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经营企业意味着要应对大量过于复杂的软件,而大多数客户关系管理系统都遵循相同的模式。
Running a business means dealing with a lot of overly complicated software, and most CRMs tend to follow the same pattern.
它们塞满了你根本不会用的无穷功能,界面笨拙,团队最终花费太多时间只是为了找到基本信息。
They're packed with endless features you'll never use, interfaces that feel clunky, and teams end up spending way too much time just trying to find basic information.
今天的赞助商Pipedrive是一款专为中小型企业设计的简单客户关系管理工具。
Today's sponsor, Pipedrive, is a simple CRM tool designed for small and medium businesses.
Pipedrive将整个销售流程整合到一个仪表盘中,为您提供清晰、完整的销售流程和客户信息视图,帮助团队掌控局面并快速促成更多交易。
Pipedrive brings you entire sales processes into one dashboard, giving you a crystal clear, complete view of sales processes and customer information designed to help teams stay in control and close more deals fast.
所有功能都围绕可视化销售漏斗展开,您可以查看每一笔交易、它所处的阶段以及接下来需要做什么。
It all centers around the visual sales pipeline where you can see every deal, what stage it's in, and what needs to happen next.
由于所有内容都集中在一个平台上,Pipedrive旨在团结您的团队,跟踪销售任务,并牢牢掌握潜在客户动态。
Since everything is in one platform, Pipedrive is designed to unite your team, keep track of sales tasks, and stay on top of your leads.
换用由销售人员为销售人员打造的客户关系管理系统,加入已使用Pipedrive的十多万家公司行列。
Switch to a CRM built by salespeople, for salespeople, and join the over 100,000 companies already using Pipedrive.
现在注册,您将获得三十天的免费试用。
Right now, you'll get a thirty day free trial.
无需信用卡或任何付款。
No credit card or payment needed.
只需前往 pipedrive.com/simplecrm 开始使用。
Just head to pipedrive.com/simplecrm to get started.
就是 pipedrive.com/simplecrm。
That's pipedrive.com/simplecrm.
Bloomberg Daybreak 是你每天早上在播客频道中第一时间获取资讯的最佳方式。
Bloomberg Daybreak is your best way to get informed first thing in the morning right in your podcast feed.
嗨。
Hi.
我是凯伦·莫斯科。
I'm Karen Moscow.
我是内森·哈格。
And I'm Nathan Hager.
每天早上,我们都会早早起床,制作最新一期的 Bloomberg Daybreak 美国版。
Each morning, we're up early putting together the latest episode of Bloomberg Daybreak US edition.
这是您每日十五分钟的播客,为您带来全球新闻、政治和国际关系的最新动态。
It's your daily fifteen minute podcast on the latest in global news, politics, and international relations.
每天早上收听Bloomberg Daybreak美国版播客,获取您所需背景信息的重要新闻。
Listen to the Bloomberg Daybreak US edition podcast each morning for the stories that matter with the context you need.
您可以在Apple、Spotify或任何您收听播客的地方找到我们。
Find us on Apple, Spotify, or anywhere you listen.
Bloomberg音频工作室,
Bloomberg Audio Studios,
播客。
Podcasts.
广播。
Radio.
新闻。
News.
您好,欢迎收听《Odd Lots》播客的另一期节目。
Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.
我是乔·魏森塔尔。
I'm Joe Weisenthal.
我是特蕾西·阿拉韦。
And I'm Tracy Allaway.
所以,特蕾西,我们现在是2026年3月4日下午1点录制。
So, Tracy, we are recording this 1PM, 03/04/2026.
正是那种必须精确到小时和分钟的日子,因为谁知道接下来会发生什么?
And So one of those days where you have to nail the hour and the minute because who knows what's gonna happen?
没错。
Absolutely.
当然,我们正处于一场始于上周末的与伊朗的战争中,本周市场经历了非同寻常的波动,油价大幅上涨,人们普遍担忧从该地区运输石油及其他商品的物流问题,以及谁将受到影响。
Of course, we are in the midst of a war with Iran that started this past weekend, and it's been an extraordinary week in markets, massive surge in the price of oil, all kinds of concerns about the sheer logistics of getting oil other as well as other commodities out of that region, who's going to be affected.
由于显而易见的原因,其影响是全球性的。
The ramifications are just global for obvious reasons.
是的。
Yeah.
显然有很多话题要谈。
There's clearly a lot to talk about.
是的。
Yes.
但有一些特别有趣的视角,你和我之前一直讨论过,我们将在接下来的许多期节目中逐一探讨这些内容。
But there are some interesting angles in particular that you and I have been discussing, and we're gonna try to hit all of those individually in a lot of different episodes that are coming up.
但在这期节目中,我们想谈谈一个你我都知道、目前美国和欧洲显然一直是人们主要担忧和关注焦点的问题。
But for this particular episode, we wanna talk about something that you know, obviously, The US, Europe have kind of been, I would say, the main subject of a lot of the hand wringing at or the focus at the moment.
我们知道,欧洲长期以来一直面临能源成本上升的问题,而中东的这场混乱显然不会对此有好处。
So Europe, we know, has had to grapple with higher energy costs for a while, and clearly, you know, all this chaos in The Middle East is not gonna be good for that.
但较少受到关注的是,这对作为中东石油巨大买家的中国意味着什么。
But one thing that hasn't gotten as much attention is what this actually means for China, which is a huge, huge purchaser of oil from The Middle East.
对。
Right.
这真的很重要。
It's really important.
所以,显然在美国,我们石油充裕。
So, obviously, in The US, we're swimming with oil.
我们是石油出口国。
We're an oil exporter.
这对我们的天然气出口到欧洲也可能非常有利。
This could be very good also for our gas exports to Europe.
我的意思是,我们已经看到美国对欧洲的天然气出口大幅增加,尤其是在俄乌战争持续期间。
I mean, already, we've seen this big increase in gas exports from The US to Europe, particularly just in the wake of the ongoing war in Ukraine.
因此,这可能会创造更多机会。
So this could create further opportunities.
但对于所有主要进口国而言,中国就是其中之一,这对它们来说是完全不同的局面。
But for all the countries that are, you know, major importers and China being one is obviously a very different dimension for them.
确实如此。
Absolutely.
另外,我能说一下吗?这个话题终于给了我们一个机会来讨论中国的土炼油厂,我一直想做一期关于这个的节目?
Also, can I just say that this particular topic is finally, finally an opportunity to touch on teapot refiners in China, which I always wanted to do an episode on?
太好了。
Great.
不知为什么,我们一直没机会谈,但现在正是时候。
And for some reason, we never got to it, but but now's our chance.
我会去了解什么是茶壶炼油厂——我以前有时候听说过茶壶炼油厂是什么。
I will learn what a tea I I've known at times what a teapot refinery is.
等等。
Wait.
你对这个词有什么印象?
What's your impression?
如果有人提到‘茶壶炼油厂’,你会想到什么?
If if someone says teapot refinery, what do you think?
别把我推到台前。
Don't put me on the spotlight.
我只会想象一个小型炼油厂。
I would just imagine a little refinery.
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是,基本上就是这样。
I mean, that's it, basically.
好的。
Alright.
嗯,这个猜测不错。
Well, that was a good guess.
是的。
Yeah.
茶壶。
The teapot.
是的。
Yeah.
猜它是
Guess it's
我只是觉得它有个可爱的名字,所以我很喜欢去想象它。
kinda I just think it has a cute name, and so I like thinking about it.
无论如何,我非常兴奋地宣布,今天我们请到了一位完美的嘉宾,从一些在当下亟需深入探讨的角度来讨论能源维度。
Anyway, I'm very excited to say we really do have the perfect guest today to sort of talk about the energy dimension from some angles that have that deserve and need more exploration in this precise moment.
我们将与埃里卡·唐斯对话。
We're gonna be speaking with Erica Downs.
她是哥伦比亚大学全球能源政策中心的高级研究员,真正在这个领域内是专家。
She's a senior research scholar at Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy and an expert truly in this field.
埃里卡,非常感谢你做客《Odd Lots》。
Erica, thank you so much for coming on Odd Lots.
非常感谢你们邀请我。
Thank you so much for having me.
为了我们的听众,你能简单介绍一下你的工作吗?
Just for the sake of our audience, why don't you give us the sort of brief overview of your work?
跟我们说说你在研究领域里主要做些什么。
Tell us a little bit about what you do in your general field of study.
我的研究主要集中在能源的地缘政治上。
So my research focuses primarily on the geopolitics of energy.
因此,最近我一直在关注中国与俄罗斯、委内瑞拉的能源关系,当然还有本周的伊朗。
And so I've been kept busy recently looking at China's energy relationships with Russia, with Venezuela, and, of course, this week with Iran.
那么,你能概括一下中国目前的能源关系吗?
So why don't you sum up, I guess, China's relationship with energy at the moment then?
我最近只知道一件登上头条的事,那就是中国进口了大量石油,这既表明它需要石油,也说明石油对其经济运转至关重要。
The only thing I know in recent times that sort of hit the headlines is that China's been importing an enormous amount of oil, which both suggests that it needs oil, and it's an important thing for its economy to work.
但同时,也许在中东供应收紧的情况下,中国拥有一定的缓冲空间。
But also that, you know, maybe in the face of tighter supply coming from The Middle East, it has something of a cushion.
是的,中国一直在大量储存石油。
So, yes, China has been putting a lot of oil into storage.
他们二十多年前就启动了战略石油储备,并一直在逐步扩充,就是为了应对眼下这样的时刻。
They kick started their strategic petroleum reserve over twenty years ago and have been building it up precisely to have in moments like the one that we are in now.
正如你所说,中国是石油的大进口国。
Now China, as you mentioned, is a big importer of oil.
中国进口的石油中,约有一半来自中东。
About half the oil that China imports comes from the Middle East.
这些中东石油中的大部分都要经过如今已关闭的霍尔木兹海峡。
Most of those Middle East oil supplies pass through the Strait Of Hormuz, which is now closed.
跟我们聊聊我们这里所讨论的这些数量吧。
Talk to us a little bit about the volumes here that we're talking about.
特蕾西提到,显然他们进口了大量石油,其中很多都储存起来了。
Tracy mentioned that, obviously, they're importing quite a bit and much of it keeping in storage.
比如,我们说的是伊朗之类的国家。
Like, okay, we're talking about Iran or something.
这种关系有多关键?
How crucial is that relationship?
我们对它的数量了解多少?
What do we know about its volume?
我们对它的价格了解多少?
What do we know about pricing?
再给我们讲讲这个双边贸易关系的一些细节。
Tell us some more details about this particular bilateral trading relationship.
当然。
Sure.
去年,中国每天进口了1160万桶石油。
So last year, China imported 11,600,000 barrels per day.
其中约140万桶来自伊朗,占中国原油进口总量的约12%。
About 1,400,000 barrels per day came from Iran, so that accounted for about 12% of China's crude oil imports.
现在,中国购买伊朗石油的主要买家是小型炼油厂。
Now the main buyers of Iranian oil in China are the teapot refineries.
我长期关注这些小型炼油厂,非常乐意谈论它们。
I've been following the teapot refineries for a long time, and I love to talk about them.
所以,乔,我很高兴听到你说‘是的’。
So, Joe, I'd be very happy to hear you Yeah.
在你的介绍中谈谈它们。
Speak about them in your introduction.
是的
Yeah.
茶壶炼油厂是小型独立炼油厂。
And so the teapots are small independent refineries.
其中许多集中在山东省。
Many of them are clustered in Shandong province.
它们的规模和复杂程度不如中国国家石油公司运营的炼油厂或新的炼化一体化项目。
They're not as big or sophisticated as the refineries operated by China's national oil companies or the new integrated refining and petrochemical projects.
这些是过去几年在中国兴起的世界级项目。
These are world scale projects, that have popped up in China over the past few years.
因此,茶壶炼油厂规模小得多,技术也较落后,它们依赖于从受制裁原油中获得的折扣来提升利润。
So the teapots are much smaller, less sophisticated, and they rely on the discounts they can receive on sanctioned crudes to boost their bottom lines.
在某些情况下,它们可能依赖这些原油来维持生存。
And in some cases, they probably depend on these crudes for their survival.
因此,它们是中国购买伊朗原油的主要买家。
So they're the main buyers of Iranian crude in China.
十年前、十五年前那些负责从伊朗进口全部原油运回中国的国家石油公司,如今已完全退出了伊朗原油贸易,原因是担心美国制裁。
The national oil companies that were, you know, lifting, you know, all of Iranian's crude to take back to China ten, fifteen years ago are completely out of the Iran oil trading business because of concerns about US sanctions.
再回到这些‘小炼厂’,它们之所以还在购买伊朗原油,而中国的国家石油公司不再购买,是因为小炼厂更能承受风险。
And just to bring this back to the teapots, the reason why they are buying and the national oil companies, China's national oil companies aren't is because the teapots are more risk tolerant.
我所说的承受风险,是指国家石油公司有维持美元金融体系准入的切身利益。
And what I mean by that is that the national oil companies have a vested interest in maintaining access to the US dollar financial system.
这些是拥有全球业务的跨国公司。
These are global companies with global operations.
它们不想失去这种准入权。
They don't wanna lose that access.
而如果你看看那些至今仍在购买伊朗原油的小炼厂,我怀疑它们对维持美元金融体系的准入几乎毫无兴趣。
Whereas if you look at the teapots who are still buying Iranian crude today, I suspect that they have little or no, you know, interest in maintaining access to the US dollar financial system.
当然,它们也不希望被制裁,但被制裁对它们而言并不会像对中石化或中国石油那样造成灾难性后果。
Sure, they'd prefer not to be sanctioned, but sanctions being sanctioned wouldn't be catastrophic for them in the way it might be for Sinopec or China National Petroleum Corporation.
因此,正是这种风险承受能力,加上对低价原油的追求,使小炼厂成为中国最大的伊朗原油进口商。
And so it's this risk tolerance as well as this pursuit of discounted barrels that has made the teapots the biggest importers of Iranian crude in China.
所以我不打算过多地扯到茶壶这个话题上。
So I don't mean to go on too big of a teapot tangent.
这个押头韵怎么样,乔?
How's that for alliteration, Joe?
谢谢。
Thank you.
但我们是怎么走到这一步的?在中国,出现了这些国家级的炼油巨头,我猜它们得到了国家的支持,并享有规模经济的所有优势。
But how did we end up with this situation where we have these national refining giants in China, which I assume, you know, enjoy support from the state, and they enjoy all the benefits of scale?
而与此同时,一些小型或规模较小的独立炼油厂却冒了出来。
And then you have these tiny or smaller refiners, independent refiners that have sort of cropped up.
这个体系究竟是如何开始的?
How did that system actually begin?
是的。
Yeah.
当然。
So sure.
很乐意提供一些背景信息。
Happy to provide some background.
所以,所谓的‘茶壶’炼油厂,在中国实际上被称为地方炼油厂,起源于中国东北地区,最初是为了加工顺利油田的原油,而顺利油田历史上是中国的骨干油田之一。
So the teapot refineries, which are actually called local refineries in China originated, they grew up in China, in Northeastern China to process crude from the Shunli Oil Field, which historically was one of China's backbone oil fields.
在它们的大部分发展历程中,这些‘茶壶’炼油厂没有权利进口和加工进口原油。
And for most of their existence, these teapots did not have the right to import and process imported crude.
这一切在2015年发生了变化,当时中国政府宣布,符合特定条件的‘茶壶’炼油厂将被授予购买和加工进口原油的许可证。
And this all changed back in 2015 when the Chinese government said that teapots who met certain requirements would be granted licenses to purchase and process imported crude.
‘茶壶’炼油厂需要满足的标准包括:淘汰高污染的原油蒸馏装置、建设天然气储存设施——你可能想不到。
And the criteria that the teapots had to meet was for things such as getting rid of highly polluting crude distillation units, building natural gas storage, believe it or not.
因此,符合这些要求的‘茶壶’炼油厂可以申请许可证,获得许可证后,它们会得到一个配额,可以用这个配额从中国境外购买原油。
And so teapots that met these requirements could apply for licenses and they get a license and they'd be given a quota and they could use that quota to purchase crude from outside of China's borders.
当我刚开始研究‘茶壶’炼油厂时,大约就在它们获得进口原油许可的时期,它们的供应商来源相当多元。
And when I first started looking at the teapot, you know, around the time that they got permission to import crude, they had a pretty diverse slate of suppliers.
但随着对伊朗、俄罗斯、委内瑞拉等国家的制裁日益收紧,以及这些国家提供折扣以吸引买家购买其原油,许多其他进口商退出后,‘茶壶’炼油厂便填补了这一空缺。
But as sanctions on, you know, countries such as Iran, Russia, you know, Venezuela tightened and discounts were on offer to entice buyers to take these barrels that a lot of other importers were consuming via the teapot stepped into the void.
这个
This
这已经非常引人入胜了。
is already fascinating.
我从中学到了很多。
I've already learned a lot from this.
我们能大致知道这些折扣有多大吗?
Do we have a sense of, like, how big are these discounts?
所以直觉上,一个国家被制裁后,很多买家不想沾边,也不愿冒被制裁的风险,这很合理。
So intuitively, okay, a country gets sanctioned and then a bunch of buyers, that makes a lot of sense, don't want to deal with it or don't wanna risk getting sanctioned themselves.
所以当伊朗因制裁被迫将大量石油卖给这些小炼油厂时,我们能知道这些交易的价格相对于整体油价是多少吗?
So when Iran, by dint of sanctions, essentially forced to sell a significant amount of their oil to these teapots, do we have a sense of, like, what the pricing is on these deals relative to overall oil prices?
行业媒体会报道当时可用的折扣,这些折扣会随时间变化。
So industry press will report, you know, the discounts available, which change over time.
这些折扣通常被报道为比基准价格低x美元。
And the discounts are usually reported as, you know, x number of dollars lower than the price of record.
因此,中国小炼厂从受制裁原油中获得的折扣确实非常诱人,足以促使他们积极寻找这些货源。
So the discounts that China's teapot refineries receive on sanctioned barrels are certainly attractive enough to make them seek them out.
这些折扣会随时间变化。
Now these discounts change over time.
它们通常在行业媒体中被报道为比布伦特原油价格低一定数额的美元。
You know, they're often reported in industry press as, you know, a certain number of dollars, you know, cheaper than the price of Brent crude.
为了让你了解这些折扣对小炼厂有多重要,路透社在2023年曾发表一篇文章,称他们计算出中国通过进口这些受制裁原油,在原油进口上节省了100亿美元。
And just to give you a sense of how important these are to the teapots, Reuters ran a piece, I believe, back in 2023 where they said they had calculated that China had saved $10,000,000,000 on crude oil imports by importing these sanctioned crudes.
好的。
Okay.
所以你可以想象,在当前情况下,这些小炼厂从受制裁与非受制裁原油之间的价差中获益,它们可能会受到总体石油供应减少的影响。
So you you can imagine that in the current scenario where you have these teapot refineries that are, you know, benefiting from the discount between sanctioned and non sanctioned oil, they're gonna be hit by, I guess, less oil Yeah.
在整体系统中。
In the system in general.
但俄罗斯依然存在。
But, I mean, Russia still exists.
俄罗斯的石油仍然存在。
Russian oil is still out there.
你能想象一种情况,即他们开始增加从俄罗斯进口石油,以弥补中东地区损失的部分供应吗?
Could you see a scenario where they just start importing more Russian oil to offset some of the supply that's lost in the Middle
是的。
Yeah.
我认为这种情况很有可能发生。
I do think that is likely.
我要说,这对茶壶炼油厂来说确实是个艰难的时期,因为上个月,特朗普政府推动推翻委内瑞拉总统马杜罗,并由美国接管部分委内瑞拉原油的销售,这引发了人们对中国还能以何种价格进口多少委内瑞拉原油的疑问。为了应对委内瑞拉原油进口可能减少的预期,茶壶炼油厂转向伊朗,特别是采购伊朗的重质原油——这种原油是相当不错的替代品,而且肯定能以折扣价获得。
And I will say this is actually a tough time for the teapots because last month, the Trump's removal of Venezuelan president Maduro from office and The US taking control of the marketing of some of Venezuela's crude sort of raised questions about how much oil how much Venezuelan oil would China still be able to import and at what price And in anticipation of a potential shortfall in their Venezuelan oil imports, the teapots turn to Iran and specifically to purchasing Iranian heavy crude, which is, you know, a decent substitute and, you know, certainly could be obtained at a discount.
但如今,随着中东战争的爆发,这又引发了人们对茶壶炼油厂伊朗石油供应的担忧。
But now, of course, you know, with the war in The Middle East, this is raising questions about the teapot supply of Iranian oil.
对中国整体而言,好消息是,中国目前拥有大量的战略和商业石油储备,其储量足以满足2025年水平下中国净原油进口量120天的需求。
The good news, I guess, for China as a whole is that they are sitting on substantial strategic and commercial oil stockpiles that provide a hundred and twenty days of China's net crude oil imports at the twenty twenty five level.
这意味着,即使中国完全无法进口任何石油——当然这种情况不会发生——他们也能依靠库存支撑四个月的原油进口。
So, you know, what that means is that if all of China was unable to import any oil at all, which obviously isn't going to happen, they could rely on their stockpiles for four months of crude oil imports.
因此,如果你看一下伊朗原油以及可能因霍尔木兹海峡关闭而受阻的其他原油流向,他们的处境相当不错。
And so if you look at sort of Iranian crude and perhaps other flows that might be disrupted by the closure of the Strait Of Khormuz, they're sitting in a pretty good position.
此外,亚洲地区,特别是中国和马来西亚沿海,还有大量伊朗和俄罗斯原油处于浮动储存状态。
Also, there is a good amount of Iranian and Russian crude in floating storage in Asia, off the coast of China and Malaysia.
而且,在美国和以色列对伊朗发动袭击之前,这些库存就已经在逐步积累。
And, you know, this had been building up before The US and Israel launched their strikes on Iran.
此外,还有伊朗原油存放在中国港口的保税仓库中,可以随时调用。
And there is also Iranian oil sitting in bonded storage in Chinese ports, which could be tapped into.
经营企业意味着要应对大量过于复杂的软件,而大多数客户关系管理系统都遵循相同的模式。
Running a business means dealing with a lot of overly complicated software, and most CRMs tend to follow the same pattern.
它们塞满了你根本用不到的无穷功能,界面笨拙,团队往往花费太多时间来寻找基本信息。
They're packed with endless features you'll never use, interfaces that feel clunky, and teams end up spending way too much time just trying to find basic information.
今天的赞助商Pipedrive是一款专为中小型企业设计的简单客户关系管理工具。
Today's sponsor, Pipedrive, is a simple CRM tool designed for small and medium businesses.
Pipedrive将整个销售流程整合到一个仪表板中,为你提供清晰完整的销售流程和客户信息视图,帮助团队掌控局面,更快地促成交易。
Pipedrive brings you entire sales processes into one dashboard giving you a crystal clear complete view of sales processes and customer information designed to help teams stay in control and close more deals faster.
这一切都围绕着可视化销售漏斗,你可以看到每一个交易、它所处的阶段以及接下来需要做什么。
It all centers around the visual sales pipeline where you can see every deal, what stage it's in, and what needs to happen next.
由于所有内容都集中在一个平台上,Pipedrive 旨在团结你的团队,跟踪销售任务,并牢牢掌握潜在客户。
Since everything is in one platform, Pipedrive is designed to unite your team, keep track of sales tasks, and stay on top of your leads.
换用一款由销售专家为销售团队打造的 CRM,加入已使用 Pipedrive 的十多万家公司行列。
Switch to a CRM built by salespeople, for salespeople, and join the over 100,000 companies already using Pipedrive.
目前,你可以获得三十天的免费试用。
Right now, you'll get a thirty day free trial.
无需提供信用卡或任何付款信息。
No credit card or payment needed.
只需前往 pipedrive.com/simplecrm 即可开始使用。
Just head to pipedrive.com/simplecrm to get started.
那就是 pipedrive.com/simplecrm。
That's pipedrive.com/simplecrm.
我是马特·米勒。
I'm Matt Miller.
我是汉娜·埃利奥特,诚邀您收听彭博社《Hot Pursuit》播客。
And I'm Hannah Elliott inviting you to join us for the Bloomberg Hot Pursuit podcast.
每周,我们为您带来关于汽车行业的最新资讯和深度洞察。
Every week, we bring you news and industry insight on everything cars.
我们做的远不止谈论汽车,马特。
And we do a whole lot more than just talk about cars, Matt.
我们实际上会亲自驾驶几乎所有最新车型,尤其是那些直接从展厅提来的豪华车和跑车。
We actually get behind the wheel of basically every latest model, especially the luxury ones and the sports cars direct from the showroom floor.
我们能接触到这么多汽车,真的非常了不起。
It really is remarkable how many cars we have access to.
我有点过意不去,但从四万美元的电动车到价值五十万美元的超级跑车,应有尽有。
I feel a little bit guilty about it, but everything from $40,000 EVs to exotic half million dollar supercars.
我们还会采访塑造汽车行业的内部人士,从顶级CEO和收藏家,到富有远见的设计师和赛车冠军。
We also speak with the insiders who shape the automotive industry from the top CEOs and collectors to visionary designers and racing champions.
在YouTube、Apple、Spotify或您收听播客的任何平台搜索《Bloomberg Hot Pursuit》。
Search for Bloomberg hot pursuit on YouTube, Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts.
也许你是在周末驾车时听我们的节目,或者去参加车友聚会。
Maybe you listen while you're on your weekend drive, maybe go into cars and coffee.
来听听我们这周开的是什么车。
Listen to us talk about what we are driving this week.
这就是《彭博热追》。
That's Bloomberg hot pursuit.
我是来自纽约的马特·米勒。
I'm Matt Miller in New York.
我是来自洛杉矶的汉娜·埃利奥特。
And I'm Hannah Elliott in Los Angeles.
现在就去你常用的播客平台订阅我们吧。
Subscribe today wherever you get your podcasts.
你知道,你之前提到过伊朗和中国贸易关系的重要性。
You know, you'd mentioned the significance of the you know, we're talking about the Iran China trading relationship.
委内瑞拉在这个格局中有多重要?我们现在对这个格局了解多少?
How significant was Venezuela in this picture, and what do we know about the picture now?
因为我认为目前仍有委内瑞拉石油正在运往中国,但你能跟我们谈谈这部分在整体格局中的重要性吗?
Because I think there's still Venezuelan oil now going to China right now, but how talk to us about the significance of the of that piece of the puzzle.
是的。
Yeah.
委内瑞拉向中国供应的原油量比伊朗少。
So Venezuela is a smaller crude oil supplier to China than Iran.
去年,委内瑞拉大约每天向中国供应40万桶原油。
Last year, Venezuela, you know, supplied, you know, around 400,000 barrels per day, of crude oil to China.
所以你只是在看非常小的一份额,去年占中国原油总进口量的4%左右。
So you're just looking at, you know, a few very, very small shares, you know, 4% of China's total crude oil imports last year.
然而,几乎所有的这些原油都流向了小型炼油厂。
However, you know, virtually all of that oil, was going to the teapot refineries.
所以,尽管你可以说,如果中国失去每天40万桶来自委内瑞拉的原油进口,也不会受到太大影响,但这确实让小型炼油厂的运营更加困难。
So while you can say, oh, China is not gonna be hit too hard if, you know, it loses 400,000 barrels per day of crude oil imports from Venezuela, it does sort of make life more difficult for the teapot refineries.
几周前,赖特部长确实提到,美国曾向中国出售了一些委内瑞拉原油。
Now secretary Wright did say a couple weeks ago that, you know, The US had sold some Venezuelan crude to China.
我不知道买家是谁。
I don't know who the buyers are.
当然,对于小型炼油厂来说,价格也是一个问题。
And of course, for the teapots, you know, price is also an issue.
我的意思是,是的,他们希望继续进口这些委内瑞拉原油,因为他们习惯加工这种类型的原油。
I mean, yes, they would like to continue to import those Venezuelan barrels because they're used to processing that type of crude.
但目前的情况是,即使他们仍能买到相当数量的委内瑞拉原油——这些原油由美国在销售——对他们来说,关键问题在于价格是多少?
But the current situation means that they might be, even if they can still buy a fair amount of Venezuelan oil, you know, that's being marketed by The US, you know, I think a big question for them is at what price?
是的。
Yeah.
我们能再回过头谈谈中国的战略石油储备吗?
Can we go back to China's strategic petroleum reserve for a second?
因为我觉得,在拜登政府时期,美国的储备一直是热议话题,某种程度上,它深深进入了我们的集体意识。
Because I feel like The US reserve was such a big talking point during the Biden administration, and it kind of, you know, soared into our collective consciousness.
当我们谈到中国的战略石油储备时,中国政府的实际目标是什么?
When we think about China's SPR, what are the actual goals there of the Chinese state?
他们为什么要建立这个?
Why did they establish this?
他们在考虑什么?
What are they thinking about?
那么,我们实际上对它了解多少?
And then also, what do we actually know about it?
是的。
Yeah.
中国建立战略石油储备的主要原因是,中国是石油的主要进口国。
So the main reason China established its strategic oil reserve is because China is a major importer of oil.
中国在1993年转变为石油净进口国。
China switched to a net importer of oil in 1993.
随着对进口原油依赖的增加,中国对供应安全产生了真正的担忧。
And as its reliance on imported crude grew, there were real concerns about supply security in China.
因此,建立战略石油储备是他们采取的措施之一,以确保在遭遇石油供应意外中断时能够妥善应对。
And so building a strategic petroleum reserve, is one of the things that they did to make sure that they were in a good position to deal with unexpected disruptions to their oil supplies.
现在,正如我前面提到的,我一直在关注这个问题很长时间。
Now, one thing, as I mentioned earlier, I've been looking at this issue for quite some time.
我记得二十多年前,中国曾讨论过:我们是否需要这个?
And I recall going back over twenty years ago, there were discussions at China about do we need this?
我们负担得起吗?
Can we afford it?
我们希望投资建设多大规模的储备?
How big a stockpile do we want to invest in building?
正如你可能知道的,对于国际能源署的成员国而言——中国并非成员国——国际能源署要求成员国持有相当于90天净石油进口量的储备。
And as you may know, for states that are members of the International Energy Agency, which China is not, but the International Energy Agency requires members to hold stockpiles equal to ninety days of net oil import coverage.
因此,多年来,这一标准一直是中国讨论其战略石油储备时的参考基准。
And so that's the benchmark that has been used in a lot of Chinese discussions about its SPR over the years.
而且,我记得十五年前、二十年前,中国确实有人提出:我们已经进口了大量石油。
And again, I remember going back fifteen, twenty years ago, and you did have voices in China that were saying, we already import a lot of oil.
我们的进口量还将持续增长。
Our imports are going to continue to grow.
我们真的负担得起建设相当于九十天净石油进口量的储备吗?
Can we really afford to build ninety days of net oil import coverage?
但如果你把时间快进到今天,看看关于中国库存石油总量的各种估算——包括战略储备和石油公司持有的商业储备——中国持有的石油总量已超过九十天的净进口量。
But if you fast forward to today and you look at the different estimates out there about how much oil is sitting in storage in China, you know, to include both strategic stockpiles as well as commercial stockpiles held by oil companies, China holds more than ninety days of net oil import coverage.
因此,考虑到近期石油市场的动荡和地缘政治 upheavals,尤其是今年美国对委内瑞拉和伊朗采取的行动,中国拥有如此庞大的储备,无疑让人感到安心,也证明了这一项目决策的正确性。
And so looking at the disruptions, looking at the geopolitical sort of upheavals in oil markets, you know, just this calendar year with The US actions in Venezuela and now Iran, The fact that China is sitting on these substantial stockpiles, you know, has to be a source of peace of mind and sort of a vindication for undertaking this project.
是的。
Yeah.
特蕾西提到,显然,拜登政府时期美国在战略石油储备问题上争论不断。
Tracy mentioned, obviously, all the fights about the SPR in The US under the Biden administration.
这有点奇怪,因为人们确实有疑问。
And it's kinda weird because, like, you know, there's some question.
为什么美国现在作为一个石油生产和出口大国,其地位与二十年前、三十年前,或战略石油储备最初设立时截然不同?
Why does you know, The US is a massive exporter, producer of oil now in a way that wasn't the case twenty years ago or thirty years ago or at the time certainly at the time that the SPR was first conceived.
因此,战略石油储备的意义有些模糊,我也并不意外它会被用来在高通胀时期降低消费者的汽油价格。
So I'm it's a little unclear what the point of an SPR is, and so I'm not surprised that it's sort of used to lower the price of gasoline for consumers in a time of high inflation and so forth.
在中国,汽车正在迅速转向电动汽车,石油对这一领域的重要性将下降,并且未来会继续降低。
In China, where the automobile, they're switching rapidly to EVs, oil is not gonna be as important for that, and it's gonna continue to be less important over time.
在某种程度上,这关乎发动战争的可能性,以及在发生侵略时被完全切断石油进口的风险吗?
How much is it about prosecuting a war at some point and the prospect that they would completely get shut off from oil imports in the event of aggression?
而有多少是真正为了在万一和届时到来时拥有作战所需的资源?
And how much is that really what it's about having the resources to fight a war if and if and when that time comes?
是的。
Yeah.
不。
No.
我绝对认为这是其中一部分原因。
I absolutely think that is part of it.
自从中国转变为石油净进口国以来,一直存在对石油进口、特别是对海上石油进口易受现代海军(尤其是美国海军)威胁的担忧。
Ever since China switched to being a net importer of oil, there have been real concerns about the vulnerability of its oil imports and specifically its seaborne oil imports by various modern navies, notably that of The United States.
这就是为什么我们看到中国修建了从俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦陆路输送石油的管道。
That's why we saw China build these pipelines to deliver oil overland from Russia and from Kazakhstan.
斯坦。
Stan.
因此,考虑到这些担忧,考虑到如果发生冲突,中国和美国彼此对抗时,美国是否能够切断对中国的石油供应。
And so given those concerns, given, you know, those fears that in the event of a conflict that it's China, you know, and The United States, you know, against each other, would China you know, would The United States be able to cut off the flow
是的。
Yeah.
切断对中国的石油供应?
Of oil to China?
为了更广泛地从历史背景来看,如果我们回溯到20世纪60年代,当时中国与苏联的关系正在恶化。
And just to put this even in sort of broader historical context, you know, if we go back to the nineteen sixties at the time that the relationship between China and The Soviet Union was following was falling apart.
那时,中国严重依赖苏联提供军事所需的航空燃油等精炼石油产品。
At that point, China was heavily reliant on the Soviet Union for refined products needed to fuel its military jet fuel.
因此,随着中国与苏联之间的紧张关系加剧,苏联减少了对中国的精炼石油产品出口。
And so as those tensions between China and the Soviet Union increased, the USSR did cut back on refined oil product exports to China.
所以,确实,从更久远的历史来看,是有先例的。
So certainly, there are examples looking sort of further back in time.
他们基本上之所以和你分享这段历史,是想让你知道,中国曾亲身经历过与另一个大国关系紧张,并且该大国切断了对华石油产品供应的情况。
They're basically you know, the reason I'm sharing this bit of history with you is to let you know that China has firsthand experience of being in, you know, a tense relationship with another major power and having that major power Yeah.
你知道的,对中国的石油产品进口进行打压。
You know, squeeze the country with respect to imported oil products.
实际上,这可能是个好时机,来谈谈中国更广泛的外交政策。
Actually, this might be a good time to ask just about China's foreign policy more broadly.
我知道他们在袭击发生后发表了一份声明,有个人形容它像是布鲁塞尔会发出的那种声明,非常
So I saw you know, they issued a statement following the attacks, and I read one person describe it as the kind of thing you would expect from Brussels, you know, very
是的。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
非常笼统,表达了对伊朗局势的关切。
Very generic, expressing concern over the situation in Iran.
但他们也对针对阿联酋的袭击表示了关切,而阿联酋对中国的经济重要性不言而喻。
But they also expressed concern over the attacks on The UAE, for instance, which is of economic importance to China, certainly.
在当前这种情况下,除了石油之外,你认为中国还有什么其他利益攸关?
What's your sense of, I guess, what is at stake beyond just oil for China in this particular situation?
除了从该地区进口能源外,中国的国家石油公司还是伊拉克的重要生产商,他们在该国拥有多个上游资产。
You know, sort of looking beyond China's energy imports from the region, China's national oil companies are big producers in Iraq, so they have a number of upstream assets in that country.
中国企业还参与了该地区其他类型基础设施的建设。
Chinese firms are also involved in building other types of infrastructure in the region.
例如,有一些中国公司正在该地区建设并运营可再生能源设施,尤其是太阳能电站。
For example, there are Chinese companies that are building, operating renewable energy facilities, especially solar farms in the region.
因此,我们看到北京不仅呼吁各方确保该地区能源的自由流动,还强调要确保平民不受伤害,对吧?
And because of this, we've seen, you know, Beijing call not just, you know, for everyone to help ensure the free flow of energy from the region, but also to make sure that civilians aren't hit, right?
因为那里有中国公民。
Because you have Chinese citizens on the ground there.
中国不希望其在该地区的任何实体经济资产或基础设施遭到破坏。
It doesn't want any of its physical economic assets infrastructure in the region to get hit.
所以,这就是关于人员和资产这一方面的考量。
So that's the, you know, the the people and assets side of the story.
乔,我刚想起来,在迪拜,远离市中心的地方有个商场,好像叫龙巴,那是个中国商品市场
Joe, I just remembered in Dubai, kind of outside of, like, main Dubai, there was this mall, and it was called I think it was called Dragon Bar, and it was just a Chinese market
我敢打赌,我一定会喜欢。
I bet I love it.
在迪拜。
In Dubai.
你一定会喜欢的。
You would love it.
绝对会。
Absolutely.
那里几乎你能想到的所有东西都能买到。
You like, everything imaginable was available there.
当你去那里时,感觉真的非常不真实。
And, like, when you went there, it felt very, very surreal, actually.
是的。
Yeah.
我会很喜欢。
I would love it.
那可能是我在迪拜听说过的最有趣的事情。
That might that sounds like the most interesting thing I've heard of in Dubai.
其他任何关于迪拜的事情都从未让我如此
Nothing else I've never nothing else about Dubai has ever made me
我可以告诉你更多有趣的事情。
I can tell you more interesting things.
还有朝鲜餐厅之类的地方。
There's the North Korean restaurants and things like that.
哦,我想去体验一下朝鲜餐厅。
Oh, I've I wanna check out a North Korean restaurant.
是的。
Yeah.
也许你会去,也许不会。
Maybe you do, and maybe you don't.
我曾经在北京去过一家。
I've been to one in Beijing
哦,真的吗?
Oh, really?
很多年前了。
Many years ago.
是的。
Yeah.
我读过关于它们的介绍。
I've read about them.
我读过关于那个北朝鲜餐厅连锁的,我的意思是,其实就是韩国菜。
I've read about, like, the chain of North Korean I'm very I mean, it's just Korean food.
对吧?
Right?
我的意思是,它有点自己的特色。
I mean, well, it's slightly it has its own twist.
食物不错,但监控不太行。
It's good food, not so great surveillance.
这就是我会说的,或者实际上,也许监控太好了。
That's how I'll I'll I'll or, actually, maybe the surveillance is a little too good.
是的。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
我们在这儿。
There we
好了。
go.
食物不错。
Good food.
太棒了。
Excellent.
这简直就像一篇超棒的大众点评评价。
That's like it's a great, like, a a great Yelp review.
没错。
That's right.
监控做得真好。
The surveillance was great.
食物不错。
The food Good food.
监控太棒了。
Excellent surveillance.
监控。
Surveillance.
为了食物。
For the food.
留下来是为了监控。
Stay for the surveillance.
留下来看人脸识别。
Stay for the face recognition.
你知道,我只想暂时谈一下中国的外交政策。
You know, I get the impression with just to stick on Chinese foreign policy for a second.
我之前一直没意识到,直到最近才恍然大悟,中国没有任何正式的条约盟友。
One thing I hadn't realized up until recently, it just hadn't dawned on me, like China doesn't have any formal treaty allies.
不像美国那样,中国没有这样的盟友。
There's nobody unlike The US.
我们有协议。
We have an agreement.
然后,你知道,我们有义务或同意保护他们。
We then, you know, we're obligated or we agree to defend them.
我认为中国不是这样做的。
I don't think China does it that way.
比如,我感到很惊讶,特蕾西也提到了,那种略带中立的语气,提醒伊朗要谨慎报复,别轻易攻击谁——这显然和你提到的一些原因有关。
Like, I was surprised, you know, at the kind of and Tracy mentioned it, the sort of neutral ish tone that's, like, telling Iran, like, be careful in your retaliation and who you hit for obvious some of the reasons that you mentioned.
你知道吗?
You know?
但显然我们并没有看到中国做出任何声明,说要增加对伊朗的武器或防御性武器的 shipments。
But it's certainly not like we're seeing China make any statement like we're gonna oh, we're gonna up our shipments of weapons or defense weapons to Iran.
也许他们确实在暗中进行一些这样的活动,但他们不会大张旗鼓地宣布。
Maybe they're doing some of that covertly, but they don't make a big announcement of it.
但我觉得这非常能说明问题:即使是对一个与他们有着相当大规模经济伙伴关系、并且在对抗西方霸权等方面可能还存在某种意识形态契合的国家,他们依然没有任何正式的安排。
But it strikes me like that's very telling that even a country with whom they have a fairly substantial economic partnership with and maybe some sort of ideological alignment in terms of countering Western hegemony and so forth, you know, still even with them, there's nothing formally established.
再多谈一点,他们是如何从战略角度思考该地区事务的,而不仅仅是出于商业需求。
Talk a little bit more about how they think strategically about the region beyond just the sort of a commercial needs.
当然。
Sure.
中国希望与伊朗保持良好关系,同时也希望与沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋、阿曼以及其他地区国家保持良好关系。
So China wants to maintain good relations with Iran, and it also wants to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, other states in the region.
因此,历史上中国一直努力在这条钢丝上行走,试图在沙特和伊朗之间维持平衡。
And so China historically has, you know, sort of walked this tightrope, you know, in trying to balance relationships, you know, with the Saudis with the Iranians.
我认为他们在这方面做得相当成功。
And think I they have been pretty successful in pulling that off.
中国无意深陷地区军事冲突,因此我们不会看到中国卷入其中。
Now China has no interest in getting bogged down in a military conflict in the region, so we're not gonna see China get involved in that.
他们乐于充当调解者。
They are happy to be a mediator.
事实上,北京最近宣布——我认为就在几个小时前——将派遣特使前往该地区进行调解。
And in fact, Beijing recently announced, I think just a few hours ago, that they are sending their special envoy to the region for mediation purposes.
因此,我认为中国喜欢扮演这一角色。
And so I think that China likes playing that role.
我认为这无疑提升了中国作为负责任的外部力量的形象,这种力量正以恢复地区和平与稳定为目标积极参与区域事务。
I think it certainly bolsters their image as a sort of responsible outside power that is, you know, getting involved in the region, you know, with the goal of restoring peace and stability.
我是乔·马修,邀请您收听《权力平衡》播客。
I'm Joe Matthew inviting you to join me for the balance of power podcast.
每天,我们为您带来来自白宫和国会山最新头条的见解与分析,包括彭博社记者的突发新闻,以及您在其他地方听不到的议员和政府官员的深度对话。
Every day, we deliver insight and analysis on the latest headlines from the White House and Capitol Hill, including breaking news from Bloomberg's reporters and in-depth conversations with lawmakers and administration officials that you won't hear anywhere else.
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特朗普政府正在实施哪些影响华盛顿和华尔街并驱动您投资决策的政策变化?
What are the policy changes the Trump administration is making that affect Washington and Wall Street and drive your investment decisions?
从关税到税收,规则不断变化,这就是为什么您需要每天收听。
From tariffs to taxes, the rules are constantly changing, which is why you need to listen every day.
我们每天工作日都会实时播报,然后将最精彩的对话整理成每日播客。
We do it all live each weekday then bring you the best conversations in the daily podcast.
补上您上班时错过的新闻头条。
Catch up on the headlines you missed while you were at work.
在回家的路上收听,获取来自我国首都及全球各地的当日要闻。
Listen on your way home for the top news of the day straight from our nation's capital and around the world.
这就是由我乔·马修和凯莉·莱恩斯带来的《权力平衡》播客。
That's the balance of power podcast with me, Joe Matthew, and Kaylee Lines.
在苹果、Spotify以及您收听播客的任何平台收听。
Listen on Apple, Spotify, and wherever you get your podcasts.
所以,我想确认一下,想更广泛地问问您:您整个学术生涯都在研究中国能源市场和中国能源政策。
So one thing I wanted to make sure to ask you is just more broadly, you've spent your entire academic career studying Chinese energy markets and Chinese energy policy.
你认为人们应该了解关于这个特定市场的一件事是什么?或者在全球能源政策格局中,中国有什么独特之处?
What's the one thing you think people should know about that particular market or the one thing that makes China unusual in the grand scheme of global energy policies?
我想强调的一点是,中国在全球能源体系中的角色正在发生变化。
So one thing I'd like to highlight is China's changing role in the global energy system.
在我关注中国能源行业的大部分时间里,人们看待中国在全球能源市场中的角色,通常是将其视为石油和天然气(包括管道天然气和液化天然气)日益增长的进口国,以及一个机会主义的煤炭进口国。
So for most of the time that I've been following China's energy sector, you know, it's and looking at China's role in global energy markets, it's been China as a growing importer of oil and natural gas, both pipeline gas and LNG as an opportunistic coal importer.
但中国目前正在经历一场重要转变,即向低碳未来过渡。
But there's an important change underway in China, which is that the country is transitioning to a lower carbon future.
你可能已经看到许多新闻报道,称中国在风能和太阳能装机容量方面创下了历史新高。
You may have seen a lot of news reports about record level of wind and solar capacity installations in China.
这其中一部分原因当然是为了脱碳。
Part of this is certainly about decarbonization.
这同时也关乎能源供应安全。
It's also about energy supply security.
我认为,中国从乌克兰战争、美国在委内瑞拉的行动,以及当前伊朗的局势中吸取的一个教训是:最好能够依赖本国境内的能源来源。
I think one thing China has taken away from the war in Ukraine from, you know, US activities in Venezuela, you know, the current war in Iran is that, you know, it's better just to be able to rely on energy sources within your own borders.
还有一个能源供应的故事。
There's an energy supply story as well.
中国还有一个能源安全的故事。
There's an energy security story for China.
但这里发生的另一件事是,中国希望继续成为全球其他地区实现脱碳、能源安全以及获得可靠且可负担能源所需绿色技术的供应商,这三大目标。
But the other thing that's going on here is that China wants to continue to be the supplier of the green technologies that the rest of the world needs for decarbonization, energy security, you know, access to reliable and affordable energy, so those three sets of goals.
因此,我们正看到中国崛起为一个所谓的绿色科技超级大国。
And so we are seeing China emerge as this green tech superpower if you will.
因此,非常有趣的是,中国在扮演这一角色的同时,美国却在推进其能源主导议程,这当然侧重于出口更多美国液化天然气和石油,并将其作为施加影响的工具。
And so it's very interesting to think about this, and China playing this role at the same time that The United States is advancing this agenda of energy dominance, which of course is focused on exporting more US LNG and oil and sort of using those as a source of leverage.
当我想到这一点时,我的直觉反应是,这更像是一种胁迫手段——当然,它也可能是一种胡萝卜或大棒,但我认为它更偏向于大棒。
When I think about that, my instinctive reaction is maybe more I mean, of course, it could be a carrot or a stick, but I think of it as being more of a stick.
而我认为,中国能提供一些非常不同的东西,这对世界上许多国家来说可能极具吸引力,因为许多国家不希望将大量外汇花在能源进口上。
Whereas I think that China has something very different that it can offer that might be quite appealing to a lot of countries in the world because a lot of countries don't want to spend a lot of their foreign exchange on energy imports.
它们不希望自己的能源供应容易受到中断的影响。
They don't want to be vulnerable to supply disruptions.
因此,如果中国提出:你们拥有优质的太阳能资源,可以购买我们的太阳能电池板,或者聘请中国的工程总承包商来建设太阳能电站,那么这些国家就不必在外汇上花这么多钱用于能源进口。
And so if China's coming along and saying that, okay, you have, you know, great solar energy resources and you can buy solar panels for us or you can hire a Chinese EPC contractor to build you a solar farm, then countries don't have to spend as much energy on foreign exchange.
举个例子,几年前,大约在2018年到2019年期间,我做过大量研究,探讨为什么中国在巴基斯坦建设了如此多的燃煤电厂,而该国其实拥有巨大的可再生能源资源,尤其是风能和太阳能。
Just as one example, did a lot of work a number of years ago, like circa 2018, 2019, looking at why China was building so many coal fired power plants in Pakistan when the country had, you know, tremendous, you know, renewable energy resource wind and solar resources, especially solar.
于是我深入研究了巴基斯坦的能源部门。
And I ended up doing this deep dive into Pakistan's energy sector.
我发现的一个关键问题是,他们花费了大量宝贵的外汇来进口燃料油,现在还有煤炭,以维持这些电厂的运行,这确实是个问题。
One of the things I discovered is that they were spending a lot of very precious foreign exchange on importing fuel oil and now coal to run these power plants, and that was an issue.
而如今,过去一年里出现了大量报道,显示巴基斯坦的许多家庭和企业都在购买大量中国产的太阳能电池板,安装在屋顶上,以获得负担得起且可靠的电力。
And now we are seeing there have been a lot of reports over the past year about how you individual households and businesses in Pakistan that have been buying a lot of Chinese solar panels to put on their roofs so that they have affordable and reliable energy.
因此,每当我听到巴基斯坦的例子,我总会回想起我早前的研究,某种程度上,这确实有助于巴基斯坦节省外汇——这些外汇原本会被用于能源进口。
And so I just whenever I hear about the Pakistan example, keep thinking back to that earlier research that I did and how this to a certain extent has to be helping Pakistan conserve foreign exchange or conserve foreign exchange that it previously would have spent on energy imports.
我不太记得具体的节省金额,但我想强调的就是这个例子。
I don't know the size of the savings off the top of my head, but that's just one example I wanted to highlight.
是的。
Yeah.
在最近的大部分历史中,直到今天,化石燃料的主导地位仍然极其重要,而这不会一夜之间改变。
It does seem like up for most of recent history and still today, fossil fuel dominance is incredibly important, and that's not going to change overnight.
因此,是的,美国、拉丁美洲、中东等地拥有巨大的化石燃料储量。
And so, yes, you have incredible fossil fuel capacity reserves in The US, Latin America, The Middle East, and so forth.
但正如你所指出的,长期趋势似乎是,总有一天,世界大部分地区不再需要这么多化石燃料,而他们降低能源开支的能力将来自中国的技术——无论是风能、太阳能还是电池,这些技术在国内安装后可能减少他们的能源账单。
But the longer term trend, as you spell it out, seems to be at some point that much of the world just doesn't need as much of it, and their ability to reduce their energy bill will come from Chinese technology, whether we're talking about wind, solar, or batteries that has been installed domestically and potentially reducing their bill.
因此,原本流向美国或阿联酋等国的付款,现在转为支付来自中国的可再生能源技术。
So the payments that were at one point going to The US or going to The UAE, etcetera, switches to being payments for renewable technology from China.
是的。
Yes.
很好。
Great.
我总结一下
I I I summed up the
我的意思是,另一个方面是,如果我们再看看中国,中国对柴油和汽油的需求已经……
I mean, I could also I mean, the other sort of thing here is that I mean, I think that and if if we sort of, you know, looking again at China, China's demand for diesel and gasoline has Mhmm.
已经见顶了。
Already peaked.
就柴油而言,这很大程度上与房地产泡沫破裂有关。
In the case of diesel, lot of it has to do with the property collapse.
至于汽油,则是因为电动汽车的快速普及。
You know, with gasoline, it's been the rapid uptake of EVs.
由于电动汽车的快速普及,国际能源署和一些中国国家石油公司已经将中国整体石油需求见顶的时间提前了。
And as a result of this very rapid uptake of EVs, the International Energy Agency, some of China's national oil companies, you know, have moved forward their date for when China's, you know, overall oil demand is gonna peak.
以前我看到的预测是接近2030年,现在则提前到了2027年。
Before I was seeing them, you know, years, dates closer to 2030, now 2027.
曾经有一段时间,中石化这家国家石油公司甚至表示是2025年。
At one point, Sinopec, one of the national oil companies, had even said, you know, 2025.
正如我提到的,我们已经看到道路运输用油需求见顶,但中国仍需要石油用于石油化工,而这些化工产品又被用于一些绿色技术。
And so as I mentioned, we have seen, you know, demand for road transport fuel peak, but China will still need oil for petrochemicals, which in turn are used in some of these green technologies.
对吧?
Right?
我们需要石油化工原料作为电动汽车、太阳能电池板和锂离子电池的输入材料。
Like, we need petrochemicals feedstocks as inputs for EVs, for solar panels, for lithium ion batteries.
因此这里存在关联,我们将会看到,中国仍需进口一些石油,以继续在这些技术的制造领域保持领先地位。
So there is a link there, and we will see you know, China still needs to import some oil to continue to be a leader in manufacturing these technologies.
我知道你显然不是宏观经济学家,但当你观察伊朗当前的情况以及中东局势时,你认为这会对中国的通货膨胀和更广泛的能源价格产生怎样的影响?
So I know you're not a macroeconomist, obviously, but when you look at what's happening now in Iran and the situation in The Middle East, what's your best guess for how this actually feeds into Chinese inflation and the broader, I guess, energy prices?
比如,由于供应受限,中国国内能源价格实际可能上涨多少?而这种供应减少又能通过储备抵消多少?
Like, how much could we actually see domestic energy prices in China go up as a result of curt curtailed supply, and how much of that curtailed supply can just be offset from the reserve?
是的。
Yeah.
我们正看到能源价格上升。
So we are seeing higher prices for energy.
我知道我们一直在讨论石油,但我更想转向液化天然气。
I know we've been talking a lot about oil, but I actually like to turn to LNG
很好。
Great.
是的。
Yeah.
为回答这个问题。
To answer this question.
中国进口的液化天然气中,近三分之一来自中东。
So China imports almost one third of its LNG from The Middle East.
其中几乎全部来自卡塔尔,少量来自阿联酋和阿曼。
Almost all of that comes from Qatar with a little bit from The UAE and Oman.
阿曼显然位于霍尔木兹海峡之外。
Oman obviously lies outside the Strait Of Hormuz.
但如果你看看来自卡塔尔以及少量来自阿联酋的供应,这些物资目前不再流向中国。
But if you look at the supplies coming, you know, first and foremost from Qatar and that little bit from, you know, from The UAE, those supplies are no longer flowing to China.
中国并没有像石油那样的大规模战略天然气储备。
And China doesn't have a massive strategic gas reserve, you know, the way it does with oil.
因此,从卡塔尔到中国的液化天然气运输路线一旦长期受阻,中国将面临更大压力,不得不设法拼凑应对方案。
And so the longer ply of LNG from, you know, from Qatar to China is disrupted, you know, the more China is going to be under pressure to cobble together a response.
我认为在非常短期的范围内,他们可以做的一件大事是找到减少用气的方法。
And I think in the very short term, one of the big things, you know, that they can do is find ways to use less gas.
而现货液化天然气价格的飙升将帮助中国实现这一点。
And here, sky high prices for spot cargoes is gonna help China do that.
你知道的?
You know?
行业媒体已有报道,一些未具名的交易员——显然来自大型国有企业——表示,由于价格实在太高,他们目前不会在现货市场购买任何货物。
And there have there has been reporting in industry press where unnamed traders, you know, certainly at the big state owned companies, have been saying that, you know, we're not gonna buy anything on the spot market right now because prices are just too high.
中国有页岩气开采吗?
Do they frack in China?
他们跟上页岩气革命的步伐了吗?
Have they got into the fracking revolution yet?
那边有这回事吗?
Is that a thing over there?
是的。
Yeah.
他们有。
They have.
实际上,去年中国43%的天然气产量来自非常规资源。
And, actually, last year, 43% of China's natural gas production came from unconventional sources.
这个数据让我特别感兴趣,因为我记得,当美国页岩革命兴起时,人们经常提到,从纸面上看,中国的页岩资源要么比美国更大,要么几乎与美国相当。
And this statistic is really of interest to me because I remember, you know, back when The US shale revolution was taking off, people would often note that on paper, China's shale resources were either, you know, were bigger than or, you know, almost as big as The United States.
也就是说,回溯十五六年,当时中国在纸面上拥有巨大的页岩资源。
Like, basically, if not I mean, this is going back like fifteen, sixteen years, but basically, there were big China had big shale resources on paper.
所以我经常被问到:我们会看到中国发生页岩革命吗?
So I would often get the question, you know, are we gonna see a shale revolution in China?
我的回答是:这更可能是一场页岩渐进式发展,因为美国和中国存在不同的因素。
My answer was over it's gonna be more of a shale evolution because of different factors in The United States and China.
比如在美国,那些拥有潜在页岩资源土地的人可以获得补偿。
Like in The United States, for example, people who were sitting above, you know, promising shale resources could be compensated for that.
但在中国,情况就大不相同。
Not so much in China.
你知道,在美国,页岩革命实际上是由这些灵活的小公司为了最大化利润而推动的。
You know, in The United States, you know, the Shell Revolution was really launched by these small nimble companies to maximize profit.
而在中国,如果你看一下所有的上游油气资产,它们都集中在几家国家级石油公司的手中。
Whereas in China, if you look at all the upstream oil and gas assets, they're concentrated in the hands of China's net national oil companies
对。
Right.
这些公司都是国有的,可能不够灵活,而且当然也存在一些其他问题。
Which are state owned, maybe not as nimble, and certainly have you know?
所以,有诸多不同的因素。
And so, you know, there are a number of different factors.
这些只是我能想到的两个,实际上我还能列出更多。
Those are just, you know, two that I can Which I'm actually I can
我对这个非常感兴趣,因为如果你想想中国的大规模基础设施项目和可再生能源的快速发展,就会觉得他们基本上能像 flip 一个开关一样,说:我们要大力推动这个。
I'm really interested in this because if you think about China's large infrastructure projects and its renewable build out, it feels like they basically are able to flip a switch and say, like, we wanna go big on this.
然后他们就能相对迅速地大规模推进,可能比美国等地通常的速度还要快。
And then they go big on this relatively quickly and probably faster than it usually happens in places like The States.
但你说的是,对于压裂这一项,情况并非如此,这让我非常惊讶。
But you're saying for this one thing, for fracking, that wasn't the case, which is very surprising to me.
是的。
Yeah.
中国非常规天然气产量的增长要缓慢得多。
It's been a much more gradual buildup of unconventional gas production in China.
当然,当我提到天然气产量的43%来自非常规来源时,这还包括致密气等其他类型。
And, of course, you know, when I say 43% of gas production, you know, it's from unconventional sources, you know, that's also including things like like tight gas.
并非全是页岩气,尽管页岩气确实是其中重要的一部分。
It's not all shale, although shale was absolutely a part of the story.
是的。
Yeah.
所以,正如你所说,非常规天然气产量的增长确实要缓慢得多。
And so to your point, yes, this was a much more gradual buildup in unconventional gas production.
埃里卡·唐斯,这场对话非常精彩。
Erica Downs, fascinating conversation.
在这四十五分钟里我学到了很多。
I learned a lot in that forty five minutes.
非常感谢你做客《Odd Lots》,而且,
Really appreciate you coming on to Odd Lots, and,
是的,
yeah,
谢谢你的参与。
thanks for joining us.
非常感谢你
Thanks so much for
参与
having
这场有趣的对话。
interesting conversation.
我之前不知道这一点,我的意思是,我不惊讶于会有小型炼油厂
I didn't know that about the I mean, I guess I'm not surprised that there were small refineries
嗯。
Mhmm.
但它们起到了一个非常战略性的目的,即避免了那些国际上的责任。
But that they served this very strategic purpose of not having those international, I guess, liabilities.
对吧?
Right?
他们没有同样的
They don't have the same
平行系统,这个系统是在更受监管的官方能源行业之外建立起来的。
parallel, like, system that they've built outside of, I guess, the more regulated official energy industry.
这对我来说非常有趣。
It's and it's fascinating to me.
首先,这是一个很好的品牌建设案例,因为我只是觉得‘茶壶’这个名字很棒。
A, it's a good exercise in branding because I just find the teapot name Yeah.
非常吸引人。
So compelling.
但这也像是一个完整的套利产业。
But, also, it's like an entire arbitrage industry.
对吧?
Right?
是的。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
不。
No.
有道理。
Makes sense.
对吧?
Right?
总会有人被制裁的。
Like, there's always gonna be someone sanctioned.
对吧?
Right?
这看起来挺安全的。
That's that seems like safe.
总是会有一些,特别是
There's always especially
人生三大确定性:死亡、税收,以及总有人 somewhere 的石油会被制裁。
Three certainties in life, death, taxes, and someone somewhere is gonna have their oil sanctioned.
这绝对没错。
That's absolutely true.
所以是的。
And so yeah.
但他们还是会卖,而且会打折卖。
But they're gonna sell it, and they're gonna sell it at a discount.
显然,任何购买被制裁商品的买家都将面临某种风险,可能会被施加二级制裁或处罚等等。
And, obviously, any buyer of sanctioned commodities is gonna be taking on some sort of risk that they're gonna get slapped with, a secondary sanction or penalty and so forth.
所以,建立一种分散的、小型的家庭产业是有道理的。
So it makes sense to have a sort of a, you know, decentralized cottage industry.
家庭产业。
Cottage industry.
这又是个听起来挺可爱的说法。
It's another cute sounding thing.
其实并不可爱。
It's not really cute.
这全都挺可爱的。
It's all very cute.
这全都挺可爱的。
It's all very cute.
但另外,确实有个,是的。
But another there's a yeah.
这个独立的产业并不像前者那样面临同样的风险。
This separate industry that does not have the same they're not exposed in the same way.
是的。
Yeah.
另一件让我非常感兴趣的事情是,关于战略石油储备的讨论非常有趣,这个想法是,你知道,建立这种战略储备背后可能存在外交政策的考量。
And the other thing I was very interested to hear obviously, the discussion around the strategic petroleum reserve was very interesting, this idea that, you know, there might be foreign policy considerations behind building up that strategic supply.
还有,页岩气在中国的发展没有像预期那样迅速。
Also, the idea that shale hasn't taken off as fast in China.
就像之前说的,这真的让我很惊讶。
Like, again, that really surprises me.
是的。
Yeah.
我也觉得很惊讶。
It surprises me too.
我们一直听说,计划经济的一个优势是可以更直接地推动大型项目,但在页岩气这件事上,似乎并没有发生。
We're so used to hearing that one of the benefits of a command economy is that you can more or less, you know, direct this big stuff, and it doesn't seem to have happened in the case of shale.
而且,也许这更多是一种战略性的决策。
And, again, maybe that maybe that's more of a strategic decision.
我本来想说,我的推测是——这纯粹是猜测——那就是不。
I was gonna say, I mean, what I would surmise, and there's just speculation, is like, no.
最大的优先事项是
Like, the big priority is
可再生能源。
the renewables.
主要的
The big
优先事项是电池、太阳能、风能等等。
priority is batteries, solar, wind, and so forth.
而且我认为这确实会成为一场重大转变,我不知道需要多长时间,但这种转变已经在进行中:许多既不是美国也不是中国的国家,都希望减少能源进口开支。
And I do think this is, like, gonna be the big I don't know how long it would take place, but the big shift that's already happening, I guess, under underway is this, like, a bunch of other countries that aren't The US and aren't China are going to wanna reduce their energy import bill.
是的。
Yeah.
他们会用从中国授权的能源技术开支来替代,这是一个长期的
And they're gonna swap it for an energy technology bill that they license from China, and that is a long term
我认为这是一个非常重要的观点。
I think that's a really important point.
这是一个非常重要的趋势。
It's a really important trend.
像战争这样的事件在短期内会提高中国和其他国家的进口账单,而在中长期则会鼓励更多国家加速这一转型。
And events like the war are in the short term going to raise China's import bill and others, and in the long term or the medium term, encourage more countries to accelerate that transition.
所以这是一个相当重要的故事。
So that's a pretty big story.
利与弊。
Pros and cons.
是的。
Yes.
如果有人正在从事中国页岩气或水力压裂工作,或者曾尝试过,我非常希望能与他们交流。
If there's anyone out there who's working in Chinese shale or fracking or has attempted to work in Chinese shale or fracking, I'd be very interested in talking to them.
所以
So
我想看看中国的土地勘测员。
I wanna watch the landman of China.
你知道吗,我还没看过《土地勘测员》美国版,但我猜那会很有趣。
You know, if you I haven't watched the Landman America version, but I bet that would be interesting.
你一定要看看。
You gotta watch it.
好的。
Alright.
我们就到这里吧?
Shall we leave it there?
我们就到这里吧。
Let's leave it there.
这又是《Odd Lots》播客的另一期节目。
This has been another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.
我是特蕾西·阿拉韦。
I'm Tracy Allaway.
你可以关注我,Tracy Allaway。
You can follow me at Tracy Allaway.
我是Joe Wiesenthal。
And I'm Joe Wiesenthal.
你可以关注我,the stalwart。
You can follow me at the stalwart.
关注我们的嘉宾Erica Downs。
Follow our guest, Erica Downs.
她就在Erica Downs。
She's at Erica Downs.
关注我们的制作人:Carmen Rodriguez(Carmen Armen)、Dashiell Bennett(Dashpot)和Kale Brooks(Kale Brooks)。
Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armen, Dashiell Bennett at Dashpot, and Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks.
如需获取更多Odd Lots内容,请访问bloomberg.com/oddlots,订阅每日简报和所有往期节目。
And for more Odd Lots content, go to bloomberg.com/oddlots for the daily news letter and all of our episodes.
你还可以在我们的Discord频道discord.gg/oddlots中24/7全天候讨论这些话题。
And you can chat about all of these topics twenty four seven in our Discord, discord.gg/oddlots.
如果你喜欢Odd Lots节目,喜欢我们讨论茶壶炼油厂和中国页岩油的内容,请在你最喜欢的平台上给我们留下好评。
And if you enjoy Odd Lots, if you like it when we talk about teapot refineries and shale in China, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite platform.
记住,如果你是彭博社的订阅用户,你可以免费收听我们所有的节目,没有任何广告。
And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad free.
你只需要在Apple播客上找到彭博社频道,然后按照那里的说明操作即可。
All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there.
感谢收听。
Thanks for listening.
四月,彭博社之家登陆迈阿密,亮相一级方程式大奖赛。
April, Bloomberg House arrives in Miami at the Formula One Grand Prix.
在世界上最激动人心的体育赛事之一背景下,彭博社之家将商业、投资与文化融为一体,由彭博社新闻、实时数据和前瞻性对话驱动。
Set against one of the world's most electrifying sporting events, Bloomberg House brings business, investment, and culture together, powered by Bloomberg journalism, real time data, and forward looking conversations.
从现场讨论到与全球领袖的专属社交活动,这里正是思想交汇之地。
From on stage discussions to exclusive networking with global leaders, this is where ideas connect.
彭博社之家迈阿密。
Bloomberg House Miami.
了解更多,请访问 bloomberglive.com/Bloomberg House Miami。
Learn more at bloomberglive.com slash Bloomberg House Miami.
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