菲利普·于内曼，《为什么？：问题背后的哲学》（斯坦福大学出版社，2023年）

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Basically, of two kinds.

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And the second is, and this is the biggest problem, you need to get an audience.

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Building an audience in podcasting is the hardest thing to do today.

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大家好。

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我是来自批判理论频道的主持人莫切扎·哈吉扎德。

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今天，我非常荣幸能与菲利普·奥曼博士对话，他最近在斯坦福大学出版社出版了一本精彩著作。

Today, I'm honored to be speaking with doctor Philip Oman about a wonderful book that he published with Stanford University Press.

这本书名为《问题背后的哲学》。

The book is called The Philosophy Behind the Question.

这本书最初以法语写成，后由亚当·霍克翻译成英文。

The book was originally written in French and it was translated into English by Adam Hocker.

菲利普是巴黎哲学、科学与技术史研究所的研究主任，但我将让他自己向大家介绍。

Philippe is a research director at the Institute of History of Philosophy, Sciences, and Technology in Paris, but I'll let him introduce himself to us.

菲利普，欢迎来到新书网络。

Philippe, welcome to New Books Network.

你好。

Hello.

谢谢。

Thank you.

非常感谢您的邀请。

Thank you very much for the invitation.

在我们开始讨论这本精彩的著作之前，如果您能向我们的听众介绍一下自己，并谈谈您是如何对哲学产生兴趣的，更重要的是，这本书的想法是如何产生的，我将不胜感激。

Before we start talking about this wonderful book, I would appreciate it if you could introduce yourself to our listeners and tell us generally, how you became interested in philosophy and more importantly, how the idea of this book came to you.

好的。

Okay.

我是一名科学哲学家，任职于法国国家科学研究中心和巴黎第一大学索邦大学。

So, I am a philosopher of science, at the French, Center of Center of Scientific Research and the University Paris one, Sorbonne in Paris.

我早年接受的是数学和哲学训练，后来转向科学哲学，并曾短暂探索过现象学等其他领域，最终专注于生物学哲学，这大概始于我的博士论文主题——关于生物体概念中的癌症问题，我从生物学史的背景出发，探讨了这一概念在康德时代胚胎学、比较解剖学和生理学发展过程中的演变。

My training was originally in mathematics and philosophy a very long time ago and then I turned to philosophy of science with some little explorations of other topics such as phenomenology, also a very long time ago, and I focused on the philosophy of biology which has been I guess started by my dissertation topic which was about cancer concept of organism, that I addressed in the background of the, history of biology at the times and how this concept emerged throughout, advances in embryology, comparative anatomy or physiology at times of Kant.

此后，我继续专注于生物学哲学，尤其关注进化生物学和生态学的哲学问题。

So then I remained with the philosophy of biology and I focused more generally on the philosophy of evolutionary biology and of ecology.

这两个领域密切相关，因此这本书名为《为什么？》

Are two fields that are really very much connected and so this book is called Why?

这是一本我们即将讨论的书，它总体上探讨了‘为什么’——我们行动的原因、世界为何如此、我们为何相信某些事物，这是一次对‘理由’本质的广泛哲学探索，即‘为什么’这个词在不同语境中的含义，那么，我为何对撰写这本书感兴趣呢？

And it's a book we'll be talking about it but it's very very generally about a book about reasons why reasons why we act, reasons why the world is as it is and reasons why we believe in such and such things and so it's a very general philosophical explorations of what it is to be a reason and so what does the word why mean in various contexts and so why was I interested in writing this book?

作为一名学术哲学家，我一直在研究各种非常专业化的课题，曾发表过关于生物功能概念、自然选择与适应的一般观念、进化生物学中的有机体概念，以及科学解释的一般观念，并且我曾为一些观点辩护，稍后我会谈到这些观点，即什么是正确的科学解释。

Actually as an academic philosopher I have been working on various very specialized topics and so I published on the concept of biological function, more generally the notions of natural selection and adaptation, the notion of organism in evolutionary biology, and also on the notion of scientific explanation in general, and I defended a few thesis that I'll talk about later about what is a correct scientific explanation.

实际上，在哲学领域，就像所有其他学术学科一样，人们都会专业化，这是不可避免的，而且通常是好事；因此，我们是科学哲学家，更具体地说是生物学哲学家，有时则专注于生物学中的某个特定主题，比如免疫学或发育理论。

Actually in philosophy, like all other academic disciplines, people specialize which is an unavoidable and in general a good thing and so we are like philosophers of science and more generally of biology and sometimes more generally of a specific topic in biology like immunology or developmental theory.

但在哲学中，概念、观念和问题之间有着密切的关联。

But in philosophy, concepts, notions, questions are very much related.

如果你讨论‘什么是有机体’，就会涉及‘什么是个体’的问题，而‘个体’本身也是一个快速的形而上学问题，它与‘什么是事物’、‘我们如何在不同时间点识别一个事物’等问题相连，进而关联到时间的本质，以及‘如何计数事物’的问题——这实际上又与数学和数学哲学相关。

And if you talk let's say about what is an organism you deal with the question what is actually what is an individual and what is an individual is also a quick metaphysical question which connects to issues about what is very generally a thing, how do we recognize a thing in various moments in time which connects to the question of time and also what it is to count things which connects to issues in mathematics actually and the philosophy of mathematics.

通过这个例子你可以看到，总体而言，哲学问题彼此紧密关联；当你阅读像亚里士多德或康德这样的经典哲学家时，这些议题之间的联系非常明显；而如今我们高度专业化，或许能意识到这些联系，却不再专注于它们，也很少就此撰写文章。

So with this example you see that in general, philosophical issues are very much related and actually when you read a sort of classic philosopher thinking of let's say Aristotle or Kant, of course the connection between those questions are very much salient and since we are nowadays very much specializing we don't, maybe we can think of the connections but we don't really focus on them and very rarely write about them.

因此，我想趁此机会，第一次尝试梳理我多年来所捍卫的那些观点之间的联系——比如关于生物功能的观点，以及关于解释或数学的其他观点——并探讨它们如何与语言、行动等更普遍的问题相关联，因为当你试图理解鲨鱼捕猎行为的生物学解释时，捕猎行为本身就是一种行动，而行动是我们日常生活中时刻都在处理的事物。

And so I wanted to, once, for once I wanted to see how the ideas that I have been defending regarding for example biological functions and other ideas regarding let's say explanations or mathematics were connected and would connect to some very general issues about language, about action because actually when you when you when you try to make sense of a biological explanation of the hunting behavior of sharks, Well hunting behavior it's an action and action is something we are dealing with all the time.

我们谈论自己的行为，也向他人解释和辩护自己的行为；因此，像捕猎行为的生态学模型这样看似微小的问题，实际上可能与关于行动本身及其正当性的哲学问题产生关联。

We talk about our actions, we justify our actions with people so the very tiny question of let's say the behavioral ecology models of hunting actually they might connect to philosophical issues with action in general and the justification of actions.

因此，这本书旨在勾勒一幅宏观图景，它建立在我多年来学术工作中所积累的内容之上，涵盖了我在各种学术论文中极力主张的主张，并延伸至与这些主张相关的其他领域，如哲学的子学科——形而上学、语言哲学、历史哲学等。

So this book is about trying to sketch the big picture it relies on things that I have been academically doing for actually for many years now so and where things like claims that I tried to defend very strongly in various academic papers and it goes into issues that are related to the claim that have been defending and that are, let's say, in other disciplines like sub disciplines of philosophy, like metaphysics, philosophy of language, like philosophy of history.

所以这本书和这个项目主要是反思我一直在哲学领域所做的工作，试图深入整体视角，努力理解它，至少对我来说，也希望对读者有所帮助。

So that's the book and the project was really about reflecting of what I've been doing in philosophy and trying to sort of venture myself into the big picture and try to to to make sense of it, at least for at least for me and hopefully for readers.

太棒了。

Great.

谢谢。

Thank you.

这是个完美的解释。

It was a perfect explanation.

而且我也非常欣赏你规划这本书的方式。

And and I also really love the way you have kind of planned the book.

全书分为三部分：语法、融合与界限。

There are three parts, grammar, fusions, and limits.

共有九章。

And each chapter, there are nine chapters.

每一章都以一个‘为什么’的问题开头，然后我们会讨论你提到的关于动物和生物学的一些问题。我现在明白了，虽然我之前不了解你的背景，但我现在能理解你为何选择在书中探讨这些问题。

And each chapter starts with a why question, and then we will talk about some of the issues you discussed about animals and biology and I can now see I didn't know your background but I can see why you decided to write about these issues in your book.

那我们先从一个比较宽泛的话题开始。

So let's start with something fairly broad.

在科学中，人们使用演绎法来发现科学事实。

So in science they use deductive method to find scientific facts.

你在书的第一章谈到了演绎推理或演绎方法的一些局限性，然后你还进一步讨论了科学解释也可以是因果性的。

The first chapter of the book you talk about some of the shortcomings related to these deductive reasoning or deductive methods, and then you also go on to discuss that scientific explanations could also be causal.

所以我对这些内容很感兴趣，想了解更多。

So I'm interested to know more about these.

是的。

Yeah.

实际上，在科学哲学中，关于什么是解释，一直存在讨论。

So actually, there is, ongoing discussions, in philosophy of science about what is an explanation.

因为作为科学哲学家，我们关注规范性问题，比如为什么诉诸魔法是一种糟糕的解释，同时我们也关注解释的规范是如何随历史变化的。

So because as philosophers of science we are interested in the normative questions why is for example an appeal to magic a bad explanation and also we are interested in accounting for the fact that the norms for explanation are historically changing.

在亚里士多德时代，人们认为正确的解释，与我们现在所认为的正确解释完全不同，这相当令人困惑，因为人们可能会说，科学是进步的，所以过去是错的，现在我们对了，但要实现进步，科学就必须找到解释。

So what people would count as a correct explanation at the time of Aristotle is not at all what we see as a correct explanation and this is quite puzzling because actually one could say okay but science you know progresses so this was wrong and now we are okay but in order to progress science has to find explanations.

所以科学可以改变解释的内容，但你如何真正改变解释的规范呢？

So science can change the contents of explanations but how do you change the norm of explanations actually?

因此，哲学家们提出的非常普遍的问题是：什么是解释？如果你在本科课堂上教授科学哲学，通常会从归纳法和大卫·休谟开始谈起。

So the very general questions philosophers ask are about what is an explanation and then if you for example teach philosophy of science in undergrad classes you'll start in general you talk about induction and David Hume.

大卫·休谟是质疑归纳法逻辑可靠性的人。

So David Hume was the guy who questioned the logical reliability of induction.

什么是归纳法？

What is induction?

它是指从一些案例出发，对所有类似案例做出一般性结论，而休谟明确区分了两种推理：演绎。

It's starting from some cases and saying something general about all the similar cases and Hume very forcefully made a difference between two kinds of inferences the deduction.

演绎是指你有一个命题，然后从中推导出某种已经包含在该命题中的内容。

So deduction is about you have a proposition and you derive something that is somehow already in the proposition.

例如，如果你告诉我你下周会在巴塞罗那，我就可以说下周二你将在巴塞罗那，因为这属于下周的一部分。

So for example, if you tell me I'll be in Barcelona next week, I can tell you that the next Tuesday you'll be in Barcelona because it's part of next week.

这就是演绎，正如维拉托首先指出的，演绎是一种保持真理的推理：只要前提为真，推导出的命题也必然为真。但当然，在归纳法中，正如休谟所说，你并不具备这种真理的保真性。

So this is a deduction and as Villato first said the deduction is an inference that conserves the truth so since as far as the first claim the first proposition is true the proposition that is deduced is also true But of course in induction you don't have that's what Hume was saying, don't have the problem of you don't have sorry this conservation of truth.

例如，如果你告诉我经典的例子：所有天鹅都是白色的，我就会推断下一个我看到的天鹅也是白色的，但实际上它可能不是，有些天鹅是黑色的。因此，从你所观察到的少数天鹅推断出所有天鹅的情况，并没有这种保证：关于少数天鹅的命题可能是真的，但关于所有天鹅的命题却未必为真。

For example, if you tell me like the classic examples all swans are white and I infer well the next one the next one I'll be seeing will be white and actually it might not some swans are black so it might be black so the claim there is not this warranty that you will from the few swans you have seen you infer to all swans so the proposition about a few swine can be true but the proposition about all the swans will not be true.

因此，自休谟以来，哲学家们对归纳法作为一种可能稳健地提供知识的认知操作持高度怀疑态度。

So since Hume philosophers are quite suspicious about induction as an epistemic operation likely to robustly provide process.

这就是为什么在20世纪60年代，当哲学家们集中关注科学解释的概念时，像卡尔·亨佩尔这样在50年代极具影响力的哲学家——他原本是德国人，后来被流放到美国。

That's why, when philosophers in the 60s focused really on the notion of scientific explanation someone like Carl Hempel who have been a very influential philosopher in the 50s was free and born but then exiled in America.

卡尔·亨佩尔试图纯粹从演绎的角度来理解解释。

Carl Hempel was trying to understand explanations purely in deductive terms.

因此，我在书中谈到了他的解释观，这一观点影响深远，尽管如今已被广泛讨论，且大多数人已不再认同，但它在关于解释的总体思考中发挥了重要作用。他认为，解释究竟是什么？解释就是一种演绎，因为只有演绎才是传递知识的认知操作。但什么样的演绎呢？他说，解释是那种能告诉你，所要解释的现象本应必然发生的推理。这究竟意味着什么？

So he had a and so I talked in the book about his view of explanation that has been very influential even though it's now very much discussed and in general few subscribe but it really played a great role in this general thinking about explanation so she says what is an explanation actually explaining is about so it's a deduction but because the only deductions are like thought conveying, epistemic operations but, what kind of deduction so he says, explanations are the sort of inferences that tells you that tell you that the scene you want to explain should have had to occur and what does it mean?

例如，如果我想解释月球的运动，我会从月球在此处这一事实出发，以及月球围绕地球运行这一普遍事实开始，那么什么是解释呢？

So if I want to explain let's say the motion of the moon, I start with the fact that the moon is here and the moon or the general fact that the moon has such orbit around planet earth and then what is an explanation?

我通过将月球的运动归摄于所有已知的宇宙事实和物理定律之下，来展示其来源，这就是关键思想——物理定律。

I subsume, show that the motion of the moon derives from all the facts known about the universe and the laws and that's the key idea and the laws of physics.

更准确地说，解释月球的运动，就是表明：如果我知道地球的位置和万有引力定律，那么月球的轨迹就可以从这些前提中推导出来。

So more precisely, explaining the motion of the moon is showing that if I know the facts about the position of the earth and the laws of gravitation then the the trajectory of the moon can be deduced from that.

因此，这就是一种解释，如果你想检验一个假设，这是一个非常普遍的观点，它还意味着：如果你想检验一个关于定律的新假设，你必须从已知的事实中推导出新的结论，并证明这些事实能够以同样的演绎方式从自然定律中推出。

And so that's an explanation and if you want to test hypothesis, it's a very general idea that also implies that if you want to test a new hypothesis you have to derive a new hypothesis let's say about laws, you have to derive the facts that you know and you have to to show show that those facts can be derived from the laws of nature in the same deduced way.

因此，他们称之为演绎-律则解释模型，‘演绎’是因为你从已知的事实和定律中推导出新的事实，‘律则’则意味着其中涉及定律。

So they call that deduced normological model of explanation, deduced because you have deduptions of facts from already known facts and laws and the homological because laws and homological means there are laws.

定律在这一模型中扮演着非常重要的角色。

Laws plays a very important role in this model.

因此，人们能够表明科学解释是完全理性的，同时避免依赖不可靠的归纳法。

And then that was why people could, let's say, show that scientific explanations are perfectly rational and avoid at the same time to make them rely on induction because induction is unreliable.

那么，因果关系在这里扮演什么角色呢？

And why causation here?

归纳法与因果关系密切相关。

So induction is really connected to causation.

说到某物导致另一物，休谟认为，这意味着将某种能力归于A，使其能够产生B，那么你该如何做到这一点呢？

What it is to say that something causes something else, Hume says it's ascribing to something A the power to produce something B and how do you do that?

通常，休谟说，你会进行归纳：例如，你吃面包，你吃过很多次面包，于是你赋予面包一种能力——能够滋养你、供给你能量。

Often you, Hume says, you make inductions so you say you see for example you eat bread and so you have eaten lots of bread and you ascribe to bread the power of, nourish you okay and feed you.

所以当你看到下一块面包时，因为它是面包，你就会说：这块面包也有让我吃饱的力量。

And so the next piece of bread you see because it's bread also, you'll say well this has the power of feeding me those two.

因此，你是基于归纳来赋予事物因果力量的。

So you ascribe causal power on the basis of induction.

如果你对归纳持高度怀疑态度，你可能会对因果关系这一概念本身也持怀疑态度——这在科学哲学中非常常见，因此汉普尔也会说：科学中或许存在因果关系，但它并非解释的核心。

Now if you are quite suspicious about induction, you might be very suspicious about the very idea of causation That's something you find in philosophy of science very often and so that's also why Hempel would say okay there might be causation in science but it's not the core of explanation.

如果某些规律是因果律，那么它们在解释中会发挥作用，但它们发挥作用是因为它们是规律，而不是因为它们是因果律。

If some laws are causal laws then they play a role in explanation, they play a role because they are laws not because they are causal laws.

因此，这就是20世纪80年代对解释的图景。那么，回到一个问题：为什么解释中要涉及因果关系？许多哲学家开始质疑汉普尔的这一观点，最终明确表示：演绎-律则模型的解释观存在问题，因为它仅仅从逻辑上出发，总体上无法区分解释某事、证成一种信念与做出预测之间的差异。

And so that's the picture of explanation let's say in the 80s and so turning to a question why causation in explanation, a lot of philosophers then questioned this view of Hempel and actually said finally said no sort of deductive nomological views of explanation it's not there is a problem because it's only logical and very generally it doesn't make the difference between explaining something and justifying a belief or making a prediction.

现在，我们来看一个非常经典的例子，这个例子来自韦斯利·萨尔蒙。

So now taking an example that is very classical that is due to Wesley Salmon.

假设你面前有一面旗帜，它投下了一道影子，你想解释这面旗帜的影子。按照汉普尔的观点，解释就是：你知道旗杆的高度、太阳的位置，以及光学和三角学的规律，然后从旗杆的尺寸推导出影子的大小。

Suppose you have a flag somewhere, you know, and with a shadow, the flag has a shadow and you want to explain the shadow of the flag and it's perfectly, if you are hamper, the explanation is that you know the fact of the size of the flagpole, you know the position of the sun, and you know the laws of optics and trigonometry and from the fact of the from the side of the flat pole you deduce the size of the shadow.

所以这是一种解释。但有人会说：你也可以反过来做——如果你知道影子的大小，你同样可以推导出旗杆的尺寸，但没人会称这种推导为解释，因为说‘旗帜的影子解释了旗杆的尺寸’毫无意义。

So that's an explanation and someone says okay but you can do the same thing the other way around you can deduce also if you know the size of the shadow you can perfectly well deduce the size of the flagpole but nobody would call that an explanation because it doesn't make any sense to say that the shadow of the flagpole explains the size of the flagpole.

解释应该是不对称的，因此，如果你用B来解释A，通常你不应该被允许用A来解释B，尽管你可以用B来合理化你对A的信念。

There is something explanation should be asymmetric asymmetrical and so if you explain A on the basis of B in general you shouldn't be allowed to explain B on the basis A even though you can justify your belief that A on the basis of B.

我所说的‘合理化’，这里涉及另一个‘为什么’的问题：如果有人问我，你怎么知道旗杆的大小，或者地球的周长是这样的，我会说，因为我了解这里的影子，抱歉，是的，我知道影子的大小，也知道光学和三角学的规律，这完全是一个合理的依据，但这不是解释。萨尔蒙会说，使解释具有解释力的，是对因果关系的引用。

What I mean by justifying and here is another sense of the question why is that if someone asks me how do you know let's say that the size of the flagpole or for example the perimeter of the earth is such and such and I would say well because I know it because I know the shadow here and sorry yes I know the size of the shadow and I know the laws of optics and trigonometry and it's a perfect justification but it's not an explanation and Solman would go saying what makes an explanation explanatory is a reference to causation.

为什么对旗杆影子的解释是正确的？

Why is the explanation of the shadow of the flagpole correct?

这是因为实际上旗杆造成了影子，而影子并不会造成旗杆。

It's because actually the flagpole causes the shadow and that whereas the shadow doesn't cause the flagpole.

因此，解释必须与因果关系相关，这就是为什么许多解释都是因果性的。

So explanation has to go somehow with causation and that's why many explanations are causal.

那么，如今你观察科学，科学家们通常试图做什么呢？

And if you look at science nowadays often what do scientists try to do?

他们常常构建模型，比如对数据建模：例如，你拥有月球的多个位置，然后推断出月球的轨迹，接着你想建立一个模型，解释为什么轨迹是这样的，是什么导致了这一轨迹。

Often they make models and so often they make model let's say of the data so for example you have let's say the various positions of the moon and so you infer a trajectory of the moon and then you want to make a model of why it is like that what produces this trajectory.

因此，你实际上想要建立一个因果模型：在你的因果模型中，输入地球的位置、月球的大小、地球的大小、它们的质量、万有引力定律，然后这个机制——通常体现万有引力定律和物理定律——将解释月球的运动。

So you want to make a causal model actually and in your causal model you'll enter the position of the earth, the size of the moon, size of the earth, their masses, the laws of gravitation and then this mechanism in general instantiating the laws of gravities and also laws of physics will explain the motion of the moon.

因此，在科学论文中，那些能够解释现象的模型通常被称为机械模型，因为它们展示了产生你想要推断或解释的现象或轨迹的某些因果机制。

So in science papers in general those models that explain are called mechanical models so because they display some causal mechanisms yielding the phenomena you want to infer or yielding the trajectory you want to explain.

在科学话语中，你经常在科学论文里看到的这个词——‘机制’，体现了因果关系这一在解释中至关重要的概念，正如索尔曼和其他人所指出的。

Within science talk this little word mechanism that you see all over the place in scientific papers implements the notion of causation that is crucial in explanations and as Solman and others said.

清楚了吗？

Is it clear?

嗯。

Yeah.

嗯。

Yeah.

而解释的结构，在科学中是这样的。

And the structure explanation, it's in science.

这是如何运作的？

How does that work?

是的，实际上我的一个观点是，一些哲学家完全不同意，但另一些人同意：并非所有解释都像这种通过揭示机制来实现的因果解释。我认为，在许多情况下，有些解释是数学属性在发挥解释作用，这究竟意味着什么？

Yes, so actually one of my claims and some philosophers absolutely disagree but others agree is that not all explanations are like these causal explanations unraveling of mechanisms and I take it that in many cases some explanations are such that some mathematical properties are playing an explanatory role and what does it mean?

在我的月球运动例子中，这是一种因果解释，而数学则描述了万有引力定律，即质量与距离平方成反比的关系，这是万有引力定律的表达形式；但数学只是因果作用的表达方式。而在我所主张的其他解释中，数学本身具有解释性，它们并不描述因果作用。

In my example of the motion of the moon, it's a causal explanation and the mathematics are, let's say, describing the laws of gravitation, so the relation between the masses and the inverse square of distance that's the expression of the law of gravitation but the mathematics is the expression of let's say the causal action of gravitation whereas in other explanations what I am arguing is that mathematics are themselves the explanatory, they are not describing causal action.

举个例子，来自图论——事实上，多年来我一直试图论证的是：图论是网络的科学。在当代科学中，网络无处不在：基因组学中有基因调控网络，生态学中有交通网络、各种类型的网络，脑科学中也有大量不同类型的网络，而这些网络具有一些被称为拓扑性质的特性，这正是图论所研究的内容。

And so an example would be from graph theory and actually something that I have been trying to argue for years is that graph theory is the science of networks and okay so in current science you have networks all over the place in genomics like in gene regulatory networks, in ecology you have traffic networks, networks of all kinds, in brain science you have also lots of networks of very different kinds and networks have properties that one calls topological properties that are studied by graph theory.

我的观点是，在某些情况下，网络的结构——即其拓扑结构——发挥着解释作用。

And my point is that in some cases the structure, so the topology of the network plays an explanatory role.

所以，举个我最钟爱的例子，我试着用语言来描述它，但用拓扑学来表达会更容易，用图像则更直观。

So for example, and that's my favorite example, it's I'll try to convey it by words, it's very it's easier when you use topology, so it's easier with images.

但无论如何，想象一下一个捕食关系网络：物种捕食其他物种，有些物种则被其他物种捕食。网络由一组点（称为节点）组成，节点之间通过线（称为边）相连。因此，交通网络就是一个图，它代表了生态系统中所有物种的捕食关系。

But anyways, you picture yourself a network of predatory interactions, so species prey on other species, some species are eaten by other species, So a network is a set of points, dots, they call it nodes and that can be related to other nodes by lines, they call them edges and so a traffic network is a graph that represents all the predatory relations of a species in an ecosystem.

因此，我们可能有成千上万的物种，物种是网络的节点，边代表它们之间的关系：如果一个物种捕食另一个物种，那么这两个节点之间就存在一条边。

So we can have like thousands of species and if a species eats, so species are the nodes of the network, edges are the relations so there is an edge between two nodes if and only if one of the species preys on the other.

因此，一旦你了解了生态系统，就可以构建出该生态系统的完美网络。

And so you can build like this when you know the ecosystem, can build the perfect network of the ecosystem.

而关键在于，这些网络大多属于一种非常普遍的类型，被称为近乎无标度网络。

And then the point is that most of those networks are of a very general kind which is called, well, almost scale free networks.

实际上这稍微复杂一点，但大致就是这个意思。

It's in reality it's a bit more complicated but that's the general idea.

什么是无标度网络？

What is a scale free network?

以航空公司为例，航空公司有从各个城市出发的航班，并非所有城市都相互连通，通常会有一些大型枢纽。

Think of for example airlines, air traffic airlines companies and so they have you know flights from various cities and not all cities are connected and in general you have very large hubs.

比如，我不记得具体是哪家了，但我们可以想象联合航空在圣路易斯设有枢纽，许多航班都会经过圣路易斯。

So for example, you for I don't remember but let's imagine for United Airlines, you have a hub in St Louis and actually lots of the flights would go through St Louis.

所以，如果你想象一下航班网络图，圣路易斯会是一个巨大的枢纽，连接着许多其他城市，而大多数城市只连接着极少数城市。

So if you picture the graph of you know flights, you have a very large hub in St Louis which is connected to many other cities and lots of cities are actually connected to very few cities.

在生态学中，这种交通网络总体上也是同样的情况。

So in ecology, it's a traffic network, it's the same in general.

因此，许多物种的连接非常少，而有些物种则与大量其他物种高度连接。

So it's that many species are very poorly connected and some species are very highly connected to many other species.

这种网络被称为无标度网络，简单来说，假设有大约一两个物种，比如十种左右，与数百个其他物种高度连接；数百个物种连接较少，只与少数物种相连；数千个物种连接更少；还有数万个物种仅与一两个物种有极弱的连接。

This kind of network is called a scale free network and to put it bluntly, let's say you have lots, let's say, well, one or two, about one or two species, like around 10 species that are very very much connected to hundreds of other species and hundreds of species that are a bit less connected, so they are connected to much less species and then thousands of species that are even much less connected and then like tens of thousands of species that are just very poorly connected to one or two.

所以如果你看到这种网络，假设有某种物种随机灭绝，你随机挑选一个物种，它灭绝了。

So if you see this, if you have this kind of networks, then let's suppose one species random one take you pick up randomly one species and it gets extinct.

如果你这样做，这种物种恰好是高度连接的可能性非常非常低，因为实际上大多数物种的连接都非常少。

If you do this, the chances that these species will be very poor, very highly connected to other species are very very low because actually most of the species are very poorly connected.

所以一个物种灭绝，不会对网络的行为产生任何影响。

So with one species go extant, it will change nothing about the behavior of the network.

除非你专门针对那些高度连接的物种，但根据数学定义，被选中的概率非常低，因为你只需看看网络中高度连接物种所占的比例就知道了。

Except if you target the species that is really very much connected, but chances that some of those species is targeted are very low by definition mathematically because just you look at the proportions of the highly connected species in the network.

因此，在这种简单的示例中，总的来说情况要复杂得多，但这就是基本思路。

And so in this kind of it's a tough toy example, mean in general it's much more complicated but that's really the general idea.

所以，这里的网络拓扑结构意味着：如果你随机挑选一个物种，它几乎肯定连接很少，这就导致网络对随机物种灭绝具有免疫力，进而使生态系统在某种程度上具有韧性。

So here it's the topology of the network which entails the fact that very few is that if you pick up randomly one species it will be almost certainly very poorly connected which entails the fact that the network is immune to random species extinctions which entails the fact that the ecosystem is somehow robust.

一些物种可能会消失，另一些物种可能会出现，但你知道它大致会保持稳定。

Some species can go, other species can appear but you know that it will sort of remain stable.

因此，这是一个解释的例子，其中所有因果过程的本质——谁吃谁、谁被谁吃——实际上在解释中并不重要。

So that's an example of an explanation where actually the nature of all the causal processes that which who eats whom who is eaten by whom it doesn't really count in the explanation.

你可以随意交换网络中的边，只要它仍然保持无标度网络的结构即可。

You can you know just switch the edges in your network provided that it still has this structure of scale free network.

它将是稳健的。

It will be robust.

这就是我所说的拓扑解释，而拓扑是数学的一个分支。

So that's what I call topological explanations and topology is a branch of mathematics.

在数学中，你有不同的结构类型，比如代数结构、数学函数空间的结构，而普遍的观点是，这些结构在解释中发挥着作用。

And in mathematics you have the different kind of structure, you have algebraic structures, you have a structure in spaces of mathematical functions and the general claim is that those structures are in some explanation that those structures play an explanatory role.

它们不仅仅是对因果过程的描述，本身就能提供解释。

They are not only a description of the causal processes, they are as such explanatory.

如果你想知道，在我的例子中生态系统为何具有稳健性，我会回答：这是因为网络的无标度特性，这是一种数学事实，而非因果过程。

If you want to, if you ask me what that account in my example the robustness of an ecosystem I will answer it's the scale free nature of the networks and this is the mathematical fact it's not a causal process.

因此，这是一种解释事物为何如此的原因——它是数学的，是数学结构，具体来说是拓扑结构，而不是因果事实。

So this is a kind of reason why things are as they are that is mathematical and it's mathematical structure namely here topological structure and not a causal fact.

我不确定这是否清楚，但这就是我的主张。

I don't know if it's clear but that's claim.

所以，这个主张实际上是关于解释的：大多数解释是因果性的，有些则被称为结构性的，其他哲学家称之为非因果性的，或者说是独特的数学解释。实际上，有几位哲学家支持同样的观点，而我自己的论证主要围绕图论和拓扑学的案例展开，但没错，这就是核心思想。

So the claim is really about the fact that explanations, most of them okay they are causal, some of them are what they call structural, other philosophers say non causal, distinctively mathematical actually there are several philosophers who defend the same idea, my sort of my own argument is really centered on this graph theory and topology case but yeah that's the idea.

如果它变得完全清晰，我想它就不再属于哲学了，因此其中一部分作用正是提出这些问题。

Well if it becomes completely clear I guess it ceases to be philosophy so part of it is just to raise these questions.

让我们谈谈第二章。

Let's talk about the second chapter.

我真的很喜欢这一章的标题——为什么米老鼠打开了冰箱？

And I really love the title of that chapter, which was why did Mickey Mouse open the fridge?

我必须说，我真的很喜欢所有章节的标题，但这个标题尤其吸引我。

And I must say that I really love the titles of all of them, but this one was really interesting to me.

我想，这里你讨论的是人们行为背后的动机，即这些行为是由欲望还是信念驱动的，以及我们如何区分——正如你的书中所谈的——行动的理由与行动的好理由之间的区别。

And I guess here it's where you talk about the reasons behind people's actions, if they are directed by desires or beliefs and how do we distinguish between, again what your book you talk about distinguishing between a reason to do something and a good reason to act or do something.

因此，如果你能谈谈这本书的这一部分，我会非常感激。

So I would appreciate if you could talk about this part of the book.

是的，总的来说，在这本书中，我试图从每个章节开始，聚焦于一个相当普通的问题，以展示世界如何以各种方式对我们产生意义。

Yeah, so yeah in the book in general yeah I tried to start each chapter by like focus on one sort of quite ordinary question and in order to show the various ways the world wide can mean something for us.

这一章主要探讨我们行动的原因，也就是我们为何以某种方式行事，它关乎我们如何理解行为与动作。

And so this chapter is really about reasons why we act or why I act the way we do and so it's about how do we make sense of actions and behaviors.

那为什么我们没有出来打开冰箱呢？

And the why didn't we come out open the fridge?

我认为这是一个非常有代表性的例子，说明了行动的理由：这个问题甚至会让一个小孩或猫咪把欲望归因于米老鼠——他想喝橙汁，因为他口渴了，同时也相信橙汁在冰箱里，而不是在床底下。

It's, I guess it's quite, for me it's a quite illustrative example of the reasons for action so the question and even a kid cat will ascribe to Mickey Mouse the desire which is like he wants to drink orange juice, he's thirsty and also a belief that I mean orange juice is in the fridge it's not under the bed.

此外，我用这个问题来强调，识别行动理由、将欲望和信念归因于他人的能力，实际上在生命早期就已出现，孩子们甚至在看卡通时就会这样做。

So, and also if I use this question also to highlight the fact that this ability of identifying reasons for actions ascribing desires and beliefs to the others is really something that arises very early in life actually kids do it in cartoons.

它还说明了，我们甚至可以将欲望和信念归因于动物，而随着时间推移，成年人可能会停止将欲望归因于动物，或者至少不再对某些动物这样做——我们暂且不谈类人猿，而把欲望和信念限定于人类。

And also it illustrates the fact that we can even ascribe desires and beliefs to animals and so maybe later in time adults will stop ascribing desires to animals and or at least to like different animals, let's not talk about like great apes and restrain those desires and beliefs to humans.

但这种能力——理解他人所有行为的欲望与信念——依然根深蒂固，欲望和信念正是我们行动以及以某种方式行事的原因。

But still this is a very deeply entrenched capacity that we have to make sense of actions of all the others and so desire and beliefs they are a reason why we act and why I act in such a way.

这其中涉及大量复杂问题，而我在书中并未深入探讨，甚至在书中我也没有详尽讨论行动哲学家们提出的关于‘什么是理由’的所有问题。

Lots of complications there and I'm really not going through in the book, even in the book I don't go through all the questions philosophers of action and efficient ask about what exactly is a reason.

我只需说明，这里的‘理由’涉及欲望、意图、目标和信念。

Suffices me to say that the action, sorry the reason here has to do with desires, intentions, goals and beliefs.

关于这一点的准确表述方式有很多相互竞争的哲学观点，而我在这里保持中立。

The proper way this is articulated, there are lots of philosophical accounts that are in competition about that and I'm quite neutral here.

但重点在于，这与一个问题相关：这里重要的是，一个理由并不一定是好的理由。

But the point and it's related to a question, what's important here is that a reason is not necessarily a good reason.

我记得在法国，我们曾有过一场公开辩论，一位部长说，关于解释恐怖主义，他说：‘这些社会学家如果解释恐怖主义，实际上就是在为恐怖主义辩护’，这完全是荒谬的。

So I remember here in France we had a sort of public debate a minister said you know about explaining terrorism and the minister said yeah but those sociologists if they explain terrorism actually they justify terrorism and that's an absolute nonsense actually.

意思是，如果你解释了人们的行为，你是在试图找出他们这样做的原因，但为他们的行为辩护则是试图证明这些原因是合理的，这是两回事。

Mean you if you explain what people do actually you are trying to find out the reasons why they act the way they do but justifying what they do is trying to show those reasons are good reasons and it's different.

那么，为什么不同呢？

So why is it different?

当我们行动时，我们是出于某种理由而行动的。

We are, let's say, when we act, we act for reasons.

实际上，这就是行动与某种自动的、无意识的动作之间的区别。

Actually that's the difference between an action and let's say a soft automatic motion.

我的意思是，打喷嚏，我不是为了某个理由而打喷嚏。

I mean sneezing, I don't sneeze for a reason.

我的意思是，虽然身体里有各种生物过程在进行，但我并不是说我会为了某个目的而打喷嚏。

I mean you have like biological processes going on but I'm not saying I will sneeze in order to something.

所以行为是有理由的，我们会形成这些理由。

So actions are for a reason, we formulate the reasons.

这里也存在一场争论，因为精神分析学家会说，有些理由是无意识的，但这些无意识的理由其实运作方式是一样的。

Well there is also a debate here because psychoanalysts would say some reasons are unconscious but actually those unconscious reasons they work the same way.

它们是我们行动的原因，是我们的欲望，它们促使我们基于对世界的某些信念去追求某物，而这些信念使某种行为成为达成其他行为的手段。

They are reasons why we act, they are desires, they make us strive towards something on the basis that we have certain beliefs about the world which make some action a mean to other action.

我们对这一点也可能出错，抱歉，是手段通往特定目标，我们对这种信念也可能判断错误，但我们正是基于此而行动。

We may be wrong about that too sorry a mean to a specific goal and we may be wrong about this belief but we act on this basis.

因此，这里存在一种理性：一旦我们形成了对世界的这种信念和这种欲望，我们的行为就会以某种方式随之而来，这相当理性。正因如此，通常当我们弄清某人的动机——比如在审判中，她有哪些欲望，她对世界如何运作抱有什么信念，从而认为某种手段能达成目标——我们就认为自己已经解释了她的行为，但当然，我们还没有评判它。

And so there is here a kind of rationality which is once we have this belief about the world, once we have this desire, what we'll do will somehow follow from that and it's quite rational and that's why in general when we have found out think of a trial for example the motives of someone, desires she has and what she thought about how the world is which makes this goal attainable by this means, then we think we have explained what the behavior, the action what she has done but of course we have not judged it.

这是好的吗？

Is it good?

这是坏的吗？

Is it bad?

那是另一回事，因为欲望本身也可能是坏的。

That's something else because actually the desires themselves can be bad.

所以，找到理由就是找出行动背后的需求和信念，但这并不能告诉你这些信念的道德价值。当我这么说是一个好理由时，我指的是信念的道德价值。

So finding the reason is finding the desires and the beliefs that are in the basis of an action it doesn't tell you anything about the moral value of the belief and when I say this is a good reason, this is about the moral value of the belief.

因此，这取决于两种理性之间的区别。

And so this hinges upon the difference between two kinds of rationality.

第一种有时被称为工具理性。

The first one sometimes people that instrumental rationality.

它关乎我的欲望、我想实现的目标以及我为实现这些目标所采用的手段之间的一致性，基于我对世界的认知。我可能对世界有非常错误的认识，拥有非常错误的信息，因此我可能会选择一些非常奇怪的手段来达成目标，但我仍然是理性的，因为这些奇怪的手段在基于我的信念的前提下对我而言是有意义的。

It's about being coherent between my desires, the means, the goals that I desire to achieve and the means that I use in order to pursue those goals based on what I know about the world and I may be very wrong about the world, I may have very wrong informations and so I can pick up let's say very bizarre means to achieve my desired results but still I'm rational because those bizarre means are let's say the means that make sense for me based on my beliefs.

如果你想要一个例子，想想一个人从小被灌输雨是一种致命威胁、雨会致人死亡的观念。如果下雨一个月，他就会整整一个月不出门。有人可能会说这很非理性，但考虑到他对雨的认知是错误的——不，是他对雨的信念，以及他想要活下去的目标，这种行为在逻辑上是完全理性的。

If you want an example think of someone who has been raised in the idea or the belief that rain is somehow a mortal threat and rain kills you and this guy if it's raining, will for example if it's raining for one month he'll never leave his apartment during one month and someone could say that's irrational but given what he knows about the rain it's wrong but it's sorry what he believes about the rain and his goal which is like to stay alive it's perfectly rational.

所以，这就是工具理性，它不关乎你欲望的价值或信念的准确性。还有一种理性，有些人称之为实践理性，它关乎目标和欲望的价值，以及其道德正当性。

So this is instrumental rationality it's not about the value of your desires or the accuracy of your beliefs And there is another kind of reason that some for example can't call the practical reason which is about the value of the goals, the desires and the moral justification for that.

但为了说明人们为何如此行动，或者解释我为何如此行动，我认为工具理性就足够了。

But in order to explain why people act as they do or to explain why I'm acting as I do, I guess instrumental rationality is enough.

当你关注更丰富的理性含义，即涉及欲望或目标并对其进行评估的理性时，伦理或道德就开始发挥作用。

Ethics or morality comes to play when you look at some more richer meaning of rationality, rationality that concerns the desires or the goals and evaluate them.

所以清楚了吗？

So is it clear?

是的，你实际上也回答了我关于这个问题的另一个疑问。

Yeah, you actually answered my other question as well about this.

但我很想谈谈你提到的生物学背景，我想说的是你的第三章。

But I'm keen to talk about you said that you had this background in biology, and I'm keen to talk about your I think it's a third chapter.

为什么没有。

Why did no.

抱歉。

Sorry.

是第四章。

It's a fourth chapter.

在那里你谈到了其他生物。

That's where you talk about other living being.

是的。

Yeah.

而且我认为这与前一章非常相关，你在那一章谈到了人类为什么采取行动。

If and I guess it's sort of very relevant to previous chapter where you talk about humans, why they do actions.

在这一章中，你谈到了除人类以外的其他生物。

In this chapter, talk about other living beings, except humans.

于是提出了一个问题：它们是否有生命的目的。

And the question is raised if they have a purpose in life.

我们该如何探讨目的这一问题呢？

And how can we of resort to the question of purpose?

然后你还提出了非人类生物的功能问题来回答这一疑问。

And then you also bring up the issue of function in nonhuman beings to answer this question.

达尔文生物学在回答非人类生物生命目的的问题上能帮我们什么？

And where does Darwinian biology help us in answering the questions of purpose in in nonhuman living beings?

是的。

Yeah.

所以，这里最根本的问题是，生物学中有一些特殊之处，即如果不借助某种目的性陈述，就很难解释生物学现象。

So, actually, the the very general question here is about there is something specific to biology which is it's very hard to explain biological facts let's say without referring to purposive statements of some kind.

例如，我可以这么说，抱歉，章鱼或变色龙改变颜色是为了逃避捕食者。

So for example I can say that let's, sorry octopuses or chameleons they change color in order to escape predators.

好吧，这显然是目的性的，而自笛卡尔时代以来，哲学家们一直在问：这合理吗？

Okay, so this is clearly purposive and the question philosophers have been asking since the times of even Descartes is okay but does it make sense?

在十七世纪科学革命之后，目的就不再是科学家解释工具的一部分，我们还能这样使用目的性语言吗？

Are we allowed to do this provided that since what we usually call a scientific revolution in the seventeenth century the purpose stopped being part of the explanatory toolkit of scientists.

相比之下，亚里士多德会非常乐意将目的归于动物，甚至归于石头或空气这样的自然物，比如石头——这是一个经典例子，石头倾向于向下落，落到地面或底部，而这正是它们的本性。

So Aristotle in contrast would be perfectly happy with ascribing purposes to animals or even to natural entities like stones or air, know, like the stones, that's a famous example, the stones tend to go down to go to the floor to the bottom and that's their actually that's their nature.

对亚里士多德而言，本性就是朝向某种目标的倾向。

The nature for his Aristotle is a tendency towards something.

对他而言，以及对古希腊哲学家和古代哲学家而言，说某种动物躺在那里是因为它假装死亡以诱骗捕食者，根本不是问题。

So for him nature was full of purposes and of course for him and in general the Greek philosophers and the ancient philosophers it was really not a problem to say well this animal is lying there because he fakes being dead in order to prompt a predator.

抱歉？

Sorry?

抱歉，你继续。

Sorry, go on.

对不起。

Sorry.

是的，在现代科学革命中，总的来说，事情总是更复杂，但基本理念是科学仅限于所谓的有效原因。

Yeah and in the modern revolution very generally, mean things are more as always more complicated but the basic idea is that science restricted to what one calls efficient causes.

也就是说，世界的某种状态决定了下一个状态。

So causes where some state of the world determines the next state of the world.

而如果你谈论目的，那就像是结果决定了原因。

Whereas if you talk about purposes, it's like the effect that determines the cause.

例如，逃避捕食者——这是变色龙改变颜色的效果——正是变色龙改变体色以适应周围环境的原因。

So, for example, escaping a predator, which is the effect of changing color is why the chameleon changes its color to the color of its immediate environment.

因此，这不符合科学革命和现代科学的一般解释框架，因为在这些框架中，原因必须先于结果。

So that doesn't fit into the explanatory scheme of the scientific revolution and modern science in general where causes should come before the effects.

那么，我们该如何处理这个问题呢？

And so what to do with that?

有一种消除策略，即当我们使用目的性陈述时，比如变色龙试图躲避捕食者，狼追羊是为了吃它，

There is a sort of eliminative strategy which is let's consider that when we use purposive statements like the chameleon tries to expecate a predator, the wolf is running after the sheep in order to eat it.

这些表述暗示了我们因认知能力有限而无法明确表述的因果解释，但最终世界上只有原因和结果，只是我们不得不使用这种隐喻性的、以人类为中心、拟人化的目的性语言来谈论非人类，否则就无法表达，但这种语言并不能真正把握世界中的现实。

Those are formulations that hint towards causal explanations that we cannot formulate because of our limited cognitive abilities but ultimately there are only causes and effects in the world but it's just that we have to use these metaphorical anthropocentered anthropomorphical purposive language to talk about non humans because otherwise but it doesn't you know grasp something real in the world.

因此，这是消除主义的策略，但和许多哲学家一样，我认为这是不正确的，因为我相信我们能够首先理解目的性陈述，其次理解为什么这些目的性陈述对于解释生物事件、状态和现象是必不可少的。

So that's the eliminativist strategy and as many philosophers I don't think it's correct because I think there are ways to make sense first of the purposive statements and second of why those purposive statements are actually necessary in order to make sense of biological events, state of affairs phenomena.

那么，为什么会这样呢？

And so why is it the case?

实际上，生物学中的目的性语言无处不在。

Actually the purposive language in biology it's really all over the place.

这关乎功能。

So it's about functions.

当我说到眼睛的功能是视觉，说眼睛的存在是因为它们使脊椎动物或动物能够看见时，

So when I say when I said a function of the the the function of the eyes are seeing and saying that the eyes are there because they allow vertebrates or animals to see.

眼睛的效果正是眼睛存在的原因。

So the effect of the eyes is really the reason why the eyes are there.

但我们也称适应为有目的的。

But also what we call adaptation is also purposive.

因此，适应意味着某种看似如此的情况，比如斑马的颜色或条纹是一种适应，因为这使它们不易被发现——当捕食者看到一群斑马时，很难区分每只斑马的个体边界，从而让猎豹或狮子感到困惑。

So an adaptation means a kind of it's as if let's say that the color of or the stripes of the zebra are adaptation in the sense that it allows them not to be seen because the predator of the zebras when he sees lots of zebras actually it's hard for the cheetah or the lion to distinguish where starts and ends an individual zebra and so it confuses the the cheetah.

这是一种适应，使斑马这种生活在草原上、与猎豹和狮子共存的草食动物得以生存。

So that's an adaptation for a life where the zebra are herbivorous living in the savannah with cheetahs and lions.

这是一种积极的表述：条纹的存在是为了帮助斑马不被吃掉。

It's a positive statement, the stripes are there in order to allow the zebras not to be eaten.

当你观察胚胎发育过程时，也会看到目的性，而胚胎过程对生命至关重要——很难理解一个胚胎如何发育成一只鸡，除非你说发育的每一个阶段都是为了产生一只小鸡。

And also you have perposiveness when you look at embryological processes which are really crucial for life so it's very hard to make sense of an embryological process an egg that develops into an let's say for example a chicken egg that develops into a chick it's very hard to make sense of it if you don't say that all the stages of the development are aiming at producing a chick.

因此，这些就是生命中的目的性表现，例如，当我考虑狼的捕猎行为时，这是一种有目的的行为。

And so those are the aspects of purposiveness in life and so for example, if I consider wolf hunting, this is a behavior hunting that is purposive.

所谓有目的，是指狼的行为是由其他哺乳动物的存在或假定存在以及它的饥饿感所解释的，而饥饿最终与其生存需求相关；但捕猎作为一种有目的的行为，也意味着狼有时——实际上经常——即使最终未能捕获猎物，仍在继续捕猎。

Purposive means that what the wolf does is explained by the presence of or the putative presence of let's say other mammals and its hunger which is ultimately related to its need to survive and but then the hunt it's a purposive behavior also means that sometimes the wolf actually very often the wolf is hunting but the goal is not achieved.

意思是，狼在捕猎，即使最终没有抓到猎物，它依然在捕猎。

Mean the wolf hunts and the wolf is hunting even though the wolf doesn't in the end catch the prey it's still hunting.

因此，有目的的行为实际上可能会失败。

So purposive behavior can fail actually.

积极意义的一个关键部分在于，目标可能无法达成。

An essential part of the meaning of the positive that the goal may not be reached.

然后还存在一种层级结构：狩猎是一种有目的的行为，而狩猎是为了获取食物；狼的许多身体部位——毛皮、颚部、腿部——都具有与狩猎相关的功能，这些功能是相对于狩猎来理解的；而狩猎是为了进食，因此毛皮、颚部以及狩猎行为的目的，都与生物体一个更广泛的功能相关，即进食，而进食又指向生存。

And then there is sort of hierarchical structure so they're hunting which is a purpose of behavior, hunting is to get food, All the parts of the many of the parts of the wolf have functions that are related to this hunting: clothes, jaws, legs, they are related to the capacity for hunting so that they have functions and the functions are understood in relation to the hunt and then the hunt is in order to eat so actually the purpose, the function of the clothes and the jaws and then the hunting behavior are related to a very general function of the organism which is eating, which is also directed towards surviving.

因此，你有一个非常普遍的层级结构，涉及部分功能、总体行为、生物体的总体功能——狩猎，以及最终的生存目的。

So you have a very general hierarchical scheme of entanglement between functions of parts, general behavior, general function of the organism hunting, general purpose to surviving.

那么，为什么生物学家长期以来一直使用这种认识框架呢？

So now why that's something biologists have been, you know, sort of epistemic scheme used by biologists since centuries.

为什么达尔文生物学在这里至关重要？

Why is Darwinian biology crucial here?

因为它使所有这些有目的的陈述变得合理。

Because it makes sense of all those purposive statements.

例如，这一观点是由哲学家拉里·赖特、主要是凯伦·扬格和露丝·穆利坎在20世纪80年代发展起来的。

So for example, and this is an idea that has been developed by philosophers Larry Wright and mostly Karen Younger and Ruth Mullican in the 80s.

当我说到爪子的功能是捕捉猎物时，我是什么意思？

What do I mean when I say the function of the close is to catch prey?

首先，这个陈述是在解释爪子的存在，也就是说，这种解释说明了爪子为何存在，这是第一点。它是如何解释爪子的存在呢？实际上，它涉及自然选择的进化过程。这虽然是一个简单的例子，但解释的逻辑就在这里：在远古的狼群中，按照达尔文主义的观点，种群中的个体是不同的，这是达尔文生物学的基本前提——种群中存在彼此不同的个体。因此，有些狼有爪子，有些则没有。

First this statement is explaining the presence of the close so that's the very general let's say that this kind of explanation explain the presence of the clothes that's the first thing and how is it explaining the presence of the clothes well actually it refers to evolution by natural selection what does it mean The thing of like you know it's also a toy example but the logics of the explanation is here, things of a very ancestral population of wolves also thinking Darwinian terms meaning things populations of individuals that are different that the basics of Darwinian biology it's population with individuals that vary that are different one from another And so some have claws, some don't have claws.

有爪子的狼能够捕捉到猎物。

The ones that have claws, they'll be they'll catch the prey.

而没有爪子的狼则抓不到猎物。

Actually the ones that don't have claws, don't catch the prey.

因此，有爪子的狼更有可能存活下来，并且比没有爪子的狼繁殖得更多。

So the ones that have the claws that will survive and they will reproduce much more than the ones that don't have claws.

最终，由于爪子是可遗传的，整个狼群都会拥有爪子。

So in the end because claws are heritable, wolves the whole population will have claws.

这就是达尔文主义的解释。当我说到‘爪子的功能是捕捉猎物’时，我想表达的是什么？

And that's the that's the Darwinian explanation and what am I saying with that when I said claws is the function of the claws is catching prey.

我想表达的是：捕捉猎物正是使爪子被自然选择保留下来的原因，因为它为拥有爪子的狼提供了繁殖优势和生存优势。

I am saying that catching prey is what made the claws selected by natural selection because it gave a reproductive advantage and survival advantage to the wolves that had claws.

清楚了吗？

Is it clear?

嗯。

Yeah.

嗯。

Yeah.

而且，关于这个问题的一些认识论问题，也出现在生命目的的问题上。

And, some of the epistemic problems with with this question also arise with the purpose of life.

嗯。

Yeah.

嗯。

Yeah.

所以这是一个问题。

So that's something.

所以，如果一个人同意这个观点，我刚才举了功能的例子，总体而言，达尔文生物学的逻辑让你能够理解这些目的性陈述，因此有人可能会说，好吧，所有目的性陈述——生物体各部分的功能、某些动物的目的性行为——都可以通过自然选择来解释。

So so so if one agrees with this idea, so I gave you example of functions, very generally, actually, logics of Darwinian biology allows you to make sense of those purposive statements and so someone could say okay all the purposive statements, so the functions of the parts of the organisms, the purposive behavior of some animals, you can explain them by natural selection.

只要存在个体差异，并且这些差异是可遗传的，自然选择就会出现，正如我所说。

And natural selection arises as soon as you have individuals that vary, as I said, and their differences are heritable.

比如说，你考虑体型这个问题，可遗传性意味着在一个种群中，最高的个体往往会产生比平均值更高的后代。

So let's say for example, you think about size, heritability means in a population the tallest ones will tend to have offspring that are taller than the mean.

这就是可遗传性的含义。

That's what heritability means.

而且，这些特征会带来优势，或者可能带来优势，也可能在繁殖方面带来代价。

And also that you know those properties give you an advantage or can give you an advantage or can be costly in terms of reproduction.

只要体型影响了动物的繁殖机会，自然选择就会针对体型发生作用。

You have natural selection for size as soon as the size makes a difference in the chances of reproductive chances of the animals.

这就是自然选择的逻辑。

So that's the logic of natural selection.

然后有人可能会说，好吧，只要存在个体差异，这些差异是高度可遗传的，并且这些微小差异影响了它们的生存机会，你就有了自然选择，就会产生功能、目的和行为，比如捕猎行为，这实际上是自然选择的纯粹逻辑。

And then someone could say okay so as soon as you have individuals that vary that you know very heritable variations and those little variation make a difference in their survival chances, you have natural selection and you'll have functions, you'll have proposals, you'll have behavior like hunting behavior and it's the pure logics of actually natural selection is a causal process.

因此，你并没有脱离因果过程的范畴，这不像物理学中的情况那样。

So you do not go out the field of causal processes which is not like let's say in physics ultimately.

有人可能会说，好吧，但这只在生命存在时才成立，那么生命为什么存在呢？

And someone could say okay but this is as soon as life exists but then why is life?

你不能说生命存在是因为自然选择，因为通过自然选择的进化是生命个体的属性。

You cannot say life is there because of natural selection because evolution by natural selection is a property of living individuals.

那么，生命存在的原因是什么？

So is there a reason why life is there?

也许生命的存在是为了某种目的。

Maybe life is there for something and for a purpose.

实际上，许多与宗教人士的讨论——他们认为生命中存在某种设计——都集中在这样一个问题上：在自然选择进化之前，生命最初为何会起源？

And and actually so, lots of the discussion with people who, let's say people who are somehow religious and who think there is some design in life concentrates upon the question of like, is there a reason why life originated at the first place before evolution by natural selection?

我在书中指出，这个问题存在一个误区，即动物、大多数生物类别实际上都有明确定义——动物、植物、狼、灵长类等，它们通常被明确定义，是因为你可以将它们定位在生命树上的某个位置。

And what I'm pointing out in the book is that there is an issue with this question which is that animals, most of the biological categories are actually quite well defined animals, plants, wolves, primates and so on and most of the time they are well defined because you can ascribe to them a position in the tree of life actually.

但生命本身呢？

But what about life itself?

实际上，我认为很难对生命做出明确的定义，我认为几乎所有哲学家和生物学家都认为，要给出生命的定义非常困难；如果你连生命是什么都定义不清，又如何能提出‘生命是否有目的’这样的问题呢？

Actually I think it's very hard to have a sort of definition of what life is and what I think of all philosophers and biologists think it's very hard to get a definition of what life is and if you don't have a definition of what life is, how could you even formulate the question does life have a purpose?

我的意思是，你可以说眼睛有目的，因为你清楚眼睛是什么，所以你可以问这个问题；但关于生命，这就困难得多。因此，基于多种原因，我非常接近康德的观点，这是一种康德式的回答——但生命是否有目的这个问题本身其实没有意义。

I mean you can say do eyes have a purpose because you know what eyes so you can ask the question you know what eyes are but about life it's much more difficult and so I tend to think that the question about the purpose of life, you know, I'm quite for many reasons I'm very close to Kant and that's a Kantian answer but the question doesn't really make sense actually.

因为你对生命有许多不同的理论，却无法通过实证手段区分它们；有些观点甚至认为股票市场也是有生命的，这是哲学家马克·贝道的观点，但他对生命本质的定义会导致这种非常奇怪的推论。

So because you have lots of theories about what life is and no way to empirically discriminate between them and some views are such that for example even stock markets will be alive so that's philosopher Mark Bedau's he has a concept of the nature of life but it entails this very bizarre consequence.

其他一些生命定义则得出病毒不属于生命的结论，这对某些生物学领域来说也是有问题的。

Other definitions of life have the consequence that viruses are not alive which is also problematic for some biology.

所以，生命究竟是什么？我认为这个定义太不稳定了，你根本无法问‘生命为何存在’这个问题，除非从因果过程的角度来看——比如生命出现之前世界的化学过程，我们在这方面已经取得了一些进展；但从目标或目的的角度来问‘生命为何存在’，这毫无意义。清楚了吗？

So what life is I think it's a is so just the definition is so unstable that you cannot even ask the question is that what's the reason why life is there except in terms of causal processes that you know the chemistry of the world before life we make some progresses in that but the reason why life in there in terms of goal or it doesn't make sense Is it clear?

是的。

Yeah.

你还在下一章中谈到了解释历史事件的原因，你的例子是第一次世界大战。

You also talk about, within the next chapter, talk about explaining the causes of historical events and your example is the first world war.

这一章让我非常着迷，主要原因是我自己对其中许多概念并不熟悉。

And that chapter was quite fascinating to me, the main reason was that there were a lot of concepts that I wasn't familiar with myself.

例如，你谈到第一次世界大战为何爆发，是基于触发性原因，但你又说这种解释并不充分。

For example, you talk about why the First World War happens and is it based on triggering causes and then you said that this kind of explanation is not adequate.

然后你谈到了大卫·刘易斯的模型实在论观点。

Then you talk about David Lewis's idea of model realism.

这确实引起了我的兴趣，因为我之前没听说过他的名字，也不熟悉这个模型实在论。

And that's what really interested me because I hadn't heard his name before and I wasn't familiar with this model realism.

所以你能谈谈为什么在讨论历史事件的原因时，比如说这些触发事件、导致该事件的触发原因并不是充分的解释。

So can you talk about why when we're talking about the causes of historical events, say, these triggering events triggering causes that lead to that event is not an adequate explanation.

还有大卫·刘易斯的模型实在论是什么？

And what is David Lewis's idea of motor realism?

是的。

Yeah.

实际上，我是从历史学家们正在讨论的这个话题开始的。

So actually, I'm starting with this thing that historians are, discussing.

关于第一次世界大战的解释让我印象深刻，你知道，在历史课上我们被告知，1914年弗朗茨·斐迪南大公遇刺是第一次世界大战的起因，但同时我们也被告知，欧洲的局势——特别是那些联盟关系，使得德国一旦遭受攻击奥地利就不得不回应等等——实际上让一战的发生变得非常可能。

So there were the explanation of World War I and I was struck by the fact that at the same time, you know, in history classes we are told that it's the assassination of Adjudic Franz Ferdinand in 1914 that is the cause of the first world war and we are also told that the situation of Europe especially with these alliances that made it impossible for like Germany being attacked without Austria replying and so on so the situation of Europe made it actually very prebable that World War I would have occurred anyway.

意思是，即使没有这次刺杀事件触发一战，也会有其他事件引发。

Mean if it hadn't, if it wasn't this like assassination that triggered the first world war it would be like something else.

所以我的问题是，这个刺杀事件是解释吗？还是不是？

So my question is okay so is this assassination the explanation or not?

它是原因吗？还是不是？

Is it the cause or not?

我发现实际上存在几种非常不同的原因，而关于第一次世界大战起因的这个问题，答案会因视角不同而不同：一方面，从世界当时的状况来看，触发事件是弗朗茨·斐迪南大公的遇刺；另一方面，真正使战争成为可能的是更广泛的背景，即欧洲各国之间的联盟体系。

And I saw that actually have kinds of causes that are quite different and this very question is about so the question about the causes of World War I, the answer will be different if you look at what we can say, what triggered it given the state of the world and this will be the assassination of France president and what was the general background that made it possible and actually it was the general situation of alliances between the countries in Europe.

弗雷德·布雷德斯基区分了结构性原因和触发性原因，我认为这种区分非常有用。

And this is a difference that Fred Bredsky makes between structural and triggering causes and I think it's quite useful.

那为什么提到大卫·刘易斯呢？

And then why David Lewis?

大卫·刘易斯提出了他所谓的‘模型实在论’，但那到底是什么？我所使用的又是什么？

David Lewis defines what he called model realism but actually what is it and what I am using.

简单来说，这是一种高度精巧的观念，最初由十八世纪的莱布尼茨提出：我们生活在一个真实的世界中，同时存在许多可能的世界。例如，一个我住在马赛而不是巴黎的世界，就是另一个可能的世界；当然，那里的一切都会不同——如果我住在马赛，就不会住在同一个公寓，外面也不会下雨，等等。

So what is it is the very sophisticated realization of an idea that was initially an idea by Leibniz in the eighteenth century that this is we live in a world it's the real world and there are possible worlds so a world for example where actually I'm living in Marseille and not in Paris it's another possible world and of course lots of things would be different, so if I were living in Marseille, wouldn't be the same apartment there, would not be raining outside and so on.

因此，这些可能世界可以看作是我们现实世界的各种变体。

So there are possible worlds that are, let's say, variants of the world as it is.

而对于莱姆病来说，这非常重要，因为它为他提供了回答‘为何存在万物而非虚无’这一问题的框架。

And for Lyme disease that was very important because that would provide him the frame for addressing the question why is there something rather than nothing?

为什么世界是这样的？

Why is the world like this?

但实际上，大卫·刘易斯与安塞尔·克里普克和罗伯特·斯塔尔纳克不同，后者是研究这些思想的哲学家，他们并不接受整个可能世界理论，而只是采纳了其中一种非常普遍的观点，即这些世界是可能的。

But actually David Lewis doesn't Ansel Kripke and Robert Stallnaker who are the philosopher who worked on those ideas they don't take the whole of slide needs but just a very general idea that they are possible.

你可以设想可能的世界。

You can think of possible worlds.

这些可能世界可能与我们的世界或多或少不同。

Those possible worlds may be more or less different than our world.

例如，一个我成为阿根廷士兵的世界，比我在马赛当哲学家的世界与我们的世界差异更大；而一个你和我都是黑猩猩的世界，则更加不同；或者一个万有引力定律具有不同公式的世界，差异则更大。

So a world where for example I am a, let's say a soldier in Argentina, this is more different than our world from the world that where I'm just a philosopher living in Marseille and the world where you and me are chimpanzees is a world even more different or a world where let's say the law of gravitation has another formula is a world even more different.

因此，直观的想法是，你可以设想经典世界，这些世界可能与现实世界或多或少不同，而刘易斯的观点是，为了理解我们概念体系、思维方式和语言中许多真正关键的东西，我们必须诉诸可能世界。

So the intuitive idea is that you can think of classical worlds Those worlds may be more or less different than the actor world and Louis's idea is that in order to make sense of lots of things that are really crucial in our, let's say, our conceptual scheme, in our ways of thinking and in our language actually we have to refer to possible worlds.

例如，当我进行权衡时，我会想：我应该这样做吗？

So for example, when I deliberate and I think should I do this?

实际上，我正在比较两个可能的世界。

Actually I'm comparing two possible worlds.

一个是由我做A所导致的世界，另一个是由我做B所导致的世界。

The world that will derive from me doing A and the world that will derive from me doing B.

这两个是可能的世界，因此即使是在进行权衡时，我们也在思考可能的世界——当我做选择时，我究竟在做什么？

Those are two possible worlds and so even deliberating is about thinking of possible worlds and what I am am I doing when I choose?

实际上，我说的是，由我做A所导致的可能世界比由我做B所导致的可能世界更好，所以我们选择A。

Actually I'm saying the possible world that derives from me doing A is better than the possible world that derives from me doing B, so let's do A.

好吧，也许我错了，但这不是问题所在；关键是，权衡过程即使在隐含层面也涉及可能世界。

Well, may be wrong, that's not the problem, but the point is that deliberating refers to possible world even implicitly.

这就是一般性的观点，那么这和第一次世界大战有什么关系呢？

And so that's the general idea and what's the relation with World War I?

实际上，这非常简单：什么是必然发生的事件？

Actually it's very simple: what is an event that is necessary?

比如，像我这样，从窗户把一块石头扔到街上，它会掉下来。

So for example, the like me, if drop a stone like in the street from my window, it will fall.