如何找到你的套利机会（来自三次成功套利的专家）——专访尼克·科科纳斯

是不是——

Is that-

对，而且也很难理解。

Yeah, and also difficult to understand.

我觉得我有能力理解期权、掉期和奇异期权。

I felt like I was capable of understanding options and swaps and exotic options.

但在我读书的时候，没有一本好书。

And as I was reading books, there is not a good option.

只有一两本，但市面上所有的期权书都是学术性的，比如讲这是一种权利而非义务，在特定时间之前买入。

There are one or two, but all the options books that you get are academic books on like, this is the right but not the obligation to buy by a certain time.

是的，你必须理解这些，但这并不能帮你真正决定该买哪个或卖哪个。

And yes, you have to understand all that, but that doesn't get you anywhere in terms of actually why do I buy this one or sell that one.

那并不能帮你赚钱。

That doesn't get you to making money.

或者说，对。

Or yeah.

或者它们之间是怎么相互关联的，等等。

Or how do they all interrelate and all that.

所以我读了那些书，但感觉对理解这些东西没有任何帮助。

So I read all those books, and I felt no closer to understanding any of it.

最后我遇到了一个特别技术宅的人，他有一台小小的惠普计算器——

And I finally met a guy who was super geeky, and he had a little HP calculators-

……里面还有宏，特别酷——

... that had macros in it, like super cool-

对，编程过的。

Programmed, yeah

……大概48K内存那种。

... 48K in it kind of thing.

他刚雇了一个职员，我就说：“不不不，你才是我需要的人。

And he had just hired a clerk, and I was like, "No, no, no. You're the guy I need.

就是你了。”

You are the guy."

他上的是芝加哥大学。

He went to the University of Chicago.

他学的是量化金融，之前在芝加哥研究与交易公司工作，他们不想让他去交易大厅。

He studied quantitative finance, and he had worked for Chicago Research and Trading, and they didn't want to put him on the floor.

他们觉得他是个量化分析师。

They thought he was a quant.

他们觉得他太书呆子了。

They thought he was too geeky.

所以他辞职了，自己跑到交易大厅，做很小的交易，而且非常……

So he quit, and he put himself up on the floor trading very small and very...

我一见到他，就觉得：“就是你了。”

And as soon as I met him, I'm like, "You're my guy."

他说：“哦，我刚雇了个人。”

And he's like, "Oh, I just hired someone."

我说：“不不不，你是这里唯一懂我想搞明白的事，而且能教给我的人。”

And I was like, "No, no, no. You're the only guy here that understands what I'm trying to get at and can teach it to me."

我当时真的说：'我付钱给你，来为你工作。'

And I literally said, "I'll pay you to work for you."

这句话引起了他的注意。

And that got his attention.

因为他觉得：'这很奇怪。

Because he was like, "That's weird.

为什么？'

Why?"

我解释了一下，然后他说：'好吧，我每周付你250美元。'

And I explained it, and he was like, "Okay, I'll pay you 250 bucks a week."

这肯定完全不合规，我敢说——

Totally illegal, I'm sure-

……按现在的标准来看，对吧？

... by today's standards, right?

那真是太棒了。

And that was awesome.

六个月后，我对如何做市和交易期权有了基本的了解，我投入了两万美元，他投入了四万，然后我开始交易瑞士法郎期权。

Six months later, I had a rudimentary understanding on how to make markets and options, and I put up $20,000, he put up 40,000, and I started trading Swiss franc options.

差不多正好一年，这个主题我们后面还会提到。

It was almost a year to the day, which is a theme that-

我们还会再回到这个话题。

... we'll come back to.

你一开始问我的问题，我有没有设定目标？

You asked at the beginning of the question, did you set a goal?

我的回答是，一年之内，我必须拿到交易牌照，开始交易。

And the answer was, within a year, I need to be on a badge and trading.

我晚了一个星期，但已经在路上了。

And I was a week late, but I was in process.

所以我知道，我算过。

So I knew, I counted it.

但那真的很吓人。

But it was terrifying.

没有比这更难的了。

There's nothing harder.

后来我教了三四十个人怎么做这个，规则是，你第一天进交易场，必须做成一笔交易。

I taught 30, 40 people how to do that after the fact, and the rule was on your first day in the pits, you had to make one trade.

我无法告诉你这有多有用，因为你必须进入一个非常零和、充满敌意和竞争的环境，那里是体力活，嘈杂混乱，你必须在所有人面前开口，冒着看起来像个白痴的风险。

I cannot express to you how useful that is because you have to go into a very zero-sum hostile, competitive environment, which was physical, loud, chaotic, and you have to open your mouth in front of all those people and risk looking like an idiot.

第一天有什么特别的？

What is it about that day one?

我觉得Facebook也有这个，第一天，任何工程师都要把代码部署到生产环境。

So I think Facebook had this too, day one, any engineer, you will ship code to production.

他们这么做了——

They did it-

我不知道这个。

I didn't know that

……持续了很长时间。

... for a long time.

这个我还真不知道，不过那挺好的。

I didn't know that, but that's wonderful.

那时候这么做简直是大逆不道。

And it was like blasphemy back then.

我第一个创业想法是开寿司店，我还专门去洛杉矶跟师傅学艺。

My very first business idea I had was a sushi restaurant, and I went out to LA to train with the chef.

寿司有个很出名的地方，就是你要花好几年时间光擦地——

And sushi's famous for this thing where you spend years just mopping-

对，好几年都在切米饭。

Yeah, years chopping rice.

然后你才能碰米饭。

And then you get rice.

对，八年之内你都别想碰米饭。

Yeah, you're not going to get to the rice eight years in.

要是能让你碰米饭，那简直是奇迹了。

That would be incredible if you got rice.

所以你得先干完所有这些杂活，才有资格上手。

And so you would do all this menial work before you were allowed.

对。

Yes.

我本来要跟着的那个主厨，他说：“我们要开这家餐厅。”

The chef that I was going to work under, he's like, "We're going to open this restaurant up."

那不行。

Can't do that.

结果第一天，办公室的达里尔就装成顾客进来，坐在吧台前，然后他说：“轮到你了。”

So the very first day, Darryl from the office came in as a customer, sat down at the bar, and he goes, "You're up."

我就看着他做，看了一个小时——

I just watched him do, for an hour-

……

...

我一直盯着他看，努力记住每个步骤。

I'd been watching him, try to pay attention.

我不知道你会不会做寿司。

I don't know if you know how to make sushi.

你得先把手沾湿。

You dip your hands in water first.

哦，对。

Oh, yeah.

拍一下。

Clap.

挺难的。

It's hard.

然后放海苔、米饭这些。

Then you do the seaweed, the rice, et cetera.

所以当时我不明白为什么要拍一下。

So I didn't understand at that time, the clap.

所以——

So-

你的手湿透了。

Your hands soaking wet

……

...

我当时以为那只是个庆祝的动作。

I thought it's just like a celebratory thing.

他们为什么要拍手？

Why are they clapping?

他们就是，我也不知道，就是个仪式。

They're just, I don't know, it's just a ritual.

但其实是为了把手上的水弄掉——

But it's to get all the water off-

……只留下刚刚好的湿度。

... to leave only the perfect amount of moisture.

水太少的话，米饭会粘在你手上。

Too little water, rice is stuck to you.

水太多，就软塌塌的——

Too much water, soggy-

恶心的寿司

Gross sushi

……寿司。

... sushi.

我没拍手。

I didn't clap.

我给了办公室的达里尔一些软塌塌的寿司。

I gave Darryl from the office some soggy sushi.

但其实这样做非常有用，就是彻底——

But it was actually very beneficial to just absolutely up-

对，你得——

Yeah, you have to-

……马上

... right away

你就得直接——

... you have to just-

打破僵局

Break the seal

打破僵局。

... break the seal.

后来有个人，他最后成了很棒的交易员，也是很好的朋友，他当时大概拖了三个星期。

And there was a guy who ended up becoming a very good trader, very good friend, and he went like three weeks.

表现焦虑。

Performance anxiety.

弗兰克，如果你在听，我记得。

Frank, if you're out there, I remember.

每天他回来，我都会跟他说：‘哥们，你是个有能力的人。’

And every day, he'd come back and I would just be like, "Dude, you're a capable human.

就——

Just-

……去做吧。

... do it."

但他就是会僵住，整个人都卡住了。

And he would freeze, he'd lock up.

其他所有事情，每隔十年，我都会换个不同的方向，因为那些事不会带来同样的焦虑。

And everything else, every 10 years, I did something different because it didn't produce that same anxiety.

你其实是在追求那种焦虑和恐惧，还是在追求别的什么——

Is it that you're actually seeking the anxiety and fear, or are you seeking something else-

不，我觉得——

No, I think-

……而焦虑和恐惧就像是给你的信号——

... and anxiety and fear is like the signal to you-

对

Correct

……“我找到了。”

... "I found it."

对，是后者。

Yeah, the latter.

那是什么？

What is it?

你实际上在寻找什么？

What are you looking for, actually?

我们在这里，如果幸运的话，能待上几十年。

We're here for whatever, decades if we're lucky.

为了保持学习和年轻，像你们今天这样醒来。

And in order to keep learning and keep young and wake up, like you guys were coming today.

他们大概六点半、六点一刻就到了。

They showed up at what, 6:30, 6:15, something like that.

这让我很兴奋。

I get excited by that.

感到不舒服其实很刺激，因为这意味着我们今天在做点什么。

It's exciting to be uncomfortable in the sense of, hey, we're doing something today.

我们正在做这个小东西——

We're making this little thing here-

谁知道它会带来什么，诸如此类。

... and who knows what that'll lead to, and all of that.

如果你基本上让自己退休了——一旦你擅长某件事，就很容易陷入‘我赚得不错，我知道自己在做什么，我现在算是专家了’的状态。

And if you just put yourself out to pasture, essentially- ... once you get good at something, it's very, very easy to fall into, well, I'm making good money, and I know what I'm doing, and I'm kind of an expert in it now.

而专家身份是个陷阱。

And expertise is such a trap.

真是个陷阱。

It's such a trap.

而且你知道，会有非专家来追赶你。

And you know that a non-expert is going to come after you.

一旦你达到专家水平，你就完了，因为会有更年轻、更有冲劲的人——

Once you get to expert level, you're screwed because somebody who's younger, hungrier-

眼光更敏锐

Fresher eyes

更愿意打破常规、找到新出路的人，会把你打得落花流水。

... more willing to break convention to find the new way through, is going to kick your ass.

所以在被打败之前，你应该主动退出。

So before your ass gets kicked, you should quit.

这真的很难做到。

It's really hard to do.

然后去找点新的事情做。

And then go find something new.

而且这真的很难。

And it's really hard.

年纪越大，做这件事的速度就越慢，动力也越少。

The older you get, the slower you get at doing that, the less incentive you have to do it.

如果你已经取得了一些成功，无论是经济上还是其他方面，都很难有动力去打破现状、放弃一切、去做新的事情并暂时亏钱。

There's very little incentive, financially and otherwise, if you've had some success, to break it, to quit, to go do something new and lose money for a while.

那句话怎么说来着？

What's the quote?

大多数人在25岁就死了，75岁才被埋葬，或者-

Most men die at 25, they're buried at 75 or-

……

...

我觉得Naval也说过，那些伟大的人，真正伟大的人，他们伟大不是因为登上了山顶，而是因为他们愿意回到山脚重新开始，找到一条新路。

I think Naval says as well, the great ones, the truly great ones, they're great not because they've reached the top of a mountain, it's because they are willing to go back to the bottom of the mountain and start again and find a new path.

没有人会这么做。

Nobody does that.

我爸爸桌上摆着一个小小的西西弗斯雕像。

One of the things my dad had on his desk was a little Sisyphus.

我桌上一直放着那个。

I've got that always on my desk.

我桌上一直有这个，很久了。

I've had it on my desk forever.

对我来说，西西弗斯就像是在说，天啊，我们得醒来，然后我在这里建个酒吧。

And for me, the Sisyphus thing is like, shit, we got to wake up and I'm building a wine bar here.

我已经退出餐饮业了。

I got out of the restaurant business.

这个我们肯定还会聊到，但我确实已经退出餐饮业了。

We'll get back to that, I'm sure, but I got out of the restaurant business.

这两年我一半时间都在这里，然后突然有一天我路过，心想：“天哪，我得租下那个地方，再开一家新餐厅。”

I was here for half the time for two years, and then all of a sudden I'm walking by, I'm like, "Oh, shit, I got to rent that place and build a new restaurant."

把石头推出来吧。

Bring out the boulder.

我找到了一座新山。

I found a new hill.

我当时特别犹豫：“我真的想做这件事吗？”

And I was very much like, "Do I want to do this?"

但我内心深处所有声音都说：“不，我不想做，所以这恰恰说明我应该去做。”

And everything in me said, "No, I don't want to do it, so that's why I should probably do it."

你知道吗，你的哲学——你也许知道——西西弗斯的故事，讲的是最重的惩罚，对吧？

Well, your philosophy, you might know this, the story of Sisyphus is about it's the ultimate punishment, right?

他要把那块大石头推上山。

He's going to push the boulder up the hill.

然后有个人，我忘了是谁，说：“我们必须想象西西弗斯是快乐的。”

And then somebody, I forgot who, but they were like, "We must imagine Sisyphus happy."

对。

Yes.

意思是，工作本身就是胜利。

Meaning that the work is the win.

所以他对这个想法有不同的看法，认为这不是最残酷的惩罚，而是他正处在自己的领域里。

And so he had this sort of alternate take on the idea that this is the cruelest punishment, and instead it's like, no, he's in his element.

他做的正是他想做且必须做的事，而人最好的状态就是——

He's doing exactly what he wants to do and must be doing, and where man is at its best-

——当工作本身就是胜利的时候。

... is when the work is the win.

工作本身就是胜利。

The work is the win.

嘿，我们稍微休息一下。

Hey, let's take a quick break.

你有没有过这种感觉：策略定好了，简报写完了，大家都对齐了，然后你发现还是得有人坐下来，真正把那些内容做出来？

You know that feeling when strategy is done, the brief is written, everyone's aligned, and you realize someone still has to sit down and actually create all the content?

那个人通常就是你，而且明天就要交。

That someone is usually you, and it's due tomorrow.

那么，HubSpot的Breeze助手可以帮上忙。

Well, the Breeze Assistant from HubSpot can help.

它直接在HubSpot里面就能用。

It works right inside HubSpot.

你可以起草活动文案、博客文章、邮件，全都用你的品牌语气，全都基于你真实的客户数据。

You can draft campaign copy, blog posts, emails, all in your brand voice, all using your actual customer data.

所以你不只是做内容，你做的是能转化的内容。

So you don't create just content, you create content that converts.

去hubspot.com看看吧，那是为成长型企业打造的智能客户平台。

Check out hubspot.com, the agentic customer platform for growing businesses.

你之前提到过交易，你是怎么开始做交易员的，我的理解是，你基本上是在寻找套利机会。

So you talked about trading, how you started as a trader, and you were My understanding is that essentially, you were looking for arbitrages.

你在寻找系统里的某种漏洞。

You were looking for some sort of glitch in the system.

你在寻找某种定价错误，好让你能进场占个便宜。

You were looking for some sort of mispricing where you can come in and take advantage.

我觉得交易是一种非常纯粹的方式来做这件事。

And I think trading is a very pure way to do that.

但即使在你其他的生意里，我觉得你在某种程度上也找到了套利的机会。

But even in your other businesses, I feel like in some ways you've found an arb.

我们能聊聊套利吗？

Can we talk about arbs?

比如说——

So like-

对，当然可以。

Yeah, absolutely

……套利让你兴奋的点是什么，然后给我讲讲一些套利的故事吧。

... what excites you about an arb, and then explain to me some arb stories.

好的。

Okay.

三年来我拒绝了所有播客邀请，直到遇到这个想法，对吧？

So I've said no to every podcast for three years until I got to this one idea, right?

我答应来是因为你，也因为我现在确信，所有的套利本质上都是时间尺度的问题。

And I said yes to this because of you, and also because I am now convinced that every arb is just about timescale.

这不是我独创的观点，但很明显，尤其是现在AI来了之后。

This is not something that I've come up with or whatever, but it's evident, especially with AI coming in now and everything.

一切都是时间尺度。

Everything is timescale.

所以我们刚开始聊的时候，那张纸来回传递需要30秒。

So at the time we started talking, that piece of paper took 30 seconds to go back and forth.

我是个不错的交易员，但不是天才交易员。

And I was a good trader, not a genius trader.

我当然有能力，而且我挺擅长招那些我所谓的“企业难民”。

I was certainly capable, and I was quasi-decent at bringing what I called corporate refugees.

比如我在晚宴上遇到一个人，他肯定很聪明、能干、外向，可能心算也很快。

So I'd meet someone at a dinner party who was certainly bright, capable, outgoing, could probably do mental math quickly.

然后我发现他们当律师当得很痛苦。

And then I'd see that they're miserable being an attorney.

我就会说：“我有个活儿给你。”

And I'd be like "I got a thing for you."

跟我来。

Come with me.

“我每小时付你7美元，八个月后你就能交易了。”

"I'll pay you $7 an hour, and in eight months you can trade."

这种事我干了几十次。

And I did that dozens of times.

这基本上是线性增长的，我从每小时赚5美元，到五六年内每小时赚几千美元。

That scaled kind of linearly and I went from making $5 an hour to thousands of dollars an hour in five or six years.

但我环顾四周，发现有些公司一天就能赚一千万美元。

But I was looking around and there were companies making $10 million a day down there.

甚至更多。

More.

简直是疯狂的钱。

Crazy money.

我当时就想，我们真正需要做的是想办法绕过那张纸的传递。

And I was like, what we really need to do is figure out a way to bypass that piece of paper going.

所以如果你在纽约交易当时刚兴起的ETF，比如QQQ、SPDR这些，它们其实就是纳斯达克100指数的一篮子股票。

So if you're in New York trading what was then nascent ETFs, triple Qs, spiders, all that, those are just a basket of the Nasdaq 100 stocks.

我们知道这些是什么，也知道它们的比例。

We know what those are, and we know their ratios.

所以如果你有1000份QQQ，你就能算出那对应多少股。

So if you have 1,000 triple Qs, you can figure out exactly how many shares all that is.

自然的对冲工具就是芝加哥的期货，纳斯达克期货。

The natural hedge for that is the futures in Chicago, Nasdaq futures.

然后一切都归结为，在三角关系中，现金头寸。

And then it all comes down to, in the triangle, a cash position.

你不需要真正理解它——

You don't really need to understand it-

好的

Okay

……在细节上，仅此而已。

... in detail beyond that.

但我想做的是，在纽约交易三倍Q的人必须不断打电话，或者通过电话与某个提供纸质凭证的人联系。

But what I wanted to do is, the guys trading the triple Qs in New York would have to pick up a phone or be on the phone constantly with someone who would give someone a piece of paper.

如果我能直接从交易场内与纽约对话，我就有20秒的时间窗口领先于高盛。

And if I could just talk directly to New York from inside the pit, I've got a 20-second time window on Goldman Sachs.

他们赢不了我。

They can't beat me.

20秒到底意味着什么，那值多少钱？

What does 20 seconds actually mean, and what is that worth?

这能让你做什么？

What does it allow you to do?

这是怎么运作的？

How does that work?

嗯，交易会在QQQ上进行，如果你买了100万美元名义价值的QQQ，你大概会在芝加哥卖出8份期货来对冲。

Well, so a trade would take place in the triple Qs, and then if you just bought a million dollars notional in triple Qs, you would sell eight futures roughly in Chicago against it.

好的。

Okay.

这样你就能锁定一点利润。

And you'd lock in a little profit there.

然后你会在纽约持有多头头寸，在那边持有空头头寸，但都是同一家公司的。

And you'd be left with a long position in New York and a short position there, but it's all one company.

现在，那30秒，如果我在那边做了那笔交易，并且能直接和场内的人通话，绕过中间环节，我就能立刻知道价格信息。

And now, that 30 seconds, if I make that trade there and I can talk to the guy who's actually in the pit, bypassing that, I know the pricing information instantly.

第一天，我花了一年时间才把这一切搞定。

And the first day, it took me a year to get this all done.

还有一件事。

So here's another thing.

好。

Okay.

读一下规则。

Read the rules.

好。

Okay.

听起来像——

It sounds like-

大多数人都不读规则。

Most people don't read the rules

……听起来很傻，但还是要读规则。

... it sounds like a dumb thing, but read the rules.

有法律规定的。

There are laws.

而且CFTC的法规有这么厚，Merc和Amex的董事会成员以及所有这些机构的人可能都没读过。

And the CFTC had regulations that were this thick, and all of the people on the board at the Merc and the Amex and all these institutions probably never read them.

他们有律师。

They had lawyers.

律师可能也没读过。

And lawyers probably never read them.

他们靠的是判例法，靠的是实践经验，靠的是他们习惯的那一套。

They went on case law, they went on practice, they went on what they're used to.

然后我就想，如果我们在纽约和芝加哥用的是同一个税号，同一家公司，为什么我不能跟那边的人聊聊呢？

And I went, well, if we're on the same tax ID in New York, in Chicago, same firm, why can't I talk to somebody there?

我没看到这条规则。

I don't see the rule.

我通篇都读过了。

I've read the whole damn thing.

我真的读完了。

I mean, I really did.

那真的特别长。

It's really long.

而且这可不是你随便扔进电脑里就能搞定的那种。

And this is not when you can just throw it in a computer and be like-

……“帮我找找看。”

... "Find the thing."

然后我就想，“天哪，我根本找不到这个。”

And I'm like, "Man, I can't find this."

所以我就想，太好了，我得在纽约和芝加哥之间拉一条专用的部分T1线路，但芝加哥交易所那边就是不通。

And so I was like, great, I need to put up a partial T1 line for a dedicated phone line between New York and Chicago, and the Merc wouldn't run.

那时候交易池底下都是电缆。

Underneath these pits was cabling back then.

还没有Wi-Fi。

It wasn't Wi-Fi.

我得让AT&T来铺光纤。

And I needed AT&T to run fiber.

我提交了申请，但他们不让我做，因为他们大概意识到这对经纪商群体不利。

And I put in permitting, and they wouldn't let me do it because they kind of got that this would be bad for the broker groups.

那Merc是谁的？

And who owned the Merc?

经纪商群体的。

The broker groups.

所以我用几箱詹姆森威士忌贿赂了干活的工会工人。

So I bribed the union guys who did the work with cases of Jameson.

真的。

For real.

现在我可以说了。

I can say that now.

我不会再惹上麻烦了。

I'm not going to get in trouble anymore.

你还记得你产生那个想法的日子吗？

Do you remember the day you kind of had that idea?

或者你当时是——

Or you were like-

嗯，我记得第一次启动它的那天，基本上就像是在说，假设这里有苹果，池塘那边也有苹果，那边有个人愿意出5美元一个苹果来买。

Well, I remember the day when we turned it on the first time, and it was basically like saying, let's say there's apples here and there's apples on the other side of that pond, and that guy, there's someone who rolls up over there and is willing to pay $5 an apple.

而这边这个人愿意以3美元一个卖给我苹果。

And this guy over here is willing to sell me apples for $3.

还有个人正要跑向池塘，说：“去那边做那笔交易吧。”

And there's a guy about to run to the pond going like, "Do that trade over there."

但与此同时，我们可以通话。

But meanwhile, we can talk.

我们有绳子和铁罐。

We got the string and the tin can.

所以我们做了一笔交易。

So we made a trade.

我当时就想：“天哪。”

I went, "Oh my God."

然后我们就赚了，我也说不清，一下子几十万美元。

And we made, I don't know, a couple hundred thousand dollars instantly.

而且这时候你一点风险都不承担。

And you're taking no risk at this point.

零风险。

Zero risk.

然后我马上——

And I immediately-

当你终于找到这种套利机会的时候，那种感觉是不是特别爽？

Is that feeling just orgasmic when you finally find one of these arbs?

不，那太吓人了。

No, it was terrifying.

太吓人了。

It was terrifying.

之所以吓人，是因为这机会太好了，以至于那些掌权的人会把你干掉。

And the reason it was terrifying was because it was so good that the powers that be would kill you.

我不是那个意思——

And I don't mean that as-

这不是比喻。

It's not figurative.

我不是在打比方。

I don't mean that as figurative.

黑手党那一套。

Mafia shit.

确实如此。

It really was.

那时候确实是这样。

It really was at that time.

我也知道，如果我们从大投行口袋里偷钱，那天赚了200万——那就会是我们赚的最后200万。

I also knew that if we picked the pockets of the big investment banks and we made $2 million that day- That'd be the last $2 million we ever make.

所以从某种意义上说，我当时心里想：“哦，对。

So in one sense, I was going like, "Oh, yeah.

果然和我想的一样。

It is as I thought it was."

这里有个空档。

There's this gap here.

但后来我说：“停掉吧。”

But then I went, "Shut it down."

大家都说：“停掉？

And everyone was like, "Shut it down?

我们为这个已经忙了七个月了。

We've been working on this for seven months.

你说停掉是什么意思？”

What do you mean shut it down?"

我说：“我们不能这么明目张胆。

I go, "We can't be so blatant.

我们最好还是细水长流，慢慢从他们那里捞一点——

We're much better off picking their pocket a little bit for years-

……总比第一天就把他们彻底搞垮要好，对吧？

... than we are just destroying them on day one, right?"

所以我回去重新申请，说：‘嘿，这里有所有证据证明我们是芝加哥的自然对冲，而且这些产品类别、这些ETF新创新增长非常快。

So I went back and reapplied for, "Hey, here's all the evidence that we're the natural hedge in Chicago, and these are growing really fast, this product class, this ETF new innovation.

你们会想做这类事情的。’

You're going to want to do this kind of thing."

所以他们给了我一个试点项目，以为我需要六到八个月才能把所有东西都弄好。

So they gave me a pilot program, thinking that it would take me six to eight months to get everything wired up.

你回来了。

You're back.

不，然后一旦他们给了我试点项目，我就可以公开做了，而且我可以在几个不同的交易池里做。

No, and then once they gave me the pilot program, then I could do it in the open, and I could do it in a couple different pits.

我有一个搭档，就是那个Najera的家伙，他……

And I had a partner, the guy, the Najera guy that-

……他在纽约那边，我们是一起上大学的。

... that he was in the New York side, and we went to college together.

他是个电子表格高手，数学思维特别棒。

And he was a spreadsheet guru, just great math mind.

我们就把那玩意儿搞起来了。

And we cranked that thing up.

那你从哪儿开始的？到最厉害的时候，你在做什么？

So you started where, and at its peak, what were you doing?

六个月内，我们就做到了美国证券交易所每日交易量的几个百分点。

We were doing a couple percent of the daily volume of the American Stock Exchange within six months.

那换算成美元是多少？

What does that mean in dollars?

你们做这个赚了多少钱？

How much money were you making doing this?

嗯，我想那一年我们赚了超过一亿美元。

Well, I think that year we made over $100 million.

一年之内？

In a year?

一年之内。

In a year.

那时候一亿美元可是笔巨款。

Back when $100 million was a lot of money.

而且我有个小——

And I had a small-

一亿美元不算多吧。

Hundred million's not a lot of money.

显然不算。

Well, apparently not.

对我来说算多，但对——

It is for me, but it's not for-

那也就是AI公司两周的收入。

That's two weeks of AI company.

确实不算什么，对吧？

It's nothing, right?

就像，‘哦，一亿美元。’

It's like, "Oh, $100 million."

但是就像——

But like-

那是利润吗？

That's profit?

那是收入吗？

That's revenue?

那是什么意思？

What does that mean?

嗯，那是交易。

Well, it's trading.

但那不是像GMV那样的。

But it's not like a GMV.

那是你拿到的部分。

That's like your take.

那就是你赚到的钱。

That's what you made.

对，那就是套利。

Yeah, that's arbitrage.

套利利润。

Arbitrage profits.

那方面的开销相对较小，而且显然我们雇佣了很多人，支付了很多工资，还有……

The overhead on that was relatively small, and obviously we hired a lot of people and paid out a lot of salaries and-

那你有没有打电话回家说：“嘿，爸妈，今年过得不错吧？”

So did you call home like, "Hey, Mom, Dad, had a good year?"

我看起来——

I look-

“今年赚了点钱？”

"Made some money this year?"

发生了什么事？

What happened?

所以我当时有——

So I had-

因为你小时候家里并不富裕。

Because you didn't grow up rich.

不是。我在这家公司只占很小很小的股份，因为我需要资金。

No. I had a minority, a tiny little percentage of that company because I needed the capital.

当时我唯一缺的可能是——我的第一个一百万大概是在我28岁左右赚到的。

The one thing I didn't have then was I probably had-- My first million probably happened when I was 28 or so.

而且那些钱全都冒着风险。

And all that money was at risk.

那是——

That was-

那你发现这个套利机会的时候，你大概多大年纪？

And so what age are we talking about right now when you figured this arb out?

31岁。

31.

好的。

Okay.

但那些钱全都处于风险之中。

But all that money was at risk.

所以虽然我有钱，但感觉非常脆弱。

So I had it, but it very much felt fragile.

那是你做这个的本钱——

It was your bankroll to do the-

那是用来交易的本钱。

It was the bankroll to trade

……每天。

... every day.

随着公司发展，我的第一个员工成了我的合伙人，现在还是我最好的朋友，吉姆·汉森。

And as we grew the company, my first employee became my business partner, still my best friend, Jim Hansen.

我们发展公司，雇佣了那些从公司逃出来的人，最后团队壮大到大约35个人。

And we grew the company, and we hired the corporate refugees, and we built to, like, 35 guys.

但要把这种套利做大，我们需要资金。

But in order to do this arb at scale, we needed capital.

所以我们和纽约一家有更多资金的公司合并了。

So we merged our firm with a firm in New York that had some more capital.

没人知道怎么经营公司。

No one knew how to run a company.

说清楚点。

Let's just be clear.

我完全不知道怎么管理别人。

I had no idea how to manage people.

就是——

All-

你那时候是什么样的人？

What were you like back then?

混蛋一个。

An asshole.

我不知道。

I don't know.

我当时想找个好办法。

I was trying to come up with a good way.

你每天早上五点半起床，我六点半就到场了，那是比赛日，我靠浓缩咖啡和Agitas撑着，我就想，"你发现了这个东西。"

You woke up every day at 5:30 in the morning, and I got on the floor at 6:30, and it was game day, and I was fueled by espresso and Agitas and I was just like, "You found this thing.

"走吧，"对吧？

Let's go," right?

还有一件事——那时候我爸还在，你问过，"你给父母打电话了吗？"

And one of the things that-- My dad was still around then, and you asked, "Did you call the parents?"

我记得，不管谁说有钱人不交税，相信我，就算有人搞明白了，我也没有。

I remember, whoever says rich people don't pay taxes, trust me, if people have figured it out, I have not.

那一年，我记得我有一笔巨额的税单，几百万美元的税单，然后我得想办法从交易公司里取钱来交税，诸如此类。

That year, I remember that I had a giant tax bill, multimillion-dollar tax bill, and had to then figure out, well, I need to remove money from the trading firm and pay the taxes and all that.

我记得我写了一张支票。

And I remember writing a check.

我之前开过最大的支票，大概也就三千美元——

The biggest check I had written before that was probably, like, $3,000-

……用来付车子的首付什么的。

... for a down payment on a car or something.

所以我开了这张几百万美元的国税局支票，开车去我爸家，拿给他看。

So I write this multimillion-dollar IRS check, and I drove to my dad's house, and I showed it to him.

他当时有点震惊，说：“哎呀，我去。”

And he was kind of like, "Oh, shit."

他问：“你干的事合法吗？”

He's like, "Is what you're doing legal?"

这是他问的第一个问题。

First question.

他是在杂货店生意里长大的希腊人。

Greek guy who grew up in a grocery store business.

问得挺合理。

Fair question.

问得对。

Fair question.

我说："当然。

I said, "Of course.

是的。"

Yes."

然后他说："好吧。

And he went, "Okay.

这不会长久的。"

It won't last."

他是大萧条时期过来的人，他说："这不会长久。

He was a product of the Great Depression, and he was like, "It won't last.

把钱收好。

Put it away.

别买船，别沾女人，别碰毒品。"

No boats, no women, no drugs."

他给我讲了那番话。

Gave me that little talk.

然后他说：“记住，这是一个伟大的国家，你的祖父母就是来到这里的。”

And then he said, "Just remember that this is the great country that your grandparents came to.

交税吧。

Pay that.

交税是你的爱国义务。

It's your patriotic duty to pay that.

这就是我牺牲的原因。

That's why I sacrifice.

这就是他们牺牲的原因。”

That's why they sacrifice."

我当时想：“天哪，我还指望在这税单上得到点同情呢。”

And I went, "Shit, I was hoping for a little sympathy on the tax bill here."

但我记得清清楚楚。

But I remember it vividly.

对，我们得给那段话起个名字。

Yeah, we need a name for that speech.

就像我们有“小鸟和蜜蜂”那套说辞一样。

It's like we have the birds and the bees speech.

那是税务。

It's tax.

那叫什么来着——

What's the-

国税局说辞。

The IRS speech

……去赚点钱吧，孩子。

... make some money, son.

不，是去交税。

No, pay your taxes.

没有船，没有酒，没有女人。

No boats, no liquor, no ladies.

真的，他就是这么说的。

Really, that's what he said.

然后他说：“这次我允许你请我吃顿饭。”

And then he's like, "I will allow you to take me out to dinner this time."

就这样。

And that was it.

没有那种“太好了，恭喜”之类的。

There was no, "Hoorah, congrats."

更像是一种谨慎的乐观告诫——

It was more just like a cautious tale of optimism in a way-

就是说，“把钱存起来。

... of like, "Save it.

别干蠢事。

Don't do stupid shit.

回家，第二天醒来，再继续干。”

Go home and wake up the next day and do it again."

我爸还教了我一件事，一开始的时候，别人可能会说“你脑子真好使”之类的话，但这话真不真还不一定。

The other thing that my dad really taught me was, at the beginning, you were kind of like, "Oh, you have this great mind," and all that stuff, and that might or might not be true.

真正重要的是你得出现。

But what's really the case is that you show up.

我爸就说：“每天准时到，提前到。”

My dad was just like, "Show up every day on time, early."

提前。

Early.

老话说得好，提前到就是准时，准时到就是迟到，迟到就赶紧滚蛋。

The old adage, early is on time, on time is late, and late means get the out of here.

我真的是这么想的。

And I literally feel that way.

大多数人根本不会出现。

Most people don't show up.

大多数人不会坚持到底。

Most people don't follow through.

而且说到出现，不只是人到了就行。

And showing up means not just showing up.

你看，出现有两种。

Look, there's two kinds of showing up.

一种是准备好了再出现，另一种是没准备好，但承认自己没准备好。

There's showing up prepared, and then there's showing up unprepared, but admitting that you're unprepared.

顺便说一句，这两种都算数。

Both of those count, by the way.

但迟到、不来、取消、改时间，这些就不算了。

But then show up late, don't show up, cancel, move it.

你给我发短信，多久能收到回复？

When you text me, how long does it take to get a text back?

几乎是秒回。

Almost instantaneous.

几乎是秒回，因为如果你一直这么做，其实并不难。

Almost instantaneous, because if you consistently do that, it's not very hard.

我不需要提前三周就计划好。

I don't need to plan something three weeks out.

你发消息给我，咱们现在就打电话。

You text me, let's get on the phone right now.

咱们把问题解决了。

Let's hash it out.

如果你一直这样做，长期下来会积累很多好处。

And if you do that consistently, it accrues so many benefits over time.

所以这是你从你爸爸那里学到的。

So you learned that from your dad.

对，百分之百。

Yeah, 1,000%.

你这一年过得真棒。

And you have this amazing year.

我想这些事不会永远持续下去。

I assume these things don't last forever.

那么接下来的一年，当然任何套利机会都像一扇会关闭的窗户，它们要么关得快要么关得慢，但最终都会关上。

Well, so the following year, of course any arbitrage is going to be a window that closes, and they close quickly or slowly, but they're always going to close.

所以那个时间窗口变得越来越短。

So the timescale of that kept getting shorter.

其他人也搞明白了。

Other people figured it out.

我们开始在上面加计算。

We started adding computation onto it.

当时的情况是，纽约的一些资深合伙人那年赚了太多钱，以至于他们说：“这就是我等了30年的东西。

What had happened is that some of the older partners in New York made so much money that year that they went, "This is what I've been waiting for, for 30 years.

我不干了。”

I'm out."

那时候，我们会看到波士顿证券交易所有一家陷入困境的小型交易公司。

And at that time, we'd see a small trading company that was distressed in Boston, at the Boston Stock Exchange.

我们会问：“他们需要多少钱才能维持运营？”

We'd be like, "How much do they need to keep them in business?"

结果呢，转眼间我就坐上了去波士顿的飞机，一个三十来岁的小伙子，带着台电脑，跟那些在那儿干了四十年的老前辈说：“以后你们这生意就按我们这套来。”

Okay, next thing you know, I'm on a plane to Boston and some 30-year-old dude with a computer is telling these guys who've been there for 40 years, "Here's how we're going to run your business now."

那场面可不太妙。

That did not go well.

你懂我意思吧？

You know what I mean?

所以后来就过度扩张了，倒不是因为别的，就是——

So there was overexpansion, not because of anything other than like-

……“哦，对，

... "Oh, yeah.

嗯，我们就把——

Well, we'll take-

……把学到的东西用到新领域去。”

... what we've learned and we'll apply it to new things."

可我们根本不懂怎么经营一家公司。

But we didn't know how to build a business.

我们不知道怎么建立管理层和会计体系，这方面我们做得一塌糊涂。

We didn't know how to build a layer of management and accounting, and we were terrible at that.

第二年，有些人的收入只有2000年、2001年的一半。

And some of the guys the following year made half of what they made in, call it 2000, 2001.

到了2002年，交易量下降了。

So 2002 comes along, trading volumes go down.

我们没做错什么。

We're not doing anything wrong.

只是赚的钱少了很多。

We're just making a lot less money.

比如一个赚两百万的人，我认识他的时候他赚五万。

So a guy that made $2 million, he was making 50 grand when I met him.

现在他赚两百万。

And he makes $2 million.

就像运动员一样。

It's like athletes or something.

现在一百万感觉就像——

Now a million feels-

然后你会——

And you get-

……贫困线一样。

... of poverty.

对，然后突然之间，两年后他们赚了80万，他们就会觉得：“唉，这太扯了。”

Yeah, and then all of a sudden it's like they make $800,000 two years later and they're like, "Ugh, this is bullshit."

然后就会出现那种摇滚乐队综合症，大家都开始有点不满，诸如此类的。

And then you get the rock band syndrome, where everyone's starting to get a little salty and all that.

但我们其实都非常幸运。

But we're all super fortunate.

而且就像我一开始说了八遍的，我以前是个很糟糕的管理者。

And I just got, like I've said eight times in the beginning, I was a terrible manager of people.

可能现在还是。

I probably still am.

而且我就是不喜欢那种感觉。

And I just didn't enjoy it.

我拼命努力了十年，终于到了某个阶段。

I got to the point where I had run really hard for 10 years.

我爸是在2001年去世的。

My dad died in '01.

我们俩关系特别铁。

I was very close with him.

九一一事件发生了。

9/11 happens.

我们当中有人在华尔街工作。

We had people that worked on Wall Street.

大家都没事，但我确实认识一些受影响的人。

Everyone was okay, but I definitely knew people who were not.

那年我离开的时候一直在想，"我到底在干什么？"

And I left that year going, "What am I doing?

我得放慢节奏了。

I need to dial this back."

而且我不是个好父亲，也不是个好丈夫。

And I wasn't a good parent, I wasn't a good husband.

我简直就不是个好人。

I just wasn't being a good person.

我去参加晚宴的时候，心里就想：“大家能不能快点啊？”

I'd go to dinner parties and I'm like, "Can we just move shit along, people?"

因为感觉就是——

Because it just felt-

尼克，这里不是交易大厅。

Nick, this is not the trading floor.

世界感觉太慢了。

The world felt slow.

对，太慢了。

Slow, yeah.

我从小就给人家当球童。

And I grew up caddying.

我打了一辈子高尔夫。

I'm a lifelong golfer.

所以突然有一天，我发现自己在跟一些三十多岁的退役职业运动员打高尔夫，他们都是名人，大人物，可他们却痛苦不堪。

So all of a sudden I would find myself playing golf with ex-professional athletes who were in their 30s, who were famous, big-time guys, and they were miserable.

他们把高尔夫看得太重了，而且赌注很大。

And they took golf way too seriously, and they played for big money.

我当时就想，这有什么意思呢？

And I was like, "There's no edge.

他们为什么要在高尔夫上赌博？

Why are they gambling on golf?"

我真搞不懂这是怎么回事。

"I don't understand what's going on."

我从来不觉得自己是个赌徒。

I didn't consider myself a gambler.

我把自己看作套利者。

I considered myself an arbitrageur.

我看着他们，然后老婆给我使了个眼色，意思是“嘿，你让人受不了了”之类的。

And I just looked at them and I got the nudge from the wife like, "Hey, you're not pleasant to be around," and all that.

其实那不算使眼色，简直是打脸。

It wasn't really a nudge, it was a slap in the face.

不过她做得对。

To her credit.

活该。

Deserved.

我记得有一天醒来，心想：“我觉得我该退出了。”

And I just remember one day waking up going, "I think I'm out.

我觉得我需要休个假。

I think I need to take a sabbatical."

我记得我给基思打电话说：“我觉得我需要休息六个月。”

I remember I called Keith and I was like, "I think I need to take six months off."

他说，那个，

He's like, "that.

你不可能休六个月假。

You don't get six months off.

你想休六个月假还拿工资？

You want to take six months off and get paid?

而且你正在组建的期权组，业绩也不如XYZ？

And meanwhile, the options group that you're building is not doing as well as the XYZ?"

我当时就想，天哪，我在这儿干嘛呢？

I was like, "Man, what am I doing here?

我大概想明白了一件事。

I kind of figured something out.

我已经不再享受这份工作了。

I'm not enjoying it anymore.

我应该辞职。

I should quit."