Odd Lots - 美国国债收益率大幅飙升背后的原因 封面

美国国债收益率大幅飙升背后的原因

What's Behind the Big Surge in US Government Bond Yields

本集简介

全球债券收益率处于2008年以来的最高水平,30年期美国国债收益率在财政部长斯科特·贝森特宣布意外扩大其部门债券回购计划之前触及5%,美联储主席凯文·沃什也在杰克逊霍尔发表鹰派讲话。那么,是什么推动收益率上升?政策制定者有哪些选择来压低收益率?在本期节目中,我们与斯坦福大学教授达雷尔·达菲对话,他多年来一直研究债券市场,包括在2023年杰克逊霍尔研讨会上提交了一篇关于如何修复美国国债市场的论文。自那以来,情况发生了很大变化,在今年的杰克逊霍尔研讨会上,我们再次与达菲交流,探讨债券市场正在发生的一切,以及缩减美联储资产负债表所面临的挑战。 获取洛杉矶现场观看《Odd Lots》的门票! 请访问 omnystudio.com/listener 了解隐私信息。

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深入了解那些正在塑造当今复杂经济的创新者、颠覆者以及科技驱动的趋势。

Gain insight on the innovators, disruptors, and tech driven trends shaping today's complex economy.

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我是卡罗尔·马瑟。

I'm Carol Masser.

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我是蒂姆·斯泰内维克。

And I'm Tim Stenevek.

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用彭博商业周刊每日播客来结束你的工作日吧。

Wrap up your workday with the Bloomberg Businessweek daily podcast.

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我们带你深入探讨那些影响你生活的故事,从人工智能的演变到全球商业重心的转移。

We bring you deeper dives into the stories shaping your world from the evolution of AI to the shifting priorities of global business.

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还有硅谷的权力人物和最新的科技趋势。

Plus Silicon Valley power players and the latest tech trends.

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补上你白天错过的那些对话。

Catch up on the conversations you miss during the day.

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在苹果播客、Spotify或任何你收听的地方订阅彭博商业周刊每日播客。

Subscribe to the Bloomberg Businessweek daily podcast on Apple, Spotify, or anywhere you listen.

Speaker 2

你好,Odd Lots的听众们。

Hello, Odd Lots listeners.

Speaker 2

我是乔·维森塔尔。

I'm Joe Wiesenthal.

Speaker 2

还有

And

Speaker 3

我是特蕾西·阿拉维。

I'm Tracy Allaway.

Speaker 2

我们是Odd Lots播客的主持人,今天有件激动人心的事要告诉你们。

We're the hosts of the Odd Lots podcast, and we've got something exciting for you.

Speaker 3

没错。

That's right.

Speaker 3

主持播客最棒的一点就是能真正见到听众,和他们互动,我们知道在洛杉矶有一些我们的听众。

So one of the best parts of hosting our podcast is we get to actually meet and interact with our listeners, and we know we have some listeners over in Los Angeles.

Speaker 2

对。

That's right.

Speaker 2

所以如果你在洛杉矶,我们将会录制一场现场节目,一些现场录音

So if you're in LA, we are going to be recording a live show, some live recordings

Speaker 3

在

at

Speaker 2

好莱坞的佛蒙特剧院,9月17日。

the Vermont Theatre in Hollywood on September 17.

Speaker 3

我们邀请了一些非常令人兴奋的嘉宾,也准备了一些非常精彩的对话。

We have some really exciting guests lined up, have some really great conversations planned.

Speaker 3

所以赶紧去看看吧。你可以在bloomberg.com/oddlots找到这些信息,或者点击节目说明中的链接,到时候来打个招呼吧。

So go ahead and get your You can find those over at bloomberg.com/oddlots, or click the link below in the show notes and come and say hi when you're there.

Speaker 0

彭博音频工作室。

Bloomberg Audio Studios.

Speaker 0

播客。

Podcasts.

Speaker 0

电台。

Radio.

Speaker 0

新闻。

News.

Speaker 3

大家好,欢迎收听另一期Odd Lots播客。

Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.

Speaker 3

我是Tracy Alloy。

I'm Tracy Alloy.

Speaker 2

我是Joe Wiesenthal。

And I'm Joe Wiesenthal.

Speaker 3

Joe,我们现在还在Jackson Hole。

Well, Joe, we are still at Jackson Hole

Speaker 2

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 3

今年研讨会的官方主题是支付领域的金融创新。

Where the official theme of this year's symposium is financial innovation in payments.

Speaker 3

不过,非官方主题肯定是债券收益率和美联储到底怎么回事,因为整个会议都是在收益率上升的背景下进行的,尤其是长期收益率,还有新任美联储主席。

However, the unofficial theme has to be what the heck is going on with bond yields and the Federal Reserve because this whole meeting is coming against a backdrop of higher yields, particularly at the long end, a new Fed chair Yeah.

Speaker 3

他好像想在美联储留下自己的印记,还成立了各种特别工作组,研究沟通、资产负债表之类的事情。

Who seems to want to make a mark on the Fed and has started all these different task forces to look at things like comms and balance sheets.

Speaker 3

然后,当然,我们还有一个美联储,感觉可能跟美国财政部有点对着干。

And then, of course, we also have a Fed that seems to kind of maybe be operating at crosscurrents to the US Treasury Yeah.

Speaker 3

因为财政部现在在回购长期债券,似乎在压低长期收益率。

Given that the Treasury is now buying back longer dated bonds and seemingly suppressing longer dated yields.

Speaker 2

你刚才说的涉及好多不同的方面。

There's so many different dimensions to what you described.

Speaker 2

对吧?

Right?

Speaker 2

有正式的技术层面。

So there is the formal technical thing.

Speaker 2

还有美联储和财政部之间的关系。

There is the sort of relationship between the Fed and the Treasury.

Speaker 2

还有美联储内部正在发生的新变化。

There is the new things going on inside the Fed.

Speaker 2

显然经济也在升温。

There's obviously the the warmth in the economy.

Speaker 2

顺便说一句,太阳出来了。

By the way, the sun just came out.

Speaker 2

我们正在户外录制。

We're recording outside.

Speaker 2

今天一整天都是阴雨凉爽的。

It was been rainy and cool all day.

Speaker 2

现在突然又热起来了。

Now it suddenly got hot again.

Speaker 2

也许这是个好兆头。

Maybe that's a sign.

Speaker 2

总之,这就是为什么在杰克逊霍尔很有趣,我们能接触到各种各样的人,包括那些正好处于我们讨论的所有话题交汇点上的人。

Anyway, that's why it's fun to be in Jackson Hole, There are all kinds of different people we can talk to, including people who sit perfectly at this intersection of all the things that we're talking about.

Speaker 3

这正是我想说的。

That's exactly what I was gonna say.

Speaker 3

所以,今天的嘉宾,真的是最合适的嘉宾,他既能综合宏观形势,又能分析债券市场的动态,还能讲清楚国债市场的实际运作。

So the the guest for today, truly the perfect guest, someone who's able to sort of synthesize the macro and what's going on in the bond market as well as some of the operations of the actual treasury market.

Speaker 3

所以,真的是最合适的嘉宾,我们要和Darrell Duffie聊聊。

So truly the perfect guest, we're gonna be speaking with Darrell Duffie.

Speaker 3

他当然是斯坦福大学的金融学教授。

He is, of course, professor of finance over at Stanford University.

Speaker 3

那么,Darrell,非常感谢你再次来到Odd Lots节目。

So, Darrell, thank you so much for coming back on Odd Lots.

Speaker 4

Tracy,Joe,很高兴再次回来。

Tracy, Joe, great to be back.

Speaker 4

谢谢。

Thank you.

Speaker 3

债券收益率上升和支付系统之间有什么联系吗?

Is there a connection between higher bond yields and the payment system?

Speaker 3

基本上,你为什么会来这儿?

Basically, why are you here?

Speaker 4

嗯,有可能。

Well, there can be.

Speaker 4

2020年3月,当市场失灵时,美联储……

In March 2020, when the markets became dysfunctional, the Fed

Speaker 3

回答得好。

good answer.

Speaker 4

美联储不得不介入,清理大型交易商的资产负债表,以维持债券市场的运转,而债券收益率飙升且波动剧烈。

The Fed had to step in and, dig out the balance sheets of the largest dealers to keep the bond market moving, and bond yields jumped and were very volatile.

Speaker 2

我们上次谈话也是在杰克逊霍尔,当时我们讨论了如今交易的公共债务规模与交易商资产负债表稀缺性之间的关系。

The last time we talked was also at Jackson Hole, and we talked about this relationship between just the sheer volume of public debt that's traded these days and the sort of, like, scarce dealer balance sheet.

Speaker 2

而且,你知道,人们谈论债务规模时,通常会提到债务占GDP的比例之类的。

And this is, like, a you know, often when people talk about the size of the debt, they talk about maybe, like, debt to GDP or something like that or whatever.

Speaker 2

而你当时关注的是这个,你的研究也是从不同的角度切入的。

This is, like, what you what you focus on then and some of your work takes it from a different angle.

Speaker 2

是的。

Yes.

Speaker 2

说说交易量,但更重要的是我们用来处理这些交易的那些管道。

Talk about the volume, but just sort of the pipes that we have to run it through.

Speaker 4

没错。

That's right.

Speaker 4

而且,你知道,在2020年那次事件之后,有人说这种情况会再次发生。

And, you know, after that event in 2020, said it would happen again.

Speaker 4

交易商的资产负债表会再次堵塞,但即使我们今天看到大量交易,交易商还有更多空间。

Dealer balance sheets would get clogged again, but even with the massive amounts of trading we're seeing today, the dealers have more space yet.

Speaker 4

可能是资本监管不够严格,也可能是交易商已经重新注资,但它们肯定还在起作用。

Could be capital regulations are not as strong, it could be the dealers have recapitalized, but they're definitely in force.

Speaker 3

我确实想多聊聊这个,但就基本层面而言,当你看到三十年期国债收益率超过5%时,我知道今天在主席讲话后有所回落,但当你看到收益率处于那个水平时,你怎么看?

I definitely want to talk more about that, but just on a basic level, when you look at yields on something like the thirty year above 5%, I know they've come in slightly today following, the chairman's speech, but when you see a yield at that level, what do you think?

Speaker 3

它告诉你什么?

What is it telling you?

Speaker 4

嗯,如果我是财政部长,它告诉我美国在利息支出上花了太多钱,我需要尽我所能压低这些收益率。

Well, if I'm the secretary of the treasury, it's telling me that The United States is spending a heck of a lot on interest expense, I need to do what I can to get those yields down.

Speaker 4

问题是,财政部长能做什么呢?

The question is, what can the treasury secretary do?

Speaker 4

作为经济学家,我会做这样一个思想实验。

As an economist, I run the following thought experiment.

Speaker 4

假设,Tracy,我说服你相信没有通胀风险。

Suppose, Tracy, I were to convince you there's no inflation risk.

Speaker 4

通胀就像今天市场所显示的那样,未来会相当稳定。

Inflation is as indicated in today's markets is pretty stable going forward.

Speaker 4

主权国家不会违约。

The sovereign is not going to default.

Speaker 4

你比如说,是一个对冲基金,一个宏观对冲基金。

You are, let's say, a hedge fund, a macro hedge fund.

Speaker 4

你持有两百亿美元的十年期国债。

You have 20,000,000,000 of the ten years.

Speaker 3

我希望如此,但请继续。

I wish, but go

Speaker 4

而且我是从财政部打来的电话,我建议你可以再买一百亿,你自己的资产负债表上还有空间。

and I'm calling from the Treasury Department and I'm suggesting that you could take another ten, there's space on your own balance sheet to do that.

Speaker 4

现在,考虑到我刚才描述的SAFE债券的条件,你为什么不买呢?

Now given the conditions that I described for the SAFE bonds, why wouldn't you?

Speaker 4

原因是你已经选择了持有5.3%收益率的债券,而为了让你再买一百亿,你需要更高的收益率来补偿你。

The reason is you already have what you chose to have at 5.3% and in order to get you to buy 10,000,000,000 more, you need a higher yield to compensate you.

Speaker 4

外国央行,他们早就有了他们需要的。

The foreign central banks, they have had what they need for a long time now.

Speaker 4

他们不会再买更多了。

They're not buying more.

Speaker 4

外国投资者总体上并没有跟上债券市场的规模。

Foreign investors generally are not keeping up with the size of the bond market.

Speaker 4

所以,是那些对收益率敏感的自由投资者,比如共同基金、对冲基金、银行、保险公司、养老基金,他们被要求持有更多这种相当安全的资产,但除非获得更高的收益率补偿,否则他们不会这么做。

So it's the discretionary investors, the mutual funds, hedge funds, banks, insurance companies, pension funds that are yield sensitive and are being asked to take more of a pretty safe asset, but they're not gonna do it unless they get more yield compensation.

Speaker 2

这个思考角度挺有意思的。

It's an interesting way to think about it.

Speaker 2

所以,在特蕾西那个典型的对冲基金里,她有200亿美元的国债配置,但没人会付钱给特蕾西,就为了让她持有国债。

So in Tracy's proverbial hedge fund, she has the $20,000,000,000 allocation to treasuries, but no one's paying Tracy just to hold treasuries.

Speaker 2

对吧?

Right?

Speaker 2

所以她肯定还有很多其他资产,风险资产。

So she presumably has a lot of other assets, risky assets.

Speaker 2

也许她买了英伟达的股票。

Maybe she's been in Nvidia.

Speaker 3

我买的是最好的

I've got the best

Speaker 2

资产,乔。

assets, Joe.

Speaker 3

最好的。

The best.

Speaker 2

也许她买了韩国芯片股,或者其他那些东西。

Maybe she's been in Korean chip stocks or all the other things.

Speaker 2

不过说到定价,我们在多大程度上可以把国债看作是在和其他理论上可投资的资产竞争呢?

When we think about the pricing, though, to what extent does it make sense to think about a treasury bond being as in competition for other theoretically investable assets?

Speaker 2

当所有这些资产都在飞涨,或者像我们看到的很多资产那样,这是否会对无风险资产产生某种连锁反应?

And when all those are flying to the moon, or many of them like we've seen, does that have a sort of a reverberation onto the risk free asset?

Speaker 4

当然会,而且其他债券也包括在内。

Sure it does, and it's other bonds included in that.

Speaker 4

众所周知,超大规模企业一直在要求债券投资者进行大量投资,这些需求都在不断累积。

The hyperscalers have famously been demanding a lot of investment by bond investors, and it's all piling on.

Speaker 4

但最大的问题其实出在各国政府身上,不只是美国,但尤其是美国。

But the biggest culprit is our governments generally, not just The US, but in especially The US.

Speaker 4

而且政府的财政赤字和债务占GDP的比例高得惊人,而且看不到尽头。

And government, you know, deficits and debt to GDP are spectacularly high, and there's no end in sight.

Speaker 4

所以这种累积效应,我觉得主要是在债券市场上。

So this piling on effect, you know, I think it's mainly in the bond market.

Speaker 2

债务占GDP的比例,看不到尽头,等等。

Debt to GDP ratios, no end in sight, etcetera.

Speaker 2

我觉得这确实有道理。

I certainly that seems right.

Speaker 2

五六年前人们就可以这么说了。

People could have said that five or six years ago.

Speaker 2

嗯,或者他们在2018年、2019年就可以这么说,而且他们多年来一直对日本这么说,但利率却一直在走低。

Well or they could have said that 2018, 2019, and they said it for years about Japan and just rates kept going layer.

Speaker 2

现在,现在它们却在走高。

Now now they're going higher.

Speaker 2

但他们之前一直说利率会继续走低。

But they said they kept going lower.

Speaker 2

那是什么原因呢?

What is it?

Speaker 2

是什么发生了变化?

What changed?

Speaker 2

就像,你十年前就可以讲这个故事,也可以把人口结构因素摆出来。

Like like, you could have told this story ten years ago and you could have laid out the demographics.

Speaker 2

你还可以谈谈政治上缺乏削减开支的意愿等等。

You could have talked about the lack of political appetite to cut spending, etcetera.

Speaker 2

到底是什么根本性的变化导致了这种逆转?

What changed fundamentally such that we got this reversal?

Speaker 4

好,那我们再往前追溯,当时国际货币基金组织说债务占GDP的60%是红线。

Okay, so let's go back even further to when the IMF said 60% debt to GDP is the red line.

Speaker 4

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 4

你不应该超过这个数字,如果超过了,风险自负。

You should not want to go beyond that and if you do it's at your own risk.

Speaker 4

这个数字对所有主要政府来说一直在不断上升。

That number just kept getting higher and higher for all major governments.

Speaker 4

现在法国债务占GDP的比例也达到了100%。

France now is also at 100% debt to GDP.

Speaker 4

所以变化的是政府债务相对于GDP的绝对规模。

So what's changed is the sheer volume of government debt relative to GDP.

Speaker 4

它一直在不断攀升。

It marches on and on.

Speaker 4

十年前,它远未达到100%,而国债市场,我记得大约是18万亿美元,现在已经是31万亿美元了。

Ten years ago it wasn't anywhere near 100% and the treasury market was, let's see, if I recall about 18,000,000,000,000, now it's 31,000,000,000,000.

Speaker 4

所以,这纯粹是规模问题。

So it's just volume.

Speaker 4

正如肯·罗格夫午餐时所说,长期收益率存在很多均值回归现象,事情来来去去,但一直在增加的是越来越多的债券债务。

As Ken Rogoff remarked at lunch, there's a lot of regression to the mean in terms of long term yields and things come and go, but what's been coming is more and more bond debt.

Speaker 4

是的,你能

Yeah, can you

Speaker 3

再多谈谈与超大规模企业的竞争吗?

say more about this idea of competition with hyperscalers?

Speaker 3

因为我觉得有些人似乎认为这是理所当然的,比如超大规模企业发行了这么多债务到市场上,尤其是长期债务,显然会产生挤出效应。

Because I see some people seem to take it as a given, like the hyperscalers are issuing so much debt into the market, particularly longer term debt that like it obviously has this crowding out effect.

Speaker 3

但我也看到另一些人,他们会说,哦,不。

But then I see some other people, and they'll be like, oh, no.

Speaker 3

美国国债的买家和投资级债券的买家是不同的,他们之间根本不存在竞争关系。

The buyers of US Treasuries are different to the buyers of investment grade bonds, and there's no way they're in competition with each other.

Speaker 3

但在我看来,现在债券市场的大主题就是投资者需要吸收更多的久期风险。

But to me, it feels like the overall theme of the bond market right now is this additional duration that investors have to absorb.

Speaker 4

不。

No.

Speaker 4

完全正确。

That's absolutely right.

Speaker 4

我不会说是超大规模企业挤占了国债市场,反而恰恰相反。

And I wouldn't describe it as the hyperscalers crowding out the treasury department, but rather the other way around.

Speaker 4

这个规模很有意思。

The volume interesting.

Speaker 4

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 4

我的意思是,32万亿美元,而且每年还在增加2万亿美元。

I mean, 32,000,000,000,000 and and rising at 2,000,000,000,000 a year.

Speaker 4

其实也没什么,但确实是这样。

There's nothing I mean, it is true.

Speaker 4

超大规模企业未来几年可能会达到一万亿的债务。

Hyperscalers are perhaps gonna hit a trillion of debt in the next couple of years.

Speaker 4

跟财政部相比,这算小的了。

That's small compared to the treasury department.

Speaker 4

所以,我真的认为是财政部,而且不只是美国财政部,全球各国的财政部和立法机构,都在把大量债券塞给同一批投资者。

So I, you know, I really think it's the Treasury and not just the US Treasury, finance ministries and legislatures around the world that are stuffing a lot of bonds into the hands of the same investors.

Speaker 4

是的,养老基金、保险公司,他们会买下所有这些,然后做出权衡,我们也看到了收益率的变化。

Yeah, pension funds, insurance companies, they'll buy all of this and they make trade offs and we see what's happening to yields.

Speaker 2

我刚想到一个科幻故事的好点子,就是这些巨大的政府债务压垮了政府,而这些AI建造公司变成了新的主权实体。

I just thought of a great idea for a sci fi story in which essentially these giant government debt loads, collapsed governments, and these AI building companies become the new sovereign.

Speaker 3

我一直这么说。

That's what I've been saying.

Speaker 3

看,这在玛格丽特·阿特伍德的一本书里就有。

See, that's in Margaret Atwood, one of Margaret Atwood's books.

Speaker 3

基本上就是公司取代了政府,你住在公司园区里,一切由科技公司提供,包裹着你的生活。

It's the companies basically replace the governments, and you live in a corporate compound, and everything is provided to you by the tech company, wrapping

Speaker 2

还有Claude收益率和Gemini收益率,这些都可以无风险赚到。

And the Claude yield and the Gemini yield, and those will be earned you risk free.

Speaker 2

Boyd,我想再回到一个话题。

Boyd, I wanna get back to one more thing.

Speaker 2

你说的这些我都明白了。

So I get all of this, what you're saying.

Speaker 2

不过有一个词还没提到,那就是通货膨胀。

One word that hasn't come up, though, is inflation.

Speaker 2

所以我在想,七八年前和现在的一个很大区别是,持续多年通胀高于目标,而且即使大幅加息也没能把它拉回目标水平。

And so when I think like a big difference between seven or eight years ago and now is that there's continued to be high inflation years above target, and it turned out it was even a very aggressive rate hiking cycle didn't get it back to target.

Speaker 2

为什么不能简单地说,利率上升的原因就是一系列短期利率高于预期,因为有很多通胀推动因素,其中之一可能就是支出。

Why couldn't it simply be that the reason for higher rates is the series of higher short term rates as expected because there are a lot of inflationary impulses, one among them may be spending.

Speaker 4

从长远来看,通胀和债券价格是同步的。

In the long run, inflation and bond prices go together.

Speaker 4

这是价格水平的财政理论。

It's a fiscal theory of the price level.

Speaker 4

去读读约翰·科克伦的书,或者……

Read John Cochran's book or

Speaker 2

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 4

也许你已经读过了。

Maybe you have.

Speaker 2

我们从来没在播客里请过约翰。

We've never heard John on the podcast.

Speaker 2

我们真应该……

We really should

Speaker 4

……这么做。

do that.

Speaker 4

他非常适合讨论这个问题。

He he would be perfect on this question.

Speaker 4

但今天,如果你看实际债券和名义债券推算出的远期隐含通胀数据,

But today, if you look at forward implied inflation numbers coming from real and nominal bonds

Speaker 2

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 4

它们根本没有显示出任何警报信号。

They're not showing alarm bells at all.

Speaker 4

确实,过去五年我们的通胀水平明显高于美联储希望看到的。

It's true that we've had a significantly more inflation than the Fed would like to see for the last five years.

Speaker 4

而且正如凯文·沃什今早提到的,其他人也说过,美联储还有很多工作要做。

And as Kevin Warsh remarked this morning and others have spoken, the last part is a lot of work remaining to be done by the Fed.

Speaker 4

所以,是的,通胀是个担忧。

So, yeah, inflation is a concern.

Speaker 4

我的看法是,我不认为这是那些考虑十年、二十年、三十年期的债券投资者最关心的问题。

My view, I don't think that's what bond investors that are thinking about the tens, twenties, and thirty years, what's foremost on their mind.

Speaker 4

我觉得他们关注的是供需关系。

I think they're looking at the supply relative to the demand.

Speaker 4

再说,外国央行已经买够了,不会再买更多了。

Again, foreign central banks have had all that they need and they're not buying more.

Speaker 4

现在主要是国内的散户投资者被要求吸收这些额外的供应,他们自然需要更高的回报。

And it's mostly domestic discretionary investors that are being asked to take this additional supply and they just need more compensation.

Speaker 5

获取关于推动科技行业进入新领域的人物和公司的重要新闻。

Get essential news on the people and companies pushing the tech sector to new frontiers.

Speaker 5

你好。

Hi.

Speaker 5

我是艾德·拉德洛。

I'm Ed Ludlow.

Speaker 5

欢迎收听彭博科技,这是一个每日播客,专注于科技、创新和商业的未来。

Join me for Bloomberg Tech, a daily podcast focused exclusively on technology, innovation, and the future of business.

Speaker 5

每个工作日,我们都会为您带来硅谷顶级公司的最新见解,以及与科技界最重要决策者的对话。

Every weekday, we bring you the latest insights on Silicon Valley's top companies and conversations with tech's biggest decision makers.

Speaker 5

在通勤回家的路上收听彭博科技,保持对新闻动态的领先。

Listen to Bloomberg Tech on your commute home and stay ahead of the news cycle.

Speaker 5

今天就在Apple、Spotify或任何你收听的地方订阅吧。

Subscribe today on Apple, Spotify, or anywhere you listen.

Speaker 3

这个问题有点老套,但我想问的是,那波债务发行潮对央行行长们到底意味着什么?

This is kind of a cliched question, but that deluge of debt issuance, I guess, what does that actually mean for central bankers?

Speaker 3

因为当你来参加这样的会议时,感觉这是最明显的事情,你会听到一些关于财政主导的窃窃私语,但没有人真正直接谈论它。

Because when you come to a conference like this, it feels like that's the obvious thing in the mix, and you hear little whispers of words like fiscal dominance, but no one actually talks about it in any direct way.

Speaker 4

是的。

Yeah.

Speaker 4

我觉得美联储在刻意回避财政主导的问题。

I think the Fed is studiously avoiding fiscal dominance.

Speaker 4

它不会,也不会与财政部讨论收益率曲线控制。

It wouldn't it would not entertain a discussion with the treasury, regarding yield curve control.

Speaker 4

上次发生这种情况是在20世纪50年代,美联储和财政部之间的协议以非常不愉快的方式结束。

The last time that happened, it was a very acrimonious end in the nineteen fifties with the treasury the Fed treasury accord.

Speaker 4

人们以为“协议”这个词意味着他们达成了良好的共识。

People think the word accord means they they had a good agreement.

Speaker 4

实际上,他们当时吵得非常厉害。

It actually means they had a really, really rough argument.

Speaker 2

有意思。

Interesting.

Speaker 4

美联储当时极不情愿地给债券市场提供了一些支持,但时间很短,之后就退出了收益率曲线控制,而且它不想再重蹈覆辙。

And the Fed supplied some support to the bond market kicking and screaming for a short period of time and then got out of the business of yield curve control, and it won't want to revisit that.

Speaker 4

美联储,也就是联邦公开市场委员会,会尽一切可能避免陷入财政主导。

The Fed will the FOMC will do everything possible not to get into fiscal dominance.

Speaker 4

所以,这就是我的看法。

So I think that's that's my reaction.

Speaker 3

我们想和你聊的一个原因是,你专门研究过国债回购计划的影响,而且,我猜,大概是一两周前?

So one of the reasons we wanted to speak to you is because you've done work on the impact of treasury buyback programs in particular, and of course, I guess, it a week or two ago?

Speaker 3

我已经完全没有时间概念了。但最近,我们请到了斯科特·奥弗

I've lost all sense of But recently, we had Scott Over

Speaker 2

过去两周。

the last two weeks.

Speaker 3

是的。

Yeah.

Speaker 3

我们听说斯科特·贝森特宣布要扩大财政部的回购计划规模。

We had Scott Bessent announcing that he was increasing the size of the Treasury's buyback program.

Speaker 3

他提到了流动性方面的担忧,但据我所知,当时国债市场看起来一切正常。

He cited liquidity concerns, but as far as I can tell, things looked pretty normal in the Treasury market at that moment in time.

Speaker 3

你觉得他当时是怎么想的?

What do you think his thinking was?

Speaker 4

从他的言论来看,他似乎认为收益率过高,不管流动性如何,而且他觉得市场参与者应该明白,美国国债收益率低一些才是合理的。

Well, from, from his remarks, he seemed to think that yields were too high irrespective of liquidity concerns, and that in his view, market participants should have understood that a lower yield for the US Treasury securities would be appropriate.

Speaker 4

他还说他在向市场发出信号,他用了“信号”这个词,表明他认为国债收益率太高了。

And he said that he was signaling, he used the word signal, signaling to the market his belief that Treasury yields were too high.

Speaker 4

现在我们可以看到,虽然市场当时对这一消息反应很快,但很快就反转了。

Now I think we subsequently can see that while the market reacted quickly to that news, it reversed itself pretty quickly afterwards.

Speaker 4

这在一定程度上与财政部相对于债券市场的实力有关。

Part of that related to the firepower of the Treasury Department relative to the bond market.

Speaker 4

我相信你还记得詹姆斯·卡维尔关于债券市场影响力的那句名言。

I'm sure you remember James Carville's famous comments about the power of the bond market.

Speaker 3

任何写过债券市场的人,都曾在某篇专栏里用这句话作为开头,我也不例外。

Anyone who has ever written about the bond market has used this quote as the lead for a column at some point, myself included.

Speaker 4

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 4

你有没有

Did you

Speaker 2

看到特朗普说的

see what Trump said

Speaker 3

什么?

What?

Speaker 3

前几天?

The other day?

Speaker 3

看到了。

Yeah.

Speaker 3

关于军事

About military

Speaker 2

干预,军事干预债券市场。

intervention Military intervention in the bond market.

Speaker 2

我不知道。

I don't know.

Speaker 2

也许詹姆斯·卡维尔当时没有完全想到,债券义警可能被炸到屈服,他可能没考虑过这一点。

Maybe James Carville wasn't thinking fully that the the bond vigilante had not James Carville had not considered that the bond vigilantes could be bombed into submission potentially.

Speaker 2

我不知道他有没有那样想过。

I don't know if he thought about it that way.

Speaker 4

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 4

嗯,即使是强大的美国财政部,在设定收益率方面也不如债券市场有影响力。

Well, even the mighty US Treasury Department is not as powerful as bond markets when it comes to setting yields.

Speaker 4

我们还从日元干预中看到一些信号,也许首先,我们的财政部比过去更加积极,更愿意参与金融市场交易。

We also saw in the Yen intervention some signals that perhaps, first, we have a more activist Treasury Department than we've had in the past in terms of willingness to engage in financial market trades.

Speaker 4

第二,可能有人担心,如果日本那边情况不妙,日本央行需要抛售美国国债,那就会加剧我们刚才讨论的那种抛售潮,给美国国债市场和美国政府的利息支出带来麻烦。

And secondly, that there might be some concern that if things don't go well in Japan and the Japanese Central Bank needs to unload treasuries, that that would add on to this piling on that we just discussed and cause problems for US Treasury, Treasury markets and the interest expense of the US government.

Speaker 4

所以我的印象是,也许我想多了,但贝森特财长是想让市场明白,财政部不会坐视不管,任由这种情况发生。

So my impression, maybe I'm reading too much between the lines, is that Secretary Bessent wanted the market to understand that the Treasury Department wasn't just going to sit there idly and take that.

Speaker 4

他们想参与其中。

They wanted to be involved.

Speaker 2

我觉得传统的干预讨论中,干预措施在设定水平目标时效果更好,而不是设定数量目标。

I feel like classical discussions of interventions, they seem to work better when they're not volume bound by but by level bound.

Speaker 2

而且通常当干预是设定水平目标时,你甚至不需要花一分钱。

And when it seems often the case when they're level bound, you don't even have to spend anything.

Speaker 2

所以你就说,好。

So you say, okay.

Speaker 2

5%就是我们的底线。

5% is our line in the sand.

Speaker 2

理论上,财政部难道不能发行两年期国债,然后把三十年期国债都买回来吗?

And in theory, doesn't the treasury have it could just issue two year bills and just take out the thirties.

Speaker 2

那我的意思是,如果贝森特非常强烈地觉得这些价格在根本层面上就是不合理,他能不能就说,你知道吗,我们只发行两年期或五年期的国债,不管怎样,只要三十年期收益率到4.99%,我们就买入,如果你是债券义警,你觉得它会涨,你做空债务,你会被狠狠烧伤的?

Would that I mean, if Bessent very strongly feels that it's like these prices just do not, on some fundamental level, do not make sense, Could he just say, you know what, we're gonna issue only two years or five years or whatever, we're gonna buy thirty years anytime they get to 4.99%, and if you're a bond vigilante and you're thinking it's gonna go, you're shorting debt, you're gonna get badly burned?

Speaker 4

嗯,那会增加美国政府利息支出的波动性,因为你的债务期限会越来越短。

Well, that would be a formula for increasing the interest rate expense volatility for the US government because your debt maturity is going to be shorter and shorter.

Speaker 2

对。

Right.

Speaker 4

而且你会在反映当前市场状况的拍卖中展期这些债务,你利息支出中越来越大的一部分会逐日实现。

And you're going to be rolling over that debt in auctions that will reflect current market conditions and a larger and larger fraction of your interest expense is going to be realized on a day to day basis.

Speaker 4

所以美国的情况还是相当不错的。

So that's a US is still in pretty good shape.

Speaker 4

它的平均债务期限大约是六年。

It has an average debt maturity of about six years.

Speaker 4

我也认为,政府仅凭自己的资源,是不足以控制这些趋势的。

I also, you know, have the view that governments are just not powerful enough to control these trends with their own, you know, resources.

Speaker 4

让我们回到1992年对英镑的攻击,当时斯科特·贝森特在索罗斯对冲基金工作,英国政府根本无法捍卫英镑,而且它根本不应该尝试。

Let's go back to the attack on the British pound that in which Scott Bessent had a had a role in 1992 when he was working with the Soros hedge fund, the the British government was simply unable to defend the pound, and it should never have tried.

Speaker 4

那样做消耗了很多火力。

It used up a lot of its firepower that way.

Speaker 4

所以,就像我说的,即使美国财政部,如果市场决定收益率会到6%,美国财政部也没法在这方面有太大的话语权。

And so even, as I said, the US Treasury Department if if markets decide that yields are gonna be at 6%, the US Treasury Department is not gonna be able to have a strong say in that.

Speaker 4

除非,你知道,承担很大的风险。

Not not without, you know, taking a lot of risk.

Speaker 3

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 3

那你的研究实际上是怎么说的,关于国债回购的影响和持续时间?

What does your research actually say about, I guess, the the impact and duration of treasury buy backs?

Speaker 3

因为这不是财政部第一次这么做了。

Because this isn't the first time the treasury is doing this.

Speaker 3

有很多实际案例可以作为你研究的基础。

There's plenty of empirical instances that you can base your research on.

Speaker 3

你之前发现了什么?

What have you found previously?

Speaker 4

嗯,我现在正和纽约联邦储备银行的两位经济学家迈克尔·弗莱明和奥什·沙卡尔合作,还有我在斯坦福的博士生山姆·威彻利。

Well, I'm working right now with, two economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Michael Fleming and Orsh Shakar, and with, my PhD student at Stanford, Sam Witcherly.

Speaker 4

我们正在利用回购数据和经销商资产负债表上的周转数据,来理解回购计划最初目的的好处,那就是去清理旧国债和债券的剩余部分。

And, we are using the buyback, data as well as turnover data on dealer balance sheets to understand the benefit of the original purpose of the buyback program, which is to go out and clean up the leftover bits and pieces of old Treasury notes and bonds.

Speaker 1

Odd Lots。

Odd Lots.

Speaker 1

Odd Lots。

Odd Lots.

Speaker 3

但这些其实已经不怎么交易了,对吧?

But this was stuff that actually wasn't really trading anymore, right?

Speaker 4

是的,它们堵塞了经销商的资产负债表,而且交易价格低于平滑收益率曲线所暗示的水平。

Yeah, it was clogging up dealer balance sheets and trading at lower prices than would be suggested by a smooth yield curve.

Speaker 4

所以当时的想法是,正如时任财政部助理部长乔什·弗罗斯特所解释的,我们要定期、可预测地清理这些零碎部分,用新的流动性国债替换它们,让国债市场更具流动性,并且通过低买高卖为美国纳税人赚点钱。

And so the idea was, as explained by then assistant treasury secretary Josh Frost, let's be regular and predictable and clean up these bits and pieces, make the treasury market more liquid by replacing those with new liquid treasuries, and implicitly make some money for The US taxpayer by buy low, sell high.

Speaker 4

那是个好计划。

And that's a good program.

Speaker 4

我们的研究显示,嗯,还在进行中。

Our research shows well, it's in progress.

Speaker 4

你最终会看到那篇论文的。

You'll see the paper eventually.

Speaker 4

结果显示,是的。

Shows Yeah.

Speaker 2

你和你的博士生可以再来节目上聊聊这个。

You and your PhD student can come back on for that.

Speaker 4

它表明那是有效的。

It shows that that's effective.

Speaker 4

顺便说一句,我觉得财政部长或财政部介入市场,利用回购计划来应对未预料到的需求,是完全合理的。

And by the way, I think it's totally legitimate that a treasury secretary or treasury department would step into the market and use the buyback program for unanticipated needs.

Speaker 4

比如说,回到2020年3月。

So for example, going back to March 2020

Speaker 2

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 4

财政部或国库部门介入市场,说我们的债券市场出了问题,介入对我们有利,而不是完全交给央行,这完全合理。

It's totally legitimate that a finance ministry or a treasury department would say it's our bond market, it's dysfunctional, it benefits us to step into that market and not leave it entirely to the central bank.

Speaker 4

你可能还记得利兹·特拉斯的那份预算案。

You may remember the Liz Truss budget.

Speaker 3

有点印象。

Vaguely.

Speaker 3

有点印象,是的。

Vaguely, yeah.

Speaker 4

那时候,英格兰银行面临一个两难境地。

At that time, the Bank of England faced this dilemma.

Speaker 4

它正在收紧货币政策,同时还得购买英国国债,所以它做了非常明确的区分,并且很快就卖掉了那些国债。

It was tightening its monetary policy and at the same time it had to buy gilts and so it made a very clear distinction and soon afterwards sold those gilts.

Speaker 4

如果财政部参与进来,事情会更容易处理。

It's easier if the Treasury Department is involved.

Speaker 4

在英国的情况中,财政部为英格兰银行可能遭受的损失提供了担保。

In the case of The UK, it indemnified the Bank of England for the losses that it might have incurred.

Speaker 4

而就美国而言,财政部可以利用自己的回购计划来增加火力,规模可以达到数千亿美元,而不是过去几周财政部提到的区区40到80亿美元。

And in the case of The United States, the Treasury Department could use its own buyback program to add firepower, and that could be done on the scale of hundreds of billions, not the mere 4 to 8,000,000,000 that the that, the Treasury Department has been speaking about over the last couple of weeks.

Speaker 2

但以你的视角来看,最近几周,那些传统的流动性指标有没有出现异常?

But from your perspective, in the last few weeks, there's nothing in the sort of classical classical measures of liquidity that were out of whack?

Speaker 4

没有。

No.

Speaker 4

没有,你知道的,交易商的资产负债表看起来状况良好。

Nothing nothing you know, dealer balance sheets seem to be in good shape.

Speaker 4

对。

Okay.

Speaker 4

买卖价差、市场深度都在正常范围内。

Bid offer spreads, market depths are in normal range.

Speaker 6

你好。

Hi.

Speaker 6

我是汤姆·基恩,欢迎收听彭博观察播客。

I'm Tom Keene inviting you to join me for the Bloomberg Surveillance Podcast.

Speaker 6

这个节目旨在让你在每个工作日都变得更聪明。

It's about making you smarter every business day.

Speaker 7

我是保罗·斯威尼。

I'm Paul Sweeney.

Speaker 7

我们为你带来股票、债券、大宗商品,甚至加密货币的全面报道,以及你在市场中脱颖而出所需的所有信息。

We bring you complete coverage of stocks, bonds, commodities, even crypto, all the information you need to excel in the markets.

Speaker 8

我是亚历克西斯·克里斯托弗里斯。

And I'm Alexis Christofferis.

Speaker 8

收听我们的节目,与经济学、金融、投资和国际关系领域最聪明的人物进行重要对话。

Listen to us for essential conversations with the smartest names in economics, finance, investment, and international relations.

Speaker 6

这就是彭博观察播客。

That's the Bloomberg Surveillance Podcast.

Speaker 6

今天就在Apple、Spotify或任何你收听的地方订阅。

Subscribe today on Apple, Spotify, or anywhere you listen.

Speaker 2

我的意思是,一种思考方式是,这与量化宽松或扭转操作等央行在2010年代为改变收益率曲线形状或斜率而采取的措施并没有太大不同。

I mean, one way to think about it is it's not that different from QE or Operation Twist as some of these things that the central bank did in the twenty tens to sort of change the shape or the slope of the yield curve?

Speaker 2

但那是在通胀低于目标、央行试图推动经济重新加速的时期。

But that was in a time of below target inflation and the central bank trying to cause things to reaccelerate.

Speaker 2

但从某种程度上看,这是否像央行在试图刺激通胀时,你通常会预期看到的那种操作?

But on some level, does this look like efforts that classically you might expect to see in an environment where the central bank is trying to goose inflation?

Speaker 4

你说这个,指的是什么行动?

When you say this, meaning what action?

Speaker 2

就是扩大回购、压低长期利率,看起来有点像扭转操作,但那是在通胀低于2%、让央行感到沮丧的环境下。

The sort of the expanded buy backs, the attempt to depress the long end that sort of looks Operation Twisty, but that was in an environment where we were sub 2% to the frustration of the central bank.

Speaker 4

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 4

首先,我不认为这是在踩美联储的脚。

Well, first of all, I don't think this is stepping on the toes of the Fed.

Speaker 2

好的。

Okay.

Speaker 4

而且我确实觉得这有点像扭转操作,但只是微型的扭转。

And I I do think that it feels like a twisty type of operation, but a micro twist.

Speaker 2

没关系。

It's Okay.

Speaker 4

你知道,那几十亿美元的火力,除了信号意义之外,几十亿美元根本起不了什么作用。

The firepower that, you know, a few billion dollars other than the signaling, a few billion dollars is just not gonna move the needle.

Speaker 3

微扭转听起来像是两千年代初那种糟糕的果味酒。

Microtwist sounds like one of those terrible alco pops of, like, the early two thousands.

Speaker 3

对吧?

Right?

Speaker 3

比如,'67年那种。

Like, '67

Speaker 4

听起来

it sounds

Speaker 2

像是我会试试微扭转。

like a I would try a micro twist.

Speaker 3

好的。

Okay.

Speaker 3

好吧,行。

Well, okay.

Speaker 3

但如果财政部真的在发行更多短期债务,事实也确实如此,那这能解决长期收益率的问题吗?还是说只是把问题转移到了货币市场?

But if if the treasury is issuing more short term debt, which it is, does does that solve the long end yield problem or does that just end up shifting the issue into money markets?

Speaker 4

确实,发行转向了短期国库券,回购操作就是这么运作的。

Well, does shift issuance into bills, and that's how buybacks are working with these particular operations.

Speaker 4

对,所以就像我说的,债务期限越来越短,但还没有敲响警钟。

And yeah, so it means as I mentioned, there's shorter and shorter debt maturity but no alarm bells yet.

Speaker 4

美国还没有偏离历史常态。

The US is not out of historical norms.

Speaker 4

实际上,平均期限比正常水平还要长一点,你知道,我目前还不太担心。

It's actually a bit longer maturity, average maturity than normal and you know I'm not that worried yet.

Speaker 4

我的意思是,如果他们继续这样下去,真正的关键在于新发行,而不是回购。如果他们继续像现在这样,按照预测的那样,保持长期证券的发行量,并且持续好几年,那么短期债务的累积最终会变得明显,并引发担忧。

Mean if they were to continue really the real action is in new issuance not in buybacks If they were to continue to keep the issuance of long term securities at current levels as they have been and have forecasted that they will, if they were to keep doing that for years then the piling up of short term debt would eventually be notable and it would cause concern.

Speaker 3

好的,你知道,我在开头提到了现在正在发生的各种事情,其中之一就是新的美联储主席和他成立的特别工作组,包括一个负责研究美联储资产负债表的。

Alright, so you know I talked in the beginning of all these different things that are happening at the moment, but one of them is the new Fed chair and the task forces that he's created, including one that's looking at the Fed balance sheet.

Speaker 3

你能不能稍微代入一下凯文·沃什的角色?

Can you maybe put your Kevin Warsh hat on for a second?

Speaker 3

他说想缩小美联储的资产负债表规模,这为什么是好事?

When he says he wants to shrink the size of the Fed's balance sheet, why is that desirable?

Speaker 4

首先,我不是凯文·沃什,所以我没法猜他心里怎么想。

Well, first, I'm not Kevin Warsh, so I'm I'm not gonna get inside inside his head.

Speaker 4

但根据他去年在G30会议上的发言,那次他对自己的观点表达得最清楚,我觉得他担心美联储在金融市场里显得太活跃,足迹太大,而且有可能会被看作在插手财政政策。所以他想表明——当然这是我的解读——他想避免给人留下这种印象,而缩小资产负债表就能传递这个信号。

But judging from his, speech around the g thirty meeting last year, which in which he was most, clear on his views here, I think he worries that the Fed looks like it's too active in financial markets, that its footprint is too big, and that it has the image of possibly getting into fiscal policy and so he wants to say completely my interpretation he wants to stay clear of having created that impression and a smaller balance sheet would signal that.

Speaker 4

我觉得更有意思的问题是,怎么做到这一点?

I think the more interesting question is how could you do it?

Speaker 4

因为在资产端卖债券很容易,但要在负债端消除那些负债就没那么简单了。

Because it's easy enough to sell bonds on the asset side, but it's not easy to extinguish the liabilities on the other side of the balance sheet.

Speaker 3

没错。

That's right.

Speaker 3

我们一想到美联储的资产负债表,大家总是只想到资产,因为我们经历了这么多年、这么多年的量化宽松,从来没人想过负债那一边。

When we think about the Fed balance sheet, everyone always thinks about assets because we've gone through years and years and years of QE and no one ever thinks about liabilities.

Speaker 3

但这两者必须保持平衡。

But how do you those two things have to be in balance.

Speaker 3

你不能只缩减资产端而不缩减负债端。

You can't shrink the asset side without shrinking the liability side.

Speaker 4

特蕾西,你得出这个结论的速度,比我聊过的几乎所有人都快。

You reached that conclusion, Tracy, faster than almost anyone that I talked to.

Speaker 3

哎呀。

Oh dear.

Speaker 3

好吧。

Okay.

Speaker 4

所以,如果你只是做加减法,你知道,如果你想减少资产,你就得一对一地减少负债。

Well So if you just do adding up, know, if you want to reduce the assets, you have to reduce the liabilities one for one.

Speaker 4

我们一个一个来看。

Let's take them in turn.

Speaker 4

首先是财政部一般账户。

You've got the treasury general account.

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Speaker 4

我觉得美联储不会打电话给财政部说,你能把你在美联储账户里的钱取出来一些吗?

I don't think the Fed's gonna call the treasury and say, would you take some money out of your account at the Fed?

Speaker 4

然后是纸币。

Then you've got paper money.

Speaker 4

我觉得美联储不会发广告说,

I don't think, the Fed is going to put out advertisements saying,

Speaker 3

打开你的钱包,把

Open your wallets and give

Speaker 4

它们交出来。请美国人民和世界上所有持有纸币的人,你们愿意把纸币交上来,这样我们就能减少那项负债吗?

them Please Americans and everybody else out there in the world that has paper money, would you mind turning it in so that we can reduce that liability?

Speaker 4

所以唯一可能大幅减少的就是准备金,也就是商业银行在美联储的存款。

So that the only significant possible reduction is in reserves, meaning the deposits that commercial banks have at the Fed.

Speaker 4

这样做是有空间的,但用美联储现有的工具是做不到的。

And there is scope for doing that, but not with the current tools that the Fed has.

Speaker 2

那是不是需要监管上的改变?

Would there be a regulatory change that would be necessary?

Speaker 2

因为我们等了好多年,对吧,基本上没有资产负债表,然后,你知道,2008年危机来了,突然就出现了这么多储备金。

Because we wait years and years, right, with basically no balance sheet, and then, you know, then 2008 hit and suddenly there's all these reserves.

Speaker 2

为什么我们不能回到过去呢?回到过去会有什么挑战?

Why can't we go back to what would it what would be the challenge of going back

Speaker 1

回到2000年,储备金只有那时的一半?

to 2000 and half that many reserves?

Speaker 1

对。

Right.

Speaker 2

那么,如果我们出于某种原因认为这非常重要,想要回到美联储资产负债表的真正美好旧时光,从监管角度来看,要怎样才能让银行体系回到2005年的样子呢?

So what would be what would it take if we if for some reason we thought this is very important, we want to get back to the real good old days of Fed balance sheet side, what would it actually take from a regulation perspective to get to just a 2005 looking banking system?

Speaker 4

这不可能发生的,乔,因为2005年的流动性监管规定和现在大不相同。

It's not going to happen, Joe, because back in 2005, liquidity regulations were much different.

Speaker 2

好的。

Okay.

Speaker 4

而且那时候美联储对储备金不支付利息。

And the Fed didn't pay interest on reserves.

Speaker 4

所以银行对持有准备金毫无兴趣,因为为什么要持有零利率的准备金,而不把钱投到货币市场赚取全额市场利率呢?

So the banks were not in the least interest in holding reserves because why would you hold reserves getting zero interest when you could invest the money in money markets and under a full market rate?

Speaker 4

如今,为了控制通胀,美联储被迫向银行支付接近市场利率的利息,所以如果你问银行为什么不放弃部分准备金,

Today in order to control inflation, the Fed is forced to pay an interest rate to banks that's roughly the market rate and so you know if you ask a bank why don't you give up some of those reserves?

Speaker 4

他们可能会说,为什么要放弃呢?

They might say well why?

Speaker 4

这些准备金在满足流动性监管要求方面非常有用。

They're so useful for meeting liquidity regulations.

Speaker 2

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 4

它们支付全额市场利率。

They pay a full market interest rate.

Speaker 4

它们非常适合用于支付服务。

They're they're perfect for payment services.

Speaker 4

有什么不好的呢?

What what's not to like?

Speaker 4

这简直就是金融界的瑞士军刀。

It's the Swiss Army knife of finance.

Speaker 4

我们可不会轻易放弃这些。

We're not gonna give those up easily.

Speaker 4

就在2017年的杰克逊霍尔,维拉利查里亚和拉古拉詹提交了一篇论文,描述了一种棘轮效应:每次美联储扩大资产负债表、增加准备金,银行就会对这种极其有用的资产上瘾,不愿意放弃。

And right here in Jackson Hole in 2017, Veralicharia and Raghurajan presented a paper describing a ratchet effect by which every time the Fed increases its balance sheet and adds reserves, the banks get addicted to having more of that extremely useful asset, reserves, and they're reluctant to give it up.

Speaker 4

如果你试图强迫他们放弃,市场就会变得动荡,美联储只能退让。

And if you try to make them, markets get volatile and the Fed has to back off.

Speaker 4

所以,情况已经大不一样了。

So a lot has changed.

Speaker 3

如果你在这个工作组里,你会有什么建议?

What would be your recommendation if you were on this task force?

Speaker 3

我觉得是斯坦因在负责,但你知道,如果沃什说要缩减资产负债表规模,而我们又面临这个准备金问题,你会怎么做?

I think it's Stein who's heading it but you know if Warsh says I want to shrink the size of the balance sheet and we have this reserves problem, what would you do?

Speaker 4

是杰里米·斯坦因、拉古拉姆·拉詹——就是刚才在这里讲棘轮效应的那位经济学家——还有凯伦·迪南。

It's Jeremy Stein, Raghur Rajan, the same economist that spoke here about the ratchet effect, and Karen Dinan.

Speaker 4

都是非常知名的人物,是的。

All very noted Yeah.

Speaker 4

都是非常可信、极其睿智且善于表达的的经济学家。

Very credible, extremely wise and articulate economists.

Speaker 4

他们会做什么、会给出什么建议,我不知道。

What they're gonna do and what they're gonna recommend, I don't know.

Speaker 4

但我认为他们会从非常宏观的角度来看待这个问题。

But I think that they're gonna take a very wide lens look at this.

Speaker 4

他们不会只看规模。

They're not gonna look only at size.

Speaker 4

他们会看资产的构成。

They're gonna look at the composition of the assets.

Speaker 4

我预测他们会——这完全是我自己的猜测,没有从他们那里得到任何消息——我预测他们会建议减少美联储持有的长期国债数量,用短期国库券来替代,以降低美联储利息支出的波动性。

I predict that they will, and this is with no information from them, I predict that they will recommend reducing the quantity of long term Treasury securities that the Fed holds and replacing those with Treasury bills in order to reduce the volatility of the Fed's interest expense.

Speaker 4

所以,举个例子,如果你用短期国库券一比一来支持准备金,那么每当美联储为了控制通胀而不得不向银行支付更多利息时,它也能从国库券上获得相应的利息收入。

So, for example, if you back the reserves one to one with Treasury bills, then every time the Fed has to pay more interest to the banks to control inflation, it's getting more interest on their Treasury bills one for one.

Speaker 4

纸币方面,他们可以继续持有长期证券,而且我觉得美联储对持有抵押贷款支持证券并不感到舒服。

Paper money, they could continue to hold long term securities, and I don't think the Fed feels good about having mortgage backed securities.

Speaker 4

我觉得他们就会让这些证券自然到期。

Think they're just gonna let those roll off.

Speaker 4

所以我认为这可能是他们会涉及的一个领域,就是资产的构成。

So I think that could be in one area that they will get into, is the composition of the assets.

Speaker 4

而在负债方面,很难预测。

And on the liability side, it's hard to predict.

Speaker 4

我个人认为,美联储不需要缩减其资产负债表的规模,但它应该拥有能够做到这一点的工具。

In my own view, the Fed doesn't need to reduce the size of its balance sheet, but it should have the tools that would allow it to do that.

Speaker 4

因为如果我的直觉是对的,这件事背后有政治因素,那么美联储绝不想在缺乏工具的情况下被国会逼到墙角,无法说:不,我们不会按照你们的要求扩大资产负债表,也不会购买你们希望我们购买的资产,而是我们可以通过缩减资产负债表来控制自己的资产负债表,如果需要的话。

Because if my hunch that this has politics around it is correct, The Fed never wants to be put into a corner by Congress over the size of its balance sheet without the tools that would allow the Fed to say, no, we're not going to increase our balance sheet as you would like us to do and buy the assets that you would like us to buy, but rather we can control our own balance sheet by reducing it if we need to.

Speaker 4

这些工具在理论上存在,但美联储在实践中还没有开发出来。

And those tools exist in theory, but they haven't been developed in practice by the Fed yet.

Speaker 4

其他央行已经开发出来了。

They have been for other central banks.

Speaker 3

我还有一个问题,其实也不算问题,更像是个请求——你能说服乔,让他相信期限溢价是个有用的概念吗?

I have one more question and it's not really a question, it's more of a favor really but can you convince Joe that the term premium is a useful concept?

Speaker 3

他根本不信这个。

He doesn't believe in it.

Speaker 3

我觉得你相信它存在,但你觉得它一点用都没有。

I think you believe it exists, but you don't believe that it's useful in any way.

Speaker 2

咱们就直说吧。

Let's literally just talk.

Speaker 4

乔,你不打算为自己辩解一下吗?

You're not gonna defend yourself, Joe?

Speaker 2

我是个简单的人。

I'm a simple man.

Speaker 2

我就看三十年期收益率。

I look at a thirty year yield.

Speaker 2

我觉得它看起来就像三十年的隔夜利率。

I think it looks like a thirty years worth of overnight rates.

Speaker 2

你就把它们加起来,我就知道,这就是我假设的方式,但然后每个人都像,不。

You just add them up, and I just know, that's that's how that's how what I assume, but then everyone's like, no.

Speaker 2

但是期限溢价。

But the term premium.

Speaker 2

然后他们说,然后我说,好吧。

And then they say and then I say, okay.

Speaker 2

但它是什么?

But what is it?

Speaker 2

他们说,嗯,我们真的无法测量它。

They're like, well, we can't really measure it.

Speaker 2

而且我们用来测量的所有模型都不起作用。

And then all the models that we have to measure don't work.

Speaker 2

但相信我们。

But trust us.

Speaker 3

它存在。

It exists.

Speaker 3

这就是它有用的原因。

This is why it's useful.

Speaker 2

然后他们说,哦,国债投资者需要为风险获得补偿。

And then they say and then they say, oh, well, they need treasury investors need compensation for risk.

Speaker 2

我就说,国债投资者,好像这有什么特别似的。

To which I say, just treasury investors as if there's something special about it.

Speaker 2

我真的很难理解这个。

Like, I really struggle with it.

Speaker 2

所以我们需要一个斯坦福经济学家来帮我理清思路。

This is why we need a Stanford economist to straighten me

Speaker 4

理清。

out.

Speaker 4

是的,这是一个容易衡量的概念。

It's a, yeah, it's an easily measured concept.

Speaker 4

好的。

Okay.

Speaker 4

所以它告诉每个人短期和长期资金及利率的价值,但分解它才是难点。

So it tells everyone the value of short term versus long term money and interest rates, but then decomposing it is the hard part.

Speaker 4

你提到,你知道,预期短期利率的路径已经包含在内,这本身就反映了通胀。

So you mentioned, you know, there's the path of expected short term interest rates that's built in, that in its of itself reflects inflation.

Speaker 2

对。

Right.

Speaker 4

然后在此基础上,还有一个风险溢价。如何分解它,你知道,我们之前提到的经济学家约翰·科克伦,是的。

And then on top of that, there's a risk premium And how to decompose that, you know, economists like John Cochran, who we mentioned earlier Yeah.

Speaker 4

他和莫妮卡·皮耶泽齐一起,你知道,在这个分解上做了些最出色的工作,而且它会随时间变化,取决于我们刚才讨论的一个因素,那就是国债发行量,它会抬高整个收益率曲线,如果你认为财政赤字不会下降,它未来还会抬得更高。

With Monica Pietzezzi have, you know, done some of the best work on that decomposition, and it changes over time depending on one of the things that we just discussed earlier, which is the volume of treasury issuance that elevates the entire curve and it elevates it more in the future if you don't think that the fiscal deficits are going to go down.

Speaker 3

好的。

Alright.

Speaker 3

乔带着作业离开播客了。

Joe's going home from his podcast with homework.

Speaker 2

我打算去读点东西。

I'm gonna do some reading.

Speaker 3

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 3

布置阅读任务了。

Assigned reading.

Speaker 3

好的。

Alright.

Speaker 3

斯坦福的达雷尔·达菲,非常感谢你再次来到Odd Lots节目。

Darrell Duffie from Stanford, thank you so much for coming back on Odd Lots.

Speaker 3

真的很感谢。

Really appreciate it.

Speaker 4

特蕾西、乔,和你们聊天总是很愉快。

Tracy, Joe, it's always a pleasure.

Speaker 4

下次再请我来吧。

Ask me back.

Speaker 2

我们一定会再邀请你的。

We we'll definitely do it again.

Speaker 2

非常感谢。

Thank you so much.

Speaker 2

那么,

So,

Speaker 3

乔,那真是太棒了。

Joe, that was great.

Speaker 3

我知道我们一直想聊聊国债回购的事,所以很高兴我们能深入讨论这个话题。

I know we've been meaning to talk about the treasury buyback, so I'm glad we could get into that.

Speaker 3

我在想,你知道,他提到了财政部总账户,对。

I was thinking, you know, he mentioned the treasury general accounts Yeah.

Speaker 3

在美联储,就是财政部的支票账户。

At the Fed, which is, like, the treasury's checking account.

Speaker 3

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 3

你总是听到这个数据,说它大概能覆盖五天的政府开支之类的。

And you always hear this stat that it covers five days of government expenses or something like that.

Speaker 3

我总会想到那些新闻标题,说普通美国人,你知道的,一半的普通美国人只有够花三个月的积蓄。

And I always think about the headlines saying, oh, ordinary Americans, you know, half of ordinary Americans only have enough money to cover three months expenses.

Speaker 3

然后我就想,那美联储呢?

And then I'm like, what about the Fed?

Speaker 3

那财政部呢?

What about the Treasury?

Speaker 3

我有点开玩笑的意思。

I'm being somewhat facetious.

Speaker 3

抱歉。

Sorry.

Speaker 3

那财政部呢?

What about the Treasury?

Speaker 3

但说真的,这确实有点离谱。

But, like, it is kinda crazy.

Speaker 3

就五天。

Five days.

Speaker 2

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 2

我觉得确实有点疯狂,但你知道,总是可以继续发行更多债务。

I guess it is kinda crazy, but, you know, just can always just issue more debt

Speaker 3

如果你在操作的话。

if you're working it.

Speaker 3

那如果债券市场真的崩了呢?

Actually bombs the bond market?

Speaker 3

财政部的账户会怎么样?

What happens to the Treasury's account?

Speaker 2

奇怪的是,我们其实没怎么讨论过那句话,但生活就是这样。

It is weird that we actually haven't talked about that quote very much, but such as life

Speaker 3

我会找个合适的嘉宾来聊这个话题。

I'll find the perfect guest to talk about it.

Speaker 2

2026年的生活就是这样。

Such as life in 2026.

Speaker 3

我觉得那真的很不错。

I thought that was really good.

Speaker 2

我以前其实不太明白,正常情况下为什么会有回购这回事。

I actually did not fully understand previously why buybacks exist in the normal term.

Speaker 2

就是说,先不管为什么这次偏离了常规时间表,就说它们最初为什么存在,还有那种想法,比如那些非活跃的、奇怪的债券,像那种没人要的二十七年期债券,定期清理一下其实挺有道理的。

Like, okay, setting aside why there's the deviation from typical schedule, why they exist in the first place, and this idea that, like, what is the point of having these sort of off the run, weird, you know, is that some twenty seven year bond that's sitting out there that no one wants, whatever, that it just sort of makes sense to have a regular a regular sweep of that.

Speaker 2

你知道在加密货币圈里他们怎么叫这个吗?

Know you know they call it in crypto world?

Speaker 2

什么?

What?

Speaker 2

叫灰尘。

It's dust.

Speaker 2

比如说,就像

So for example, like

Speaker 3

有点像被遗弃的资产那种感觉。

Like abandoned assets, kind of.

Speaker 2

就像是有那么一点点比特币,比如0.02美元的那种,

It's kinda like if there'll be little flex of, like, point $0.02 Bitcoin on,

Speaker 3

比如某个钱包里

like, some wallet

Speaker 2

或者什么的。

or something.

Speaker 2

因为每笔都有交易费,这些灰尘会越积越多,而且把它们转出来不划算。

Because there's a transaction fee with all of them, you can accumulate this dust, and it's not economical to move it off of them.

Speaker 2

这会带来各种问题和麻烦。

That creates all kinds of issues and stuff.

Speaker 2

有点类似。

It's sort of similar.

Speaker 3

我记得,是不是有一阵子有些初创公司想收集这些灰尘?

I remember, weren't there some startups at one point who were trying to, like, collect all the dust?

Speaker 3

把所有的灰尘收集起来,整合成什么。对。

Collect all the roll it up into something Yeah.

Speaker 3

另外,我还在想回购计划的事,就是说,现在财政部几乎要面临一个反应函数的问题。

Other thing I was thinking just about the buyback program now is, I mean, you almost have an issue with the reaction function of the treasury now.

Speaker 3

如果它是以市场流动性为由扩大回购规模,但国债市场看起来运行得相当正常。

If it's citing market liquidity in order to increase the size of the buybacks, but the treasury market seems to be operating pretty normally.

Speaker 3

对。

Yeah.

Speaker 3

然后大家开始关注收益率,就像达雷尔说的,好像贝森特就是觉得收益率不在合适的位置。

And then everyone starts focusing on the yield, as Darrell was saying, like, oh, it seems like Bessent just doesn't think the yield is at the right level.

Speaker 3

这样一来,突然就有了一个目标,投资者可能会盯着这个目标,看财政部会不会再次入场。

Well, then suddenly you have this target that investors are maybe going to be watching for signs that the Treasury is going to come back in.

Speaker 8

我觉得

I think

Speaker 2

贝森特其实真的很怀念做对冲基金的日子。

Bessent really just misses being a hedge fund.

Speaker 2

他就像在说,不,这收益率太高了。

He's like, no, this is like the yield is too high.

Speaker 2

这就像是个买入的机会。

It's like an opportunity to buy.

Speaker 2

对吧?

Right?

Speaker 2

而且你还在干预日元什么的。

And you're, like, intervening in the yen and stuff.

Speaker 2

我觉得这就像,他做这种操作的时候,是在他的舒适区里。

I think this is, like, he's he's in he's in his comfort ground when he's making moves like this.

Speaker 3

好吧,我得说,在我们录制的这一刻,他买国债可能还是赚的。

Well, I will say, as of the moment we're recording, he's probably above water on his treasury purchases.

Speaker 2

对吧?

Right?

Speaker 2

我也这么觉得。

So I thought so too.

Speaker 2

是的。

Yeah.

Speaker 2

不过,这就是我当时的想法。

Except so this is what I thought.

Speaker 2

我当时觉得,这交易不错。

I was like, oh, this is a good trade.

Speaker 2

显然,这个购买——这是推特上有人告诉我的,有两个人告诉我这个,因为我也这么想。

Evidently, the the purchase this is what someone on twit two people on Twitter told me this because I thought that too.

Speaker 3

哦,那肯定是真的了。

Oh, it must be true too.

Speaker 2

购买从9月9日开始。

The purchases start September 9.

Speaker 2

所以,之前有公告发布。

So there there was the announcement that came.

Speaker 3

明白了。

I see.

Speaker 2

所以,不管怎样,他当时……

So had he anyway.

Speaker 2

但我当时也有同样的想法。

But I had that same thought.

Speaker 2

哦,现在看来这交易挺划算的。

Oh, it's looking like a pretty good trade now.

Speaker 3

好的。

Alright.

Speaker 3

请继续关注追踪贝森特交易的Odd Lots节目。

Stay tuned for the Odd Lots episode tracking Bessent's trade.

Speaker 3

那我们今天就先聊到这里吧?

But shall we leave it there for now?

Speaker 2

就到这里。

It there.

Speaker 3

好。

K.

Speaker 3

这里是Odd Lots播客的又一期节目。

This has been another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.

Speaker 3

我是特蕾西·阿洛韦。

I'm Tracy Allaway.

Speaker 3

你可以在推特上关注我,账号是Tracy Allaway。

You can follow me at Tracy Allaway.

Speaker 2

我是乔·维森塔尔。

And I'm Joe Wiesenthal.

Speaker 2

你可以在推特上关注我,账号是The Stalwart。

You can follow me at The Stalwart.

Speaker 2

也请关注我们的制作人:卡门·罗德里格斯,账号是Carmen Erman;达希尔·贝内特,账号是Dashbot;凯尔·布鲁克斯,账号是Cale Brooks;还有凯文·洛萨诺,账号是Kevin Lloyd Lozano。

Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Erman, Dashiell Bennett at Dashbot, Cale Brooks at Cale Brooks, and Kevin Lozano at Kevin Lloyd Lozano.

Speaker 3

想获取更多Odd Lots的内容,记得查看我们的每日通讯。

And for more Odd Lots content, you should check out our daily newsletter.

Speaker 3

你可以在bloomberg.com/oddlots找到它。

You can find that at bloomberg.com/oddlots.

Speaker 2

你还可以在我们的Discord服务器里随时讨论这些话题,地址是discord.gg/oddlots。

And you can chat about all of these things twenty four seven in our Discord, discord.gg/oddlots.

Speaker 3

如果你喜欢这次对话,请留下评论或点赞这个视频,或者更好的是,订阅我们。

And if you enjoyed this conversation, then please leave a comment or like the video or better yet, subscribe.

Speaker 2

感谢观看和收听。

Thanks for watching and listening.

Speaker 6

你好。

Hi.

Speaker 6

我是汤姆·基恩,邀请你加入我的彭博观察播客。

I'm Tom Keene inviting you to join me for the Bloomberg Surveillance Podcast.

Speaker 6

这个节目旨在让你在每个工作日变得更聪明。

It's about making you smarter every business day.

Speaker 7

我是保罗·斯威尼。

I'm Paul Sweeney.

Speaker 7

我们为你带来股票、债券、大宗商品,甚至加密货币的全面报道,以及你在市场中脱颖而出所需的所有信息。

We bring you complete coverage of stocks, bonds, commodities, even crypto, all the information you need to excel in the markets.

Speaker 8

我是亚历克西斯·克里斯托弗里斯。

And I'm Alexis Christofferis.

Speaker 8

收听我们的节目,与经济学、金融、投资和国际关系领域最聪明的人进行重要对话。

Listen to us for essential conversations with the smartest names in economics, finance, investment, and international relations.

Speaker 6

这就是彭博观察播客。

That's the Bloomberg Surveillance Podcast.

Speaker 6

今天就在苹果播客、声田或任何你收听的地方订阅吧。

Subscribe today on Apple, Spotify, or anywhere you listen.

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