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市场变化迅速。
Markets move fast.
通过巴克莱简报——来自巴克莱投资银行的播客,您可在十分钟内获取所需洞察。
Get the insights you need in ten minutes with Barclays brief, a podcast from Barclays Investment Bank.
每周,我们的专家都会分析市场主题,帮助您预判下一步动向。
Each week, our experts analyze market themes, helping you anticipate what's next.
无论您在何处收听播客,都可以收听巴克莱简报。
Listen to Barclays brief wherever you get your podcasts.
Bloomberg Daybreak 是您在早晨第一时间获取资讯的最佳方式,直接在您的播客推送中收听。
Bloomberg Daybreak is your best way to get informed first thing in the morning right in your podcast feed.
嗨。
Hi.
我是凯伦·莫斯科。
I'm Karen Moscow.
我是内森·哈格。
And I'm Nathan Hager.
每天早上,我们都会早早起床,制作《彭博早间新闻》美国版的最新一期节目。
Each morning, we're up early putting together the latest episode of Bloomberg Daybreak US edition.
这是您每日十五分钟的播客,为您带来全球新闻、政治和国际关系的最新动态。
It's your daily fifteen minute podcast on the latest in global news, politics, and international relations.
每天早上收听《彭博早间新闻》美国版播客,获取您所需背景信息的重要新闻。
Listen to the Bloomberg Daybreak US edition podcast each morning for the stories that matter with the context you need.
您可以在苹果、Spotify 或任何您收听播客的平台找到我们。
Find us on Apple, Spotify, or anywhere you listen.
彭博音频工作室,播客、广播、新闻。
Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio, news.
你好,欢迎收听《奇思妙想》播客的另一期节目。
Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Thoughts Podcast.
我是特蕾西·阿拉韦。
I'm Tracy Allaway.
我是乔·艾森塔尔。
And I'm Joe Eisenthal.
乔,我喜欢做美国历史的节目,部分原因是我觉得自己对美国历史的了解相当浅显。
Joe, I love doing American history episodes, in part because I feel like my own knowledge of American history is fairly simplistic.
而我
And I
我记得当我从高中升入大学时,经历了巨大的文化冲击,我想我之前讲过这个故事。
do remember a huge culture shock when I went from high school to college, and I think I told this story before.
于是我去了伦敦的大学。
So I went to college, university in London.
我一直听到美国革命被称作美国革命。
And I had always heard the American Revolution described as the American Revolution.
对吧?
Right?
嗯。
Mhmm.
但一到英国
And then as soon as I got to The UK
好的。
Okay.
他们怎么称呼它?
What do they call it?
我从来没,嗯。
I never yeah.
他们怎么称呼它?
What do they call it?
是的。
Yeah.
他们称之为美国独立战争,这听起来语气不同,但它确实清楚地表明,历史中的紧张关系、冲突和政策究竟有多主观,取决于你和谁交谈。
They call it, I think, the American War of Independence, which has a different tonality to But it definitely demonstrates just how subjective tensions, conflicts, and policies can actually be in history depending on who you're talking to.
我们不仅要讨论一项相当主观的美国政策,还要讨论一项在过去被反复重新诠释和修改的政策。
And we're gonna talk about not just a pretty subjective American policy, but one that has been reinterpreted and amended many, many times in the past.
对。
Right.
所以显然,对我们来说,这是一周的委内瑞拉议题,随之而来有很多直接相关的问题,我们主要讨论了市场因素。
So obviously, for us, this has been a Venezuela week, and there's all sorts of immediate questions that are sort of most directly relevant to We've been talking about the market elements mostly.
我们谈到了石油。
We talked about oil.
我们谈到了主权债务等等。
We talked about the sovereign debt, etcetera.
但当然,还有许多关于国际法以及何为合法、何为非法的问题。
But then there's all these questions, of course, about international law and what is legitimate and what is illegitimate.
当我看到我们逮捕了某人的头条新闻时,简直不敢相信。
And I mean, I couldn't even believe the headline when I saw it that we had arrested.
我知道。
I know.
我惊呆了。
I was flabbergasted.
我们竟然逮捕了另一个国家的国家元首,这简直令人难以置信。
The idea that we'd arrested a head of state from another country is just absolutely gob smacking.
然后人们谈论国际法。
And then people talk about international law.
接着他们问,国际法真的存在吗?等等。
And then they say, does international law even exist and so forth?
在某种程度上,这感觉确实是一片未探索的领域。
What it feels like to some extent truly uncharted territory here.
是的。
Yep.
未探索的领域。
Uncharted territory.
但人们正在引用一个类似的先例,即门罗主义。
But people are drawing on a parallel, which is the Monroe Doctrine.
是的。
Yes.
门罗主义,我想是1823年提出的,基本上宣称美国将对整个美洲地区主张其主导地位。
The Monroe Doctrine of I think it was 1823, I wanna say, basically said that America would assert its dominance over the entire American region.
从那以后,它已经多次发生变化。
And since then, it's changed a number of times.
但如今人们谈论它时,称之为特朗普修正案或唐·罗伊主义,这一说法出自特朗普政府于去年12月发布的《国家安全战略》文件。
But the way it's being talked about now is as the Trump corollary or the Don Roe doctrine, which was described in the National Security Strategy document that the Trump administration put out back in December.
而这一版本略有不同。
And that one's a little different.
所以我们不断看到对这一主义的修订。
So we keep seeing these amendments to the doctrine.
顺便说一下,我应该提一下,你还记得2013年约翰·克里曾明确表示,门罗主义已经终结了吗?
By the way, I should just say, do you remember back in 2013, John Kerry explicitly said that the Monroe Doctrine was over?
它已经死了。
It was dead.
我不记得有这回事。
I don't remember that.
而现在它又回来了。
And now it's back.
它又出现了。
It's arisen.
某种形式的它确实回来了。
Some version of it is certainly back.
这非常有趣,因为美国显然有着长期介入邻国政治和内政的历史,无论是公开的还是秘密的,尤其是在中美洲和南美洲等地。
It's very interesting because The US clearly has a long standing history of various operations, overt and covert of involving itself, shall we say, with the politics and domestic affairs of our neighbors, particularly in the South And Central America and so forth.
我猜想,任何国家自然都会对其周边发生的事情抱有某种安全利益。
I suppose any country is naturally going to have some security interest in what's happening in its proximity.
我认为这本身并不特别奇怪。
I don't think that itself is particularly weird.
我真的很喜欢‘唐·罗伊主义’这个说法,因为其中有两点。
I really like this term, the Don Roe Doctrine, because there's two things.
一是美国长期以来希望在邻国的政治事务中扮演角色。
There's this long standing history that The US wants to have a role to play in everyone else's politics among our neighbors.
二是与唐纳德·特朗普相关的另一个要素:许多政策和原则似乎都基于一个观念——他是总统,他的想法和主张就是合法的,仅仅因为它们是他本人的想法,而他是总统。
But then there's this other element with Donald Trump specifically where it feels like a lot of our policy and principle is essentially he's the president and what's in his head and his ideas are legitimate because they're his ideas and he's the president.
所以,这有先例,有规范等等。
So, there's precedent, there's norms and so forth.
然后还有一种新奇的现象,大家都在试图揣测他的想法。
And then there's this sort of novelty that everyone's trying to read his mind.
我们正处在一个非常非常奇怪的境地,这在我们上两期节目中已经提到过:总统在谈论石油
And we're in this very, very strange situation, which has come up on our last two episodes, in which you have the president talking about oil
exclusively,没错。
Exclusively, yeah.
但人们却持怀疑态度。
And yet people are like skeptical.
这非常奇怪。
It's very strange.
这种情况很奇怪,因为你
It's a very strange situation because you
它通常是这样的。
have it torpically.
就好像,哦,他承认了。
It's like, Oh, he admitted it.
这跟石油有关。
It's about oil.
但每个人都在问,除了这里之外,还有什么其他因素在起作用吗?
And yet everyone's like, is there something else at play beyond here?
这完全颠倒了过去人们谈论我们国际介入合法性或非法性的说法。
It's the total inversion for how people have talked in the past about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of how we involve ourselves internationally.
最初的门罗主义中也有这种成分。
That was part of the original Monroe Doctrine as well.
在支持民主、反对殖民主义、驱逐欧洲列强之间,存在着一种奇怪的张力。
There was this weird tension between pro democracy, anti colonialism, keep the European powers out.
是的。
Yeah.
而美国基本上是在建立自己的非正式殖民地。
And America basically kind of creating its own informal colonies.
这种紧张关系一直存在。
That tension has always been there.
我们应该谈谈这一点。
And we should talk about that.
我们应该讨论一下,在委内瑞拉是否存在不同的策略或目标。
We should talk about whether or not there might be, you know, different strategies at play in Venezuela, different goals.
我很高兴地说,我们确实请到了一位完美的嘉宾。
And I'm happy to say we do, in fact, have the perfect guest.
我们将与格雷格·格兰丁对话。
We're going to be speaking with Greg Grandin.
他是耶鲁大学的历史学教授,也是新书《美国,美国:新世界新历史》的作者。
He is a professor of history at Yale and the author of the new book America, America, A New History of the New World.
所以,格雷格,欢迎来到《OddLots》。
So, Greg, welcome to OddLots.
非常感谢你前来做客。
Thanks so much for coming on.
哦,谢谢您邀请我。
Oh, thanks for having me.
门罗主义在美国政策和发展历史中究竟有多重要?
How important has the Monroe Doctrine actually been in the history of American policy and development?
嗯,它无疑具有影响力,并且多年来被反复引用。
Well, it's certainly been influential, and it's certainly been cited repeatedly over the years.
我的意思是,首先我们需要回溯一下,究竟什么让它成为一种主义。
I mean, first, I think we need to back up and say exactly what makes it a doctrine.
没错。
Yeah.
它从未经过投票表决。
It was never voted on.
也没有任何法院批准过。
No court ratified it.
直到它被提出几十年后,才真正获得了主义的地位。
It didn't actually assume the status of doctrine until a couple of decades after it was pronounced.
1823年,詹姆斯·门罗担任总统,当时大多数西班牙美洲国家正通过长期而艰难的独立战争脱离西班牙统治,这些战争比美国独立战争持续时间更长。
In 1823, when James Monroe was president at the time, and this was around the time that most Spanish American nations were breaking from Spain in their successful wars of independence, which were much longer and dragged out than the US war for independence.
到1823年,西班牙即将失去其帝国已显而易见,美国终于决定发表一项声明。
By 1823, it was fairly clear that Spain was gonna lose its empire and The United States finally decided that it was gonna issue a statement.
你必须理解,这一学说本身或门罗的声明,实际上只是6000字国情咨文中的四到五个不相连的段落。
And you have to understand that the doctrine itself or Monroe's statement, it's really just a kind of, you know, four or five non contiguous paragraphs in the State of the Union address of 6,000 words.
你必须从国情咨文中仔细挑选,才能找到所谓的门罗主义。
You have to kind of cherry pick through State of the Union address to find what is the doctrine.
而且它显得犹豫不决。
And it's hesitant.
它十分谨慎。
It's cautious.
美国当时并不确定自己在各个问题上究竟该持何种立场,门罗内阁内部显然也存在分歧和不同意见。
The United States wasn't really sure where it wanted to land on on any given issue, and there were obviously tensions and differences of opinions within Monroe's cabinet.
换句话说,用现代术语来说,当时有孤立主义者、国际主义者,也有单边主义者。
I mean, to put it in more modern terms, isolationists, you had internationalists, you had unilateralists.
当时有不同的观点,思考美国应该如何应对南美洲、中美洲和墨西哥新出现的共和国,以及它们在欧洲的前殖民统治者。
You had different people thinking of different ways on how The United States should address and deal with, on the one hand, these new republics that were coming into being in South America and in Central America and in Mexico.
另一方面,则是它们在欧洲的前殖民统治者。
And on the other hand, their former colonial rulers in Europe.
实际上,这份宣言是由门罗的国务卿约翰·昆西·亚当斯撰写的。
And so it was actually written by John Quincy Adams, who was Monroe's Secretary of State.
正如我所说,它被分散插入在不同部分。
And as I said, it was inserted in different parts.
确实如此。
It's true.
它是一份略显矛盾的文件。
It a bit of a contradictory document.
一方面,它宣布美国认为拉丁美洲(当时称西班牙美洲)的独立是不可逆转的。
On the one hand, it announces that The United States considers the independence of Latin America or at the time Spanish America to be irreversible.
并且承认了若干已建立有效主权、与西班牙彻底脱离关系的国家。
And that it was recognizing a number of states that had established effective sovereignty and unbroken with Spain.
它警告欧洲,不仅是西班牙,还包括西班牙可能拉拢来帮助其征服或重新征服美洲任何部分的任何国家,如神圣罗马帝国或英国。
And it warned off Europe, not just Spain, but any country Spain might recruit to help them or the Holy Roman Empire or Great Britain against trying to conquer or reconquer the Americas, any part of The Americas.
因此,这就是该学说的反殖民主义部分,再次用引号标注,所谓的‘学说’。
So that's the kind of anticolonial part of the doctrine, again, in quotation marks, the doctrine.
然后其他段落指出,美国和西班牙美洲同处西半球,拥有某些特殊利益和理想,尽管并未具体说明这些利益和理想是什么。
Then other paragraphs said that The United States and Spanish America being of the Western Hemisphere shared certain special interests and ideals, although it didn't specify what those interests and ideals were.
但人们普遍认为,它们指的是君主制与共和制之间的差异。
But people kind of presume they meant the difference between monarchy and republicanism.
但至少,它表达了一种拥有共同利益的国家间兄弟情谊的姿态。
But at least there was a kind of gesture to a kind of shared fraternity of nations that had common interests.
因此,这是门罗主义的另一个部分。
And so that's another part of the Monroe Doctrine.
接着是被提及的部分,即它并未明确赋予美国在监控整个半球方面的实际权力。
And then there was the part that was referenced that it didn't exactly grant The United States much power in terms of policing the hemisphere.
它只含糊地表示,美国将根据西半球任何地方发生的事件对其‘美国的和平与幸福’的影响来加以解读。
It was a vague sentence that said The United States would interpret events that happened anywhere in the Western Hemisphere on how they bear on the, quote, peace and happiness of The United States.
这是一份能够吸引美国国内众多不同群体的文件。
It was, you know, so it was a document that could appeal to a lot of different constituencies within The United States.
就像托马斯·杰斐逊的扩张主义一样,这种观念认为新世界有着某种共同的目标。
Like Thomas Jefferson's expansionism, this notion that, you know, the new world was shared a certain unity of purpose.
约翰·昆西·亚当斯是一位著名的孤立主义者和单边主义者。
John Quincy Adams was a famous isolationist and unilateralist.
因此,有一种观点认为,如果美国想要行动,只要它察觉到威胁就可以采取行动。
And so there was this notion of The United States could act if it wanted, if it saw a threat.
而像亨利·克莱这样的人则设想了一个庞大的美国体系,一个商业体系,在这个体系中,美国将成为一个强大的制造业基地,而拉丁美洲、西班牙美洲则提供资源,以抗衡英国和欧洲帝国。
And you have somebody like Henry Clay who imagined a kind of large American system, a mercantile system in which The US would be a great manufacturing base in Latin America, Spanish America would supply resources in order to rival The United Kingdom and the empires of Europe.
但关键在于,这实际上并没有多少实质内容。
But the point being, it really wasn't much of anything.
拉丁美洲人很喜欢它。
Latin Americans did like it.
我的意思是,他们有大把时间去阅读。
I mean, they had a lot of time to read.
那是另一个时代。
It was a different period.
那时候还没有iPhone。
There were no iPhones.
人们会仔细阅读,并说:哦,这段话挺有意思的。
People read closely and said, oh, well, that that's an interesting paragraph.
他们阅读并最喜欢的部分是,他们将其视为支持自身反殖民主义立场的法庭之友简报。
And what they read and liked mostly was they thought it was a they read it as a kind of amicus brief for their own anti colonialism.
西班牙美洲人强烈主张,征服的理论已不再有效。
Spanish Americans were very much vocal in their idea that the doctrine of conquest was no longer valid.
发现的理论也已不再有效。
The doctrine of discovery was no longer valid.
新大陆已没有等待欧洲人偶然发现并据为己有的未发现土地。
There was no undiscovered land in the new world waiting for Europeans to stumble upon and claim as their own.
他们将门罗主义解读为在很大程度上支持这一立场,尤其是其中警告欧洲不得试图重新征服任何已宣布独立的国家的部分。
And they read the Monroe Doctrine as largely supporting that position, especially in the part that warned Europe against trying to reconquer any countries that had claimed their independence.
但多年来,它被以另一种方式解读。
But over the years, it was interpreted in a different way.
政治家和外交官,尤其是在与欧洲发生摩擦时——特别是当英国希望在中美洲修建运河时——如此说道。
Politicians and diplomats, particularly in skirmishes with Europe, say Great Britain when Great Britain wanted to build a canal through Central America.
就在那时,那些模糊零散的言论被提升到了教义的层面。
That was around the time that those kind of vague scattered remarks were elevated to the level of doctrine.
它成为了门罗主义,或称门罗 doctrine。
And it became the Monroe Doctrine or the Doctrine of Monroe.
从那时起,它逐步被纳入我们或许可称为习惯法的体系中。
And from that point forward, it was progressively incorporated into something we might call customary law.
我的意思是,再次强调,是什么让一个主张成为教义?谁有权力执行它?
I mean, again, what makes a doctrine a doctrine and who gets to enforce it?
这本质上只是一个权力的问题。
It really is just a question of power.
这涉及到你在引言中谈到的问题:什么是国际法?它如何被执行?
It goes to what you were talking about in the introduction about what is international law and how is it enforced.
我的意思是,大多数国家都有原则声明。
I mean, most countries have statements of principles.
美国却有自己的学说。
The United States gets its own doctrine.
是的。
Yeah.
这真的很有趣,不是吗?
It's really interesting, isn't it?
因为从某种程度上说,当我想到美国的介入时,感觉无论何时何地,我们总有一种对抗共产主义的必要,对吧?
Because to some extent, when I think about American involvement, it's like all around the world at any time, we sort of feel the need to fight against communists, right?
这似乎是一种非常普遍的现象。
That seems to be a very common thing.
并且为民主国家或任何与我们政体相似的国家而战,诸如此类。
And fight for democracies or any country that sort of has something similar to our way of government or something like that.
我们似乎总是基于原则行事。
We seem to be on principle.
我们必须是那个介入的一方,或者我们感到有义务去干预。
We have to be the ones or we feel compelled to intervene.
而这里还有一个看似非常不同的地理因素。
And then here is this geographical element that seems very different.
你能谈谈地理上的冲动——即对邻国施加影响——与另一种我也不知道该怎么称呼的准则、学说等之间的交集吗?后者指的是我们不喜欢某些类型的领导人。
Can you talk a little bit about the intersection of the geographical impulse to exert your influence among your neighbors and how that intersects with this other, I don't know what we call it, principle, doctrine, etcetera, where there are just certain kinds of leaders that we don't like.
当他们掌权时,我们会尽一切努力将他们除掉。
When they're in power, we do what we can to eliminate them.
是的。
Yes.
这涉及到美国的历史,以及它对自己半球、拉丁美洲、西班牙美洲和巴西所施加的权力。
And this goes to the history of The United States, its relationship to its own hemisphere and the power that it has exerted over the Latin America and Spanish America and Brazil.
以及它有时试图走向全球,成为更全球性的超级大国的努力。
And then its efforts at times to go global to become a more global superpower.
在不同的历史时期,美国曾多次试图突破其半球的界限,成为世界强国。
There's been, you know, there's long different iterations of this in which The United States kind of tries to escape the boundaries of its hemisphere and become a world power at different moments.
然后它又退回到西半球。
Then it falls back to the Western Hemisphere.
这种情况一再发生。
This has happened over and over again.
大萧条时期就发生过。
It happened with the Great Depression.
在某种程度上,越南战争之后,美国又转向了拉丁美洲。
It happened in some ways after Vietnam, The United States turned back to Latin America.
恐怖战争灾难之后,这种情况当然也发生过。
It happened certainly after the catastrophic war on terror.
我的意思是,如今特朗普身上发生的事就是一个例子。
I mean, in many ways, what's happening now with Trump is an example of this.
这种状况,你知道,是他自己的问题,很多错误都是他造成的。
This kind of, you know, is his own problem and a lot of the things that are wrong is of his doing.
但他继承的国家正因恐怖战争的灾难、金融危机以及政客们无法应对企业财富与不平等问题而陷入深刻危机。
But he did inherit a country that was in profound crisis as a result of catastrophic war on terror, the financial crisis, the inability of politicians to deal with the corporate wealth and inequality.
因此,有一种重新转向拉丁美洲的趋势。
And so there is a kind of turning back to Latin America.
如果我们稍后想深入讨论,我们可以谈一谈,但特朗普在委内瑞拉的行动正是一个完美例证,说明当美国全球扩张失败后,不得不退回其半球时会发生什么。
And we can get to this a little bit later if you want, but Trump's actions in Venezuela are a perfect example of what happens when The United States, know, its bid to go global fails and it has to return to its hemisphere.
这就是为什么门罗主义如此重要。
And that's why the Monroe Doctrine is so important.
拉丁美洲是美国首次感受到自己作为海外强国的地方。
Latin America is the first place in which The United States got a sense of itself as an overseas power.
它能够将自己的影响力、经济实力、文化力量和军事力量投射到国境之外。
You know, was able to project its power, its financial power, its cultural power, its military power beyond its own borders.
但这样说有点复杂,因为美国的边界一直在变化。
And even saying that is a little bit tricky because The United States borders were always changing.
我的意思是,美国的边界具有扩张性,它实际上吞并了得克萨斯和墨西哥。
I mean, The United States borders, the expansive nature of The United States where it actually took Texas and took Mexico.
因此,这不仅仅是美国在与拉丁美洲打交道,而是它在向太平洋推进的过程中,直接吞并了拉丁美洲。
So it wasn't just that it was dealing with Latin America, it was literally gobbling up Latin America on its way to the Pacific.
但撇开这一点,要在本半球内工作并学会如何与其他国家相处。
But setting that aside, working within the hemisphere and learning how to deal with other nations.
拉丁美洲对此至关重要。
Latin America is absolutely central to that.
这也是为什么门罗主义变得如此重要,因为它 supposedly 为这种做法提供了一种指导方针。
And that's one of the reasons why the Monroe Doctrine rises in importance because it supposedly provides a kind of guideline for that.
多年来,门罗主义本身已经得到了扩展。
Now, over the years, the Monroe Doctrine itself has expanded.
总统们曾明确地将门罗主义应用于委内瑞拉和圭亚那的边界争端,当时美国支持委内瑞拉,而英国支持英属圭亚那。
Presidents explicitly expanded over a boundary dispute in Venezuela and Guyana in which The United States was supporting Venezuela and Great Britain was supporting British Guyana.
格罗弗·克利夫兰宣布,门罗主义赋予美国对整个西半球的绝对主权。
Grover Cleveland declared that the Monroe Doctrine granted The United States absolute sovereignty over the whole Western Hemisphere.
这从‘我们只是要解释发生在某地的和平与幸福事件’跃升到了一个相当大的跨度。
That's a that's a pretty big jump from you know, we're gonna interpret any event that happens somewhere on a peace and happiness.
因此,它关乎和平与幸福——通过法令,我们的意志成为半球内的法则。
So it bears on a peace and happiness to by fiat our will is lore in the hemisphere.
然后在1904年,沿着类似的思路,西奥多·罗斯福担任总统时,通过他自己的推论扩展了该主义,他称之为国际警察权力,用以镇压拉丁美洲的长期不法行为。
And then in nineteen o four along similar lines, Theodore Roosevelt when he was president, he expanded the doctrine with his own corollary to what he called international police power to suppress chronic wrongdoing in Latin America.
必须说明的是,那些长期不法行为大多是由美国挑起的。
Now, must say that most of that chronic wrongdoing was provoked by U.
S.
S.
银行和美国。
Banks and U.
S.
S.
雇佣兵和U.
Mercenaries and U.
S.
S.
石油开采者。
Oil extractors.
你知道,长期以来一直有强迫国家接受它们无法偿还的贷款的历史,这会导致各种不稳定,甚至内战,然后美国政府被召去解决这些私人利益制造的问题。
And you know there's a long history of like forcing loans on countries that they can't pay off and it leads to all sorts of instability, then civil war, and then the US government is called in to settle the problem that these private interests created.
因此,罗斯福将门罗主义扩展为一种永久性的全球警察授权,允许美国在任何时间、任何情况下采取行动。
So Roosevelt expands the Monroe Doctrine into a kind of standing universal police warrant that will allow The United States to act whenever it will and whenever it wants.
今天的市场变化迅速。
Today's markets move fast.
通过《巴克莱简报》——巴克莱投资银行推出的新播客,您只需十分钟即可获取所需洞察。
Get the insights you need in ten minutes with The Barclays Brief, a new podcast from Barclays Investment Bank.
通过敏锐的对话和基于情景的分析,我们的顶尖专家每周剖析关键市场主题。
Through sharp dialogue and scenario based analysis, our leading experts analyze key market themes each week.
无论您是在管理投资组合还是领导企业,《巴克莱简报》播客都能帮助您今天做出更明智的决策。
So whether you're managing a portfolio or leading a business, the Barclays brief podcast can help you make smarter decisions today.
保持敏锐。
Stay sharp.
保持知情。
Stay briefed.
在您收听播客的任何平台都可以找到《Barclays Brief》。
Find Barclays brief wherever you get your podcasts.
嘿,Odd Lots 的听众们。
Hey there, Odd Lots listeners.
随着我们进入2026年,我们意识到节目中我们一直在思考的一件事是公司究竟是如何建立起来的。
As we come into 2026, we are realizing that one thing we're constantly thinking about on the show is how companies actually get built.
不仅仅是那种 headline 版本的故事,而是其中混乱而实际的操作现实。
Not just, like, the headline version of that story, but the messy operational reality of it.
没错。
Right.
我们喜欢事物混乱而实际的操作现实。
We love messy operational reality of things.
那种永无止境地深入探究的追求:公司如何做大做强,是什么让一家公司成功,而其他公司却失败了。
The never ending quest to dive deeper, how companies make it big, what causes one company to succeed, why others fail.
我有个好消息。
Well, I have good news.
这正是《Acquired》播客所做的。
That is exactly what the Acquired podcast does.
本·吉尔伯特和大卫·罗森塔尔会选择一家公司,深入探索其发展历程的方方面面。
Ben Gilbert and David Rosenthal pick a company and then explore all the ins and outs of its trajectory.
其中包含大量细节,比如它是如何扩张的、经历了哪些起落,还有更多内容。
Lots of detail there, how it scaled, the ups and downs, and so much more.
没错。
Yeah.
我们其实早在二月就邀请过他们做客《Odd Lots》。
And we actually we had them on Odd Lots back in February.
我们和他们聊了从台积电、英伟达、玛氏、爱马仕,到规模扩张、资本结构、激励机制的重要性,所有这些构成我们每天讨论的这些成功企业背后的关键要素。
We talked to them about everything from TSMC, NVIDIA, Mars, Hermes, scale, capital structure, the importance of incentives, all of the different, I guess, ingredients that go into some of the success of these names that we talk about every day.
另外,他们的节目在2025年也迎来了十周年,和我们一样。
Also, their show actually turned 10 years old in 2025 just like us.
所以,我们在播客年龄上算是同岁了。
So we're, I guess, the same age in podcast years.
大年。
Big year.
无论如何,如果你喜欢《Odd Lots》,喜欢我们深入探讨各种市场动态和经济实际运行机制,那你一定会欣赏并喜欢《Acquired》播客。
Anyway, if you like Odd Lodge, the way we get into various market dynamics, how the economy actually works under the hood, You'll obviously appreciate and enjoy the Acquired podcast.
他们做的工作类似,理念相近,都聚焦于单个公司的背景与脉络。
They do similar work, similar ideas, all focused on the context of individual company.
所以去听听《Acquired》播客吧。
So go check out the Acquired podcast.
你可以在任何你收听播客的平台找到他们。
You can find them wherever you get your podcasts.
难道罗斯福也没有重新诠释过吗?但没持续多久?
So didn't FDR also reinterpret it, but it didn't last long?
另一位罗斯福的重新诠释?
Another Roosevelt reinterpretation?
没有。
No.
并不是。
Not really.
但富兰克林·罗斯福实际上来了个180度大转弯。
But FDR actually reversed course a 180 degrees.
因此在1933年,他放弃了美国干预的权利。
So in 1933, he renounced the right of The United States to intervene.
长期以来,拉丁美洲的法学家、政治家和外交官一直要求放弃征服权。
There's long standing demands by Latin American jurists and politicians and diplomats to give up the right of conquest.
我的意思是,美国在整个十九世纪都一直坚持保留征服权。
I mean, The United States continued to hold on to the right of conquest throughout the nineteenth century.
这基本上为美墨战争和印第安人迁移提供了正当性。
Basically justified the war with Mexico, Indian removal.
直到20世纪20年代,征服权还一直被写入美国教科书。
The right of conquest was taught in US textbooks up until the nineteen twenties.
拉丁美洲在独立时就废除了征服权,因为西班牙语美洲国家在诞生之初就已组成一个国际联盟。
Latin America had revoked the right of conquest with its independence because Spanish American nations came into the world together already a league of nations.
七个必须在拥挤的大陆上学会共处的国家。
Seven nations that had to learn to live with each other on a crowded continent.
美国作为一个单一国家在一片广阔陆地的东海岸诞生,而它想象这片土地是空无一人的。
The United States came into being a single nation on the Eastern Coast of a great landmass that it imagined as empty.
显然,这片土地并非空无一人。
Obviously, it wasn't empty.
那里有美洲原住民。
There was Native Americans.
那里有墨西哥人。
There was Mexican.
那里有西班牙人。
There was Spaniards.
但美国毫无疑问地认为自己终将抵达太平洋,并坚持使用征服理论来正当化对这片土地的全部占领。
But The United States there was no doubt that The United States was gonna reach the Pacific, and it held on and used the doctrine of conquest in order to justify taking all of that land.
拉丁美洲一直在努力迫使美国接受征服理论已被废除、无效这一事实。
Latin America was constantly trying to force The United States to accept that the doctrine of conquest was abrogated was void.
直到1933年,这种情况才得以改变。
And it wasn't until 1933 that it did.
正是罗斯福做到了这一点。
And it was Roosevelt who did that.
他承认了拉丁美洲国家的绝对主权,并放弃了干预的权利。
And he recognized the absolute sovereignty of Latin American nations and he gave up the right of intervention.
这是美国权力的一次巨大转变。
And that was an enormous turnaround in US power.
这并没有以任何方式削弱美国的实力。
It didn't weaken US power by any means.
实际上,它增强了美国的实力,因为它使美国的权力更加集中。
It actually strengthened it because it focused it.
它教会了美国如何更高效地行使权力。
It taught The United States how to exercise power more efficiently.
组织起了拉丁美洲。
Organized Latin America.
这十年的善意真正让拉丁美洲支持了即将到来的反法西斯战争。
It was ten years of goodwill that really got Latin America kind of on board for the coming war against fascism.
富兰克林·罗斯福政府中的许多战略家担心,整个拉丁美洲可能会步西班牙的后尘。
There was a lot of fear among strategists within the Franklin Roosevelt administration that all of Latin America could have gone the way of Spain.
我的意思是,导致西班牙法西斯主义或长枪主义兴起的许多社会学因素,在拉丁美洲也同样存在。
I mean a lot of the sociological variables that led to the rise of fascism or phalangeism in Spain were present in Latin America.
那里有大量顺从的农民,一小群地主,贵族式的保守天主教徒,日益激进的工会和农民,威胁着土地阶级的权力。
There was a large group of servile peasants, a small group of landowners, patrician conservative Catholics, increasingly militant unions and peasants threatening the power of the landed class.
你知道,这描述的是西班牙,但也是整个拉丁美洲的写照。
You know, that was Spain, but it was also Latin America writ large.
如果拉丁美洲落入了法团主义的手中,那么美国就会被纳粹主义、法西斯主义和法团主义夹在中间。
And if Latin America fell to philanthropism, then, you know, United States would be kind of cornered between Nazism, fascism, and philangeism.
罗斯福同意拉丁美洲的要求,放弃干预权,这基本上使拉丁美洲的政治天平向左倾斜。
Roosevelt's conceding to Latin America's demand to give up the right intervention basically tilted the playing field to the left in Latin America.
你知道,罗斯福容忍了经济民族主义者。
You know, Roosevelt tolerated economic nationalists.
他允许墨西哥的革命者将标准石油公司国有化,并没收了大量美国拥有的财产。
He let revolutionaries in Mexico nationalize standard oil and appropriate massive amounts of US owned property.
这创造了巨大的善意,为美国以实力和大陆统一的姿态进入第二次世界大战奠定了基础。
And it created enormous goodwill and set the stage for The United States' entrance into World War II from a position of strength and continental unity.
所以你提到,在不同时期,拉丁美洲的法学家们曾反对美国绝对主权的观念和这些争端。
So you mentioned, okay, at various times the jurists in Latin America, they push back against this notion of American absolute sovereignty and these fights.
这引出了我在推特上经常看到的一个争论问题。
This gets to a question I see it debated on Twitter a lot.
你会如何回应那些说国际法不存在的人?
What do you say to someone who says international law doesn't exist?
什么是国际法?
What is international law?
它真的存在吗?
Does it exist?
这个术语是有用的,还是没有用的?
And how is this term useful or not useful?
嗯,我是个历史学家。
Well, I'm an historian.
我不是律师或法学家。
I'm not a lawyer or a jurist.
所以我倾向于从权力关系的角度来看问题。
So I tend to see things in terms of power relations.
我认为法律是一种道德平台,它被创造出来,形成了一套规范性原则,人们可以在其中进行斗争。
So I think I see law as a moral venue that is created, that creates a set of normative principles in which people can fight over.
所以,显然,国际法并不是存在于某种真空之中,指望绝对正义在那里发生。
So, you know, obviously the international law doesn't exist in some void in which absolute justice is going to happen.
你知道,最强大的国家决定例外情况,而像美国这样的国家,在某种程度上,当它们服从国际法体系时。
You know, the most powerful country decides the exception and, you know, The United States to the degree that countries like The United States submit to a system of international law.
通常是在弱势时刻,比如罗斯福在1933年大萧条高峰期、法西斯主义兴起时所采取的行动。
It usually was during moments of weakness like when Roosevelt did it in 1933 at the height of the great depression and with fascism on the rise.
但它确实创造了这些规范和原则,让人们去斗争和争论。
But it does create these norms and these principles that people fight and argue over.
所以,是的。
And so yes.
自1945年联合国成立以来,所谓主导世界的自由主义国际法秩序。
And the liberal international law order that has supposedly governed the world since the creation of the United Nations in 1945.
其中的虚伪、差异和例外众多,总能找到规避办法,美国和苏联当然也找到了各种方式绕开国际法对它们施加的任何限制。
The hypocrisies and the variances and exceptions are many, and there's always workarounds and The United States and The Soviet Union certainly found ways to skirt any kind of limits that were placed on them by international law.
但它确实创造了一个场所,一个道德舞台,让人们可以在此理解并争论对与错。
But it does create a venue, a moral arena in which right and wrong could be understood and argued over.
对于贫穷和弱小的国家来说,其他自卫手段非常有限。
There's other very little recourse for poor and weak nations to defend themselves.
我的意思是,我们可以回溯到修昔底德,对吧?
I mean, we can go back to Thucydides, right?
强者为所欲为,弱者忍其所不得不。
The strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must.
认为国际法某种意义上超越了权力关系,这种想法或许只是一种幻想,但它至少为各国相互交往提供了某种准则。
And the conceit that there is such a thing as international law that is somehow transcendent of power relations is, it might just be a conceit, but it still at least creates terms on which nations could deal with each other.
再次说明,拉丁美洲和美国正是这一现象的绝佳例子。
Again, Latin America and The United States is absolutely a perfect example of that.
美国对主权和合作关系的承诺,很大程度上是在与世界上有史以来最强大国家相处的过程中形成的——这个国家向太平洋扩张,吞并了德克萨斯,占领了墨西哥,控制了古巴、波多黎各和巴拿马。
America's commitment sovereignty and to cooperative relations was largely forged in relationship to living under what was becoming the most powerful nation in world history as it moved across the Pacific, as it took Texas, as it took Mexico, as it took Cuba, as it took Puerto Rico, as it took Panama.
你知道的。
You know?
因此,当时有一些法学家撰写法律著作,提出这些法律原则。
So you had these jurists, like, writing law books and coming up with these legal principles.
但这些原则的实施方式,往往本质上还是由权力决定的。
And the way they get implemented though often is really about power.
比如,20世纪初的阿根廷法学家路易斯·德拉戈,当时意大利、英国和德国的军舰驶抵委内瑞拉,试图追讨债务——这些债务可追溯到殖民时期,欧洲银行声称委内瑞拉欠款,因为西班牙王室早在1776年或更早时候就借了贷款。
So, you know, Argentine legal theorists, for instance, Luis Drago, for instance, at the early twentieth century when Italian and British and German war boats were showing up at Venezuela trying to collect debt, debt that had gone back to the colony that European banks were claiming that Venezuela owed because the Spanish crown, you know, contracted loans in 1776 or whenever whenever they did.
路易斯·德拉戈提出了一个原则,即德拉戈主义:不得使用武力追讨债务。
Luis Drago issued a principle, the Drago doctrine, that you cannot use coercion to collect debt.
然而,美国自己也曾多次通过胁迫手段追讨债务,我们甚至可以看看唐纳德·特朗普近期对委内瑞拉的所作所为。
Now The United States collected plenty of debt through coercion, and we could I can look at Donald Trump and what's going on in Venezuela right now.
但美国有点像德拉戈 doctrine,有点紧张。
But The United States kind of like the Drago doctor, Nervous.
他们不希望意大利、德国和英国的军舰在加勒比海来回游荡,轰炸哥伦比亚或委内瑞拉的海岸,试图占领海关以收取税款。
They didn't want Italian and German and British warships flitting around the Caribbean bombing the coast of Colombia or Venezuela trying to seize hold of the custom house to get the receipts.
他们认为,好吧,那我们就支持德拉戈主义。
They thought that, okay, so we'll support the Drago doctrine.
这将为我们提供一种杠杆,把欧洲挡在我们的后院之外。
This will give us a leverage in keeping Europe out of our backyard.
所以你隐约看到法律作为一种超越社会权力的道德原则,与它实际被运用之间的来回拉扯。
So you you kinda see the back and forth between law as a kind of moral principle that transcends social power, but then it's hot.
你知道,它显然被社会权力所支配和实施。
You know, it's obviously subordinated and implemented through social power.
嘿,Odd Lots 的听众们。
Hey there, Odd Lots listeners.
随着2026年的到来,我们意识到,节目中我们一直在思考的一件事是公司究竟是如何建立起来的。
As we come into 2026, we are realizing that one thing we're constantly thinking about on the show is how companies actually get built.
不仅仅是那个故事的 headline 版本,而是它混乱的运营现实。
Not just, like, the headline version of that story, but the messy operational reality of it.
没错。
Right.
我们喜欢事物那混乱的运营现实。
We love messy operational reality of things.
那种永无止境地深入探究的追求:公司如何做大做强,是什么让一家公司成功,而其他公司却失败了。
The never ending quest to dive deeper, how companies make it big, what causes one company to succeed, why others fail.
好吧,我有个好消息。
Well, I have good news.
这正是《Acquired》播客所做的。
That is exactly what the Acquired podcast does.
本·吉尔伯特和大卫·罗森塔尔会选择一家公司,然后深入探索其发展历程的方方面面。
Ben Gilbert and David Rosenthal pick a company and then explore all the ins and outs of its trajectory.
里面有大量细节:它是如何扩张的,经历了哪些起起落落,还有更多内容。
Lots of detail there, how it scaled, the ups and downs, and so much more.
是的。
Yeah.
而且我们实际上在今年二月邀请他们上了《Odd Lots》节目。
And we actually we had them on Odd Lots back in February.
我们和他们聊了从台积电、英伟达、玛氏、赫尔墨斯,到规模、资本结构、激励机制的重要性,所有这些构成我们每天讨论的这些成功公司背后的各种要素。
We talked to them about everything from TSMC, NVIDIA, Mars, Hermes, scale, capital structure, the importance of incentives, all of the different, I guess, ingredients that go into some of the success of these names that we talk about every day.
另外,他们的节目在2025年也迎来了十周年,和我们一样。
Also, their show actually turned 10 years old in 2025 just like us.
所以我们在播客年龄上算是同龄人。
So we're, I guess, the same age in podcast years.
大年份。
Big year.
无论如何,如果你喜欢《Odd Lots》,喜欢我们深入探讨各种市场动态和经济底层运作机制,那你一定会欣赏并喜欢《Acquired》播客。
Anyway, if you like Odd Lodge, the way we get into various market dynamics, how the economy actually works under the hood, you'll obviously appreciate and enjoy the Acquired podcast.
他们做的工作类似,理念相近,都专注于单个公司的背景与脉络。
They do similar work, similar ideas, all focused on the context of individual company.
所以去听听《Acquired》播客吧。
So go check out the Acquired podcast.
你可以在任何获取播客的地方找到他们。
You can find them where ever you get your podcasts.
你对委内瑞拉行动背后的真实目标有什么看法?
What's your sense of the actual goals behind the Venezuela move?
因为如果你看看《国家安全战略》文件,里面提到美国要重新确立其在西半球的主导地位。
Because if you look at the National Security Strategy document, they talk about The US reasserting its preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.
我不知道该如何衡量‘主导地位’。
And I don't know how you measure preeminence.
对吧?
Right?
这似乎是一个非常宽泛的术语。
That seems a pretty broad term.
与此同时,特朗普曾明确表示委内瑞拉的石油属于美国。
Meanwhile, Trump has talked very explicitly about Venezuelan oil belonging to The US.
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目前没有政权更迭的迹象。
There's no regime change on the horizon.
他们并没有推动这一点。
They're not pressing for that.
那么这一切的最终目标是什么?
So what is the ultimate goal of all of this?
他们究竟想达到什么目的?
What are they aiming for?
嗯,这很难说。
Well, you know, it's hard to say.
正如我之前所说,特朗普的做法与多位前任在美國全球影响力衰退时期的做法类似。
As I said earlier, Trump is doing what a number of his predecessors have done during moments of of US kind of recession of US power in the world.
他们重新将目光转向拉丁美洲。
They turned back to Latin America.
但在某些方面,这纯粹是特朗普主义的体现。
But in some ways, it's pure Trumpism.
对吧?
Right?
这纯粹就是一场戏剧性的表演。
It's just this theatrical, spectacle.
你知道,他说这是为了石油。
You know, he said it was about oil.
一开始说是移民问题,然后是帮派,接着是芬太尼和毒品,最后他又说是为了夺回我们的石油。
Well, first, was about immigration, then it was about gangs, then it was about fentanyl and drugs, and then he then he landed on oil getting our oil back.
石油价格现在处于历史低位。
Oil is trading at an all time low.
也许不是历史最低,但已经相当低了。
Maybe not an all time low, but it's pretty low.
市场上石油供应过剩。
The market is filled glutted with oil.
要让委内瑞拉恢复生产需要巨额资本投入,而目前并没有多少石油公司急于行动。
And to get Venezuela back online is gonna cost an enormous amount of capital investment, and there's not a lot of oil companies that are rushing.
他们不会急着去委内瑞拉做这件事。
They're gonna rush into Venezuela than do that.
你知道,我觉得特朗普只是在迎合他的基本盘。
You know, I think Trump there was just playing to his base.
我觉得他,你知道,他的支持者喜欢特朗普当海盗的形象。
I think he was he was you know, I think his base likes the idea of Trump as a pirate.
特朗普作为殖民掠夺者的形象,你知道。
Trump as a colonial plunderer, you know.
而且,是的,是的,我们会把我们的石油拿回来。
And and, yeah, yeah, we'll get our oil back.
你知道,就像2003年的伊拉克战争一样,总有办法搞到石油。
You know, just like with the Iraq war in 2003, there's always ways to get oil.
对吧?
Right?
搞到石油的方法有很多。
There's many ways to get oil.
你不需要发动一场全球反恐战争来确保伊拉克的石油。
Like, you don't have to start a a global war on terror in order to secure Iraqi oil.
你本可以只是和萨达姆·侯赛因做个交易,就能得到石油。
You could have just, you know, made a deal with Saddam Hussein and got the oil.
你本可以对所谓的物质利益采取同样的做法,但这些利益总是通过意识形态的棱镜来理解的。
You could have did the same thing with you know, so material interests are always understood through a prism of ideology.
所以,一部分原因是委内瑞拉长期处于危机之中,这又是另一个节目要讲的完整故事了。
And so part of it was that Venezuela has been in crisis for a long time and that's a whole another story for a whole another show.
而像美国这样的霸权国家,是无法容忍这种危机的。
And, you know, a hegemon like The United States can't have that kind of crisis.
我的意思是,数百万委内瑞拉人正在逃离这个国家。
I mean millions of Venezuelans were fleeing the country.
你完全不必为特朗普的民族主义和边境政策辩护,也能说这种动荡和混乱不可能在一个区域霸权的后院永远持续下去。
I mean you don't have to be carrying water for Trump's nativism and his border policies at all to say that that kind of disruption and that kind of chaos can't go on forever in a regional hegemon's hinterland.
所以你必须得做点什么。
And so you have to kind of do something.
问题是,你打算怎么做?
The question is what are you gonna do?
特朗普似乎喜欢这种有针对性的袭击。
And Trump seems to like these targeted attacks.
对吧?
Right?
无论是在伊朗,还是在尼日利亚,这些一次性打击。
Whether they're in Iran, whether they're in Nigeria, you know, these one and done attacks.
我认为他被说服了,认为只要除掉马杜罗,而让马杜罗政权保持完整,因为它早已深深植根于委内瑞拉社会。
And I think he was sold on the idea that if they just took out Maduro and left the Maduro state intact because it is very much ingrained and embedded in Venezuelan society.
我认为马可·卢比奥国务院里有几位聪明人,不希望重演2003年伊拉克战后那种全面混乱的局面。
I think there were a couple of intelligent people in Marco Rubio's state department that didn't wanna see a repeat of 2003 with what happened after the in Iraq, that complete chaos.
所以特朗普相信,你只要做一次性的打击,然后继续威胁这个国家,这符合他的行事风格。
So Trump was convinced that, you know, you do this one and done thing, and then you just kind of continue to threaten the country in order to it it corresponds to his way of being.
这里没有道德可言。
There's no morality.
没有任何规范性意义。
There's no normative sense.
没有任何理想主义。
There's no idealism.
你知道,通常当总统在经历全球危机后转向拉丁美洲以重新调整或平衡时,他们会提出新的世界观,以扩大选举基础,深化联盟,试图建立一种霸权感,对吧?
You know, normally when presidents turn back to Latin America to kind of regroup or rebalance after global crises, they kind of come up with new kind of world views to widen their electoral base, to deepen their coalition, you know, they try to create a sense of hegemony, right?
所以,罗斯福曾利用拉丁美洲提出一种社会民主的大陆新deal。
So you had FDR using Latin America to put forth a kind of social democratic continental new deal.
然后里根在越南战争后,提出了一种强硬的反共自由主义,但这是以道德视角来理解的。
Then Reagan after Vietnam, a kind of muscular anti communist liberalism, but understood in moral terms.
因此,重新确立美国的目标,将美国自身定位为世界自由的捍卫者。
So the kind of reassertion of American purpose, American sets of itself as a defender of world freedom.
你知道吗?
You know?
这些都成为持久的主导意识形态。
And and these become kind of governing ideologies that are durable.
它们持续存在。
They last.
我的意思是,新政联盟一直持续了几十年,直到二十世纪七十年代。
I mean, the New Deal coalition lasted for decades up until the nineteen seventies.
里根主义至少持续到了巴拉克·奥巴马时期,甚至在世界观层面可能更久。
Reaganism lasted, you know, at least until Barack Obama, if not if not even even further in terms of the worldview.
我的意思是,特朗普甚至都不想拼凑出一个新的世界观。
I mean, Trump isn't even trying to cobble together a new worldview.
对吧?
Right?
特朗普并没有提出任何所谓为了自由的主张。
Trump isn't coming up with any kind of you know, it's not he's not doing it for freedom.
他不是为了个人权利而行动。
He's not doing it for individual rights.
他当然也不是为了社会民主而行动。
He's not he's certainly not doing it for social democracy.
你知道,他是在索要贡品。
You know, he's demanding tribute.
对吧?
Right?
只是试图把委内瑞拉变成附庸国。
And just trying to turn Venezuela into a vassal state.
但我认为这反映了他及其政治运动的道德空虚。
But I think that speaks to the moral emptiness of him and his and and and his political movement.
里根和罗斯福领导的是多数派运动。
And Reagan and FDR presided over majoritarian movements.
对吧?
Right?
他们在选举中以压倒性优势获胜。
They won overwhelmingly at the electoral.
你知道的?
You know?
特朗普实际上是在领导一个少数派运动,这个运动之所以掌权,是因为美国反多数派的政治结构以及特朗普对共和党的掌控。
Trump pretty much is running a minority movement that is only in power because of the anti majoritarian political structure of The United States and Trump's dominance of the Republican party.
因此,他似乎完全不感兴趣将特朗普主义转变为一个执政联盟。
So he doesn't seem interested at all in turning Trumpism into a governing coalition.
他只是想继续煽动文化战争,继续激发‘美国优先’派的部落民族主义怨恨,从而复兴门罗主义。
He just wants to continue to stoke the culture wars, continue to, you know, stoke the grievances of tribal nationalism of the American firsts, and hence the Monroe doctrine.
你知道的,把门罗主义重新带回来。
You know, bring it back to the Monroe Doctrine.
门罗主义和‘美国优先’民族主义之间,一直存在着强烈的关联。
The Monroe Doctrine and American First Nationalism, there was always a strong kind of correlation between the two.
‘美国优先’民族主义者,对吧?那些特朗普之前的,上世纪二十年代到二战前的那些人,他们喜欢门罗主义,因为它不是普世主义的。
American First Nationalists, right, the pre Trump ones, the ones from the nineteen twenties and leading up into world war two, they liked the Monroe Doctrine because it wasn't universalist.
它不是国际法。
It wasn't international law.
它是一种惯例,专门与美国在其势力范围内的权力相关。
It was customary specifically related to US power within its hemisphere.
因此,门罗主义很自然地成为特朗普作为当今美国优先民族主义代表所青睐的替代品,以取代自由国际主义。
And so the Monroe Doctrine, it makes sense that Trump as the standard bearer of today's iteration of America First Nationalism would latch on to the Monroe Doctrine as a kind of substitute for liberal internationalism.
是的,我认为这可能是所有元素中最引人入胜的一点。
Yeah, I think this is maybe the most fascinating element of all.
真的毫无掩饰。
The complete lack of pretense, really.
对吧?
Right?
当然,你提到过,国际政策在不同时期都曾有一些叙事框架。
And obviously, you mentioned at various times international policy has had some storyline.
我们都清楚那个故事:我们要把伊拉克变成一个民主国家,然后这种民主会蔓延到整个中东,接着会出现更多民主国家,国家也会变得富裕或稳定,等等。
We all know what the story, oh, we were going to turn Iraq into a democracy, and then that would spread throughout The Middle East, and then there would be other democracies, and then be rich or be stable, etcetera.
总有一个故事在背后。
There's some story.
我认为,特朗普主义——至少这种特定的转向——最引人注目的地方就在于它完全缺乏更宏大的叙事。
I think that is so striking about Trumpism, or at least this particular move, really just sort of the complete lack of a broader story.
你还提到,当然,我认为这在特朗普的外交政策中值得注意:这种‘一劳永逸’式的做法之所以有吸引力,是因为在伊拉克战争之后,尤其是阿富汗战争之后,国内出现了对地面部队、长期战争、无尽战争的强烈反弹。
You mentioned also, of course, which I think is notable about Trump foreign policy, this appeal of these sort of one and done things because, okay, there seems to be post Iraq, this sort of national backlash towards, or certainly post Afghanistan, this backlash towards boots on the ground, long wars, forever wars, etcetera.
但同时,似乎也有一种冲动,那就是:好吧,我们仍然想做些有力的事情。
But there also does seem to be this impulse of just, Yeah, but we still want to do something powerful.
我们仍然想展示我们的强硬。
We still want to show that we're tough.
因此,他们解决问题的方式就是这些一次性行动。
So then the way that they solve the problem is by these one offs.
我们要对伊朗进行一次轰炸行动。
We're going to do a one bombing run-in Iran.
我们要逮捕一位外国领导人。
We're going to arrest a foreign leader.
这种做法有先例吗?还是说,当你思考外交政策的这些脉络时,这确实属于完全未charted的领域?
Is there any precedent for that, or is this truly sort of feel uncharted territory when you think about these arcs of foreign policy?
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
嗯,在拉丁美洲有两个先例。
Well, in Latin America, there are two precedents.
一个是1989年乔治·H·W·布什时期的曼努埃尔·诺列加。
One is obviously Manuel Moraga in 1989 when George H.
W.
W.
布什曾派遣约3万名海军陆战队员,依据逮捕令去抓捕诺列加。
Bush sent about 30,000 marines in to capture Noriega on a on a warrant, basically, to arrest him.
这被视为一次警察行动,并且这就是其法律上的正当理由。
It was considered a police action, and and that's how it was legally justified.
诺列加曾是美国的盟友。
Noriega was an ally of The United States.
他在1980年代是美国中央情报局(CIA)的资产。
He was a CIA asset in the nineteen eighties.
他深度参与了伊朗门事件的复杂事务,但同时在各方之间周旋。
He was very much involved in the complexities of Iran Contra, but he played all sides against the other.
我认为他一直在向古巴出售情报信息。
I think he was selling information intelligence to Cuba.
他同时也与摩萨德合作。
He was also working with Mossad.
当冷战结束、柏林墙倒塌后,他的利用价值基本终结,美国决定除掉他。
And when the cold war ended and the Berlin Wall fell, his usefulness had largely come to an end and The United States decided that they were gonna take him out.
《纽约时报》刊登了西·赫希的报道,详细揭露了他深度参与毒品走私的行径,这已无法再被忽视。
There was a Sy Hirsch report in the New York Times that detailed his deep involvement in drug running, and it couldn't be ignored anymore.
于是,他们介入并逮捕了他。
And so, they went in and they arrested him.
所以,这是一个先例。
So, that's one precedent.
另一个较少被讨论的先例发生在海地。
A less discussed one is in Haiti.
2005年,让·佩特龙·阿里斯蒂德是海地总统。
In 2005, Jean Petron Aristide was president of Haiti.
当时发生了一场美国支持的政变,但真正 destabilize 这个国家的是那些由美国国际开发署和国家民主基金会资助的所谓民主促进组织,它们使局势恶化到伊拉·斯蒂尔无法执政,而乔治·W。
And there was a US backed coup, but it was one of these democracy promotion organizations that were funded by AID and the National Endowment for Democracy that destabilized the country to the point where Ira Steele couldn't govern and George W.
布什派海军陆战队进驻,几乎用枪指着他的头,将他飞往刚果,他至今仍流亡在那里。
Bush sent marines in and basically put a gun to his head and and and flew him to The Congo where he still lives now, where he's in exile.
所以,这种事情以前发生过。
So so it's happened before.
我认为前所未有的是,我们竟然准备接受委内瑞拉的石油贡赋,准备直接向委内瑞拉政府下达指令,让他们输送石油——我们嘴上谈的是国际法。
I think what is unprecedented is this idea that we are just going to accept oil tribute from Venezuela, that we're just gonna give these directives to the Venezuelan government, and they're gonna send I mean, we talk about international law.
所有这些行为都只是美国单方面对其权力的投射。
All of this stuff is just unilateral US projections of its power.
美国对委内瑞拉实施制裁。
I mean, The United States places sanctions on Venezuela.
这并不是国际法。
That's not international law.
我的意思是,新闻媒体都说委内瑞拉试图通过寻找规避方式来销售其石油,从而违反制裁。
I mean, news the papers talk about it as, you know, Venezuela is trying to violate sanctions by finding workarounds to sell its oil.
这有什么不对吗?
It's like, why not?
那是他们的石油。
It's their oil.
你看到了吧?
You see?
是的。
Yeah.
是美国单方面实施制裁,这根本不是像世界各国投票决定对委内瑞拉实施制裁那样。
It's The United States just putting the sanctions on just because it's it's not like it's not like the nations of the world voted on putting sanctions on Venezuela.
但无论如何,我认为前所未有的是他们正在达成的这种安排,而且他们似乎是一边走一边临时决定的。
But in any case, I think what is unprecedented is what they're working out, and they seem to be working it out on a as you go basis.
他们看起来并没有一个清晰的计划。
It doesn't seem like they have a clear plan.
你说得对。
You're right.
他们不希望重演2003年的伊拉克。
They don't want it to be 2003 Iraq.
他们不希望派地面部队。
They don't want boots on the ground.
他们了解特朗普的基层支持者。
They know the rank and file of Trump.
这些人对伤亡的容忍度极低,而‘美国优先’的民族主义也不愿参与国家重建。
It has a very low tolerance for for casualties and and fatalities, and America first nationalism doesn't wanna be involved in nation building.
但你所看到的,我认为是两条截然不同的路径。
But what you're seeing is I think two distinct trajectories.
一方面,他们设想了一种体系,即委内瑞拉通过石油向美国缴纳某种‘贡品’。
On the one hand, they're imagining some system in which is that Venezuela just continues to kind of pay a tribute to The United States through oil.
但当马可·卢比奥谈到这个问题时,他说我们已经为委内瑞拉的重建和民主过渡规划了不同的阶段。
But then when Marco Rubio talks about it, he says, well, we have these different phases of reconstruction and transition to democracy planned out in Venezuela.
所以,这暗示着美国要更直接地介入,推动该国朝某个政治方向发展,而不仅仅是任其自流,只要它继续运送船只——就像殖民时代那样。
So, that kind of suggests more of a direct role in pushing the country in a certain direction politically, not just leaving it as it is as long as it continues to send the ships, you know, just like during colonial times.
我的意思是,殖民地曾经满载黄金的船只驶向西班牙,而现在,满载石油的船只则驶向德克萨斯州的波特阿尔特。
I mean, the the colonies sent the ships filled with gold to Spain, and now they're sending the ships filled with oil to Port Arthur, Texas.
好的,格雷格。
Alright, Greg.
我们就到这里吧,非常感谢你做客《一切想法》节目。
We're gonna have to leave it there, but thank you so much for coming on All Thoughts.
太棒了。
That was fantastic.
非常感谢。
Really appreciate it.
谢谢。
Thanks.
非常感谢你邀请我
Thanks so much for having
乔,这简直太引人入胜了。
Joe, that was absolutely fascinating.
让我印象深刻的是这样一个观点:当多边主义在其他地方衰退时,我们转而走向自己的后院来彰显主导地位,这在某种程度上是一种替代或补偿,这确实说得通。
The point that stood out to me was this idea of going into your own backyard to assert your dominance as a sort of replacement or off offset to a decline of multilateralism elsewhere That in the kind of makes sense.
有趣的是,美国存在这样一种历史模式:当我们内部虚弱时,拉丁美洲就成了我们施加主导权的地方。
And it's very interesting that there's this pattern, this historical pattern in The United States that essentially Latin America is where we go to dominate when we're internally weak.
当然,我认为人们都会同意,美国目前在多个方面都感到特别虚弱。
And of course, I think people would agree that The US is feeling particularly weak on a number of angles.
显然,中国崛起等带来的生存威胁就是其中之一。
There's obviously the existential threat, about the rise of China, etcetera.
所以,也许这就是一种心态:好吧,至少在现阶段,我们不再是曾经那个全球性强国了,等等。
So maybe it's this kind of thing, okay, we are not going to be, at least for the moment, the global power that we once were, etcetera.
但在失去全球主导地位的同时,我们至少还能决定各个拉丁美洲国家的总统人选。
But in the absence of that, at least we can still establish that we get to decide who the president of various Latin American states.
没错。
Right.
拉丁美洲的主导力量。
Latin American dominant power.
顺便问一下,你看过马可·卢比奥的那个梗吗?他身上贴满了来自拉丁美洲的各种国旗。
By the way, have you seen the Marco Rubio meme where he's, like, covered in all these different flags from Latin America?
基本上我
And basically I
我没看过那个。
have not seen that.
负责一切?
Responsible for everything?
我知道。
I know.
我看过那些关于马可·卢比奥实际上不得不承担的各种工作的梗。
I have seen the memes about the various jobs that Marco Rubio is sort of de facto having to plan this.
卢比奥给我的感觉像是一个有趣的过渡性人物,因为我觉得他有点像一个复古的冷战战士,可能真的相信我们要在全球传播民主,并希望看到拉丁美洲由自由派民主党人和资本主义国家主导。
Rubio strikes me as like a sort of interesting bridge figure between the sort of because I think of him as sort of being like a sort of retro cold warrior type and someone who does probably have beliefs like, Oh, we're going to spread democracy throughout the world, and wants to see Latin America sort of be run by liberal Democrats, capitalist countries, and so forth.
但显然,他所在的政府并没有同样的动力去推动这一点。
But obviously, he's in an administration that does not have the same impulse for that.
因此,在某种程度上,这种做法感觉像是在折中。
And so to some extent, it feels like this operation, it's like they're going to split the difference.
所以,他得以参与推翻一位他认为具有敌意的拉丁美洲领导人。
So, he gets to be involved in taking out a Latin American leader, which he finds to be hostile.
但这一届政府似乎并不打算在后续采取实质性行动,比如真正推动委内瑞拉走上新的政治道路。
But the idea that it does not feel like this administration is gonna have much follow through in terms of, Okay, now we really want to set Venezuela on a new political course.
对。
Right.
我的意思是,我们拭目以待吧。
I mean, I guess we'll see.
我们走着瞧。
We'll see.
最终,他们还是优先考虑自己的利益。
Ultimately, they prioritize there.
但与此同时,我们就到这里吧?
But in the meantime, shall we leave it there?
我们就到这里吧。
Let's leave it there.
这是《奇思妙想播客》的又一期节目。
This has been another episode of the Odd Thoughts Podcast.
我是特蕾西·阿拉瓦。
I'm Tracy Allaway.
你可以关注我,账号是TracyAllaway。
You can follow me at TracyAllaway.
我是乔·威森塔尔。
And I'm Joe Wiesenthal.
你可以关注我,账号是the stalwart。
You can follow me at the stalwart.
请关注我们的嘉宾格雷格·格兰丁。
Follow our guest Greg Grandin.
他是格雷格·格兰丁。
He's GregGrandin.
关注我们的制作人:卡门·罗德里格斯(Kermann Arment)、达希尔·本内特(Dashbot)和凯尔·布鲁克斯(Kale Brooks)。
Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Kermann Arment, Dashiell Bennett at Dashbot, and Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks.
如需获取更多OddLots内容,请访问bloomberg.com/oddlots,订阅每日简报并收听我们所有节目,您还可以在我们的Discord频道(discord)中24/7全天候讨论这些话题。
For more OddLots content, go to bloomberg.com/oddlots with the daily newsletter and all of our episodes, and you can chat about all of these topics twenty four seven in our Discord, discord.
GgOddLots。
GgOddLots.
如果您喜欢OddLots,觉得我们关于委内瑞拉的对话和报道有所帮助,请在您最喜欢的播客平台上为我们留下好评。
And if you enjoy OddLots, if you found this conversation and our coverage on Venezuela to be useful, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform.
请记住,如果您是彭博社的订阅用户,您可以免费收听我们所有的节目,没有任何广告。
And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad free.
您只需在Apple Podcasts上找到彭博社频道,并按照那里的说明操作即可。
All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there.
感谢收听。
Thanks for listening.
我是卡罗尔·马瑟。
I'm Carol Masser.
我是蒂姆·斯泰内克,邀请您收听彭博商业周刊每日播客。
And I'm Tim Stenevek inviting you to join us for the Bloomberg Businessweek daily podcast.
现在,我们每天为您带来这本杂志的报道,帮助全球领袖保持领先。
Now every day, we are bringing you reporting from the magazine that helps global leaders stay ahead.
我们提供关于塑造当今复杂经济的人物、公司和趋势的洞察。
We've got insight on the people, the companies, and trends that are shaping today's complex economy.
没错,蒂姆。
That's right, Tim.
我们全方位覆盖全球商业、金融和科技新闻,实时追踪最新动态,并全面报道美国市场收盘情况。
We're all over global business, finance, tech news, all as it is happening in real time, and we've got complete coverage of The US market close.
可以说,只要影响金融市场、影响企业、影响当前的趋势和叙事,我们都会跟进。
Gotta say, basically, if it impacts financial markets, if it impacts companies, if it's impacting trends and narratives that are out there, we are on
没错。
it.
我们做这件事也很有趣。
We also have a lot of fun doing it.
《彭博商业周刊》还通过与我们的专家嘉宾对话,为您揭示新闻背后的分析。
Bloomberg Businessweek also brings you the analysis behind the headlines through conversations with our expert guests.
我们每天工作日都会实时进行直播,然后将最优质的分析内容放在我们的每日播客中。
And we are doing this all live each weekday, and then we bring you the best analysis in our daily podcast.
在YouTube、Apple、Spotify或您收听的任何平台搜索《彭博商业周刊》。
Search for Bloomberg Businessweek on YouTube, Apple, Spotify, or anywhere else you listen.
下班回家的路上收听一下,补上你白天错过的对话。
Check it out on your way home from work to catch up on the conversations that you miss during the business day.
到了周末,收听一下,全面回顾你这一周的商业动态。
And on the weekend, check it out for a complete wrap up of your business week.
这就是《彭博商业周刊》每日播客。
That's the Bloomberg Businessweek daily podcast.
我是卡罗尔·马瑟。
I'm Carol Masser.
我是蒂姆·斯坦尼韦克。
And I'm Tim Stanivek.
今天就订阅吧,无论你在哪个平台收听播客。
Subscribe today wherever you get your podcasts.
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