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一只典型的股票一天要交易成千上万次。
A typical equity trades hundreds of thousands of millions of times a day.
对吧?
Right?
而一只典型的市政债券,可能很多人没意识到,可能每三周才交易一次。
A typical muni bond, people may not realize this, might trade once every three weeks.
低效就等于优势。
Inefficiency equals edge.
像大宗商品、固定收益、私人信贷这些领域,其实挺棘手的。
Some of these areas like commodities, like fixed income, like private credit, they're gnarly.
它们看起来不怎么样。
They're ugly.
在很多方面它们并不光鲜,但它们非常重要,而且效率低下。
They're not sexy in a lot of ways, but they're super important, and they're inefficient.
这个世界需要有人来解决这种低效问题。
The world deserves an answer to that inefficiency.
而且,只要有人能想出办法来减少这种低效,那些市场里不起眼的角落就有大把的钱可赚。
And to the extent that people can come in and invent ways to reduce that inefficiency, there's tons of money to be made in those ugly corners of the market.
现在私募市场的管理资产规模有多大?数万亿美元,而且这个资产类别每年以两位数的复合增长率增长。
How much AUM you have in private markets these days, trillions of dollars in that asset class growing at double digit compounded rates every year.
在我看来,这似乎难以为继。
This seems untenable to me.
我刚入行的时候,我觉得在任何一个成功的交易组织核心,都有那么一点神奇的东西。
When I was first getting into the industry, I think I had this view that in the heart of any successful trading organization, there was some little bit of magic.
真正让优秀团队与众不同的,一是拥有一个高瞻远瞩的愿景和理念,关于世界应该是什么样子,然后就是那种令人难以置信的坚持不懈,去把世界变成那样。
What really differentiates great teams is, one, having a great top level vision and philosophy about the way that the world should be, and then just an unbelievable dogged relentlessness to make the world that way.
你能举个例子吗?一个不起眼的领域,像我这样的年轻人,或者我大学同学,看到后会觉得,绝对不可能。
Can you give an example of an ugly space that a young person like myself, someone else, maybe a buddy from college, he'd see that and go, absolutely no way.
那是最蠢的事情。
That is the dumbest thing ever.
但站在你的角度,你觉得那里可能有一些阿尔法机会。
But you, from your perspective, think maybe there's some alpha there.
我们聊什么,准备?
What we talk about, prep?
大家好。
Hey, everyone.
我们非常激动地宣布,Odds on Open 正式与 Onex Capital Group 合作,后者是全球第一的石油衍生品做市商。
We're super excited to announce that Odds on Open is officially partnering with Onex Capital Group, the number one oil derivatives market maker in the world.
当我和我兄弟帕特里克创办 Odds on Open 时,我们想减少量化金融行业的不透明性。
When my brother Patrick and I started Odds on Open, we wanted to reduce the opacity of the quant finance industry.
On X 正在解决石油衍生品市场中的类似问题。
On X is tackling a similar problem in oil derivatives markets.
能源市场是世界上最重要的市场之一,但长期以来,对于核心行业之外的人来说,进入真正的批发市场既昂贵又不透明,而且很困难。
The energy market is one of the most important in the world, but for a long time, access to the real wholesale market has been expensive, opaque, and difficult for anyone outside the core industry.
Onex 正在改变这一点,让进入石油衍生品市场变得更便宜、更透明、更容易。
Onex is changing that by making access to oil derivatives markets cheaper, more transparent, and easier.
我们真心相信 Onex 是这个领域的颠覆者,并且非常高兴他们能成为 Odds on Open 的第一个品牌合作伙伴。
We truly believe Onex is a game changer in this space and are super excited to have them as Odds on Open's first brand partner.
马特,非常感谢你来参加我们的播客。
Matt, thank you so much for coming on the pod.
谢谢你邀请我,伊森。
Thanks for having me, Ethan.
很感激。
Appreciate it.
做市市政债券和其他证券有什么区别?
What are the differences between market making municipal bonds versus other securities?
哦,天哪。
Oh, man.
让我数数有多少种。
Let me count the ways.
首先,我觉得大家最熟悉、最先想到的就是流动性问题,对吧?
So to start, I think the part that everybody knows and the first thing that people think about is the liquidity story, right?
股票比几乎所有固定收益产品都要流动得多,差不多是这样。
Equities are much more liquid than really all of fixed income, more or less.
而且,如果我们想
And definitely, if we want to
聊
talk
市政债券,我们亲切地这么叫它们,跟股票很不一样。
about muni bonds, as we lovingly call them, very different than muni bonds.
你知道,一只典型的股票一天交易多少次?几十万次,甚至几百万次,对吧?
You know, a typical equity trades, what, hundreds of thousands of millions of times a day, right?
而一只典型的市政债券,大家可能没意识到,可能三周才交易一次,对吧?
A typical muni bond, people don't people may not realize this, might trade once every three weeks, Right?
所以,在一个某种工具可能三四周才交易一次的市场里,你需要采用的建模方法和策略,跟应用于股票这类资产的方法截然不同。
And so the kinds of modeling and the approaches that you need to take in a market that trades a given instrument might trade once every three or four weeks is dramatically different than what you might need to apply to something like equities.
这里面也隐含着一个关于延迟敏感性的问题。
Kind of baked into this is also a story of latency sensitivity.
所以,大家,你知道,很多人听说过高频交易这个词。
So everybody, you know, thinks about a lot of people have heard of the word high frequency trading.
类似的术语还有低延迟交易。
Similar term would be low latency trading.
它们可能略有不同,但概念非常相似。
They're maybe slightly different, but but very similar concepts.
如果感兴趣的话,我可以详细讲讲。
I can go into the details if if interested.
这基本上指的是,在某个事件发生后,你需要多快做出反应。
And that refers basically to, you know, the how quickly after something happens do you need to respond.
对吧?
Right?
如果是低延迟交易,你就必须非常非常快地做出反应。
That would be if it's low latency trading, you've gotta respond very, very quickly.
比如股票交易就是这样。
That would be equities.
对吧?
Right?
市政债券远没有达到那种程度。
Munis are nowhere near that.
对吧?
Right?
举个例子,媒体市场中的典型市场事件叫做RFQ,也就是报价请求。
As a as a as a detail, like, the canonical market event in in the media market is something called an RFQ, which stands for a request for quote.
基本上就是一场拍卖。
It's basically an auction.
明白吗?
Okay?
所以,基本上,有人想卖债券,就会把它放到拍卖会上,这些拍卖会会开放大约三个小时。
And and so, essentially, somebody wants to sell a bond, and they put it out for auction and those auctions are open for like three hours.
所以基本上对延迟的敏感度几乎为零。
So there is approximately zero latency sensitivity.
对。
Right.
所以从某些方面来看,这可能会让人觉得比股票、期货或者那些对延迟敏感的东西要容易得多。
So in some ways, that might make it sound like it's much easier than equities or futures or latency things.
但事实并非如此。
And that is not true.
它的难处在于完全不同的方面。
It's hard in very different ways.
如果容易的话,早就被自动化了,很多很多年前就该实现了。
If it were easy, it would have been automated years and years and years ago.
但实际上,它比股票市场更晚实现自动化。
But in actual point of fact, it took much longer than equities to get automated.
对吧?
Right?
为什么?
Why?
我问你一个问题吧。
How many I'll ask you a question.
你觉得大概有多少,多少流动性好的股票?
How many roughly, how many equity how many liquid equities do you think there are out there?
我数不过来。
I can't count.
有很多。
There's a lot.
好。
Okay.
那,多少算多呢?
So, like, what's a lot?
比如,几千只?
Like, a few thousand?
对。
Yep.
是的。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
我觉得吧。
I'd say.
行。
Alright.
大概也就是几千只股票,你知道的,交易量还算比较活跃的。
That's that's probably probably a few thousand, you know, equities that that trade a reasonable amount.
光市政债市场,抛开其他固定收益产品不谈——那些数量也多得很——就有大概一百五十万只不同的证券。
In the muni market alone, putting aside all of the rest of fixed income, which there's tons of, there's something like a million and a half unique securities.
我看你脸上都写满了惊讶。
I can see it under your face.
大家真的没意识到这一点。
Like, people don't realize.
这个数字大得让人吃惊。
It's a shockingly huge number.
而且每只债券,平均每三周才交易一次。
And every individual bond, again, trades, like, once every three weeks.
所以如果我问你,伊森,今天拍卖的这只随机市政债券,合理的价格是多少?
So if I ask you, Ethan, what is the right price for this random municipal bond that comes out for auction today?
我觉得,这难多了。
I mean, it's much harder.
你究竟怎么回答这个问题?
How in the world do you answer that question?
这真的非常非常难。
It is very, very difficult.
对吧?
Right?
而且,在股票市场那种数据海量的环境里,你采用的建模方法,和你在单只证券几乎没什么市场数据的情况下采用的方法,是完全不同的。
And the modeling approaches that you would take in a market like equities, where you have just just vast oceans of market data, are very different than the approaches that you would take where you have, on an individual security basis, almost no market data.
但是有一百五十万种其他证券,其中有些跟这只有点像。
But there's a million and a half other securities that are kind of some are kind of like this one.
有些差别很大。
Some are very different.
总之,你最终采用的方法和股票市场非常不一样。
Suffice to say, approaches that you end up taking look very, very different from equities.
如果对你有帮助,我很乐意详细说明。
And I'm happy to elaborate if helpful.
好的。
Yeah.
那市政债券的定价方法是什么呢?
What are the approaches for pricing munis?
你怎么考虑这个问题?
How do you think about that problem?
完全同意。
Totally.
我会尽可能详细地讲这个。
And I'll go into as much detail as can on this.
相比之下,在股票这类资产里,市场数据非常多。
In something like equities, let's say, by contrast, again, there's lots and lots of market data.
比如你可以看苹果公司的单只股票。
So you can look at an individual Apple stock, let's say.
对吧?
Right?
而且,回答苹果股票当前价格是多少这个问题,是有意义的。
And again, answering the question of what is the current price of Apple stock is a meaningful question.
你很容易就能做到。
You can do it pretty easily.
对吧?
Right?
你可以看最后一笔成交,或者看订单簿,订单簿的价差只有一分钱。
You could look at the last trade or you look at the order book, and the order book is a penny wide.
对吧?
Right?
所以,在股票市场里赚钱的挑战,跟问出正确价格是完全不同的两回事。
And therefore, the challenges involved in making money in equities are very different than asking what's the right price.
对吧?
Right?
因为每个人都能做到这一点。
Because everybody can do that.
所以这里面没什么钱可赚。
So there's no money in it.
对吧?
Right?
相比之下,在市政债券市场,如果某样东西每三周才交易一次,那么连问这个问题本身都是不成立的。
By contrast, in in munis, even asking the question, if something only trades once every three weeks, the question is malformed.
根本没有当前价格。
There is no current price.
这甚至都说不通。
It doesn't even make sense.
对吧?
Right?
只有最后一笔成交价,还有其他一些成交记录,基本上就这些了。
There is the last trade, and there are other trades, and that's really all there is.
对吧?
Right?
然后还有你交易时会出现的一个价格。
And then there's the the price that will be when you trade it.
对吧?
Right?
所以这就变成了一种更偏向统计和概率的事情,要搞清楚某只债券的合理价格,你得看的东西远不止这只债券本身。
And so it becomes a much more kind of statistical, probabilistic endeavor, where trying to figure out the right price for an individual bond, you have to look at a lot more than just that bond.
你得开始看其他类似的、最近有成交的债券。
You've got to start looking at other bonds that might look like it that have traded recently.
对吧?
Right?
你可以想象一下,市面上有一百五十万种债券,有些跟你正在看的那个很像。
And you can imagine in the million and a half, bonds that are out there, some look a lot like the one that you're looking at.
有些则跟你正在看的那个完全不像。
Some look nothing at all like the one that you're looking at.
用机器学习的语言来说,每只债券都有很多不同的特征,有些债券的特征跟你正在看的那个很相似。
To get into kind of machine learning language, there's a bunch of different features about each bond, and there's some bonds that have similar features to the one that you're looking at.
还有很多债券的特征跟你正在看的那个非常不同。
And there's a lot of bonds that have very, very different features.
你得开始把它当成一个回归问题来处理,对吧,就是试图从已有的数据中推断出一个并不完全存在的数据点。
And you have to start treating this like, you can almost think of it like a regression problem, right, where you're trying to infer from the data that does exist a point that doesn't quite exist.
对吧?
Right?
而实际去做这件事的方式,有很多艺术、科学、苦力活和数据整理,这些都是量化交易最终会呈现的样子。
And the way that you actually go and do that, there's a lot of art and science and grunt work and data wrangling and all the stuff that quantitative trading ends up looking like.
但从高层次来看,你必须开始把视野放宽,不再局限于单个证券,而是要从整个市场格局去思考,利用现有的市场数据,并从中提取最优的信息。
But at a high level, you have to start looking much broader than individual security and thinking across the landscape and looking at the market data that does exist and optimally extracting information from it.
所以这有点像相对价值问题,你会这么说吗?
So it's kind of like a relative value problem, would you say?
绝对是,
Definitely,
是的。
yes.
绝对是,是的。
Definitely, yes.
现在你可能更多是从买方角度来想,比如,你知道,这个债券相对那个来说更贵,所以我想买便宜的,卖贵的。
Now you might be thinking of it more from kind of a a a buy side angle where, you know, this bond is rich relative to this one, and so I wanna I wanna buy the cheap one, sell the rich one.
我们确实在一定程度上会这么想,但重要的是要明白我们是做市商。
And we definitely do think about that that way to to some extent, but it's important to note that we are market makers.
对吧?
Right?
我们主要不是,我们不是试图去建仓然后实现收益,我们主要赚钱的方式,我觉得在交易中重要的是要知道你靠什么赚钱,以及你不试图靠什么赚钱。
We are not primarily, we are not trying to, like, put on positions and realize we are trying to the main way that we make money I think it's important in trading to to know what you get paid for and what you what you're not trying to get paid for.
因为如果你去赚那些不该赚的钱,你很可能就会爆仓。
Because if you're gonna pay for something you're not supposed to be paid for, you're probably gonna get blown up.
对吧?
Right?
所以我们主要靠为市场提供流动性来赚钱,就是当别人需要买或者需要卖的时候,我们就在那里。
So what we get paid for primarily is providing liquidity to the market, being there when people, need to need to buy or or need to sell.
对吧?
Right?
所以对我们来说,我们不太会去想,我们能不能做这个相对价值交易,觉得它会在几周或几个月内实现,或者别的什么。
And so for us, we're not so much trying to figure out, like, can we put on this rail valve trade that we think is going to realize over X number of weeks or months or what have you?
更多的是,我们能不能始终提供一个公平的价格,比竞争对手更有竞争力,这样当有人需要买的时候,他们想从我们这里买,当有人需要卖的时候,他们想卖给我们。
And more like, can we always have a fair price that is more competitive than our than our competition such that when somebody needs to buy, they wanna buy from us, and then when somebody needs to sell, they wanna sell to us.
所以我们更多是从这个角度来考虑的。
And so we think of it more in that sense.
但是,是的,我们确定买卖价格的方式,确实会受到相对价值分析的影响。
But, yes, the way that we come up with kind of the prices that we want to buy or sell at would be informed by kind of a relative value type of analysis.
你怎么判断你的价格好不好呢?
How do you even determine how good your price is?
因为数据太分散了。
Because the data is so fragmented.
你看这边的一个交易所。
You look at one uni over here.
和那边的另一个交易所差别很大,而那个又和另一个不一样,但你却用其中两个来给这个定价。
It's so different from the other one over there, which is different to the other one, but you're using two of those to price this one.
你能给我讲讲这个问题吗?
Can you walk me through that problem?
这个问题问得很好。
That is a great question.
最根本的答案是,这非常难。
And the highest order answer is it is super hard.
我们多年来在这方面投入了很多思考。
We put a lot of thought into it over the years.
从我们开始到现在这十一年里,我们建立了一个庞大的基础设施,目的就是为了回答这个问题。
And we've built over the last ten, eleven years since we started a vast infrastructure whose goal is to answer that very question.
这确实很难。
And it's difficult.
但我觉得这个问题是多层次的,首先呢。
But I would say it's multi layered, first of all.
所以,第一个层面的问题就是统计上的,比如,我的模型能不能预测下一个价格?
So, the kind of first order question would be just sort of statistically, like, do my models predict the next price?
对吧?
Right?
你可以回过头去看看这个,对吧?
And you can go back and you can look at that, right?
然后你可以说,好,根据我在某个时间点之前知道的信息,如果我试着预测这只债券的下一笔交易,预测的误差有多大?
And you can say, okay, given what I knew up to date X, if I try to predict the next trade for this bond, like how often what's the error of that prediction?
你可以做这样的分析,对吧?
And you can run that analysis, right?
我觉得这算是标准做法,不过在这种特别复杂的数据集上做分析,噪音确实很大。
And that's, I think, standard, although there's a lot of noise when you do it in such a complicated, complicated data set.
这种分析,我觉得是必要的,但光靠它还不够。
That kind of analysis, I would say, is necessary but insufficient to do this well.
它只能告诉你,我的模型和预测大概在不在合理范围内。
That kind of tells you, like, are my models, are my predictions roughly in the ballpark?
对吧?
Right?
但它不能告诉你,我能不能赚钱。
It does not tell you, will I make money?
那是完全不同的一个问题。
That's a very different question.
对吧?
Right?
要回答能不能赚钱这个问题,我们在这方面下了很多功夫。我们有个很大的优势,就是我们交易的是那些复杂的固定收益产品,对吧,它们有很多奇怪又独特的属性。
And to answer the will I make money question, this is where we've tried to be we had a we had a great benefit of, so we trade these gnarly fixed income instruments, right, that have all these weird, unique properties.
但我们是在Headlands这家顶尖的低延迟高频交易公司内部建立这项业务的,它在低延迟高频交易的期货、股票、期权等领域做得非常好。
But we built that business inside of one of the best low latency, high frequency trading firms in Headlands that does really well in the low latency, high frequency futures equities options type spaces.
所以我们尝试——这也是我们一开始就与众不同的地方,直到今天依然如此——我们试图把那个领域的优秀原则、实践和方法,适应到固定收益这个非常不同的领域,同时保留一些核心原则和优势。
And so we tried to and this is really what made us different when we started certainly and even to this day is we tried to adapt the best principles and practices and approaches from that world and adapt them to this very, very different world of fixed income, but while retaining some of the kind of the core principles and benefits.
当然,我不能透露所有细节。但可以说,我们的方法在高层次上,对Jump、Citadel、Vertu和Headlands这些公司的人来说会觉得很熟悉,但对如今几乎所有做固定收益做市的人来说,都会觉得陌生。
And I can't go into all of the details, of course, But suffice to say that the approach that we take, I think, would look at a high level familiar to people at places like Jump and Citadel and Vertu and Headlands, but would not look familiar to almost anybody who is market making fixed income these days.
在高层次上,我们非常依赖严格的回测或模拟,然后在回测和模拟的基础上做智能优化。在单个工具每三周才交易一次的资产类别中,实现交易策略的准确模拟非常困难,我们在这方面投入了很多思考。
And at a really high level, it relies very heavily on very rigorous backtesting or simulation, and then doing smart stuff on top of the back testing and simulation and pulling off an accurate simulation of a trading strategy in an asset class where the individual instruments trade every three weeks is really difficult, and we put a lot of thought into how to do that well.
然后,同样,我不能深入所有细节,但我们尝试做一些智能的事情——既然你有非常准确的模拟,能不能在此基础上做智能优化?
And then, again, I can't go into all the details, but we try to do some smart given that you have a very accurate simulation, can you then use that to do kind of smart stuff on top of it?
所以我们再次采用了这种方法。
And so we've, again, taken that kind of approach.
我意识到我没有深入太多细节,但我觉得这与大多数人在固定收益领域做的事情非常不同。
I realize I didn't go into a ton of detail, but and it's very different, I think, than what most people are doing in fixed income.
关于你提到拥有极其准确的模拟这一点,我想谈谈先验概率。
On the point of given that you have an extremely accurate simulation, I just wanna talk about the prior.
你怎么能——我知道你不能说具体细节——但你怎么能对这些每三周才交易一次的产品做出准确的模拟呢?
How do you even and I know you can't go into specifics, but how do you even come up with an accurate simulation when these products trade every three weeks?
这真的很难,我们为此付出了很多心血和汗水。
This is it's really hard, and we put a lot of blood, sweat, and tears into doing it well.
所以,我还是得绕开一些细节,但我会尽量回答我能回答的部分。
So again, I'll have to necessarily dance around some of it, but I'll try to answer it to the extent that I can.
我们这次谈话一直聚焦在市政债券上,但值得注意的是,我说的很多内容对其他资产类别也同样适用。
We've been very focused on munis in this conversation, but it's worth noting a lot of what I'm saying is true of other asset classes as well.
而且我们为市政债券做的很多建模,对信用类产品几乎没什么改动。
And a lot of the modeling that we do for munis is almost unchanged for things like credit.
所以它也适用于那些领域。
So it applies there as well.
但具体到市政债券,你可以从宏观角度这样理解。
But in munis in particular, think about it like this from a high level.
市政债券就像雪花一样,每一片都独一无二。
And munis are a snowflake.
它们在某些方面确实挺特别的,而且我接下来要说的有些内容就是专门针对市政债券的。
They are kinda unique in some ways, and and some of what I'm about to say is unique for for munis.
所以当人们想卖出市政债券时,他们会通过我之前提到的RFQ流程,也就是拍卖流程来做。
So when people want to sell muni bonds, okay, they do it via the RFQ process that I mentioned, the auction process.
对吧?
Okay?
但是,当人们想买入市政债券时,他们几乎从来不用那个RFQ流程,这一点马上就会变得很重要,因为你需要用非常不同的方式来模拟这两个方面。
However, when people wanna buy munis, they almost never use that RFQ pro and this will become relevant in a second because you have to model these two sides very differently.
他们几乎从来不用RFQ,这背后是有原因的,如果你感兴趣的话,我可以详细讲讲。
They almost never use RFQs, and and there's a reason for it, and I can go into it if you're if you're interested.
这是一个技术性的市场结构原因,几乎不适用于其他任何市场。
It's a it's a kind of technical market structure reason that doesn't apply to almost any other market.
当人们想买市政债券时,他们的购买方式其实更像股票交易,更像是做市商把他们的库存都摆出来,然后资产管理公司会过来说,嘿,我想买那个报价。
When people wanna buy munis, they buy it in a way that actually looks more kind of more like equities, where it's more like the dealers, the market makers, post out all their inventory, and asset managers will come and say, hey, wanna I wanna lift that offer.
对吧?
Right?
所以我们称之为被动报价,就是那个。
So we call that passive Passive quoting is what we call that.
这两种交易流程的建模方式差别很大。
The way that you have to model trading across those two workflows is very different.
不过我要说,如果你能把这两种流程都建模好,基本上就差不多能模拟出你实际的操作了。
For but I will say, if you can model each of those two workflows, you've gotten a decent part of the way to simulating what your activity will actually look like.
对吧?
Right?
所以如果你能,是的。
So if you can yeah.
再说一遍,如果你能模拟所有的RFQ,你就能模拟所有的买入。
Again, if if you can if you can simulate all the RFQs, you can simulate all your buys.
如果你能模拟所有的被动报价,你就能模拟所有的卖出。
And if you can simulate all the passive quoting, then you can simulate all your sells.
那基本上就是你的全部策略了。
And that's pretty much your whole strategy.
对吧?
Right?
那这些怎么做呢?
Now how do you do those?
这非常棘手。
It's very tricky.
不过,我还在琢磨该讲多细,但比如说在RFQ这边,也就是买入这边。
But, again, I'm trying to figure out the right level of detail to go into, but let's say for on the on the on the RFQ side, on the buying side.
明白吗?
Okay?
你可以这样做:对于每一个历史拍卖,每一个历史RFQ,如果你稍微聪明一点,就能弄清楚那个RFQ历史上实际成交在哪里,那个拍卖的赢家价格是多少。
You could do things like for every historical auction, for every historical RFQ that occurred, if you're somewhat clever, like you can figure out where that RFQ actually did clear historically, what the what the winning price in that auction was historically.
对吧?
Right?
如果你能做到这一点,而且我略过了很多细节,关于怎么做好这件事。
And if you could do that, and there's a lot of nuance I'm glossing over to how to do that well.
但如果你能做到这一点,那你就可以相当确信,如果你的价格高于那个水平,你历史上就能赢得那次竞标,对吧?
But if you can do that, then you can be fairly confident that if your price was higher than that, you would have won it historically, right?
这就会告诉你,好的,在买方这边,我现在知道我需要出什么价格才能赢得那次RFQ。
And that will tell you, okay, on the buying side, I now know what price I needed to have in order to win that RFQ.
然后如果你对每天发生的七万次RFQ都这样做,你就能很好地了解,在给定你的策略会报出的某个价格的情况下,你在买方这边的交易会是什么样子。
And then if you do that across all of the 70,000 RFQs that happen every day, you have a pretty good idea of what you're trading on the buying side would have been, you know, given a certain price that your strategy would have quoted.
对吧?
Right?
这是比较容易的一边。
That's the easier side.
另一边真的很难,因为你可以这样想。
The other side is really hard because think about it like like this.
在高频交易的世界里,很多股票基本上都是以最小价格变动单位,也就是一分钱,来交易的。
In HFT world, so many stocks are, like, basically trade like a penny wide, like, at the minimum minimum increment.
对吧?
Right?
一切都变成了排队位置的问题,这完全是另一种游戏。
And everything becomes about queue position, and it's a very different kind of a game.
有些股票流动性较差,买卖价差非常大。
There are some stocks that are less liquid that trade really, really wide.
当你和那些习惯了超流动性、一个分钱价差的订单簿的高频交易人士交谈时,他们会告诉你,处理一个价差很大的订单簿其实非常困难。
And when you talk to people who are used to in the HFT space who are used to super liquid penny wide order books, they'll tell you the case of a really wide order book is really hard.
因为你怎么知道,即使历史上在订单簿的顶部没有成交,如果你稍微改善一下价格,就不会有成交呢?
Because how do you know that even though there wasn't a trade historically at the top of the book, there wouldn't have been if you would have improved the price a little bit.
对吧?
Right?
比如,历史上最好的卖价是100,而且没有成交。
Like, if the best offer is a hunt historically was a 100 and there was no trade.
那如果你出价99呢?
Well, what if you would offer it at 99?
会不会就有成交了?
Would there have been a trade?
这真的很难说。
Really hard to say.
事实证明,在市政债券市场,这是唯一的情况,因为实际上根本没有任何订单簿。
Turns out that is the only case that we have in Munis because there is effectively never any order book at all.
当然也不会有那种一分钱价差的订单簿。
There's certainly not a penny wide order book.
对吧?
Right?
这里很难深入所有细节,但可以说,这是一个非常棘手的建模问题。
This is where it's hard to go into all the all the details here, but suffice to say, that is a very tricky modeling problem.
而且我要说,拥有大量自己的数据来工作非常有帮助,这也是我们在这里有优势的原因之一,因为我们是市场上最大的流动性提供者。
And I will say it helps a lot to have a lot of your own data to work with, which is one of the reasons that we are we have an an edge here is that we are the largest liquidity provider in the market.
我们有很多数据点,比如,当我们尝试以特定价格出售债券时,我们是否成功?
We have a lot of data points around, like, when we try to sell bonds at certain prices, are we successful at that or not?
对吧?
Right?
而且要从零开始建立这些数据很难。
And it's hard to bootstrap that from scratch.
所以,我知道这些内容很多都是非常技术性的细节。
So, anyway, I realize a lot of that is, like, very kind of in the weeds technical.
但简单来说,这确实是个难题。
But, yeah, it's it's a hard problem is the is the short version of all that.
听起来确实很有挑战性。
Sounds challenging for sure.
然后我现在很好奇。
And then now I'm curious.
当这些工具交易不频繁时,你怎么看待库存问题?
How do you think about the inventory problem when these instruments don't trade that frequently?
不是说你随便就能把库存清掉。
It's not like you can just get rid of the inventory.
你多少得持有不少库存。
You kinda have to hold on to a good amount of it.
你们是怎么管理的?你们是怎么应对这个问题的?
How do you guys manage how did you guys manage that?
这个问题问得好。
That is a great question.
而且,这又是高频交易和固定收益领域之间最大的区别之一——你不能在收盘时清空仓位。
And again, that is one of the of the the biggest differences, again, between the HFT space and fixed income is you cannot go home flat.
那是不可能的。
It's impossible.
对吧?
Right?
所以,是的,我们在固定收益领域持有价值数十亿美元的库存。
And so, yeah, we own billions of dollars worth of worth of inventory in, in in in fixed income.
这个我们后面可以再聊。
And and we can go into this later.
这其实也是我们最终选择道明而不是海德兰兹的原因之一。
That's actually part of why we end up at TD as opposed to Headlands.
TD的资产负债表比Headlands大得多。
TD has a lot more balance sheet than Headlands had.
但大体上来说,第一步就是承认这个问题确实存在。
But roughly speaking so step one is acknowledge you have the problem.
你没法摆脱它。
You're not getting out of it.
你手里肯定会有持仓。
You're gonna have inventory.
对吧?
Right?
既然手里肯定会有持仓,那你们怎么处理这些库存呢?
So given that you're going to have inventory, what do you do about it?
对吧?
Right?
就像我们对待其他事情一样,我们尽量非常审慎且量化地来回答这个问题。
And we try to be very, as we do with everything, we try to be very thoughtful and quantitative in answering that question.
大致上,我们的思考方式——当然这不是唯一的思考方式——是在某种风险约束下,每个交易团队都有自己的风险约束,我们的就是X。
And roughly, the way that we think about it, which is not the only way that it could be thought of, is subject to some risk constraint, which every trading group has, so ours is X.
在某种风险约束下,我们如何最优地设定买卖报价,以最大化,大致来说,利润或风险调整后的利润,也就是某个目标函数,同时满足这个约束。
Subject to some risk constraint, how do we optimally set our bid and offer prices such that we maximize, roughly speaking, P and L or risk adjusted P and L, some some objective function subject to that constraint.
对吧?
Right?
这确实是个非常棘手的问题。
And that's a really tricky problem.
我要指出的是,不管他们愿不愿意,交易员们其实一直在尝试解决这个问题。
I will point out, you know, whether they want to or not, traders are trying to solve that problem all the time.
他们只是用脑子在算。
They're just doing it in their head.
对吧?
Right?
所以我们试图把这种思考系统化,大致转化成数学。
And so we try to systematize that thinking into math, roughly.
对吧?
Right?
而且,你知道,我可以详细讲讲具体是什么样子的。
And, you know, I could go into a lot of detail about kind of what that looks like.
但大致来说,你可以把报价挂得非常非常宽,这样交易量会很少,库存也会很小,但可能赚不到多少钱。
But roughly speaking, you know, like, you can either trade super, super wide, and you'll, you know, not trade very much, and and your, your inventory will be pretty small, and but you probably won't make very much money.
对吧?
Right?
你也可以把报价挂得非常非常紧,这样交易量会很大,但每笔交易都没什么利润,扣除交易成本后还会亏钱。
You could trade super, super tight, and you'll do a ton of trading, but you'll make no edge on any of it, and you'll be you'll lose net of transaction costs.
对吧?
Right?
你可以把买价和卖价都设得相对激进,这样你会买入很多,卖出不多,库存会非常大。
You can set your bid prices relatively aggressively and your offer prices relatively aggressively, and you'll buy a lot and you won't sell a ton and you'll have a very large inventory.
对吧?
Right?
你可能会赚到不少钱,但你的库存会非常大。
You might make a decent amount of money, but you're gonna have a very large inventory.
或者你也可以反过来做。
Or you could go the other way.
在这两者之间的某个位置,存在一个理论上的最优值,对吧,这样你买卖的量和价差都合理,并且能利用你的风险预算盈利。
And somewhere in the middle there, there is a theoretical optimal number, right, such that, you know, you're buying and selling in reasonable volume and at reasonable edge, and you're profitable using your risk budget.
所以我们有一个非常系统化的流程,试图找到策略的最优参数。
And so we have a very systematic process by which we attempt to find that optimal phrasing of the strategy.
一旦你找到了那个最优、最优、最优的库存量,你如何管理这个最优状态下的风险?
And once you found that optimal, optimal optimal amount of inventory, how do you manage risk on that optimal?
所以我不太确定,比如,你持有的这些市政债券和国债之间的相关性有多高?
So I don't know if like, how correlated are treasuries to this basket of munis that you're holding?
嗯,你其实提到了一个很有意思的点。
Well, you're actually hitting on a an interesting point.
而且,正如我之前提到的,让市政债券有点特别,并导致一些我谈到的奇怪的下游效应的一个有趣事实是,你根本不能做空市政债券。
And one of the things that makes munis kind of a snowflake, as I mentioned, and has some of the some of the causes, some of the weird downstream effects that I've talked about, is an interesting fact, which is that you cannot short munis at all.
实际上,我觉得做空市政债券是违法的。
You're it's actually I believe it's illegal to be short munis.
它们很奇怪。
They're weird.
这是因为市政债券的利息是免税的。
It has to do with the fact that their the interest on munis is tax exempt.
如果你仔细想想,做空一个免税工具意味着什么,那真的很奇怪。
And if you really think through, like, what would it mean to short a tax exempt instrument, it it it's, like, very strange.
比如,税怎么算呢?
Like, how how does the tax get applied?
很奇怪。
It's strange.
你就是做不到。
You just can't do it.
对吧?
Right?
所以这当然意味着,你不能用做空市政债券来对冲你做多的市政债券。
So what that means, of course, is you are not hedging your long munis with other short munis.
对吧?
Right?
在其他固定收益资产类别或其他资产类别中,通常不是这样的。
In other fixed income asset classes or in other asset classes in general, like, that's very much not true.
比如在信用债里,你几乎肯定想用做空公司债来对冲你做多的公司债。
Like, in in credit, you almost certainly want to hedge your long credit corporate bonds with short corporate bonds.
但在市政债券上你就是做不到。
You just can't do it in munis.
所以你可以选择一系列对冲方式,或者选择不对冲。
So there's a menu of options that you can choose to hedge, or you could choose not to hedge.
这不是我们的做法,但有些人会这么做。
It's not what we do, but some people do that.
有哪些选择呢?
What's the menu?
对,没错。
Yeah, right.
你提到了其中一种,就是国债。
So, you mentioned one of them, treasuries.
国债是我所说的和平时期的对冲工具。
Treasuries are what I would call a peacetime hedge.
它们在大多数时候都很好用,直到它们真的、真的、真的失灵了。
They work really well until they really, really, really don't work.
你可以想象那些失灵的时候。
And you can imagine the times where they don't work.
比如新冠疫情期间。
It's COVID.
那种大规模避险事件中,国债上涨,其他所有资产都在下跌。
It's the massive risk off event where treasuries rally and everything sells off.
所以很多人确实会用国债来对冲。
So a lot of people do hedge with treasuries.
我们不会。
We don't.
你可以用信用来对冲。
You can hedge with credit.
信用在尾部事件中的相关性更好,但非常不完美。
Credit has better correlations during tail events, but it's very imperfect.
你可以尝试用市政债券ETF来对冲,但通常,当你需要时,没有足够的借券可用。
You can try to hedge with muni ETFs, but generally, there's not enough borrow available and or when you need it.
而且非常昂贵。
It's incredibly expensive.
事实是,这里根本没有套利机会。
And the truth is there's just no ARB here.
实际上就是很难。
It's actually just hard.
如果你想交易市政债券,你将会持有一个你不想要的基础头寸。
And if you wanna trade munis, you are gonna be long a basis that you don't want.
这也是为什么这里面有机会。
And it's part of the reason there's edge.
对吧?
Right?
所以我想说,如果你想交易这个资产类别,你得有点承受波动的心理准备,因为那个基差会来回波动。
And so I would say if you wanna trade the asset class, you've got to have a bit of a stomach for some vol because you're going to have that basis is going to move around.
大多数时候还好,但有时候真的很难受。
It's mostly benign, but sometimes it's really not.
但事实证明,基差特别难搞或者对冲特别困难的时候,恰恰是最好的交易环境。
But it turns out that the times where the basis is really tough or that hedge is really difficult are also the best trading environments out there.
对吧?
Right?
所以如果你足够厉害,那些就是绝佳的机会,但你得愿意承受一些波动。
So if you're good enough, those are great opportunities, but you've got to be willing to wear some vol.
所以你得愿意承受一些波动。
So you have to be willing to wear some vol.
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回到我们之前说的,或者说你之前说的,这就是为什么赫德伦德那部分被TD收购了。
And going back to what we said earlier to what you said earlier, rather, that is why got like, Hedlund's that part was bought by TD.
你能再多讲讲这个吗?
Can you talk a little bit more about that?
当然可以。
Yeah, definitely.
这个话题我可以聊很多。
So I could talk a lot about this.
可以说,作为一家顶级自营交易公司的一员成长起来,那感觉太棒了。
So growing up, if you will, as part of an elite prop trading firm was awesome.
我们能够以在大银行里永远不可能实现的方式去构建东西。
And we got to build things in a way that it never could have gotten built at a big bank.
但说到底,自营公司相对大银行来说,资本还是有限的。
But at the end of the day, a prop firm has, relatively speaking, limited capital compared to a major bank.
所以这就是那种情况:这项业务实际上对有真正资产负债表的公司来说价值更大,因为你可以把我们核心的东西真正地扩大和推广出去,对吧?
And so it's one of those cases where the business is just actually worth more to a firm with real balance sheet, because you can take the core of what we have and really scale it up and out, right?
但当你这么做的时候,你得特别小心,别把让我们成为我们的东西给毁了,也就是那种灵活、敏捷、行动迅速的能力,还有世界级的技术,以及招到最优秀的人才并用正确的方式激励他们。说白了,我们的模式和银行里典型的交易团队看起来非常不一样。
But when you do that, you've got to be really careful to not kill what made us who we were, which is the ability to be nimble and agile and move quickly and have world class technology and hire all the best people and incentivize them the right way, our model, suffice to say, looks quite different than what a typical trading group looks like at a bank.
所以这里的诀窍就是,既要能把整个团队带过来,又要保留那种让我们成为我们的魔力。
And so the trick here was to be able to bring the whole team over, but preserve that kind of magic that made us who we were.
对吧?
Right?
而且我非常感谢TD,因为他们从来没有试图——我们到现在已经差不多合作五年了。
And I give TD a whole lot of credit because, you know, they never tried, and we're almost five years into it at this point.
你知道,他们基本上从来没有试图消除或稀释让我们成为我们的东西。
You know, they've, by and large, never tried to eliminate or dilute what made us who we are.
所以我觉得,我们在TD内部运作的方式,和银行里很多其他传统交易团队看起来不太一样。
And so we operate inside of TD, I think, in a way that looks kind of different than a lot of other traditional trading groups at banks.
我们组里直接嵌入了很多软件开发和量化研究员,而不是把他们放在别处的IT部门。
We have a lot more software developers and quantitative researchers embedded directly in our group as opposed to off in a IT group somewhere else.
当你能够把这种自营交易公司的低延迟基因,和一家伟大金融机构的资产负债表、客户网络以及实力结合起来的时候。
And when you're able to combine this prop firm low latency DNA with the balance sheet and the client franchise and the firepower of a great financial institution.
这种情况在咨询公司和投行眼里,通常被称为协同效应。
It's one of those situations where the consultants and the investment bankers would call it synergies.
也就是常说的二加二等于五的效果,对吧?
It's the two plus two equals five situation, right?
而且事实证明确实达到了这样的效果。
And it's actually worked out that way.
我们的业务规模已经翻了好几倍,比起刚被收购时有了巨大的增长,并且通过多种方式实现了强有力的扩张。
Our business is multiples of what it was when we first got acquired, and we scaled out in lots of powerful ways.
在像TD这样的大型机构里,你们是怎么保持小公司的活力,并且还能飞速运转的?
How do you maintain the energy of still being a small firm, moving super quickly within a big institution like TD?
对。
Yeah.
这也是我经常会思考的问题。
That's something I think about a lot.
所以你得现实一点。
So you've got to be realistic about it.
银行确实是在与自营交易公司不同的监管体系下运作的。
The bank really does operate under a different regulatory regime than a proprietary trading firm.
不过,不是说自营公司就不受监管,其实每家交易公司都受到严格监管。
Now, not that prop firms are you know, every trading firm is highly regulated.
对吧?
Right?
所以我觉得有时候这一点被夸大了。
So I think sometimes this point can be overblown.
比如,每家交易公司都受监管,但银行的监管体系确实不同。
Like, every every trading firm is regulated, but banks do operate under a different regulatory regime.
所以我们不能,我们不可能完全无视这一点。
And so we can't there is no world in which we just ignore that.
对吧?
Right?
我们必须履行我们的监管义务。
We we have to satisfy our regulatory obligations.
就这么简单。
Full stop.
如果你只是试图沿用银行一直以来的那些模型来处理这件事,那也是行不通的,因为银行在构建技术和管理技术方面的很多思路,跟我们经营业务的方式根本不兼容,对吧?
If you just try to apply the same models that the bank has always applied as to how you go about doing that, that won't work either, because a lot of the ways that banks think about building technology and governing it is just not compatible with the way that we built the business, right?
所以这需要跟公司上下很多人协作,找到合理的折中方案,既要首先确保满足监管要求、保证安全,同时也要让我们能保持一直以来那种运营模式。
So it's a lot of working with people across the firm to find reasonable compromises that both, yes, first and foremost, always satisfy our regulatory obligations and keep us safe, but also allow us to kind of keep the operating model, that that we've always had.
对吧?
Right?
所以有很多——我可以讲很多可能非常无聊的细节,关于这香肠到底是怎么做出来的。
And so there are a lot of I can go into a lot of, like, probably very boring details about how exactly the sausage gets gets made on that.
但你知道,简单来说,我们尽量非常谨慎地思考,应该搭建什么样的桥梁,连接到组织其他治理部分,这样能让所有人都放心,一切都在正确、安全地进行。
But, you know, suffice to say, we we try to be very thoughtful about what are the right kind of bridges to build, back to the rest of kind of the the the the governance parts of the of the organization such that we can give everybody comfort that that everything is being done, correctly and safely.
但在那个——我讨厌用“泡泡”这个词,但确实有点像——在那个泡泡里面,如果你问我们团队里那些收购前后都在的人,感觉变化大吗?
But within the kind of I hate to use the term bubble, but that's kind of kind of how it within the bubble, like, if you ask the average person on our team who was there before and after the acquisition, does it feel very different?
我觉得他们会说,你知道,跟我们在Headlands的时候相比,90%都是一样的,对吧?
I think they would say, you know, it's 90% the same as it was when we were part of part of Headlands, Right?
所以这其实是一场持续的战斗,因为你知道,这真的是一个完全不同的体系。
So it but it's a constant battle because, you know, it really is a different a different regime.
所以在这方面需要不断地解决问题。
So it's it's a lot of a lot of constant problem solving on that front.
那10%是什么?
What's the 10%?
或者你能举个例子,说明在TD和在LLMs相比,那10%需要你做得不一样的地方吗?
Or can you give an example of one thing that the 10% that you had to do differently at TD versus at LLMs?
更多的合规培训?
More compliance trainings?
好的。
Okay.
好的。
Okay.
不。
No.
不是。
No.
不是。
No.
那个其实无所谓。
That that obviously, that one doesn't really matter.
不是,比如我们在软件开发生命周期(SDLC)上需要多一些控制。
No, there are for example, we have to have some more controls around the SDLC, the software development life cycle.
比如代码上线到生产环境时,谁需要查看和批准。
So who has to view and approve when code gets shipped into production?
类似这样的东西。
Like, things like that.
但说实话,真的就10%。
But, you know, really, it's 10%.
不是90%。
It's not 90%.
所以其实日常的工作量并没有那么大。
So it really isn't that much day to day.
我和我的合伙人需要和公司的其他人进行很多沟通,才能保持这种状态。
There's a lot of conversations that me and my partner running the business have to to have with the rest of the firm to keep it that way.
对吧?
Right?
但真正实质性的日常工作,我觉得其实差别不大。
But the actual substantive day to day is, I think, really not that different.
那在TD和HEDLMs,团队规模分别扩大了多少?
And how much did the team expand at TD versus at HEDLMs?
大概翻了一倍吧。
Have, I would say, roughly doubled.
我们被收购的时候,大约有15个人。
So when we got acquired, we were about 15 people.
这一点很重要,因为我和那些习惯引用大型机构人数的人交流时,要知道我们不是那种前台部门或量化团队。
And that was it's important to note when I talk to with people who are used to citing headcount numbers that come from larger institutions, like that's not like a front office group or a quant group.
这就是整个业务。
That's the entire business.
从我和合伙人管理公司,到交易员、销售、销售培训、量化开发、量化研究、软件开发、网络和基础设施,所有人都包括在内。
That was everybody from me and my partner running the business through to traders and sales and sales training and quantitative development and quant research and software development and networking and infrastructure, like all of it.
所以团队非常精简。
So it was very lean.
当时只有几个开发人员和几个量化研究员。
It was a couple of developers, a couple of quantitative researchers.
现在我们到了这里,大概有三十多人。
And since we've gotten here now, we're, I would say, in the mid-30s.
那只是因为我们现在做的事情多了很多,对吧?
And that's just because we do a lot more, right?
不仅核心交易业务规模大了很多,但真正的原因还不止这个,因为那主要是扩大规模而已。我们交易更多资产类别,比如扩展到了投资级信用债。
Not only is the core trading business a lot bigger, but that isn't even really why, because that's mostly just scaling a dial, We trade more asset classes, so we've grown into investment grade credit, for example.
在那方面我们已经做得相当大了。
I've gotten pretty large there.
而且我们也开始把我们这套运营模式和技术栈,我们认为非常非常强大、而且跟银行其他地方现有的东西很不一样的那套,扩展到组织的其他领域。
And we also have begun to take this kind of operating model and technology stack that we have and we think is really, really powerful and kind of looks different than a lot of what exists at the rest of the bank.
我们已经开始把它推广到组织的其他部门了。
And we've started expanding it out into other areas of the organization.
比如说,像大宗商品部门,那是道明银行一个很不错的业务,但他们目前技术还不太完善。
So, for example, there's groups like our commodities group, which is a great business that TD has, but they don't have a ton of technology yet.
不是他们不想要,只是还没发展到那一步。
Not because they don't want it, they just haven't gotten there yet.
所以我们实际上在帮他们建设,把我们的一些方法应用到其他市场。
And so we are actually helping to build out, and apply the, the approaches that we have into other markets as well.
现在银行内部已经有一些这样的例子了。
And there's a few examples of that kind of within the bank now.
我们还做了很多其他事情,这也是团队壮大的原因。
So we do a bunch of other stuff, which is why the team has grown.
但人数肯定不是我们的目标。
But head count is certainly not our goal.
我们希望团队尽可能精简。
We want to keep the team as lean as possible.
我觉得这非常重要。
I think that's really important.
我们之所以扩张,是因为我们做的事情更多了。
We've grown because we do a lot more.
我现在特别好奇你刚才说的关于大宗商品的事情。
I'm now exceptionally like, I'm super curious about what you said about commodities.
因为当我想到你跟我说的市政债券,再想到大宗商品产品时,我觉得人们可能没有意识到,光是石油就有多少种不同的类型。
Because when I'm thinking about what you've told me about munis and I'm thinking about commodities products, I don't think people realize how many different types of even just oil there are.
比如有WTI,它由很多不同的合约组成,每个合约在实物市场上又代表不同的东西。
So there's WTI, and that's composed of a bunch of different others contracts, which are each something else in this physical market.
同样地,市政债券也有很多需要理解的地方。
In the same way in the same way, there's so many things to understand about Munis.
所以我想,这对那个团队的人来说应该是一件很令人兴奋的事情。
So I imagine that's an exciting thing for the guys on that team.
我想我不该让你为难,问一些你可能不方便透露的细节。
I guess I don't wanna put you in a position where I have to ask specifics that maybe you're not allowed to talk about.
不过,你知道的,具体是个什么情况呢?
But, you know, what is that like?
你为那个团队带来的、价值极高的具体贡献都有哪些?
What are the specific things that you're bringing to the table for that team that have been extremely high value?
没问题。
Sure.
我想先统一一下认知,我们才刚刚踏上这段旅程。
And I would say to to level set on this point, like, we're just starting this this journey.
特别是那个团队,也是刚开始起步。
With that team in particular, we're just starting this journey.
不过我觉得,在搞全自动交易系统、完整建模模拟和回测这些之前,你可能还没怎么跟银行里工作的人交流过。
But I think it starts with even before you get to full automated trading systems, full modeling and simulation and back testing and all these things, you probably don't talk to people that work at banks too much.
我自己也不是从那个圈子里出来的,对吧?
And I didn't come from this world either, right?
你会发现市场上其实还有很多人工交易业务,我们在这方面有很好的优势。
What you learn is there's a lot of voice business out there still that like, we have a great commodity.
真的,他们确实很优秀。
They're like, genuinely, they're great.
实际上,他们的业务基本上还是靠人工交易,对吧?
Effectively, all of their business is still voice, right?
所以他们连电子交易都很少用,更不用说自动化交易了,对吧?
And so they don't really, even transact electronically very much, let alone in an automated fashion, right?
所以那些流动性的池子,虽然他们可以用,但现在他们根本接触不到。
So all of these liquidity pools that are out there and available to them that they don't even really have access to at this point.
所以第一步,我们能不能先给他们建一个世界级的、基础的电子交易系统?
And so step one is, can we build them just a world class kind of basic trading stack for electronic trading in the first place?
我们有很多技术,比如连接交易所、数据整合、交易报告等等,这些单独看可能没什么特别的,但合在一起,就是任何真正交易业务的支柱。
And we have a ton of technology built around connectivity to to exchanges and, data aggregation and trade reporting and all these things that actually aren't like, they're not individually that interesting, but when you combine them together, they're the backbone of any real trading business.
对吧?
Right?
所以第一步就是把这个基础搭建起来。
So step one is to build that out.
然后一旦有了这个基础,第二步就是开始加入我们之前讨论过的那些有趣的建模类型。
And then once you have that foundation, then step two is really to start layering in a lot of the interesting types of modeling that we've talked about.
所以这既包括大宗商品也包括金属,比如黄金。
So it's both commodities and metals, so think gold as well.
黄金、白银等等。
Gold, silver, etcetera.
这些市场很有意思,因为有一部分业务非常依赖人工报价和定制化,就像你刚才提到的。
And these are interesting markets because there's a very voice bespoke kind of part of the business, like like you were referring to.
但同时也存在像黄金ETF这样的产品,交易速度极快,流动性也很好。
But then there's also, like, you know, gold ETFs, which are super low latency and liquid.
所以它们实际上开始……我的理解是,市场是沿着一个流动性连续谱分布的。
And so they really start The way that I think about it is markets exist on a continuum of liquidity.
在最左边,比如国债或者世界上流动性最强的资产,比如股票。
And all the way on the left hand side, let's say you've got like treasuries or whatever the most liquid thing in the world, equities.
而在另一端,你会有市政债,或者比市政债流动性更差的资产。
And then all the way on the other side, you've got probably munis or whatever even less less liquid than munis.
我最近挺感兴趣的一个领域是私人信贷,这甚至更加……是的。
An area that I'm actually pretty interested nowadays is private credit, which is even more Yeah.
如果你想聊的话我们可以展开说说,不过那是在更远的那一头。
We could talk about that if you want, but way further that way.
然后还有一些处于中间地带的东西,对吧?
And then you've got things that are kind of in the middle, right?
大宗商品正好横跨了这个连续谱系的一大块区域,对吧?
And commodities are some They kind of span a decent swath of that continuum, right?
所以我们会结合我们做的相对价值模型,以及更传统的低延迟、高频交易模型。
And so it will be, a mixture of the kinds of modeling that we do, relative value type modeling, right, as well as the more traditional low latency, high frequency type modeling.
我觉得目前市场上还没多少人能把这块做得特别出色,尤其是像我们在TD这样拥有强大平台支持的情况下。
And there's not a lot of people out there, I think, that do that super well yet, certainly not with the kind of platform that we have here at TD for it.
所以现在还处于非常早期的阶段,但我们已经开始着手搭建了,而且我们在其他几个领域也在做类似的事情。
So you know, very early days there but we're starting to build that out and it's not very, we're doing this in a in a couple of other areas as well.
对。
Yeah.
我是说,现在确实还早,但我问大宗商品是因为我对这个领域越来越感兴趣了,尤其是考虑到伊朗战争。
I mean, very early days but it's and I'm asking about commodities because it's an area I've gotten a lot more interested in and I think especially given the Iran war.
然后我觉得,对。
And then I think yeah.
我是说,在大宗商品交易这个领域,我觉得对大宗商品交易感兴趣的新毕业生太少了。
I mean, also, I think commodities trading within commodities, I think there are too few young grads curious about that.
我觉得这是最酷的领域之一,而且我觉得大家都痴迷于量化和对冲基金。
I think it's one of the coolest spaces out there, and I think everyone is obsessed with quant and hedge funds.
但没人想到,石油,它几乎驱动着一切。
And no one is thinking about, you know, oil, it powers air basically everything.
我完全同意。
I totally agree.
总的来说,Ethan,你看。
And in general, Ethan, I look.
我只能说说我自己的经历,以及我看到哪些做法是成功的。
I can only speak about my journey, what I've seen succeed.
我觉得人们,尤其是年轻人,应该去碰那些看起来不起眼的东西。
I think people, especially kid like, younger people, should be running to the ugly stuff.
那些大家都懂、容易上手、又光鲜亮丽的事情,确实有人能赚钱。
Like, all of the well understood, easy, sexy things, like, yes, there are people that make money in them.
但每一个成功的人背后,都有大量不成功的人,而且竞争特别激烈,大家都明白游戏规则是什么。
But for every one of those, there's tons of people who don't, and it's really hard, and and and, you know, everybody kind of understands what the game is.
而且看起来……
And and it look.
在这些领域你也可以有很好的职业发展。
You can have a great career in those things.
我不是说你不行。
I'm not saying you can't.
我觉得真正有意思的是,去寻找世界上真正低效的地方在哪里。
What I find, you know, intellectually interesting is really searching for where is the real inefficiency in the world.
我之前提到过,知道自己靠什么赚钱很重要。
And I mentioned earlier, it's important to know what you get paid for.
对吧?
Right?
市场真正付你钱,是因为你减少了低效。
What the markets really pay you for is reducing inefficiency.
对吧?
Right?
这也是我当初进入市政债券领域的原因,因为那是我能想到的最低效的地方之一。
And this why I got into munis in the first place, because they were one of the most inefficient places that I could possibly think of.
对吧?
Right?
低效就等于优势。
And inefficiency equals edge.
对吧?
Right?
所以,是的,像大宗商品、固定收益、还有我刚提到的私人信贷这些领域,它们真的很复杂。
So, yeah, some of these areas like commodities, like fixed income, like private credit, which I just mentioned, like, they're gnarly.
它们很难看。
They're ugly.
在很多方面都不吸引人。
They're not sexy in a lot of ways.
对吧?
Right?
但它们非常重要,而且效率低下。
But they're super important, and they're inefficient.
而世界需要有人来解决这种低效问题。
And the world deserves an answer to that inefficiency.
对吧?
Right?
只要有人能想出办法来减少这种低效,在这些市场里不起眼的角落,就有大把的钱可以赚。
And to the extent that people can come in and invent ways to reduce that inefficiency, there's tons of money to be made in those ugly corners of the market.
对吧?
Right?
所以,是的,我绕了一大圈,其实就是想说,我同意你的看法。
So, yeah, I a very long way of saying I agree with you.
而且,我也同意。
And I mean, I I agree.
而且我还想说,昨天我和一个朋友吃午饭,我们聊了聊。
And I would even say on top of that, I was having lunch with a friend yesterday, and we were talking.
他大概五六年前从常春藤毕业的。
And he'd graduated from an Ivy League five or so years ago, six or so years ago.
他告诉我,他所有混得最好的朋友,都是那些做了别人可能会质疑他们决定的事情的人。
And he told me that all his friends who'd done the best were the ones who did things and keep in mind, he's still very young, but they did things that peep where people would have questioned their decision.
你知道,我觉得所有的优势和超额收益,都在于做那些一半人会说你是天才,一半人会说你是白痴的事情,而希望你是那个天才。
You know, it's I think all the alpha and all the edge is in doing something where half the people will say you're a genius, half will say you're an idiot, and hopefully you're a genius.
完全同意。
Could not agree more.
如果事情简单又显而易见,那就没什么优势可言了。
If it is easy and obvious, there is no edge in it.
我觉得这不仅仅适用于交易。
I think that's a general that's not just trading.
商业也是一样。
There's business.
现在,别扯太远,就说AI领域发生的这些事吧,人们真的得好好想想,到底什么还能带来真正的优势。
Think nowadays with not to get too far afield here, but with everything happening in the AI world, people have to think a lot about what actually has edge anymore.
不只是交易,商业也一样。
Not just trading, but business.
这世界上到底哪里还有真正的优势?
Where is there actually edge in the world?
我的看法是,肯定不在那些容易的事情上。
And my contention is it ain't in the easy things.
而是在那些看起来很难看、你得真正深耕某个领域才能理解的事情上。
It's in the things that are ugly, and you really have to develop deep domain expertise to understand.
所以,我是建议大家去那些看起来不太顺眼的领域里找找机会,成为这方面的专家。这样你才能有信心坚持自己,哪怕别人都觉得你疯了。
And so, yeah, I would encourage people to look for the ugly spaces, become an expert in those spaces, such that you can be confident that you're the genius even if everybody else says you're crazy.
我想你在这方面肯定思考了很多。
I'm sure you've thought about this quite a lot.
你能举个例子吗?比如那种连像我这样的年轻人,或者大学同学看到都会觉得完全没戏、绝对不可能的领域。
Can you give an example of an ugly space that a young person like myself, someone else, maybe a buddy from college, he'd see that and go, absolutely no way.
他们会觉得这简直是蠢透了。
That is the dumbest thing ever.
不过从你的角度来看,你觉得那边可能还存在一些超额收益的机会?
But you, from your perspective, think maybe there's some alpha there.
我们之前稍微聊过一点私募信贷。
Well, we talked about private credit a little bit.
你知道的,我可不想过度乐观。
You know I don't want to get over my skis here.
我不是私募信贷出身,所以这只是我站在远处的一种观察视角。
Like, this is not I don't come from a private credit background, but this is kind of a, you know, from a view from afar, if you will.
但是,你知道,这个资产类别里有数万亿美元。
But, you know, you've got trillions of dollars in that asset class.
我不确定你对它有多熟悉,可能不太了解。
I'm not sure how familiar you are with it, probably not very much.
但是,你知道,这个资产类别里有数万亿美元,每年以两位数的复合增长率增长,而且越来越多地投入到零售半流动性的产品中,这些产品有季度或月度的流动性,但这个资产类别本身根本不交易。
But, you know, you've got trillions of dollars in that asset class growing at double digit compounded rates every year, getting put into increasingly retail semi liquid type vehicles that have, you know, whatever, quarterly, monthly liquidity, and the asset class does not trade at all.
这在我看来是不可持续的。
This seems untenable to me.
我不是这方面的专家。
I'm not an expert in it.
我不想假装自己知道得更多。
I want to claim to know more than I know.
我想说的是,像阿波罗这样的公司,他们在这个观点上也非常直言不讳,他们也觉得这个资产类别会开始——我觉得他们谈论的方式是,公共和私人资产之间的界限会开始模糊,不再有明确的界限。
I will say there are firms out there like Apollo who have been very vocal in basically this view as well, who feel that that asset class is going to start I think the way that they've spoken about it is public and private assets are gonna start to like, there's not gonna be a bright line between them anymore.
对吧?
Right?
我觉得这是不可避免的。
And I I think that's inevitable.
你看看现在私募市场的管理资产规模有多大。
Look at how how much AUM you have in private markets these days.
私募信贷是一回事,但我觉得现在世界上一些最大的公司仍然是私有的。
Not private credit is one thing, but I think some of the largest companies in the world today are still private.
SpaceX就是私有的。
SpaceX is is private.
OpenAI也是私有的。
Open AI is private.
Anthropic这些,都是万亿美元级别的公司。
Anthropocos, these are trillion dollar companies.
对吧?
Right?
而且这些领域越大,我觉得就越需要某种流动性。
And the larger those spaces get, I think there will need to be liquidity of some sort.
但这确实是个非常棘手的问题。
But it is an ugly, ugly problem.
我不确定你想在这里深入多少细节,但如果你愿意的话,比如说,什么是私人信贷贷款或工具?
And I'm not sure how much detail you you you want to go into here, but, you know, if you if you want to, like, what is a what is a a private credit loan or an instrument?
我的意思是,它们甚至没有Q SIPs,对吧?
I mean, they don't even have Q SIPs, right?
没有代码。
There's no symbols.
基本上就是一千页的法律文件。
It's basically 1,000 pages of legal documentation.
所以如果你想交易,它们偶尔也会交易,但实际情况是,有人要翻阅一千页的法律文件和公司财务的Excel表格,试图得出正确的估值。
So if you want to transact, they do occasionally trade, but what it looks like is somebody going through 1,000 pages of legal documentation and Excel spreadsheets of company financials and trying to come up with the correct value.
你可以想象,这个过程有很多低效之处。
And you can imagine there's a lot of inefficiency in that process.
有很多麻烦的地方。
It's lot a of ugliness.
管理规模非常大。
Huge AUM.
我预测这个领域会发生一些变化。
I would I would predict that you will see changes in that space.
你觉得大型语言模型会不会帮助人们消除很大一部分低效,从而为这些资产创造市场?
And do you think LLMs will lead to a big portion of will allow people to scrape up a good chunk of that inefficiency, you know, make a market for it.
简单来说,我觉得这会让每个人的蛋糕都变大。
Basically, I would say increase the size of the pie for everyone.
你怎么看?
What do you think?
说实话,现在根本不存在什么市场。
Well, the pie doesn't exist today, really.
根本没有交易活动。
There is no trading.
对吧?
Right?
对。
Yeah.
他们会把蛋糕做出来。
It will create, they will bake the pie.
是的。
Yeah.
没错。
Yeah.
对。
Right.
我觉得大语言模型是促成交易的必要条件,但光有它还不够。
I think LLMs are a necessary but not sufficient condition to enable trading.
还有啊,结算和清算这块儿也挺让人头疼的。
There's also like again, a very ugly like settlement and clearing part of it.
再说,这些领域我不打算过度吹嘘自己的专业度,但确实得想办法搞定那种无缝的结算和清算流程。
Again, these are worlds that I am not I don't wanna overclaim my own expertise, but you've gotta figure out, like, some way to do kind of seamless settlement and clearing.
你得想办法减少那种尽职调查的摩擦,就像我提到的,要翻阅那些文件。
You've got to figure out how to reduce the kind of due diligence friction of going through all those documents, like I mentioned.
你得有愿意参与的参与者。
You've got to have participants that want it.
对吧?
Right?
而且我觉得,作为一个局外人来看,像Apollo这样的玩家确实有这个意愿。
And I think that from my understanding as an outsider, there's some players like Apollo that really do.
但其他一些玩家就没那么积极了。
There's other players that that don't as much.
他们把缺乏交易看作是一种特性,而不是缺陷。
They view the lack of trading as kind of a feature rather than a bug.
我觉得这种观点有点值得商榷。
I think that's somewhat of a questionable view.
但我认为这个领域的一些创新是不可避免的。
But I some innovation in this space is kind of inevitable.
我觉得,再说一次,我不是想替监管机构说话,但我觉得监管机构非常清楚这个领域的增长、不透明性、这些资产的估值方式以及缺乏流动性。
I think even Again, not a I don't want to speak for regulators, certainly, but I think that regulators are keenly aware of the growth in this space and the opacity and how these things are valued and the lack of liquidity.
我觉得从这个角度也会有一些压力。
I think there will be some pressure from that angle as well.
所以你看,在很多方面,我觉得历史不会重演。
So look, in a lot of ways, I think history doesn't repeat itself.
历史可能不会总是重演,但往往会押韵。
History may not always repeat itself, but it often rhymes.
二十五年前,人们会说市政债券也永远不会真正交易,对吧?
And twenty five years ago, people would have said munis would never really trade either, right?
但现在它们确实交易了,而且原因很多是相同的——通常是技术变革和监管变革的结合,推动市场走向效率和透明,而且它们只会朝一个方向前进。
And and now they do, and it's for a lot of the same re it's usually a combination of technological change and regulatory change that push markets towards efficiency and transparency, and they they really only go in one direction.
它们不会倒退,对吧?
They don't go the other way, Right?
它们只是以不同的速度前进。
They go at different speeds.
最终的终点不一定相同,但它们只会朝一个方向走。
The ultimate ending location is not always the same, but they only go in one direction.
对吧?
Right?
我预测你会看到那个资产类别朝着那个方向发生变化。
I would predict that you will see movement in that direction in that asset class.
关于
On
试图参与让那些不吸引人的市场变得更高效。
trying to participate in the in making unsexy markets more efficient.
当选项在技术上并不存在或不可用时,你怎么去参与这些呢?
How do you even try to participate in those things when the option isn't technically on the table or available?
我举个例子。
And I'll I'll give an example.
你可能会说同样的话,而且我确信在2000年代末、2010年代初,也有人对加密货币说过同样的话。
You could have said the same thing, and I'm sure there were people who said the same thing about cryptocurrencies in the late two thousands, early two thousand tens.
对吧?
Right?
但如果你只是个人,除非你自己开一家交易公司或者交易所,否则你很难真正参与进去。
But you're a person there, and barring building up your own trading firm or that or exchange, you can't really participate in in that.
那你怎么做呢?我觉得这其实是一个普遍的问题,就是怎么才能真正成为这些浪潮中的一员,特别是让低效市场变得更高效这件事。
How do you do it for, you know, I guess this is a general question about how to actually approach being a part of these rising tides, and this specifically is for making inefficient markets more efficient.
当这些选项目前还不存在的时候,你怎么参与呢?
How do you participate when those options aren't on the table right now?
问得好。
It's a good question.
我觉得你可以把这个问题推广一下,变成:在商业中,怎么才能提前进入那些低效的领域?
You know, I think you could generalize that question to how do you get in early in inefficient places in business in general?
我觉得答案在一般领域和金融领域之间有点区别,比如在一般领域,你可以说我要创业做点酷的事情,但在金融领域,因为监管和机构化程度太高了。
And I think there is a bit of a distinction between the answer kind of in the general, like, I'm forming a startup to do something cool space, and in finance, because finance is so regulated and institutional.
所以我觉得确实有点不一样。
So it is a little bit different, I think.
但某种程度上,也不是。
But in some ways, it's not.
所以,好吧。
So Okay.
如果你想,比如,创办一个人工智能初创公司,你基本上可以直接去尝试,对吧?
In If you want to start, you know, whatever, an AI startup, you can kind of just go and try to do it, right?
而且这真的很难,就像任何新事物一样,你的成功很大程度上取决于你能否把自己的愿景变成现实。
And it will be really hard, like any new thing, and your success will be largely a function of your ability to will your view of reality into existence.
对吧?
Right?
而且,这是真的,而且,你得搞定一大堆细节。
And it's real And it's You got to nail a bunch A million little details.
对吧?
Right?
这一点在金融领域也同样适用。
That part of it is equally true in finance.
对吧?
Right?
就是说,你得有能力把你认为应该存在的现实变成现实。
Like, you've got to be able to manifest the reality that you think should exist.
而且没有现成的套路,因为如果有套路的话,早就有人做成了。
And there is no playbook because if there was a playbook, it would have already been done.
对吧?
Right?
你就是得特别执着,一步一步地走下去,才能到达那个目标。
It's You just got to be really stubborn and and and and out the steps to, to get there.
我得说,在金融领域,情况有点不一样,因为如果你没有任何业绩记录就走进贝莱德,他们根本不会理你。
I will say, in finance, it is a little bit different because if you walk into BlackRock with no track record, like, they're just not gonna talk to you.
对吧?
Right?
所以我觉得在金融领域,你大概得看看——我可以讲讲我自己的背景。
So I think in finance, like, you probably look, I can speak about my my background.
我就是这么做的,我觉得这基本上就是通常的做法。当时我很幸运,能跟Headlands的创始人搭上关系。
This is how I how I went about it, which I think is kind of the way that it generally which is, I was very lucky to get put into contact with, the founders of Headlands back in the day.
而且他们之前已经在其他资产类别里做出过这种变革了。
And they had a track record already of creating this kind of change in other asset classes.
他们之前在Citadel待过,对吧?
They were at Citadel, right?
对,他们确实做过一些很厉害的事情。
They were yeah, they've done some really cool things.
我讲讲他们的背景吧。
I go to the background.
不过是的,其中一个人帮Citadel建立了期权业务。
But yes, one of them built the options business at Citadel.
另一个人更多参与的是Citadel的股票业务。
One of was more involved in the equity business at Citadel.
还有一个很久以前是Island ECN的首席执行官,那可比你那时候早多了。
One of them was the CEO of Island ECN way back in the day, which is way before your time.
那时候它可是最早的电子股票交易平台之一。
It was one of the first electronic equity trading platforms back in the day.
后来经过一系列收购,最终被纳斯达克收入囊中。
Ultimately got acquired by through a string of acquisitions by Nasdaq.
所以他们确实搞出了一些很酷的东西。
So, they've done some some really cool stuff.
他们曾设想,那些推动股票和期货市场演变的逻辑,同样会在固定收益领域发挥作用。
And they had a vision for how the same themes that had driven markets to evolve in equities and futures would play out in fixed income.
但那时候确实还非常早期,对吧?
But it was still so early, right?
然后我有机会跟他们一起工作,我就立刻抓住了这个机会。
And I got the opportunity to work with them and I jumped at it.
对吧?
Right?
所以他们提供了平台,也带来了必要的分量,让我们得以开启这段旅程。
And so they provided the platform and kind of the gravitas to begin the journey.
对吧?
Right?
所以这算是打开了门。
So that kind of opened the door.
但我们还得自己走进去。
But we still had to walk through it.
在这个世界上,做任何新事情都没有现成的配方。
And the way that you build any new thing in the world, there is not a recipe for it.
这很难,最后赢的是那些固执的人。
It's difficult, and the stubborn people win.
你得愿意比别人扛过更多的烂事。
And you've got to be willing to push through more shit than anybody else.
我觉得这一点在商业和金融领域都是成立的。
And that part, I think, is true in business and in finance.
在金融领域,我觉得重要的是要么自己有经验,积累起那种分量,要么能加入一个平台,让平台帮你打开那些门。
In finance, I do think it's important to get either have some experience such that you've built up that gravitas yourself or to be able to join a platform where the platform can open those doors for you.
你和那些顶尖公司的人合作,他们在这个领域干了很久,然后你又想建立新的业务,你从中学到了什么?
What did you learn from working with those guys, top firms, been in the space for a long time, and then trying to build out a new operation.
听起来不容易,但感觉他们都是顶尖高手。
Doesn't sound easy, but sounds like they were top performers.
有什么特别具体的经验吗?
Any specific things?
很多。
Many things.
如果非要提炼一下的话,这跟我之前说的有点关系。我在你这个年纪,刚入行的时候,我觉得任何成功的交易组织或团队的核心,都藏着某种魔法。
If I had to distill it down and it kind of touches on something I was talking about before is when I was your age, when I was first getting into the industry, I think I had this view that somewhere kind of in the heart of any successful trading organization or group or team, there was some little bit of magic, if you will.
就像某种非常复杂的公式、技巧或者阿尔法之类的,被严密保护着,钱就是从那里来的。
Like some really fancy formula or trick or alpha or what have you that was jealously guarded, and that was where the money came from.
对吧?
Right?
我觉得我从Heavens那些人身上学到的最重要的一点就是,根本没有魔法。
And I think one of the biggest things I learned from working for the guys at Heavens is there is no magic.
如果说真有什么秘诀的话,那就是一群非常有才华、有干劲的人聚在一起,日复一日地钻研那些我们之前聊到的极其困难、枯燥、繁琐的细节。
To the extent that there is any, it is in a group of really, really talented and motivated people coming together and grinding through years of really difficult, tedious, ugly to the point that we talked about earlier details forever.
没错,这些人确实聪明又有才华,我们也会用一些像机器学习之类的有趣又高级的工具。
And yes, those people are smart and talented, and we use, you know, some interesting and fancy tools in terms of machine learning, etcetera.
但这些只是入场券。
But that's table stakes.
这并不能真正区分什么,因为每个人都有这些工具。
That doesn't really differ everybody has those tools.
这并不能让谁脱颖而出。
That doesn't differentiate anybody.
对吧?
Right?
真正让优秀团队与众不同的,我觉得在交易和商业中都是如此,首先是要有一个高瞻远瞩的顶层愿景和理念,关于世界应该是什么样的。
What really differentiates great teams, and, again, think this is true of businesses as it is in trading, is one, having a great top level vision and philosophy about, like, the way that the world should be.
或者说,世界应该是什么样,和现在有什么不同?
Or, like, some what is different about the way that the world should be than the way it is today?
而且,为什么你的观点是正确的?
And and why is your view correct?
然后就是那种难以置信的坚持不懈,非要让世界变成那样。
And then just an unbelievable dogged relentlessness to make the the world that way.
对吧?
Right?
而且在建设的过程中,感觉从来都不好。
And it never feels great as you're building out.
事实上,常常感觉很糟糕。
And in fact, often feels terrible.
常常感觉每天都在输。
It often feels like you're losing every day.
对吧?
Right?
但你还是继续一点一点地推进,每隔几个月,你停下来喘口气,回头看看,然后意识到,我们其实已经取得了很大的进展。
But you keep chipping away at it, every few months, you stop and you take a breath and you look back and you realize, we've actually made a lot of progress.
然后你低下头,继续埋头苦干。
And then you put your head back down and you keep grinding.
在某些方面,我觉得这种对成功的看法其实更让人有力量。
And in in some ways, I find that to be kind of a more empowering view of what success looks like.
就像魔法一样,是不可言说的。
Like magic is ineffable.
那你怎么找到那种魔法呢?
How do you find magic?
对吧?
Right?
但埋头苦干、拼命努力,这个我能做到。
But putting your head down and grinding, I could do that.
我觉得那些企业家就是这么一步步把公司做起来的。
And I think it's, you know, that's how those guys built those businesses over the years.
这也是他们一直教导我们的理念。
It's what they've instilled in us.
这也是我现在想灌输给我们团队的。
It's what I try now to instill in our team.
而且这对我们来说确实很有效,很有效。
And it's it's worked it's worked it's worked well for us.
我喜欢那个画面。
I love that picture.
我真的非常喜欢。
Like, I absolutely love it.
而且,我是说,我根本不敢把自己和那些人相提并论。
And, I mean, I wouldn't knew I wouldn't even put myself close to people like that.
但即使是做内容,
But even with content,
我记得有
I mean, I remember there's
几周前有一次
a time a couple weeks ago
你基本上就是内容界的肯·格里芬。
You're basically the Ken Griffin of content.
你在说什么?
What are you talking about?
不。
No.
但是,你知道,我当时病了,病得很重。
But I, you know, I I was sick, very sick.
我还得剪辑播客。
I had to edit a podcast.
我还得,你知道,用一些片段做开场。
I had to do the I had to, you know, like, use some clips for the intro.
而且,是的,当时也有一些私事。
And I, yeah, had some personal stuff happening as well.
我就想,好吧,让我把它搞定。
And I was like, okay, let me get it done.
然后我就把活儿给干完了。
And I and I get the job done.
周日我还在笔记本上干活呢。
I'm on my laptop, work on the Sunday.
周二早上我一看电脑,发现开不了机了。
I checked my laptop on Tuesday morning, and it's not turning on.
于是我就去了苹果店,跟他们说电脑突然就坏了。
And so I go to the Apple store, and I show them, you know, my laptop just stopped working all of a sudden.
他们检查了一下。
They take a check on it.
其实去苹果店的那段路上,你知道的,我先去了一个店,但没货,我就直接去了另一家,因为我得赶紧把这事儿搞定。
And actually, on the way to the Apple Store, you know, I went to one, wasn't available, just went to the other because I needed it to to get this done.
然后他们跟我说,你知道的,他们会先看一下设备的情况。
And they tell me, you we know like, you know, they take a look at the at the device.
他们告诉我,东西坏了。
They tell me, it's broken.
他们表示你并没有做任何导致它损坏的事情,但他们可以免费帮你修好。
We know you didn't do anything to cause it to break, but we can fix it for free.
所以好消息是这一点。
So that's the good news.
坏消息是你所有的文件都会丢失。
Bad news is you're gonna lose all your files.
哦,天哪。
Oh, yeah.
当时我一下子没反应过来。
And I was I can't remember in the moment.
我当时就想,你们是在开玩笑吧?
Was like, are are you serious?
我辛辛苦苦忙活半天,结果全白费了。
I just I you know, all that work was was for nothing.
后来我才明白,这就是规矩的一部分。
And then I realized, that's just part of the game.
对吧?
Right?
如果你想参与任何游戏并且想玩得好,就会遇到这样的情况。
If you wanna participate in any game and you wanna be good at it, there are gonna be things like that that will happen.
不如就干脆好好玩游戏吧。
You might as well just play the game.
所以我买了一台新笔记本电脑。
So I bought a new laptop.
大概一个半星期后,我把电脑退回去了。
I returned it, you know, a week and a half later.
然后我买了台新笔记本,当天就把活儿给干完了。
But bought a new laptop, got the thing done that day.
虽然身体还是不舒服。
Still sick.
但说实话,我心里反而挺踏实、挺高兴的,因为我想通了,这就只是生活常态罢了。
But I was actually felt a lot of comfort and joy in that because it was like, okay, this is just how it feels like.
如果你能接受这一点,那就没问题。
And if you're fine with that, then it's fine.
你明白吗?
You know?
成功是优秀过程的副产品。
Success is the byproduct of a great process.
我这么说吧,我是个超级体育迷。
I look to I'm a a big sports fan.
我会看那些像,怎么说呢,像那样的人。
Look to people like I don't know.
比如,我成长的时候,勒布朗·詹姆斯正变得非常出名。
Like, LeBron James was becoming huge as I was growing up.
你看像他,或者斯蒂芬·库里那样的人,听他们说话,全都是关于过程、过程、过程。
And you look at a guy like that or a Steph Curry or people like that, and you listen to them talk, it's all about the process, the process, the process.
对吧?
Right?
如果你需要成功的虚荣感来支撑自己继续前进,那你肯定走不远。
And if you need the ego boost of success in order to keep going, you won't make it.
对吧?
Right?
就是说,你不仅要能忍受困难,甚至要有点享受那种挑战的感觉。
Like, you've got to be able to not just tolerate, but almost relish the difficulty.
因为,再说一次,如果你做的是容易的事,那就没什么优势可言了。
Because, again, if you were doing something easy, there would be no edge in it.
之所以有优势,就是因为这件事难。
The reason that there's edge is that it is hard.
而成功者和失败者的区别之一,就在于这种能力。还有一个很好的例子就是詹森。
And part of what distinguishes those who are successful from those who aren't is the ability to, like Another good reference point here is Jensen.
詹森·黄。
Jensen Huang.
你听过他大概一年半、两年前的那个演讲吗?
You ever heard his it was, like, maybe, like, a year and a half, two years ago.
那段视频特别精彩。
He it's a great clip.
在YouTube上就能找到。
It's on YouTube.
你可以去搜来看看。
You could you could play it.
当时他好像在跟一群毕业生讲话,我记得好像是伯克利的毕业生,反正就是那种学术氛围很浓的场合。
Where he was talking to a bunch of, I think it was Berkeley graduates, some something like that, a very much school.
他的意思大概是,我祝你们经历巨大的痛苦和磨难,因为痛苦和磨难真的是通往成功的唯一途径。
And he was like Basically, he was like, I wish upon you great pain and suffering, because pain and suffering is really the only way to get to success.
他想表达的是,所以他会谈到韧性,他认为韧性是成功者与失败者之间最关键的差别。
His point was and so he talks about resilience, and resilience being maybe the main ingredient in those who succeed versus versus those who fail.
别误会我的意思。
And don't get me wrong.
你看。
Look.
是的,你得聪明。
Like, yes, you have to be smart.
你得有能力。
You have to be capable.
你得有专业技能。
You have to have the technical skills.
对吧?
You right?
你得有深厚的领域知识。
Like, you have to have the deep domain expertise.
但这些只是基本要求。
But that part is just table stakes.
这些是理所当然的。
Like, that part is just a given.
对吧?
Right?
有很多人具备所有这些条件。
There's tons of people that have all that.
对吧?
Right?
既然标准这么高,我觉得真正让人脱颖而出的,就是拒绝让失败击垮你。
Given that bar, what separates people, I I think, is just refusing to let your losses defeat you.
我喜欢这个说法。
I love that.
我也喜欢把投资中的概念应用到生活中。
And I love applying the concepts in investing to life.
所以,我举个例子吧。
So something and I'll give an example.
前几天我和我弟弟通电话,你知道,我在想风险溢价和获取超额回报的概念,就是获得……
I was on the phone with my brother the other day, and, you know, I was thinking about the concept of risk premia and getting excess return, gaining you know,
承担风险而获得回报。
getting paid to take on
承担别人不愿意承担的风险。
risks that others don't want.
对。
Sure.
然后我说,你知道吗,如果把这个应用到个人层面,我觉得愿意看起来像个傻瓜会带来巨大的好处。
And I was saying, you know, if you're to apply that on a personal level, I think being happy to look like a fool yields enormous benefits.
而且这甚至不算真正的风险,你知道,这就是那种……
And it's not even a real risk, you know, and that that's the
那是对你的自尊心而言,但谁在乎你的自尊心呢?
It was to your ego, but who cares about your ego?
没错。
Exactly.
而且我很喜欢,你知道,有一位对冲基金经理,他现在成了我的导师。
And I love, you know, these you know, there's this hedge fund manager who's who's now become a mentor of mine.
他喜欢的一个理念是,你知道,他喜欢股票,或者说他喜欢看基本面改善的速度。
One of the ideas he likes to you know, he likes in stocks or continuous he likes to see in the velocity of the improvement in fundamentals.
他喜欢看到这个数字在增长。
He likes to see that that's increasing.
他说,你看Palantir,当盈利增长的速度持续超出预期时。
And he says, you look at Palantir when that velocity of of the earning, they keep beating it.
或者英伟达,他们也一直在超预期。
Or NVIDIA, they keep beating it.
他说,你知道,我觉得这里面有一些动量的因素,但我觉得在某种意义上它也是一个纯粹的指标。
He was saying that you know, and I think there's some momentum ingrained within that, but I think it it is also a a pure indicator in a sense.
他还告诉我,他喜欢把这种方法用在人身上。
And he was telling me that he likes applying that to people as well.
所以,你看到一个人,他不是最优秀的。
So you see you see a guy, and he's not the best.
他绝对不是最优秀的。
He's definitely not the best.
但你看到,每个星期、每个月,他就是不知怎么地一直在进步,而且他的进步速度不仅快,有时候还在加快。
But you just see that every week, month, he just somehow, just keeps improving, and and his rate of improvement not is not only fast, but it sometimes just increases.
他说,要小心那个人。
He says, watch out for that guy.
当他告诉我这个的时候,我开始在别人身上看到这一点,我简直惊呆了。
And when when when he saw when when he told me that, I started seeing it in people, and I was I I was blown away.
我觉得这太神奇了,就是看着一个高中同学,每个月都让你刮目相看。
I I thought it was I thought it was magic just seeing, you know, just some guy, you know, from high school and just every single month, like, you're just blown away by the guy.
完全同意。
Totally.
我的意思是,这可能是个不太恰当的比喻,但你知道,我们做了很多招聘工作。
I mean, maybe an imperfect comparison here, but, you know, we do a lot of of recruiting.
显然,我们花时间最多的事情就是招聘和留住合适的人。
Obviously, it's, like, probably the biggest thing we spend our time on is hiring and retaining the right people.
我不会说我们的做法是唯一可行的方式。
And I'm not gonna say that the way that we've gone about it is the only way that one could go about it.
但这和Jensen的观点也有点关系。
But this was kind of related to Jensen's point as well.
我是说,他当时好像在跟伯克利或者某所顶尖名校的人讲话。
I mean, he was talking to, I think it was Berkeley or some great some amazing school.
对吧?
Right?
那些孩子,我是说,你根本不在乎他们来自哪所学校。
And those those kids, I mean, you were don't know where you go to school.
哥伦比亚大学的,反正都超级聪明。
I Columbia, like, you you super smart.
才华横溢,顶尖中的顶尖。
Unbelievably talented, best of the best.
但他的观点是,那些只经历过成功的人,往往抗压能力很弱。
But his point was often people that have only ever seen success have very low resilience.
这其实是个负面信号。
And that actually is a negative indicator.
结果我们发现,我们到处都在招人。
And it turns out that we try to hire from everywhere.
我们经常招到的不是那些来自麻省理工、哈佛、伯克利这些名校的人。
We often end up hiring people that have come not from the MITs and the Harvards and the Berkleys of the world.
我们也招过一些。
We have hired some of them.
但我觉得最成功的,是那些来自好的十大联盟学校,但心里憋着一股劲的孩子。
But we've had, I think, the most success with the kids that come from a good Big Ten school, but have a massive chip on their shoulder.
他们就是那种,我绝不会比别人少努力。
And are just like, I will not be outworked.
我气自己没进麻省理工。
I'm pissed I didn't get an MIT.
我绝不会比别人少努力。
I will not be outworked.
这种性格,我觉得至少对我们来说,效果很好。
And that DNA, I think, has, at the least, worked well for us.
但这可能也跟你说的那些主题有关。
But think it hits on some of the themes that you're talking about.
在招聘方面,有没有什么你们会关注、但别人通常不会留意的点?
On hiring are there any things that you look for that people wouldn't normally look at?
比如,有没有哪些反直觉或者特别的特质是你们能看出来的?
Like, are there any counterintuitive or or traits that you can see?
如果你给出的答案比较常规,那也没关系。
And if you have it if if your answer is generic, that's fine.
但我挺好奇的是,你是不是有一些与众不同的看法,觉得其他人也能从中受益?
But I'm curious if you have a differentiated view on that that you think others could could gain some
我觉得也许确实是这样。
I think maybe we do.
我的意思是,跟世界上大多数地方相比,我们的做法可能有些不同。当然,未必是所有培训领域都这样,但我们的思路是:我们其实一直在试图反复招到同一种人,可这种人根本不存在,所以我们永远找不到。
I mean, maybe it's I think it's differentiated in compared to a lot of the world, maybe not to, like, all of all of training, but the way that we think about it is we're really trying to hire the same person over and over again, but we will never find that person because they don't exist.
于是我们只能做出妥协,然后努力把他们训练成那种理想的人选。
And so we make compromises, and we try to train train them into that person.
对吧?
Right?
那个人是什么样的?
Who is that person?
对我们来说,那个人要兼具一些很难在同一个人身上找到的特质。
That person, for us, is somebody who combines a set of traits that are very difficult to find in the same person.
那具体是哪些特质呢?
So what would those be?
首先,要有很好的商业背景。
Those would be, number one, great business context.
也就是对我们所在的市场有深刻的理解。
So like deep understanding of the markets that we're in.
无论是货币市场、固定收益、大宗商品,还是其他任何资产类别。
So whether it's meanings or fixed income in general or commodities or whatever asset class we're talking about.
这是第一点。
Number one.
第二点,就是要有很强的软件开发、软件工程能力。
Number two would be great software development, software engineering capabilities.
对吧?
Right?
而且我们不太在意用什么语言,只要是个优秀的软件开发者就行。
And we don't care so much about language as much, but just a great software developer.
第三点就是要有扎实的统计、数学和机器学习功底。
And then number three would be great stats math machine learning toolkit.
对吧?
Right?
而且所有这些,你从我的说话方式就能看出来。
And then all of that, of course, you could tell by the way that I've been talking about it.
前提是态度上必须非常出色。
The given is an absolute killer from an attitude perspective.
对吧?
Right?
这种人就是凤毛麟角。
That person is a unicorn.
根据我们的经验,我觉得我们招到的人里,最接近理想状态的也就是具备这三项能力中的两项半。
In our experience, I think the closest we've ever come to hiring somebody with has been somebody who had maybe two and a half of those three legs of the stool.
对吧?
Right?
然后我们再想办法去培养那缺失的一项。
And then we try to train in the the the third one.
对吧?
Right?
要找到这样的人真的很难。
It's very difficult to to find people like that.
我觉得AI其实正在稍微改变这个局面,因为它在早期阶段就把一些角色融合到一起了。
I do think actually AI might be changing this picture a bit because it kind of collapses some of those roles down into each other a little bit, very much in the early phases of that.
对,我们确实是在寻找那种全能型人才。
But yeah, we kind of look for that unicorn.
而现实中,大家当然还是倾向于走专业细分路线。
And then people, of course, look in practice, up specializing.
你知道,如果你擅长软件开发,你可能会更偏向做软件开发。
You know, if you're great at software development, you're probably gonna be more of a software developer.
如果你擅长交易,但只会一点点Python,那你可能更偏向交易这边。
If you're great at trading, but you don't really you you only know a little bit of Python, like, you're probably gonna be more on the on the trading side.
但我们不会在两者之间划清界限,实际上我们也不怎么给人定岗位或头衔。
But we don't put bright lines between the in fact, don't really give people, like, roles or titles.
每个人基本上都处在技术量化交易员这个连续谱上的某个位置,理想状态是希望每个人都具备全面的跨领域技能。
Everybody's just sort of somewhere on that technical quantitative trader continuum, and the ideal is we want everybody to have that entire cross sectional skill set.
我们发现这样做效率更高,而不是像这样:这边是一群只懂交易、不太理解技术的交易员。
We find that it is much more efficient to do it that way than to have, like, your silo of traders over here who really know trading but can't really understand the technology.
那边是一群擅长C++但不太懂交易的软件开发者。
You have your software developers over here who are great at c plus plus but don't really know about trading.
当技术就是业务,业务就是技术时,你需要你的员工也体现这一点。
When technology is the business and the business is technology, you need your personnel to reflect that.
所以我们不想在业务的这些部分之间划出界限。
And so we don't want to draw lines in between those parts of our business.
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