杰里米·格兰瑟姆：如何判断泡沫即将破裂

如果你看看MAG七巨头，回过头看历史，就能很坦然地说，每一个都在自己的领域里占据绝对主导。

If you look at the MAG seven, you look backwards in history, and you can say with a pretty clear conscience each one dominates their seven different niches.

它们在全球范围内几乎都是垄断地位。

They have near monopolies on a global basis.

就连特斯拉，在电动车领域也早早领先，长期保持最大最强的优势。

Even Tesla has a jump start, the biggest and the best for a long time in EVs.

亚马逊在零售、谷歌在搜索，诸如此类，都是这样慢慢掌控全局的。

And you have Amazon beginning to dominate retail, Google research, etcetera, etcetera.

七个实力雄厚的垄断企业，统治着整个世界。

Seven decent monopolies dominating the world.

司法部之类的机构，完全睡着了。

Justice department, etcetera, perfectly sound asleep.

没人有兴趣像西奥多·罗斯福那样出手干预。

No one is interested in pulling a Teddy Roosevelt.

他们不会跳出来把埃克森美孚拆成七家小公司。

They're not going to jump in and slash and burn and divide Exxon into seven different pieces.

他们任由这些公司扩张、调整、定价格，赚得盆满钵满。

They're they're letting these things grow and fix and set their pricing and make tons and tons of money.

再往未来看一眼。

And then you look forward.

从今天开始，情况还会像以前那样吗？

Starting from today, does it look anything like that?

难道不是七家大公司都盯上了同一个市场——人工智能吗？

Doesn't it look like seven companies deciding they're all in the same market AI?

没错。

Right.

谁投入最多、动作最快，谁就占主导地位，这不是很明显吗？

That moving the most powerfully with the greatest investment is dominant?

他们不都在大张旗鼓地炫耀吗？说我们一年砸两千亿美元，比你那一百二十七亿强多了？

Are they not seen here beating their chests and saying, my 200,000,000,000 in investment in a single year is bigger than your 127 yahoo?

他们很清楚，第一个抢占市场的公司能捞到多大好处。

They know how much gets paid off to the first mover who grabs the market.

他们都想当第一个。

They all want to be the first.

正如电影里说的，只能有一个胜出，可现在有七个在拼命争抢。

There can only be one, as they say in the movie, and there's seven of them fighting it out.

这可能会变成一场极其血腥残酷的较量。

It could be a very messy blood curdling game.

我建议他们干脆在白宫外面摆摊卖培根。

I suggested that they have it outside the White House and sell bacon.

这对比也太荒唐了。

What a comparison.

想象一下十年后回头看，你会说：根本看不出区别——是七个轻松垄断的公司，还是七家凶猛又富有的企业，现金流巨大，深谙主导市场的优势，偏偏在同一时间冲进同一个市场厮杀。

Just imagine 10 from now looking back and saying, you couldn't see the difference between seven easy monopolies and a dogfight of seven vicious, rich companies, huge cash flow, huge understanding of the virtues of being dominant, all deciding at the same time to fight out in one market.

你可能会说，没错，还有云计算那回事。

And you could say, yes, there was the cloud.

那又怎么说？

What about that?

而云市场当时是个温和有序的寡头垄断。

And the cloud was a nice, well behaved oligopoly.

三家巨头心照不宣地以体面的方式竞争。

Three of them gentilly deciding to compete in genteel ways.

如果你处在那种位置，这确实是该做的，但显然这次完全不是这么搞的。

Exactly the right thing to do if you find yourself in that position and clearly not the approach that is being adopted this time.

我们已经看到了巨额投入。

We have seen huge investment.

回头一看，他们靠的是点子，不靠资本。

You look back, they're idea heavy, capital light.

往前看，但愿他们还是靠点子，但这次真成了重资本运作。

You look forward, let's hope they're idea heavy, but they are capital heavy this time.

这简直是过去和未来之间几乎所有关键事项的分水岭，可居然没人这么看。

It's like a watershed in all almost everything that matters between the past and the future, and nobody seems to be talking about it in that way.

我真搞不懂。

And I don't get it.

那我可以就这一点问个相关的问题吗？

Well, can I just ask related to this point?

在这次对话中，互联网泡沫已经提过好几次了。

The .com bubble has come up a number of times in this conversation.

对于我们现在所处的这种情况，你有没有特别中意的历史类比？

Do you actually have a preferred historical analogy for the situation that we're facing now?

我们以前经历过不少由技术革命引发的投机狂潮，有些确实挺实在的，比如铁路泡沫和互联网泡沫，也有一些简直离谱，比如人人都要去深海打捞。

Because we've been through technological revolutions associated with speculative manias before, ranging from, I guess, what I would say are pretty real ones, like the railroad bubble and the internet, to kind of crazier ones, like we're all gonna go deep sea diving.

是的，完全对。

Yeah, totally.

然后靠这个发大财。

And get rich that way.

你可是研究金融泡沫历史的行家。

You are a connoisseur of historical financial market bubbles.

在这些历史案例里，哪一个跟我们现在的情况最像？

Which one is most similar to the current period that we're in?

人们总以为泡沫一定是个骗局。

Ah, people tend to think a bubble, oh, it has to be somehow a con job.

但事实恰恰相反。

And it's exactly the opposite.

最大的泡沫，往往是几十年来最宏大的构想。

The great bubbles are the biggest ideas for decades.

和人工智能规模相当的，可能只有铁路了。

So the only one as big as AI is possibly the railroads.

当然，人人都看得出铁路会彻底改变世界。

Of course, everybody could see that the railroads were going to change the world.

你那时候还坐着马车去火车站呢。

You arrived at the railway station in a horse and buggy, for heaven's sake.

时速七英里，一上火车直接飙到六十英里，一口气跑上好几千英里。

And you went seven miles an hour, and then you got on a train traveling at 60 miles an hour and went a couple of thousand miles.

这简直是翻天覆地的变革。

I mean, it was utterly revolutionary.

那后来怎么样了？

So what happened?

人人都看得出铁路会改变世界，而它确实做到了。

Everybody could see that the railroads were going to change the world, which they did.

大家都想分一杯羹，而且也真的做到了。

Everybody wanted to have a piece of it, and they could.

人人都往里投钱，结果大西洋两岸都爆发了史上最大的泡沫破裂，所有人都亏得血本无归。

Everybody put their money in it, and you had the biggest bust on both sides of the Atlantic that you could imagine, and everybody lost their money in railroads.

但泡沫破灭后，铁轨还在，火车头还在，需求也还在，最终它还是改变了世界。

And out of the ashes, the tracks were still there, the locomotives were still there, the demand was still there, and it changed the world.

再把时间快进到互联网时代。

And then you fast forward to the Internet.

这是一个强大的构想。

Powerful idea.

当然，伴随而来的也有很多荒唐的东西，但 underneath，核心是个非常强大的理念。

Clearly, by the way, accompanied by a lot of silly stuff as well, but under underneath it, a very powerful idea.

所以1999年的时候，亚马逊的股价涨了六七倍。

So you had Amazon go up six or seven times in '99.

市场崩盘后，它的股价暴跌了92%，简直是臭名昭著。

And when the market broke, it went down famously, infamously, 92%.

你去查一下。

Check it.

92%。

92%.

后来它像铁路一样从废墟中重生，几乎完全接管了零售市场。

And then it rose from the ashes just like the railroads and inherited the retail market, more or less.

要形成一个大泡沫，得有不错的经济环境。

To have a great bubble, you have to have decent economic times.

经济越好的时候，泡沫就越旺。

The better off, the better the bubble.

还得有宽松的货币环境，越宽松，泡沫就越大。

You have to have easy money, the better and easier, etcetera, the better the bubble.

你还得有个绝妙的点子。

And you have to have a fabulous idea.

而且这个点子得明显重要到人人都看得出来。

And you have to have it so obviously be important that everybody can see it.

这种事现在可太稀有了，对吧？

Now they're very, very rare events, aren't they?

这一次的规模跟铁路时代不相上下。

This one is as big as anything but the railroads.

我甚至不敢说它比铁路时代小。

I am not even prepared to say it isn't bigger than the railroads.

它可能更大，但这两者绝对是顶尖的。

It may be, But they're the two super champs.

除了它们，我觉得互联网也就算个次要角色。

Besides them, I think the Internet is, yeah, a bit of a piker.

但它们才是真正的巨无霸。

But they're the two colossal ones.

如果真有什么宏大的构想正在改变世界，而且已经改变了世界，那一定是人工智能。

If ever there was a massive idea that will change, is already changing the world, it's AI.

还有人不知道吗？

Does anyone not know that?

我觉得人人都知道。

I think everybody knows it.

有谁愿意往里投钱吗？

Does anyone want to put their money in it?

SpaceX这些公司就给了我们一个很清晰的信号。

I think SpaceX, etcetera, gives us a pretty good idea.

如果你看他们的招股说明书，90%的价值都建立在人工智能上，尽管眼下他们的AI技术正被另外两三个对手打得落花流水，但事实从来挡不住一个好故事。

90% of the value, if you read the prospectus, is based on AI, even though their particular AI seems to be having its bottom kicked by two or three others as we sit, but wouldn't let facts get in the way of a really good story.

这简直就是教科书级的案例。

And this is an absolute classic.

它一条接一条地满足了所有条件，而历史上很少有哪件事能同时做到这些。

It checks everything off one after another, which haven't been checked off many times in history.

这就是全部了。

So this is it.

如果你觉得这还不是泡沫，那你肯定会大失所望。

If you think this is not a bubble, you are going to be in for a bitter disappointment.

你在书里提到，你从小就很争强好胜，喜欢玩各种各样的游戏。

In your book, you talk about how competitive you are and growing up and wanting to play all different types of games.

你是怎么把这种好胜心转化为职业上的动力，让它推动你前进，而不是让你过度追求表现，或者总是拿今年的成绩跟别人比较呢？

How do you channel competitiveness in a productive manner career wise so that it doesn't hinder you or it doesn't make you chase performance or does it make you worry about one year's performance versus another competitor?

你怎么让这种好胜心变成一种积极的力量？

How do you make the competitiveness instinct be a good thing?

我觉得你可以把这种心态用在几个对你真正重要的事情上，首先是打一场像样的网球双打。

I think try and bring it to bear on a few areas that that matter to you, starting with obviously the most important, playing a decent game of doubles in tennis.

每一局都要拼尽全力，就像生死攸关一样。

And every point has to be played as if your life depends on it.

选搭档和对手时，也挑那些同样认真对待的人，这样你会玩得特别开心。

And you pick partners and opposition who do the same, and you have a wonderfully good time.

然后我就四处找别的东西，对我来说，那就是想法。

And then you look around for other things, and for me, it was ideas.

如果我只盯着利润最大化，我本可以赚更多钱。

And I could have made a lot more money if I'd focused on profit maximizing.

但对我来说，想法才是核心，而竞争的本质就在于比对手想得更远。

But for me, the the idea was the dominant principle, and the idea of being competitive was everything hinges on trying to outthink the enemy.

对我而言，最简单的方法总是拉得更长、铺得更宽、考虑得更全面，站得比别人更远一些。

The easiest way for me, it always seemed, was to be longer and wider and more comprehensive and stand further back than the other guy.

当你这么做的时候，很快就会发现，根本没人这么做。

And what you quickly realize when you do that is that no one else is even trying.

这根本不是一场公平的竞争。

So this is not a fair fight.

所有人都盯着短期利益，如果你的目标是利润最大化，这倒也没什么错。

Everybody is focused on the near term, and if you want to profit maximize, that's not a bad idea.

但很少有人既身处市场之中，又去思考几年后、甚至十年二十年后的问题。

And very few people are attempting to be in the market and simultaneously asking questions that are several years out and even to some extent a decade or two out.

所以对我来说，保持竞争力、心态乐观，但经常犯错，一直都很自然。

So it's been very easy for me to be both competitive and cheerful and often wrong.

既然我们现在聊到职业发展，我想问一下，当你是个永久看空者，或者更准确地说，当别人认为你是永久看空者时，有没有必要和市场上其他看空者区分开来？

Since we're talking about career development now, I suppose, is it important when you're a Permabear, or more accurately, when you're perceived to be a Permabear, to distinguish yourself in some way from other bears who are out there?

因为眼下，有不少知名评论员都说人工智能是个泡沫。

Because, again, at this particular moment in time, there are a number of high profile commentators who would say that AI is a bubble.

那你到底怎么才能从这群喊‘泡沫’的人里脱颖而出呢？

So how do you actually stand out from, I guess, the bubble calling crowd?

是的。

Yeah.

我也不知道。

I've no idea.

我这辈子只做过两次毫无保留的看涨判断。

I have only made two unmitigated bullish calls.

市场真的很难分清，比如说，

The market has a really hard time telling the difference between, hey.

这价格太高了。

This is overpriced.

在未来二十年里，它的收益会比原价一半时还要少。

This is going to make you less money over the next twenty years than it would do if it was half priced.

这纯粹是数学上的事实。

They're just kind of mathematical realities.

因为你这么说，他们就觉得：哦，你说市场要崩盘了。

And because you say that, they oh, you you said the market was gonna collapse.

你一直都很看空。

You have been bearish forever.

当我真想看空、建议你退出市场时，我会明确说出来。

Now when I wanna be really bearish and recommend you get out of the market, I say so.

但我只这么做过两次。

And I've only done that twice.

2008年7月15日，我写了一封季报，明确说‘赶紧撤吧’，用的是法语里类似的说法，还引用了那首童谣：别逞强，快跑，留得青山在，不怕没柴烧。

On 07/15/2008, I wrote a quarterly letter which basically which actually said abandon ship, stove keeper, the French equivalent, and actually quoted the nursery rhyme, don't be brave, run away, live to fight another day.

别冒任何不必要的风险。

Do not take any risk you don't have to take.

我们每个人在冒险这件事上都有极限，但凡是能不碰的，就别碰。

We all have restrictions on how much we can get out of the risk taking business, but do not take anything you don't have to.

明白吗？

Okay?

这话说得已经很清楚了。

That was pretty clear.

我们之前一直看好的是新兴市场，但我得说，我们改变主意了。

And the last thing that we had been bullish about was emerging markets, and I said, I've changed changed our mind.

我们认为，这波行情已经到头了。

We think this is the end of the line.

能卖的新兴市场资产都卖了吧——就在我们发布这封信前不久，我们做了有史以来最大一笔交易，清空了所有剩余的新兴市场持仓。

Sell any emerging that you can, and we did the biggest trade that we had ever done getting rid of the last of our emerging, I must say, shortly before we published the letter.

你当时是哪一年后悔的？

What year were you sorry.

那是哪一年？

Which year was that?

2008年。

2008.

没错。

Right.

新兴市场啊，

Emerging oh,

明白了。

okay.

懂了。

Got it.

是的。

Yes.

而且我要说，就在那之后的四个月里，新兴市场直接跌了一半。

And may I say that following that in four months, the emerging market halved.

我认为这是任何主要指数历史上最大、最陡峭的下跌。

I think it was the biggest, sharpest decline in the history of any major index.

从7月15日到11月15日，甚至更早一点，整个指数就跌了一半。

From July 15 to November 15, and actually slightly before that, the whole index halved.

另一个看跌的节点发生在2021年底，当时季度信件标题是‘让狂野的喧闹开始吧’。

And the other bearish one was at the end of twenty twenty one where the quarterly letter was called let the wild rumpus begin.

对吧？

Right?

意思就是赶紧撤出市场。

That meant now get your tail out.

远离股市。

Avoid the market.

我很高兴地说，标普指数像火箭一样暴跌了25%，成长股跌了35%，MAG七巨头跌了40%，债券市场也经历了有史以来最糟糕的一年。

I'm happy to say S and P went down like a rocket ship, minus 25, growth stocks down 35, MAG seven down 40, and the bond market had the worst year in the history of the bond market.

而且，就像我常说的，我原本不错的熊市被ChatGPT给打断了。

And then as I also like to say, my nice bear market was rudely interrupted by cat GPT.

原本经济正按部就班地步入温和衰退，因为市场情绪在下滑，但AI领域大规模且持续增长的资本支出彻底打乱了这一节奏，硬是把整个经济的市场情绪拖着往前走。

And the economy that was doing its usual thing of gracefully moving into a mild recession because animal spirits were going down was also changed by massive and increasing CapEx spending on AI, which dragged kicking and screaming the animal spirits of the rest of the economy.

不过，这些情绪可没那么容易就被改变。

They didn't change easily, by the way.

是的。

Yeah.

标普指数和其他部分又继续下跌了十个月。

The S and P, the rest of it went down for another ten months.

但AI相关的市场和资本支出势头实在太猛，直接改变了整个游戏规则。

But they kept going so powerfully in the market and so powerfully in the CapEx business that they changed the game.

历史上这种情况只发生过一次，我跟预测新冠一样，完全没法预判这种事。

That's only happened once in history, and I don't know how to predict things like that anymore than COVID.

新事物总是让人头疼。

And new things are a pain.

幸运的是，这种事不多，但它们确实是我职业生涯中最值得关注的两个。

There aren't happily many of them, but they're the two most interesting ones in my career.

新冠疫情是前所未有的。

COVID was novel.

作为历史学家，你该怎么应对这种前所未有的情况？

How do you treat novelty if you're a historian?

你没法应对。

You don't.

你得靠其他原则来分析。

You have to work it out on other principles.

这次AI的出现打乱了原本非常普通、在我看来也完全可以预测的熊市——当时市场领头羊在下跌，而蓝筹股却还在上涨，这太反常了。

And this AI interruption of what was a perfect perfectly ordinary, and I thought predictable bear market because it flagged my great discrepancy between the market leaders going down as the blue chips continued up.

你该怎么解释这种现象？

How do you do that?

我不知道。

I don't know.

对。

Yeah.

这真的非常引人注目。

This is really striking.

我们曾经请托尔斯滕·斯洛克在一次活动中谈过，说AI相关的交易对传统意义上的宏观因素几乎免疫。

We we had Torsten Slock at one of our events talking about this sort of imperviousness of the AI trade to what traditionally we'd call macro.

你描述的这种情况是，本来预期会是一次轻微的经济衰退，结果呢？

So what you describe, you're like, okay, here comes the expected, as you said, would have been a shallow recession.

但现在我们看到，企业的投资和资本支出完全不受影响，哪怕美联储没按预期降息，他们也毫不在意。

And now we see this investment, this capital expenditure, does not seem like the companies care at all about the fact that the Fed hasn't cut rates as expected, etcetera.

这些原本被视为经典宏观指标的因素，

These classically macro indicators

我们

that we

本该预示经济衰退、商业周期之类的，现在全都被打乱了。

did a recession, business cycle, etcetera, had just seemed to be blown out of the water.

对。

Yeah.

被人工智能交易彻底颠覆了。

Blown out of the water by the AI trade.

确实如此。

Yeah.

过去五十年来，人们对利率和利率预测的狂热兴趣，对我来说完全提不起兴趣。

And and I must say the overwhelming interest in interest rate and interest rate predictions has left me totally cold for the last fifty years.

这些事我交给别人去操心。

I I leave that to other people.

我觉得总体上被严重夸大了。

I think it's in general, wildly exaggerated.

我生活在一个世界里，五十多年来，美国、日本和其他所有经济体的债务与GDP比率不断上升，每次都预示着即将崩溃。

I've lived in a world where for fifty years the increasing debt to GDP ratio of The US economy, the Japanese economy, and every other economy has been predicting imminent collapse.

比率越来越高，预测也从一次崩溃变成两次崩溃，可它还是继续攀升。

And the ratio has gotten higher and higher, and then it's predicted double collapse, and it still keeps rising.

利率的唯一作用，就是让借钱更容易，而借钱容易了，经济才能运转起来。

The only function of interest rates is that it makes debt easier to acquire, and the function of easy acquired debt is that it helps the economy.

有个小问题。

One little problem.

如果你回看艾伦·格林斯潘上任之前，会发现债务占GDP的比例只是缓慢上升，因为金融行业变得越来越复杂。

If you go back to Alan Greenspan, you find that before he gets there, there is a very, very slow increase in debt to GDP ratio just because the financial business is becoming more complicated.

但他离任之后，这个比例就像陡坡一样飙升，从GDP的一小部分直接暴涨。

And then after him, it rises at 45 degrees, and it goes from a small fraction of GDP.

如果把所有债务都算上，那数字直接翻了三到四倍。

If you throw in all debt, it it triples and quadruples.

而这一切，是在三十年内发生的。

And it does it over thirty years.

世界上最大的经济体，用了三十年时间做了一次宏观实验：债务翻了四倍，经济增长率却下滑了。

You have biggest economy in the world, thirty years to test what happened, quadrupling of the debt to GDP, and the growth rate goes down.

既然有这么明显的长期数据摆在眼前，你怎么还能说债务是推动增长的关键因素呢？

So how can debt be a real mover of growth rate when you've had that wonderful macro test seen from looking back over forty years.

债务大幅增加，GDP增长率却在下降。

Huge increase in debt, decrease in GDP growth rate.

太奇怪了。

Very strange.

所以这些事我完全不碰。

So I leave all that stuff way alone.

如果允许我退一步说，我之前的意思是，别轻易喊着要退出市场。

If you will let me back up, I was saying too clear get out of the market calls.

市场确实被高估了。

Plenty of the market's overpriced.

从2000年起，市场就一直被高估。

The market has been overpriced since 2000.

我承认这一点。

I admit it.

市场一直被高估，我们一直这么说，因为回看整个二十世纪，市场整体都处于高估状态。

It's been overpriced, and we have said so the whole time because looking back at the twentieth century, the 20 century has been overpriced.

以前股价通常是盈利的15倍。

They used to sell at 15 times earnings.

我们现在的市盈率已经到了23倍。

We have been selling at 23 times earnings.

这可不是个小幅度的上涨。

That is not a small fraction of an increase.

二十一世纪完全是另一个世界了。

It has been a different world, the twenty first century.

但按历史标准来看，市场一直被高估。

But based on history, it's been overpriced.

而且，现在依然被高估。

And, of course, it still is.

但我这一生只做过两次看涨预测。

But I have made two bull calls in my life.

在头十年里，我们唯一被引用过的一次，是在一份叫《华尔街简报》的刊物上，那早就停刊了。

The only time for the first ten years we got quoted was in some something called the Wall Street letter long deceased.

我记得它好像是附在《华尔街日报》上的。

I think it was attached to The Wall Street Journal.

那是个每周更新的行业八卦小报。

And it was a weekly kind of gossip thing about the industry.

其实我的第一次公开言论，就藏在那封信的末尾。

And there, hidden in the tail end actually of that letter is my first opportunity to quote.

那是1982年7月，标普500的市盈率只有7倍。

And it's July eighty two, and the PE of the S and P is seven times.

我当时说，我觉得股市和债市即将迎来前所未有的上涨行情。

And I say, I think we're close to an unprecedented rally in both the stock and the bond market.

我一直很乐意把这份简报的复印件送给别人。

And I've always been thrilled to give people copies of this newsletters.

我敢肯定。

I'm sure.

后来市场突然飙升，我们不得不长时间保持谨慎。

And then the market shoots up and we become more careful for a long, long time.

直到1999年，市场才终于回落。

And then finally the market comes down in 'nine.

奇迹般地，这二十年一遇的机会让我们发了一封只有一页的信。

And by a miracle that only occurs once every two lifetimes, we published a letter, one pager.

在我三十年的写信生涯里，这种信总共就写过两封。

Only two of those were done in my career of thirty years letter writing.

这封信叫《在恐惧中继续投资》，我觉得是我写得最好的一篇，主要因为它简短有力。

It's called reinvesting when terrified, and I think is the best thing I wrote mainly because it was short.

信里只说了一点：你根本不可能精准抄到市场的底部。

And it just said, you won't call the bottom of the market.

别费这劲了。

Don't bother with that.

根本别想去猜。

Don't even try it.

你只管看清楚，现在的市场比过去二十二年里任何时候都便宜。

Just concentrate on the fact that the market is cheaper than it's been for twenty two years.

就算按我们七年期的预测，标普的年化回报也能达到12%，新兴市场和海外股票的回报还会更高，赶紧制定个计划吧。

Even on our seven year forecast, you're dealing with 12% a year compounded returns in the S and P equivalent to a higher numbers in emerging and foreign equity, get together a plan.

拿去给你的委员会讨论吧。

Take it to your committee.

有计划总比没计划强。

Any plan is better than no plan.

你得开始把资金重新投入市场。而好消息是，就我看来，只有你亲笔写下的才算数。

You have got to start recycling your money back into the And the good news is, as far as I'm concerned, it only counts if you wrote it.

对。

Yeah.

光说说太表面了。

Saying it is too peripheral.

那话一说就飘散了，没人记得。

It gets washed away in into the ether.

但我写下来了，还发给了《华尔街日报》，他们却没回音。

But I wrote it, and we sent it to The Wall Street Journal who didn't get back.

一天天过去，四天后，我和我的宣传顾问决定：管他呢。

And day by day, four days passed until my adviser on propaganda and I decided to hell with this.

咱们自己发出去吧。

Let's post it ourselves.

正因耽搁了这么久，我们正好在市场触底那天发布了。

And because of that delay, we posted it the day the market hit its low.

标普500指数跌到666点，还不到今天十分之一的水平。

666 on the S and P 500, less than one tenth of where it is today.

天哪。

My god.

这可是一轮大牛市。

This has been a bull market.

谢谢你提醒我们这两个播客主，只有写下来才算数。

Well, thank you for reminding two podcasters that it only counts if you write

不，这样挺好。

No, it's good.

不过说公平点，我们确实也写过一些内容，这点没错。

But to be fair, we do write some stuff, so there is that.

我能接着说吗？

Can I just go

我们继续聊吧。

back to talking?

我理解你的感受。

I sympathize with you.

我想再回到你之前说的，投资者现在是不是比过去一个世纪的大部分时间都更接受较高的市盈率了？

Can I just go back to you were talking about how investors seem to have, to some extent, become more comfortable with higher price to earnings ratios now versus, say, for much of the last century?

说到价值投资，我们都清楚，最近价值股的表现一直落后于动量股。

When it comes to value investing, we all know that value has been losing recently to momentum.

你有没有觉得，某种根本性的变化发生了？比如投资者现在更关注股价本身了？

Does it feel at all to you that something has structurally broken in the sense that investors are much more focused on price nowadays?

他们更看重短期收益，而不是长期回报。

They're much more focused on short term gains rather than longer returns.

同时，得益于Robinhood这类新平台，大量散户资金涌入了市场。

And at the same time, you've had a lot of retail money flow into the market courtesy of new platforms, Robinhood.

每当我想到Robinhood，就想到不停地点按钮。

And whenever I think about Robinhood, think about clicking buttons.

你还记得吗？以前你下单交易时，他们还会放个庆祝动画。

Remember they used to have the animation when you would, like, celebrate if you placed a trade?

这么多新资金涌入市场，他们的思维方式可能跟上世纪大部分投资者截然不同。

Like, that's a lot of new money coming into the market that potentially thinks differently to the way investors for much of the nineteen hundreds actually thought.

我觉得每个泡沫期都会变成这样。

I think in every bubble it gets very much like this.

你说得对，他们更关注价格，但不是在找便宜货，而是纯粹追着趋势跑。

And you said much more focused on price, not in the sense that they're looking for bargains, much more focused on momentum.

没错。

Right.

我就是这个意思。

That's what I mean.

对。

Yes.

价格飞涨，他们就喜欢这样，根本不在乎价值。

The price rises rapidly and they like it and the value is irrelevant.

你知道吗？南海泡沫是这样，郁金香狂热是这样，铁路热潮是这样，尼弗五十股和科技泡沫也都是这样。

You know, this is what happened in the South Sea bubble and this is what happened in tulips and it's what happened in the railroads and it's what happens in in the Nifty Fifty and the tech bubble.

每次都是这样重复的。

It's what always happens.

这其实一点都不奇怪。

This is not remarkable, by the way.

跟日本比起来，这根本算不上特别高估。

This isn't even spectacularly overpriced compared to Japan.

日本才是所有泡沫的祖宗。

Japan is the mother and father of all bubbles.

1989年的时候，它的市盈率高达65倍。

In 1989, it sold for 65 times earnings.

如果这还不能让价值投资者半夜惊醒、尖叫起来，那真没什么能了——我们科技泡沫最高也就到35倍市盈率，之前从来没超过21倍。

And if that doesn't make a value manager wake up in the middle of the night screaming once in a while, nothing will because we went up finally to 35 times earnings in the tech bubble, never having been over 21.

这可真是个惊人的跃升。

And that's a pretty spectacular jump.

但日本以前从未超过25倍市盈率，最后却涨到了65倍。

But Japan had never sold over 25 times earnings and went up to 65.

我很高兴地说，我们靠着运气挺过来了，幸运的是，国际投资刚兴起，我们正在帮客户配置他们人生中第一个国际投资组合，包括哈佛和耶鲁。

And I'm happy to say we survived that quite well through good luck, and the good luck was that international investing had only just come in, and we were selling people their first international portfolios that they had ever had, including Harvard and Yale.

顺便说一句，美国在这方面进展得真是慢得惊人。

And that is quite remarkable, by the way, how slow The US was.

苏格兰那些地方早就做国际投资很久了，但在美国，这根本不流行。

Scotland and so on had been doing this foreign investing for a long, long time, but not it was not fashionable in The US.

正因如此，没人拿国际投资和国际指数做比较。

Because of that, no one was comparing international with an international index.

他们刚接触国际投资，也就两三年，甚至只有两三个月。

It was only two or three years or two or three months that they had had an international portfolio.

他们拿它和标普指数比，因为所有竞争对手都还困在标普里。

They were comparing it with the S and P because all their competitors were still in the S and P.

当时的新颖之处在于拿国际股市和标普500做对冲。

And and the novelty there was betting international against the S and P.

结果国际股市赢了。

It was winning.

国际股市领先太多，就算日本拖了后腿，我们每年跑输市场10个百分点，连续三年都没事。

The international was so far ahead that we could underperform because of Japan, and we underperformed by 10 points a year for three years.

我们一点客户都没丢，市场份额也稳稳的。

And we lost no business at all, And we had a decent market share.

后来，日本市场终于崩了。

And then, of course, Japan broke.

日本这个案例给我们的教训再清楚不过了。

The lesson from Japan is pretty clear.

这是重要股市历史上最大的泡沫，仅次于日本当时那场地产泡沫，时间上几乎同步。

The biggest bubble in the history of the stock market of an important stock market, second only to the land bubble in Japan of coincident more or less coincident timing?

从25倍市盈率一路涨到30、40、50、60，最后冲到65倍，你为此付出了什么代价？

And what was the price you paid for having it go from 25 to 30 to 40 to 50 to 60 to 65?

所罗门兄弟团队当时到处说，日本的债券利率这么低，理应只有现在的百分之一。

And the Solomon Brothers team went around at 60 to 65 explaining that the bond rate in Japan was so low it should be a 100 times less.

我跟你说真的。

I am not kidding you.

我跟你说真的。

I am not kidding you.

你为此付出了什么代价？

What is the price you paid?

过去整整二十年，不是十年。

The last twenty years, really, not ten years.

要等三十五年，股价才能重新回到高点，而且我觉得这还没算上他们那点轻微的通胀。

Thirty five years have to go by before you get back to a high, and I don't think even that is adjusted for the modest inflation that they had.

你想看更大、更夸张的泡沫吗？

I mean, you wanna have a bigger bubble and a better bubble?

那你尽管试试。

Go ahead.

请注意，这种长期且更严重的下跌趋势，其相关性已经非常明确了。

Just be advised that the correlation with a longer and worse decline is pretty well won.

很多每日短新闻播客只聚焦于单一事件。

A lot of short daily news podcasts focus on just one story.

但眼下，你可能需要更全面的信息。

But right now, you probably need more.

首先，来自NPR，我们每天用不到十五分钟为你呈现全球三大头条新闻，因为任何单一事件都无法完整反映这个复杂世界每天发生的种种变化。

On up first from NPR, we bring you three of the world's top headlines every day in under fifteen minutes because no one story can capture all that's happening in this big crazy world of ours on any given morning.

立即收听NPR的《Up First》播客。

Listen now to the Up First podcast from NPR.

其实，光是国际事务我们就还能聊上一小时，但我还有一个最后的问题。

You know, I we could talk for another hour just on international all these things, but I have one last question.

大家都知道你除了投资之外，还有很多其他兴趣，尤其是环保和气候变化方面。我记得你去年还写过一封信，谈到了塑料以及其他对环境的威胁。

You're known for having a lot of personal sort of like other interests besides investing, particularly related to the environment, climate change you talk about, you wrote a letter, I believe last year about plastics and other forms of like dangers to the environment.

你有没有一丝乐观，觉得人工智能尤其能在应对你所关心的生态问题上，真正帮上人类的忙？

Do you have any optimism at all that AI in particular will be of a service to humanity in tackling some of these concerns that you have about sort of ecology and so forth?

天啊，我要是知道就好了。

God, I wish I knew.

AI最惊人的一点，就是人们的意见分歧太大了。

The spectacular thing about AI is the degree of difference of opinion.

通常呢，普通员工有一种看法，而那些最懂行的专家却有完全不同的看法。

You know, often you find that the rank and file have one view and the hotshots who know the most have a different view.

但这次情况不一样。

But this is not like that.

连诺贝尔奖得主都在激烈地争论。

This is you have Nobel Prize winners who disagree violently.

还有那些研究了三十年的真正专家，也吵得不可开交。

You have real experts who've studied it for thirty years who disagree violently.

是的。

Yeah.

就连那些经验丰富的基层人员，意见也截然不同。

You have the rank and file with as much experience as they could have who disagree violently.

关于人工智能的未来，根本就没有任何共识。

There is simply no agreement on the future of AI.

它要么让我们全都变得极其富有，整天躺在沙滩上，由机器人伺候；要么再往前一步，机器人无意中或故意把我们给淘汰了。

It will either make us all incredibly rich, We'll sit on the beach and be served by robots, or the robots will go one step further and get rid of us inadvertently or deliberately.

这并不可怕。

This is not bad.

这是人类有史以来遇到的最复杂的难题，你根本没法预测接下来会发生什么。

This is the ultimate complexity that one has ever heard, and you cannot possibly know what is going to happen.

你只能为各种可能的结果做好准备。

You can only plan for a wide range of outcomes.

但有一点是确定的，那就是它消耗的电力极其庞大。

But we know for a fact that it chews up enormous amounts of electricity.

我们很清楚，这会带来大量的二氧化碳排放，给环境带来巨大压力。

We know for a fact that that is associated with an awful lot of carbon dioxide production and real pressure on the environment.

所以我们开始意识到，这事儿不会轻松。

So we start knowing that it will be tough.

顺便说一句，每二十分钟就能生产出一台机器人。

And by the way, you make robots every twenty minutes.

这些类人机器人得出去喝杯咖啡，然后自己插上电充电。

These humanoid robots have to go off, take a coffee break, and plug themselves in.

是的。

Yeah.

它们消耗能源的速度快得超乎想象。

They they will run through energy like we have no idea.

我们现在连笔记本电脑上运行的AI都快供不起电了。

We can hardly support the energy demands of current AI confined to your laptops.

要是让这些机器到处跑，能耗会远远超过现在，根本没法比。

The energy demand of having machines running around will dwarf that beyond recognition.

我们需要的电力将是目前全球总产量的数倍。

We will have to have multiples of the global energy production that we have now.

我们简直是在透支未来。

We are simply living beyond our means.

真正研究了三十年的专家说，我们要维持当前的收入水平并做到可持续，需要1.7个地球。

The real experts who studied for thirty years say we need 1.7 planets to maintain the current level of income in a sustainable way.

如果我们想过美国人的生活，那就得要五个地球。

And if we want to live like Americans, we need five planets.

在最理想的情况下，人工智能或许能帮我们解决这个问题。

And AI, in the best of all possible worlds, might help address this.

但很难想象人工智能会变得有自我意识，而且在所有方面都比我们更出色。

But it's hard to imagine AI becoming self aware and being better at everything than we are.

就像杰弗里·辛顿说的，我们很难找到一个例子，说明一个更聪明的文明或物种会被一个相对愚笨的物种所支配。

It's hard to think of an example, as Geoffrey Hinton would say, where a smarter civilization, a smarter species has been dominated by a comparatively stupid species.

我们潜意识里还是依赖它们的善意。

We somehow implicitly rely on their benevolence.

我们并没有花多少时间和金钱去设计一个有善意的人工智能。

We are not spending that much time and money trying to design a benevolent AI.

我们花的钱，都是用来打造更强大、更具竞争力、谁强谁上的人工智能。

We are spending money trying to design a more powerful, competitive, devil take the hindmost type of AI.

这已经是我们的固有模式了。

It's inherited our our style.

你知道的，人类一直信奉适者生存。

You know, humans have been the survival of the fittest.

能抓到多少就抓多少，趁还能抓的时候。

Grab what you can, why you can.

别太操心三四年之后的事。

Don't worry too much about three or four years from now.

说来也巧，我在美国企业界和资本主义体系里也看到完全一样的情况。

I find that exactly the same in corporate America and capitalism, by the way.

我们根本不像真正在乎子孙后代。

We don't act as if we value our grandchildren.

周末陪他们踢踢球，就像我说的，再帮着付点学费。

We play soccer with them at the weekend, as I like to say, and we help pay the school fees.

可转头又去为化工厂或化石燃料公司卖命，仿佛真想把他们全害死似的。

But then we go back to work for a chemical company or fossil fuel company and act as if we mean to kill them all.

这行为挺奇怪的，但其实和地球上其他所有物种都一样。

It's a strange nature except it's the same as every other species on the planet.

能抓多少就抓多少，活在当下，而我们如今也在做同样的事。

Grab what you can, live for today, and here we are doing the same.

我们都清楚，这比我们历史上遇到的任何威胁都要严重得多。

It's something we all recognize is a bigger danger than anything we've ever met before.

我们要和另一种智能共存，它迟早会远远超越我们。

Living with another intelligence that is going to be inevitably much more than we are.

可我们却还在担心那些琐碎的事，而人类的生存已经岌岌可危——气候不是几十年后才崩溃，是现在就在恶化。

And we are left worrying about PEs when when the survival of our species is at stake, when our strangely, climate is going to hell, not as we used to think in twenty, thirty, forty years, but now.

生育率也不是五十年或一百年后才崩盘，是现在就已经在崩盘。

Our baby production is going to hell, not as we used to think in fifty years or a hundred years, but now.

中国现在的生育率只有1，每三十年新生儿数量减半，九十年后只剩八分之一；韩国更糟，每三十年减少三分之二，六十年后只剩九分之一，二十七分之一……

China is producing fertility rate of one, a baby production that every thirty years halves, that in ninety years is an eighth, and Korea is a third of its baby production each thirty years, a ninth in sixty years, a twenty seventh, I.

嗯。

E.

如果情况不改变，它们在一代人之内就会彻底消失。

They're out of business in a single lifetime unless it changes.

情况确实在变，但一直在朝着更糟的方向稳步发展。

And it has been changing, but it's been changing steadily for the worst.

全球65%的国家生育率都低于替代水平，像中国这样的国家更是跌到了接近1的低位。

65% of all countries are below replacement, and quite a few, like China, are way, way down towards one.

可没人放在心上。

And nobody cares.

我们天生就不擅长担忧那些缓慢积累的长期问题，而这些危机现在正同时爆发，再加上我们对AI风险的无知或漠视，情况变得更糟了。

We are not programmed to worry about long term slow burning problems, and they're all coming to bear together, and they're compounded by our ignorance or lack of concern about the risks of AI.

这本该是个令人无比振奋的时代。

This was going to be a very exciting time.

振奋又可怕。

Excitingterrifying.

如果我们真需要五个星球，那你这番话简直是为SpaceX做的最强有力的辩护。

Also, if we need five planets, I think you just made the bull case for SpaceX.

我正想说同样的笑话呢。

I was just going to make the same joke.

天哪。

Oh my god.

没错。

Yeah.

我们本来是。

We were

我不该让你先说的。

I shouldn't have let you.

我不该让你抢了先。

I shouldn't have let you go first.

还有另一种解决办法，那就是让人口达到十亿，而不是八亿、十亿或十二亿。

There's another way to resolve that, though, and that is to have a billion people and not eight or 10 or 12.

有意思的是，如果你请一个社会少生孩子，而他们本来想多生，除非动用强制手段，否则根本没戏。

And the interesting thing is if you asked a society to please have fewer children when they wanted more, you wouldn't have a prayer unless you used force.

但我们的人口将出现急剧且持续的下降，纯粹是运气使然——我们成了历史上第一代，出于完全合理的原因，决定少生孩子，理由多得数不清。

But we are going to have a dramatic sustained drop in our population By sheer luck, we are the first generation in history who are deciding to have, for perfectly good reasons, a 100 good reasons, we have decided to have fewer children.

如果我们继续这样下去，人类迟早会走向终结。

And if we keep doing this, we go out of business.

这道理再简单不过了。

It's quite simple.

如果你生不出两个以上健康、受过良好教育的孩子，你就走在消亡的路上了。

If you don't have 2.1 healthy, well educated children, you're on your way out.

在发达国家，几乎没人能做到这一点。

And almost nobody does in the developed world.

就连撒哈拉以南非洲，生育率也在断崖式下跌。

And even in Sub Saharan Africa, baby production is falling like a stone.

只是起点很高，从每个母亲生七个孩子，降到了四个。

It's just falling from a very high level, falling from seven babies per mother to four.

过去五十年里，他们减少的婴儿数量，比欧洲整个地区还要多。

They have lost more babies over the last fifty years than Europe has.

只是他们是从高得多的基数上降下来的。

It's just that they've lost them from a much higher level.

好的。

Alright.

那我们就先到这里吧。

We're gonna have to leave it there.

不过，杰里米·格兰瑟姆，非常感谢你做客《Odd Lots》。

But Jeremy Grantham, thank you so much for coming on Odd Lots.

谢谢你们给我至少两分钟时间，聊点正经的。

Well, thank you for allowing me at least two minutes to talk about serious stuff.

谢谢。

Thank you.

当然。

Of course.

聊点别的，别光谈市盈率了。

Something other than PE ratios.

是的

Yeah.

随时欢迎你再来。

Anytime, and you're always welcome back.

非常感谢你参加这个播客。

Thank you so much for coming on the podcast.

谢谢。

Thank you.

历史上的泡沫现象。

Historical bubbles.

是的

Yeah.

我也是。

Me too.

我觉得我该提一下我们一些很早以前关于非常冷门泡沫的节目。

And I guess I should, like, shout out some of our really old episodes at this point on very esoteric bubbles.

是的。

Yeah.

比如佛罗里达地产泡沫、鲶鱼泡沫。

Like the Florida land bubble, the catfish bubble.

我确实觉得关于科技巨头格局变化这一点很有意思。

I did think the point about the change in the mag seven

股票市场确实如此。

stocks Very yeah.

这简直是个转折点，就像一场拳击赛一样。

This sort of watershed moment, this idea of a cage fight Yeah.

在白宫草坪上展开的较量，还有企业战略的转变，大家都开始聚焦同一个领域。

On the White House lawn, and I guess a change in corporate strategy where everyone is really tackling the same area of business.

是的，这点挺有意思的。

Yeah, that was interesting.

不，这真的非常有意思。

No, it's super interesting.

十年前，谷歌和Meta的业务边界还非常清晰。

Like, ten years ago, you could draw a very clear line between what Google's business was and, say, Meta's business.

对吧？

Right?

但现在就没那么明显了。

You can't do that the same degree.

Meta虽然还没完全站到最前沿，但也想加入AI模型研发的行列。

When both of them, Meta, they're not right at the edge, but they're trying to they wanna be in the game as like a model maker.

两家都在巨额投入资本开支，方方面面都不惜血本。

They're also spending both spending enormous amounts of money on capital expenditures and so forth.

它们早已不再像以前那样，牢牢掌控自己的垂直领域了。

Like, they really are, like, no longer the sort of dominance of their verticals.

不过话说回来，他最后那段话挺有意思，说什么机器人会不会在海滩上给我们当管家？

But I have to say, like, his conversation there at the end, and he's like, well, will the robots be our butlers on the beach?

还是说，它们会不小心把我们给灭了？

Or will they accidentally kill us?

还是他们会故意杀了我们？

Or will they purposely kill us?

还是人类会因为不再生孩子而自我灭绝？

Or will humanity extinct ourselves because we're stopped having babies?

这确实让人想问，我们干嘛还花时间讨论市盈率？

Yes, it sort of does make you like, why are we wasting time talking about PE ratios?

当这些才是我们正面对的真正大问题时，谁还该关心市盈率呢？

When these are the big questions that we're right up against, yeah, why are we talking about PE ratios ever?

我该怎么为机器人灭绝做好投资准备？

How do I prep my portfolio for robot extinction?

这是个非常重要的问题。

Very important question.

凯文·沃什会降息吗？

Is Kevin Worsch gonna cut at his first interest rate?

十年后，这种问题或时刻大概根本没人会在意了。

Like, that will not very likely be a particularly important question or moment ten years from now.

但从大局来看，这 probably 并不是关键所在。

That's probably not what's anything will hinge on that in the grand scheme of things.

确实如此。

Well, that's true.

但话说回来，这又回到了科技巨头的争论：如果你把一切都包装成关乎生死的问题，那什么都能说得通。

But again, this sort of goes back to the Big Tech argument, but if you couch everything in existential terms, then you can justify anything.

完全正确。

Totally.

对吧？

Right?

这正是眼下科技巨头们正在做的事。

Which is what we're seeing right now in Big Tech.

我注意到，我刚才不知不觉又从人类灭绝的话题转到了科技公司的估值上。

I realize I just naturally went from talking about the extinction of humanity back to Big Tech valuations.

各种计算。

Calculations.

是的，对此我表示歉意。

Yeah, I apologize for that.

你知道吗，这挺有意思的。

You know, it's interesting.

我们最近刚做过一期关于绳子历史的节目。

You know, we did that episode about the history of rope recently.

在那本书里，他在播客中提到，人类在大约一百万年的时间里，可能甚至在人类出现之前，

And, you know, in that book, he and he made the point on the podcast that, you know, we went for about a million years, maybe I don't know if it's humans, but maybe right before humans.

真正重要的发明其实只有一样，那就是手斧。

Well, there was literally one invention, and that was the hand axe.

而且

And

再看看最近几年，仅凭ChatGPT、GLP-1药物、电动车这些技术，

then you think about like in the last few years alone between ChadGPT and GLP-1s and EVs, etcetera.

杰里米当时就说，历史其实有点单调。

And Jeremy was making that point, like, history was a little bit boring.

你知道吗，五十年代的时候，可口可乐开了个新工厂，这都能上新闻。

You know, the 1950s, oh, Coke opened a new factory, and that was news.

也就是说，别人也说过，时间真的在加速。

And what that means is literally and other people have said this, time is speeding up.

每天发生的事情变得越来越多了。

Like, there are just more events per day happening.

我是乔。

I'm Joe.

我累了。

I'm tired.

我累了。

I'm tired.

但这对新闻行业来说是好事。

But that it's good for the news business.

可对我们的制作团队来说就不那么好了。

It's not so good for our producers.

好的。

Alright.

既然如此，我们就到这里吧。

On that note, shall we leave it there?

那就到这里。

Let's leave it there.

好的。

Alright.

以上就是《奇思妙想》播客的又一期内容。

This has been another episode of the Odd Thoughts Podcast.

我是特蕾西·阿拉韦。

I'm Tracy Allaway.

你可以关注特蕾西·阿拉韦。

You can follow me at Tracy Allaway.

我是乔·魏森塔尔。

And I'm Joe Weisenthal.

你可以关注我，账号是 The Stallard。

You can follow me at The Stallard.

我们的制作团队也值得关注：Carmen Rodriguez 的账号是 Carmen Arman，Dashbot 的账号是 Bill Bennett，Kale Brooks 的账号是 Kale Brooks，Kevin Lozano 的账号是 Kevin Lloyd Lozano。

You can follow our producers, our tireless producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Arman dash Bill Bennett at Dashbot, Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks, and Kevin Lozano at Kevin Lloyd Lozano.

想了解更多 Odd Lots 的内容，请访问 bloomberg.com/oddlots，订阅每日简报和所有往期节目。

And for more Odd Lots content, go to bloomberg.com/oddlots for the daily newsletter and all of our episodes.

你还可以在我们的 Discord 频道 discord.gg/oddlots 里随时讨论这些话题。

And you can chat about all of these topics twenty four seven in our Discord, discord.gg/oddlots.

如果你喜欢 Odd Lots，尤其是我们一边聊市盈率一边谈人类灭绝的那些 episode，别忘了在你常用的播客平台给我们点个好评。

And if you enjoy Odd Lots, if you like it when we talk about PE ratios alongside the extinction of humanity, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform.

另外，如果你是彭博的订阅用户，可以免费收听我们所有的节目，没有任何广告。

And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad free.

只需要在 Apple Podcasts 里找到彭博频道，按照页面说明操作就行。

All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel for Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there.

感谢收听。

Thanks for listening.

每天早上收听《市场早晨报》，我是金伯利·亚当斯。

Start your day with Marketplace morning report and me, Kimberly Adams.

十分钟内，我会为你解读当天的经济新闻，说明它们为何重要，以及对你的生活和工作意味着什么。

In ten minutes or less, I'll explain the day's economic news, why it matters, and what it means for the way you live and work.

每个工作日早晨，收听这份独立获奖的报道，帮你理清经济脉络。

Tune in each weekday morning for independent, award winning journalism that brings clarity to the economy.

在你常用的播客应用里收听《市场早晨报》。

Listen to Marketplace morning report on your favorite podcast app.