伊朗战争正在消耗美国的导弹库存

经营企业意味着要应对大量过于复杂的软件，而大多数客户关系管理系统都遵循相同的模式。

Running a business means dealing with a lot of overly complicated software, and most CRMs tend to follow the same pattern.

它们塞满了你根本不会用的无穷无尽的功能，界面笨拙，团队往往花费太多时间只是为了找到基本信息。

They're packed with endless features you'll never use, interfaces that feel clunky, and teams end up spending way too much time just trying to find basic information.

今天的赞助商Pipedrive是一款专为中小型企业设计的简单客户关系管理工具。

Today's sponsor, Pipedrive, is a simple CRM tool designed for small and medium businesses.

Pipedrive将整个销售流程整合到一个仪表板中，为您提供清晰、完整的销售流程和客户信息视图，帮助团队掌控局面并快速促成交易。

Pipedrive brings you entire sales processes into one dashboard, giving you a crystal clear, complete view of sales processes and customer information designed to help teams stay in control and close more deals fast.

所有功能都围绕着可视化销售漏斗展开，您可以查看每一笔交易、它所处的阶段以及下一步需要做什么。

It all centers around the visual sales pipeline where you can see every deal, what stage it's in, and what needs to happen next.

由于所有内容都集中在一个平台上，Pipedrive旨在团结您的团队，跟踪销售任务，并牢牢掌握潜在客户动态。

Since everything is in one platform, Pipedrive is designed to unite your team, keep track of sales tasks, and stay on top of your leads.

换用一款由销售专家为销售团队打造的客户关系管理系统，加入已使用Pipedrive的十多万家企业行列。

Switch to a CRM built by salespeople, for salespeople, and join the over 100,000 companies already using Pipedrive.

现在注册，您将获得三十天的免费试用。

Right now, you'll get a thirty day free trial.

无需信用卡或任何付款。

No credit card or payment needed.

只需前往 pipedrive.com/simplecrm 开始使用。

Just head to pipedrive.com/simplecrm to get started.

就是 pipedrive.com/simplecrm。

That's pipedrive.com/simplecrm.

如果有一个大红色按钮能直接摧毁互联网，我会用额头撞碎它。

If there was a big red button that would just demolish the Internet, I would smash that button with my forehead.

来自BBC，这里是《界面》，一档探讨科技如何重塑你的一周与整个世界的节目。

From the BBC, this is The Interface, the show that explores how tech is rewiring your week and your world.

这与季度收益或科技评测无关。

This isn't about quarterly earnings or about tech reviews.

这关乎科技实际上如何影响你的工作、政治和日常生活。

It's about what technology is actually doing to your work, your politics, your everyday life.

以及人们使用互联网的各种古怪方式。

And all the bizarre ways people are using the Internet.

在 bbc.com 或您收听播客的任何平台收听。

Listen on bbc.com or wherever you get your podcasts.

彭博音频工作室。

Bloomberg Audio Studios.

播客。

Podcasts.

广播。

Radio.

新闻。

News.

你好，欢迎收听《Odd Lots》播客的另一期节目。

Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.

我是乔·魏森塔尔。

I'm Joe Weisenthal.

我是特蕾西·阿拉韦。

And I'm Tracy Allaway.

特蕾西，你知道，我认为我们进入伊朗战争还不到两周。

Tracy, you know, I think we're roughly maybe a little bit less than two weeks into the war in Iran.

我们录制这段内容的日期是2026年3月12日。

We are recording this 03/12/2026.

当然，关于战争的时机和持续时间，出现了大量问题。

And there are, of course, extraordinary number of questions about the timing and the duration of the war.

我们已经知道，经济影响非常显著，尤其是如果你只看大宗商品市场的话。

We know already that the economic impact has been quite significant, particularly if you just look at commodity markets.

但其中一个可能有助于确定时机或结果的问题是，就像我们在乌克兰战争爆发后讨论过的那样，战争关乎供应链，是的。

But one of the questions that sort of may help determine timing or outcome, I guess, you know, when we talked about this in after the war in Ukraine started, wars are about supply chains Yeah.

从广义上来说。

In large sense.

而且显而易见，战争还关乎军火库的规模以及它们被补充的速度。

And quite obviously, wars are about size and scale of the arsenals and how fast they can be replenished.

对。

Right.

我知道两件事，战争就是后勤，没错。

Two things I know, war is logistics Yes.

战争也是一种牟利工具。

And also war is a racket.

我知道这一点的唯一原因是，我刚刚下载了这本书。

And the only reason I know that is because I just literally downloaded the book.

所以过一会儿我会更了解这一点。

So I'll know more about that in a second.

但你说得完全正确。

But you're absolutely right.

我一般不喜欢谈论战争、冲突或军事相关的话题，但我很喜欢讨论供应链。

I do not like talking about war or conflict or military stuff in general, but I do enjoy talking about supply chains.

有一个至关重要的供应链，我们以前从未详细讨论过，但在这场冲突中却越来越频繁地出现。

And there's one crucial supply chain that we haven't really discussed in detail ever before, but it keeps coming up more and more in this conflict.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

That's right.

所以，显然你看到这些数字，我不知道它们有多真实，但它们确实惊人。

So, obviously, you know, you see these numbers, and I don't know how real they are, but they're extraordinary.

你知道的？

You know?

比如伊朗可以对一个军事基地及邻近国家发动攻击等等。

That's like Iran can launch an attack against a military base and a nearby country, etcetera.

所以我只谈谈廉价无人机的惊人效能，然后你就会听到导弹防御系统的惊人成本。

So I'll just talk about the extraordinary efficacy of cheap drones and so forth, and then you hear about the extraordinary cost of missile defense.

对。

Right.

所以让我们戴上以前国际关系的帽子。

So putting on our old international relations hats.

是的。

Yeah.

我们过去研究的很多内容都是关于非对称战争的理念。

A lot of what we used to study was this idea of asymmetric warfare.

对吧？

Right?

经典的例子通常是游击战，你知道，一支装备较差的军队通过不断的小规模袭扰，对抗一支装备更好、规模更大的军队。

And the classic examples that would come up would be guerrilla warfare where, you know, you have a a less well equipped army that is engaging in exhausting skirmishes against, like, a better equipped, larger army.

是的。

Yeah.

这是一种弥补自身弱点、对抗对方优势的方式。

And it's a way of, like, offsetting their own weaknesses against the strengths of another force.

如今，我们实际上已经没有这种地面冲突了。

Nowadays, we don't really have that kind of ground conflict.

对。

Right.

借个吉言。

Knock on wood.

但你正看到，有些人说，这种冲突在导弹领域上演，而所有这些冲突实际上都发生在导弹领域。

But you're seeing it, some people say, play out in this arena of missiles, which is really where all this conflict is playing out, is in the missile space.

所以，你会听到这样的故事，比如伊朗发射的无人机，每架大约2.5万美元

So, you hear these stories about, like, Iran is launching these drones that cost, I think, $25,000 a pop

有些人这么说。

Some people say.

是的。

Yeah.

其中一些。

Some of them.

或者在霍尔木兹海峡布设水雷，这些水雷相对于其他战术来说成本也非常低。

Or putting mines in the Strait Of Hormuz, which are also very cheap relative to some other tactics.

与此同时，你听到的说法是，阿联酋的导弹防御系统，每拦截一架无人机，成本高达数百万美元，真的是每架数百万美元。

And meanwhile, you hear things like, well, The UAE's missile defense system costs, like, millions of dollars per pop, literally per pop, against a drone.

与此同时，美国正在发射拦截导弹之类的武器，每枚成本又是数百万美元。

And meanwhile, The US is firing, you know, interceptor missiles or whatever that cost, again, millions and millions of dollars.

是的。

Yeah.

而且你听到的，你知道，这种导弹的数学计算看起来非常不平衡。

And you hear and, you know, again, the math, the sort of missile math seems very lopsided.

然后，当然，问题就在于纯粹的数量。

And then, of course, the question is just the pure numbers.

你有多少枚导弹？生产能力又能提升到什么程度？等等。

And how many do you have, and what is the capacity to ramp up production, etcetera?

这些都是巨大的问题，

All huge questions that are

导弹究竟来自哪里？

Where do missiles actually come from?

它们是在哪里制造的？

Where are they made?

没错。

That's right.

无论如何，我们有很多问题，却没有答案，但我们会学到很多。

Anyway, we we have a ton of questions, and we don't have the answers, but we're gonna learn a lot.

我们有一位完美的嘉宾，他对此了如指掌，完全专注于这一领域。

We have the perfect guest, someone who knows about this intimately, someone who focuses on this entirely.

我们将与汤姆·卡拉科交谈，他是战略与国际研究中心导弹防御项目的高级研究员兼主任，他会为我们详细讲解这一切，以及如何思考这些武器的供应链。

We're gonna be speaking with Tom Karako, senior fellow and director of the Missile Defense Project at CSIS, and he's gonna walk us through all of this and how to think about the supply chain of these armaments.

所以，汤姆，非常感谢你做客《Odd Lots》。

So, Tom, thank you so much for coming on Odd Lots.

嗨。

Hey.

很高兴能和大家交流。

Great to be with y'all.

非常感谢。

Thank you so much.

你先跟我们说说，你平时具体做些什么？

Why don't you tell us just to begin, what do you do?

你的工作重点是什么？

What is the focus of your work?

CSIS，即战略与国际研究中心，可以说是华盛顿特区最主要的国防智库。

CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies, I would say, is the main defense think tank in Washington DC.

它自上世纪六十年代冷战时期以来就一直存在。

It's been around since, you know, I think the sixties and the Cold War.

在CSIS内部，有一个专注于硬实力、以国防部为核心的部门。

And within CSIS, there's sort of the the department that focuses on hard power, focus on defense Department centric things.

在这个部门里，我负责导弹防御项目。

And within that, I run the Missile Defense Project.

因此，基本上从地面到太空，包括无人机、巡航导弹、弹道导弹、太空传感器，所有这些领域——无论是进攻还是防御——都是我的团队研究、撰写、评论并举办大量活动和讨论的内容。

And so basically, mud to space, UAVs, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, space sensors, everything in that window, both offense and defense, is what my team kinda studies, writes about, comments upon, and hosts just a lot of events and commentary.

实际上，在我们深入讨论导弹之前，我有个问题想问。

Actually, before we even get into missiles, this is a question I wanted to ask.

我们为什么需要国防智库呢？

But why do we have defense think tanks anyway?

比如，这些机构为什么存在？

Like, why do these exist?

因为如果你想想美国的军事冲突，理论上，任何时刻参与军事冲突的主体应该只有一个，那就是美国政府本身，即国防部或战争部。

Because if you think about military conflict in The US, presumably, there should just be one actor engaged in military conflict with other states at any one moment of time, and that's the actual US government, the Department of Defense slash Department of War.

为什么我们需要私人机构对军事战术、战略和供应链发表意见呢？

Why do we need private actors opining on military tactics, strategy, supply chains at all?

是的。

Yeah.

这是个好问题。

That's that's a good question.

这是个合理的问题。

That's a fair question.

我想我会用国防部的人常说的话来回答：这是世界上最大的官僚机构。

And I think I would answer it with what folks coming out of DOD always say, which is it's the world's largest bureaucracy.

而且确实，他们根本没有时间去思考。

And quite literally, they don't have time to think.

这是高级官员经常说的话。

That is what senior officials say all the time.

当你进入政府后，也往往不会有新的想法。

And when you go in, you also tend not to have new ideas.

因此，这为思想的产生提供了一个机会。

And so it's kind of an opportunity for idea generation.

这并不是我的说法。

And this is not my formulation.

这是你经常听到的、那些进出政府的人所说的话，他们需要有人来代为进行这种思想生成，因为那些人有时间。

This is what you frequently hear from people who go in and out of government, that they need those idea generation in a way to be contracted out by those people who have time.

因此，这么说吧，很多进入政府的人来自智库界，来自政策界，我想我会这么表述。

And so, having said that, a lot of people who go into government come from the think tank world, come from the policy world, is what I think I would put it, rather.

他们离开后，我认为会写一些东西，反思和研究一些问题，然后可能再次回到政府任职。

And they go out, I think, they write some things, they reflect on things and study things, and then they kind of perhaps go back in to govern.

让我们从外部视角来谈谈。

Let's talk about, from the outside perspective.

你知道，你会尝试估算美国拥有的各种武器的规模。

You know, you try to estimate the size of the arsenal of various different weapons that The US has.

政府在多大程度上公开了库存的数量？而来自智库的外部人员，他们的工作在多大程度上是通过交叉验证、推断等方式来理解这些信息的？

How transparent is the government about the size of stockpiles, and how much is one's job from the think tank world, from the outside, an exercise in triangulation, inference, and so forth to be able to understand these things?

除了你测量这些数据的方法之外，我们现在讨论的一些具体数字是多少？

And then just like besides the sort of approach you take to measuring these things, what are some of the numbers that we're talking about right now?

是的，这必须因情况而异。

Yeah, so look, it's got to vary case to case.

但我想说，在很多方面，尽管政府有责任保守某些机密，以免坏人知道我们具体拥有什么或有多少，我仍然认为，作为一个民主国家，每年提交给国会的预算文件中提供了大量细节，尤其是在年度预算申请公布时。

But I would say, in many respects, although it's the government's job to keep a number of things secret, so that the bad guys don't know exactly what we have, or how many we have, rather, I would nevertheless say that to a very large extent, we are a democracy, and a lot of detail is available in the budget books that go over to Congress every year when the annual budget request comes out.

因此，我们可以相当准确地追踪这些信息。

And so, there is a pretty good amount of tracking.

如果你想了解美国国防部的构成，就去看看它的资金流向。

If you want to understand what kind of defense department you have, look at the money.

因此，关于那些需要国会审议、拨款并由工业界制造的常规导弹和常规能力，外界已经能获得相当多的信息。

And so, there's a decent amount of information out there about, you might say, the garden variety missiles, the garden variety capabilities that have to be deliberated, appropriated by Congress, and then also built by industry.

因此，虽然具体数字被视为敏感信息，但通过这些资金和弹药数量，你可以非常接近地估算出来。

And so while exact numbers are kept sensitive, you can get pretty close in terms of these dollars and this number of rounds.

你可以相当准确地估算出来。

You you can get you can get pretty close.

你能

Can you

对于那些没有像你那样密切关注这一问题的人，能否简要描述一下，当我们谈论当前伊朗局势时，我们所指的导弹类型有哪些？这些不同类型的导弹各自有什么用途？

for those who haven't been following this as intensely as you have, can you paint a schematic of the kind of missiles we're we're talking about when we talk about the situation in Iran right now, and what exactly are the different missile types being used for?

我知道人们喜欢谈论导弹的名称。

I know guys love talking about missile names.

对吧？

Right?

而且喜欢当业余军事战略家，所以有些人可能已经知道了。

And being, like, armchair military strategists, so some people might know this already.

为了那些我们这些只看到导弹就觉得都一样人的利益，目前部署的导弹有哪些不同类型？

For the benefit of those of us who have it, you know, we just see a missile and it's a missile, what are the different types that are currently being deployed?

基本上，有平台和弹药之分，比如飞机、地面车辆、舰船之类的。

Basically, there's platforms and there's projectiles, aircraft, ground vehicles, ships, this sort of thing.

但自20世纪60年代以来，人们一直高度重视制导导弹、各种精确制导弹药，以及远程打击能力。

But basically, since the 1960s, there's been a high degree of emphasis on essentially guided missiles, precision guided munitions of various kinds, and also standoff capability.

因此，间接火力、火炮、枪械这类武器逐渐被更远距离的打击能力所取代，这些能力可以飞出很远，再返回并俯冲，特别是在末端制导方面，能够定位海上的舰船，或利用地形匹配等方式进行瞄准。

And so, you know, indirect fire, cannons, guns, this kind of thing, began to be replaced by much more over the horizon capabilities that could fly out of good ways, come back down, and especially in terms of terminal guidance, could then find a ship on the ocean, or find using terrain mapping or what have you.

所以，自20世纪70年代尤其是精确制导革命以来，这一领域取得了巨大的进步。

So basically, since the precision guidance revolution in the 70s especially, there's just been an enormous amount of progress.

而且，坦白说，这种技术进步如今已不再像过去那样被美国独家垄断。

And so, and frankly, this technological progress is no longer that monopoly of The United States as it perhaps once was.

这种技术已经无处不在。

It's ubiquitous.

就连伊朗、朝鲜这类国家也已掌握。

Even folks like Iran, North Korea, and that kind of thing have it.

因此，这就是基本背景。

And so that's the baseline.

因此，导弹有不同的类型，从词源上讲，导弹 simply 就是被发射出去的东西。

And so there's, look, there's different kinds of missile re, and a missile, etymologically speaking, is simply that which is sent.

有弹道导弹，它们沿着重力的抛物线飞行，在大部分飞行过程中基本无动力。

There's ballistic missiles that fly gravity's rainbow, mostly unpowered for most of their flight.

巡航导弹本质上是气动设计，利用升力和阻力，通过喷气发动机之类的方式前进。

Cruise missiles that are essentially aerodynamic and use lift and drag to travel some kind of jet engine or what have you.

然后还出现了这些新型类别，正在相互融合。

And then there's these new classes of things that are kind of blending.

人们谈论高超音速滑翔器，它们可能先由弹道助推启动，然后具备弹道导弹的速度，同时拥有巡航导弹或飞机那样的机动性。

You know, people talk about hypersonic gliders that may start off with a ballistic push, but then have the maneuver, the speed of a ballistic missile, but the maneuverability a cruise missile or aircraft, you might say.

因此，多年来出现了一个丰富多样的谱系，正如一位前拜登政府官员所说，我经常重申：导弹真正成为了首选武器。

And so it's a rich and diverse spectrum that has emerged over the years, and as a former Biden administration official said, and I like to repeat, missiles truly have become weapons of choice.

在冲突中，我们总是首先且频繁地选择导弹，这主要归功于精确制导与远程打击能力的结合。

It's the thing for which we reach early and often in a conflict, and largely because of the combination of that precision guidance and that standoff capability.

因此，当特朗普第一任政府想要打击叙利亚时，他们派出了59枚战斧导弹——这是一种巡航导弹——去执行任务。

And so when the first Trump administration wanted to go hit Syria, you know, they sent 59 Tomahawks, that's a cruise missile, to go get them.

在这场冲突中，美国发射了数量巨大、我甚至可以说令人恐惧的导弹，伊朗也发射了数百枚，猛烈攻击其几乎所有邻国，结合了弹道导弹和大量本质上属于巡航导弹的无人机。

And in this conflict, there has been an enormous, and I would say a scary amount of missiles expended on the part of The United States, hundreds and hundreds on the part of Iran, lashing out at basically all of their neighbors, with a combination of ballistics and a lot of these drones are essentially cruise missiles.

当你射程超过1000公里时，那本质上就是一种类似沙海德的巡航导弹。

When you're over 1,000 kilometers in range, you know, it's essentially a cruise missile that shaheads, for instance.

于是你就进入了导弹防御领域。

And so then you have the missile defense world.

就在不久之前，在体面的社会中，普遍认为用子弹击中子弹是不可能的。

And, you know, it wasn't that long ago when in polite society it was conventional wisdom that it was impossible to hit a bullet with a bullet.

但在过去五年里，这种观点已被彻底推翻。

Over the past, especially five years, that has been completely and utterly refuted.

在一次次冲突中——乌克兰、红海行动，以及以色列几次的防御中，我们见证了导弹被多种手段成功拦截，不仅仅是导弹对导弹，而是多种手段的结合。

And in conflict after conflict, in Ukraine, in the Red Sea operations, in the defense of Israel a couple times now, we've seen an extraordinary degree of missiles being defeated by a combination of effects, not just missile on missile, but a combination of effects.

现在，当我们未能拦截某些目标时，反而会感到惊讶。

And now, you know, we're kind of surprised when we miss at some of these things.

曾经是美国独有的导弹防御能力追求，如今已成为一种全球现象。

And what was once an American idiosyncrasy, the pursuit of this missile defense capability, is now very much a global phenomenon.

在乌克兰冲突之后，尤其是在欧洲，欧洲天盾计划以及德国购买以色列的箭-3反导系统，这是一场翻天覆地的变化。

After the Ukraine conflict, especially in Europe, the European Sky Shield initiative, Germany buying an Israeli Arrow three system for ballistic missile defence, it has been a sea change.

对远程精确打击的需求，以及应对这种打击手段的需求，如今已成为一种全球现象。

The demand signals, the supply and demand signal of long range standoff and the means to contend with it is very much a global phenomenon.

我想问一下，在过去四年里，对乌克兰援助的前两大优先事项是什么？

I'll say that the top two priorities for aid for Ukraine over the past four years were what?

远程火力、导弹，以及防空反导系统。

Long range fires, missiles, and air and missile defense.

他们甚至把爱国者导弹发射器印到了货币上，因为它基本上保障了他们的国家主权。

They went so far as to put the Patriot launcher on their currency, because it has basically kept them kept them sovereign.

这些是最重要的

And these are the top

我不知道这一点。

I didn't know that.

这很有趣。

It's fun.

我办公室里就有一个。

I've got I've got one in my office.

哦，对。

Oh, right.

是货币，不是导弹。

The currency, not the missile.

对吧？

Right?

我还在设法为办公室买一个爱国者导弹系统。

I'm still trying to buy a a Patriot for the office.

他们不让我买。

They won't let me get it.

但我正在努力争取。

But I'm I'm working on it.

经营企业意味着要应对大量过于复杂的软件，而大多数客户关系管理系统都遵循同样的模式。

Running a business means dealing with a lot of overly complicated software, and most CRMs tend to follow the same pattern.

它们塞满了你根本用不上的功能，界面笨拙，团队往往花费太多时间来寻找基本信息。

They're packed with endless features you'll never use, interfaces that feel clunky, and teams end up spending way too much time just trying to find basic information.

今天的赞助商Pipedrive是一款专为中小型企业设计的简单CRM工具。

Today's sponsor, Pipedrive, is a simple CRM tool designed for small and medium businesses.

Pipedrive将整个销售流程整合到一个仪表板中，为您提供清晰完整的销售流程和客户信息视图，帮助团队掌控全局，更快地促成交易。

Pipedrive brings you entire sales processes into one dashboard, giving you a crystal clear complete view of sales processes and customer information designed to help teams stay in control and close more deals faster.

所有功能都围绕可视化销售漏斗展开，您可以查看每一笔交易、它所处的阶段以及下一步需要做什么。

It all centers around the visual sales pipeline where you can see every deal, what stage it's in, and what needs to happen next.

由于所有内容都集中在一个平台上，Pipedrive旨在团结您的团队，跟踪销售任务，并随时掌握潜在客户动态。

Since everything is in one platform, Pipedrive is designed to unite your team, keep track of sales tasks, stay on top of your leads.

换用一款由销售专家为销售团队打造的CRM系统，加入已有超过十万家企业在使用的Pipedrive行列。

Switch to a CRM built by salespeople, for salespeople, and join the over 100,000 companies already using Pipedrive.

现在，您将获得三十天的免费试用。

Right now, you'll get a thirty day free trial.

无需提供信用卡或任何付款信息。

No credit card or payment needed.

只需前往 pipedrive.com/simplecrm 即可开始使用。

Just head to pipedrive.com/simplecrm to get started.

那就是 pipedrive.com/simplecrm。

That's pipedrive.com/simplecrm.

新闻在周末也不会停歇。

The news doesn't stop on the weekends.

情境不断变化，

Context changes constantly,

而现在，彭博社是您掌握一切动态的最佳去处。

and now Bloomberg is the place to stay on top of it all.

你好。

Hi.

我是大卫·古拉。

I'm David Gura.

每周六和周日，请收看全新的《彭博社周末新闻》。

Join us every Saturday and Sunday for the new Bloomberg this weekend.

我是克里斯蒂娜·拉菲尼。

I'm Christina Raffini.

我们将为您带来最新头条、深度分析和重磅访谈。

We'll bring you the latest headlines, in-depth analysis, and big interviews.

所有在您休息日触动人心的故事。

All the stories that hit home on your days off.

我是丽莎·马泰奥。

And I'm Lisa Mateo.

请观看并收听本周末的彭博社节目，了解关于商业、生活方式、人物与文化的深刻而富有启发性的对话。

Watch and listen to Bloomberg this weekend for thoughtful, enlightening conversations about business, lifestyle, people, and culture.

在周六早晨，我们会将上周的事件置于背景中分析，探讨市场和世界发生了什么。

On Saturday mornings, we put the past week's events into context, examining what happened in the markets and the world.

而在周日，我们会采访记者、专栏作家和关键政治人物，为您准备

Then on Sundays, we speak with journalists, columnists, and key political figures to prepare you for the

即将到来的一周。

week ahead.

从你一醒来就加入我们，无论你的周末计划带您去往何处，都让我们陪伴在您身边。

Join us as soon as you wake up and bring us with you wherever your weekend plans take you.

请在彭博电视上观看我们。

Watch us on Bloomberg Television.

请在彭博广播收听，或通过彭博商业应用在线直播观看，也可以收听我们的播客。

Listen on Bloomberg Radio, stream the show live on the Bloomberg Business app, or listen to the podcast.

这就是本周末的彭博节目，周六和周日早上7点（东部时间）开始。

That's Bloomberg this weekend, Saturdays and Sundays starting at 7AM eastern.

让彭博电视、广播以及您收听播客的任何平台，都成为您周末生活的一部分。

Make us part of your weekend routine on Bloomberg television, radio, and wherever you get your podcasts.

这已经非常有帮助了。

That was already extremely helpful.

但为了再确认一下，你用‘令人害怕’来形容美国的活动规模，或者我们已经裁员了多少，你具体指的是什么？

But just to go back, use the word scary to talk about the sort of volume of activity that The US has, or how much we've fired already.

你这么说是什么意思？

What did you mean by that?

稍微解释一下这句话。

Unpack that statement a little bit.

是的。

Yeah.

让我明确说一点，导弹防御系统本身并不能为你赢得战争，但如果没有它，战争可能会迅速失败。

Let me just say that missile defense will not win a war for you, but its absence will lose one or could lose one pretty quickly.

我刚才提到，导弹防御系统帮助乌克兰保持了主权。

And so I said a moment ago that missile defenses helped keep Ukraine sovereign.

如果不是因为能够拦截这些来袭的空中和导弹攻击，局势将会截然不同。

If not for being able to thwart these incoming air and missile attacks, it would have been a very different situation.

让我回到去年夏天。

Let me go back to last summer.

在为期十二天的战争中，来自中东多个地区的数百枚导弹、六百五十枚弹药同时向以色列袭来。

In the hundreds of missiles, six fifty projectiles from multiple parts of the Middle East coming into Israel all at once during the twelve day war.

如果这些成百上千的弹药如原计划般同时落在一个像新泽西州那样大小的地区，后果将是灾难性的。

If those hundreds and hundreds of objects had arrived all at once as they were intended to do in a place the size of New Jersey, it would have been catastrophic.

令人惊讶的是，几乎所有的导弹都被拦截了。

Surprisingly enough, almost everything was defeated.

因此，导弹防御系统为通过其他手段消除威胁赢得了时间。

And so missile defense buys time to end the threat by other means.

但它本身并不能消除威胁。

It does not end the threat itself.

现在，当我提到去年夏天那次冲突结束后，特朗普政府实际上给了伊朗一条生路，说：‘我们停手吧。’我当时就说：‘这会是个错误’，因为伊朗会趁机重建，然后我们大概一年后又得再来一次。

Now, when I said last summer, after that conflict ended, the Trump administration basically threw the Iranians a lifeline, and said, hey, we're going to stop, I said, That's going be a mistake, because what's going to happen is the Iranians are going to rebuild, and then we're going to come and we're going to do this again in a year or so.

但我错了，因为根本不用一年，只过了九个月。

And I was wrong, because it didn't take a year, it's only nine months.

这之所以重要且令人恐惧，是因为它关乎能力。

And why that matters and why it's scary is because it's about capacity.

防御性拦截弹的能力能赢得时间，但要生产出这种能力需要耗费大量时间。

Capacity of defensive interceptors buys time, but it takes a heck of a lot of time to produce that capacity.

因此，这就引出了一个令人担忧的问题——我即将发表一篇相关社论——那就是‘温彻斯特困境’：防御性拦截弹耗尽，那将是一个非常糟糕的日子。

And so this gets to the specter, I've got an op ed coming out on this, the specter of going Winchester, of running out of defensive interceptors, and that would be a very bad day.

因此，当你谈论时，成百上千枚导弹需要成百上千枚拦截弹，去年如此，今年也是如此，这才是令人担忧的部分——这些拦截弹的巨大消耗。

And so when you talk, hundreds and hundreds of missiles are going require hundreds of interceptors, that was last year, again this year, and so that's the scary part, the massive expenditure of these things.

我想引用联合参谋长委员会主席凯恩将军的话，他曾被问到：‘我们有足够的吗？’

And I want to quote General Kane, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said, who's asked, Do we have enough?

他回答说：‘我们足以应对这场冲突。’

And he said, We have enough for this conflict.

但这并不等于说我们有足够的拦截弹来应对全球其他任务，尤其是遏制与中国发生冲突。

That is not the same as saying that we have enough for the other tasks that we have around the world, most significantly deterring a conflict with China.

因此，我们现在已大幅削减了导弹防御拦截弹的总库存。

And so, we have now cut in very substantially to our total inventory of missile defense interceptors.

完整数字尚未公布。

The complete numbers have not been released.

我们对这一情况进行了研究，对比了去年的数量，那时数量多得惊人。

We've done a study on this from what it was last year, and it was a lot.

那么，为什么这很重要？

And so, why that matters?

目前，我们正将爱国者导弹系统，可能还包括萨德系统，从韩国和日本转移到中东。

Right now, we're moving Patriots and perhaps some THAAD, those missile defense systems, from South Korea and Japan to The Middle East.

这很重要，因为它们的职责本应部署在太平洋地区，以威慑中国或朝鲜的冒险行为，或其他类似举动。

That's significant because their job is to be in the Pacific and to deter, to provide a defensive deterrent to Chinese adventurism or to North Korean adventurism, or what have you.

因此，我们一直说，自奥巴马政府以来，各届政府都表示要将重心转向太平洋。

And so, we've been saying, different administrations have been saying, that we're going to pivot to the Pacific since the Obama administration.

但我们仍在等待这一转变真正发生。

We're still kind of waiting for that to happen.

我们却不断将注意力拉回欧洲和中东。

We keep lurching back to Europe and to The Middle East.

事实上，五角大楼的许多政府官员正是那些曾表示‘我们必须聚焦中国，必须聚焦太平洋’的人。

In fact, a lot of the administration officials in this Pentagon have been among those who said, Hey, we've got to focus on China, we've got to focus on the Pacific.

而他们现在正在短短的时间内，眼睁睁看着我们的武器库存急剧消耗。

And what they're doing right now is presiding over an extraordinary vaporization of our inventory in a very short window of time.

因此，我担心的是，你可能听说过‘戴维森窗口’，这位前印太司令部司令曾表示，他担心中国可能在2027年前后对周边国家采取行动。

And so what I worry about, you've heard of the Davidson Window, the former head of Indo Paycom, who said, hey, he worries that China would be ready to move against some of their neighbors by 2027.

我最担心的是，这种巨大的物资消耗在一年内根本不可能得到补充，绝对不可能。

What I worry about most is that this extraordinary expenditure of stuff is not going to be replaced in a year, absolutely not.

事实上，这可能会成为一个自我实现的预言，诱使或诱惑中国做出非常糟糕的举动。

And that, in fact, this may kind of be a self fulfilling prophecy of encouraging, of tempting China to do something very bad.

乔，我已经好多年没听到过‘去温彻斯特’或者‘我是温彻斯特’这种说法了。

Joe, I haven't heard the term going Winchester or I'm Winchester for years and years and years.

你还记得吗？

You remember No.

意思是弹药耗尽了。

That It's running out of ammunition.

是的。

Yeah.

我之所以知道这个，是因为我父亲小时候让我看了大量军事电影。

The only reason I know this is because my dad made me watch, like, an inordinate amount of military movies growing up.

但不管怎样，我对你说的‘你无法用导弹赢得战争’这一点非常好奇。

But, anyway, I'm very curious about something you said, which is that you can't win a war with missiles.

而且这看起来像是

And it it seems like

通过导弹防御。

With missile defense.

哦，抱歉，导弹防御。

Oh, I'm sorry, missile defense.

但如果是进攻， presumably 你可以，这似乎是目前的策略。

But with offense, presumably, you can, which seems to be the strategy right now.

所以让我谈谈这一点。

And so let me speak to that.

美国联合部队与以色列合作，在战争最初的几天内打击了大约5000个目标。

The Joint Force of the United States, working with Israel, hit, you know, I think it's up to 5,000 targets within the first several days of the war.

但他们是从远处进行的。

Well, they were doing so from afar.

他们是通过远程打击完成的。

They were doing so from standoff.

因此，尽管他们没有公布战斧导弹、JASSM、LRASM等导弹的数量，但可以很容易推断出，这些远程武器很可能对大量目标实施了打击，而我们拥有的这类武器数量是有限的。

And so while they're not releasing the numbers of the Tomahawk missiles, of the JASM, of the LRASMs and such, they're not releasing those, one may easily surmise that a significant number of those targets were serviced by these long range things, of which we have finite quantities.

因此，进攻性打击能力作为威慑手段也变得更加重要，而我们至少已经消耗了数百枚，我怀疑最终可能会达到数千枚。

And so the offensive strike capability is also even more important as a deterrent, and we are chewing those up by least the many hundreds, and it may, I suspect, turn out to be thousands.

这也是令人担忧的一部分。

And that's also part of the scary part.

您能否稍微详细说明一下不同类型的导弹采购流程？

Can you give a little bit more detail on, I guess, the procurement process for different types of missiles?

因为我非常好奇背后的战略考量，比如为什么有人会决定我们需要这么多远程进攻导弹，而不是这么多短程防御导弹。

Because I'm very curious about the thinking that goes behind, you know, someone saying that we wanna have this many long range offensive missiles versus this many, you know, maybe shorter range defensive missiles.

这些决策究竟是如何做出的？

How do those decisions actually get made?

这是个好问题。

That's a good question.

从根本上说，这取决于对作战部署的构想，即一场冲突可能如何展开。

You know, fundamentally, it comes down to an idea, an idea of the order of battle, of how a conflict may play out.

因此，军事规划人员和联合参谋部的工作就是深入思考这些问题，推测在战场上我们需要多少导弹、多少飞机、多少舰船，以及我们如何能够调动这样一支力量。

And so, you know, this is the job of the military planners and the joint staff to kind of think that through, and hypothesize this is how many missiles we would need to have in theatre, how many aircraft, how many ships, and this is how we might be able to marshal a force.

反过来，我们也要设想对方可能如何调动他们的兵力。

Conversely, how we think the other side might be able to marshal their forces.

我要说，尤其是乌克兰冲突，让人们意识到我们之前对所需物资的估算严重偏低。

I will say that the Ukraine conflict especially made folks realize that our estimates of what we would likely need were dramatically too low.

所以我只举一个例子，但我想你们会看到这种情况，事实上过去一年里的一些新闻动态以不同方式印证了这一点：今年四月，美国陆军将其在未来几年内需要采购的爱国者PAC-3导弹数量目标提高了四倍，从大约3000枚增加到13000枚左右。

And so I'm just going give one example, but I think you're going to see this, and in fact, there are news developments over the past year that gratify this in different ways, that in April, the US Army quadrupled its objective acquisition number of how many Patriot PAC three missiles it needed to buy over next coming years, quadrupled that number from like 3,000 and something to 13,000 and something.

我认为，背后正在形成一种共识：随着我们看到乌克兰和俄罗斯大量使用各种类型的弹药和导弹，人们逐渐意识到，在真正的冲突中，这种消耗量会急剧上升。

And I think behind the scenes, you're seeing a recognition, as we've seen the Ukrainians and the Russians use enormous numbers of projectiles or missiles of different kinds, kind of sinking in that, oh, in an actual conflict, this would ramp up dramatically.

因此，即使在去年夏天以色列与伊朗之间的十二天战争以及我们卷入之前，五角大楼就已经开始采取几项非常重要的措施。

And so even before the twelve day war last summer, between Israel and Iran and our being involved, even before that, the Pentagon began to do a few things, some really important things.

拜登政府一直在增加各种类型进攻性和防御性导弹的生产规模。

The Biden administration had been ramping up a number of missiles of offensive and defensive of various stripes.

你可能还记得关于ATACM导弹的讨论，当时我们是否能腾出一些ATACM导弹提供给乌克兰，拜登政府最初并没有同意，但后来最终还是提供了。

You probably remember the discussion about ATACMs and whether we could spare any ATACMs to give to Ukraine, and the Biden administration didn't at first, and then they eventually did.

过去四年里，许多弹药都面临同样的情况。

That was true with a lot of munitions over the past four years.

时间快进到去年春天，新任副部长史蒂夫·费恩伯格——这位来自私营资本领域的官员（听众们想必熟悉）——上任后开始召集多家国防公司的首席执行官，可以说，他抓住他们的衣领，敦促他们：我们必须最大化产能。

Flash forward to last spring, incoming Deputy Secretary Steve Feinberg, who comes out of the private capital world, which listeners no doubt know, came in and began to call in the CEOs of a number of defense companies, and I will say metaphorically, grabbed them by the lapels and shook them, to say, We need to maximize production.

我尊重他对硬实力的重视，在接下来的六个月里，从去年阵亡将士纪念日开始，你开始看到大量演练和对如何生产更多战斧导弹及各类攻防导弹、固体火箭发动机产能等的深入测算。

I respect his respect for hard power, and over the next six months, from basically Memorial Day of last year, over the next six months, you began to see a lot of drills and a lot of figuring out of just how many Tomahawks and all these offensive and defensive missiles, and how much solid rocket motor production we could do, on and on.

因此，在过去两个月，即今年一月和二月，所有这些工作基本上通过新闻稿公之于众。

And so over the past two months, since January and February, all that work was basically publicized, at least in press releases.

报道称，雷神公司将提升五种弹药的产能。

It said that Raytheon would ramp up five munitions.

还有更多举措即将出台。

There's more to come, by the way.

洛克希德·马丁宣布，将把THAAD和爱国者PAC-3的产量翻四倍，在爱国者导弹方面，年产量将从600枚提升至2000枚。

Lockheed announced THAAD and PAC three Patriot, that they were gonna quadruple THAAD and go on the Patriot side from 600 a year to 2,000 a year in production.

此外，我们计划将战斧巡航导弹的年产量从去年申请的57枚——这微不足道——提升至目标年产1000枚。

And we're gonna go, by the way, from Tomahawk cruise missiles, from 57 requested last year, which is a pittance, to their goal is a thousand a year of Tomahawks.

我想说的是，这些举措虽然都非常合理，但显然来得太晚了，它们恰当地应用了过去几年的经验教训。

And what I would say is that those are all very sensible moves, very belated, by the way, that are properly allowing the lessons of the past couple years to be applied.

等等，这一切都发生在我们对伊朗开战之前。

Break, that was all before we went to war with Iran.

因此，现在所谓的弹药产能提升尚未开始，更令人担忧的是，它尚未启动是因为资金不到位。

And so now, the ramp, it's called the munitions ramp, hasn't yet begun, and the other kind of scary thing is it hasn't begun because the money wasn't there.

而一月份出台、或更准确地说，上个月初成为法律的拨款法案中，报告附言提到：顺便说一句，我们——国会和拨款委员会——知道，这笔拨款比五角大楼为弹药所申请的金额少了288亿美元。

And the appropriations bill that came out in January, or I guess became law in early February last month, the report language said, Oh, by the way, we know, we, Congress, the appropriators know that this appropriation is 28,800,000,000.0, with a B, short of what the Pentagon requested just for munitions.

因此，这里涉及几件事情。

And so there's a couple things going on here.

第一，我们早已存在对2026财年高达280亿美元的缺口，正因如此，我们无法充分签订合同来启动这一长达七年的良好计划。而现在，就在过去两周，我们已经消耗掉了数十亿美元和成百上千枚导弹。

One, we already had that $28,000,000,000 and change shortfall for FY '26, and then, and because of that, we can't put things on contract adequately to start this seven year process that is a good plan, very good plan, And now, we have just gone and vaporized many billions of dollars and hundreds and probably thousands of missiles over the past two weeks.

因此，把这些情况放在一起看，局面并不乐观。

And so you put that together, and it's not a very good picture.

因此，至少国会必须尽快为弹药追加拨款，我相信这一点。

And so at the very minimum, Congress is going have to step up, I believe, for a munitions supplemental in the very near term.

所以让我们谈谈真正提升产能的制约因素，因为显然存在政治制约，这里的政治指的是拨款问题。

So let's talk about the binding constraints to really ramping up production, because there's clearly the political constraint, and by political, I mean appropriations.

必须通过投票来决定：我们将这些资金分配给国防。

Votes have to happen to say, We're going to allocate these dollars to defense.

好的，我们理解这一部分。

Okay, we understand that part.

这其中的政治因素很棘手。

There's politics that's difficult.

现在我们来谈谈实际的物理制约因素。

Let's talk about the binding physical constraints.

当你说到要把产量从57枚提升到1000枚时，我们具体需要考虑哪些设施和自然资源？

So when you say, Okay, you want to go from 57 to a thousand, what are we talking about in terms of the facilities that we have, the natural resources?

我猜稀土金属和某些关键原材料可能会成为这个过程中的瓶颈或卡点？

I imagine rare earth metals and certain key commodities may be choke points or bottlenecks in this process?

我们所有人都希望，我猜，拥有无限多的导弹防御能力等等。

We all would love, I presume, to have an infinite number of missile defense capabilities, etcetera.

我们不希望在韩国和中东或海湾盟友之间做出取舍。

We would like to not have to choose between Korea and The Middle East or the Gulf allies and so forth.

但以你看来，提升产能的物理限制是什么？

But what are the physical constraints as you see them to ramping up production?

是的，你提到过无限供应，如果我没理解错的话。

Yeah, well, you mentioned there unlimited supply, if I'm not mistaken.

前几天总统发了一条推文，说我们拥有几乎无限的供应量，但我只想说，这种说法在现实中是有问题的。你看，你刚刚列出了生产所需的设施和长周期物料。

There was a presidential tweet the other day saying that we had a virtually unlimited supply, and I would just say that that is a statement that is problematic relative So, to look, you just listed off facilities, long lead items for production.

你们都关心供应链，但还有人员问题。

Know you all like supply There's chain also people.

还有劳动力问题。

There's also the workforce.

比如，目前亚利桑那州图森市只有一家工厂在生产战斧导弹。

There's basically one facility in Tucson, Arizona that cranks out Tomahawks, for instance.

实际上，当您开始审视供应链时，会发现瓶颈非常多，而且有很多零部件只有一家供应商，这一点已经有不少论文讨论过，但仍有大量内容有待进一步确认。

There's a small number of things, so actually when you start looking at the supply chain, it is in surprising degree, and there's been a number of papers written on this, although there's a lot more to ascertain, is there's a lot of bottlenecks, there's a lot of sole source for some widget.

值得肯定的是，过去几年里，五角大楼进行了大量反思——虽然‘内省’这个词不太恰当，但确实努力去理解并真正从智力上弄清楚供应链究竟是什么。

To the Pentagon's credit, over the past several years, there's been a lot of, I would say navel gazing is a bad term but a lot of introspection, trying to figure out and understand, to at least truly intellectually understand, what is the supply chain.

但在这方面仍存在一些不透明性。

And there is still some opacity to that.

不过，主要承包商、国防承包公司和国防部一直在研究这个问题，我认为这有助于揭示瓶颈和单一来源的问题。

But nevertheless, the primes, the defense prime companies, and the department have been looking into this, and I think has been illuminating in terms of the bottlenecks and sole source issues.

因此，你已经看到，比如一系列尝试，旨在A：吸引私人资本参与，即战略资本办公室。

And so you've seen, for instance, I would say a series of experiments trying to, A, get private capital involved, the Office of Strategic Capital.

当这个办公室刚成立时，我问过负责的人：我只想知道一件事：你们的规模能大到产生实质性影响吗？

When that was first being stood up, I asked the guy in charge of it, I said, I really want to know one thing: are you going to be big enough to matter?

美国的非对称优势——用这个说法——是我们是一个富裕的国家，但我们必须利用好这些私人财富。

America's asymmetric advantage, to use that phrase, America's asymmetric advantage is we're a wealthy country, but we have to leverage that private wealth.

我认为，在这方面有许多举措正在推动并帮助引导私人资本流向对国防至关重要的供应链。

And I think there's a number of initiatives on that front that will direct and are helping to direct private capitals to the supply chains for things that matter to defense.

此外，这里还有一些正在进行的试点项目，比如投资于新型固体火箭发动机制造商。

The other thing, couple of experiments going on here, are investment in, for instance, new solid rocket motor producers.

大家都了解SpaceX及其在航天发射方面的业务。

Everybody knows SpaceX and space launch side of the things.

还有很多新兴初创公司正在进入固体火箭发动机领域。

There's also a lot of new startup companies for solid rocket motors.

我认为这是好事。

I think this is good.

我认为这是必要的，如果这些公司足够重要，那我们绝对应该全力支持。

I think this is necessary, and if they are big enough to matter, then we should absolutely be doing all that.

与此同时，我们也面临一种风险，我常形容这就像在调低音和高音旋钮，却没把音量调高——这意味着目前只有两家大公司生产固体火箭发动机，其中一家刚获得了五角大楼十亿美元的股权注资，那就是拥有Aerojet子公司的L3Harris。

At the same time, there is the risk that we're kind of, I like to say, fiddling with the bass and the treble knobs, and not turning up the volume, and that essentially means there's two big companies that do SRMs, Solid Rocket Motors, and one of them just got a billion dollar equity stake investment by the Pentagon, that is L3Harris that had Aerojet as a subsidiary.

另一家巨头自然是诺斯罗普·格鲁曼公司，它过去收购并整合了ATK。

The other big one, of course, is Northrop Grumman, which owns and has assumed overall ATK in the past.

因此，在固体火箭发动机领域，这些实验和投资正在持续进行。

And so, on the solid rocket motor front, there's these experiments going on and these investments.

拜登政府向位于阿肯色州卡姆登的Aerojet公司投入了2.16亿美元，而这个地方实际上是我们尽量避免公开讨论的少数几个地方之一。

Biden administration put $216,000,000 into Aerojet in Camden, Arkansas, which is actually one of the handful of places where we kind of keep it away from polite society.

你当然不希望大型设备在城市附近爆炸，这也是生产面临的一个挑战。

You don't want big things blowing up near cities, which is one of the challenges of production as well.

第三种实验类型，特别是来自施泰因布雷斯坦的，是在这个推动军火产能提升的计划中，他采取了非常不同的做法：他要求主要承包商自掏腰包投入。

A third type of experiment, and this is coming out of Steinbrenstein in particular, is that in this plan, this initiative to get this munitions ramp, he's doing something very different, which is he's asking the primes to lean in on their own dime.

我说的‘自掏腰包’，指的是大量的资金，因为我们谈论的是数十亿美元的规模。

And when I say lean on their own dimes, I mean a lot of dimes, because we're talking about double digit billions.

他基本上是在要求这些公司——再次强调，是上市公司——用自己的内部资金冒险，提前投资这些设施。

He's basically asking the companies to pony up out of their internal funds, publicly traded companies again, on spec begin to invest in these facilities.

如果你是一家上市公司，这样做就是在冒险。

Now, if you're a publicly traded company, that's sticking your neck out.

而这里的客户也存在问题。

And there has been the customer here.

国防部在购买爆炸物方面是唯一的买家。

DOD is a monopsony in terms of buying things that blow up.

多年来，这个客户一直不够可靠。

The customer has not been very reliable over the years.

在国防部采购的所有物品中，弹药的采购量一直呈上下波动的周期性趋势。

And of all the things DOD buys, munitions has been a sine wave up and down, lots of very cyclical.

因此，这削弱了工业界进行投资、招聘和采购长周期物资的确定性。

And so that hurts the certainty of industry to be able to invest and hire and buy long lead items, etc.

因此，你需要多年期采购。

And that's why you need multi year procurement.

因此，你需要一个七年的窗口期。

That's why you need a seven year window.

如果我们能推动这个弹药计划落地，那么整个计划就很有意义。

That's why this whole munitions plan makes sense if we can get it off the ground.

这是汤姆·基恩邀请您收听彭博社监控播客。

This is Tom Keene inviting you to join us for the Bloomberg Surveillance Podcast.

它致力于让您每个工作日都变得更睿智。

It's about making you smarter every business day.

我是保罗·斯威尼。

I'm Paul Sweeney.