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经营企业意味着要应对大量过于复杂的软件，而大多数客户关系管理系统都遵循相同的模式。
Running a business means dealing with a lot of overly complicated software, and most CRMs tend to follow the same pattern.
它们塞满了你根本不会用的无穷功能，界面笨拙，团队最终花费太多时间只是为了找到基本信息。
They're packed with endless features you'll never use, interfaces that feel clunky, and teams end up spending way too much time just trying to find basic information.
今天的赞助商Pipedrive是一款专为中小型企业设计的简单客户关系管理工具。
Today's sponsor, Pipedrive, is a simple CRM tool designed for small and medium businesses.
Pipedrive将整个销售流程整合到一个仪表板中，为您提供清晰、完整的销售流程和客户信息视图，帮助团队掌控局面并快速促成交易。
Pipedrive brings you entire sales processes into one dashboard, giving you a crystal clear, complete view of sales processes and customer information designed to help teams stay in control and close more deals fast.
所有功能都围绕着可视化的销售漏斗展开，您可以查看每一笔交易、它所处的阶段以及下一步需要做什么。
It all centers around the visual sales pipeline where you can see every deal, what stage it's in, and what needs to happen next.
由于所有内容都集中在一个平台上，Pipedrive旨在团结您的团队，跟踪销售任务，并牢牢掌握潜在客户。
Since everything is in one platform, Pipedrive is designed to unite your team, keep track of sales tasks, and stay on top of your leads.
换用一款由销售专家为销售团队打造的客户关系管理系统，加入已使用Pipedrive的十多万家公司行列。
Switch to a CRM built by salespeople, for salespeople, and join the over 100,000 companies already using Pipedrive.
现在注册，您将获得三十天的免费试用。
Right now, you'll get a thirty day free trial.
无需信用卡或任何付款。
No credit card or payment needed.
只需前往 pipedrive.com/simplecrm 即可开始使用。
Just head to pipedrive.com/simplecrm to get started.
就是 pipedrive.com/simplecrm。
That's pipedrive.com/simplecrm.
你可以随时通过彭博新闻现在获取新闻。
You can get the news whenever you want it with Bloomberg News Now.
我是艾米·莫里斯。
I'm Amy Morris.
我是凯伦·莫斯科，今天来向你介绍我们全新按需新闻报道，直接推送至你的播客订阅源。
And I'm Karen Moscow here to tell you about our new on demand news report delivered right to your podcast feed.
彭博新闻现在是一份时长五分钟的音频简报，涵盖当天最重要的新闻。
Bloomberg News Now is a short five minute audio report on the day's top stories.
节目全天多次更新，提供最新信息和数据，助你随时掌握动态。
Episodes are published throughout the day with the latest information and data to keep you informed.
是的。
Yes.
其他新闻机构也有类似的产品，但它们通常全天重复播放其广播新闻。
There are other products like this from a variety of news organizations, but they usually rerun their radio newscasts throughout the day.
这并不是我们的做法。
That's not what we do.
我们制作的是仅在彭博新闻现在（Bloomberg News Now）上收听的定制化节目。
We create customized episodes that can only be heard on Bloomberg News Now.
我们不会等上一小时才发布突发新闻。
And we don't wait an hour to publish breaking news.
一旦有新闻发生，我们会在几分钟内将节目更新到您的播客订阅中，确保您始终获取最新动态和进展。
When news breaks, we'll have an episode up on your podcast feed within minutes, so you're always getting the latest stories and developments.
获取来自彭博社3000名记者和分析师的报道与背景分析。
Get the reporting and the context from Bloomberg's 3,000 journalists and analysts.
我们的记者遍布全球。
We're all over the world.
在 Apple、Spotify 或您收听的任何平台收听来自彭博新闻现在节目的最新内容。
Listen to the latest from Bloomberg News Now on Apple, Spotify, or anywhere you listen.
彭博音频工作室。
Bloomberg Audio Studios.
播客。
Podcasts.
广播。
Radio.
新闻。
News.
你好，欢迎收听《Odd Lots》播客的另一期节目。
Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.
我是吉尔·韦因瑟尔。
I'm Jill Weisenthal.
我是特蕾西·阿洛韦。
And I'm Tracy Alloway.
特蕾西，我们最近采访了美国贸易代表戴琪，谈到了我们与中国贸易关系的显著变化。
Tracy, we recently interviewed US trade representative Katherine Tai about obviously the changing nature of our relationship with China on trade.
我觉得，整个这期播客其实都可以只讲这个话题。
I feel like though we could this entire podcast could just be about that.
对吧？
Right?
有无数个角度可以探讨。
There's an infinite number of angles to explore.
好吧。
Okay.
我们现在成了一档关于中美贸易的播客了。
We're a China trade podcast now.
就这样定了。
It's done.
是的。
Yeah.
就这样了。
It's done.
不。
No.
你说得对。
You're absolutely right.
有一件事，今年一直潜伏在背景中，基本上，你一直听到关于中国产能过剩的讨论。
So one thing, this has been hovering in the background all year, basically, but you've been hearing this mention of China overcapacity.
我认为就连乔·拜登总统也在谈论中国向全球市场倾销价格人为低廉的出口商品这一观点。
And I think even president Joe Biden was talking about this idea of China flooding global markets with artificially low priced exports.
除此之外，今年的一个大叙事是中国经济放缓。
And then beyond that, a big narrative this year has been China's economy slowing.
所以，我想我有一个问题，或者在我看来非常值得注意的一点，我很想深入探讨一下：中国的经济增长正在放缓。
And so I guess one question I have or one thing that seems very noteworthy to me that I would love to dive into a little bit more is Chinese growth has been slowing.
是的。
Yeah.
人民币一直在升值，自特朗普政府以来，再到拜登政府，一直实施着各种新的贸易限制。
The renminbi has been appreciating, and there have been all these new trade restrictions since the Trump administration and continuing into the Biden administration as well.
然而，中国的经常账户盈余却在增加，我知道关于官方数据的准确性存在一些讨论，等等。
And yet China's current account surplus and I know there's some discussion about how accurate the official numbers might be, etcetera, etcetera.
但盈余再次上升，这似乎相当惊人。
But the surplus is going up again, which seems kind of remarkable.
完全正确。
Totally.
这是一个非常奇怪的时刻，因为我会看到一些电池工厂、工厂或交通运输的图片。
It's a really weird moment because I'll look at images of some sort of battery plant or factory or some transportation.
我会想，哦，这就是未来。
I'm like, oh, this is the future.
这里正在建设的东西、效率以及所有这些，都非同寻常。
This is extraordinary what's being built and the efficiency and all that.
但当你读到那些基本上在谈论经济危机的新闻标题时，就会感到矛盾。
And then you read these headlines that basically talk about an economy in crisis.
我们正面临自邓小平以来最严峻的挑战，某种意义上的经济放缓。
We're facing their worst challenges since Deng Xiaoping or whatever, sort of a slowdown.
这两者似乎在某种程度上难以协调，但就我个人而言，我仍然很难调和当前这两种截然不同的中国叙事。
And it's hard to they fit together in some way, but on some level, I still have a hard time reconciling the dual China narratives right now.
确实如此。
Absolutely.
而我经常观察到并对此充满疑问的另一个矛盾是：中国似乎依然坚持出口导向型经济模式。
And then the other tension that I observe all the time and I have a lot of questions about is this idea that, okay, China seems committed to the export driven economic model.
是的。
Yeah.
尽管在我看来，目前所有逆风似乎都来自出口方面。
Even though, again, as far as I can tell, all the headwinds right now seem to be coming on the export side.
是的。
Yeah.
这很有趣。
That's interesting.
但据我所知，似乎并没有太多努力去提升消费，或者搞点消费者刺激之类的措施。
And yet, like, there's still not that much effort as far as I can tell to increase consumption or to maybe, I don't know, do, like, consumer stimulus or something like that.
所以，你说得对。
So, yeah, you're right.
这确实感觉像是一个奇怪的时刻。
It does feel like a strange moment.
然后，我想还有另外两个相关的方面，比如一个观点，戴琪大使也提到过，就是中国没有遵守规则，至少没有遵守过去几十年WTO成员国普遍接受的那些规则。
And then I guess two other sort of dimensions of this is, like, one of the points, and Ambassador Tai mentioned this, is this view that China isn't playing by the rules, or at least the rules that maybe the members of the WTO for many of the last decades had accepted.
总有人质疑，每个国家的制度安排都不同。
It always questions like, country has a different arrangement.
在美国，企业为员工支付医疗费用。
In The US companies pay the healthcare of their workers.
在欧洲，政府承担医疗费用。
In Europe, the government pays for healthcare.
每个国家的规则都不一样。
Every country has different rules.
所以有一部分我在想，中国和他们那种国家主导的资本主义到底有什么特别之处，以至于让人觉得‘哦，这越界了’，贸易规则似乎真的不适用于他们。
So part of me wonders, what is it about China and the state directed capitalism that they have there that's particularly like, Oh no, this crosses a line and the rules of trade don't really work with them.
其次，是关于产能过剩和倾销的观点。
And then two, this idea of overcapacity and dumping.
我理解在纯大宗商品比如钢铁方面，这似乎说得通，但当涉及到太阳能、石化产品或汽车等其他领域时，我很难认同这种说法有用，但也许确实如此。
I get that perhaps intuitively in a pure commodity such as say steel, but when it comes to some other things like solar or petrochemicals or cars, I struggle with this notion that it's a useful concept, but maybe it is.
不过，算了。
But anyway.
与其我们在这里对这些问题胡思乱想，不如直接问问我们的嘉宾吧。
Rather than us wondering about all these questions and thinking aloud, let's ask our guest.
我很高兴地宣布，我们再次邀请到多次做客《Odd Lot》的嘉宾，虽然我们已经很久没和他聊过了，但他能帮我们理解所有这些问题。
Well, am thrilled to say that we are welcoming back on the show multi time Odd Lotz guest, but it's been a while since we've talked to him, but someone who could help us understand all of these things.
我们将与哥伦比亚大学的亚当·图泽教授对话。
We're going to be speaking with Adam Tooze, professor at Columbia.
他是欧洲研究所所长，也是全球思想委员会主席。
He's the director of the European Institute and the chair of the Committee for Global Thought.
他常年在全球各地旅行，今年夏天还去了中国大陆。
He travels all around the world, and he was actually in Mainland China this summer.
亚当，非常感谢你再次做客《OddLots》。
So Adam, thank you so much for coming back on OddLots.
已经太久没见了。
It's been too long.
是的，确实很久了。
Yeah, has.
很高兴来到这里，各位。
It's a pleasure to be here, guys.
非常感谢。
Thank you so much.
我先开始吧。
I'll just start.
我们经常听到中国产能过剩的问题。
Chinese overcapacity, we just hear so much about it.
你觉得这个框架有用吗？
Do you think that's a useful frame?
你认为‘产能过剩’这个分析概念，现在对于理解中国或中国的关系是否有用？
Do you find that to be a useful analytical concept overcapacity for understanding either China or a relationship with China right now?
我有点怀疑。
I'm a little bit skeptical.
乔，你在引入这个概念时语气中的怀疑态度，我很欣赏。
I like the tone of doubt in your own voice, Joe, as you were introducing this.
我不太明白。
I don't get it.
我的意思是，也许在技术相对稳定、我们有比较清晰的产业经济模型来解释掠夺性策略的领域更容易定义——比如大规模建设产能、沿着成本曲线下滑，或者只是建立一种可信的威胁，让人相信你会为市场份额而战，因为你已经投入了大量沉没成本。
I mean, I I think maybe it's easier to define in sectors where the technology is relatively static and where we have relatively straightforward industrial economics models of predatory strategy that would involve building massive amounts of capacity, maybe sliding down a cost curve, or maybe just establishing some sort of credible threat where folks will believe that you're gonna fight for market share because you've just got so much sunk cost.
所以你可以用这种方式来看待钢铁和铝等行业，我认为中国人自己也会承认，他们大力推进城市化，因此在钢铁、水泥等领域建设了巨大的产能。
So you could look at industries like steel and aluminum in those terms, and I think the Chinese themselves would admit that, you know, they went hard on urbanization, and so they built enormous capacities in steel, cement, and so on.
这是一种类型的行业。
That's one sort of sector.
我觉得在新兴领域中，我感到有点模糊困惑，因为得益于我们所处的这个新世界——气候规划，我用这个词是有意的。
I think where it gets I just find kind of vaguely puzzling is in new sectors where thanks to the kind of new world that we're in with climate planning, where we I use that word advisedly.
我们知道为了实现净零排放需要做什么，而且西方政府似乎认真对待这一点。
We have an idea of what we need to do to get to net zero, and that's apparently taken seriously by Western governments.
我们知道，绿色电力产能、输电设施以及电动汽车等终端应用的需求都极其庞大。
We know that the demands in terms of the build out of green electricity capacity transmission, and then end use in the form of electric vehicles are just huge.
而对于所有这些领域，我们对最终将主导这些行业的技术，即使在中期也仍不确定。
And for them all, we're pretty uncertain about the technologies that are ultimately going to come and dominate those sectors even over the medium term.
对我来说，说这个世界光伏板太多了，这简直难以想象，你知道，这不符合我女儿和孙女的未来利益。
And it's hard for me to really kind of, to say that the world has got too many photovoltaic panels just seems, you know, not for my daughter and granddaughter's chill, you know, future.
说实话，我觉得光伏板越多越好。
I think the more photovoltaics, the better, to be honest.
而且价格暴跌，使得巴基斯坦在今年头六个月进口了13吉瓦的光伏产能，成为一个非凡的故事。
And the fact that the price has crashed, you know, enables this extraordinary story about Pakistan importing 13 gigawatts of photovoltaic capacity in the first six months of this year.
巴基斯坦正面临严重的财政困境。
Pakistan, which is in real serious financial trouble.
这是因为它们实在太便宜了，而中国已经建成了巨大的产能。
And that's because they're so damn cheap, and that's because the Chinese have built out this huge capacity.
所以这些领域正是我觉得故事有点难以理解的地方。
So those are the areas where I find the story just a little hard to really wrap my head around.
而且我认为这背后显然有战术上的动机。
And I I I think it's got, you know, it's an obvious tactical motivation.
你可以看出西方政客是如何利用这一论点的。
You can see how the argument is being used by Western politicians.
但即使你看钢铁行业，实际上，中国产能销往全球市场的比例，总体来说，在这些中国建成的、规模极其庞大的产业中，只占相对较小的部分，而这些产业绝大部分都面向本国市场。
But even when you look at the steel sector, like, you know, if you actually look at the share of Chinese capacity that's being sold onto global markets, generally speaking, it's a relatively small share of these absolutely immense industries the Chinese have built, which are overwhelmingly directed towards their own home markets.
所以为了换个方式问乔的问题，你为什么认为政策制定者——至少在美国——会把中国产能过剩视为贸易问题，并且对此如此关注，以至于它成为为数不多的两党共识领域之一？
So just to ask Joe's question in a different way, why do you think it seems like policymakers, at least in The US, have landed on China overcapacity as this issue in trade that they seem to be concerned about to the extent that it is one of the very few areas of bipartisan consensus?
我认为，中国总体上在美国本来就是两党共识的领域。
Well, I think China generally is an area of bipartisan consensus in The US anyway.
对吧？
Right?
所以我认为，这是美国政治中另一个各方都能达成共识的例子，听起来很有道理，也为保护主义提供了一个理由，而保护主义在选举年正变得非常流行。
So I think this is another instance of something that folks can agree on in US politics, and it sounds good, and it offers a rationale for protectionism, which is very much on vogue in an election year.
而这种共识真正有趣的地方，不是吗？
And with this consensus, what's really interesting, isn't it?
确实出现了一种转变。
Is there's been this shift away.
我的意思是，这里背后的大背景是，美国经济政策的讨论已经发生了巨大转变，不再从消费者利益的角度，或从消费者与生产者利益平衡的角度思考，而是转向了一种非常单一地聚焦于生产者利益的模式。
I mean, the the big thing in the background here is that there's been such a powerful shift in American economic policy discourse away from thinking in terms of consumer interest, or holistically in terms of the balancing of consumer and producer interest towards a really rather monolithic focus on producer interest.
当然，你通常不会在这种语境下谈论企业利润。
And you don't, of course, generally talk about corporate profits in that context.
你会谈论美国工人。
You talk about American workers.
对。
Right.
尤其是美国人所说的中产阶级，换句话说，也就是世界上其他地方所称的蓝领工人阶级。
Especially as what the Americans call middle class, in other words, for the rest of the world, working class blue collar jobs.
这成为了政策讨论的核心。
And that becomes the center of policy discourse.
在这种背景下，你可以理解为什么产能过剩听起来像一个迫在眉睫的威胁，而不是给美国消费者的一份免费礼物——这些消费者突然间可以从最终由中国纳税人买单的补贴中获益。
And in that context then, you can kind of see how overcapacity begins to sound like a looming threat as opposed to a free gift to American consumers who all of a sudden get to benefit from whatever subsidies ultimately Chinese taxpayers are going to end up footing the bill for.
因此，我认为这种向以工人为中心的愿景转变，在特朗普一方表现为纯粹的民族主义和相当男性化的模式，而在拜登一方，这构成了他们对2016年失利原因以及民主党为何必须构建这一新经济政策愿景的核心解释——本质上是恢复美国工人阶级的前景。
So I think this shift towards a worker centered vision, and this operates, you know, in a purely nationalist mode, a rather masculinist mode on the Donald Trump side, And it is a huge part of the Biden folks interpretation of why they lost in 2016 and why the Democrats had to fashion this new vision of economic policy, which was essentially around restoring prospects of the American working class.
我认为，正是在这里，相关工作正在展开，过渡也正在建立。
And I think that's where the sort of the work is being done and the segues are being established.
你觉得这是个正确的转向吗？
Do you think that was a good pivot?
我的意思是，撇开实际执行策略不谈，值得注意的是，人们不再谈论‘太好了，我们能通过全球贸易买到这么多便宜商品’。
Like, I mean, setting aside the actual implementation of the tactics, and it is striking, people aren't talking about, oh, it's great that we can get all these cheap goods by global trade.
我们不再谈论以消费者为中心的视角。
We are not talking about the sort of consumer centric frame.
我们是不是早就该这样了？
Were we overdue?
这种以工人为中心的贸易影响框架是否合理？
Was this warranted the sort of worker centric frame on the effect of trade?
我的意思是，我对所谓的‘中国冲击’也持怀疑态度。
I mean, I'm a skeptic also when it comes to the China shock.
我的意思是，我不是在细节层面上否认。
I mean, I'm not not at the detailed level.
显然，美国有一些工业生产社区受到了严重冲击，全世界各地都是如此。
Obviously, there are industrial producer communities in The US that were hit really hard, and that's true all the way around the world.
在许多情况下，这提前终结了工业化进程。
And in many cases, it's preempted industrialization.
比如非洲的部分地区，工业化已经完全失去了希望。
Like parts of Africa, you know, there's just no prospect of that industrialization any longer happening.
所以，这确实是真实的。
So that's that's real.
但作为对美国社会困境的诊断，我认为这种说法总体上并不成立。
But as a diagnosis of the malaise of American society, I don't think it does work in general.
美国工人阶级的生活条件存在诸多问题，这些问题无法简单归结为所谓的高薪蓝领工作的可得性。
There are a whole bunch of things wrong with the conditions of life for working class Americans that aren't reducible to the availability of so called, you know, good paying blue collar jobs.
我认为，民主党与进步政治过度关注这一点是个错误，因为这分散了本应更广泛的议程——即改善服务行业的生活条件，而服务行业占美国经济的绝大多数，我们需要认真思考如何提升服务质量、工作条件，同时也要意识到，通常人们认为只有制造业才能带来生产率提升。
And I think it's a it's a mistake on the part of Democratic Party and progressive politics to focus excessively on this because it distracts from what should have been a much broader agenda of improving the conditions for the service sector, which makes up the vast majority of The US economy, and thinking hard about how to improve the quality of life, conditions of work, and also to think, you know, because the standard argument is it's always a manufacturing that you get the productivity increases.
也许现在是时候更深入地思考，如何将服务业也视为生产率提升的驱动力，提升服务品质、工作环境，并提升这些行业劳动力的技能。
Well, maybe it's time to think harder about how we could think about the service sector also as a driver of productivity and improve quality of provision, quality of workplace, upskill the workforce in those sectors.
在拜登政府初期，‘重建更好未来’议程曾更具前景。
And there was a moment in the early Biden administration with the Build Back Better agenda, which was more promising.
我认为许多人或许希望卡玛拉·哈里斯也能对此更持开放态度。
And I think a lot of people maybe hope that Kamala Harris might also be more amenable to this.
但一旦曼钦介入该议程，加上拜登自身根深蒂固的思维惯性，他就转向了所有那些老旧的观念。
But once Manchin got to work on the agenda and Biden's, I think, just habits of mind, he goes after all the very old man.
因此，他来自一个美国工业主义曾是王牌的时代。
So he comes out of an era in which American industrialism was really the Trump card.
于是，我们在思考产业政策时，某种程度上倒退到了那种模式。
And so we kind of regressed into that mode of thinking about industrial policy.
从政治角度来看，很容易形成一种过渡，即中国已经吞并了某个战略性产业部门。
And then in political terms, it's incredibly easy to sort of form a segue where you have a strategic industrial sector that China has sort of gobbled up.
你面临美国工人阶级的危机、绝望性死亡，以及安格斯·迪顿和凯斯等人所讨论的问题。
You have a crisis of the American working class and deaths of despair and Angus Deaton and Case and so on.
然后你有支持特朗普的工人阶级选民，还有芬太尼危机，你把这些事情全部堆叠在一起，就形成了一堆严重的问题。
Then you have the working class voters for Trump, and then you have the fentanyl epidemic, and you pile all of these things together, you've got yourself a real stack there.
而每种情况中的共同问题，某种意义上，都是中国。
And the common problem in each case is, in a sense, China.
你知道，产能过剩这个说法正好契合这一点，因为产能过剩源于中国不平衡的增长模式。换句话说，你可以更善意地将产能过剩视为一种相对中立、技术性的说法，用来描述一种本可以更强烈、更具攻击性地表达的指控——比如你们窃取了我们的知识产权，坑了我们。
And, you know, that's an overcapacity fits quite nicely into that because overcapacity is the result of the, you know, the unbalanced Chinese growth model that I mean, overcapacity is you could more charitably say it's a relatively neutral and technocratic way of describing an accusation against China that could be put in more forceful and aggressive terms along the lines of you stole our IP and screwed us.
但你却说：不不不，让我们来给你解释一下。
And instead you say, no, no, let us explain to you.
我们认为你们存在产能过剩的问题。
We think you have an overcapacity problem.
让我们帮助你们思考这个问题，找出如何应对它。
Let us help you think this through and figure out how we deal with it.
经营企业意味着要应对大量过于复杂的软件，而大多数客户关系管理系统都遵循相同的模式。
Running a business means dealing with a lot of overly complicated software, and most CRMs tend to follow the same pattern.
它们塞满了你根本用不到的无穷功能，界面笨拙，团队往往花费太多时间只是寻找基本信息。
They're packed with endless features you'll never use, interfaces that feel clunky, and teams end up spending way too much time just trying to find basic information.
今天的赞助商Pipedrive是一款专为中小型企业设计的简单客户关系管理工具。
Today's sponsor, Pipedrive, is a simple CRM tool designed for small and medium businesses.
Pipedrive将整个销售流程整合到一个仪表板中，为你提供清晰完整的销售流程和客户视图，帮助团队掌控局面并更快地促成交易。
Pipedrive brings you entire sales processes into one dashboard, giving you a crystal clear complete view of sales processes and customer designed to help teams stay in control and close more deals faster.
所有功能都围绕可视化销售漏斗展开，你可以看到每个交易所处的阶段以及下一步需要做什么。
It all centers around the visual sales pipeline where you can see every deal, what stage it's in, and what needs to happen next.
由于所有内容都集中在一个平台上，Pipedrive旨在团结你的团队，跟踪销售任务，并牢牢掌握潜在客户。
Since everything is in one platform, Pipedrive is designed to unite your team, keep track of sales tasks, stay on top of your leads.
换用一款由销售专家为销售团队打造的客户关系管理系统，加入已使用Pipedrive的十多万家公司行列。
Switch to a CRM built by salespeople, for salespeople, and join the over 100,000 companies already using Pipedrive.
现在注册，你将获得三十天的免费试用。
Right now, you'll get a thirty day free trial.
无需信用卡或任何付款。
No credit card or payment needed.
只需前往 pipedrive.com/simplecrm 开始使用。
Just head to pipedrive.com/simplecrm to get started.
就是 pipedrive.com/simplecrm。
That's pipedrive.com/simplecrm.
你提到过，亚当，服务业对美国经济的重要性。
You mentioned, Adam, the importance of the services sector to The US economy.
而中国，当然，有着完全不同的经济模式。
And China, of course, has a very different economic model.
我在开场时提到过这一点，但中国似乎仍然坚定地致力于出口驱动型增长。
And I alluded to this in the intro, but it is still one that seems very much committed to export driven growth.
所以我很好奇，你认为这是为什么。
So I'm curious why you think that is.
为什么尽管面临制造业和出口的种种表面逆风，中国仍坚持依靠这一领域实现增长。
Why, despite all the ostensible headwinds to manufacturing and exports, China remains committed to growth coming from that.
然后我知道最近有些传闻，说可能会有所增加。
And then I know there have been some rumblings about maybe, like, increasing.
我想她称之为内循环之类的。
I think she called it domestic circulation or something like that.
但似乎并没有真正推动服务业或消费的增长。
But it doesn't seem like there's been a real push to boost the services sector or boost consumption.
是的。
Yeah.
这是一个非常有趣的观点。
So this is a really interesting point.
当我听你，蔡斯，刚开始说的时候，我在想，我不确定我是不是不确定我
And I as I was listening to you, Chase, as you opened up, I was thinking, I'm not sure I I'm not sure I
如果你不
If you don't
同意，也没关系。
agree, that's fine.
是的。
Yeah.
我不确定我是否同意中国战略是出口导向的。
I'm not sure I'm not sure that I would agree that the Chinese strategy is export led.
我的意思是，我们不应该把德国和中国混淆，因为我觉得德国的策略很难明确界定，但他们确实把出口本身视为一种国家成就。
I mean, we shouldn't confuse Germany and China because I think the Germans really, you'd have a hard time actually putting a pin in German strategy, but they celebrate exports per se as a kind of national achievement.
而我不认为这是中国政策讨论的核心。
Whereas I don't think that is the center of Chinese policy discourse.
相反，恰恰是这样。
Rather I the opposite.
他们现在实际上采用了双循环模式，承认存在外部部门，但外部部门极易受到外部冲击，核心其实是国内生产。
They actually now have this dual circulation model where they recognize there is an external sector, but that's very vulnerable to external shocks, the center is really domestic production.
如果你看一下钢铁，比如，在中国进行城市化、建设与房地产转型之前的好年份里，中国庞大的钢铁产量中95%，至少92%到93%都是在国内消费的。
If you were to look at steel, for instance, you know, in a good year in China either too, and before they did the whole gear shift with urbanization and construction and real estate, I mean, 95%, certainly 92 to 93% of Chinese immense steel production was consumed domestically.
对吧？
Right?
他们生产了十亿吨钢铁，仅出口六七千万吨。
They produced a billion tonnes of steel and would export 60 to 70,000,000 tonnes.
其中绝大部分都在国内消费。
The vast majority of it is being consumed at home.
如果你看看亚当·沃尔夫对行业的精彩分析，就会发现完全相同的情况。
If you look at Adam Wolf's amazing breakdowns of industry, you see exactly the same thing.
对吧？
Right?
中国生产的绝大多数汽车都是在国内销售。
The vast majority of Chinese motor vehicle production is domestic.
他们生产的电动汽车——那些引发众人热议的电动车——绝大部分也都在中国国内消费。
The vast majority of their EV, their electric vehicles, the ones that everyone's up in arms about, are also being consumed in China.
这也是你在上海街头和高速公路上看到的令人印象深刻的一幕。
And that's one of the really impressive things you see on the streets and the highways around Shanghai.
一辆接一辆的高端电动车，都是你从未见过的车型。
It's just one fancy EV after another, stuff you've never seen before.
鸥翼门，太未来感了。
Gullwings, it's so futuristic.
你知道的，这已经结束了。
The, you know, it's over.
竞争非常激烈。
The competition is extraordinary.
但到目前为止，主要还是以内需为主。
But so far, it's really largely internal.
中国机动车出口的大幅增长，使它们突然间成为行业中的巨大势力，尤其对欧洲人造成了巨大冲击，但实际上这主要集中在内燃机领域。
The big surge in Chinese motor vehicle exports, which has made them all of a sudden this huge force in the industry, which is hugely disruptive to the Europeans notably, is actually in internal combustion engines.
也就是说，这是技术含量较低的中国制造业，而且很多是合资企业。
So as it were lower tech Chinese manufacturing, and a lot of it is joint ventures.
换句话说，西方公司在中国市场已无法销售它们那些过时且被污名化的产品。
In other words, Western firms who can no longer find markets in China for their now defunct and stigmatized.
中国人真的不想再开，尤其是美国品牌的汽车了。
Folks in China really don't want to be driving, especially American batched cars now.
因此，当我们看到出口激增时，将其归因于政策是一种逻辑谬误。
And so when what we see is the export surge, but to attribute that to policy, think is a non sequitur.
中国确实有一项推动现代化的产业政策。
There is an industrial policy in China which is driving towards modernization.
而连接这两者、将它们联系起来的，是彭慕兰关于宏观经济失衡的论点。
And then what mediates between the two things, what hooks these two things up is the Michael Pettis argument about macroeconomic imbalance.
真正的问题在于，他们有着极其强烈的产业政策，却缺乏足够的内需来支撑它。
The real issue is they have this very, very heavy driven industrial policy and they don't have the macro demand to sustain it.
因此，由于企业出于绝望的战略选择，本质上是在国外市场孤注一掷，试图寻求救赎。
And so it spills over as a result of corporate strategies of desperation, basically gambling for salvation through looking in foreign markets.
我认为这是一个令人信服的总体图景。
That I think is a is a convincing overall picture.
当你观察某个特定行业时，我认为可以讲出略有不同的故事，而且一直都能这么讲，那就是光伏产业，因为其一半的产量都用于出口。
When you look at there's one sector where I think you could tell a slightly different stories and always have been able to, which is photovoltaics, because they're about half of output is exported.
他们在光伏领域过度建设，实际上已经决定要成为全球能源转型的垄断供应商。
They've so overbuilt in photovoltaics that that really is they basically decided we're gonna be the monopoly supplier to the entire energy transition worldwide.
十年前，当中国为满足欧洲对光伏产品的需求而扩大产能时，情况就已经如此了。
That was already the case ten years ago when they built out to meet European demand for photovoltaics.
但纵观整个中国经济，我认为更合理的解释是，产业政策主要面向国内需求。
But across the board in the Chinese economy, I think it's more convincing to tell a story of industrial policy, is primarily domestically orientated.
中国对这一战略做出了巨大而混乱的创新回应，这导致了国内激烈的竞争，尤其是在迈克尔·佩蒂斯所指出的需求受限背景下，企业于是转向海外市场寻求需求。
This huge Chinese innovative scrambling response to that strategy, which then generates such fierce competition within China, especially in light of the Michael Pectus demand constraint situation, that then the firms go looking for foreign markets to find the demand.
我认为，这样的解释比说北京旨在推动出口导向型增长更有说服力。
A story like that, I think, is more convincing than to say Beijing is aiming at export led growth.
引发了一个问题：特蕾西提到过，为什么中国没有做更多来提振消费？
Raises a question, one of the things, again, Tracy mentioned it, but why isn't China doing more to boost its consumer?
我们客观上看到消费增长非常缓慢。
We have seen very sluggish growth objectively.
消费表现一直平平，尤其是自新冠疫情封控以来更是如此。
Consumption has been very mediocre, particularly ever since the COVID lockdowns.
马特·克莱因最近在他的Substack上发表了一篇非常精彩的文章。
Matt Klein had a really great piece in his Substack recently.
无论如何分析，看起来消费者都相当疲软。
Basically, no matter how you slice it, it looks like the consumer has been very weak.
所以，如果你只看铁路客运量或餐厅预订量之类的数据，情况依然很一般。
So if you just look at train miles traveled or restaurant bookings or things like that, it still looks very mediocre.
另一方面，尽管没有直接向消费者提供刺激政策，我时不时还是看到一些令人信服的迹象，表明经济政策的根本目标——提升全民生活水平——仍在持续推进，中国社会的生活水平仍在增长和改善。
On the other hand, despite the lack of direct in the pockets of consumer stimulus, I see convincing things from time to time that the real goal of economic policy improve everyone's standard of living is still going on, that there's still growth and improvement in the standard of living in Chinese society.
我从未去过中国大陆。
I've never been to the Mainland.
你今年夏天去过那里，我猜这也不是你第一次去了。
You were there this summer, and I assume it was not your first time.
当你在那里时，和当地人交流，是否感觉总体上，无论是否能通过零售额等明确数据衡量，当前的模式仍在持续提升人们的生活水平？
When you're there and when you talk to people, does it seem like overall that whether it's clearly measurable in retail sales or whatever that the current model is continuing to lift people up.
我的意思是，如果你去上海这样的城市，最强烈的印象就是它简直太棒了。
I mean, the overwhelming impression one has if you visit a city like Shanghai is just it's absolutely awesome.
我的意思是，从技术层面来说。
I mean, it's in the in the sort of technical sense.
你只是被震撼到了。
You're just overawed.
它太广阔了。
It's so vast.
我的意思是，人口超过两千万。
I mean, it's 20,000,000 plus people.
它组织得非常好。
It's so well organized.
它非常现代化。
It's so modern.
它非常富裕。
It's so rich.
基础设施方面，你知道，产能过剩也有好处，那就是毫无限制。
The infrastructure I mean, you know, there's an upside to overcapacity, which is just like there's no limits on it.
空间很充足。
There's space.
空间非常充裕。
There's there's there's ample room.
这令人极为印象深刻，而且显然仍然充满活力。
It is incredibly impressive and clearly still highly dynamic.
这不像某些欧洲地区那样，给人一种过去五到十年缺乏投入的感觉。
It doesn't feel like a society which hasn't been invested in the last five years or ten years like some bits of Europe feel at this point.
是的。
Yeah.
因此，技术创新仍在继续。
So the technological innovation continues.
毕竟，即便我们对他们的数据有所保留，他们的增长率仍高于或至少与美国持平，远超欧洲和日本。
And after all, I mean, even if we think the numbers of Fudge, their growth rates are higher or at least on a par with The US and way above those of Europe and Japan.
因此，它无疑仍在增长，持续创造财富、创新和技术变革。
So it's definitely still growing and still generating affluence and innovation and technological change.
是的。
Yeah.
这一点毫无疑问。
There's really no there's no question about that.
但你还会听到非常强烈的声音，我原本以为这会像朝鲜或斯大林主义那样，人人都担心墙里有窃听器。
But what you also hear really quite vocally, and I was surprised this isn't North Korea or Stalinism or something where everyone's worried about bugs in the walls or something.
人们会坦率地告诉你他们有多痛苦。
People will tell you quite openly how miserable they're feeling.
确实有一种感觉，有什么地方出问题了。
And there is definitely a sense that something's broken.
房地产市场正朝着错误的方向发展。
The real estate market's headed in the wrong direction.
政府不再支持单纯的财富积累。
The regime is not friendly to go getting just simple wealth accumulation anymore.
应试教育体系给年轻人及其父母带来的压力是持续而残酷的。
The pressures of the intensely exam driven education system on young people and the parents of young people are relentless and brutal.
还有一种感觉，整个系统正在承受巨大压力。
And there is that sense of a system that is straining.
下一个每年8%的增长引擎将来自哪里，并不明显，而从每年8%调整到3%或4%总是一个挑战，即使3%到4%仍然非常可观。
It's not obvious where the next 8% per annum growth machine is going to come from, and it's always an adjustment to go from 8% per annum to three or four, even if three and four is still very respectable.
有很多经济学家，我不知道你们有没有读过Zishan Wong的精彩博客《Pecanology》，他现在实际上是普林斯顿大学的学生。
Loads of economists, I don't know whether you folks read the amazing blog, Pecanology by Zishan Wong, who's now actually a student at Princeton.
我不知道他是否同意参加
I don't know whether he'd agreed to be on
这个节目。
the show.
我们应该请他来。
We should have him on.
是的。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
我跟他聊过，一直打算找他。
I've I've talked to him, and I've been meaning to.
是的。
Yeah.
他堪称顶尖人物，通过不断翻译一篇又一篇文献，为英语世界提供了巨大服务。
He's like the top and does such a service to the Anglosphere just translating document after document.
你应该已经看到过了。
And he's you'll have seen it.
他整理了一份关于11位重要人物的综述，我们说的是中国经济学界内副部级级别的声音，他们说的全都和你所说的完全一致，乔。
He has this roundup of 11 prominent, and we're talking like vice ministerial level voices from within the Chinese economic scene who are all saying exactly what you're saying, Joe.
别管了。
Like, go away.
这正是我们为什么不做这件事？
This is why aren't we doing this?
这太明显了。
It's so obvious.
比如，这是我们可以做的另一种方式。
Like, here's another way we could do this.
我们可以为从农村到城市的移民提供更好的住房。
We could provide better housing for rural to urban migrants.
我们可以为父母实施各种类型的优惠方案。
We could do various types of discount scheme for parents.
有益的。
Beneficial.
我们可以建立一个更具支持性的福利体系。
We could build out a welfare system that will be more supportive.
真正有趣的是，在最高层面上，似乎存在着一种声音——而这正是来自中国高层专家群体的连续意见所表明的，这些人都绝非异见者。
What's really fascinating is that at the top level, there seems to be, and this is what this drum roll of expert opinion from within the Chinese hierarchy, none of these people are remotely dissident.
似乎在一系列意识形态观念上，尤其是关于福利依赖的问题上，存在着一种近乎德国式的阻力，其核心观点是：不，我们应该创造一个严苛的环境，让中国家庭和住户必须证明自己。
There does seem to be almost a German style level of resistance around a series of ideological ideas, crucially around welfare dependence, which basically say, no, we should create this really tough environment in which Chinese families and households have to prove themselves.
不，我们不会轻易地提供援助。
And no, we're not going to, you know, just easily provide support.
这似乎成了对社会的一种执念。
And it does seem to be something of a hang up almost about a society.
我想，这个政权担心中国会失去那种令人难以置信的、不安分的、充满渴望的精神，正是这种精神推动中国在过去二三十年里快速发展。
I guess the regime fears that China will lose that incredible, restless, you know, hungry edge that drove it through the last twenty to thirty years.
我想，这正是我所想的，但我没有一个很好的答案。
It's I guess, all I I don't have a good answer.
我的意思是，是的。
What I'm saying is that Yeah.
在体制内部，人们正在意识到这种困惑，而得到的回应通常是：高层并不认为这是个好主意。
Within the system itself, people are registering this perplexity, and the answer you get back runs along the lines of, well, the higher ups just don't think that would be a good idea.
既然你提到了德国，至少就中德经济关系而言，我的框架一直认为是‘亦敌亦友’的关系：双方在某种程度上都受益，联系紧密，但显然也存在紧张和分歧。
Since you mentioned Germany, my framework for the China German economic relationship, at least, has always been sort of frenemies where they both benefit in some way and they're quite closely linked, but there are obviously tensions and and points of issue there.
我想知道，你如何看待当前中德关系的发展趋势？
I'm wondering, how do you see the evolution of the China German relationship right now?
比如，与新冠疫情前相比，如今的关系变化有多大？
Like, how much has it changed from, say, pre COVID to where we are today?
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是，你可以从结构上的相似性说起。
I mean, we you could start with the structural similarity.
我的意思是，它们都是长期贸易顺差国，并且一直在竞争谁的贸易逆差、经常账户顺差更大。
I mean, they both are chronic trade surplus countries and have kind of competed with each other to have the largest, not just trade imbalance, the current account surplus.
所以它们在结构上有这种相似性。
So they have that structural similarity.
它们曾经是互补的：中国使用德国设备生产廉价制成品，供美国消费者购买。
They were once complimentary in that China would produce with German equipment, the cheap manufactured goods that American consumers would buy.
当然，美国消费者也直接购买高端的德国出口产品，中国中产阶级也是如此。
Of course, American consumers also bought high end German exports directly, as did the Chinese upper middle class.
但直接的联系在于，美国的总需求过剩为德国和中国的出口提供了市场，而中国的工业化则为德国的工业品提供了市场。
But the direct link was that the American aggregate demand excess provided a market for both German and Chinese exports, with Chinese industrialization providing a market for German manufactured goods.
这种联系依然存在，你可以在德国资本货物行业和德国工业企业持续对中国进行直接投资中看到这一点，这种投资仍在进行中。
And that still is a link, and you see it in the commitment of capital goods industries in Germany and industrial companies in Germany to ongoing direct investment in China, which is still live.
我访问时就看到了这一点，因为我懂德语，在那里也有人认识我。
I saw this when I was visiting because I speak German and I'm known there.
我在中国的时候会遇到德国商人，他们会直截了当地告诉你，他们必须在那里，根本原因有两个：因为中国市场庞大且增长迅速。
I bump into German business people when I'm in China, and they will tell you flat out that they have to be there for two reasons fundamentally, because it's a big market and it's rapidly growing.
如果你说的是巴斯夫这样的重化工业，你就不能不在那里。
If you're saying heavy chemicals of your BASF, you can't not be there.
但像大众这样的公司之所以不能不在那里，另一个原因是：如果你想在下一代汽车领域参与全球竞争，你就不能像美国企业那样，退守到国家保护主义的壁垒之后。
But the other reason why a VW, for instance, can't not be there is that if you're actually going to compete in the global market in the next generation of vehicles, motor vehicles, you can't do what The US firms are doing, which is basically retreating behind national protectionism.
你至少得努力跟上中国制造商在中国市场的发展步伐。
You have to at least try and stay with the Chinese manufacturers in the Chinese market.
因此，大众正在加大对中国的投资，因为他们视中国为整个市场。
And so VW is doubling down on its investments in China because they just see it as the market.
它已经是最大的市场，但如今更处于质量与技术的前沿。
It's already the biggest, but it's also now at the qualitative, at the technological frontier.
除非你能在那里竞争，尽管过去十八个月他们经历了一段艰难时期，否则你基本上就完了。
Unless you can compete there and they've been having a brutal period for the last eighteen months, you're basically done.
你将沦为生产精密内燃机的legacy制造商，而不是新一代尖端技术的参与者。
You're basically going to be a legacy manufacturer of sophisticated internal combustion engines, not of the new cutting edge.
西门子，我认为这家电气工程公司处于两者之间。
Siemens, I think the electrical engineering firm is kind of a little bit in between the two.
我认为它也认识到，尤其是在流程制造领域。
I think it also sees, especially in process manufacturing.
因此，德国企业擅长的那些高度复杂、完全集成且受控的生产线，它们觉得仍必须留在中国。
So the sort of highly sophisticated, fully integrated, controlled manufacturing lines, which the German firms specialise in, they feel they have to still be there.
因此，德国与中国之间存在着一种由重大投资驱动、以市场为导向、受技术启发的紧密联系。
So there is this substantial investment driven, market orientated, technologically inspired link between Germany and China.
你可以从德国政府无论顺境逆境都坚持与中国保持关系的方式中看到这一点。
You see it in the way the German government maintains its relationships with China through thick and thin.
当朔尔茨前往中国时，他会带领一大群德国商界领袖同行。
And when Scholz goes, he takes these large delegations of German business leaders with him.
而且他们非常直言不讳。
And they're quite outspoken.
他们反对你正确指出的在美国盛行的对华共识，这种共识确实如今给美国商界领袖带来了压力，但并未阻止德国商界领袖公开表示：如果我们从事汽车制造，我们就必须在中国。
They're sort of anti China consensus that you quite rightly pointed out is prevailing in The US, and which I really think weighs on American business leaders now, doesn't prevent German business leaders openly saying if we're in the business of car making, we need to be in China.
我的意思是，他们会直接这么说。
I mean, they'll just simply say that flat out.
巴斯夫在乌克兰战争和能源成本问题上与德国政府强硬对抗，已公开表示：你们要么提供我们需要的支持，要么我们就去中国。
BASF, who's played real hardball with the German government over the Ukraine war and the energy costs issue, has openly said, basically, you either give us the support we need or we're leaving for China.
最终，他们还是去了中国，因为在那里他们能获得所需的发电厂。
In the end, they've left left for China where they will get the power plant they need.
这并不是什么见不得人的事。
This isn't dirty stuff.
巴斯夫承诺在可预见的未来实现碳中和。
The BASF has this commitment to being carbon neutral in the foreseeable future.
所以他们对投资所在地的中国方面说：我们需要一吉瓦的清洁能源。
So what they said to their Chinese, the region where they're investing is, Hey, we need a gigawatt of clean power.
猜猜怎么着？
Guess what?
海上风电场已经在建设过程中。
The the wind farm, the offshore wind farm is already in process of construction.
所以，德国的关系不同，它是基于这种分工和产业整合的。
So, the German relationship is different, and it's based on this division of labor industrial integration.
自从我们转向德国后，最近有大量关于德国模式脆弱性和增长疲软的故事，这感觉与2010年代德国繁荣、边缘国家疲弱的情况完全相反。
So since we pivoted to Germany, there's just a ton of stories these days about frailties within the German model and the poor growth, and it feels like a very flip the script from the 2010s when Germany was booming and the periphery was so weak.
当然，今年9月初，极右翼政党AfD在地方选举中大获全胜。
And then of course, early September, we had the AFD party, which is a right wing party, won big in regional elections.
所以现在人们对德国正在发生的事情感到非常焦虑。
So there's a lot of angst right now about what's going on in Germany.
德国到底发生了什么？
What is going on in Germany?
有多少担忧是源于德国传统制造商难以与中国制造商竞争？
How much of the concern is like, okay, German legacy manufacturers are having trouble competing with Chinese manufacturers.
当然还有移民政策等政治问题。
There's obviously the politics of immigration and so forth.
你能多直接地把经济现状与政治局势的变化联系起来呢？
Like, how much of a direct line can you draw between what's going on with the economy and then sort of what's going on in the political scene?
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我认为有三个问题在起作用。
I think there's three issues in play.
我们在图林根州和萨克森州看到的非凡选举结果，这两个州。
The the extraordinary election results that we saw in Thuringia and Saxony, two states.
是的。
Yeah.
德国是一个联邦制国家。
Germany is a federal system.
图林根州和萨克森州是新并入的东德地区中的两个州。
Thuringia and Saxony are two states from the newly joined East German provinces.
这其中的一个因素是德国统一的遗留影响，我的意思是，如果你有机会穿越东德，就会明白这一点。
Like, one element of this is the legacy impact of German unification, which, I mean, if you've ever had the chance to travel through East Germany, was accomplished.
这其实是一个顶级的区域政策项目，像德累斯顿这样的城市美得惊人，投入巨大，是非常宜居的地方。
You know, it's really a gold plated regional policy program, and cities like Dresden are absolutely gorgeous, hugely invested, wonderful places to live.
但尽管如此，东德人普遍有一种相当有根据的认知，觉得自己在某种程度上是这个体系的新来者。
But nevertheless, there is this reasonably well founded understanding on the part of East Germans that they are at some level new to the party.
他们基本上被强行并入西德的体系，不得不主要接受其条件。
They were basically bolted onto the West German experiment and had to largely accept its terms.
在九十年代和二十一世纪初的动荡时期，这主要是东德人的父母或中年一代。
For a traumatic period in the nineties and the early two thousands, this is largely the parents or the middle aged generation of East Germans.
当时出现了大规模失业、严重动荡以及令人震惊的去工业化，这种影响至今仍在政治体系中持续存在。
There was huge unemployment and massive disruption and deindustrialization of a really shocking variety, and that lingers in the political system.
如果你询问支持这两个极端政党的选民，一个是德国选择党（AfD），最初是一个反对德拉吉的欧洲怀疑主义政党，另一个是萨拉·瓦根克内希特。
And if you ask the voters for the two extreme formations, one is the AFD, the Alternativa for Deutschland, originally an anti Draghi's Euro skeptic party, and the other one is Sara Wagenknecht.
她是一位真正的马克思主义哲学家，同时也希望在乌克兰问题上与普京达成妥协。
So truly a Marxist philosopher who is also keen to make a compromise with Putin over Ukraine.
因此，这既有左翼极端势力，也有右翼极端势力。
So there's a left and a right wing extreme.
如果你问他们的选民如何看待自己在德国社会中的地位，超过80%的人会说，我们感觉自己是二等公民。
And if you ask their voters how they feel about their standing in German society, 80% plus will say we feel like second class citizens.
所以，这是其中一个关键因素。
So that's that's one key element.
第二个关键因素是移民问题。
The second key element is the migration issue.
德国选择党最初并不是一个反移民、仇外或种族主义的政党。
And the AFD didn't start as an anti migrant, xenophobic, racist party.
它最初是作为对量化宽松和德拉吉政策的替代而出现的。
It started as the alternative was to QE, to Draghi.
但在2015至2016年叙利亚难民危机之后，它演变成一个公开的种族主义和新纳粹组织。
But after the refugee shock in Syria in 1516, it became an openly racist, openly neo Nazi formation.
我认为，去工业化这一因素的关键在于，它剥夺了主流观点最后的希望——即德国的经济成功故事能够解决这些问题，并更成功地实现融合。
Where I think the deindustrialization element of the story comes in is that that removes the last best hope, if you like, of the mainstream, which says, you know the way we're going to address these problems and as it were integrate these more successfully is by Germany's economic success story.
最终，经济繁荣将解决这些问题，实现成功的融合。
That's ultimately going to take care of this problem, will achieve successful integration.
他们向英特尔和德累斯顿周边的台湾芯片制造商投入了大量资金，但这并没有赢得东德选民的支持。
They plowed money into Intel and the Taiwanese manufacturing chips around Dresden that hasn't bought off the East German voters.
而汽车工业的真正危机——它仍是德国工业基础设施的重要组成部分——在于，如果这一产业崩溃，那么对抗种族主义和伊斯兰恐惧症的良方将不再具有可行性。
And the real nightmare of the shift in the motor vehicle industry, which is a huge piece of the German industrial infrastructure still, is that if that goes, then your antidote, if you like, to what is essentially a politics of racism and Islamophobia, that is no longer plausible.
我认为，德累斯顿或萨克森地区的人们投票给德国选择党，并不是因为他们担心大众汽车的工作岗位会流失。
And it isn't, I don't think that, you know, folks in Dresden or in Cheroingia are voting AFD because they're worried about jobs being in VW.
更准确地说，柏林方面完全陷入恐慌，因为如果没有大众汽车模式，德国是否真的拥有一个增长模式就变得不那么明显了。
It's more that in Berlin, there's total panic because if you haven't got the VW model, it's not obvious that Germany really has a growth model.
这在某种程度上，和我们之前讨论美国时所提到的盲点是一样的。
And in part, it's the same blind spot as we were talking about with The US.
换句话说，他们实际上并没有关注德国最主要的就业和GDP来源——服务业，而不是制造业基础。
In other words, they aren't actually focused on what even in Germany is the main source of employment and GDP, which is services and not the manufacturing base.
但他们已经把自己困住了。
But they have been they've trapped themselves.
他们被强大的利益集团所束缚，包括德国强大的有组织劳工声音，还有工业游说团体，以及一种缺乏想象力的状态。
They are trapped by powerful interest groups, the very strong voice of organised labour in Germany, but also the industrial lobby and a kind of lack of imagination.
他们正紧紧抓住工业化，把它当作最后的救命稻草。
They're kind of clinging to industrialism as really the last straw.
是的，这正是为什么中国构成的威胁如此令人担忧。
And yeah, that's why then the threat of China is really ominous.
你之前提到，中国和德国似乎都寄希望于供给侧解决方案的自然涌现，而不是采取大规模刺激措施。
You alluded earlier to the idea that maybe both China and Germany seem to be hoping for, I guess, the immaculate emergence of supply side solutions to their problems rather than having to do some sort of large scale stimulus.
这种想法现实吗？
How realistic is that?
真正的缓解措施可能来自哪里？
Like, where could relief actually come from?
就中国的情况而言，这一点其实很清楚。
I mean, in the Chinese case, it's pretty easy to see.
他们完全可以采取一系列措施，这些措施几乎毫无疑问都是三赢的局面。
I mean, they could do there's a whole series of moves that they could make that would be it's hard to see that they're just not straightforwardly win win win really.
那就是扩大家庭需求和高质量公共服务。
They would be a expansion of household demand and expansion of high quality human services.
实际上还有很多补救工作需要做，才能支撑起‘中国梦’。
There's a lot of remedial stuff that actually needs doing to back fill the China dream.
像上海这样高度发达的城市，其 sophistication 在中国内陆地区却完全无法匹敌，而内陆地区幅员辽阔，拥有数亿人口。
The extraordinary sophistication of a city like Shanghai is not matched in the Chinese hinterland, which is, of course, vast and it contains hundreds of millions of people.
甚至像教育这样的基础事项，在中国各省也相当糟糕。
And even elementary stuff like schooling is really miserable in provincial China.
我们当然会想到中国精英教育的巨大成功，但这并不是大多数人的经历。
We, of course, think of the huge success of elite education in China, but that isn't the majority experience.
因此，你可以很容易地想象出一种全面的技能提升和升级策略，虽然实施起来会是另一回事，但这才是应该走的路。
And so, you you could very easily imagine a kind of comprehensive up skilling upgrading strategy, implementing it will be a different thing, but that will be the way you would go.
像中国这样庞大的经济体，最终决定性的还是国内政策。
First economy as large as China's, it's a domestic policy story in the end that will make the difference.
对于德国来说，我认为必须从欧洲层面入手。
For Germany, I think it has to be Europe wide.
这才是正确的方向。
That's the way to go.
他们可以打破国内关于债务上限的僵局，进行投资，这会是一个选择。
I mean, they could break the impasse domestically over the debt break and invest, and that would be one option.
这无疑是一个重要的优先事项。
And that's certainly a big priority.
现在终于有了一些令人欣慰的迹象，来自社民党——也就是朔尔茨总理的政党——关于对这一债务刹车机制发起正面挑战。
There's some promising noises now, mercifully, finally out of the SPD, out of the Social Democratic Party, Chancellor Schulz's party, about a frontal attack on this debt break.
债务刹车机制是德国版的欧洲债务规则，反之亦然。
So the debt break is the German version of the European debt rules or vice versa.
欧洲规则实际上是德国债务刹车机制的版本，它限制赤字并约束借贷，即使德国几乎不需要支付实际利息，却仍急需在公共基础设施和数字化等各个领域投入数千亿欧元的投资。
The European rules are a version of the German debt break, which limits the deficit and constraints borrowing, even when Germany pays hardly any real interest and is in need of several €100,000,000,000 worth of investment in every area of public infrastructure, of digitization.
因此，这是一种出路。
So that would be one way out.
另一种方式，我认为，必须是欧洲层面的。
The other one, I think, has got to be Europe.
而可能正是某些冲击会带来实现这一目标的机会。
And it may be shocks which deliver the opportunity to do this.
特朗普获胜后乌克兰遭遇灾难，我认为将促使推出一项新的欧洲层面借贷计划，或许再增加五千亿欧元的借贷额度。
A Trump victory followed by disaster for the Ukrainians would, I think, unleash a new Europe level borrowing package, maybe another half trillion euros worth of borrowing.
这将是一种结构性刺激措施，会显著惠及德国经济。
And that would be the kind of structural stimulus that would benefit the German economy quite considerably.
我在开头提到过，但在美国，人们经常提出的一个理由是，加强对中国贸易限制是因为中国在某些方面作弊，对吧？
I mentioned this in the intro, but one of the arguments that you hear in The US about why ramping up the trade restrictions with China is this idea that they're cheating in some way, right?
可能是公开的，比如纯粹的工业间谍活动。
Maybe overt whether it's a pure industrial espionage.
但随之而来的问题是：这么多国家支持，这并不符合全球贸易的规则。
But then there's this question like, well, there's all this state support and these aren't the rules of global trade.
从历史学家的角度来看，这种说法是全新的吗？还是说，一直以来都存在这样的观点，认为你的方式不对，或者你的工业能力是用不同于我们的方式建立起来的？
Just from the historian perspective, is this a novel argument or has there always been this idea that you're doing it the wrong way or you've built up this industrial capacity in a different way than we built up?
再次让我觉得，每个国家都有不同的国内规则等等。
Again, it strikes me that every country has different domestic rules and so forth.
在美国，我们对教育的补贴相当大。
In The US, we subsidize education to quite a degree.
因此，这是一种补贴工人培训的形式，企业随后可以从中受益。
So that is a form of subsidizing worker training that then corporations can take advantage.
这种声称‘我们有权这么做，因为我们不喜欢你们的发展方式’的说法，究竟有多新颖？
How novel is this claim that we get to do these things because we don't like the way you've developed.
这一直是全球贸易辩论的一部分吗？
Has that always been part of these global trade debates?
首先要说的是，据我们所能估算的，已经有一些相当认真的努力试图衡量中国产业政策支出的规模，而且数额巨大。
The first thing to say is that as far as we're able to estimate, there've been a couple of fairly serious minded efforts to estimate the scale of Chinese industrial policy spending, and it's significant.
我认为最常被引用的估计是约占GDP的1.7%，尽管我同意你，乔，对于如何定义它其实有多种不同的方式。
I think the most widely cited estimate puts it about 1.7% of GDP, which when you compare it to a similarly defined measure, though I agree with you, Joe, there's like lots of different ways of defining it.
但如果你用同样的分类标准来衡量欧洲和美国，中国的比例大约是他们的三倍。
But if you apply the same classification to Europe and The US, that's about three times the share that they spend.
所以，这是其中的一个方面。
So that's one element of this.
这显然是真实存在的。
That's clearly for real.
另一个可以用来衡量这一点的背景，是我们之前所处的体制。
Another, I think, horizon against which to measure this is like the regime that we had before.
我认为，这种争论的激烈程度，必须放在这样一个假设下评判：即我们已经超越了国家主导和国家补贴支持的时代。
And I think the ferocity of this argument has to be judged against the assumption that somehow we had outgrown that kind of era of state led and state subsidised support.
在欧洲的情况下，你必须说，自90年代以来，他们确实认真对待了这一点。
And in the European case, you'd have to say that since the 90s, they've taken that really quite seriously.
换句话说，欧洲人确实制定了切实有效的规则，以防止各国政府和地区政府进行中国视为理所当然的那种补贴。
In other words, the Europeans do have rules that bite to prevent national governments and regional governments from doing the kind of subsidy that the Chinese take for granted.
为什么？
Why?
因为欧洲人需要平衡这个极其复杂的多国联盟——欧盟。
Because the Europeans are balancing this really complicated multinational European Union.
因此，为了避免出现疯狂的补贴竞赛，让德国包揽所有补贴，就必须制定这些严格的规则。
So to avoid just these crazy subsidy races and Germany winning all of them, there have to be these very tight rules.
欧洲人对此非常认真，甚至有时显得荒谬可笑。
And the Europeans take this seriously to an extent that is at times quite farcical.
来自美国方面的论点则不太站得住脚，因为这类补贴从未真正消失过，美国各州和城市一直以相当激烈的方式争夺投资。
The argument coming from the American side is a little less plausible because that kind of subsidy never really went away, and American states and cities have always competed in a fairly brutal way for investment.
但我认为，这又是另一个用来指责中国的参照背景，即：好吧。
But I think that's another horizon against which sort of the point the finger is pointed at China, which was, okay.
在九十年代，我们期望你们这么做，因为那时你们还很贫穷。
In the nineties, we expected you to do this cause you were still poor then.
然后你们加入了世贸组织，我们本以为你们会变得富裕并逐渐放弃这种做法，但结果你们根本没有。
And then you did WTO and then we were expecting you to get rich and grow out of this and goddamn it, you haven't.
毫无影响，你们从2010年代起反而变本加厉，做得越来越频繁和激烈。
No impact, you've somehow doubled down since the twenty tens, you've been doing it more and more intensely.
有一项关于中国的最新研究指出，这实际上是北京从2008年汲取的政策经验。
And there's a new study of China which suggests that in fact, this was a policy learning on the part of Beijing out of 2008.
因此，中国人认为，在西方发生金融危机后，欧洲人和美国人会意识到以金融为中心的增长模式并不理想，转而大力扶持产业；为了抢占先机，中国决定率先行动。
So the Chinese imagine that after the great financial crisis in the West, the Europeans and the Americans would realize that finance centered growth was not a great thing and they would double down on industry and to get ahead of the game, the Chinese thought they should.
当然，结果是其他人根本没真正采取这样的举措。
And of course, it turned out that no one else really ever did quite make that move.
但中国人确实这么做了。
And the Chinese really did.
到2015年，他们推出了‘中国制造2025’政策。
And, you know, by 2015, they had the made in China 2025 policy.
因此，欧洲和美国的政策理论存在一种不同步性，它们以为我们会自然摆脱这种状况。
So there was an asynchronicity in which, as it were, European and American policy theory thought we would get grow out of this.
于是，中国突然加倍投入。
So the Chinese suddenly, in fact, doubled down.
这太有趣了，因为我一直觉得像CHIPS法案、通胀削减法案这些举措，我总有一种想法。
That's so funny because I always think like all these things, CHIPS Act, Inflation Reduction Act, I always have this idea.
我觉得2009年可能是采取这类措施的好时机。
It's like, you know, 2009 might have been a good time to have done this.
那时候产能过剩，劳动力便宜，各种条件都具备。
There was a lot of spare capacity and cheap labor and all this stuff.
总之，我最后还有一个问题要问你。
Anyway, I just have one last question for you.
你对拜登政府一直持批评态度。
And you've been fairly critical of the Biden administration.
我们确实经历了这样的转变，对吧？
We have had this turn, right?
因此，政府——或许从特朗普开始——已经转向了与此前数十年所谓的新自由主义共识不同的方向，不再以工人为中心来思考我们的贸易关系、国内投资等问题，而是终于迟来地实施了一些本应在2008年金融危机后就应推行的政策。
So the administration, and maybe starting with Trump, and the administration has pivoted away from the sort of, I guess people call it neoliberal consensus of the decades that preceded it, the worker centered approach to thinking about our trade relationships, etcetera, domestic investment, maybe belatedly getting to do some of the policies that maybe we should have implemented fifteen years ago after the financial crisis.
作为一位公共知识分子，尤其是左翼人士，你如何看待自己的角色？
What do you see as your role as I guess a public intellectual, someone on the left?
你知道，你是那些民主党人可能会阅读和倾听的人。
You know, you're someone who people in the Democratic Party might read and listen to.
你希望通过自己的写作和公共工作实现什么目标？
What do you what do you see as sort of what you trying to accomplish with your writing and your public work?
是的，这确实是个巨大的冲击。
Yeah, it's been it's been quite a shock, actually.
我的意思是，一方面，我们曾经被倾听，而且我们是有意这样做的。
I mean, on the one hand, we were listened to, and I'll say we advisedly.
但如今被埋葬、他们更愿意遗忘的，是拜登经济政策中属于我团队的那一部分。
And and but it's the bit of Biden economics which is now buried and they prefer to forget, which is my team.
我是那个团队的主要发言人之一，我们当时指出，奥巴马在2009年推出的刺激计划远远不够，我们需要真正大规模地行动。
I was one of the leading spokespeople of the of the team that basically said Obama didn't go big enough with the stimulus in 2009, and we needed to go really big, you know, this time.
而且我们确实被听进去了。
And we were listened to.
比如，我知道舒默那边的人确实接受了这个观点，认为2009年错失了一个良机，这个说法真的传进去了。
Like, you know, I know from from Schumer's people that absolutely that argument that they missed a trick in 2009, it really that actually got through.
毕竟，拜登政府上台初期就推出了大规模刺激计划，我认为这带来了惊人的宏观经济表现。
And after all, they did the huge stimulus early in the Biden administration, and I would argue that it delivered a miraculous macroeconomic record.
对吧？
Right?
但有趣的是，正是拜登经济政策中的这一部分，大家都想忘掉，因为拉里·萨默斯的通胀论调。
But the funny thing is that that's the bit of Biden economics that everyone wants to forget because of the Larry Summers inflation argument.
没错。
Right.
因为这个观点几乎在提出时就被彻底否定了。
Because that was anathematized almost as it was happening.
取而代之的是，整个团队都转向了产业政策这个方向。
And instead, the entire team has swarmed around this industrial policy element.
我认为我发现了新的角色。
And I think there I've discovered a new role.
所以我觉得在第一阶段，我感到政策学习正在发生，而左翼对奥巴马政府的批评正在为这种学习做出积极贡献。
So I think in the first phase I felt, okay, there was policy learning that was going on and the kind of left critique of the Obama administration was making a very positive contribution in feeding that.
然后我们进入了实际上在产业政策中浮现出来的东西。
Then we came to what actually emerged in the industrial policy.
我必须说，许多我视为盟友、朋友的人，转变了角色，基本上变成了为拜登政府摇旗呐喊的角色。
And I have to say that a lot of folks that I would consider allies, friends, whatever, shifted roles to essentially the role of a kind of cheerleading around the Biden administration.
我理解。
And I get it.
对吧？
Right?
他们是美国人。
They're Americans.
我不是美国人，也不是美国公民。
I'm not an American, non American citizen.
对他们来说，这关乎生死，关乎共和国的命运。
For them, this is life and death, fate of the republic.
我们必须团结在我们的团队身后。
We have to rally behind our team.
他们确实是以开玩笑的方式这么做的。
By joke, they did.
就像拜登政府一样，至少在信息管理上非常出色，大力动员金融推特圈的常客，让所有人都参与进来并持续推动。
Like the Biden administration, if nothing else, was brilliant at message management and worked the usual suspects in the finance Twitter space incredibly hard to get everyone on-site and keep pushing.
在那一刻，我不得不说我发现自己扮演了一个稍微不同的角色，这个角色吸引力较低。
And at that point, I have to say I discovered a slightly different role, which was more that it's a less attractive role.
这是一个更不舒服的角色，那就是充当内部批评者。
It's a less it's less comfortable role, which is really that of the sort of inside critic.
或者更准确地说，只是一个没有盲目追随主流观点的人，会问：究竟以什么标准、什么尺度来衡量这真的足够了？
Or rather just simply somebody who wasn't necessarily drinking the Kool Aid and was saying, well, by what metric, by what scale is this really adequate?
因此，在《通胀削减法案》方面，这项法案被塑造成了一部宏大的产业政策史诗。
And so that was on the IRA side, the Inflation Reduction Act, where this was turned into this gigantic epic of industrial policy.
但我就是看不到。
And I just don't see it.
我在数据中看不到。
I don't see it in the data.
我在规模上也看不到。
I don't see it in the scale.
如果你做任何反事实分析，或者看看我们原本预期会发生什么，我也看不到。
I don't see it if you run any kind of counterfactual or what we would have expected anyway to have happened.
我认为在这方面，人们一直采取了一种非常温和、小心翼翼的态度。
I think there's been a real sort of soft kid glove treatment of this.
然而，更严肃的问题是战争与和平，以及国家安全如何已成为美国进步派经济政策中不可或缺的一部分。
Much more seriously, however, is question of war and peace and the way in which national security has come to form an essential part even of a progressive economic policy in The United States.
我来自一代欧洲人，我们的童年和青年时代完全被一种前景所主导——我们所有人都将死于核焚烧。
I come from the generation of Europeans whose childhood and youth was entirely dominated by the prospect that we were all going to end our lives in a nuclear incineration.
我对这种转向鹰派、反华的产业、经济与军事政策结合感到深深不安。
And I find that turn towards a hawkish anti China synthesis of industrial economic and military policy profoundly troubling.
至少，我认为像我这样背景的人，成为美国公民后，所扮演的角色应该是这样。
And the very least, I think the role of folks with my kind of biography, I will become an American citizen.
但即便如此，我觉得我们此时的角色是进行反驳，因为在这种时刻，一种左翼的美国例外论式旗帜挥舞行为会迅速浮现。
But nevertheless, I feel like our role at this point is to push back because there's an element of flag waving a kind of left American exceptionalism that comes very rapidly to the fore in moments like that.
而且人们愿意相信，是的，你知道，美国可以推行一项绿色马歇尔计划，或者那种我们非常熟悉的整个话语体系。
And there is a willingness to believe that, yes, you know, I don't know, America can do a green Marshall plan or, you know, that whole rhetoric that we're very familiar with.
和。
With.
我发现自己扮演的角色与我原本想象的完全不同，我不知道是否已经锚定什么，但我始终在问一个问题：这真的成立吗？这并不是对美国领导力潜在积极作用的怀疑。
I've discovered a different role for myself than I really imagined in, I don't know whether I've anchored anything, but that's just consistently asking the question, is this And it's not a skepticism about the potentially beneficial role of US leadership.
而更常问的是：你真的认真吗？
It's just actually more often than not are kind of asking, are you actually serious at all?
因为我看到的是数亿甚至十亿美元级别的投入，而我们都知道，如果我们真的认真对待，并且真正想与中国竞争，那么需要调动的资金是数千亿，甚至上万亿美元。
Because I see hundreds of millions and single digit billions when we all know that the problems we're talking about, if you're serious and if you actually want to compete with China, are hundreds of billions, if not trillions of dollars that need mobilizing.
我绝对不认为我们应该接受那种空洞的承诺，即承诺将采取巨大而戏剧性的行动，虽然我们都会因此感到兴奋，但实际交付的却远低于此。
What I definitely don't think we should buy is the kind of weak soup of a promise of giant and dramatic action, which we all kind of can get excited about when in fact what's being delivered is something far less than that.
亚当·图泽，很高兴你再次做客《Odd Lot》。
Adam Tooze, so great having you back on Odd Lot.
精彩的对话，期待下次再聊。
Fantastic conversation and looking forward to the next time.
谢谢。
Thank you.
非常感谢你们的做法。
Really appreciate the way you guys do.
这真是不可或缺的聆听体验，再次合作太棒了。
It's such a such an essential listen together again.
太客气了。
Too kind.
我没法告诉你，有多少次我忍不住想，天啊，我真受不了这种机场时刻。
I can't tell you how many, like, oh my god, I can't stand this airport moment.
你知道吗？
You know what?
听一下《Odd Lots》吧。
Mean, listen to Odd Lots.
一切都会好起来的。
Everything will be okay.
然后，Carly，保留这部分。
Then Carly, keep that in.
保留这部分。
Keep this part in.
是的。
Yeah.
认真的，我跟你说真的。
Seriously, I kid you not.
三天前，贾斯汀·希思罗，那安检队伍简直像噩梦一样。
Justin Heathrow three days ago, it was like some nightmare security line.
我只是把它们放上去。
I just put them on.
杰克逊霍尔的精彩内容。
Great stuff from Jackson Hole.
哦，非常感谢你。
Oh, thank you so much.
你知道的，这真的是一项巨大的服务。
Like, you know, it's really it's really a huge service.
知道我们让希思罗机场的体验变得更好一点，这温暖了我那颗愤世嫉俗的心。
And it warms my cynical heart to know that we make the experience of Heathrow Airport a little bit better.
太棒了。
That's great.
还有其他一些更好的时刻。
Mean, there are other also better moments.
我可以描述一下那个聊天的时刻。
I could describe that for a chatty moment.
但，是的，这真的
But, yeah, it's really
好的，非常感谢，保重，希望很快能再见到你。
Well, good thank you so much, and take care, and hope to see you around soon.
是的。
Yeah.
你也是。
You too.
我很喜欢和亚当聊天。
I love talking to Adam.
确实太久没聊了，但你知道的，我特别喜欢和人交谈。
It really had been too long, but, you know, I love love talking to people.
你随便说点什么，他们总能说出些有趣的话。
You just throw out anything, and they'll have something interesting to say.
我知道。
I know.
这些嘉宾都很棒。
Those are great guests.
他是，是的。
He's yeah.
他确实让事情变得很容易。
He definitely makes it easy.
当然了。
That's for sure.
我喜欢他关于‘产能过剩’这个词词源的观点，意思是，好吧。
I did like his point about the sort of etymological point about the word overcapacity And this idea that, like, okay.
好吧，你对中国有怨言，归根结底就是他们没有公平竞争。
Well, you have a grievance with China that basically boils down to, well, they're not playing fair.
是的。
Yeah.
但如果你能用这种看似中立、技术性、甚至听起来像科学的说法来包装的话
But if you can put this sort of seemingly neutral, technocratic, almost it sounds scientific
对。
Right.
把这个术语加上去。
Term onto it.
也许你可以以此为基础，加入具体数字，或者给它披上一层看似科学的外衣。
And maybe you can use that as the basis for, like, adding specific numbers or just giving it this veneer of, like, scientific feeling.
我觉得这非常有趣，因为似乎过去一年左右确实发生了这样的情况。
I thought that was really interesting because it does seem to be like maybe that has happened over the past year or so.
你知道吗，我发现一个非常有趣的观点，最近另一件事也让我想到了这一点，也许我们应该多聊聊：我们普遍接受这样一个观点，即如果我们想要生产率增长，就无法在服务业实现。
You know what I found to be a very interesting point, and actually something else made me think about this recently and maybe we should talk about it more, is the sort of acceptance that we have that if we want productivity growth, we can't get that in the service sector.
你看医疗成本。
So you see healthcare costs.
我认为近年来医疗成本的增长趋势确实有所缓和，但医疗成本仍在上升。
I think that actually the cost curve has been bent a little bit in recent years, but there's a growing healthcare cost.
住房服务仍然是主要的压力来源。
Housing services continue to be a major source of strain.
我们都了解人们对大学学费、育儿成本或养老成本等方面的不满，诸如此类的问题。
We all know the frustrations that people have with university costs or childcare costs or eldercare costs, things like that.
因此，当我们思考经济增长以及生产率提升将来自何处时，我们默认会想到制造业。
And so when we think about economic growth and where productivity gains are going to come from, we default to the manufacturing sector.
与此同时，我们的经济中有一大片领域，我认为很多人直觉上觉得正在失去优势——我们得到的是同样的东西，但每年却越来越贵，或许我们最终应该面对的一个重大挑战或任务是：为什么我们不能让服务变得更便宜？
Meanwhile, there's this huge swath of our economy that I think many people intuitively feel like we're losing ground on, that we're getting the same thing, but it's more expensive every year, and that perhaps the sort of big challenge or a task that we should take up at some point is like, why don't we make our services cheaper?
我认为这是对的。
Well, I think it's true.
而且你看到，这确实是个非常好的观点。
And you see that's a totally that's a great point.
而且你在通货膨胀数据中也能看到这一点。
And you see it borne out in the inflation statistics.
对吧？
Right?
我有时会想，虽然东西的价格在下降，但生活成本却在上升。
I sometimes think, okay, the cost of things is going down, but the cost of living is going up.
你在统计数据中能非常清晰地看到这种分化：比如，电视变得越来越先进、功能更强大，价格却比以往任何时候都低，但房租、购房、保险、医疗费用、大学教育、托儿费用，甚至在某种程度上的食品价格，全都大幅上涨。
And you see that delineated very clearly in the statistics where like, okay, TVs have become more sophisticated and more advanced and they're cheaper than ever, but rents, homeownership, insurance, medical costs, college education, childcare, food prices to some extent, all of those have gone up phenomenally.
所以，是的，我觉得这是个很好的观点。
So, yeah, I think it's a great point.
完全同意。
Totally.
我很高兴亚当提到了这一点。
And I'm glad Adam brought that up.
他提到的另一个有趣观点是，中国存在大量不满情绪。
Another interesting thing that he said was just this idea that there is a lot of dissatisfaction in China.
我的意思是，美国也有很多不满情绪，当你和人们交谈时，能听到很多人说，确实有一种非常消极的氛围，也许这仅仅是因为GDP增长疲软，但至少——再次说明，这对我来说都是二手信息——中国国内民众对经济走势的感知似乎出了问题。
I mean, there's a lot of dissatisfaction in The United States, and you hear this from multiple people when you talk to them, that there really is this sort of deeply negative vibe, and maybe it's just because GDP growth has been weak, But it feels like at least, again, this is all secondhand for me, that there is something wrong going on there with the way the domestic population perceives how the economy is unfolding.
我一直在想，我们之前讨论过，为什么美国在2008年之后没有实施更大规模的刺激政策？
Well, one thing I was thinking, we talked about, well, why didn't The US maybe have bigger stimulus post 2008?
而且，这一点已经被很多人提过了，确实很有道理。
And again, I think that's a really valid point that has been brought up by a number of people at this point.
但反过来，如果你看看中国，中国当时实施了大规模的刺激政策，是的。
But conversely, if you look at China, China had massive stimulus Yeah.
2008年之后，人们甚至将中国描述为在那段时期拯救了全球经济。
Post 2008, and people have even described China as saving the global economy in that time period.
我想你可能会好奇，如果当时的刺激措施能稍微缩减一些，会不会让2000年后这十二年的过渡期变得更容易一些？
And I think you kind of have to wonder, like, if that stimulus had been somewhat scaled down, would that have made, I guess, the transition or the post 2000 sort of twelve years a little bit easier?
比如，如果美国在2008年后能更早地加大财政刺激，也许情况会更好。
Like, The US, if we had scaled up fiscal sooner post 2008, maybe things would have been better.
但反过来，如果中国在2008年后能适度减少部分刺激措施，经济会不会更好？
But conversely, if China had maybe scaled some of it down post 2008, would it have been better for the economy?
或许能推动经济更多转向市场驱动的消费需求。
Maybe enabled it to move more to, you know, market driven consumer demand
是的，挺有意思的。
Yeah, interesting.
我不知道。
I don't know.
不过这真的很有趣。
No, but it is so funny.
我之前没有意识到，这种观点认为，在美国金融体系崩溃后，中国人可能以为西方会放弃其金融化的经济模式。
I had not realized that this idea that after the financial system in The US collapsed, the Chinese may have thought, Oh, the West is going to give up on their financialized economy.
但他们不可能放弃，结果我们又回到了同样的做法。
They can't and then we basically just went right back to the same approach.
从这场对话中能提取出太多内容了。
So much to pull from that conversation.
是的。
Yeah.
和亚当聊天总是很愉快。
Always great catching up with Adam.
我们就这样结束吧？
Shall we leave it there?
我们就到这里吧。
Let's leave it there.
这又是《All Thoughts》播客的另一期。
This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.
我是特蕾西·阿拉韦。
I'm Tracy Allaway.
你可以关注我，账号是Tracy Allaway。
You can follow me at Tracy Allaway.
我是吉尔·韦辛瑟尔。
And I'm Jill Weisenthal.
你可以关注我，账号是the stalwart。
You can follow me at the stalwart.
关注我们的嘉宾亚当·图泽。
Follow our guest Adam Tooze.
他的账号是Adam_Tooze。
He's at Adam underscore Tooze.
另外，别忘了收听他的播客《Ones and Twos》，还有他的精彩通讯《Chartbook》。
Also, check out his podcast, ones and twos, and also check out his fantastic newsletter Chartbook.
关注我们的制作人：卡门·罗德里格斯（Carmen Armen）、达什尔·贝内特（Dashbot）和凯尔·布鲁克斯（Kell Brooks）。
Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armen, Dashle Bennett at Dashbot, and Kell Brooks at Kell Brooks.
感谢我们的制作人摩西·安达姆。
And thank you to our producer, Moses Andam.
如需获取更多《Odd Lots》内容，请访问 bloomberg.com/oddlots，那里提供文字稿、博客和通讯，并且你可以在我们的 Discord 中讨论所有这些话题。
For more Odd Lots content, go to bloomberg.com/oddlots where we have transcripts, a blog, and a newsletter, and you can chat about all of these topics in our Discord.
事实上，那里还有一个亚当·图泽频道，因为人们对亚当的兴趣如此浓厚，以至于我们在 Discord 中专门开辟了一个地方来讨论亚当，discord.gg/oddlots。
In fact, there is an Adam Tooze channel in there because people are so interested in Adam that there's a separate place where people chat about Adam in our Discord, discord.gg/oddlots.
如果你喜欢《Odd Lots》，如果你也喜欢在机场等候时收听节目，那么请在您最喜欢的播客平台上给我们留下一个好评。
And if you enjoy Odd Lots, if you too like to listen to episodes while waiting in airports, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform.
请记住，如果你是彭博的订阅用户，你可以免费收听我们所有的节目，没有任何广告。
And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad free.
你只需要将你的彭博账户与 Apple 播客连接起来即可。
All you need to do is connect your Bloomberg account with Apple Podcasts.
要完成这一操作，只需在平台上找到彭博频道并按照那里的说明操作即可。
In order to do that, just find the Bloomberg channel on the platform and follow the instructions there.
感谢收听。
Thanks for listening.
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