前特斯拉总裁：特斯拉超高速增长背后的非传统理念

我从一位导师那里学到的第一个原则是，他经常带我去我经营的软件公司。

And the first principle that I learned from a guy that who was a mentor of mine, he taught me he used to haul me down to the like I had a software business.

他会带我去客户支持团队，然后说：就坐在这里听这些电话。

He would haul me down to the customer support teams, and he'd say, Just sit here on a chair and listen to these calls.

他一直对我说的第一个原则是：我要让你见识作为领导者最强大的分析工具。

And his first principle that he kept saying to me was, I'm gonna introduce you to the most powerful analytics you have as a leader.

你自己的两只眼睛和两只耳朵。

Your two eyes and your two ears.

真不错。

Nice.

好好利用它们，因为你会比数据更快地获得洞察。

Use them because you will get insights so much faster than the data can get to you to give you insights.

这确实是对的。

And it was true.

所以当我加入特斯拉时，我们在生产Model X、让鹰翼门顺利安装方面遇到了巨大的问题。

And so when I started at Tesla, we were having a super big problem producing Model Xs and getting that Falcon Wing doors to fit.

埃隆和我都很喜欢一本书，叫《目标》，讲的是制造流程。

Elon and I had shared this favorite book, The Goal, which is all about manufacturing process.

有一天他拉住我说：‘好了，目标先生，走，我们去生产线看看。’

And he grabbed me one day and he said, Okay, The Goal Guy, come on, we're going down the line.

他说：‘帮我解决这个问题吧。’

And he said, Help me solve this problem.

我一直在工厂里睡觉，想办法处理这个问题。

I've been sleeping in the factory trying to work on this.

我说：‘好的，我们沿着生产线走，去看看所有堆积的零部件，因为问题就出在那里。’

And I said, Okay, we're gonna walk up the factory line to where all the inventory is stacked up on these doors because that's the clue where the problem exists.

如果产能无法通过那里，东西就会全部堆积起来。

If throughput can't get through there, it's all stacking up.

问题就出在那里。

That's where the problem exists.

所以我们就在那儿站着。

So we're just gonna stand here.

于是我们走到那个地方，果然，一堆门板堆在那里。

So we walked to that point, sure enough, a bunch of doors stacked up.

我说了和我导师说过的一样的话。

And I said, said the same thing my mentor said.

我说，你现在要用，我也要用世界上最强的分析工具——我们的眼睛。

I said, You're gonna now use, and I'm gonna now use the greatest analytical instrument in the world, our eyes.

我们就坐在这里，看上一个小时。

And we're just gonna sit here for an hour.

这会让你发疯，但我们就是要静静地看着这些人工作。

And this is gonna drive you crazy, but we're just gonna watch these people work.

于是我们站在那里看着他们工作，突然就明白了，啊，这些人看不到螺栓该往哪儿拧，因为视线被挡住了。

And so we stood there and watched them work, you could all of a sudden see, ah, these people can't see where the bolt goes because it's blind.

所以他们只能盲拧螺栓，角度不对，导致门板装歪了。

And so they're threading a bolt blind, and they're missing the angle, and therefore the door is going on crooked.

他们需要什么？

What do they need?

他们需要一个夹具。

They need a jig.

十分钟后，你就看明白了。

After ten minutes, you could see this.

于是他坐不住了，我也坐不住了，我们就说：好吧，让维修人员做个夹具，拿过来试试，看看他们能不能正确地装上螺栓。

And so he got antsy, I got antsy, we're like, okay, just have the maintenance guys build a jig, bring it out here, and let's start to experiment about whether they can get the bolt on correctly.

但这就是一个典型的例子：直接去现场。

But that was an example of just go out there.

不要依赖数据。

Don't depend on data.

不要依赖别人的看法。

Don't depend on anybody else's opinion.

亲自去用你的眼睛看。

Just go see it with your own eyes.

这样很可能会让你获得一个洞见，然后你就可以告诉别人：这就是我当时看到的情况。

And that will lead most likely to an insight that you can then teach people like, here's what I was looking at.

这就是我看到的。

Here's what I saw.

所以，如果你是这个小团队的负责人，下次遇到这种情况，你就能自己解决这个问题。

So if you're the leader of this little team, next time you look for this and you can solve this problem.

你不必非要等我亲自下来，作为总裁或CEO睡在工厂地板上。

You don't have to wait for me to come down here and sleep on the factory floor as the president or CEO.

这挺有趣的。

What's it's it's funny.

这就像双缝实验的问题一样，一旦你开始观察，它就会表现得不一样？

It's like is there a double slit experiment problem here where as soon as you start observing it, it it behaves differently?

有时候你和埃隆坐在一起看着，突然间门就飞快地通过了。

Sometimes you're sitting there watching with Elon, all of a sudden the doors are going through real fast.

是这个原因吗，还是不是？

Is that is it that or no?

不管他们多么努力地工作，这通常都是一个流程瓶颈。

Like, it's usually a process constraint no matter how hard they're trying to work.

无论他们多么努力工作，这通常都是流程瓶颈，但这种情况确实会发生。

No matter how hard they're trying to work, it's usually a process constraint, but that does happen.

所以这个问题可能会让你产生错觉。

And so the problem can, like, can can fool you.

是的。

Yeah.

因为人们开始出现白大褂效应，当老板站在那里时，他们就会拼命干活，试图给老板留下好印象。

Because people do start to have the white coat problem where the boss is standing there and they're like, now they're hustling, now they're trying to impress the boss.

但大多数时候你还是能看出来的。

But most of the time you can see it.

比如，只要你站得够久，他们就会忘记你在那里。

Like if you stand there long enough, they're gonna forget you're there.

对。

Right.

而且你还提到，你在那里待一个小时，十分钟后就能发现问题，然后你就坐不住了，想马上解决它。

And there's also, you talked about being there for an hour and after ten minutes you see it and then you get antsy, you wanna fix it right away.

实际上，稍微多感受一会儿本不该承受的痛苦，反而能更深刻地凸显其重要性。

There's almost actually a benefit in just feeling the pain a little longer than you're supposed to, to just really actually drive home the importance of it.

完全正确。

Totally.

我们做过这样的事，我并不做制造业，但我有个电商生意。

We did this, I'm not in the manufacturing business, but I have an e commerce business.

在我们的电商公司，我们正在开一场领导层户外会议，大家正在讨论各种策略。

And in our e commerce business, we're at this leadership off-site and we're all talking about these strategies.

然后有人问：有没有人试过自己在网站上购物，或者观察别人在网站上购物？

And it's like, has anyone tried shopping the site or watching someone shop the site?

嘿，咱们现在就找个人来实际购物吧。

Hey, let's get somebody here to shop right now.

他们试图找我们明明有的商品，却在网站上怎么也找不到，这让人非常沮丧。

And they're trying to find something that we know we have and you can't find it on the site and it's painful.

我们觉得这确实太明显了。

And we think this is so yeah.

只要点一下那个按钮，但他们就是不会点，因为看起来不够明显。

Just click that thing and they won't click it because it doesn't look obvious.

亲身体验别人使用你的产品时的痛苦，令人惊讶的是，有那么多首席执行官根本不用自己的产品，也不观察普通人使用产品时的困难。

And feeling the pain of watching somebody use your product, it's surprising how many CEOs don't actually use the product or watch average people struggle to use the product.

几周前，我和一群银行高管在一起，我问他们，有多少人在过去一周使用过自己银行的App，也就是消费者端App，结果没人举手。

So I was with a group of bank executives a few weeks ago, and I asked them to raise their hand if they use their bank's app in the last week, their consumer app, and no hands go up.

我对他们说，我其实早就猜到了，因为我本身就是你们两家银行的消费者，而你们的App太糟糕了。

And I said to them, I could have guessed that because I'm a consumer of two of your banks, and your apps are terrible.

没错。

Right.

如果你真的用过这些App，你就知道，根本没法再忍受一天这样的体验了。

And if you use them, you couldn't live for another day without terrible this was.

你肯定会立刻打电话给能解决问题的人，要求他们尽快修复。

So you'd be calling whoever could fix it to fix it ASAP.

而且正如你所说，我从Intuit的创始人斯科特·库克那里学到了这个方法。

And a little bit to your point, like I learned this technique from Scott Cook, the founder of Intuit.

他有一个流程，叫做‘跟我回家’。

And he's got this process he calls, follow me home.

这意味着你要站在真实客户身后，观察他们使用你的产品。

And what it means is you look over the shoulder of real customers who are using your product.

所以有时候你无法亲自使用它。

So sometimes you can't use it.

这种情况很多，但你希望看到实际用户是如何思考使用你的产品的。

And there's a lot of cases of that, but you wanna see how an actual user thinks about using your product.

当你站在他们身后观察时，你会看到产品中所有让你感到困扰的障碍。

And when you look over their shoulder, you see all of the friction you're putting into that product.

比如找到你想要的东西有多难，点击正确的选项有多困难，等等。

Like how difficult it is really to find what you're looking for, to make the right clicks, do whatever.

他让高级管理人员频繁地进行这项活动，以便他们能通过客户的眼睛获得反馈。

And he has his senior executives do this on a really frequent basis so that they're getting the feedback loop through the eyes of the customer.

而很多时候，这些客户会转过身来说：你们能不能直接把这个修好？

And oftentimes those customers will turn around and say, would you just fix this?

或者你能帮我做一下这个吗？

Or could you just do this for me?

他们也会因此获得新的产品创意，比如看到一位会计在处理月末工资结算时的情景。

And they get new product ideas too, where they would get to like an accountant doing the end of the month payroll close.

在一次这样的观察中，有人对一位高级经理说：如果工资能用QuickBooks自动处理，那就简单多了。

One of them in this exercise turned to a senior manager and said, be a whole lot easier if the payroll was just done by QuickBooks.

于是这个想法立刻被反馈给了高级管理团队，有人立刻说：嘿，我刚从客户那里听到这个，我们是不是该进入工资业务？

And boom, that idea was like right back into the senior management team discussion instantly like, hey, I just heard this from a customer, should we get in the payroll business?

这对Intuit来说是一个巨大的业务。

Now that's a huge business for Intuit.

这一切都源于‘跟随客户回家’——观察他们如何点击操作，然后让他们告诉你产品哪里有问题，以及缺少什么功能。

It came out of these like, just follow the customer home and watch them click, and then have them tell you not only what's wrong with the product, but what's missing in the product.

宝洁公司是不是也做类似的事情？你是不是觉得他们有研究团队会真的去客户家里？

Doesn't Procter and Gamble do something like this where you think they have, like, research teams that will literally go home.

他们会去一位普通妈妈的家里，观察她们如何清洁厨房，如何使用肥皂。

They'll go to the home of a of an average mom, and they'll watch, you know, how they clean their kitchen, how they're oh, they use the soap this way.

完全正确。

Totally.

我认识一个叫奇普·伯格的人。

I'm on board with a guy named Chip Berg.

奇普在宝洁公司开始了他的职业生涯。

Chip started his career at P and G.

他最终成了李维斯的CEO，但在宝洁时，他因在厨房里观察妈妈们而闻名，就像你说的那样。

He ended up being the CEO of Levi's, but he was famous at P and G for washing moms in kitchens, like you said.

他和他的团队发明了Swiffer拖把，因为他们觉得拖把太糟糕了。

And he and his team invented the Swiffer because they're like, the mop sucks.

你得把水弄得到处都是。

Like, you gotta get water all over the place.

你得把水倒进水槽里。

You gotta dump it in the sink.

这简直太麻烦了。

It's totally janky.

因此，他们根据观察母亲们使用普通拖把时的痛苦，发明了Swiffer。

And so they invented the Swiffer based on how they watch moms suffer with regular mops.

对。

Right.

我喜欢这个。

I love that.

今天的节目由HubSpot赞助。

Today's episode is brought to you by HubSpot.

你知道吗？大多数企业只使用了20%的数据？

Did you know that most businesses only use 20% of their data?

这就像读一本书，却撕掉了五分之四的页面。

That's like reading a book but then tearing out four fifths of the pages.

关键是，你会错过很多东西。

Point is you miss a lot.

除非你使用HubSpot——这个客户平台能让你获取推动业务增长所需的数据，那些藏在邮件、通话记录、转录文本中的非结构化数据，正是关键所在。

And unless you're using HubSpot, the customer platform that gives you access to the data you need to grow your business, the insights that are trapped in emails, call logs, transcripts, all that unstructured data makes all the difference.

因为你知道得越多，成长得就越多。

Because when you know more, you grow more.

所以，如果你想读完整本书，而不是只读一部分，请访问 hubspot.com。

And so if you wanna read the whole book instead of just reading part of it, visit hubspot.com.

你还有其他一些商业原则。

You have a couple of other business principles.

我最喜欢的一点是，我是个点子型的人。

One of the things I liked was I'm an idea guy.

我的创业风格是高度多样化型的。

My entrepreneurial style is a high variety style.

我涉足过各种生意，无论是餐厅、生物科技、网络安全，还有许多不同行业，虽然不是所有都成功了，但我想，这大概就是我的天性。

I've done businesses, whether it's restaurants and biotech and cyber and a bunch of different industries, and not all have worked, but that's, I guess, just the way I'm wired.

而有些人则专注于一个领域，用四十年的职业生涯不断解决该领域的问题。

Whereas some people, they stay in one domain and they keep solving problems in that domain for forty years of their career.

看起来你也属于高度多样化类型。

And it seems like you're also in the high variety category.

其中一个原因是，你学会了通过问题来嗅出机会，因为机会闻起来就像一个问题。

And one of the reasons why is you've learned how to sniff out opportunity because it smells like a problem.

它闻起来像是某种不合逻辑的东西。

It smells like something that doesn't make sense.

而书中提到的一个线索是，每当你看到所谓‘一刀切’的东西时。

And it sounds like one of the tells that you have in the book is anytime you see something that's one size fits all.

是的，和你有点像，我也是一个追求多样性的创业者。

Yeah, so a little bit like you, I've been a variety driven entrepreneur.

我想这有点是因为我有商业多动症。

I think it's a little bit because I've got business ADD.

如果让我一辈子只做一件事，我会疯掉的。

Like I could spend an entire career in a single without driving myself crazy.

所以我看到‘一刀切’的东西时，就会觉得：哦，这里可能有商机。

So I do look at these one size fits all and as a clue of, Oh, there could be an opportunity here.

比如，我们曾审视过网络安全行业。

So an example of that is we took a look at the cybersecurity industry.

我们从这个问题开始：嘿，30%的计算机已经迁移到云端，但70%还没有。

And we started with this question of like, hey, 30% of computers moved to the cloud, 70% hasn't.

接下来的30%什么时候迁移？

When does the next 30% move?

这会带来哪些机遇，等等？

What opportunities is that gonna create, etcetera?

这是在我自己的风投公司里发生的。

This is in my venture firm.

我们发现了一个令人惊讶的现象：30%的计算资源并没有迁移到云端。

And we found something surprising that 30% of compute wasn't moving to the cloud.

这些主要是律师事务所、会计师事务所等中小型企业，它们没有充分的理由迁移到云端。

It was small, medium sized businesses like law firms, accountancies, etcetera, have no compelling reason to go to the cloud.

而且它们还面临数据风险的阻力。

And they have a headwind of data risk.

它们处理的数据非常敏感。

They have very sensitive data.

他们不想把那些数据迁移到云端。

They don't wanna move that to the cloud.

于是我们开始自问：这里是否存在一种万能解决方案？

And so then we started to ask ourselves like, is there a one size fits all here scenario?

结果发现确实存在。

And it turned out there was.

我们恰好问了一个问题：过去五年里，为云端创建了多少个网络安全平台？

We just happened to ask the question, how many cybersecurity platforms have been created for the cloud in the last five years?

答案是大约1300个。

And the answer is like 1,300.

然后我们问：过去五年里，为中小企业创建了多少个网络安全平台？

And then we said, how many have been created for the SMB in the last five years?

答案是零。

And the answer was zero.

好的。

All right.

这是一个适合所有人的市场。

This is a one size fits all market.

网络安全是为云量身定制的，这一点我完全理解。

Cyber is sized to the cloud, which I totally get.

作为一名计算机科学家，我明白向亚马逊、微软Azure和谷歌开发更容易，但要适配无数中小企业的技术栈则极其困难。

As a computer scientist, I get that it's easier to write to Amazon, Azure, and Google, and it's super difficult to write to an infinity number of tech stacks in SMB.

因此，这种适合所有人的方案创造了一个机会。

So that one size fits all is creating an opportunity.

然后我们又提出了另一个问题，因为那时我们认为自己已经知道了这个问题的答案。

Then we asked one more question because then we felt like we knew the answer to this question.

勒索软件攻击发生在什么地方？

Where are the ransomware attacks happening?

毫不意外，攻击主要针对中小企业，因为它们五年来都没有得到过技术投入。

And no surprise, it's in the SMB side because they haven't had tech in five years.

因此，我们着手打造一家公司，本质上是为多样化技术栈提供一个超现代的网络安全平台，并推出了这一产品。

And so we set out to build a company that is essentially a super modern cyber platform for widely variable tech stacks and introduced that.

它在市场上取得了巨大进展，是目前网络安全领域增长最快的企业之一。

It's got a ton of market traction, and it's like one of the fastest growing companies in cyber right now.

但它源于最初的那个洞察——我们偶然发现了一个适合所有人的解决方案。

But it came from that first insight of like, Oh, we just tripped across a one size fits all.

市场完全转向了云，而这里还有一块中小型企业市场，既不属于大型企业，也不属于超大型企业。

The market has been a 100% cloud and there's this small medium thing hanging out here that isn't large or extra large.

我们为什么不把市场细分，去瞄准竞争对手忽视的领域呢？

How about we like split the market and go after where the competition isn't?

我喜欢这个观点。

I like that.

在书中，你讲述这个故事时用了稍有不同的开场，我很喜欢——你提到当时你在两家公司的董事会任职，或者类似的情况。

In the book, you phrase this you use a slightly different intro to the story, which I liked, where you basically talked about, like, you're looking at the expense I think you were on the board of two companies or something like that.

是的。

Yeah.

你盯着费用单上的各项支出，发现它们是两种完全不同的情况，就像

You're looking at the line items on the expense sheet, and it was like it was two different you know, it was like

那是Lyft和Lulu。

It was Lyft and Lulu.

Lululemon，一家零售商。

Lululemon, which is a retailer.

它们其实并不掌握任何客户的个人敏感数据。

They don't really have any personal sensitive data about any customers.

你知道，顾客进店，刷一下信用卡。

You know, customer comes in, swipes your credit card.

它们不会保存这些信息。

They don't save it.

它们每年在网络安全保险上的支出高达700万美元。

And they were spending something like $7,000,000 on cyber insurance.

是的。

Yeah.

而另一家拥有大量敏感数据的公司，也在支出700万美元。

And then somebody else was spending, you know, somebody else who had a lot of sensitive data was also spending $7,000,000.

你是不是觉得奇怪，这两家在风险状况和行业上都截然不同的公司，为什么会有相同的情况？

And you sort of had this like, How could these two vastly different companies with vastly different risk profiles and vastly different industries have the same thing?

你当时就觉得，这有点不对劲。

And you were like, that that smells a little fishy to me.

不管它们最终是否成功，我只是喜欢这种‘觉察’的总体理念，这其实是一种超能力。

And whether that became a successful company or not, I just like the the general idea of noticing is actually a superpower.

我们之前谈过觉察瓶颈，但你也可以觉察那些世界中不合理的事情，创业者可以通过改变世界的运行方式，让这些事情变得合理。

We talked about noticing for bottlenecks, but then you can sort of notice for things that don't make sense in the world and an entrepreneur can come in and make it make sense by actually changing the way the world works.

对吧？

Right?

没错。

Exactly.

真正去改变系统，而不是仅仅说，我想这大概只能这样了。

And actually change the system rather than try to just say, I guess it just has to be that way.

对。

Right.

对。

Right.

这正是一个完美的例子。

And that's a perfect example of that.

比如，注意观察是许多创业者具备的特质，因为我们确实能察觉到摩擦，并问自己：为什么生活中会存在这种摩擦？我们该如何消除它？

Like, think noticing is a trait a lot of entrepreneurs have because we do see friction and say to ourselves, like, why does this friction exist in life and how do we get rid of it?

对。

Right.

经常有人问我：你坐私人飞机吗？

And I have people ask me like, do you fly private?

我的回答有点特别。

And I've got a weird answer.

我说：不，别坐。

I said, no, don't.

但理由有点奇怪。

But for a weird reason.

我不坐私人飞机。

I don't fly private.

我坐商用航班，因为我希望体验日常生活的不便。

I fly commercial because I want to experience friction of everyday life.

这会给我带来下一个商业点子，甚至两三个。

That's gonna give me my next business idea, or two, or three.

我认为企业家天生倾向于把不便视为潜在机会的线索。

And I think entrepreneurs are kind of wired to look for friction as a clue that there could be an opportunity.

但我们都有一种高度敏锐的直觉，能察觉到这些不便之处。

But they definitely We all have, I think, heightened spidey sense where that friction is.

是的。

Yeah.

作为企业家，如果你的生活太安逸了，就会失去发现问题的能力。

As an entrepreneur, if your life gets too comfortable, you lose your ability to spot problems.

没错。

Exactly.

就像喜剧演员一样。

It's like comedians.

当喜剧演员变得太富有时，他们会迅速跌落，因为他们不再有能引起共鸣的段子了，因为他们的生活已经完全脱离了普通人的真实体验。

When comedians get too rich, they fall off a cliff because they don't have relatable jokes anymore because their life is completely unrelatable at this point.

对。

Right.

他们看不到日常生活中的那些细节。

And they don't see the the everyday things.

好吧，我想来梳理一下这个算法的几个步骤。

Okay, so I wanna go through a couple of the steps of the algorithm.

你的书名叫《算法》，我想说说我对这个理念的理解。

Your book is called The Algorithm, and the idea is that Let me phrase what I took away from the idea.

好的。

Okay.

这个理念是，有一种特定的方式可以经营公司，从而带来更快的增长和更大的成功，这显而易见。

So the idea is there's a certain way that you can run a company that will lead to faster growth and more success, obviously.

我喜欢这一点，就是人们觉得埃隆就像个超级天才外星人，也许他确实如此。

And what I liked about it is there's this feeling that Elon's just the super genius alien, and maybe he is.

但假设这些公司的成功是因为你拥有一个超级天才的话。

But let's say, like, that the success of the companies are because you have this super genius.

这是一个非常美好的故事，很符合好莱坞看待世界的方式。

It's a very nice story, fits well in the sort of Hollywood way of looking at the world.

但你说过，或者是不是这样：他其实非常聪明、有抱负且有才华，但他身边围绕着一群同样聪明、有抱负、有才华的人，这些人被一种工作方式、一种文化、一种方法所赋能，正是这些让他旗下的多家公司都能达到这样的成功水平。

But you said or is it that he is really smart and ambitious and talented, but he surrounds himself with really smart and ambitious and talented, a legion of smart people who are empowered by a way of working, a culture of working, a method that leads to this level of success because he's got all these different companies.

一个人能做的事情终究有限，也不可能同时出现在太多地方。

One man can only be doing so much and can be only be in so many places at once.

我这样描述我们讨论的前提，准确吗？

Is that accurate how I describe the premise of what we're talking about?

是的。

Yeah.

这其实有三个层面。

It's kind of three layers.

首先，他非常聪明，在我们这个时代是一位独特的创业者。

First off, he's brilliant and he is unique as an entrepreneur in our time.

比如，我想不出还有哪位创业者能创建四到五家价值数十亿甚至数百亿美元的公司。

Like, can't name any entrepreneur who's created four or five companies all worth tens of billions of dollars, if not hundreds of billions of dollars.

扎克伯格只有一家。

Know, Zucker's had one.

盖茨也只有一家。

Gates had one.

乔布斯有两家。

Jobs had two.

贝佐斯有一家。

Beating Offs had one.

埃里森也只有一家。

Ellison's had one.

如果你列出我们这个时代的所有创业者，没有人能像他这样。

You go down the list of entrepreneurs of our time, there's nobody like him.

所以他确实是个非常特别的人。

And so he is pretty special dude.

他身边围绕着世界级的人才。

He does surround himself with world class talent.

但这个算法的初衷是为这些世界级人才提供一个框架，让我们能把决策下放到边缘，让人们能够自主推动创新，而不需要我们亲自出马去驱动。

But the idea of the algorithm was to give that world class talent a framework so that we could push decisions to the edge and people could drive innovation without us showing up and having to drive it ourselves.

而一个框架在这方面非常有帮助。

And a framework is super helpful in that.

所以，当你把世界级人才、一个框架和一套方法结合起来，就会开始出现真正独特的创新突破。

So you combine world class talent with a framework and a method, and you start to get innovation breakouts that are really unique.

很多人问：‘你得是马斯克才能做到这一点吗？’

And a lot of people said, Hey, do you have be Elon to do this?

我的回答是：不。

And my answer was no.

这正是这本书通过那些真正身处前线、从事这项工作并讲述自己故事的人的视角来叙述的原因。

Like, that's why the book is told through the eyes of people who are actually on the edge doing this work and telling their stories.

所以你可以看到，这里根本没有高层管理团队在场。

So you can see, Hey, there was no senior management team hanging around here.

这都是前线人员在主动应对这些重大问题，说：我们只想解决它。

This was like frontline people taking on these big problems and saying, We just wanna solve this.

你给他们一个解决问题的框架。

And you give them a framework to solve it.

他们就会做出一些疯狂的事情，比如让汽车制造商推出移动维修服务、发明一键贷款、将保险嵌入汽车付款流程——这些创新层出不穷、飞速推进，因为边缘人员不仅被赋权，还配备了这个框架。

And they do crazy things like inventing mobile car service from a manufacturer, inventing one click loans, inventing insurance embedded in car payments, like just stuff that was flowing and moving so fast because people at the edge were empowered, but they were also equipped with this framework.

而框架里没有提到的一点，但似乎普遍存在的是，很多故事的起点都是：我们遇到了一个问题。

And one thing that's not in the framework, but it seemed common, was that the starting point for a lot of the stories was we had this problem.

你书里提到的那个在线销售的例子就是这样。

You have this one in there about online sales.

特斯拉是一家高科技、技术最前沿的公司，但当时其电子商务和在线销售其实相当薄弱。

It's like, Tesla is this high-tech, kind of the most tech forward company, but actually the e commerce, the online sales were pretty weak at the time.

对。

Right.

所以你面临这个问题，这目前是公司的短板。

And so you have this problem and it's a weakness in the company right now.

但你并没有只是说，嘿。

And instead of just saying, hey.

我们稍微改进一下这个短板吧。

Let's improve our weakness a little bit.

我们回到及格水平就行了。

Let's get back up to par.

埃隆的方法似乎是从一个疯狂的目标开始——不仅我们要从短板变成平均水平，还要在这个领域做到世界级或顶尖水平，我认为这并不是大多数人会有的想法。

Elon's method, it seems like starts with a crazy goal that's like, not only is this today not only are we gonna go from weakness to average, we're gonna go to, like, world class or best in class in that same category, which I think is not how most people think.

这也不是我做事的方式。

It's not how I I operate.

当我看到这种情况时，我会想，这可不是我会在那种情况下说的话。

Like, I when I see that, I'm like, that's not what I would have said in that situation.

比如在线销售，就是在线销售很弱。

For example, with the online sales, it's like online sales are weak.

好的。

Okay.

我们接下来要这么做。

Here's what we're gonna do.

我们要把线上销售额提升二十倍，或者类似的目标。

We're gonna 20 x our online sales or something like that.

我们要把这个提升起来，让它成为销售的首要驱动力，对吧？

Like, we are going to lift this and be it's gonna be the the number one driver, right, of sales.

因此，为了启动这件事，我们设定了一个疯狂而雄心勃勃的目标。

And so there's this crazy ambitious goal to start the thing.

这听起来相当不切实际，尤其是因为你不是从优势地位出发，而是从劣势地位起步。

And it's it sounds pretty unreasonable, especially because you're starting not from a position of strength, but from a position of weakness.

你能谈谈这方面的情况吗？

Can you talk about that side of things?

比如，我们干脆先在今天实际上还很薄弱的领域，立下一个近乎不可能的目标。

The, like, let's just start by laying down the gauntlet of a somewhat impossible goal on something that today is actually a weak area.

目标设定可以决定你会得到什么样的结果。

Goal setting can determine, like, what outcome you're gonna get.

所以如果你设定的是5%到7%的改进目标，你可能最终只能获得3%到5%的提升。

And so if you set a goal for five to 7% improvement, you're probably gonna get three to five.

但如果你设定的是数量级的改进目标，人们就必须以完全不同的方式思考这个问题。

If you set a goal for an order of magnitude improvement, now you got people that have to think way differently about that problem.

因为你无法通过微调现状来实现100%的提升或20倍的增长。

Because you can't tweak the status quo to get to a 100% improvement or a 20x improvement.

所以他的秘诀之一就是设定这种数量级的改进目标。

And so part of his sauce is he sets these order of magnitude improvement goals.

比如10倍、100倍的增长，这迫使你以截然不同的方式思考如何解决这个问题，或者如何改进产品或流程等等。

So 10X, 100X, and it forces you to think way differently about how you would solve that problem or what you would do with the product or what you would do with a process, etcetera.

就像你提到的例子，他来找我说：嘿，你看，我们一直面临持续的需求挑战。

And so like you're referencing this example of he came to me and said, hey, look, we have continuous demand challenges.

我们必须想办法在线销售汽车，这在当时听起来很疯狂，因为没人会在线上购买一辆12万美元、没亲眼见过的车。

We gotta figure out how to sell cars online, which sounded crazy at this time because nobody was buying $120,000 thing, sight unseen online.

点击，点击。

Click, click.

但我们俩都知道，因为我们都有消费领域的经验，每多一次点击，消费者的转化率就会下降。

But we both knew because we'd both been in consumer that every click you have, you ask the consumer to make your conversion goes down.

这话说出来很显而易见，所有电商创业者都明白这一点。

And that's, I'm saying it obvious, every entrepreneur in e comm knows that.

但我们查看了我们的点击次数，发现购买一辆车需要64次点击。

But we looked at our clicks and there were 64 clicks to buy a car.

于是他转向我说，我们来提升数字销售吧。

And so he turns to me and he says, let's improve digital sales.

这就是你的目标。

This is your goal.

将数字销售提升20倍。

Improve digital sales by 20x.

这下好了，我得彻底重新思考这个问题了。

So now it's like, oh crap, I gotta think way differently about this.

不能只是在这里那里做点小调整。

Can't think about like tweaking here and there.

所以他问，通过他们的应用购买一份达美乐披萨需要点击多少次？

So he said, how many clicks does it take to buy Domino's Pizza on their app?

我完全不知道。

I have no idea.

他说，我们来查一下。

He's like, let's pull it out.

于是我们查了一下。

So we pull it out.

结果发现，当时购买一份达美乐披萨需要点击十次。

It turns out it takes ten thumbtaps to buy a Domino's pizza at that time.

他说，我们是64次，达美乐是10次。

He's like, we are 64, Domino's is 10.

那我们就目标定为10次。

Let's go to 10.

而这第一个引发质疑的，是当时公司的一项核心理念，即按订单定制生产产品。

And the first thing then that that calls into question, it was a core tenant of the business at that time, which was producing custom build to order product.

对。

Right.

那时这简直像宗教信仰一样。

And that was religion there.

部分原因在于他们不想成为一家典型的汽车公司。

Partly driven by the fact they didn't wanna be a typical car company.

他们想为你打造你想要的车，而不是公司想卖的车。

They wanted to make you the car you wanted versus the car the car company wanted to sell.

对。

Right.

这一点每个人都深有共鸣。

And it's something everyone will nod their head to.

完全可定制。

Fully customizable.

当然。

Of course.

完全正确。

Totally.

但这导致了多达36万辆不同配置的汽车选择，这不仅增加了大量点击，还让客户感到决策疲劳。

But that led to like 360,000 different combinations of a car that you could choose, which is driving a lot of clicks, plus a lot of decision fatigue for people.

于是我们去分析了数据。

And so we went and ran the data.

我的团队分析了数据，结果发现客户并没有购买那36万种不同的版本。

My team ran the data, and we came back and figured out that people weren't buying 360,000 versions.

他们只买了两种。

They were buying two.

就是今天所谓的标准版和性能版。

And it was either what is known today as a standard or a performance.

于是我去找了制造负责人格雷格·赖肖和工程负责人道格·菲尔德。

And so I went to the head of manufacturing, Greg Reichow, and the head of engineering, Doug Field.

我说：‘嘿，听我说，我是新来的。’

I said, Hey, look, I'm the new guy here.

我以前从没做过汽车这一行，所以对这件事可能完全外行。

I've never been in the car business, so I could be completely stupid about this.

但让我给你们看看数据怎么说。

But let me show what the data says.

数据显示，在这36万个可定制的组合中，人们实际上只买了两种。

The data says that out of all these 360,000 combinations of build to order, people are only buying two.

如果真的只有两种，这对你们业务端意味着什么？

And what would it mean to you guys' side of the business if there were only two?

抱歉，让我澄清一下，你真正想说的是，他们并不是买了两种配置。

And sorry, just to clarify, what you're really saying is it's not that they're buying two configurations.

而是他们要完成的任务。

It's like the job to be done.

客户真正关心的是，他们想要的是高性能，也就是那种，是的。

The thing that the customer cared about was they wanted either high performance, you know, like Yeah.

踩下油门，车就飞驰出去。

Tap the pedal and it flies.

是的。

Yeah.

或者他们想要安全加上电动车以及其他功能。

Or they want the safety plus EV plus whatever.

你知道的，比如加上

You know, like Plus some

他们能负担得起的其他续航电池。

other range battery they could afford.

最长续航的电池。

Longest range battery.

对。

Yeah.

很好。

Good.

我就要这个。

I'm gonna have that.

而且实际上，我们可以预先定制、预先配置车辆，以解决这些需求，而不需要让用户自己选择车门侧面条纹的颜色。

And actually, like, we can pre customize we could pre configure cars to, like, solve those needs without letting them choose what color the the strip is on the the side of the, you know, the side of the door.

没错。

Exactly.

就是这样。

And that's exactly it.

所以负责制造的格雷格说：天哪，我一直在等这一天，终于有人真正推动这件事了，你知道这对我们的工厂意味着什么吗？

And so Greg, who's running manufacturing says, Oh my God, I've been waiting for this day for somebody to really drive this because you know what that would do to our factory?

这能极大简化工厂的运作。

Totally simplifies the factory.

它还能简化供应链。

It simplifies the supply chain.

我们可以大幅提升产能。

We could increase throughput dramatically.

转向道格。

Turned to Doug.

这对工程意味着什么？

What does it mean for engineering?

他问：你开玩笑吧？

He's like, are you kidding me?

我不用设计这么多零部件了。

Like, I don't have to design all these parts.

我不用测试它们了。

I don't have to test them.

我可以把工程团队的时间集中在真正关乎客户任务的核心事项上。

I can port engineering's time on the stuff that really matters to the job to be done for the customer.

我完全同意。

I'm totally in.

于是我去参加高级管理团队会议，其中一个团队成员说：嘿，你是新来的。

So then I walk into the senior management team meeting, and one of the team members was like, hey, you are the new guy.

你不明白。

You don't understand.

这里的做法就像一种信仰。

Like, it's religion here.

我们一直按订单生产。

We do build order.

我觉得这可能是信仰，但这种信仰可能会把你带到坟墓里。

And I'm like, it might be religion, but that religion might take you to the grave.

听我解释原因。

Here's why.

如果我们这么做，会对业务造成什么影响。

Here's what happens to the business if we do this.

如果我们只保留两种配置，就能减少大量操作步骤和决策疲劳。

We're gonna get rid of a lot of clicks, a lot of decision fatigue if we just get down to two configurations.

如果你愿意，也可以设成三种。

And you can make it three if you want.

我不在乎，但你不能把它定为360,000。

I don't care, but you can't make it 360,000.

对。

Right.

而埃隆，他非常理性。

And Elon, he's super rational.

他看了这个案例，然后听了格雷格和道格的意见。

He looked at the case and then listened to Greg and listened to Doug.

然后他说，是的，我们必须这么做。

And he was like, yeah, we have to do this.

所以如果你今天去购买一辆特斯拉，你会看到上面只有两到三种配置。

So if you go to buy a Tesla today, you'll see you've got two or three configurations on there.

就这些。

That's it.

我们担心会看起来像本田，但结果并没有，因为我们有完全不同的产品。

And the fear was we would look like Honda, but it turns out we didn't because we had a completely different product.

我们有的是装上软件的轮子。

We had software on wheels.

我们通过质疑，消除了客户的选择疲劳和销售过程中的所有摩擦——归根结底，我们当时质疑了商业模式，这对我这样的创业者来说很常见，对很多创业者也是如此。

We taking away all that decision fatigue from the customer and all that friction in the sales process just by questioning, at the end of the day, we questioned the business model at the time, which happens to me as an entrepreneur, happens to a lot of entrepreneurs.

你容易对你的商业模式产生感情，当有人问‘我们是不是该放弃这个商业模式？’时，你根本不愿意接受任何挑战。

You fall in love with your business model and you don't really accept any challenge when somebody says, Should we chuck this business model?

因为这恰恰是阻碍你前进的东西。

Because it's actually what's in the way.

对。

Right.

我想知道，当你去为别人工作时，你学到了什么？

And I wonder what you learned when you went to work for someone.

因为就像你说的，我当了二十年的CEO，也有过同样的经历：我们被收购了，从一家20人的公司，我一直以来都是自己创业，十年来一直是初创公司的CEO。

Because like you said, I've been CEO for twenty years, and I had the same experience where we got acquired, and I went from a 20 person company, and I'd always been my own I was always the CEO of startups for ten years.

然后突然间，我必须去向别人汇报，甚至忘了要去向谁汇报。

And then suddenly, I now had to go and report to and forget to report to.

我只是不得不把我想做的事情的计划带到桌面上，和别人一起讨论。

I just had to bring my plans of what I'm trying to do to the table with somebody.

我必须学会如何与一位从不同角度思考业务的CEO沟通。

I had to learn how to talk to a CEO who was thinking about the business, you know, separately.

我以前从未真正站在过对方的立场上。

And I had never really been on that side of the table.

我必须学会如何向上沟通。

And I had to learn how to, like, communicate upwards.

这到底意味着什么？

What does that mean?

我该如何简化？

How do I simplify?

我该如何用他们能理解的语言来表达，以便更好地完成这件事？

How do I speak the language that they're trying to understand in order to do this well?

对于正在学习如何与CEO沟通的人，你有什么建议吗？

Do you have any tips for somebody who's learning how to communicate to a CEO?

而且你知道，你当时是和埃隆一起做的，对吧？

And you know, you were doing it with Elon, right?

也许埃隆有一些特别的地方，但当你去参加这些会议时，你用什么方法来呈现信息，使其高效而不浪费时间呢？

Maybe there's something specific to Elon, but what what was what your method for when you go into those meetings of how you present information in a way that is productive versus wasting time?

我们曾经有一段时间玩过一个小游戏。

We actually had this bit of a game for a while.

我想这是他的主意。

I think it was just his idea.

他说，我们试试把邮件压缩到三句话以内。

He's like, let's try to get down to three sentence emails.

问题是什么？

What is the problem?

你对根本原因的分析是什么？你的解决方案是什么？

What's your analysis of the root cause and what's your proposed solution?

他说，我觉得我们完全可以靠三句话的邮件来运营公司。

He's like, I think we could run the company on three sentence emails.

所以我们就这么做了。

And so we did that.

这让我明白了高管沟通中的效率有多么重要。

And what that taught me about exec communication was that level of efficiency is so helpful.

比如，如果你能用三句话告诉我。

Like if you can give me three sentences.

于是我对我团队的人也说了同样的话。

So I turned to my people and said the same thing.

告诉我问题是什么。

Like, tell me what the problem is.

告诉我根本原因是什么。

Tell me what the root cause is.

告诉我你提出的解决方案是什么。

Tell me what your proposed solution is.

而在你的解决方案中，必须包含成本估算、经济效益等所有相关信息。

And in that proposed solution, you gotta have like, how much it's gonna cost and what's gonna do the economics and all that sort of stuff.

但对高管来说，如果你在和CEO沟通，CEO最宝贵的资源就是时间。

But the thing executives, if you're talking to a CEO, the most precious commodity that CEO has is time.

这种时间包括信息接收时间、信息处理时间和决策时间。

And it's information inbound absorption time, information processing time, decision time.

所以，如果你能以极高的效率与CEO沟通，说我会最大限度减少你的信息接收时间。

And so if you can get super efficient in communicating to a CEO and say, I'm gonna minimize your information absorption time.

我会最大限度减少你的决策时间。

I'm gonna minimize your information decision time.

你就会成为团队中非常有价值的一员。

You become a very valuable member of that team.

非常有价值。

Very valuable.

而且这能让你的思维更加清晰。

And it sharpens your own thinking.

你以为你是在为他们这么做，但后来你意识到，其实直到我被迫向他们表达清楚时，我才真正理清了思路。

You think you're doing it for them, and then you realize, actually, I didn't fully have clarity on this until I was forced myself to be clear to them.

现在我自己已经清楚了。

Now I'm clear to myself.

说来有趣，你提到的这三点，当我第一次去见Twitch的创始人埃米特时，我就问他：我该怎么跟你沟通？

Actually, it's so funny you said that those exact three, when I went into my first meeting with Emmett, the founder of Twitch, I said, how do I talk to you?

我该怎么运用这些？

How do I use these?

我不想过来只是闲聊，你知道的，我们可以聊闲天，但我猜这并不是你希望我做的。

I don't wanna come here and just chitchat, you know, like, we could do that, but I'm guessing that's not what you want me to do.

他回答说：是的，三种方式，三句话。

And he goes, yeah, three ways three sentences.

他说：什么、为什么、所以呢？

He goes, what, why, so what?

发生了什么？或者发生了什么事？

What is happening or what happened?

为什么会发生？或者为什么会这样？

Why is it happening or why did it happen?

那我们对此该怎么办？

And so what are we gonna do about it?

他说，这就是我喜欢的沟通方式。

And he's like, that's the way I like to communicate.

什么，为什么，所以呢？

What, why, so what?

然后我现在已经把这套方法教给了我团队里的其他人。

And then I've I've now taught that to my team of the same place.

这太有趣了。

It's so funny.

基本上是一样的，几乎是完全相同的东西。

The same basically, almost the exact same thing.

我们只是给同一个沟通结构用了不同的标签。

We just had different labels for the for the same exact communication structure.

我太喜欢了。

I love that.

事实上，我要借用这个说法，因为我非常欣赏埃米特，但这是看待沟通的一种绝佳方式。

In fact, I'm gonna steal that because I think the world of Emmett, but that's a great way to think about communication.

我还想到另一点：作为创业者，如果你成功了，你的企业最可能的结果就是被人收购，这意味着你将拥有一个新老板，你需要向他汇报。

And I think the other way I The other thing you made me think about is as an entrepreneur, if you're successful, the most likely outcome of your business is somebody's gonna buy And that means you're gonna have an owner that you're gonna now be subordinate to.

这是一种不同的思维模式。

And that's a different form of mindset.

在我们第一次出售公司时，我犯了错误。

And I got it wrong the first few times that we sold companies.

每次我出售公司时，都是卖给了上市公司。

Every time we sold a company of mine, we sold it to a public company.

所以之后我会加入那家公司，工作一到两年，必须适应他们的组织结构。

And so then I would come in and I'd owe that company a year or two and I'd have to work in their structure.

当时我还年轻，所以一直坚持着那种固执的创业者心态。

And at the time I was young and so I was trying to keep this bullheaded entrepreneurial mindset.

但在大公司里，这种做法行不通。

And that doesn't work in large corporations.

我现在明白了，如果能重来一次，我要向所有购买过我公司的朋友道歉，你们不得不忍受这个固执、不懂事的创业者。

And what I've now learned, if I had a redo, and I apologize if anybody's listening who bought one of my companies, you had to put up with this pugnacious entrepreneur who didn't get it.

现在我明白了，我本该坐下来问他：是什么驱动着你的成功？

Now what I get is I should have sat down with him and said, what drives success for you?

你真正关心的是什么？

Like, what do you care about?

你买下了这家公司，那么在你心里，必须发生什么才能让它成功？

Like you bought this company, what has to happen in your mind to make it a success?

这通常与固执的创业者对它的思考方式不同。

That's often different than the bullheaded entrepreneur's way of thinking about it.

我认为，当你把自己卖给另一家公司时，会面临一组不同的挑战。

And I think that's a different set of challenges when you sell yourself to another company.

你首先要意识到，你不再拥有它了。

The first thing you gotta realize is that you don't own it anymore.

他们才拥有。

They do.

他们掌握着主动权。

They have the keys.

如果你还欠他们一两年，那就别搞得那么痛苦了。

And if you owe them a year or two, might as well not make that miserable.

还不如把它变得有趣些。

You might as well make it fun.

让这件事变得有趣的方法是弄清楚：我该如何让这个安排对你我都有效？

And the way to make it fun is to figure out, okay, how do I make this thing work for you and for me?

如果你这么做，通常你就能获得业绩对赌，这对你也同样有利。

And if you do that, oftentimes you got an earn out and it's gonna work for you too.

是的，这真是很好的建议。

Yeah, that's great advice.

我希望我早点听到这些建议。

I wish I had that advice earlier.

我也是。

Me too.

我也是。

Me too.

天啊，我摔得可惨了。

Man, I stumbled so badly.

你往往是通过艰难的方式才慢慢发现的。

You you sort of discover it the hard way.

我想问问你关于碰撞维修业务的事，因为这太棒了。

I wanted to ask you about the collision repair business because this was fantastic.

你能讲讲这个故事吗？因为我只知道部分情况。

Can you just tell the story of because I only know part of the story.

我想知道整个故事。

I wanna know the whole story.

那你是怎么进入这个行业的？

So what's the story of how you got into that business?

你是怎么发现这个问题的？

Like how you discovered the problem?

那家公司后来到底怎么样了？

And what actually happened with that company?

因为我觉得这非常有趣，因为它并不是一家风险投资科技公司。

Because I think it's pretty fascinating because it's not a venture tech.

至少在我看来，这不像一家风险投资型的软件业务，但你却把它做起来了。

It doesn't sound to me at least like a venture tax business, no software, but you built that.

而且听起来像是一个相当有趣的成功故事。

And and I it sounded like a a pretty pretty interesting success story.

你能讲讲这个故事吗？

Can you can you tell that one?

是的。

Yeah.

最后我在这上面用了不少软件，但得先说点背景。

I ended up having a lot of software in it, but it starts with a little context.

我是在我祖父的汽车修理店后面长大的。

I grew up in the back of my grandfather's auto repair business.

所以当时我是个技术小白，因为是小孩，没什么技能，干的都是最脏最累的活。

And so like I was a tech, I had the dirtiest jobs because I was a kid, didn't have any skills.

所以我负责换机油、换轮胎之类的活，但也学会了怎么跟汽修技工们打交道。

So I was changing oil and changing tires and that sort of stuff, but learned how to hang out and talk to auto technicians.

几十年后，我妻子的车被我们邻居撞了，我不得不去修车。

And so decades later, my wife's car gets hit by one of our neighbors and now I gotta go get that fixed.

于是我去了家大型钣金店，把车放下，拿到了报价，同意让他们修，对方说周五就能修好。

And so I go to a large body shop and drop it off, get the estimate, agree to have this place fix it, and the guy says it'll be done by Friday.

所以这是周一。

So this is Monday.

我周五又回来了。

I come back on Friday.

车还没修好。

Car's not done.

他说：哎呀，那个人没来上班。

He's like, ah, this person didn't come in.

这挺典型的，下个星期五。

This is kind of typical, next Friday.

所以我就在下个星期五过来了。

So I show up next Friday.

车还没修好。

Car's not done.

那个技工没来。

Tech didn't show up.

我说，你知道吗？

I said, you know what?

我刚卖掉了一家公司。

I've just sold one of my businesses.

我对你们的生意是怎么运作的很好奇。

I got a curiosity about how your business works.

我能在这儿待一会儿看看吗？

Can I just come hang out here?

他跟我说：‘你是第一个问这个问题的顾客，但我不能让你去后面，因为你可能会受伤。’

He was like, you're the first customer ever to ask that, but I don't want you back there because you're gonna get hurt.

然后我向他解释：不，我对汽修厂很熟悉。

And then I explained to him, no, I know my way around a body shop.

我对汽车维修很在行。

I know my way around auto repair.

我会避开危险区域。

I'll stay out of way.

我不会受伤的。

I won't get hurt.

事实上，如果你需要，我可以帮你跑腿拿零件。

In fact, I'll just run parts for you if you want.

所以那个周末我回家后开始做研究，发现汽车碰撞行业是一个价值500亿美元的产业。

So I went home that weekend and I started to do research and found out the auto collision industry is a $50,000,000,000 industry.

接着我发现这类店铺有38,000家，因此平均每家企业的营收大约是1万亿美元——其实规模很小。

Then found out that there were 38,000 of these, and so the average business is around $1,000,001,200,000 so pretty small.

我之前接触过先进制造，因此我能感觉到这些修理厂后面的情况并非如此。

And I had been exposed to advanced manufacturing and I could get a sense of that was not what was happening in the back of these shops.

于是我过去观察，跑腿送零件，只是在观察。

So I went and just observed, I was running parts, just observing.

而我看到的简直就是一家美发沙龙。

And what I saw was essentially a hair salon.

每位技工都有两个工位，他们按计件拿报酬，靠这两个工位赚钱。

Every technician had two bays and they were on commission and they made money off of those two bays.

因此，他们对车辆通过的速度毫无兴趣，因为那辆车在他们面前就像一台现金注册机，能为他们带来收入。

So they had no interest in how fast that car went through because that car was sitting in front of them as a cash register to make money.

于是我心想，如果这个价值500亿美元的行业能实现现代化会怎样？

So I thought to myself, what if this was $50,000,000,000 industry was modernized?

如果把这些车辆像亨利·福特那样放进流水线会怎样？

What if you put these cars into a production line like Henry Ford did?

如果根据周期时间和产能向整个团队发放奖金会怎样？

And what if you paid the entire team a bonus based on cycle time and throughput?

对。

Right.

所以我不理解。

So I didn't understand.

那为什么技术人员不希望车更快流转呢？车越多，佣金也越多啊？

So why doesn't the technician want the cars to go through more cars equals more commission?

不是的。

No.

他们想掌控自己的工资，所以他们会围住三四辆车，只从这些车上挑时间来算工时，他们是按小时计酬，但并不在乎车是否完成。

They wanna control their paycheck, and so they would surround themselves with three or four cars, and they would just cherry pick hours off of those cars, and they got paid by the hour, but not so the car didn't have to get finished.

他们只是根据在每辆车上的工作时长从店里领工资。

They were getting paid by the shop just on the hours they worked on that car.

所以那辆车可能在那里停上几周。

So that car could sit there for a couple weeks.

他们根本不在乎。

They didn't care.

你提到了两个术语：周期时间和实际工时。

And you had these two terms, cycle time and touch time.

你能解释一下吗

Can you explain

我去找了店老板，问他：客户把车送来和取走之间，平均需要多长时间？

a little So bit about I went to the shop owner and I said, tell me what the average time it takes between a customer dropping it off and a customer getting their car back?

他说：是的，我可以告诉你，平均是十八天。

And he said, Yeah, I can tell you that it's eighteen days.

我问：你怎么知道这个数字的？

I said, How do you know that?

他说：这是租车的平均时长。

He said, That's the average rental car time.

我说：好吧，这倒是个不错的参考指标。

I said, Okay, that's pretty good proxy.

我又问：平均每单作业你们会收取多少小时的工时费？

I said, How many hours of labor do you bill on each job on average?

他说，哦，这很简单。

He said, Oh, that's easy.

六到八小时。

Six to eight.

我当时想，十八天才完成六到八小时的工作。

And I went, eighteen days to get six to eight hours of work done.

这看起来是个机会，因为这就是差距所在。

That looks like an opportunity because that's the difference.

周期时间就是那十八天。

Cycle time is the eighteen days.

这是从流程开始到结束的全部时间。

That's from the beginning to the end of the process.

而实际接触时间是指技术人员真正接触车辆的时间，也就是六到八小时。

And touch time was the amount of time that those technicians were actually touching the car, six to eight hours.

我当时想，这看起来像是一个可能改变这个行业、让消费者受益的机会。

And I went, oh, that looks like an opportunity to maybe turn this industry around for the consumer.

如果你能去市场说，你的车一天内就能取回，而街上的其他人都要十八天，会怎么样？

What if you could go to market and say, you'll get your car back in a day versus the eighteen days of the rest of the guys down the street?

那时我开始认真地想，我们来创办一家公司吧。

That's when I started to diligently say, Let's start a business.

于是我找了一些以前一起工作过的人，开始专注于做这件事。

So I grabbed some guys that I'd worked with, and we started to work on just doing that.

我们最终成为了当时全国最大的碰撞维修连锁企业。

We ended up with the largest, at the time, collision repair chain around the country.

它叫什么名字？

What was it called?

当时叫Sterling。

It was called Sterling then.

现在叫Service King。

It's now called Service King.

它现在属于Carlisle公司。

It's owned by Carlisle.