的早期投资，因为Shopify没有像如今许多公司那样，把所有收益都留给内部人士和风投，而是在已经趋于平稳时才上市。
At a $1,000,000,000 valuation, I mean, that's a hall of fame early investment you could have made because Shopify didn't do as so many other companies do now, which is essentially reserve all the upside to insiders and their VCs, and then go public when it's already kind of plateaued.
对吧？
Right?
从它们当初的状态到现在的发展，如果公众投资者当时参与了，这段旅程真是令人惊叹。
Like, from where they were to where they are now, an amazing ride for the public investor if they were along for it.
但，是的，我由衷地表示敬意。
But, yeah, I mean, tremendous respect.
有趣的是，我是一年半前刚加入董事会的，当时是因为一次对话，我向托比论证说董事会根本就是扯淡，我曾经参与过的所有董事会都无聊透顶，只处理一些琐事，只是为了给审计师走个过场。
It's funny because, I mean, I just joined the board a year and a half ago, and it came out of a conversation, actually, where I was making the argument to Toby that boards are bullshit, and that all the boards I've ever been on were boring snooze fests dealing with minutiae to rubber stamp things for auditors and whatnot.
他却说：我不知道。
And he was like, I don't know.
我觉得我们的董事会还挺不错的。
I think we have a pretty good board.
我当时说，好吧。
I was like, okay.
我们开始聊天，然后我们聊了几个小时。
And we started talking, and then we had talked for a few hours of five.
然后我突然意识到，你知道吗？
And then suddenly, I did come to realization, do you know what?
是的，我可能只是因为一直在处理和我自身规模太相似的事情而感到无聊，根本学不到新东西。
Yeah, I probably just been bored because I've been dealing with things at a scale too similar to my own, and I'm not learning anything.
Shopify 在规模上与我所熟悉的完全不在一个层面，但仍然使用了一些我热衷的技术。
Shopify is dealing at a universe apart in terms of scale, while still using some of the same things that I'm passionate about.
Shopify 是全球最大的 Ruby on Rails 公司。
Shopify is the biggest Ruby on Rails shop in the world.
显然，我对这一点非常热衷。
Obviously, I'm very passionate about that.
它的许多其他方面与我的兴趣高度重合，但我并不了解那样的规模。
Many of the other aspects of it has great overlap, but I don't know that scale.
我觉得这听起来是个有趣的挑战。
I'm like, that sounds like a fun challenge.
我们就干吧。
Let's just do it.
当然，托比是对的。
And, of course, Toby was right.
像那种规模的董事会里，难道就没有扯淡的东西吗？
Like, is there bullshit on the board of that scale?
当然有。
Of course, there is.
但那其实只是少数，大部分内容都是些非常有趣的东西，涉及我日常在
But it's actually a small minority, and most of it is just really interesting stuff dealing with problems I would never see day to day in
我自己的生意里永远遇不到的问题。
my own business.
你提到AI的时候，说托比有点儿拉着我入了坑。
You mentioned with AI, you're like, Toby kinda dragged me into it a little bit.
你在人工智能方面的演变是怎样的？
What's been your evolution with AI?
所以，几年前，你对人工智能的看法是什么？
So, you know, couple years ago, what was your opinion?
你当时在玩些什么？
What were you playing with?
而现在，你看到了什么？
And then now, what do you see?
从一开始我就觉得它太棒了，从那个界面推出的第一天起就是个忠实的GBT用户，一直很欣喜我们能从一开始就让计算机做到这些。
I thought it was amazing since day one, and been a fat GBT user since the first days of that interface, and just loved that we were able to make computers do this right from the get go.
我真的很喜欢电脑。
I really like computers.
我只是单纯喜欢电脑，甚至不总是为了实用目的。
I just like them for their own sake, not even always for productive purposes.
我只是喜欢电脑。
I just like computers.
我最享受的时光之一就是坐在电脑前，做些与电脑相关的事情，学习电脑知识，即使没有明确的目标。
Some of my favorite time is just sitting in front of the computer, doing computer stuff, learning computer things, even if it's not directional towards a specific goal.
从一开始就是这样，即使ChatGPT还很笨拙，连‘strawberries’里的r都数不清时，也让我觉得无比着迷。
And this, even from the get go, even when ChatGPT was dumb as rugs and couldn't count the r's in strawberries, was just fascinating.
我还是搞不懂。
I'm like, I still don't get it.
现在我开始深入研究很多东西，比如Transformer的工作原理、温度参数之类的。
I mean, now I look into a lot of it now, transformers works and whatever backforth and temperature and all of it.
我还是没完全搞明白。
I'm like, I still don't fully get it.
我是说，它怎么就能做到呢？
Like, how is it yes.
我知道是下一个词预测，但它是怎么变成这样的？
I know next token, but how does it turn into this?
它怎么能如此逼真地扮演一个智能生物？
How does it cosplay so well as an intelligent being?
也许我感到惊讶的原因是我对人类意识的理解模型是错误的。
Maybe the reason I'm surprised is because I have the wrong model of human consciousness.
也许人类意识比我们任何人愿意承认或认真研究的都要更接近于词元预测，而我们现有的模型正是如此发展而来的。
Maybe human consciousness is far closer to token prediction than any of us would have cared to admit or even investigate seriously before, And the models as we have them as they came to be, work quite close to that.
某种程度上，我们已经发现了智能。
And we have discovered intelligence in some sense.
但时间线仍然是：从一开始就很棒，我喜欢它，但它并没有改变我的本职工作。
But the timeline is still that from the get go, awesome, love it, it's not changing my day job.
我这么说的原因是我对代码的外观和感觉非常挑剔。
And the reason I say that is I'm very particular about how code looks and what it feels like.
我本来想说正确性，但那甚至都不是最重要的部分。
And I was about to say correctness, that's not even like at the top part of it.
我会在喜欢上它的美学之后再去考虑正确性。
I'm like, I'll get to correctness when I love the aesthetics.
单就美学而言，这些模型在很长一段时间内都并不出色。
And on aesthetics alone, the models are just not that good for a really long time.
这只是其中一部分。
That's one part of it.
另一部分是早期的八年前，甚至还不算智能体，因为那时根本不是智能体。
The other part of it was the early eight not even agents, because they weren't agents.
它们没有使用工具。
They weren't doing tools.
早期的大型语言模型，早期的人工智能，其实就是自动补全。
The early LLMs, the early AI was autocomplete.
对吧？
Right?
你正在编辑器里写代码，它试图补全剩下的内容。
You're in your editor, and then it tries to complete the rest of it.
我讨厌那种东西。
And I hated that.
就好像每五秒钟就有人打断我的思路，而且通常还都是错的。
It was like having someone interrupt my train of thought every five seconds to usually be wrong.
我说的‘错’，并不是指程序能不能正确执行，而是指——这根本不是我想写的代码，我不喜欢你生成的内容。
And I say wrong not in a factually correct way of does this program execute, but wrong in the sense of, like, this is not the code I wanna write, and I don't like what you're producing.
所以我并不喜欢这种使用AI的方式，因此很长一段时间里我都很少使用它。
So I didn't like that form of using AI, and therefore, didn't really use it that much for quite a long time.
我把它当作一个编程搭档，一个更强大的谷歌，一个更优秀的Stack Overflow，当我遇到问题时，可以请它帮忙看看。
I used it as a pair programmer, as a better Google, as a better Stack Overflow, as a here I have a problem, can you have a look at it?
哦，你告诉我解决方案是什么了。
Oh, you taught me what the solution was.
然后我去自己写代码。
Let me go off and write it.
这一直延续到去年夏天我与莱克斯·弗里德曼的那次访谈，当时我基本上就是在重复这套说法。
And this takes us all the way up to the interview I did with Lex Friedman in the summer of last year, where I was essentially giving this spiel.
对吧？
Right?
就是说，我不喜欢它生成的内容。
Like, hey, I don't like what it produces.
我非常印象深刻。
I'm extremely impressed.
你要是不认真对待这一点，不把它看作我们未来发展的方向，那才是傻瓜，但目前还不是。
You'd be a fool not to take this super seriously and as a directional path for where we're going, but it's not yet.
它还没进入我的业务范围。
It's not in my business yet.
然后，我想是在十二月初，我又做了一次采访。
And then I even, I think early December, did another interview.
我对那次采访做了一些修改，从那以后，感觉这两个阶段就像相隔了十年。
I had some revisions on it, and then from there, it was like those realms could have been a decade apart.
因为十一月底发布的那些模型，我觉得Opus 4.5大概是11月27日左右，这一类智能突然从‘我不喜欢它生成的东西’转变为‘天哪，这是什么？’
Because the models that dropped in late November, I think Opus 4.5 was November 27 or something, that class of intelligence suddenly switched from I don't like what it's making to holy shit, what?
怎么做到的？
How?
好吧。
Okay.
我要合并了。
I'm gonna merge.
所以过去三个月，我认为是我使用电脑以来，对计算机思维方式变化最大的时期。
So the last three months, I'd say, has been the most churn in my mental approach to computers in the entire time I've been using them.
比我以往任何时期，更多深层次的问题和工作流程的改变进入了我的个人生活、我的日常生活、我每天面对那块小屏幕的八个小时。
More deep questions and more workflow changes have entered my personal life, my day to day life, my eight hours in front of that little screen than in any time before that.
现在我可能已经彻底被洗脑了。
And now I'm probably and thoroughly pilled.
我这么说并不是因为这意味着，我实际上现在已经融入了大众群体。
And I don't necessarily say that with like because that also means, like, I'm actually now in the herd.
对吧？
Right?
比如，硅谷的主流观点就是：AGI即将来临。
Like, the herd, certainly out of Silicon Valley, is like AGI is imminent.
而在通往AGI的这段时间里，我们将经历一场如此剧烈的智能爆炸，简直让人难以招架。
And even between now and AGI, we're gonna go through such an intelligence explosion that hold on to sucks.
对吧？
Right?
是的。
Yeah.
我实际上现在也认同这个共识了，而我通常对这种共识持一点怀疑态度。
I'm actually now in the in the consensus on that, which I'm always a little skeptical about.
我总是想寻找其他角度，但这是无可否认的。
I always wanna try to look for the other angle, But it's just undeniable.
到了某个时候，你只能承认，数学和这些智能体确实是极其出色的程序员。
At some point, you just got to admit that the math maths and that the agents are incredibly capable programmers.
我去年夏天和莱克斯谈话时，以为这会把每个人都变成传统意义上的项目经理。
I thought, when I talked to Lex last summer, that it was going to turn everyone into a project manager of the old type.
那种不亲自做事、只是告诉别人该做什么的项目经理，然后你就会经历一点反复，再获得反馈。
The kind of project manager who's not really doing the things, just telling other people what to do, and then you got this little churn, and then you get the feedback.
但我意识到这完全不对。
And I realize that's not true at all.
这更像是我长出了十八只手臂和七个额外的大脑，正在操作二十二个屏幕，而且我仍然在完成所有这些工作，即使我不是亲自敲下每一个字符。
It is more like I've grown 18 arms and seven more brains, and I'm operating 22 screens, and I'm still doing all of it, even if I'm not typing every character myself.
当一切条件完美时，我的进展简直难以置信，而且让人上瘾。
And my progress when the stars are just right, is just unbelievable and incredibly addictive.
从某种意义上说，这有点像那个Facebook的事情。
And that's, in some sense, a little bit like that Facebook thing.
你知道吗？
You know what?
我对这件事会多快彻底改变一切的判断是错的。
I was wrong about how quickly this was gonna radically change everything.
我以为这件事会发生。
Like, I thought it was gonna happen.
我以为我们还得等几年。
I thought, like, we gotta have a few years.
对吧？
Right?
然后从十二月开始，我们突然进入了一个完全不同的世界。
And then suddenly, from December onward, we live in a completely different world.
我得感谢你推荐的那期莱克斯·弗里德曼播客。
I have to thank you for that Lex Friedman podcast.
A，这是一档很棒的播客，长达六小时。
A, great podcast, six hours long.
B，我为我的公司汉普顿在莱克斯·弗里德曼那里投放了三个广告。
B, I bought three ads with Lex Friedman for my company Hampton.
第一个广告上线时，他根本没告诉你会放在哪里。
The first ad went on, like he doesn't tell you what it's gonna go on.
第一个广告居然放到了伊朗战争相关的节目里。
The first ad went on, like, Iran war thing.
我当时就想，
And I was like,
那根本不是我的目标受众。
That was not my target audience.
这行不通。
That's not gonna work.
第二个广告像是一个杰弗里·爱泼斯坦的视频。
The second one was like a Jeffrey Epstein video.
我不觉得这是潜意识的。
I don't it was like subconscious.
然后第三个广告是你。
And then the third one was you.
我当时就想，对。
And I was like, yes.
明白了。
Got it.
所以你的那一期节目真的让我们的广告盈利了。
And so your your episode actually made our ad profitable.
谢谢你。
Thank you for that.
我们开始吧。
We go.
你知道的，我读过你的作品。
Are you you know, so I read your work.
我读过你的书。
I've read your books.
我觉得很棒。
I think it's great.
我经常借鉴你的很多东西。
I copy a lot of your stuff.
我受到你的启发，因为我想要建立一家像你这样的公司。
I'm inspired by your stuff because I want to build a company like you.
你们今天所建立的东西怎么样？
What about what you guys have built today?
你觉得这很愚蠢吗？
Do you think is foolish?
或者，在过去二十年里，你打造了哪些被众多企业家和商人钦佩、但你认为如今复制起来很傻的东西？
Or what have you built over the last twenty years that a lot of people admire, a lot of entrepreneurs and business owners admire that you think is silly to replicate today?
如果你有一个价值两三百万元的公司，却想通过自力更生，成长为一家年收入五亿五千万、和我们一样盈利的公司，并拥有这样的生活，那就别盲目模仿你现在看到的东西，因为那在今天行不通。
And you would like advise someone who has like a 2 or $3,000,000 company if you want to be a bootstrapped $550,000,000 or whatever you guys are company a year and be as profitable as we are and have this life, don't actually copy what you see now because that won't work today.
我对这个问题没有直接的答案，部分原因是我发现我们过去一些做法的效果不如以前了。
I don't have a straight answer to that, and partly it is because I can see some of the things we've historically been doing work less well than they had.
还有一部分原因正是如此：如今，吸引关注对商业成果的推动作用，已不如从前那么明显。
And some of it is exactly this, that being able to generate attention is not as transferable to business outcomes as it used to be.
加里·维纳查克写过一本叫《 jab, jab, jab, right hook 》的书。
And there's a great Gary Vee has this book, Jab, Jab, Right Hook.
我很喜欢这本书。
Love the book.
我很喜欢这个理念。
Love the concept.
本质上，就是给予、给予、给予，连续一百次的 jab。
In basis, it is give, give, give, jab, jab, jab, a 100 times.
只管给予。
Just give.
要善良。
Be kind.
走出去。
Go out there.
分享所有这些东西。
Share all this stuff.
然后偶尔，给你一记右勾拳。
And then occasionally, you give it a right hook.
呼吁行动，买我的东西。
You call to action, buy my stuff.
对吧？
Right?
正是这些偶尔落下的右勾拳，才支撑了那一百次的出拳。
And that's what pays the 100 jabs, is that occasionally there's a right hook that lands.
我所看到的是，其中一部分只是社交媒体动态的反映，那就是右勾拳已经不再传播了。
What I've seen, and some of it is just a reflection of the dynamics of social media, is that the right hook doesn't travel anymore.
因为所有的主流媒体或社交媒体平台，尤其是X平台，我和杰森都在上面很活跃，但算法根本不会向你展示这些内容。
Because all the main media outlets or social media outlets, X in particular, where both Jason and I are strong, the algorithm is just never going show you stuff.
以前拥有大量粉丝意味着很多人会看到你的内容。
Used to be that having a ton of followers meant that a ton of people just saw your stuff.
现在讽刺的是，这正是人们在2012年左右对Facebook抱怨的事情。
Now, great irony here is that this is what people complained about on Facebook back in like 2012.
我有这么多粉丝，但如果不买广告，根本无法触达他们。
I have all these followers, but I can't reach him unless I buy ads.
这正是BuzzFeed和这些大型公司衰落的原因。
That's the demise of BuzzFeed and all these huge companies.
没错。
Exactly.
但实际情况并不完全如此，因为据我所知，X平台上的广告现在依然效果不佳。
That's not actually quite what's happening now, because from what I can tell, ads on X still don't really work.
我们试过一点。
We tried them a bit.
也许现在它们效果更好了。
Maybe they work better now.
对我们来说从来不管用。
Never worked for us.
有效的是能走红的内容。
What works is viral.
对吧？
Right?
我的意思是，真正有效的是分享特别有趣的内容。
Like, what works is sharing really interesting stuff.
我并不是真的想用负面含义来形容走红。
I don't mean viral actually in a negative connotation.
它确实也有这方面。
It also has that.
但这也是一件积极的事情。
But it also is something positive.
你把一些新颖的内容分享给感兴趣的人，他们也会与之互动。
You sharing something novel with people who are interested, and they engage with it.
但这种涓滴效应已经基本停止了。
But the trickle down has kind of stopped.
所以这种涓滴效应是这样的：我每天都会分享很多有趣的内容，偶尔我会请你看看我的新产品或其他东西。
So that trickle down of like, I share a lot of interesting stuff on a daily basis, and then occasionally I'll ask you to check out my new product or something else.
然后让你看看我的新产品，这种方式已经不再有效了。
Then to check out my new product, that stopped working.
因此，我不确定我们过去长期采用的策略——先建立庞大的受众群体，然后好事自然会发生——是否还成立。
So, I'm not sure our historic long run strategy of build a large audience, and then good things will happen, is necessarily true anymore.
我觉得这其中仍有道理，但作为新人，这还能否作为你唯一的策略呢？
I think there's still something to it, but is it viable as your sole strategy being someone new?
我认为它现在的转化效果和以往相比已经大不如前了。
I don't think it converts or works as well as it once did.
所以这就是不起作用的地方。
So that's the thing that doesn't work.
不过，我仍然不会这么说。
Now, I still wouldn't say that.
我仍然认为，为了你自己的成长，你应该尝试分享有趣的内容。
I still think just for your own edification, you should try to share interesting things.
当你试图教授你内化的东西时，这实际上是让你学得更多的方式。
That's actually how you learn more when you try to teach what you've internalized.
你会让这些知识理解得更深刻。
You make it sink in deeper.
我也认为，无论结果如何，单纯为了分享而分享本身就是好事。
And I also think it's just good to share for the sake of it, regardless of the outcomes.
但我也能看到那些不断分享却从未得到任何回报的人会发生什么。
But I can also see what happens to people who share, share, share and never see something back.
这样的人最终变得愤世嫉俗的可能性相当高。
The odds of that person ending up bitter is pretty high.
我和萨姆都喜欢那种按照自己规则行事的人。
One of the things that both me and Sam love is anybody who sort of plays their own game by their own rules.
每当我们邀请杰森或你来做客时，这正是我们最欣赏和尊重的一点。
And I think whenever we had Jason on or you on, like, that's one of the things that we like and respect the most.
事实上，我年轻时差点就加入了37signals。
In fact, I almost joined thirty seven Signals when I was very young.
我当时在申请两份工作。
I was applying to two jobs.
一份在旧金山，属于科技圈，另一份则是去37signals。
One was in San Francisco and, like, the tech world, and the other one was gonna be with thirty seven signals.
真的吗？
Oh, really?
但我最后去了旧金山。
I went to San Francisco instead.
等等。
Wait.
你拿到面试了么，肖恩？
Did you get the interview, Sean?
我确实拿到了面试，但我先拿到了另一份工作。
I did get the interview, but I got the other job first.
所以我根本没去参加，我根本没去
And so I never even took I never even
去董事会了
went board with
它。
it.
太棒了。
That's awesome.
但它
But it
是一家我一直在研究的公司。
was a company I was studying.
当时我就想，如果我要加入一家公司，我就是喜欢这些人。
It was like, if I'm gonna join one company, I like these guys.
我喜欢他们的做事风格。
I like how they roll.
我喜欢他们有自己的节奏，就像自己的鼓点一样。
I like that they have their own, like, their drumbeat.
对吧？
Right?
所以你们长期以来一直坚持按自己的方式做事。
And so you guys have, for a long time, just done things your way.
我觉得，对你来说，你其实是很多像我和萨姆这样非开发人员心中的工程偶像，虽然我们不是开发者，但很多开发者都尊重你，因为你对技术有自己坚定的主张。
I think both, you know, for you, I think you're kind of like an engineering hero for a lot of me and Sam are not developers, but, like, I think a lot of developers respect you because you have a a strong opinion in a way you roll technically.
我觉得这其中有37signals的部分。
I think there's the 37 signals part of things.
然后还有外部的部分。
And then there's the outside of it.
对吧？
Right?
比如参加比赛，以某种方式生活。
Like, doing the races and just living life a certain way.
我们和杰森聊过他的房子，他是那种工匠，很有品味，诸如此类。
We talked to Jason about his houses and how he's like a craftsman and he's got taste and things like that.
我想知道是谁启发了你？
I'm curious who kind of inspired you?
那么，有没有哪些人，你在他们的蓝图中看到了一些值得借鉴的地方？无论是他们经营公司的方式，还是工作之外那些酷炫的副业，这些是否让你也想参加比赛，或者在某种程度上投入其中？
So who are people that you kinda liked something in their blueprint, either how they ran their company or how they had, you know, these these side quests outside of their their work that that was cool that, you know, maybe made you want to do the races and dedicate in that sense.
有没有谁是你仰慕的，你从他们的蓝图中借鉴过一些东西？
Is there anybody that you've looked up to that you've stolen a little bit from their blueprints?
完全正确。
Completely.
事实上，我整个早期职业生涯就是寻找那些我非常喜欢和仰慕的人，然后说：我就照着他们的做法来。
I mean, in fact, my entire early career was just finding people who I really liked and looked up to and said, I'm just gonna copy the motions.
就像我甚至不确定自己是否完全理解，但如果我用手做出同样的动作，跳同样的舞，也许我就能沾到一点那种魔力。
Like, I don't even know if I fully understand it, but if I move my hands in the same way and dance the same dance, maybe I'm gonna get a little bit of that magic.
我认为杰森可能也提到过里卡多·塞姆勒，他写了一本叫《叛逆者》的书。
One of the ones that I think maybe Jason has cited as well is Ricardo Semler, who wrote a book called Maverick.
我觉得这本书是九十年代出版的。
I think it was published in the nineties.
带着
With the
巴西人？
Brazilian guy?
我见过这个书名。
I've seen that book title.
你能给我们讲讲这本书吗？
Can you tell us about it?
比如，我知道几个
Like, I know a couple of
人们，是的，他的故事是什么？
people Yeah, what's his story?
一本了不起的书。
Amazing book.
一个了不起的故事。
Amazing story.
我认为，里卡多·塞姆勒继承或接管了一家庞大的巴西工业公司，生产用于油轮之类的泵。
So Ricardo Semler, I think, inherits or takes over this huge industrial Brazilian company that makes pumps for, I think, oil tankers or something.
就像你最不可能想象到会在工作实践等方面有所创新的公司。
Like, the last company you would imagine being innovative on work practices and so forth.
他以一种对既有做法毫不敬畏的态度来经营这家公司，这足以让杰森和我都脸红。
And he just approaches that company with an irreverence to how things are done that would make both Jason and I blush.
我们认为自己在提出建议时已经相当激进了，但他确实给了我极大的启发，让我能够以完全不同的方式思考如何做事。
And we try to be relatively radical, I think, in what we try to prescribe, but he really gave us like, he certainly gave me permission to think very different ways about how to do things.
他有一个我印象深刻的例子，就是如何以更长远的眼光来看待员工及其带来的价值。
He has a one of the examples I remember is, like, how to look at employees and the value that they bring over a much longer period of time.
他举了一个例子，说公司里有个人几乎每周都坐在桌前，摊开一份报纸，什么也不做。
And he gives the example of this one guy he has that on almost every week sits at his desk with a newspaper open and does nothing.
他就只是坐在那里。
He's just there.
你会想，为什么要付钱给一个人，让他坐在桌前看报纸？
And you're like, why would you pay a guy to sit at his desk and reach a newspaper?
但碰巧的是，这些泵有时会在遥远的地方以极其壮观的方式故障，而他就是那个能应对的人。
Well, it just so happens to be that occasionally some of these pumps fail in really spectacular ways in far flung places, and he's the guy.
拥有这种能力，能够迅速解决一艘油轮的困境，仅这一件事的收益就足以抵得上他七倍的薪水。
Having that capacity to get some oil tanker out of some predicament, immediately one of those will pay for a salary seven times over.
我喜欢这个故事，因为它是我一直在Thirty Seven Sickles努力实践却难以实现的类型，而这正是最棒的。
Now, I love that anecdote because it's one I've struggled to implement at Thirty Seven Sickles, which is the best kind.
对吧？
Right?
我 literally 已经实践了二十年，努力摆脱那种新教工作伦理的观念——即为什么你不能每周四十小时都动个不停？那并不是这个人给公司带来的真正价值。
I've been practicing this for literally two decades of divorcing this sense of, I don't know, Protestant work ethic of, like, why are you not moving your hand forty hours a week with that's not the value this individual brings to the corporation.
所以我非常喜欢这一点。
So I love that.
他对于如何经营公司有一大堆建议。
He has a million suggestions on how to run a company.
我们在《Get Real》和《Rework》这两本书中汲取了不少灵感。
We took a fair bit of inspiration for both getting real and for rework.
但形式并不完全一样。
Not quite the form.
他讲的是更多故事和叙述，这很棒。
He tells more of a story, a narrative, which is great.
我是他的铁杆粉丝。
Huge fan of him.
另一个是肯特·贝克。
Another one is Kent Beck.
肯特·贝克是极限编程的作者，那是九十年代一种颇具叛逆性的软件开发方法，当时所有人都固守着理性方法、瀑布模型或大型前期设计，比如在写代码之前先写厚厚的手册。
So, Kent Beck is the author of Extreme Programming, one of the heretical software methodologies back in the nineties, when everyone was stuck on rational or the waterfall method or big upfront designs, like large manuals before you write a piece of code.
肯特·贝克是完全不同的工作方式——敏捷工作方式的绝对先驱之一。
Kent Beck was one of the absolute pioneers on a completely different way of working, the agile way of working.
现在这个词几乎已经失去了意义，因为如今它仅仅意味着软件开发。
Now that word has stopped meaning almost anything because today, it just means software development.
没有人会告诉你他们不敏捷，除了那些真正特立独行、最近才开始转向敏捷的人，这倒挺有意思。
No one is gonna tell you they're not agile, except for the really edgy people who've now started to turn towards agile, which is fun to watch.
但主流的敏捷方法已经普及了。
But the main agile got mainstream.
在1999年或2000年初时还不是这样，我记得2001年在丹麦的一场会议上，肯特·贝克登台演讲，讲述软件方法论时，完全掌控了全场，我那时简直佩服得五体投地。
It wasn't in '99 or early two thousands, and I saw Kent Beck on stage in 2001 at a Danish conference have complete an other command of the room as he delivered his sermon on software methodology, and I was just in awe.
顺便说一句，他的领英个人资料特别搞笑。
By the way, his LinkedIn his LinkedIn is hilarious.
上面写着
It says
他的个人简介说：在那些塑造了我们构建软件方式的少数人中，肯特就是那个竖起中指的人。
his bio says, of the handful full of people who have shaped how we build software, Kent is the raised middle finger.
他看起来像是在发表大学毕业演讲，穿着一件扎染的牛津扣领衬衫。
And he's giving a it looks like it looks like he's giving a university graduation speech, and he's wearing a tie dyed Oxford button down shirt.
太棒了。
Amazing.
我非常喜欢肯特，以及他对软件开发所做的一切贡献，无论是他的方法论，还是他的技艺。
I love Kent and everything he's contributed to software development, both in terms of his methodology, but also in terms of his craft.
我最喜爱的关于编程细节的书，是他上世纪九十年代写的一本小书，叫《Smalltalk 最佳实践》。
My favorite book on the nitty gritties of programming is a small book he wrote in the nineties called Small Talk Best Practices.
这本书很短，却是我读过的影响最深远的、关于如何编写软件的书。
It's a quite short book, and it is the most influential book on how I write software that I've ever read.
有趣的是，我职业生涯中多次提到过这本书，有一段时间，它还没有电子版。
Now, it's funny because I've mentioned this book many times over my career, and at one point, I think it was not available yet as an ebook.
你只能找到纸质版，我竟然制造了如此大的需求，以至于一度纸质版卖到了4500美元。
You could only find the print versions, and managed to create so much demand that I think at one point, it went for $4,500 for print edition.
现在它已经可以在线获取了。
Now it is available online.
你可以直接购买PDF版本。
You can just buy the PDF.
尽管如今大多数人不再使用Smalltalk编程，但这本书在今天依然极具价值。
It still totally holds up in this day and age from a language most people are not programming in, small talk, is incredible.
肯特不仅写了这本关于编程技艺的工匠之书，还重塑了整个软件开发方法论。
And Kent wrote not just that, like a craftsman's book about craftsmanship, but then also reshaped how all of software methodology is done.
最后，我要提到马特，他在九十年代创造了Ruby，让我重新思考了优先级的排列。
And then finally, I'd say Matt, who created Ruby back in the nineties and opened my eyes to rearranging the priority list.
当我刚进入编程领域时，大多数编程语言都宣传自己：速度最快、最正确、内存占用最少、最像C语言、最安全，诸如此类的形容词。
When I got into programming, most programming languages were sold on like, I'm the fastest, I'm the most correct, I have the least memory usage, I'm the most like C, I'm the most safe, all those adjectives.
我当时想，是的，是的，这听起来很有道理。
And I'm like, yeah, yeah, that makes sense.
我应该选择速度最快、错误最少的那一个。
I should pick the fastest, the the least amount of errors.
但马特却说：不。
And then Matt comes in and says, like, no.
不。
No.
它的设计是为了让程序员感到愉快。
Is designed to make the programmer feel good.
什么？
Like, what?
等等。
Wait.
你刚说了什么？
What did you just say?
是关于程序员的幸福感？
It's about programmer happiness?
这是什么嬉皮士的胡说八道？
What hippie dippie bullshit is this?
如果我们只关注程序员的幸福感，怎么才能创造出正确且能赚大钱的程序呢？
How are we gonna get create or correct programs that makes us lots of money if we're focused on programmer happiness?
那真是一次醍醐灌顶的震撼，也是我作为程序员职业生涯的转折点。
That was a real mind blown explosion, and it was also the inflection point of my professional career as a programmer.
在此之前，我一直在使用各种其他工具，关注效率和速度，直到突然发现了Ruby，我才意识到编写代码竟能如此令人极度满足，只为了把它打磨得完美无瑕。
I'd been using a bunch of other things before as tools, looking at like what's the most efficient, and how do I get the fastest, and then suddenly I discover Ruby and realize that writing it can be this intensely satisfying experience, just getting it beautiful.
我们之前稍微谈过这些美学，而我之所以长期不喜欢AI自动补全，是因为它干扰了我对Ruby诗篇的精心雕琢。
We talked a little bit about those aesthetics earlier, and why I didn't like AI auto completion for so long was because it interfered with that massaging of the Ruby poem.
而我如今已经整整二十多年深深热爱着Ruby编程语言，因为一位日本程序员重新排列了软件开发者可以关注的优先事项。
And I've now spent well over 20 years just absolutely loving the Ruby programming language because some guy in Japan rearranged the priorities of what was permissible to care about as a software developer.
我们有这么个东西，大卫。
We have this thing, David.
我现在要称它为MFM倾斜。
I'm now gonna call it the MFM lean.
Shaan，你愿意给他们展示一下MFM倾斜吗？
Shaan, do you wanna show them the the MFM lean?
你让我们俩都中招了。
We you we you you had us both.
我们就这样坐着，结果就被你给骗得跌倒了。
We are whatever we sit like this, and we're just like, you have got us to fall down.
如果你是在Spotify上听的，一定要去YouTube听这一段。
If you're listening on Spotify, gotta go on YouTube and hear this part.
但如果你已经让我们掉进了你的滑坡陷阱。
But if you're you've gotten us to fall down your slippery slope.
一旦你赚到了钱，你会怎么用它？
What do you do with the money once you've already made it?
这个问题，Shaan和我经常问我们所有的成功嘉宾，我们问这个问题的原因是，如果你成功了，如果你
This is a question Shaan and I ask our successful guests all the time, and the reason we ask it is because if you are successful, if you
确实有了一点钱
do have a little bit
关于如何花费或投资你的钱，相关信息其实非常难找。
of money, information on how to spend or invest your money, it's actually really hard to come by.
我知道这一点，因为在我自己的创始人社群Hampton里，人们经常问这个问题。
And I know this because inside of Hampton, which is my community of founders, people ask this question all the time.
有些人赚了1000万或5000万美元。
People have made 10 or $50,000,000.
你该怎么花这些钱？
How do you spend it?
你该怎么投资这些钱？
How do you invest it?
为了解决这个问题并回答这个疑问，我实际上采访了80多位创始人，比如斯科特·戈洛韦、亚历克斯·斯拉莫齐、布莱恩·约翰逊等人，他们身家高达五千万、一亿甚至数十亿美元。
And so to help solve this problem and answer this question, I actually interviewed 80 plus founders, guys like Scott Galloway, Alex Sramozi, Brian Johnson, people who are worth 50, 100, even billions of dollars.
我们让他们坦诚分享了一切。
And we got them to reveal everything.
包括他们的净资产、自己拿多少薪水、每月开销、投资组合等等。
So their net worths, how much they pay themselves, their monthly expenses, their portfolio, things like that.
我们把这些80次采访整理成了一份文档，我认为你几乎不可能在互联网上找到这种信息，而且它是完全免费的。
And we turned these 80 interviews into one document, and I don't think you can find this type of information literally anywhere on the Internet, and it's completely free.
所以，如果你想了解那些身家数十亿美元的人的净资产、投资组合、开销等一切细节，请前往 join.hampton.com/reveal。
So if you wanna see behind the net worths of people who are worth billions of dollars and their portfolios, their expenses, everything, you go to join hampton.com/reveal.
再次强调，前往 join hampton.com/reveal。
Again, join hampton.com/reveal.
去看看吧。
Check it out.
你提到了长寿这个话题，这挺有意思的。
You made a comment about longevity, which is pretty cool.
你提到，这些人尝试了各种方法，但都没用，而我们并没有盲目追潮流，现在我们依然在这里，并且建立了一家取得了惊人累计收入——我不知道具体多少，可能是几亿甚至上百亿美元——的公司。
You talked about, you know, all these people tried all these tactics, it didn't work, but, you know, we didn't we weren't too trendy, and now we're sitting here and we still have lasted, and you've built this amazing company that has made, I don't know how much, hundreds of millions, billions in cumulative revenue.
在你的公司日常运营中，有没有哪些决策是专门为了五年或十年后的长远发展而做出的？也就是说，你是否在做那些着眼于长期而非短期的决策？
Is there anything that you do on a day to day basis within your company where you are making decisions to last five or ten years out or have being, you know, like longevity decisions versus short term decisions?
你是否经常有意识地思考这个问题？
Like, do you actively think about that on a regular basis?
或者，也许我可以反过来问你，哪种方式更容易回答？
Or maybe I could even ask you the other way around, whichever is easier.
如果你只是为了快速进入并退出市场，你会做出哪些不同的决策？
What decisions would you make differently if you were just trying to, like, you know, get in and get out?
好问题。
Good question.
我认为在长期发展方面，我和杰森的首要目标是确保37signals仍然是我们想工作的地方。
I think on the longevity front, the number one objective, both Jason and I, is to ensure that thirty seven signals is still a place we want to work.
不仅仅是想工作，而是真正喜欢这里，把它当作我们最爱的工作场所。
Not just want to work, but like to work is our favorite place to work.
我见过并接触过很多创业者，他们急于求成，因为他们建立了一家自己不喜欢的公司，只想赶紧脱身。
I see and talk to a lot of entrepreneurs who are in a hurry because they managed to build a company they don't like, and they would love to get out of it.
我觉得这非常令人难过，不是因为他们无法实现人生中的其他目标，比如可能他们获得了巨额退出收益，但在两到五年的退出期内咬牙坚持，等待业绩对赌完成，之后就能过上幸福美满的生活。
And I find that tremendously sad, not because they can't achieve other objectives in their life, like maybe they have a tremendous exit, and then they grit their teeth for the two to five year exit period, and they're on hold up and earn out, and then they go on living merry good lives.
很棒。
Great.
真好。
Lovely.
我为你感到高兴。
I I'm glad for you.
那不是我想要的。
That's not what I want.
我希望达到人生中的一个阶段，在那里我不必做那些我不愿意做的事，除非它们服务于我主动选择承担的有意义的负担。
I want to arrive at a station in life where I don't have to do things I don't wanna do if they're not in service of a meaningful burden I have chosen to carry.
工作中充满了这样的人，即使在最高层，比如首席执行官和创始人，他们也困在自己其实并不喜欢的循环里。
And work is full of individuals, even at the highest levels, the CEOs, the founders, who are stuck in these loops that they actually kinda hate.
他们之所以继续做下去，仅仅是因为对投资者或结果或其他任何东西怀有一种勉强的义务感。
And the only reason they're doing it is because of some begrudging obligation to investors or outcomes or whatever else have you.
从一开始，杰森和我就设定了这样的目标：我们不会陷入那种境地。
And Jason and I, from the get go, just set the objectives like, we're not gonna fall into that.
我们不会为了追求未来的结果而把建立这家公司当作手段。
We're not gonna be instrumental about how we built this business because we're seeking the after.
我们致力于当下，而这个当下已经持续了二十七年，在我的情况下则是二十五年。
We're committing to the now, and the now has lasted for twenty seven years, and in my case, for twenty five years.
我是在2001年加入的。
I joined up in 2001.
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