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他们向你兜售的是一个让你变得过时或无足轻重的AI未来。
You're being sold an AI future where you're obsolete or irrelevant.
这种愿景是错误的。
That vision is wrong.
在Palantir，他们正在构建能帮助工人并释放其全部潜能的AI。
At Palantir, they're building AI that helps workers and unlocks their full potential.
美国工人是我们国家最伟大的力量。
American workers are our nation's greatest strength.
AI不应该淘汰他们。
AI shouldn't eliminate them.
而应该提升他们。
It should elevate them.
Palantir在此讲述他们的故事。
Palantir is here to tell their stories.
从工厂到医院，AI正将人们从苦差中解放出来，让他们做人类最擅长的事——创造、解决、建设。
From factories to hospitals, AI is freeing people from drudgery, letting them do what humans do best, create, solve, build.
Palantir，让美国人变得不可替代。
Palantir, making Americans irreplaceable.
你好。
Hi.
我是星星。
I'm Xing Xing.
我是西蒙·杰克。
And I'm Simon Jack.
我们共同主持《好坏的亿万富翁》节目。
And together, we host Good Bad Billionaire.
这档播客探讨世界上部分最富有的人如何积累财富。
The podcast exploring how some of the world's richest people made their fortunes.
我们带着全新一季的亿万富翁故事回归了。
And we are back with a brand new season of billionaires.
是的。
Yes.
电影巨星阿诺德·施瓦辛格。
Movie megastar Arnold Schwarzenegger.
美国白手起家的女首富黛安·亨德里克斯。
America's richest self made businesswoman Diane Hendrix.
还有Snapchat联合创始人埃文·斯皮格尔等众多富豪。
And co founder of Snapchat, Evan Spiegel, to name just a few.
我们将邀请您评判他们是好是坏，或只是又一个亿万富翁。
And we're asking you to decide if they're good, bad, or just another billionaire.
BBC国际频道出品《善恶亿万富翁》。
Good, bad billionaire from the BBC World Service.
欢迎在bbc.com或任意播客平台收听。
Listen on bbc.com or wherever you get your podcasts.
彭博音频工作室。
Bloomberg Audio Studios.
播客。
Podcasts.
广播。
Radio.
新闻。
News.
大家好，欢迎收听本期《奇思妙想播客》。
Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Thoughts Podcast.
我是崔西·阿拉维。
I'm Tracey Allaway.
我是乔·韦森塔尔。
And I'm Joe Weisenthal.
乔，为了准备今天的对话，我今天早上特意坐下来——
Joe, in preparation for this conversation today, I sat down this morning.
我们录制日期是...11月20号对吧？
We're recording on, what is it, November 20?
我在谷歌新闻里输入了'中美关系'进行搜索
And I typed US China into Google News results.
你只是想看看最新情况。
You just see what the latest is.
以下是一些精选标题。
Here is a selection of headlines.
美国委员会称中国可能在几乎没有预警的情况下入侵台湾。
US Commission says China could invade Taiwan with little advance warning.
中国利用印巴冲突来试验并炫耀其军事实力。
China leveraged India Pakistan conflict to trial and tout its military strengths.
太平洋岛屿处于未来美中战争的前线。
Pacific Islands on frontline of future US China war.
最后还有，美中芯片战。
And then finally, The US China chip war.
就这样。
That's it.
我们准备好了吗？
Are we ready?
我正想说，尤其是芯片领域，几乎每隔一天就有关于什么被允许或不被允许的不同头条新闻。
I was just going to say, I feel like the chips in particular, every other day, there's a different headline about what's allowed or what's not.
但你说得对，这就是现状。
But to your point, this is the story.
我是说，还有人工智能。
I mean, there's AI.
还有其他几件事。
There's a couple other things.
然后就是美中关系。
And then The US China relationship.
确实如此。
Absolutely.
现在看来，我们几乎不可避免地要用竞争性词汇来讨论美中关系了。
And it seems almost inevitable at this point that we talk about US and China in competitive terms.
对吧？
Right?
而且是以军事化的措辞。
And also in militaristic terms.
这种情况从我记忆以来就一直在持续。
And this has been going on for as long as I can remember at this point.
这种态势在加剧，对吧？
It's building up, right?
就像过去十年间，你知道，我们年轻时，我还以为我们会一直保持贸易往来，甚至他们可能有一天会自由化，变成自由民主国家。
Like really in the last decade, you know, when we were younger, I thought, oh, we're just going to trade together and maybe they'll even liberalize and become a liberal democracy one day.
但这并未发生。
It didn't happen.
然而在过去十年或九年里，人们越来越多地用军事术语来框定这种关系。
But in the last ten years or nine years, it's really picked up how much people are framing this in military terms.
其实我在2002年就写过一篇论文，预测中国会在2008年奥运会前入侵台湾。
Well, I wrote that paper back in, like, 2002 that China was going to invade Taiwan by the two thousand and eight Olympics.
所以我对这个问题的看法可能与你不同。
So my view of this might be different to yours.
我的观点也被证明是极其错误的。
My view has also been proven to be incredibly incorrect.
所以我就说到这里吧。
So I'll leave it at that.
但你知道，几个月前我们和Henry Wang录制了这期节目，当时我们在讨论美中关系。
But, you know, we recorded this episode with Henry Wang a few months ago where we were talking about U.
美中关系。
S.-China relations.
他提到了一个人。
And he mentioned one person.
对。
Yeah.
他说，你得邀请他上节目。
And he said, You got to get him on the show.
你得听听他对美中关系的看法。
You got to get his his perspective on this view of U.
美中竞争。
S.-China competition.
我们是否注定要陷入军事冲突？
And are we doomed, destined to end up in a military conflict?
所以我们来了。
So here we are.
我们这就开始。
We're going do it.
我们在他的办公室。
We're in his office.
开始吧。
Let's do it.
好的。
All right.
事实上，我们请到了最合适的嘉宾。
We have, in fact, the perfect guest.
我们有格雷厄姆·艾利森教授。
We have Professor Graham Allison.
他是哈佛大学道格拉斯·迪伦政府学教授。
He is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University.
当然，正是他创造了'修昔底德陷阱'这一术语来描述美中竞争可能的结果。
And he, of course, is the one who coined the term the Thucydides trap to describe the potential outcome of U.
美中竞争。
S.-China Competition.
确实是讨论这个话题最合适的人选。
Really, the perfect person to speak to about this.
艾利森教授，非常感谢您做客OddPots节目。
Professor Allison, thank you so much for coming on OddPots.
非常感谢您的邀请。
Thank you so much for having me.
我提到了修昔底德陷阱，我想很多听众都知道这个概念。
So I mentioned the Thucydides trap, and I think a lot of listeners will know what it is.
可能我们相当一部分听众对古希腊历史非常着迷，对此了如指掌。
And probably a substantial portion of our listeners are really into ancient Greek history and know all about it.
但当你首次提出这个术语时，是否曾有过灵光一现的时刻，让你觉得这就是定义美中关系未来的方式？
But when you first came up with that term, was there was there a light bulb moment in your head where you thought, like, this is the way to characterize the future of US and China relations?
谢谢。
So thank you.
答案是肯定的。
And the answer is yes.
我想起来前几天晚上，凯文·麦卡锡议长在这里参加了一场论坛活动。
I think I had actually speaker Kevin McCarthy here at a forum event a couple of nights ago.
他当时提到，当他试图弄清楚中国的情况时，给我打了电话，说‘能给我讲解一下吗？’
And he was reminding me that when he was trying to figure out what was happening with China, he called me up and he said, would you give me a tutorial?
我说当然，这是我的荣幸。
I said, of course, I'd be honored to.
我们就此展开了这场对话。
We've started this conversation.
我们刚开始时他的第一个问题是：这到底是怎么回事？
And his first question when we began was, what the hell is going on here?
那是
That's That
这本该是我的第一个问题。
should have been my first question.
好问题。
Good question.
这是个非常好的问题。
It's a very good question.
每天以各种方式，总会有关于中国威胁、中国竞争、中国中国中国的报道。
Every day and every way, somehow or another, there's a story about China threat, China competition, China, China, China.
我说，简而言之，如果你想用一个词或短语概括，这就是典型的崛起与对抗。
I said, in a word, if you're trying to capture this one or phrase, this is a classic lucidity and rivalry.
因此中国是一个迅速崛起的强国。
So China is a meteoric rising power.
历史上从未有国家在如此多的维度上如此迅速地崛起至此高度。
Never before in history has a nation risen so far, so fast on so many different dimensions.
在本世纪初，我们甚至无法在后视镜中找到这个国家，因为它落后我们太远。而今天很难在后视镜中找到它，因为如果你考虑竞争关系，它要么与我们并肩，要么已超越我们。
A country that we couldn't even find in our rearview mirror at the beginning of the century because it was so far behind us It's very hard to find in our rearview mirror today because it's either beside us or ahead of us if if you think of it rivalry.
所以这是一个如流星般崛起的强国。
So a meteoric rising power.
美国是一个庞大的统治强国。
The US is a colossal ruling power.
自罗马帝国以来，从未有国家能在如此多的维度上保持如此惊人的强大实力如此之久。
Never since Rome has a country been so powerful in so many different dimensions for such an amazing period of time.
事实上，我刚刚写了一篇文章，将于下周发表在《外交事务》上，讨论这段最长的和平时期。
In fact, I just have a piece that'll be in foreign affairs next week on the longest piece.
这是自罗马帝国以来大国间最长的无战争时期。
This is the longest period without great power war since Rome.
哇。
Wow.
我们在九月份庆祝了这八十年没有发生大国战争的历史。
The eighty years we celebrated in September without great power war.
历史上，过去几千年里每隔一两代人就会爆发一次大国战争。
Historically, every generation or two for the last few thousand years, there's been great power wars.
这太不可思议了，一个不仅自身强盛，还真正促进了国际和平的超级霸权。
So amazing, colossal ruling power who's not only been good for itself, but actually good for an international peace.
所以修昔底德在试图理解古希腊到底发生了什么时，写下了他称之为雅典崛起的故事，以及由此在斯巴达引发的恐惧，这种恐惧使得战争几乎不可避免。
So Thucydides, when he was trying to understand what the hell was going on in ancient Greece, wrote about what he called the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war virtually inevitable.
想象一下儿童游乐场上的跷跷板，一端是重物，另一端是轻物。
So think about a seesaw on a kid's playground, and one heavy is on the one end and one light is on the other.
而重物基本掌控着局面。
And the heavy is kind of in control.
我可以随意晃动你。
I can jiggle you if I want to.
诸如此类。
Blah blah blah.
突然间，轻的那端开始变重了。
Now all of a sudden, the light starts heavy.
开始增加重量。
Starts gaining weight.
增加重量。
Gaining weight.
然后他变得越来越大。
And he gets a little bigger and a little bigger.
很快，我就感觉到，等等。
Pretty soon, I'm feeling, wait a minute.
可能我只有一只脚还踩在地上。
I maybe I have only one foot on the ground.
可能我感觉自己变轻了。
Maybe maybe I'm feeling less.
所以当你看到跷跷板的倾斜和地缘权力的变化时，基本上这会让双方都感到困惑。
So when you see this tilt of the seesaw and the tectonic self power, basically, this concretes a discombobulation for both parties.
执政党心想，嘿。
The ruling party thinks, hey.
等一下。
Wait a minute.
这是怎么回事？
What's happening here?
我过去总是俯视你。
I used to look down on you.
现在你竟能平视我，甚至可能动摇我的立场。
Now you're looking me straight on and maybe even so my purse my perspective.
过去我只需按个按钮就能成事。
I used to be able to push a button and things would happen.
如今我按下按钮却毫无反应，因为我的相对权力已经改变。
And now I push the button and things don't happen because my relative power has changed.
从心理上说，我已习惯站在每个等级制度的顶端。
Psychologically, I'm accustomed to being at the top of every pecking order.
我妻子说美国人（指我）洗掉胸前的化妆品，上面写着美国第一。
Americans, my wife says about me, wash the cosmetics off my chest, and it says USA is number one.
第一就是我们，那是我们的身份认同。
Number one is who we that's our identity.
如果你看电视，他们会扫描，你知道的，随便什么。
If you do the the television, they scan, you know, whatever.
人们会为自己的队伍竖起第一的手势，诸如此类。
People hold up their number one for their team, whatever, whatever.
所以当有人挑战我曾经作为最大经济体的地位时。
So the idea that somehow somebody is challenging my position as I used to be the biggest economy.
现在我也有一个经济体。
Now I have an economy.
我曾经是所有人的主要贸易伙伴。
I used to be the main trading partner of everybody.
曾经所有东西都是我们制造的。
Now I used to be every everything that was made was made by us.
那曾是我。
That was me.
随着这种情况发生，历史上我们反复看到这种混乱状态，继而导致大量误解、误判和错误判断。
So as this happens, historically, we've seen over and over this discombobulation that leads then to a lots of misperceptions, miscalculations, misjudgments.
不幸的是，约四分之三的案例最终会走向战争，往往是灾难性的战争。
And, unfortunately, in about three quarters of the cases, this ends up in war, often a catastrophic war.
所以很遗憾。
So sorry.
这是个冗长的版本。
That's a long version.
不。
No.
不。
No.
这样很完美。
That's perfect.
所以斯巴达最终进攻了雅典，对吧，因为他们害怕崛起的势力。
So Sparta ended up attacking Athens, right, because they were scared of the rising power.
嗯，基本上，发生的事情我的意思是，这又比那要复杂一点。
Well, basically, what happened I mean, it's, again, a little more complicated than that.
但是，是的，基本上，随着混乱的发生，雅典变得越来越自满，就像崛起的势力总是会做的那样
But, yes, basically, as the discombobulation was occurring and Athens became more and more full of itself, as the rising power always does
真是该死。
As darn it.
而统治势力变得越来越恐惧，然后一些原本对双方无关紧要的第三方活动在Coursera上出现了。
And the ruling power become more and more fearful, then it turns out that some third party activity in Coursera that wouldn't have mattered to the two parties otherwise.
所以一些原本无关紧要或容易处理的事情，加上一层误解和误判，就导致了这样的结果。
So something that's otherwise incidental or or easily managed with throw in a layer of misperceptions and miscalculations, and you get there.
另一个绝佳的例子，我认为最接近我们现在所见的是1900年至1914年那段导致第一次世界大战的时期。
Another wonderful example, I think the one that's closest to what we're now seeing, is the period from 1900 to 1914 that led to World War one.
所以如果你问自己，萨拉热窝一位大公的刺杀，原本无关紧要到甚至没登上纽约报纸的头条，怎么会引发世界大战呢？
So if you ask yourself, how in the world could a assassination of an archduke in Sarajevo, which was so inconsequential that it didn't even make the front page of the newspapers in New York?
短短五周内，整个欧洲便卷入了一场战争。
Within five weeks, all of Europe was caught up in a war.
事后回顾时，人们不禁质问：你们怎能任由这一切发生？
And when you looked afterwards, people said, how how did you guys let this happen?
正如德国首相比洛所言：'唉，要是我们早知道就好了。'
And as Bula, the the chancellor for Germany said, he said, oh, if we only knew.
所以这种日益增长的不信任与对地位处境的焦虑，并非直接引发战争，而是创造了这样的条件——当某个突发事件发生时，由于缺乏信任且充满忧虑，可能仅仅是一个普通公爵、第三城市的某些人...
So so the rising distrust and the anxiety about status position, it's not that it directly provides the impetus for war per se, but that it creates the conditions such that when there's an incident or an event that oh, because there's no trust, because there's all this concern, it can be that random thing, an average duke, some people in a third city
台湾发生了些事情
Something happens in Taiwan.
这里出了状况
Something happens here.
这边发生了变故
Something happens here.
因此，随着权力天平的倾斜，新兴与守成势力此消彼长，误解就被不断放大。
So and because as the as this seesaw is shifting, as the rising and ruling, the tectonics are moving, the misperceptions are are magnified.
误判不断叠加，第三方事件的影响实际上被放大了。
And miscalculations multiply, and the impact of third party incidents are actually amplified.
原本可以控制的事情。
So things that would otherwise be manageable.
嘿。
Hey.
这简直是无稽之谈。
This is just nonsense.
我们得解决这个问题。
Let's let's deal with this problem.
突然间，我把这看作是你的某种行动。
All of a sudden, I see it as you doing something.
而当我这么看时，你也看到了什么。
And then when I see that, you see something.
一件事导致另一件事。
One thing leads to the other.
以雅典和斯巴达为例，科林斯这个城邦双方都不太在意，更谈不上信任，却卷入了与现在的科孚岛有关的Coursera事件。
So if you look in the case of Athens and and Sparta, Corinth, a city state that neither of them cared much for and in particular trusted at all, gets involved with Coursera, which is now Corfu.
他们担心对方会建立一支能挑战雅典的海军，这让雅典人更加紧张。
And there's a fear that they're gonna have a navy that will be able to challenge Athens so that the Athenians get more excited.
于是事情就一环扣一环地发展下去。
So one thing leads to the other.
误解和误判形成了恶性循环，最终突然引爆了事端。
You get kind of a vicious cycle of misperceptions and miscalculations that then all of a sudden something happens.
一旦事态爆发，天啊——
And once they something happens, oh my god.
我就必须做出反应，行动引发反制。
I have to react and action and reaction.
最终就会陷入你根本不想面对的境地。
And there you get to somewhere you don't wanna go.
我们这档节目很少讨论古希腊历史
We don't talk about ancient Greek history enough on this podcast
我同意。
I agree.
在我看来。
In my opinion.
但我确实需要更新一下观点。
But I do need to bring it up to date.
要知道，有些人会认为中国已经崛起几十年了，我相信大家对起点的看法各不相同。
So, you know, some people would argue that China has been on the rise for decades now, and I'm sure people have different starting points.
但假设从1990年代开始算起，到现在三四十年后，我们正处于军事和经济领域都存在竞争对抗的阶段。
But let's say since the 1990s and, you know, now thirty or forty years later, we're at a point where there is competitive rivalry, both militarily and economically.
但迄今为止我们还没有爆发战争。
But we haven't had war so far.
正如你刚才提到的，大国之间保持了八十年的和平，这是我们今天的好消息。
As you just noted, we've had eighty years of peace between the great powers, which is our good news story of the day.
没错。
You bet.
但为什么会这样呢？
But why is that?
这是否意味着需要重新审视修昔底德框架？
And does it mean that you need to reconsider the Thucydian framework?
嗯，再次强调，修昔底德对此有过深刻思考。
Well, again, Thucydides was very thoughtful about this.
他并未指出故事中存在某个特定时刻或节点。
He didn't say that there was a specific moment or point in the story.
在我所著的《注定开战：美中能否逃脱修昔底德陷阱》一书中，我回溯了五百年历史，发现16起崛起大国严重威胁守成大国的案例——其中第一次世界大战就是个引人注目又充满戏剧性的例子。
And in the book that I wrote called Destined for Work in The US and China Escape Thucydides' Trap, I look at the last five hundred years and find 16 incidents or 16 cases in which a rising power seriously threatens a ruling power, The World War one being one interesting and dramatic example.
在这些案例中，有时在崛起国尚未真正超越守成国前，变故就发生了。
So in these, sometimes before the rising power has actually overtaken the ruling power, something happens.
有时则在超越之后——因此修昔底德陷阱并非关乎某个特定时间点。
Sometimes after so it's not not that Thucydides is not about some specific moment in time.
它描述的是一种动态关系：当条件成熟时，冲突便会爆发。
It's about a dynamic that then when something happens, something happens.
以冷战为例，这是16个案例之一，其中12个以战争告终。
So if you look, for example, at the Cold War, which is one of the so in the 16 cases, 12 end in war.
如果你想为战争建模，可以参考第一次世界大战。
If you wanna model for war, think World War one.
明白吗？
K?
但有4个案例没有爆发战争。
But four end in no war.
这是个好消息。
So that's good news.
其中之一被称为冷战。
One of which is called Cold War.
虽然名为战争，实则并非战争。
So it's called war, but it's not war.
它具备战争的所有形式，唯独没有炸弹和子弹。
It's war in every form but bull bombs and bullets.
所以在冷战期间，我们有过好几次非常、非常接近战争的边缘时刻。
So in the cold war, we had several very, very close calls.
例如，我写过的古巴导弹危机。
For example, the Cuban missile crisis about which I wrote about.
如果你看那边墙上的小图表，那是肯尼迪在古巴导弹危机期间的涂鸦。
And that if you look at that little chart over there on the wall, that's Kennedy's doodles during the Cuban missile crisis.
哦，太不可思议了。
Oh, that's amazing.
思考
Thinking
关于他正在做出的选择。
about the choices that he's making.
他认为当时有三分之一甚至更高的概率会以核战争告终。
He thought that was a between a one in three and even chance this would end in a nuclear war.
但最终并没有爆发核战争。
But it ended in a nuclear war.
我们可能会有数亿人丧生。
We would have had a couple 100,000,000 people killed.
我们就不可能进行这次采访了。
We wouldn't be doing this interview.
所以当时确实有可能发生，但最终没有。
So it could could he could have happened in that instance, but it didn't.
那么它是如何避免发生的呢？
Now how did how did it come not to happen?
首先，当时展现了一些卓越的外交手段，化解了本可能引发灾难的事件。
First, there was some brilliant statecraft, for example, to get out of an incident that could have otherwise.
我认为这其中也有极大的运气成分。
There was a great, great glob of grace and good fortune, I'd say.
但同时也存在一场持续已久的对抗，其中一方苏联最终被其指令控制体系的内在矛盾所掏空，结果证明其缺乏竞争力。
But also there was a rivalry that went on for long enough in which one of the parties, the Soviet Union, end up hollowing being hollowed out by the contradictions that were part of a Soviet command and control system, turned out not to be competitive or the lower.
这就是这个事件得以成功收场的方式。
So that's how one story ended that successfully.
这可能成为当前美中对抗的一个潜在类比，中国人会说：我们看到你们社会的分裂、腐败堕落等等，也许你们会成为...
And that could be a possible analog for the current US China rivalry in which Chinese would say, we see in your divisions in your society and in your corrupt decadent, you know, whatever whatever whatever, maybe you'll be the one to
但他们把我们视为苏联
But they perceive us as the Soviet Union in
而许多试图讲述我们这边故事的美国人会说，他们最终会像苏联那样，毕竟他们也是共产主义者等等等等。
that And and we many Americans trying to tell our side of the story say, well, they're gonna be sort of like the Soviet Union because actually they were communists and blah blah blah.
硅谷正在向你兜售一个你被淘汰或变得千篇一律的未来。
Silicon Valley is selling you a future where you're obsolete or worse identical.
在Palantir，他们见证着截然不同且革命性的变化——从国防工业基地的再工业化，到造船工人加速建造，再到一线工人提升生产效率，AI正在全美范围内改变工作方式。
At Palantir they're witnessing something different and revolutionary From re industrializing the nation's defense base to shipyard workers building faster and frontline workers boosting productivity, AI is transforming work across the nation.
AI不会取代美国工人，也不会 不会让美国工人 也不会将他们压制成千篇 也不会将他们压制成千篇一律的复制品。
AI is not replacing American workers or flattening them into conformity.
AI正在释放让每个人不可替代的特质。
It's unleashing what makes each one irreplaceable.
他们的判断力、他们的技艺、他们的创造力。
Their judgment, their craft, their creativity.
当美国工人更强大地做回自己时，他们就掌握了未来。
When American workers become more powerfully themselves, they own the future.
Palantir，让美国人无可替代。
Palantir, making Americans irreplaceable.
我是Jennifer Zabasaja，这里是《下一个非洲》播客，彭博社每周探讨塑造这个全球最年轻、增长最快大陆未来的故事。
I'm Jennifer Zabasaja, and this is the Next Africa podcast, Bloomberg's weekly show about the stories shaping the future of the world's youngest, fastest growing continent.
每周五，《下一个非洲》播客都会深入探讨头条背后的故事——从埃塞俄比亚可能引发地区冲突的巨型水电站大坝，到博茨瓦纳努力摆脱钻石依赖的转型之路，再到重塑非洲创意经济的音乐节。
Every Friday, the Next Africa podcast goes deeper than the headlines from Ethiopia's giant hydroelectric dam that could spark a regional showdown to Botswana's struggle to move beyond diamonds to music festivals transforming Africa's creative economy.
我们揭示推动整个大陆变革的理念、冲突与机遇。
We uncover the ideas, conflicts, and opportunities driving change across the continent.
通过彭博社驻拉各斯、开罗、约翰内斯堡等地的记者，您将获得别处无法获取的深度视角：13亿人口如何重新定义全球市场、文化与权力格局。
With Bloomberg journalists on the ground in Lagos, Cairo, Johannesburg, and beyond, you'll get the context you won't find anywhere else, how 1,300,000,000.0 people are redefining global markets, culture, and power.
彭博社《下一个非洲》播客。
The Next Africa podcast from Bloomberg.
权力、政策与繁荣，尽在此处。
Power, policy, and prosperity all in one place.
立即订阅《下一个非洲》播客，每周五在苹果播客、Spotify或您收听的任何平台加入我们。
Follow the Next Africa podcast now and join us every Friday on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you listen.
你知道，我们显然会参考美苏关系，或许能从中汲取历史教训。
You know, obviously, we look to The US Soviet relationship for perhaps lessons from history.
中国在很多方面与苏联截然不同，特别是在外交政策的一些方面。
China feels in many ways very different from The Soviet Union in some ways with respect to foreign policy.
比如我读过亨利·基辛格的书。
Know, like I read Henry Doctor.
基辛格在关于中国的著作开篇就指出，中国历来对境外民族兴趣寥寥——除了涉及台湾、西藏等领土问题之外。
Kissinger's book on China, he starts off by pointing out that China has never never been particularly interested in people beyond its borders outside of the territorial questions, say related to Taiwan or Tibet.
即便到今天，中国对世界其他地区的兴趣似乎也主要停留在商品贸易层面。
Even still today, it's not obvious that China's interest with the rest of the world expands much beyond the goods trade at all.
这是否会影响你的判断？当你分析这些数据时，是否考虑到虽然存在历史规律，但各国国情不同，动机也可能各异？
Does that affect your calculation, the sort of internal when you think about these statistics, the fact that, yes, there are these patterns of history, but also countries are different internally and may have different motivations?
确实如此。
Absolutely.
我认为可以将其分为一级、二级、三级、四级来理解。
And I think I mean, I can you can take it to kind of level one, level two, level three, level four.
显然，每个国家的历史轨迹都各不相同。
Obviously, each of the country's story is different.
以葡萄牙和西班牙为例——这是哥伦布时代最早的16个案例中的首例——两国当时都信奉天主教，且共尊一位教皇。
If you look at Portugal and Spain, which is the first of these 16 cases back at the time of Christopher Columbus, they both were Catholic and there was a pope.
因此当冲突濒临爆发时，教皇出面表示：我有解决方案。
And so when the conflict got to the edge of a conflict, the pope said, I got a solution.
就在这里划条线。
Here's a line.
我要从这里画一条分界线。
I'm gonna draw the line down here.
这边归葡萄牙。
This side is gonna be Portuguese.
那边归西班牙。
This side is gonna be Spanish.
这就是为什么巴西人讲葡萄牙语，因为他们位于那条分界线的葡萄牙一侧。
That is why people in Brazil speak Portuguese because they got on the on the Portuguese side of the line.
但当时的情况是存在一个能够做出裁决的权威领袖。
But you had a situation in which you had a kind of a ruling guru who could make a declaration.
遗憾的是，如今已没有这样的人能做出这样的裁决。
Unfortunately, there's no such person today to do that.
但如你所说，观察中国的案例，其历史轨迹表明它始终自视为万物所朝的中心。
But looking at the Chinese cases, as you say, China's history has been one in which historically, it is wanted to be and thinks of itself as the sun around which everything else rotates.
他们有句俗话叫'一山不容二虎'。
They've got a line about there can be only one, you know, tiger in the valley.
但它字面意思就是'中央王国'。
But It's literally called the Middle Kingdom.
对吧？
Right?
中央之国。
The middle Country.
是的。
Yeah.
而'中国'的含义就是天地之间的中心。
And the Middle Kingdom was the the meaning of it was the middle between the earth and heaven.
所以我们就是那个...但不像苏联那样想要转化所有人。
So we're the we're the that that, but not about the Soviet not like the Soviet Union wanting to convert everyone.
对。
Right.
比如，中国从来没有轮番上阵的情况。
Like, China has never had a come in turn, for example.
没错。
Yeah.
他们也没有试图夺取其他国家的领土，除了周边地区。
And they haven't been trying to take over territories of other parties other than just, you know, you know, in periphery.
他们也没有这种野心。
And they haven't had an aspiration.
亨利对此有句精辟的评论。
Henry actually has a good line about this.
他说，美国人和中国人其实很相似，就是我们都有优越感，但只有我们一方是传教士。
He said, you know, that the Americans and Chinese are very similar in that both of us have a superiority complex, but only one of us is a missionary.
另一方甚至觉得别人不配成为中国人。
The other one doesn't think people are even good enough to be Chinese.
所以他们希望你模仿他们的行为，但并不认为你会变成中国人，也不希望你变成中国人。
So they'd like for you to mimic their behavior, but they don't think you're ever gonna become Chinese, and they don't want you to become Chinese.
他们不希望你像中国人那样治理国家。
They don't want you to rule your country the way Chinese do.
他们希望你保持尊重。
They wanna they want you to have respect.
是的。
Yeah.
他们只想守着自己的疆域。
And they wanna be in their own domain.
我认为这大致是正确的。
And I would say that's roughly right.
李光耀是最优秀、最有洞察力的中国观察家，也是观察习近平时期中国的最佳人选。李光耀就是那位最杰出的、最具洞察力的中国观察家。
Lee Kuan Yew was the the best, the most insightful China watcher and Xi China watcher was Lee Kuan Yew.
李光就是最优秀的、最具洞察力的中国观察家，也是最有洞察力的中国问题观察家。
Lee Kuan Yew was the founder and father Yeah.
他是新加坡的缔造者，也是我的导师之一。
Builder of Singapore, and he was one of my mentors.
我写了一本关于他的小书。
I wrote a little book about him.
他这样评价中国：这将是世界历史上最重要的角色。
And he said about China, this is gonna be the biggest player in the history of the world.
美国人会很难适应这一点，尤其是考虑到历史上存在种族因素等等，对于某些身材较矮小的黄种人这种观念。
It's gonna be very uncomfortable for Americans to get used to it, especially the idea that some smaller yellow you know, race there's a racial element in the history and whatever.
他说，但他相信如果中美双方足够明智，是有可能在二十一世纪找到共享太平洋的方法的。
He said, but he believed that it was possible that The US and China could find a way if they were smart to share the Pacific in the twenty first century.
我想说，这大概就是，你知道的，那会是个好消息，希望。
And I would say that's the you know, that would be the the good news, Hope.
所以乔和我都研究国际关系，大概是在两千年代初吧？
So both Joe and I did international relations, I guess, the early two thousands?
世纪末那会儿。
Late end days.
两千年初。
Early two thousand.
大概那个时候。
Around that time.
当时有一种观点认为全球化将拯救我们所有人，我们的经济将如此紧密交织，以至于战争或军事竞争的想法会变得完全荒谬，因为这意味着一同毁灭。
And a line of thinking back then was that globalization was going to save us all, and we were going to have our economies so enmeshed with each other that the idea of going to war or military competition would just be completely insane because it would mean mutual self destruction.
不是用炸弹，而是通过消费品，比如利布布斯。
Not with bombs, but with consumer goods like libubus.
我不得不提这个梗。
I had to throw that in there.
现在还有人相信这个观点吗？
Do people still believe that?
因为另一方面，目前中美之间的核心冲突似乎是经济层面的。
Because on the other hand, it seems like a the central conflict between The US and China right now is economic.
但另一方面，我们还没有爆发直接的军事战争。
But on the other hand, we we haven't had outright military war.
记住这些周期循环很有意义，我想我还记得那个时期，毕竟我教书已经很久了。
So good to remember how the cycles go, and I think I remember that period since I've been teaching for a long time.
经济相互依存能防止战争的理论，在20世纪初也曾是著名的理论。
The theory that somehow economic entanglement would prevent war was a famous theory in the beginning of the '20 twentieth century as well.
一战前十年最畅销的书是诺曼·安杰尔写的。
So the big the best selling book in the decade before World War one was Norman Angel's book.
我其实在《注定一战》这本书里讨论过这个，那本书叫《大幻觉》。
I write about this actually in destined for war called the great illusion.
他说未来不会再发生战争了，因为战争的成本将远超收益，胜利者也会成为输家。
And he said, there's not gonna be wars anymore because the cost of war will so greatly exceed the benefits that the winner will be a loser.
如果你问当时最富有的人安德鲁·卡内基，在1914年或1913年圣诞节时，他给他最喜欢的4000人寄了圣诞贺卡，其中包括每个州的孩子们。
And if you asked Andrew Carnegie, who was the richest man of the time, in 1914 for Chris or the Christmas nineteen thirteen, fourteen, he sent out Christmas cards to his favorite 4,000 people who included the kids of every state.
他说，再也不会有战争了，因为现在我们有这个，你知道吗？
And he said, there's not gonna be war anymore because now we have this you know?
圣诞快乐。
Merry Christmas.
不再有战争。
No more war.
正是如此。
Exactly.
他还说，我在海牙建造了和平宫，人们可以去那里解决争端。
And he said, and and I have built the Peace Palace at The Hague where people can go and resolve disputes.
所以没有必要打仗了。
So it's not gonna be necessary to have a to fight a war.
我认为那是个巨大的错觉。
I would say that's a grand dilution.
好吗？
Okay?
结果证明这是错的。
It turned out not to be right.
那么其中对错何在呢？
Now what's right and wrong about it?
有意思。
Interesting.
所以是否真的如所说，如今美国和中国在金融、供应链和经济层面如此紧密交织，这种相互依存关系应当能对地缘政治和军事对抗冲动形成某种制衡？
So is it true that The US and China, both financially and in terms of supply chains and in terms of economy, are so entangled today that this should provide some counterbalance to the to the geopolitical and military impulses for for confrontation.
完全正确。
Absolutely right.
这一点你可以在特朗普和习近平最近的峰会上看到。
And this is what you can see in Trump and Xi at their recent summit.
我的意思是，在当前外交政策领域的人物中，特朗普在这方面是个极其另类的存在——他认为美中两国完全有可能建立一种对双方都有利的经济关系。
I mean, of the people in the current foreign policy world, Trump is a far, far, far outlier in this respect, in that he thinks it's possible that The US and China can actually both be involved in such a kind of economic relationship that'll be beneficial to both parties.
这部分原因在于，我认为那些对此持悲观态度的人某种程度上已经放弃了美国竞争力的信念，觉得我们可能不再那么有竞争力了。
Now partly that's because I think he's so some of the people who are pessimistic about this have kinda given up on American competitiveness and thinking, you know, maybe we're not as competitive.
特朗普有一种，我认为是浪漫主义的观点，认为美国能在所有竞争中获胜。
Trump has a kind of a, I think, a romantic view that The US can win, you know, every race.
另一方面，他也有商人的视角，认为人们可以既成为激烈的竞争对手，又以某种方式保持合作。
On the other hand, he also has a businessman's view that it's possible for people to be entangled in ways in which they can be fierce rivals and can also be somehow cooperating.
所以我一直在努力寻找积极因素，因为特朗普确实有很多很多令人不喜欢的方面。
So I've been stretching for silver linings because there's there's many, many, many things not to like about Trump.
但我认为这是可以想象的。
But I think it's conceivable.
我是说，如果你看看他在峰会后的推文说了什么。
I mean, if you look look and see what he said after the summit when he tweeted.
起初，他说这对我们来说是10分制的巨大成功。
At first, it's a he said it was great success for us on a 10 scale.
实际上达到了12分。
It was a 12.
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实际上，他意识到自己遇到了一个实力相当、筹码相当的对手。
Actually, what he understood was he came up against somebody who's as strong and has as many cards as he does.
所以必须找到与他合作的方式。
So you have to find a way to cooperate with him.
但如果这是真的，如果双方都在寻求合作途径，这能否成为原本动荡局势中的稳定器？
But if that's true, if the both of the parties are searching for ways to cooperate, could this be a stabilizer in what would otherwise be?
我认为是的。
I would say, yes.
有可能。
It could.
而且这最终可能会形成某种...我的另一位中国问题导师亨利就常说
And could this end up in some kind of a of a so Henry, who was my my other most, you know, mentor about China, kept saying
你指的是哪个亨利？
Which Henry are we
在谈论谁？
talking about?
亨利·基辛格。
Henry Kissinger.
好的。
Okay.
抱歉。
Sorry.
我们需要一个足够全面的新战略概念，能够涵盖我们将始终是最激烈的竞争对手这一事实。
That we need a new strategic concept that's that's comprehensive enough that encompass the fact that we're gonna be the fiercest lucidity and rivals at all times.
我们每个人都真心实意想成为第一，这在很多方面都至关重要。
Each of us really, really does wanna be number one, and it matters in many, many.
但与此同时，我们如此紧密相连，以至于需要对方的合作才能生存。
But at the same time, we're so entangled that we require cooperation of the other for our own survival.
所以这听起来像是个矛盾。
So this sounds like a contradiction.
确实如此。
It is.
但我们在冷战时期曾部分实现了这种模式。
But we managed a version of that a little bit in the Cold War.
这次情况要复杂得多，因为苏联从未真正成为重要的经济竞争对手。
This one's much more complicated because the Soviet Union was never really a serious economic rival Yeah.
等到冷战进入高潮时期。
By the time you got to a high Cold War.
就中国而言，中国是一个中等体量的国家。
In the Chinese case, China is a, you know, medium.
但在那个领域是否存在某种可能性？
But is there something in that space?
我认为是存在的。
I think there is.
怎么...
How did
或者说可能存在。
Or might be.
你提到，相比许多人，特朗普是个对华乐观派，甚至从很多标准看都是鸽派，这虽然有点奇怪但他确实如此。
So you mentioned that, like, compared to many others, Trump is a US China optimist and maybe even a dove by many measures, which is a little weird given that but he clearly is.
这是怎么发生的？
How did this happen?
就像，过去几年美国外交政策精英圈为何变得如此末日论调、愤世嫉俗、对和平共处前景如此悲观？
Like, how did so much of the foreign policy elite in The US over the last several years, it feel like, become so doomer, jaded, pessimistic about the prospect of peaceful coexistence?
我认为主要驱动力是修昔底德陷阱的结构性叙事。
I think I think the main driver was structural in the Thucydidean story.
好的。
Okay.
你看1900到1914年间的英国，他们越来越震惊地发现德国人正在做本该属于我们的事。
So if you look at the British in the period from 1900 to 1914, they become to be more and more shocked by the fact that the Germans are doing things that are supposed to be ours.
他们在生产本该由我们主导的东西。
They're producing something that we're supposed to be in charge of.
是的。
Yeah.
实际上这很有趣，我可以在书中描述这一点。
Actually, it's interesting, and I I can describe this in the book.
有一份著名文件叫克劳备忘录（Crow Memorandum）。
There's a famous document called the Crow, c r o w e, memorandum.
于是英格兰国王询问他的外交大臣。
So the king of England asks his foreign minister.
他说：为什么我们对德国人如此刻薄？
He says, why is it that we're being so nasty about the Germans?
这可是我表弟威廉皇帝啊。
This is my cousin, Kaiser Wilhelm.
字面意义上的表兄弟。
Literally his cousin.
确实是他的亲表弟。
Literally his cousin.
他们夏天还一起度假呢。
They go on vacation together in the summer.
他说，但每次我读到什么，每次我看到什么，每个人都在把所有事情归咎于他们。
And he says, but every time I read anything, every time I see anything, every everybody is blaming them for everything.
为什么会这样？
Why why is this?
克劳向他解释道，局势正在发生变化。
And Krau explains to him, the seesaw is shifting.
随着局势变化，每个人的观点都会受到影响，他们会夸大其词。
And as the seesaw shifts, everybody's perspective is impacted, and they exaggerate.
这其实挺正常的。
And this is kind of like normal.
我认为如果你看看雅典和斯巴达的故事，你会发现非常相似的情况。
And I think if you look at the Athens Sparta story, you can find a very similar thing.
雅典人做他们该做的事，而斯巴达人则在互相交谈。
The Athenians are are doing what they're doing, and the Spartans are talking to each other.
这些人真是没救了。
These guys are hopeless.
看看他们的所作所为。
Look and see what they do.
每天起床后，他们都会想出些新花样来当主教。
Every day, they get up, and they think of some other thing to be bishops.
简单快速问一下，如果我们快进到二战时期，在那个情境下，美国是否就是希特勒极度焦虑的那个崛起强国？
Just real quickly, if we zoom forward to World War two, in that scenario, is The US the rising power that hit that Hitler was completely anxious about?
你是这样对应这个框架的吗
Is that how you fit it into that
故事？
story?
二战案例比较复杂，但这是个好问题——希特勒当时试图成为崛起强权。
Say the World War two case is a complicated one and but a good question where Hitler is attempting to become a rising power Okay.
在一个已经稳定的局势中。
In a situation that's already stabilized.
但现实中大多数情况下，新兴国家并不具备强烈的领土或帝国野心。
But then he has actually such territory most in most of the cases, the rising powers don't have great territorial or or imperial aspirations.
在冷战时期，苏联确实坚信他们的意识形态，认为每个国家都应该由共产党政府统治，并且他们需要通过持续扩张来从根本上巩固自己的统治合法性。
In the in the in the Cold War, in the Soviet Union, I mean, the Soviet Union did really believe in their ideology that every country should be ruled by a communist government and that they needed to have a continuous expansion in order to basically legitimize their own rule.
幸运的是，大多数情况下并非如此。
Fortunately, most most cases don't have that.
也许你已经了解过裸卖空了。
Maybe you already know about naked short selling.
也许你自己也曾亲自做空过股票，但你知道那次做空者基本上毁了超级碗的事吗？
Maybe you personally shorted stocks yourself, but do you know about the time short sellers ruined the Super Bowl basically?
对我来说，虽然有点晚，但危险信号已经亮起，到底发生了什么？
For me, I was a little late, but red flags went up like, what is going on?
这真的很可怕。
This is this is really scary.
在Planet Money节目中，我们挖掘金钱背后的故事，解释金钱的运作方式。
At planet money, we get the story behind the money to explain how money works.
请在NPR应用或你获取播客的任何地方收听。
Listen on the NPR app or wherever you get your podcasts.
当前中美之间的紧张关系、不适感和混乱局面，有多少是由于中国作为大国崛起，而美国作为大国衰落造成的？
How much of the current tension between The US and China, tension, discomfort, discombobulation, how much of that is down to China rising as a power versus The US declining as a power?
我要说这是个很好的问题。
I would say in the good good question.
在中国的宏大叙事中，如果你问习近平或听他们讲话，他们会说这是中国不可阻挡的崛起。
So in the China's metanarrative, you ask Xi Jinping or when they're talking, it's the inexorable rise of China.
他们对此充满信心，就像西奥多·罗斯福在美国历史同等时期那样，坚信中国正在崛起并将迎来属于中国的世纪。
So they're as confident, and he's as confident that they're rising into what will be a Chinese century as Teddy Roosevelt was if you take the equivalent period in American history.
但与之不同的是，他们认为美国正在不可逆转地衰落，这部分并非罗斯福时期的观点。
But the other component of this, which was not part of Teddy Roosevelt's, was that The US is irreversibly declining.
这就是她所相信的。
That's what she believes.
这就是她所相信的。
That's what she believes.
而为他工作的人中，排名第四且与他意识形态最接近的是王沪宁。
And the person who works for him who's his number four and his closest ideological person, is Wan Hooning.
说来有些偶然和幸运，我现在成了他们乐于交谈的对象之一。
Now I've, by some accident and good fortune, have become one of their people whom they one of the people whom they enjoy talking to.
我想主要是因为基辛格——你知道的，他算是我的导师或门徒——而且我向他介绍了修昔底德。
I think mainly because Kissinger, I'm you know, was his mentor or mentee and because I introduced him to Thucydides.
就像有人说的，在中国没有哪位作家有过比我更好的宣传效果了——自从我的书出版后，《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》中文版的销量比过去两千年加起来还多。
I mean, as what was said, as the best publicity agent for a author than anybody ever had in China because they've sold more copies of Thucydides, Peloponnesian War in Mandarin since my book than in the previous two thousand years.
明白吗？
Okay?
总之，万惠宁（音）这个人啊...
So any case, Juan Huening Yeah.
是个严肃的思想家。
Is a serious thinker.
他原本是位政治学者。
He was a political scientist in originally.
他1989年通过美国政治学会的奖学金之类项目来到美国，在大学做访问学者或研究员。
He came to The US in eighteen nineteen eighty nine on a American Political Science Association fellowship or something to study at the university or to be a fellow at the university.
然后他走遍了美国各地，写了一本名为《美国反对美国》的书。
And then he traveled all around The US, and he wrote a book that's called America Against America.
你可以去看看，这本书是英文版的。
And you could go and it's in English.
你可以看看英文版。
You could see the English copy.
这是对可能导致国家分裂的因素的分析。
And it's a it's the analysis of the factors that were gonna splinter the country.
在当时算是相当不错了。
It's pretty good for the time.
嗯。
Mhmm.
相当虔诚。
Pretty godful.
而且他们显然一直在思考这个问题。
And they clearly continue thinking about that.
就在特朗普与习近平在韩国举行峰会前不久，我还在那里与几位核心圈内人士交谈。
I was there just just just before the Trump Xi summit in in Korea talking again to a couple of people in the first circle.
他们当时正在谈论美国。
And they were saying about The US.
你知道，美国...我是说，这里有个人说，
You know, The US I mean, here's one guy.
他说：‘美国比我们想象的还要奇怪。’
He said, US is stranger than we thought.
对吧？
Right?
我回应道：‘哦，哪里奇怪了？’
I said I said, oh, what what's strange?
他说：‘好吧，让我先给你开个头。’
He said, well, let me just me give you just to to start out on this.
他接着说：‘纽约是世界上犹太人口最多的城市，而他们却要选一位穆斯林市长？’
He says, New York is the city is the largest Jewish population in the world, and they're gonna elect a Muslim mayor?
纽约是全球资本主义的中心。
New York City is the epicenter of global capitalism.
他们居然会喜欢一个社会主义者。
They're gonna like somebody who's a socialist.
他们说：'我们是社会主义者'。
They say, we're socialists.
美国政府正在为九分之一的美国人提供食物，现在他们却在讨论要停止供应。
The US is the government is providing food for one in nine people in The US, and now they're talking about withholding it.
我们过去也这样做过，你知道，在我们还有穷人的时候。
We used to do that, you know, when when when we had people who were poor.
但我们认为那是我们的伟大成就之一。
But that we think that's one of our great achievements.
我们不需要分发食物，人们自然就有吃的。
We don't we don't hand out food, and and people have food.
美国正在向城市派遣军队。
The US is sending troops to cities.
他们说，我们记得天安门。
Said, we remember Tinamen.
这像天安门那样吗？
Is this like Tinamen?
我说，不像。
I said, no.
情况并非如此，要知道，收入分化已如此严重，他们提到，我们看到数据显示三分之二的消费是由收入前20%的人群贡献的。
This is not like so, you know, the division of income has now become so great that they said that you know, we saw this this data that two thirds of the consumption is down by the top 20% of the income earners.
呃，恕我直言。
Well, excuse me.
在多数社会里，那些被抛下的人会暴动，这大概就是我们自称必须成为现代社会主义国家的原因——我们不得不如此。你看，他们就这样逐条列举着。
In most societies, these the people who were not that were being left out would riot or you know, that that would be that's probably why we say we have to be a modern socialist state because we have to and so, you know, they're going down the list like that.
我说，你们必须记住的是，这是个奇特的国家。
I said, what what do you have to remember is this is a strange country.
确实如此。
It absolutely is.
一个充满矛盾的国家。
A land of contradictions.
矛盾？
A contradiction?
我有时会说这是一个矛盾的万花筒。
I sometimes say a kaleidoscope of contradictions.
是啊。
Yeah.
万花筒。
Kaleidoscope.
你一动它，就变成另一个样子。
Time you move it, it's another one.
没错。
Yeah.
但另一方面，它又展现出惊人的韧性，没有其他社会制度能在如此长的时间里取得这样的成功。
On the other hand, it's been remarkably resilient, and no other society with no other governing system has been as successful over so long a period of time as this one.
然后我通常会讲我在美国的那些关于上帝保佑醉汉的台词。
And then I usually do my lines about god looks after drunk children in The USA.
但我得说，任何理性的人看看今天的美国都会觉得，这看起来相当奇怪。
I love But I would say reasonable person could look at the country today and say, this looks pretty strange.
是啊。
Yeah.
没错。
Yeah.
显然，存在一些长期存在的大结构性问题，比如中国的经济崛起、美国内部紧张局势等等。
So, obviously, there are the big structural questions that will last for a long time, both China's economic rise, US internal tensions, etcetera.
但今年特别的是，特蕾西用所有这些头条新闻开始了这期节目，而且天天如此。
But this year, particular, Tracy started the episode with all these headlines, and that's daily.
特朗普本人，你知道的，白宫内部矛盾重重，诸如此类。
Trump himself is you know, there's the contradictions within the White House, etcetera.
但就今年发生的事件而言，从1月1日至今或就职典礼至今，你的观点有所改变吗？
But just the events of this year, had they from today from January 1 to today or from the inauguration to today, have your views changed?
你是更乐观了，还是更悲观了？
Are you more optimistic, less optimistic?
比如，你在2025年学到了什么？
Like, how what have you learned in 2025?
这是个好问题。
That's a good question.
我认为三分之二或80%的故事情节已嵌入结构中。
So I would say two thirds or 80% of the story is baked into the structure.
是的。
Yeah.
因此如果中国继续崛起——我相信它会，并以约两倍于我们的速度增长——我认为它会，并在技术方面持续进步——我认为它会，尽管它存在许多、许多、许多问题。
So if and as China continues rising, which I believe it will, and growing at about twice the rate we do, which I think it will, and advancing in technologies the way it has been, which I think it will, even though it has many, many, many, many problems.
但我认为他们或多或少会沿着这条路走下去。
But I think they'll manage more or less on that path.
而美国人每天都会越来越意识到中国就在眼前做些什么或别的。
And Americans will wake up more and more every day to China's in your face doing something or whatever.
这是第一点。
So that's point one.
第二点，在这种修昔底德式对抗中，统治大国将一切问题归咎于崛起大国是自然反应。
Point two, in this Thucydide and rivalry again, it's natural for the ruling power to blame the rising power for everything.
指责中国、炒作中国威胁论或妖魔化中国某种程度上是常态。
And blaming China or hype hyping China threat or demonizing China is kind of normal.
我认为斯巴达人当年就在妖魔化对手。
And I would say the Spartans were demonizing.
雅典人可能没做到这种程度。
The Athenians maybe not quite to the extent.
所以美国人以我们的方式行事，但我认为这部分判断是正确的。
So for Americans, we do it our way, but I would say that that part is right.
以上就是负面因素。
So those are the negative components.
虽然在剑桥这种地方，有人试图从特朗普身上寻找希望曙光或积极因素可能显得奇怪——但我认为特朗普明白核战争将是灾难性的，并且对此极为忧虑，这种认知在近年外交政策圈里，只有拜登可与之相比，奥巴马不行，其他80%的人更不行。
While it may seem strange, especially in Cambridge, for somebody to look for some signs of hope or or silver linings in Trump, I think Trump understands that nuclear war would be catastrophic and really, really worries about that in a way that the only other person in the foreign policy establishment equivalent lately that based on that was Biden, not Obama, not, you know, 80% of the others.
这是第一点。
So that's number one.
他非常非常清楚情况有多糟糕。
More he understands very, very bad.
其次，他莫名其妙地对习近平怀有这种敬意。
Secondly, he somehow he he has this respect for Xi.
他钦佩中国。
He admires China.
他部分钦佩的是中国的威权统治。
Some of what he admires is their autocratic rule.
他说：你们到底是怎么做到统治15亿人却几乎没遇到反对的？
He says, how in the world did you manage to, you know, rule 1,500,000,000 people with so little objection?
我真希望能像你们那样管理媒体。
I wish I could manage my press the way you do.
你知道，诸如此类的废话。
You know, blah blah blah.
你获得了生命的租约。
You've got a lease on life.
我是说，他是终身领导人。
I mean, he's leader for life.
有人对我有什么建议吗？
Is anybody any suggestions for me?
所以他很羡慕这一点。
So he admires that.
他想成为一名伟大的和平缔造者。
He wants to be a great peacemaker.
所以我认为我们可能会形成一个战略概念，类似于伙伴关系，从而实现平衡，这并非不可想象。
So I think it's not inconceivable that we might come to have a strategic concept that would be something like a partnership, which would then balance.
我认为修昔底德式的竞争会在所有情况下持续下去吗？
I think will the Thucydides rivalry continue in every case?
是的，我相信会的。
Yes, I believe it will.
这是否意味着恐惧的滋生以及所有将成为常态的事情？
And will it mean that this feeds of fear and all the things that will be normal?
但如果同样真实的是，作为一个国家的生存依赖于与你们一定程度的合作，以避免核战争的发生。
But if it's also the case that my survival as a country depends on a degree of cooperation with you so that we don't have a nuclear war.
因为在核战争的尽头，我的国家将不复存在。
Because at the end of a nuclear war, my country's gone.
这样人工智能最终不会统治我们所有人。
So that AI doesn't end up ruling us all.
我们是人工智能领域的两大领导者。
We're the two AI leaders.
那么我们能否找到某种金融体系。
So could we find some so financial system.
2008年，如果不是因为中美联合的刺激贸易，金融危机可能已经演变成大萧条。
In 2008, we would have had a the financial crisis would have become a depression had it not been for a joint US China stimulus trade.
我的意思是，如果我们看看稀土的故事，那些资源就在那里。
I mean, if we look at the rare earth story, I mean, that's what those are there.
哦，是的。
Oh, yeah.
好的。
Okay.
我刚才在摆弄格雷厄姆桌上的那块金属片。
I was fiddly with this piece of metal on Graham's table.
我们正想问呢。
We were gonna ask.
所以这些是一堆任务纪念币。
So there there are a bunch of these are mission coins.
对吧？
Is that right?
噢，这些只是服役纪念品。
Or Oh, well, these are just from from services.
但这个，你试试能不能分开它。
But this here, see if you can separate it.
哦。
Oh.
这些是稀土磁铁，你看，哇。
These are rare earth magnets, And you can see Wow.
那些是强力磁铁。
Those are strong magnets.
哦，知道。
Oh, know.
我害怕。
I'm terrified.
好的。
Okay.
没关系。
That's Okay.
但无论如何，因为我们会搞定的。
But in any case, because we'll get it.
我们的供应链中有多少事物已变得依赖中国。
We have become dependent upon China for how many things in our supply chain.
幸运的是，他们也有多少依赖我们。因此，当前僵局的部分原因在于，原本可能是特朗普欺凌他国的情况，现在遇到了像我们这样强大的对手。
And they fortunately depend on us for how many So part of the reason why they got the stalemate in the current, what would otherwise be, you know, Trump's bullying another country is that he comes up against somebody as strong as we are.
所以在这种情况下，他正在适应和调整。
So in that case, he's adapting and adjusting.
因此我想说，如果我要寻找一线希望，我会在那个领域寻找。
So I would say, you know, if I'm looking for silver linings, I'm looking in that space.
我很遗憾要以一个消极的调子结束，我注意到时间紧迫，你们得赶紧离开了。
I hate to end on a down note, and I'm conscious of the time and you have to run off.
但就美中冷战演变为热战而言，我们应当警惕哪些迹象？
But in terms of The US China Cold War turning into a hot war, what should we be looking out for?
因为正如我们开始这次对话时所说，每天都有新头条，比如中国将某艘军舰调往某片特定水域。
Because as we started this conversation every day, there's a new headline about, you know, China's moving this naval vessel into this particular body of water.
而且中国国内播放的宣传内容正在为民众准备应对即将到来的台湾入侵之类的事情。
And there's propaganda airing in China that's prepping the population for an imminent Taiwanese invasion, that sort of thing.
你会将什么实际视为预警信号？
What would you actually look for as a warning sign?
我认为我们听到的大多数新闻或人们的言论都是对中国的大肆炒作。
So I think most of the news lines that we hear or statements from people are China hype.
如今在美国，你无法在不引起反感的情况下指责中国任何事情。
And you cannot accuse China of anything today in The US without getting up residence.
我的意思是，有时我仅仅因为指出'你的断言是错误的'，就会被指责为中国同情者。
So nobody I mean, I get I get blamed occasionally for being a China sympathizer by simply saying, what you're asserting is false.
当然，中国确实在做许多许多事情。
Yes, of course, there's many, many things China is doing.
举个例子，现在最流行的说法之一是：中国拥有全球最快的核武扩张速度，因为他们正从约500枚核弹头增至2030年的约1000枚。
But it does so for example, one of the favorite clauses now is China has the fastest nuclear buildup in the world because they're going from about 500 weapons to about a thousand weapons in 2030.
对此的回应是：嗯，这只是历史数据的陈述。
Which answer is, well, that's a historical statement.
如果你看看我们在艾森豪威尔时期或肯尼迪时期的核弹头数量，这两个时期我们的增幅都更大。
And if you look at the number of warheads we went to from in the Eisenhower period or the Kennedy period, in both cases, there were more.
这恰好不是事实。
That just happened not to be true.
但会有很多很多类似的指控。
But there'll be many, many, many accusations of that kind.
我认为这些指控会持续下去，因为中国已经发展出一个制造业生态系统，基本上能以我们一半的价格大规模生产任何产品。
And I think those will continue because so China has developed a manufacturing ecosystem that basically can produce anything at scale at half the price that we can.
不信你去沃尔玛或家得宝看看，一半以上的商品都是中国制造的。
Well, lo and behold, if you go to Walmart or to to Home Depot, half the stuff or more is made in China.
人们会对此抱怨。
Well, people will complain about that.
这部分似乎没错。
So that part seems right.
但我要说大部分都是炒作。
But I would say that most of this is just hype.
真正的危险在于第三方可能主动采取行动——就像Coursera的故事那样——引发一系列连锁反应。
Where you find danger is where there are third parties whose initiative might, in the like the story of Coursera, produce a set of reactions.
而最领先的候选人是台湾及现任台湾地区领导人赖清德，他已采取了许多极其危险的行动。
And they're the most the leading candidate is Taiwan and the current president of Taiwan, Lai, who's done many taken many, many dangerous actions.
我认为幸运的是，无论是拜登政府还是特朗普政府，都已就领导人层面进行过对话，防止此人通过某些不负责任的行动拖累其乐观情绪。
I think, fortunately, both in the Biden administration and in the Trump administration, they've had conversations at the leader level about not letting this person by some irresponsible action drag his optimism.
另一个问题是，中国在台海和南海军事演习的交战规则现已如此，不难想象会发生舰船或飞机相撞事件。
The other is that the Chinese rules of engagement in their exercises in the straits and in the South China Sea are now such that it's not very difficult to imagine a collision of a ship or a plane.
我们在布什政府初期就见过这种情况，当时他们与我们的侦察机相撞。
We saw that at the beginning of the Bush administration when they collided with one of our spy planes.
那么这种事件是否会升级？
So could that escalate?
因此我认为这就是为什么——再次强调——要恢复双方之间的沟通渠道，让他们能够坦诚私下地交流，以便在发生意外时设置'断路器'（我认为按当前路径很可能会发生意外）。
And I think that's why, again, getting back to communication channels between the two parties where they can talk candidly and privately in order to have a circuit breaker if some accident happens, which I think on the current path would be likely to happen.
我想再快速提一个问题，既然你提到了制造业。我们最近注意到很多西方经济体，尤其倾向于讨论建立自己的制造业产能，包括弹药和稀土矿物——就像你刚才提到的。
I'm going ask one more very quick question because you brought up manufacturing And just something else that we've been noticing lately is there's a tendency among a lot of Western economies, especially to talk about building up their own manufacturing capacity, including in terms of munitions and rare earth minerals, as you just mentioned.
昨天刚有个新闻标题说，英国希望在本土生产弹药，而不是依赖盟友。
There was a headline, I think just yesterday, about The UK wanting to build ammunition within its own borders instead of relying on allies.
这背后的动机是什么？
What's the underlying motivation there?
因为大多数人看到像'英国想自己制造子弹'这样的标题时，可能会认为这是某种军事冲突的前兆。
Because most people would look at a headline like The UK wants to make its own bullets as, you know, a predecessor maybe to to some sort of military conflict.
嗯，我认为这是好事。
Well, I think it's good.
我是说，这确实令人费解，而且有很多令人费解的事情。
I mean, it is puzzling, and there are lot of puzzling things.
但我想说的是，每当人们意识到自己依赖其他方供应某些东西时。
But I would say that whenever it's pointed out to people that you're dependent on some other party for supply of something.
例如对美国来说，稀土磁铁几乎是所有产品都需要的。
So for example, for The US, rare earth magnets are required for almost everything.
无论是汽车、iPhone、笔记本电脑、F35战机，还是战斧导弹等等。
So for cars, for iPhones, for laptops, for f 30 fives, for Tomahawk missiles, or whatever.
我们怎么能让自己依赖中国呢？
So how would we allow ourselves to be dependent on China?
因为这样他们就能挤压供应链，实施胁迫。
Because that gives them something that they can squeeze that supply chain and be coercive.
所以我更希望在这方面保持独立。
So I would rather be independent on that.
因此任何政客都会宣布，好吧，我们要宣布独立。
And and so any politician would then make an announcement, okay, we're declaring that we're gonna be independent.
但没人追问要达到那个阶段需要做些什么。
Asking what would be required to be done in order to reach that stage, people are not asking.
这将是下一阶段的问题。
So that would be at the next level.
同样，如果你看看大多数药品的情况。
Similarly, if you look, for example, for most pharmaceuticals.
我们使用的绝大多数药品及制药原料都来自中国或印度。
Most of the pharmaceuticals and the pharmaceutical precursors that we use for any medicines come from either China or from India.
也许我们应该自己生产这些东西。
Well, maybe we should do these ourselves.
军需物资，我们本不应随意发放。所以当政客们看到有人指出存在依赖性或薄弱环节时，就宣布要独立自主，这种反应可以说是预料之中的。
Munitions, we shouldn't be giving out a So the fact that politicians, when they see somebody says here's a dependency or a vulnerability, declared that we're going be independent is, I would say, predictable.
如果你观察后续的实际行动，就会发现真正落实的措施寥寥无几。
If you look and see what behaviors follow from that, the answer is not very many.
因此我几乎要接受这样的观点：我们将不可避免地深陷于供应链和经济网络的纠缠中。在这种情况下，我们最终可能会形成类似核平衡状态下的那种相互威慑关系。
So I'm almost ready to accept the proposition that we're going to be inextricably entangled in supply chains and economics, in which case some version of mutual deterrence of the sort that we found in the nuclear balance may be where we end up.
那么，与其他可能性相比，这种状态算是理想的吗？
Now, is that a good place to be compared to the elsewhere?
不
No.
我宁愿保持独立
I'd rather be independent.
但相比之下，我的意思是，如果有称职的政府，我们能否管理好这件事？
But compared I mean, is that something we can manage if you have competent governments managing it?
我想0我想说，你知道，是的
I would say, you know, yes.
好的。
Alright.
Allison教授，非常感谢您做客OddLots节目并邀请我们来到您在哈佛的办公室。
Professor Allison, thank you so much for coming on OddLots and inviting us to your office here at Harvard.
非常感谢。
Thank you so much.
是的。
Yeah.
哦，我们
Oh, we're
有很多值得关注的地方。
A lot to look at.
是啊。
Yeah.
很荣幸你能来。
Honored honored to have you here.
很高兴能参加这个节目。
Glad to be on the program.
谢谢你。
I thank you.
问题问得很好，很高兴见到两位国际事务领域的认真学生。
Good questions, glad to see two serious students of international affairs.
而我们带着国际关系背景进入了金融领域
And we took our IR background and went into financial
这是我收到过的最高赞誉了。
Just the highest praise I've ever got.
乔，那真是难得的享受。
Joe, that was a real treat.
确实是难得的享受。
It was a real treat.
光是能坐在埃里森博士的办公室里
Just being in doctor Ellison's office was really nice.
虽然你可能已经听我说过，但我想再说一次，作为一名美国顶尖学府的教授
I just I could go you've heard me already say this, but, like, being a professor at an elite American
大学教授。
university professor.
终身教授。
A tenured professor.
这感觉太棒了。
It's so sick.
而且，这简直就是梦寐以求的职业。
And then, like, it was, like, such a it's, like, such a dream career to have.
你知道让我困扰的是什么吗？你和我都学的是国际关系。
You know what bothers me is you and I both did international relations.
哦，是啊。
Oh, yeah.
没错。
Yeah.
我觉得我们有类似的抱怨，但刚才和艾莉森教授的那场对话，才是我原本想象中的国际关系学该有的样子。
And I think we have a similar complaint, but, like, that conversation that we just had with professor Allison was what I thought international relations was going to be.
你知道，我们本该坐在那里高谈阔论美中关系，然后把它比作古希腊的斯巴达对抗雅典。
You know, we were gonna sit there and and pontificate about US China relations and then compare it to Sparta versus Athens in ancient Greece.
但实际上，内容几乎全是哲学。
And instead, it was basically all philosophy.
就像是博弈论那种。
It was like game theory.
是啊。
Yeah.
我懂。
I know.
这太
It's such
可笑了。
a joke.
而且，它太抽象了。
And, like, it was so abstract.
比如，我记得有些课程里我们甚至没提到任何一个具体国家的名字。
Like, I I think I had entire courses where we didn't even name a single country, like, by name.
全是这种句式：如果A国这么做，B国会怎么应对？
It was just if country a does this, what does country b do?
正因如此，这是个很奇怪的学科。
It's such a weird discipline for that reason.
成年后我试着读过一些国际关系著作，全是这种诡异的博弈论、表格之类的东西，实在不对我的胃口。
And as an adult, I've, like, tried to read some international relations books, and it's all this, like, weird game theory and tables and stuff like that and just not my thing.
我知道我们有点跑题了，不过...
I think there's there's probably I know we're going off on a little bit of a tangent here.
这感觉有点像经济学里的现象。
It feels a little bit like, you know, the same phenomenon in economics.
比如学经济的时候，你总在思考失业率会怎么变化这类问题。
For example, like, you study economics, you're you're gonna think about, like, well, what's gonna happen to the unemployment rate?
股市会怎么样，等等？
What's gonna happen with the stock market, etcetera?
然后你读学术经济学。
And then you read academic economics.
随着年龄增长和成熟，我现在比年轻时更欣赏学术经济学了。年轻时我觉得那些方程什么的都很蠢。
And I'm not as like, you know, I'm like, I as I've grown older, as I've matured, I'm like, you know, I've like I appreciate academic e con more than I did when I was in my youth, and I was like, oh, it's all all this dumb with all these equations and stuff like that.
都是假的。
It's all fake.
现在我不那么想了，但确实感觉有点脱节。等等。
I don't think that as much anymore, but it does feel like kinda disconnected from like, wait.
我以为经济学家会讨论失业率之类的，结果你读论文发现完全不是这样。
I thought economists talked about, you know, the unemployment rate and stuff like that, and then you read what a paper is about.
非常抽象。
It's very abstract.
你说得对。
You're right.
让我感到意外的是，教授谈到他最近一次中国之行时的情况。
One thing that did surprise me was when the professor was talking about, his latest trip to China.
是他最近的一次访问吗？
Was it his latest trip?
总之是他某次中国之行中，他在交流时试图解释或听取中国政策制定者谈到他们如何对美国感到非常困惑。
Well, one of his trips to China where he was talking and trying to ex or hearing from Chinese policymakers about how they're very confused by America.
嗯。
Mhmm.
尤其是资本主义的纽约选出了一位社会主义市长的例子。
And in particular, the example of capitalist New York electing a socialist mayor.
我当时就想，如果说有谁能理解具有资本主义特色的社会主义，那一定是中国人。
And I thought, like, if anyone can understand socialism with capitalistic characteristics, it must be the Chinese.
对吧？
Right?
这应该是非常直观的。
It should be it should be very intuitive.
不。
No.
不过整体上，我觉得
I thought there was, like, just overall, though,
非常
a very
我是说，这个想法有点令人沮丧，感觉我们像是在借来的时间里苟延残喘。
I mean, it was a little bit grim, the idea that almost like we're kind of on borrowed time here.
按历史标准来看，大国之间已经很久没有爆发战争了。
It's been a really long time since the great powers war by historical standards.
所以，这段和平时期已经持续了很久。
And so, it's already been a long time.
历史上战争爆发得更频繁，而现在我们正处在所谓的修昔底德陷阱的条件中，至少他是这么看的。
Historically, they come along more frequently, and now the conditions are in place for this you know, the so called Thucydides trap as he sees it.
想到在我有生之年最好的情况下，这种风险也始终如影随形，这实在让我高兴不起来。
I'm not thrilled that in the best case scenario for the rest of my life, there's always gonna be a risk of that being right around the corner.
当某个第三方国家做出失控行为时
The moment some third party country does something, know, off the leash.
另一件事——这又回到了为何我对国际关系这门学科如此失望
The other thing and again, this goes back to why I'm so frustrated with IR as an academic discipline.
但就像强调优秀治国之道那样，好的治国之道确实能带来改变
But, like, the emphasis on good statecraft, good statecraft makes a difference.
是啊
Yeah.
对吧？
Right?
他提到了古巴导弹危机，确实
You know, he talked about the Cuban Missile Crisis and Yeah.
肯尼迪总统时期，我们曾极度接近一场彻底的灾难
J JFK, and we came very, very close to absolute disaster there.
但最终正是人类个体的行动避免了这场灾难
But it was ultimately averted by the individual actions of human beings Right.
无论是在俄罗斯还是在美国。
Both in Russia and in The US.
我觉得这正是国际关系学中缺失的部分。
And I feel like that's kind of what's missing in IR.
它缺乏对个人选择、动机、激励机制的重视，以及如何真正实施良好治国之道，而非仅通过新自由主义或现实主义的棱镜看待一切。
It's that, like, emphasis on individual choice and motivations and incentives and how to actually do good statecraft rather than just, like, look at everything through the prism of either neoliberalism or realism.
权力。
Power.
是啊。
Yeah.
或者你学过性别理论吗？
Or did you ever do gender theory?
我想我没选修过那门课。
I don't think I took that.
这个理论挺有意思的。
There's an interesting one.
古巴导弹危机的发生正是因为男人和大物件。
The reason we had the Cuban Missile Crisis is because men and large objects.
我对这个观点非常感兴趣：与美国不同，他用了‘传教士’这个词来形容美国的视角，你知道的，传播民主、自由主义和资本主义。
I I am really interested in this idea that unlike The US so he he used the term, I think he said missionary, sort of to characterize how The US sees it, you know, spread democracy and liberalism and capitalism.
当然，苏联也有传播共产主义的冲动，哪里有共产党，它就觉得有义务去支持，这就是苏联深陷阿富汗多年的原因。
And, of course, the Soviet Union also had this impulse to spread communism and everywhere there was a communist party, it felt some tug to back them up and that's how the Soviet Union got mired in Afghanistan for years and years.
中国似乎并没有这种冲动。
China doesn't really seem to have that.
它只想做生意。
It wants to trade.
我是说，除了想巩固其实际领土外，但看起来并不像...几个月前有个很好的例子，古巴人显然来中国寻求建议。
I mean, outside of it wants to consolidate its physical territory, but it does not seem like There's a great story several months ago, apparently the Cubans came to China and asked for advice.
他们问：‘你们尝试过经济自由化吗？’
They said, well, have you tried liberalizing your economy?
‘你们试过基本上放弃共产主义吗？’
Have you tried basically not being communist?
它不像苏联那样有那种冲动。
Like, it doesn't have that impulse the same way the Soviet Union did.
也不像美国那样。
And nor does it have it like The US does.
所以我很好奇，当中国真正成为一个全球大国、强国时，历史上似乎很少有国家对他国如何管理自己的事务如此缺乏兴趣。
So I'm curious, like, as China truly becomes a global power, is a great power, it seems fairly rare historically for it to have so little interest in how other countries manage their affairs.
是啊。
Yeah.
我很喜欢那句话，大意是说，这其实并不是为了让更多人成为中国人，因为首先作为中国人本身就是特别的。
I did I enjoyed the line about, you know, like, it's not really about getting more people to be Chinese because it's special to be Chinese in the first place.
我们不够格当中国人。
We're not good enough to be Chinese.
是啊。
Yeah.
好吧。
Alright.
我们就聊到这里吧，中国乔？
Shall we leave it there, Chinese Joe?
就到这里吧，就到这里吧。
Let's leave it let's leave it there.
这里是《全思》播客的又一期节目。
This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.
我是崔西·奥拉维。
I'm Tracy Allaway.
你可以在Tracy Allaway关注我。
You can follow me at Tracy Allaway.
我是Jill Weisenthal。
And I'm Jill Weisenthal.
你可以在the stalwart关注我。
You can follow me at the stalwart.
关注我们的嘉宾Graham Allison。
Follow our guest, Graham Allison.
他的账号是Graham t Allison。
He's at Graham t Allison.
关注我们的制作人：Kermin Rodriguez的账号是Kermin Armen，Dashiell Bennett的账号是Dashbot，Kale Brooks的账号是Kale Brooks。
Follow our producers, Kermin Rodriguez at Kermin Armen, Dashiell Bennett at Dashbot, and Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks.
更多Odd内容请访问bloomberg.com/oddlots，阅读每日通讯和所有节目。
For more Odd content, go to bloomberg.com/oddlots, read the daily newsletter and all of our episodes.
你可以24/7在我们的Discord频道discord.gg/oddlots与其他听众讨论这些话题。
And you can chat about all of these topics twenty four seven with fellow listeners in our Discord, discord.gg/oddlots.
如果你喜欢Odd Lots节目，喜欢我们前往波士顿采访哈佛教授的节目，请在您常用的播客平台给我们好评。
And if you enjoy Odd Lots, if you like it when we travel to Boston to interview Harvard professors, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform.
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And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad free.
您只需在苹果播客中找到彭博频道并按指引操作即可。
All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there.
感谢收听。
Thanks for listening.
1975年万圣节前夜，15岁的玛莎·莫克斯利被谋杀，但警方未能逮捕任何人。
On the night before Halloween in 1975, 15 year old Martha Moxley was murdered but police failed to make an arrest.
直到2000年，她曾经的邻居迈克尔·斯卡克尔才被逮捕。
Until in 2000, her one time neighbor, Michael Scackel was arrested.
他同时也是肯尼迪家族的远亲。
He was also a cousin of the Kennedys.
肯尼迪家族的关系是大多数人知晓这起案件的原因。
The Kennedy connection is the reason that most people know about this case.
但我越是深入调查，就越开始质疑自己原本确信的一切。
But the deeper I dug, the more I came to question everything I thought I knew.
立即搜索《Dead Certain：玛莎·莫克斯利谋杀案》收听节目，并订阅每周获取新剧集。
Search Dead Certain, the Martha Moxley Murder to listen now wherever you get your podcasts and follow to get new episodes every week.
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