Ex-Tudor Quant PM: “There Hasn't Been a New Idea in Trading for 15 Years”

总会有新东西出现的。

There's always going to be something.

可惜预测它超出了我的能力范围。

Predicting it is beyond my ken, tragically.

但话说回来，如果你现在是个大学生，我觉得你不该看我走过的路，也不该看保罗·都铎·琼斯怎么走的，甚至不该看你那些去了简街、几年就赚大钱的朋友。

But yes, I will say that if you're a kid in college right now, I don't think you should look at what my career did, don't think you should look at Paul Tudor Jones' career, I don't think you should look at even your friends who went to Jane Street and were making real money in a couple of years.

我觉得那条路会非常拥挤。

I don't I think that channel is going to be really crowded.

在我看来，你最好还是另辟蹊径，这是我的看法。

I think you'd be better off, you know, trying to find some other route, is my opinion.

我同意。

I agree.

而且我觉得很可惜，这么多人热衷于玩地位游戏，然后照搬别人的成功路径，还笃定自己二十年后也会跟那些人一样。

And I think it's a shame that so many people try to play the status games and then map on other people's paths to them and then pick that they'll just, it'll just be, there's just certainty that in twenty years they'll end up similar to someone else.

我有个好朋友是投资银行家。

I have a good friend who's an investment banker.

我们俩在职业生涯早期一起做过一些项目，之后二十年一直保持联系。

He and I were involved in some projects early on in our careers and we just stayed in touch for twenty years.

他说如果能重来一次，他会选择完全不同的路，因为他有个朋友是做救护车用品供应的。

And he says that if he had it to do all over again, he would do something completely different because he has a friend who is an ambulance supply company.

那家公司只有十个员工，却给美国大部分地方政府供货。

It's 10 employees and he supplies most of the local governments in The U.

美国。

S.

救护车用品，加价高得离谱。

With their ambulance supplies at stratospheric markups.

那家伙就十个员工，每天工作六个小时，身家却有一亿五千万美元。而我那哥们儿呢，在投行里每天干二十个小时，撞破头就为了挣个几百万。

The guy's 10 employees, he works six hours a day and he's worth $150,000,000 And in the meantime, my buddy is, you know, doing those twenty hour days in investment banking, banging his head against the wall trying to get, you know, a couple of million bucks.

我觉得对冲基金领域也是一样的道理。

I think it's the same thing in the hedge fund space.

有些地方我确实很喜欢。

There are things about it I love.

地位不应该是吸引你进入这一行的原因。

Status isn't the thing that should draw you to it.

因为说实话，你知道，我觉得当别人问你是做什么的，你说出来反而会让你成为世界上最不受欢迎的人之一。

Because frankly, you know, I think it makes you one of the least popular people in the world to say, what do you do?

嗯，我在对冲基金工作。

Well, I work at a hedge fund.

你知道，十有八九，我跟别人说了之后，对方会因为这一点而看不起我。

You know, nine times out of 10 the person I say that to is going to look down at me because of it.

他们会因为我的工作而觉得我是个坏人。

They're going think I'm a bad person because of what I do.

我完全不认同，但他们会这么想。

I completely disagree, but that's what they're going to think.

所以钱是很多，但在我看来，有很多更容易的方式赚到这些钱。

So the money is great, but there's a lot of easier ways to get the money, in my opinion.

你在都铎投资公司为保罗·都铎·琼斯工作。

You work for Paul Tudor Jones at Tudor.

说到这个选择赛道的主题，你觉得他在刚开始的时候，是不是看到了这个行业，看到了正在发生的事情，然后说，哦，资金管理会变得非常庞大。

And on this topic of game selection, do you think he, when starting out, saw the industry, saw what was happening and said, oh, money management's gonna be huge.

还是说他只是慢慢地、一点一点地就陷进去了？

Or did he just kind of fall into it little by little?

我问这个问题是因为他太出色了，因为他可是保罗·都铎·琼斯。

And I'm I'm asking that question because he's so exceptional, because he's, you know, he's Paul Tudor Jones.

就连他，他有没有想过，他有没有这种远见和视野，预见到这个行业会变成什么样？

Did even he did he think about did he have this foresight and this vision of what the industry would become?

我这是在猜测。

I'm speculating about it.

我为保罗·都铎·琼斯工作过。

So I worked for Paul Tudor Jones.

我跟他不是特别熟。

I don't know him particularly well.

我们有过几次交谈，但你知道，我在那里的时候，那是个很大的公司。

We've had a few conversations, but you know it's a big shop when I was there.

我和保罗之间隔了好几层管理层。

There was intervening management layers between Paul and I.

路易斯·培根是保罗的朋友，他在媒体上没那么出名，但我跟他更熟。

Louis Bacon, is a friend of Paul's, he's just much less known in the media, I know much better.

我直接跟他共事过很长时间。

I worked directly with him for a long time.

但说到重点，如果你只是想让我猜测一下，我会说他们俩都没预料到这一点。

But to get to the punchline, if you just want me to speculate on it, would say that neither of them saw it coming.

我觉得他们都是很优秀的交易员。

I think they were both good traders.

我觉得他们就是喜欢交易。

I think trading is what they like.

我觉得他们很聪明，找到了好的管理者，因为说实话，作为对冲基金经理，你不想自己去打理公司，对吧？

I think they've been smart enough to hook up with good managers because frankly you don't want to run the business if you're a hedge fund manager, right?

你得有个好的首席财务官或者运营人员，真正负责发工资、确保账目准确无误的人。

You've got to have a good, you know, CFO or an operations guy, somebody to actually pay everybody's salary and make sure the accounting gets done right.

这工作量很大，比你想的要大得多。

That's a lot of work, more than you imagine.

所以你需要有人帮你处理所有这些事情。

So you need somebody to do all that for you.

在这方面他们俩都很幸运，遇到了非常出色的运营人才。

And they both got very lucky in that regard where they got great operational people.

他们对风险管理有正确的看法，这在行业里是至关重要的。

They had the right kind of perspective on risk management, which is essential in the industry.

而正是这一点，我觉得比什么都重要，让他们赢得了大型对冲基金投资者的信任。

And that's the thing more than anything else that I think gave them credibility with the largest hedge fund investors.

你想想看，对吧？

So you think about it, right?

你知道，我管理着一只基金。

You know, I run a fund.

我只能拿到利润的20%。

I only get 20% of the P and L.

我们公司也只能拿到利润的20%。

My firm only gets 20% of the P and L.

从这20%里，我得付所有人的工资，合伙人还要分一份，你知道的。

From that I've got to pay everybody's salaries, my partners get a piece of it, you know.

我们公司可能赚了1000万美元，但这不代表我能赚1000万，差得远呢。

My firm may go and make, you know, $10,000,000 but it doesn't mean I make $10,000,000 nothing close.

保罗·都铎·琼斯也一样，路易斯·贝克，还有英格兰的那位，都是如此，对吧？

And it's the same is true for Paul Tudor Jones, same is true for Louis Baker, is he England or whoever, right?

所以，在对冲基金行业，要想真正赚到大钱，唯一的办法就是把规模做大。当你管理100亿美元时，你实现15%的回报，拿走其中的20%，扣掉所有人的工资后，剩下的还是相当可观的。

So, the only way you're going to get really paid in the hedge fund industry if you grow to a very large size when you're managing $10,000,000,000, you know, you're delivering a 15% return, taking 20% of that there's quite a bit left after you pay everybody's salary.

但运营一个小基金，对你来说赚不了多少。

But running a small fund is just not going to be that much for you.

可能还不如拿自己的钱去交易，赚得更多。

You'd be better off just trading your own money, probably.

对，我跟一个朋友聊过这个，他是我学校的同学，一个非常有干劲的人。

Yeah, I was talking to a friend about this and he's, you know, a friend from my school and very, very driven guy.

他说有一天他想开一家基金。

And he was talking about one day he wants to start a fund.

他非常聪明，所以我毫不怀疑他也许能做成这类事情。

And he's he's very intelligent, so I have no doubt that he could perhaps do something of this sort.

他问我，他觉得这事有多大可行性。

And he asked me how viable I I thought it was.

我告诉他，如果你真的算一下账，对大多数人来说，这真的不太可行。

And I I told him, you know, if you really run the math on it, for most people, it is really not viable.

我记得我们聊的时候，我举的例子是筹集一亿美元，首先，这极其困难，尤其是刚开始的时候，那真的非常难。

As in, I remember we were talking, and the example I gave and we were talking about was raising a $100,000,000, which, number one, is extremely hard to do, especially like, starting out, that is extremely hard to do.

现在你连一亿两千万都拿不到，对吧，尤其是刚开始的时候。

You can't even get to one twenty on that today, right, especially starting out.

然后你还有所有的人员配置。

And then you have all your staffing.

你就像，当我开始仔细算的时候，而且你还在纽约这种昂贵的地方。

You're like, when you like, I I I, you know, started going through it, plus you're in an expensive place like New York.

实际上，真正进入你口袋、然后真正增加你净资产的钱，并不是表面上看起来的那样。

Really, the amount that enters your pocket and then from there, really truly grows your net worth is not what it seems on the surface.

你知道，我觉得每个人都以为管理十亿美元对冲基金的人，就是整天挥金如土。

You know, I think everyone thinks of this guy running billion dollar hedge fund as just balling in cash.

他就像把百元大钞到处乱扔，撒得满街都是。

He he's a key dollar bills just throwing them everywhere on the street.

但现实完全是另一回事。

When the when the reality is a different story.

你能具体谈谈吗？以及行业外的人有哪些误解？

Can you talk a little bit about that and what people outside the industry kind of get wrong?

当然可以。

Sure.

那么，现在，我粗略估计一下。

So, right now, there are I would Finger in the air.

大概有八百万到一千万超级聪明的工程系学生，他们觉得自己能写一个程序化交易系统。

There's probably eight or 10,000,000 super smart engineering students out there thinking they're going to write a program trading system.

他们写一段代码，开个Robinhood账户，连上API，然后砰的一声，一辆兰博基尼就出现在他们家门口了。

They write a piece of code, they get themselves a Robin Hood account, they connect it to the API and poof a Lambo appears in their driveway.

这不是现实生活，好吗？

This is not real life, okay?

刚开始的时候，每个人都会犯同样的错误，就像行业里其他聪明人一样，因为他们学的东西都一样。

When someone's starting out they make the same set of mistakes that every other smart guy in the industry makes because they're learning the same things about it.

所以，他们脑子里都会想，嗯，我确实做不了市场择时，对吧？

So, you know, they will all have it in their head, well, I can't really do market timing, right?

因为那行不通。

Because that doesn't work.

因为我没法预测什么时候涨，什么时候跌。

Because I can't figure out when things are going to go up and when they're going go down.

但我能搞懂均值回归，所以我打算建一个均值回归策略。

But I can figure out mean reversion, so I'll build a mean reversion strategy.

他们这么做了，结果还是不行。

They do that and it doesn't work.

为什么？

Why?

因为每一个有效的均值回归策略都已经运行了十年以上，甚至四十年了。

Because every mean reversion strategy that works has already been running for a decade more, for forty years.

好吧，我会做标普500套利，所以我们构建了整个矩阵，你猜怎么着？

Okay, I will do, you know, S and P 500 arbitrage so we build this whole matrix and guess what?

每个人都在做同样的事，而且他们都在交易所附近，所以交易都被他们抢走了，你根本抢不到。

Everybody's doing that too and they're co located so they're getting the trade and you're not.

好吧，那不行，我就做动量交易。

Okay, that won't work, I'll do momentum trading.

我会用这个那个找出一个动量因子，然后去做，结果还是不行。

I'll figure out a momentum factor with this and that and do that and that doesn't work.

然后根据他们数学水平的不同，他们会做主成分分析，或者某种因子分解，然后他们会转向其他方向，调整时间周期，各种花样都试。

And then depending on how much math they have they'll do principal component analysis or they'll do some sort of factor deconstruction and then they go off into other directions, opening and closing the time horizon, all sorts of things.

对，这就是最大的错误。

And yeah, that's the big mistake.

他们以为自己的想法是新的，就觉得对所有人来说都是新的。

They assume that because they have a new idea for them, that it's a new idea for everyone.

但事实完全不是这样。

And that's absolutely not the case.

我在金融行业，机构金融领域，已经干了三十五年了。

I've been in financial I've been in institutional finance for thirty five years.

这么多年里，我觉得自己也就有过一个原创的想法。

In that whole time I think I had one original idea.

说实话，那个想法还是从乔·斯蒂格利茨那儿偷来的。

And in truth, I kind of stole it from Joe Stiglitz.

那只是他已有成果的一个延伸。

It was an extension of what he had already come up with.

他确实因此拿了诺贝尔奖，所以那也不算小事。

He did get the Nobel Prize for it, so it's not nothing.

但也就那一个想法。

But that's one idea.

其他所有我做过的事，都是对已有知识的延伸、补充或者类似的东西，对吧？

Everything else I've ever done was an extension of or adding on to or whatever, right?

就是利用这些庞大的知识，再往前推一步，去找一些获取超额收益的机会。

Taking this massive knowledge and trying to extend it one more rational step in order to find some opportunity for alpha.

就这么简单。

And that's it.

就是这样。

That's it.

至于策略，你知道的，我用的策略，其实我只做过三件事。

The strategies, you know, the strategies I've employed, I've only ever done three things.

买入、卖出，还有等待。

They've bought, they've sold, and they've waited.

其他人不也都是这样做的吗，对吧？

That's all anybody else is doing either, right?

所以你得这么去看待它。

So you need to approach it.

如果你要进入这个行业，然后你说，好吧，我想成为一个伟大的交易员。

If you're going to start out in the industry and you say, Okay, I want to be a great trader.

我想找到一种方法获得巨大的利润。

I want to find a way to get great profits.

你不能像买彩票那样做，因为运气不会一直持续。

You can't do that as a lottery ticket because luck will not hold out.

你不能说，我要在这笔高确信度的赌注上全押，等它按我的方向走，我就能赚一大笔钱。

You can't say, I'm going to go all in on this high conviction bet and when it goes my way I'm going make a bunch of money.

不行。

No.

迟早你会那样输掉。

Sooner or later you're going to lose that way.

你需要思考的是，如何能在某个小方面获得系统性的信息优势，并大量复制这种优势。

What you need to think about is how you can get a systemic information advantage over somebody in some small way and reproduce that a great many times.

即便如此，即使你能做到，即使你能想出办法在市场上智胜所有人，你也无法用很多钱做到这一点，除非你是个千万富翁，那样的话，你还折腾交易干嘛呢？

And even then, even if you can do that, even if you can figure out a way to outsmart everybody else in the market, you're not going to be able to do it with much money unless of course you're a multimillionaire, in which case what are you bothering with trading for anyway?

你可以不用承受这种压力。

You can do without the stress.

所以，是的，大家犯的最大错误就是低估了竞争。

So yeah, by far the biggest mistake anybody makes is they underestimate the competition.

他们觉得只要有个想法，随便什么想法，就能成功，然后就能赚大钱。

They think if I come up with an idea, any idea, it'll work, and then that'll be the great source of wealth for me.

但事实恰恰相反。

And it's the exact opposite.

这是世界上效率最高的市场，也就是说，这里的竞争比其他任何领域都更激烈。

This is by far the most efficient market in the world, meaning the competition is better at this than it is in any other discipline.

你不如试着去建一个社交平台，跟Facebook、Twitter这些竞争。

You'd be better off trying to build a social media platform against Facebook and Twitter and whatever.

在我看来，那个市场的竞争空间比交易市场要大得多。

There's more room for competition in that market than there is in trading, in my opinion.

我已经很久没听到真正的新点子了。

I haven't heard a real new idea in some time.

我的意思是，高频交易的人算数学的方式不一样。

I mean, high frequency guys do math in a different way.

他们，你知道，他们会从各种角度、各种视角来看问题。

They, you know, they look at this angle or that angle or from this perspective or that perspective.

他们会把东西换个方式来做。

They change things around.

技术先进了，所以人们会有更快的芯片来处理事情。

The technology is advanced so people will have faster chips to do things on.

但至少十五年来，我没在交易领域看到真正的新想法。

But I haven't seen a real new idea in trading in at least fifteen years.

哇。

Wow.

十五年来没有真正的新想法，这太离谱了。

That's no real new idea in fifteen years is that's ridiculous.

对，只是更厉害的人把我们已经知道怎么做的事情做得更好，你懂的。

Yeah, just better people being better at doing the things that we already know how to do, you know.

连加密货币也是。

Even crypto.

加密货币基本上就是一群超级聪明的人在玩金融游戏。

Crypto is sort of a bunch of super, super, super smart guys cost playing at finance.

加密货币是为零售行业设计的。

Crypto was built for the retail industry.

它不是为机构设计的。

It wasn't built for institutions.

而金融里最容易赚的钱就是从散户那里赚，对吧，因为你对信息有最大的优势。

And that's the easiest money in finance, is taking money from retail, right, because it's where you have the biggest information advantage.

他们其实不太懂发生了什么。

They don't really know what's going on.

如果你对真实情况哪怕了解一点点，就很容易找到犯错的人。

If you know even a little about what's really going on, it's easy to find somebody who's wrong.

而加密货币领域大部分就是这样。

And that's most of the crypto space.

现在加密货币领域有很多真正很棒、很有创意的想法，其中很多最终会带来巨大的效率提升。

Now there's a lot of really great and innovative ideas in the crypto space, and a lot of that will inevitably produce great efficiency.

但这不会体现在交易上。

But it's not going to be in trading.

那里没有新的交易思路。

There are no new trading ideas in there.

而且他们最终也不会有人进监狱，实际上。

Then they won't end up with somebody in prison, actually.

我觉得还有一件事没人提，就是那些想进入这个行业的人，特别是想做某种量化交易的。

The other thing that I feel is not talked about and what people trying to get into the industry, specifically some variation of quantitative trading.

我觉得很多想进入这个行业的人搞错的一点是，尤其是没做过实习的话，他们其实不了解工作的本质是什么，而现实就像你说的，就是把这个小东西往前推进一点，再推进一点，再推进一点。

What I think a lot of people trying to enter the industry get wrong is, especially having, say, not done an internship, they don't actually understand what the nature of the work is when the reality is what you said of just advancing this little thing a little bit, then advancing it some more, then advancing it some more.

我觉得人们脑子里有个画面，就是坐在交易大厅里。

I feel like people have this vision where they're sitting on the trading floor.

他们，你知道，风吹着，面前有十六个显示器，然后他们在那儿发号施令。

They're they're they're, you know, they the the the the wind is blowing, and they have 16 monitors, and they're calling the shots.

比如说，哦，五号跌了。

Like, oh, I'll go number five is, is down.

我们得赶紧砍仓，砍仓，砍仓。

We gotta cut, cut, cut.

或者他们就像进入了一种心流状态，整天都在编程。

Or or they're, like, just in a in a flow state where there's just programming the entire day.

但我觉得现实是，所有工作的现实都是，大部分时间都很无聊。

When I feel like the reality, and this is the reality of all work, is that most of it is boring.

你能谈谈这个吗？就是日常工作，实际感受是什么样的，以及人们有哪些误解？

Can you speak to that as well, the day to day, what it actually feels like and the misconceptions people have?

我写书的时候，想出了一个我觉得特别好的比喻。

I had I I for my book, I came up with what I thought was a really great analogy.

把散户交易者和量化对冲基金做的事情相比，就像是在新泽西收费高速上开公交车和赢得一级方程式比赛相比。

So comparing a retail trader what a retail trader does to what a quantitative hedge fund does is like comparing driving a bus on the New Jersey Turnpike with winning a Formula One race.

完全是两码事。

Totally different things.

这两者完全没有任何关系。

One has absolutely nothing to do with the other.

对，成功的量化对冲基金其实大部分时间都很枯燥，不过AI会改变这一点。

And yeah, a successful quantitative hedge fund is a great deal of mundanity, though AI is going to change that.

在我现在的基金里，我们基本上把AI当作研究助理来用。

In my current fund, we use AI as basically research assistants.

它们负责所有数据清洗，处理那些琐碎的数据结构，确保这组数据和那组数据对应起来。

They do all the data cleaning, they do all the mundane, you know, data structures and making sure this set of data is associated with that set of data.

很多底层那些杂活，我们都交给AI了。

A lot of the really low level grunt stuff we've handed off to AI.

话虽如此，对，日常工作并不是这样的。

With that said, yeah, it is not the day on day.

实际上，我们的目标甚至不是让工作变得刺激。

In fact, it isn't even a goal to make it exciting.

我们的目标是让它尽可能平淡无奇。

The goal is to make it as unexciting as possible.

你要做的是，像高盛那样，高盛的交易大厅一年三百六十五天都在赚钱。

What you want to do, like Goldman Sachs, Goldman Sachs trading floor collectively makes money three sixty five days a year.

仔细想想，这个数字是不是很惊人？

A stunning statistic when you think that through, right?

他们几乎从来没有在完整的一天里亏过钱。

They almost never lose money on a full day.

几乎从来没有。

Almost never.

原因在于，他们建立了一套决策机制，总能在某些小方面领先竞争对手一步。

And the reason is that they built this decision making structure that is always one step ahead of the competition in some small way.

而且他们内部风险管理做得很好，所以几乎每天都能净赚。

And they manage the risks between them well enough so that the net result is a profit on virtually every day.

大概每三年才会有一天亏损。

That one down day every third year or something.

而且高盛并不是特别量化型的公司，他们很大程度上还是靠人工判断。

And Goldman is not a particularly quantitative shop, they're still highly discretionary.

在量化工作中，纪律性更强。

In quantitative work it's even more disciplined.

你知道，能带来盈利的那种东西，这里有个好例子。

You know, the kind of thing that leads to a profit is here's a good example.

所以在2003年，我建立了我的第一个成功的量化交易系统。

So in 2003, I built my first successful quantitative trading system.

这个系统利用自然语言解析来读取新闻，并根据结果进行交易。

This was a system which used natural language parsing to read the news and trade the result.

现在，这就是乔·斯蒂格利茨那个想法发挥作用的地方，对吧？

Now, had this is where that Joe Stiglitz idea comes in, right?

对于如何将那些信息应用到市场上，我有不同的看法。

I had a different vision of how you apply that information to markets.

所以，我从一个不同的方向来研究这个问题，结果非常成功。

So, I was working through that from sort of a different direction, and it turned out to be wildly successful.

那就是个大想法。

That was the big idea.

所以我写了一个系统来读取新闻。

So I wrote a system which read the news.

顺便说一句，那时候这想法太超前了，市面上根本买不到新闻数据库。

This was so early in the equation, by the way, that there was nobody I could buy a news database from at that time.

没人存储这些数据。

Nobody was storing it.

新闻在电讯上发布后就直接被丢弃了。

It was just produced on the wire and then thrown away.

所以我不得不

So I had to

首先，2003年就能想到这个，真了不起。

First off, that's 2003 to think of that.

佩服。

Kudos.

因为我觉得现在很多人刚开始做的时候还在琢磨这个呢。

Because I feel like people are trying to think about that today when starting out.

他们就说，哇，你知道吗，不过请继续。

They're like woah, you know, but please continue.

所以2003年我建了这个东西。

So 2003 I built this thing.

我首先要做的就是一个工具，用来读取新闻通讯社的新闻，把所有数据存到数据库里，这样我就可以用它来做回测。

The very first thing I had to build was a tool to read the newswire and store all the data in the database so I could use it for backtesting.

我花了两年时间——我是2001年开始写代码的，但我需要两年的数据来测试。

It took me two I'd started coding in 2001 but I needed two years of data to test.

所以那是唯一能拿到数据的方法。

So that was the only way I could get it.

2003年我真正建好了这个系统。

2003 I actually built the system.

它用了自然语言解析。

So it used natural language parsing.

它解析所有这些信息，然后根据结果进行交易。

It parsed all this information and it traded the result.

持仓期大概在三到十二天之间，差不多这样。

Had a holding period between three days and about twelve days, something like that.

所以不是特别长的持仓期，算是中等长度。

So not a super long hold period but medium sized.

我建了那个系统。

I built that system.

我经历了批准启动它的那些波折。

I went through the drama of being allowed to turn it on.

我把它启动了。

I got it turned on.

我们给它加了一些风险控制。

We got some risk thrown into it.

开始表现得非常好。

Started doing spectacularly well.

大约一年后，夏普比率开始下降，收益开始趋于平稳，情况开始变差。

After about a year, Sharpe ratio started to decline, returns started to level off a little bit, things started to decay.

那我当时需要做什么工作呢？

So what was the work I needed to do then?

嗯，我需要看看我产生的结果，然后找到更好的对冲方式。

Well, I needed to look at the results I'd produced and find better hedges.

所以，与其用标普500来对冲，我可能得用行业ETF之类的，对吧？

So instead of using like the S and P for a hedge I had to use sector ETFs or something, right?

然后一旦我这么做了，表现就改善了，我又多用了几年。

And then once I did that, performance improved, I got another couple of years out of it.

现在它又开始下滑了。

Now it's declining again.

现在我该怎么办？

Now what do I do?

好吧，我不用行业ETF做对冲了，我开始分别处理贝塔和伽马对冲，也许我会做一些期权对冲之类的。

Well, okay, I get rid of the sector ETFs as hedges and I start treating beta and gamma hedging separately so I'm maybe going to do a little bit of options hedging or whatever.

我要微调结果，这样我承担的就更多是特质风险，而不是市场风险或贝塔风险。

I'm going to fine tune the results so I'm getting more idiosyncratic risk than, you know, than market risk than beta.

所以2001年或2003年的那个大想法，真的是个特别棒的大东西，是个新东西，对吧？

So the big idea in 2001 or 2003 was this really great big thing, this new thing, right?

但到了2005年、2007年、2009年和2010年，那就是简单的金融工程了。

But in 2005 and in 2007 and two thousand and nine and twenty ten, that was simple financial engineering.

那跟我十年前做研究分析师时做的那些无聊的事情差不多。

That was the same sort of boring stuff that I'd been doing as a research analyst ten years before.

就是找到更好的方法来对冲这个结构，提高表现。

Finding a better way to hedge this structure and improve the performance.

所以，你知道，一个大想法，结果变成了不少钱。

So, you know, one big idea and it turned into quite a bit of money.

在我运营它的九年里，这是一个非常非常赚钱的策略。

It was a very, very profitable strategy over the nine years I ran it.

但其中八年，就是卷起袖子，在泥里干到胳膊肘，拼命确保从市场里榨出尽可能多的阿尔法。

But for eight years of it, it was just elbows up to the, you know, in the mud up to your elbows, wrestling with making sure that it squeezed as much alpha out of the markets as it could.

说实话，那工作挺无聊的。

It was frankly dull work.

那种工作，你知道，我很欣赏，因为我觉得在金融领域，兴奋感被严重高估了。

Kind of work that, you know, I appreciate because I don't I think excitement is wildly overbid in finance.

我最喜欢的就是每天都能稳稳地赚一笔。

Nothing I like better than making a nice steady profit every single day.

别告诉我我们亏了一大笔钱，我不想听。

Don't tell me we lost a bunch of money, I don't want to know.

我们要采取措施确保不会发生这种情况。

Let's put steps in place to make sure we don't.

在金融领域，兴奋感被高估了。

Excitement is overbid in finance.

对，没错。

Oh yeah.

是的，如果你想为了刺激而做交易，那就别以此为生。

Yeah, if you want to get into trading for the excitement, don't do it for a living.

你入错行了。

You're in the wrong game.

在我看来，光是这种态度就会让你无法进步。

And that attitude alone will keep you from advancing in my opinion.

那你觉得，那些为了刺激而想进入这一行的人，这本身是不是就说明他们不适合？

And would you argue that the type of person that wants to get in for the excitement, that's already an indicator that it's not for you?

对，没错。

Yeah, exactly.

如果你觉得，哇，这会是一份特别刺激的工作，那你就选错了。

If you think, wow, that would be a really great exciting job, that's the wrong choice.

去硅谷工作吧。

Go to work in Silicon Valley.

在风险投资领域找一份刺激的工作。

Find an exciting job in venture capital.

别在交易这行干，因为这里刺激过头了。

Don't do it in training because there's an excess of excitement.

你知道，我最喜欢的一个小数据，虽然我不确定这真的适用，但也许我们可以稍微跳出框架想一想。

You know, and one of my favorite little statistics, I don't know that this really applies but maybe we can just think about it a little bit outside the box.

早期分析师会做的一件事就是看价格图表，然后说，有些天价格小幅上涨或下跌，但有些天真的涨了很多，一年里大概有三天是这样。如果我能预测到那几天，就能赚大钱。

One of the things that an early analyst will do is he'll look at a price chart and he'll say well some days it moves up a little or down a little but some days it really moves up a lot And like there's three of those days a year so if I could just predict those I'll make a huge amount of money.

他们投入大量精力试图预测那些日子。

And they invest this huge amount of effort in trying to predict those days.

但他们没意识到的是，那些日子之所以波动这么大，正是因为没人能预测到。

And what they don't realize is that the reason those days are so big is because no one was able to predict them.

这就是市场在发生出乎意料的事情时的反应。

That's what a market does when something happens that no one else expected.

没人提前建仓或对冲之类的。

That no one had already put a position on or hedged for whatever.

这就是市场的表现。

That's what a market does.

它会给你展示一次大幅上涨或下跌。

It shows you a great big move up or down.

所以他们花了不知多少精力和努力，去预测最不可预测的东西。

So they've just spent, you know, who knows how much energy and effort trying to predict the thing that is least predictable.

都是因为他们为了追求刺激才被吸引过来的，你懂吧？

All because they're drawn to it for excitement's sake, you know?

这是一种很奇怪的心理现象，这种心态会让你浪费时间。

It's one of those weird psychological ways that, you know, that sort of attitude makes you waste time.

顶级对冲基金是怎么考虑给意外事件定价的，或者说他们到底会不会尝试给意外事件定价？

How do top hedge funds think about pricing the unexpected or do they even try to price the unexpected?

嗯，你可以把它看作一个分布，对吧？

Well, know, you think about it as a distribution, right?

我现在倾向于把所有事情都看作一个分布，你知道的。

I tend to think of everything these days as a distribution, you know.

不是看某一次会怎么样，而是看我做这件事的频率分布是什么样的。

It's not what it'll be like one time, know, it's like what is it the propensity of times that I do it?

所以你真正想问的是尾部风险。

So what you're really asking about is tail risk.

在管理尾部风险方面，人们投入了巨大的智力资源。

And there's been a spectacular amount of intellectual energy thrown into trying to manage tail risk.

事实上，我认为物理学和交易、金融回报统计之间的区别在于，物理学处理的是真正随机的现象。

In fact, I would argue that the difference between physics and trading, financial return statistics, is that in physics they're dealing with truly random phenomenon.

而在交易中，人们把确定性的现象当作随机的来处理，因为这是他们唯一能用的工具。

And in trading they're taking deterministic phenomenon and pretending they're random because it's the only tools they've got.

所以，我们关注尾部风险，试图找到某种量化的方法来衡量和应对它。

So there, you know, we look at tail risk and we try and find some quantitative way to measure and grapple with it.

我发现，一旦你意识到大部分尾部风险只是别人比你聪明造成的，就很容易理解了。

And I find it's very easy to get ahold of as soon as you realize that most of that tail risk is just a product of somebody outsmarting you.

他们知道你不知道。

They knew you didn't.

所以，如果你不看结果，而是看原因，就更容易理解。

So if you look not at the result, but look at the cause, it's going to be a little bit easier to get to.

但大型基金如何预测尾部风险呢？

But what do large funds do to anticipate tail risk?

嗯，方法有很多种。

Well, a variety of things.

这真的取决于决策是在哪个层面做出的，对吧？

It really depends the level at which the decision is made, right?

有什么好例子吗？

What's a good example?

那我就不提我当时工作的那家公司了。

So I'm not going to name the firm I was working at.

那家公司有个基差交易员，他的交易就是美国国债对国债期货，最便宜可交割债券之类的，对吧？

But the firm had a basis trader, which was his trade was US Treasuries against US Treasury futures, cheapest to deliver, that sort of thing, right?

所以结构非常非常稳定，收益序列也很稳定，但杠杆巨大，超级大。

So very, very stable structure, very stable return series, huge leverage, massive leverage.

他交易这两种资产，赚了很多钱。

He would trade these two assets and he made a lot of money on it.

最后风险经理发现，他之所以赚这么多钱，是因为他下午一点买国债，然后在收盘前以259.59美元的价格对冲。

And eventually the risk manager figured out that the reason he was making so much money on it was that he was buying his treasuries at one in the afternoon and he was hedging them at $259.59 right before the market closed.

所以看起来他是市场中性，但实际上，他整天都在扛着巨大的贝塔风险。

So he looked like he was market neutral, but in reality, all day long he'd been carrying this huge beta.

这就是他的尾部风险，对吧？

That's his tail risk, right?

这就是出现在他收益里的尾部风险，没人能搞明白。

That was the tail risk that was showing up in his returns that nobody could figure out.

最后风险经理，也就是首席风险官，发现了这个问题，禁止他再这么做了。

Eventually the risk manager, the CRO, figured it out and forbid him from doing it anymore.

当时这事儿闹得挺大的。

And there was a lot of drama about that.

所以处理尾部风险的一种方法就是找出真正的来源，然后决定是接受它还是不接受它。

So that's one way to handle tail risk is figure out the actual source and either buy into it or don't buy into it.

大多数情况下，你都不会接受它。

More often than not you're going to not buy into it.

那种大波动是不可靠的。

That big move is not something that's reliable.

你要的是可靠的东西。

What you want is reliable.

你得找那种能预测的东西。

Something you can predict.

所有金融本质上都是对折现现金流的概率判断。

All the finances are probability of discounted cash flows.

以我的经验来看，概率才是最有发挥空间的地方。

In my experience, probability is where most of the room is.

要搞清楚英伟达未来股息的范围、营收大概什么样，其实没那么难。

Not that hard to figure out, you know, what the range of future dividends will be from Nvidia, or what their revenue is going to look like, or whatever.

你可以在一定范围内做出预测。

You know, you can predict that within a certain range.

但真正关键的是概率。

But the probabilities are what's important.

那个故事我觉得特别有意思，因为在大基金里，激励机制决定了你会想尽办法多承担风险，尽量跟着大盘走，这样我才能拿到那20%的提成。

That story, I think, is so interesting because the incentives that are at play when you're at a big fund are ones where, how do I take as much risk as possible, ride beta somewhat so that I can get my 20 cut?

所以我想问个问题，大概分两部分吧。

And so I have a question, I guess, in two parts about that.

当然。

Sure.

如今，在那些非常专业的机构里，人们有没有办法实际上钻系统的空子？

Today, at very sophisticated shops, are there ways in which people can actually game the system?

然后你不需要告诉我。

And then you don't have to tell me.

如果你觉得有办法，你不需要具体说是哪些。

If you think there are ways, you don't have to say which ones those are.

然后第二点，那些人，我想，是怎么防止他们的交易员和投资经理做那种事的？

And then number two, how do those guys, I guess, prevent their traders, PMs from doing that sort of thing?

我有幸和一些极其聪明的首席风险官一起工作过。

I had the benefit of working with some exceptionally smart chief risk officers.

摩尔资本的首席风险官和卡克斯顿的首席风险官。

The chief risk officer at Moore Capital and the chief risk officer at Caxton.

我和他们两位关系都很密切。

I was very close to both of them.

他们都是极其聪明的人。

They were transcendently brilliant individuals.

没人能骗得了他们。

Nobody was going put anything over on them.

我不知道千禧年的首席风险官是谁。

I don't know who the CRO is at millennium.

如果那个人不是同样聪明，我会很惊讶。

I'd be shocked if it isn't someone equally as intelligent.

有没有办法能钻系统的空子？

Is there a way you can game the system?

你知道，更大的问题是，你以为自己在钻空子，但实际上并没有。

You know, a bigger problem is that you're gonna think you're gaming the system and you're really not.

我见过一个问题，即使是经验丰富的交易员，也会掉进一个陷阱，就是伽马陷阱，对吧？

One problem I've seen, even experienced traders, one trap I've seen them fall into, is the gamma trap, right?

伽马对冲比看起来要难得多。

Gamma hedging is much more difficult than it looks like.

这并不简单。

It's not simple.

你可以出去卖期权赚权利金，一百天里有九十九天都能赚钱。

You can go out there and sell options for the premium and make money ninety nine days out of 100.

而那九十九天里有九十八天，你都觉得自己特别厉害，想出了一个全新的方法，能让你发财。

And for ninety eight of those ninety nine days you're sure you're brilliant, you've come up with something totally new, it's going to make you rich.

你每天赚得不多，但每天都赚，所以你只需要把仓位放大一万倍或者更多，就能发财，因为每天都赚钱。

You don't make much money every day but you make it every day so all you need to do is multiply your size by 10,000 or whatever and you're going get rich because it makes money every day.

你以为自己破解了密码。

You think you've cracked the code.

其实你并没有破解密码。

You haven't cracked the code.

你做的只是把风险压缩了。

What you've done is you've compressed your risk.

你用每天百分之一、百分之零点五或者百分之零点一的收益，换来了第九十九天百分之一百五十的亏损。

You've traded, you know, a 1% gain or a half a percent or tenth of a percent gain every day for a 150% loss on the ninety ninth day.

所以如果你把时间拉长来看，你最终是亏钱的。

So when you average that over years you're going to be a loser.

但在那之前，你一直在赚钱。

But on the way up, you get paid.

所以，你知道，对冲基金的基金经理，你每年都能拿到报酬。

So, know, hedge fund your portfolio manager at a hedge fund, you're going get paid every year.

你会拿到一张支票，可能他们会扣留一部分，以后用股票支付，或者别的什么。

You get a check, maybe they hold back some, pay in stock later, whatever.

但你每年都会拿到钱。

But you're going to get paid every year.

所以如果你做空伽马赚钱，第一年你拿到报酬，第二年你拿到报酬，第三年你亏的比前两年赚的还多，所以总体来看你是净亏损的。

So if you make money being short gamma, year one you get paid, year two you get paid, year three you lose more than you made in the last two, so you're a net loser overall.

但你仍然拿到了报酬。

But you still got paid.

也许你被解雇了，然后你去了另一家公司，又重复同样的事情。

Maybe you get fired, you go to another shop and do the same thing over again.

这是个常见的错误。

That's a common error.

我见过很多很多次了。

I've seen it many, many times.

现在我想，Millennium的人和Bridgewater的人，还有所有人，应该都足够聪明，能看到这一点了。

Now I would imagine that the Millennium guys and Bridgewater guys and, you know, all of everybody is smart enough to see that coming now.

所以，是的，我不会赌自己能靠这个赚钱。你得把所有这些想法反过来想，对吧？

So yeah, I would not bet on being able to You kind of have to invert all of this thinking, right?

他们之所以做得那么大，就是因为他们知道怎么做。

The reason they're that big is because they know how to do this.

所以你想做同样的事，是行不通的。

Therefore your ability to do it is not going to work.

别想着去钻系统的空子，要老老实实做人。

Don't try and game the system, try and be honest.

在量化金融领域，聪明可能只是入门要求，而不是让你特别出众的东西。

Being a smart guy maybe is a requirement for quantitative finance as opposed to something that makes you special.

但这其中是有价值的。

But there is a value in it.

我的意思是，这并非毫无意义。

Mean it's not like it's nothing.

尽管我说了那么多批评的话，说这有多难等等，每年都有人冷启动进入这个行业，建立成功的策略，赚取巨额财富。

And with all the critical things I said, how difficult it is and all of that, people come into the industry cold, build successful strategies and make vast amounts of money every single year.

每年都会有新东西出现。

Something new comes along every single year.

通常是在已有基础上的小改进，但如果你是那个做到的人，重点就不在于此，对吧？

It's usually a small improvement on something that exists already, but that's not the point if you're the guy who's doing it, right?

所以我不想太打击人。

So I don't want to be too discouraging.

这条路是存在的。

There is a path for this.

只是有很多人在排队等着走这条路。

It's just there's a whole lot of people in line to get on that path.

比过去多多了。

A lot more than there used to be.

你知道吗，我去摩尔资本的时候，那里其实没那么挤。

You know, when I went to Moore Capital, it really wasn't that crowded.

现在为了进摩尔资本，人们连觉都不睡了，恨不得把你挤掉。

Now people would knife you in your sleep to get into Moore Capital.

而且现在它已经是个家族基金了。

And it's a family fund now.

想进千禧年、进Point72或者Two Sigma，那些做这类事情的机构，你知道的，很多人挤破头想进去，但能提供的职位却少得可怜。

To get into Millennium, to get into point seven two or Two Sigma, know, the shops that are doing that sort of thing, people will, you know, there's a whole lot of people want to be there and there's very few roles available for them to take.

说到有人钻空子，你知道，就是那种压缩风险、赚两年钱、然后爆仓、再跳槽去新基金、再试同样的把戏的回报流。

On the topic of people gaming the system, you know, having this return stream where they've compressed their risk, make money for two years, blow up, move to new fund, try to do the same thing.

当基金经理爆仓后，他们还能东山再起吗？

When fund managers blow up, can they bounce back?

他们能不能，你知道，我猜，比如说你在一个pod shop，可能你不拥有自己的业绩记录，然后你被解雇了，但你说你是主动离开的。

Can they you know, I I imagine and I'm just thinking about, say you're at a pod shop and maybe you don't own your track record and you got fired, but you say you left.

对，那这是怎么回事？

Yeah, how does that work?

所以我只能说说我自己的经历。

So I can only tell you about my experience.

我就是个普通人。

I'm a peasant.

我上的是州立大学。

I went to a state university.

你知道，我父亲家境一般。

You know, my father was of modest means.

我们小时候的生活，大多数人会说是贫穷的。

We grew up what most people would call poor.

我没上过伊顿公学。

I did not go to Eton.

也没上过牛津剑桥。

I did not go to Oxbridge.

我在摩根大通以及之后整个职业生涯中遇到的大多数人，都是那种人。

Most of the people I worked with at JP Morgan and through the rest of my career were those people.

说个小故事，我在所有文法学校里都是最聪明的孩子。

Just as a brief anecdote, I was the smartest kid in all of my grammar schools.

我们经常搬家。

We moved around a lot.

我在高中班里也是最聪明的。

I was the smartest kid in my high school classes.

在大学的大部分课程里，我也是最聪明的。

I was the smartest kid in most of my college classes.

如果不是所有课程，我会很惊讶。

I'd be surprised if it wasn't all of them.

我尽量保持开放的心态。

I'm trying to be open minded.

我觉得我也比大多数教授聪明。

I'd say I was smarter than most of my professors as well.

当我进入摩根大通时，我什么都不是。

When I got to JPMorgan, I was nobody.

我最多也就是垫底的25%。

I was in the bottom 25% at best.

他们招来的是最优秀、最有成就、最先进、最勤奋、最自律的人，是顶尖中的顶尖。

They had drawn in the best, most accomplished, most advanced, hardest working, most self disciplined, top of the top of the top.

从世界上最难的学校、最难的课程里，挑出毕业生的前2%，再用性格筛选一遍。

Take the hardest schools in the world, the most difficult program, take the top 2% of the people who graduate from that program and filter them by personality.

1990年走进摩根大通大门的就是这些人。

And that's who walked in the door at JPMorgan in 1990.

我完全被比下去了，我根本不知道还有这样的人存在。

I was so outclassed I had no idea that these people existed.

在对冲基金行业，大多数人也都是这样的。

In most of the hedge fund industry it's people like that too.

也许他们的父亲是上议院议员。

Maybe their father is in the house of lords.

或者，你知道，他们的曾祖父是沃伦·哈丁的财政部长之类的。

Or, you know, their great grandfather was treasury secretary to Warren Harding or some stuff like that.

他们有家庭关系、学校关系和其他关系，让他们在这个行业里扎根，而我从来没有过这些。

They've got family connections, school connections and other connections that embed them in the industry in a way that I never really had.

我唯一有的就是聪明的头脑和拼命工作的劲头。

The only thing I had was a sharp mind and an unhealthy work ethic.

我工作太拼命了。

I worked too hard.

所以我从来没有爆过仓。

So I never blew up.

我有过回报率只有个位数的时候，但从来没爆过仓。

I've had periods where I had single digit returns, but I've never blown up.

管理资金这么多年，从来没有亏损的年份。

Never had a down year in managing money.

所以我没法说如果那样做会怎样，因为我从来没做过。

So I can't really speak to what would happen if you do that, having never done it.

我想，根据我在这个行业的所有其他经验，如果这事发生在我身上，我肯定就出局了。

I imagine, based on all my other experience in the industry, that if it happened to me, I'd just be out.

他们不会给来自拖车公园的人第二次机会。

That they don't have room for second chances for guys from the trailer park.

你明白我的意思吗？

You know what I mean?

如果你上过伊顿公学，还和王子打过马球，他们会在别的地方给你找个位置。

If you went to Eaton and you played polo with the prince, they'll find room for you somewhere else.

但我觉得事情就是这样。

But I think that's how it goes.

如果这意味着世界不公平，那你猜怎么着？

And if that means the world's unfair, then guess what?

世界就是不公平的。

World's unfair.

你不喜欢也没办法，但世界就是这样，对吧？

Don't like it, don't have to, but that's how the world is, right?

这也是对冲基金行业的另一个特点，就是你不能假装世界和它实际的样子不一样，那样什么也得不到。

That's that's another thing about the hedge fund industry is you don't get anything for pretending the world is any different than it really is.

你知道吗，举个例子。

You know, you one example.

我答应过你，要讲一些有争议的内容，会让人生我的气。

I promised you some controversial stuff that'll get people mad at me.

在机构交易领域，女性真的非常非常少。

There are very, very, very few women in institutional trading.

非常少。

Very few.

为什么？

Why?

我不知道。

I don't know.

这不关我的事。

None of my business.

让他们自己去琢磨吧。

Let them figure that out.

不过我要告诉你，这带来的一个影响就是，你在机构交易领域遇到女性时，她们都极其能干。

I will tell you this though, one effect of that is that when you meet a woman in institutional trading they are unbelievably competent.

我觉得我遇到过的最聪明的人，是我在Tudor工作时的同事，一位女性，现在她是UBS的首席投资官。她不仅人非常好，而且我觉得她是我这辈子见过的最聪明的人。

I think the smartest person I ever met was someone a woman I worked with at Tudor, who is now CIO of UBS, who's not only is she a very, very nice person, but she's, I think, the smartest human I've ever met.

她的聪明才智简直超乎寻常。

She's just off the charts brilliant.

我很幸运，在这个行业里和不少女性共事过，她们个个都是顶尖中的顶尖。

I've had I've been lucky enough to work with a bunch of women in the industry, and all of them were absolutely the best of the best of the best of the best.

比99%的男性都强。

Better than 99% of the men.

而这正是因为她们人数不多。

And that's because there aren't that many of them.

她们不把这当回事。

They don't it's not a priority.

在交易结果上，光因为是女性可不会得到任何好处。

You don't get anything just for being female in trading results.

这倒不是说没有办公室政治，我刚才提到过。

Which isn't to say there isn't politics, I just mentioned.

这个行业里确实有些政治，躲也躲不掉。

There are some politics in the industry and it's impossible to avoid.

三个人待在一个房间里，就不可能没有政治。

You can't have three people in the same room without there being politics.

但真的非常少。

But very, very little.

已经少到不能再少了。

As little as is possible.

你被评判的最主要标准，甚至比你的个性、魅力、长相什么的都重要，就是你的业绩。

The overwhelming thing that you're judged on, even more than your personality and your charisma and your good looks or whatever, is your performance.

如果我做到20%的回报率，夏普比率3.5，而你只有10%的回报率，夏普比率1.5，那你最好有关系，否则你的资金就是我的了。

If I'm, you know, delivering 20% return in a 3.5 sharp and you're delivering 10% return in a 1.5 sharp, you would damn well better be related to somebody or I'm getting your capital.

他们关心的就是赚钱。

The thing they care about is making money.

所以一切都看业绩。

So it's all about performance.

这个说法经常被提到。

That's something that's often spoken about.

大家常说这是最看重能力的行业。

It is the most meritocratic industry that's said very often.

但你也提到过，你上的是公立学校。

But then you've also said, you went to a state school.

你没上伊顿公学。

You didn't go to Ethan.

你也没上那些精英学校，或者有那些上过精英学校的哥们儿的人脉。

You didn't go to these elite institutions or, have that network of guys who went to these elite institutions.

所以这算是一个更宽泛的问题，就是当这些人已经拥有了所有正确的条件时，这个行业到底有多公平。

And so this is a more, I guess, broad question about how truly it is when these guys have gotten all the right inputs.

所以，也许他们在那里的时候看起来是凭实力说话的，但你想一想他们所处的环境和他们的思维方式。

So maybe it appears meritocratic when they're there, but you think about the ecosystem that they're embedded in and the mindset.

比如说，爸爸是对冲基金经理，从小就教他。

Say dad was a a hedge fund manager, coached him.

对。

Okay.

这就是你思考问题的方式。

This is how you think about things.

即使在体育领域，也有一些他们早已内化的观念，而这些观念对于来自不同背景的人来说，要理解起来要困难得多。

Even in sports, there are ideas that are that they've just internalized that are much more difficult for someone from a different background to grasp.

你明白吗？

You know?

你怎么看这个问题？

How do you think about that?

嗯，我觉得你说到了一个关键点。

Well, I think you've hit on something important.

而这又把我们带回到了之前讨论的更广泛的话题上。

And the thing that ties us back to the broader conversation we've been having.

有一系列的筛选标准，目标就是可信度。

There's a set of filters and the goal is credibility.

牛津剑桥、麻省理工或哈佛的学位能给你带来巨大的可信度，而罗格斯大学的学位就做不到这一点。

A degree from Oxbridge, or from MIT, or from Harvard buys you a great deal of credibility that going to Rutgers doesn't.

这也不是没有道理的，对吧？

And not without good reason, right?

但话虽如此，如果你能展示出真正的实力，提供确凿的证据，那比一个人的出身、人脉或名声更可靠。

But with that said, if you can demonstrate, if you can provide real evidence, well that's more firmly relied upon than someone's breeding or their network or their reputation.

如果你想靠人脉、名声和家庭关系赚钱，你应该去风险投资行业。

You to make money on your network and your reputation and your family's connections, you should go to venture capital.

在那里人脉就是一切，对吧？

Where network is everything, Right?

如果你想赚钱，如果你像我一样是个普通人，出身于较低的社会经济背景，没有接受过任何关于华尔街运作的真正教育，那么在我看来，交易就是最好的选择了。

If you want to make money If you're like me and you're a peasant, if you come from a lower socioeconomic background where you're not given any real education in how Wall Street works, Trading's about as good as it's going to get in my opinion.

这就是为什么你会看到像简街这样的公司会雇一些可能没有——他们雇了山姆·班克曼-弗里德。

And that's why you see like so Jane Street will hire people that probably don't have like they hired Sam Bankman Fried.

山姆·班克曼-弗里德在都铎公司连洗盘子的工作都找不到。

Sam Bankman Fried couldn't get a job at Tudor washing up.

他连在那儿扫地的资格都没有，因为他的性格让他失去了太多信誉。

He wouldn't be allowed to sweep the floor there because his personality made him lose so much credibility.

但在简街，他们并不太担心他的性格或者其他什么的，对吧？

But at Jane Street, they weren't really worried so much about his personality and his whatever, right?

他们担心的是他的博弈论和数学能力，而且，你知道，即便如此他还是亏了一大笔钱。

What they were worried about was his game theory and math skills, and, you know, and even then he lost a bunch of money.

所以，你知道，也许我该质疑他们决定的明智性。

So, you know, maybe I should be questioning the wisdom of their decision.

话虽如此，我不认为这是纯粹的精英主义。

With that said, I don't think it's purely meritocratic.

但我确实认为这是最接近精英主义的了。

I do think it's as meritocratic as it gets.

你知道，如果有个投资组合经理来找我，有两年扎实的业绩记录，而且他掌握的阿尔法来源是我脑子里没有的，那我真的很难拒绝他。

You know, I know if someone came to me as a portfolio manager and had two years of rock solid history and was tapping a source of alpha that I didn't already have in my head, and you know, it'd be very hard for me to say no to them.

而且我不在乎他是不是额头上长了第三只眼，或者别的什么，我想不出任何个人特征能让我拒绝一个能带来互补阿尔法的人，因为那意味着我能从他身上赚钱。

And I don't care if they, you know, a third eye in the middle of their forehead or, you know, I can't think of any individual characteristic that would discourage me if they represented true source of complementary alpha, because that means I'd make money on them.

这比什么都重要。

And, you know, that overrides every other instinct.

你提到山姆·班克曼-弗里德这个案例很有意思，他确实没什么信誉，因为他很明显是个书呆子。

You bring up an interesting case with Sam Bankman Fried, end of Credibility, because, obviously, he's very nerdy.

不过，我也觉得他符合那种天才神童的典型形象，这种形象是可以建立信誉的。

There's a, but I would also argue that he fits a certain archetype of genius whiz kid that could build up credibility.

尤其是现在，你想到量化交易员，比如《大空头》里那个场景，银行家杰瑞德·贝内特指着他那个在数学竞赛中拿过第一的亚洲量化分析师。

You know, especially now, you think of a quant, you know, that scene in The Big Short where, Jared Bennett, the banker, he he points at his his Asian quant who got, first in a math competition in China.

他对着镜头说，

He looks at the camera and goes,

不，我挺好的，我数学竞赛拿了第二。

No, was fine and I was second in a math competition.

嗯，确实是这样。

Well, that's true.

所以，Bang，我不理解Jane Street当初为什么会决定把他招进来。

So, Bang, I don't understand the Jane Street decision making that brought him on board.

我只能得出这个结论。

That's the only conclusion I can come to.

这个人最后出去创办FTX的时候，居然还相信定投策略是对冲基金合理的风险管理方式。

This is a guy who when he finally went out and started FTX he believed that dollar cost averaging was a sound risk management strategy for a hedge fund.

这说明他根本不应该被托付那么多钱。

Which tells me that the guy should never have been invested with that amount of money.

但你提到的那个形象，我觉得那是创业者的典型形象。

But that image that you talk about, I think that's the startupfounder image.

如果他们有点反社会人格，大家反而觉得正常。

Where if they're a little sociopathic you kind of expect that.

魅力有很多种表现形式，有时候就是单纯地显得古怪。

Where charisma comes in a lot of different forms And sometimes it's just being weird.

他们太看重那个了。

They put an over overemphasis on that.

我跟你说，他要是去Point72，肯定会被笑话赶出来的。

Let me tell you, he's not he would have been laughed out of point seven two.

像Englander那种人，根本不会雇他这种，因为他没有足够的思想来支撑他那种量化上的怪癖，对吧？

Is the Englander would never hire someone like that because he didn't have the ideas to back up this quantitative weirdness, right?

所以他是个创业公司的创始人。

So he was a startup founder.

他不是个交易员。

He was not a trader.

证据就是，他作为交易员做的第一件事，就是让他的团队在久期上冒了太大的风险，结果把整个投资组合搞砸了。

As evidenced by the fact that, you know, the very first thing he did as a trader was have his people get out over their skis in terms of duration and blow up his portfolio.

而且到现在，他还在社交媒体上说，不，我一直都是有偿付能力的。

And even today he still goes out on social media and says no, I was solvent all along.

这说明他连偿付能力是什么意思都不懂。

Which means he doesn't know what solvent means either.

你知道，在传统金融界，风格要保守得多，稳健得多。

You know, in the traditional financial world it is much more conservative, much more steady.

你得表现出一种泰山崩于前而色不变的形象。

You need to convey the image that you're unflappable.

那种有魅力的怪咖风格在硅谷行得通。

That charismatic weirdo thing works in Silicon Valley.

但在华尔街或公园大道就行不通了，对吧？

It does not work on Wall Street or Park Avenue now, right?

你能在摩根大通当量化分析师，还干那种事吗？

Can you get a job at JPMorgan as a quant doing stuff like that?

嗯，也许如果你真的很厉害，但他们不会让你越界的。

Well, maybe if you're really good, but they're going to keep you in your box.

他们永远不会让你出头，因为你在投资者面前没有可信度。

They're never going to let you out because you don't have the credibility to put in front of investors.

你没有那种能按他们想要的方式提升公司形象的信誉。

You don't have the credibility to enhance the firm's image in the way they want it enhanced.

来自湾区的怪咖在这里行不通。

Oddball weirdo from the Bay Area doesn't fly.

但在风险投资领域就行得通。

It does in venture capital.

你想创业吗？

You want to start up?

对，太好了。

Yeah, great.

给你50万美元，看看你能做出什么。

Here's $500,000, let's see what you can build.

你知道，你能在互换交易台拿到5000亿美元的账本吗？

You know, are you going to get a $500,000,000,000 book on the swaps desk?

不可能，想都别想。

No, not a prayer.

所以我们又回到了原点。

So we've gone full circle.

信誉是最重要的。

Credibility is the most important thing.

我们又回到了信誉这个话题。

We're back to credibility.

对，在传统金融和传统对冲基金领域，我觉得确实是这样。

Yeah, well in the traditional finance, the traditional hedge fund space I believe it is, yes.

信誉可以通过很多渠道建立，但本质都是一样的。

Credibility comes through a lot of channels but it's always the same thing.

我能相信这个人说的是真话吗？

Can I is this guy telling me the truth?

如果他说的是真的，那他讲的那些想法靠谱吗？

If he is, are the ideas he's talking about valid?

他说得有道理吗？

Is he making sense?

他提出的这些想法，跟我对市场这台机器的整体看法一致吗？

Are the ideas that he brings forth consistent with my overall view of the market as a machine?