亨利·切萨布鲁夫博士，97届 - 开放式创新

欢迎收听HOSS校友播客。我是主持人Sean Lee。今天我们邀请到了‘开放式创新’概念的提出者Henry Chesbrough博士。他是伯克利哈斯商学院Garwood企业创新中心的教育主任。

Welcome to the one HOSS Alumni Podcast. I'm your host, Sean Lee. And today we're joined by Doctor. Henry Chesbrough, who coined the term open innovation. He is the educational director of the Garwood Center for Corporate Innovation at Berkeley Haas.

他的研究专注于技术管理与创新战略。他拥有耶鲁大学经济学学士学位、斯坦福大学MBA学位，以及我们伯克利哈斯商学院的工商管理博士学位。欢迎来到播客节目。

His research focuses on technology management and innovation strategy. He earned his BA in economics from Yale University, an MBA from Stanford, and a PhD in business administration from our very own Berkeley Haas. Welcome to the podcast.

Sean，非常感谢。

Sean, thank you very much.

Henry，不介意我这么称呼您吧？

Henry, if you don't mind me calling you that?

当然不介意。

No, by all means.

我父亲是博士教授，从小耳濡目染，尤其作为中国人，见到他的同事时总会习惯性地用敬称。

My dad's a doctorate professor and I just get ingrained in me when I meet his colleagues, especially being Chinese to always call people by their honorific titles.

是的，是的。

Yes, yes.

但在哈斯商学院这里，博士学位多如牛毛，却没人想被称作博士。

But here at Haas, there's so many doctorates and nobody wants to be called a doctor.

确实，我们学院的博士太多了，这个头衔已经没什么特别。在德国还有'博士教授'的传统，所有学位都会列在姓名前。不同文化对高等教育的认可方式各不相同。

It's true that we do have so many on our faculty that it isn't much of a distinction. And in Germany there's also a tradition of doctor, professor. You list all of the degrees before the person's name. So different cultures recognize higher education in different ways.

能简单介绍一下你的背景吗？就是你的成长经历。

Can you give us a bit of your background, you know your origin story?

当然。我想说我人生大部分时间都在大学城度过。我在密歇根州安娜堡长大，那里有密歇根大学——连校色都和加州大学一样。没错，那也是所顶尖的公立大学。

Sure. I guess I would say that I have spent most of my life in college towns. I grew up in Ann Arbor, Michigan where the University of Michigan is located, even has the same color scheme as Cal. That's right. And so also an excellent public university.

大学城对我来说是绝佳的生活环境，既保留了小镇的亲密感和出行便利——没有太多交通拥堵和麻烦，又能享受大城市的学术氛围。从安娜堡到伯克利，世界各地的思想在此交汇，让人眼界大开。这大概是我的起点。后来我在东海岸的耶鲁读本科，遇到了现在的妻子（当时的女友），她是加州人，所以我随她来到加州，在斯坦福拿了MBA。之后十年都在计算机行业工作，主要在一家叫昆腾的硬盘公司。最初做产品营销，后来成为子公司营销副总裁。90年代初硬盘行业开始走下坡路，于是我回加州大学攻读博士，之后在哈佛商学院任教六年，2003年回到加州大学工作至今。

And college towns have been a wonderful place for me because they combine the intimacy of a smaller town and accessibility and ability to get around without too much traffic, too much hassle, with the intellectual stimulation of much larger locations. So Ann Arbor growing up, Berkeley today, things from all over the world come through and so you can really see a lot experience That's a I guess a good starting point for me. Then I went to college on the East Coast at Yale and I met my then girlfriend, now wife at Yale, but she was from California so I followed her out to California and got an MBA from Stanford, worked for about ten years in the computer industry and spent most of those years at a hard disk drive company called Quantum. And I was initially in product marketing, eventually became the vice president of marketing for a subsidiary company of Quantum, and then in the early 90s the disc drive industry became a less exciting industry to be in. And so I went back to get a PhD from Cal and went to Harvard Business School for six years where I taught there and then came back to Cal in 2003 and I've been here ever since.

真了不起。你真是横跨两岸啊。

That's amazing. You've really been bicoastal.

其实是从中部的密歇根起步，然后才像你说的那样横跨两岸。

Well started in the middle in Michigan and then went bicoastal as you say.

你还认为自己是密歇根人吗？这是我的问题。

Do you still consider yourself a Michigander? That's my question.

非常认同。我的家人来自那里。我的三个兄弟姐妹中仍有一个住在那里。我每年至少回去一次。可以说，你能把男孩带出密歇根，却带不走他心中的密歇根。

Very much so. My family is from there. I still have one of my three siblings living there. I go back at least once a year. So that you can take the boy out of Michigan, but you can't take the Michigan out of the boy.

所以你妻子来自加州，我觉得你和她一起搬到这里是明智的决定。是什么让你又回到东部的哈佛呢？

So your wife is from California, which I think, you made the wise decision to move here with her. What made you go back out east to Harvard?

嗯，让我想想。部分原因是一位斯坦福教授史蒂文·惠尔赖特，我在斯坦福时就认识他，但那时他已经回到哈佛了。

Well, let's see. Partly it was a professor from Stanford, named Steven Wheelwright, who, I knew from Stanford but he had by this time had gone back to Harvard.

我

I

明白了。这是其中一个因素。第二个因素是——那可是哈佛。他们那里有惊人的设施和丰富的资源。

see. That was one factor. A second was, it was Harvard. They have an amazing setup there. They have lots of resources.

没错。

Right.

他们自称是资本主义的西点军校，这虽有些夸张，但确实体现了他们对此极为重视。这是一个向最优秀的教师学习案例教学法的机会，并与杰出的同事共事，尤其是已故的克莱顿·克里斯坦森，他去年去世，但在我任职的六年里一直是我的同事。其中有两年，我还与他共同教授他的课程，因此我对他的工作和研究非常熟悉。

And it was a chance they call themselves the West Point of Capitalism, which is a little bit of hyperbole, but what it does capture is they take it very seriously. And so it was a chance to learn teaching and case method teaching from the very best and to work with some wonderful colleagues, not least of them Clay Christensen, who died this past year but was a colleague of mine for the six years I was there. And for two of those years, I taught Clay's class with him. So I got to know him and his work very well.

对于可能听过克莱顿名字但记不起书名听众来说，那本书是《创新者的窘境》。至少这是我所知道的那本。

For listeners who may have heard of Clay's name but can't remember what the book is, it's the innovator's dilemma. At least that's the book I know.

是的，他写过很多书，但这本绝对是最突出的。

Yes, he's had many, but that is absolutely the one that stands out.

好的。介意我问一下，你的博士研究是什么吗？

Yeah. Do you mind me asking you, what was your PhD study?

当然不介意。这个问题很少被问及，所以很高兴有机会谈谈。我之前提到过，在攻读博士前，我在硬盘驱动器行业工作多年。而在《创新者的窘境》中，克莱顿·克里斯坦森讨论了硬盘驱动器行业的颠覆性技术。

Oh yeah, sure. This is one I rarely get asked, so it's a pleasure to have a chance to talk about it. I had mentioned I had worked in the hard disk drive industry for a number of years before my PhD and in The Innovator's Dilemma, Clay Christensen talks about disruptive technology in the hard disk drive industry.

我

I

知道自己的行业已成为学术研究对象，所以读到这本书时觉得内容非常精彩。但通过Quantum公司，我也与多家日本和欧洲的磁盘驱动器企业合作过，了解到那边的情况截然不同。因此，我的论文研究了美国磁盘驱动器行业中现有企业的更替现象，但日本的情况则不同。该行业经历了与美国相同的技术变革和颠覆，但现有企业的应对方式和市场格局变化却完全不同。

knew that my own industry had become the subject of some academic study, so when I read this I thought this is really good stuff. But I had also through quantum been working with a number of Japanese and European disc drive companies and I knew that the situation there was different. Right. And so my dissertation looked at the displacement of incumbent firms in The US in the disc drive industry, but not in Japan. So the industry went through all the same transitions that The US industry did, all the disruptive technologies, but the incumbent response and the displacement was completely different.

这就是我论文的主题。

So that's what my dissertation was about.

离开哈佛后，是什么让你回到伯克利哈斯商学院？有两个原因。

After Harvard, what brought you back to Berkeley Haas? Two things.

其一是我被哈佛赶了出来。我没能获得终身教职，哈佛实行的是‘不升即走’制度，未获晋升就得离开。哇，这确实是个动力。我曾就读于加州大学伯克利分校，在这里有学术和职业上的优秀同事，通过一位名叫David Tease的同事，我找到了一个能让我重返伯克利的职位。

One was I got kicked out of Harvard. I was not promoted to tenure and so it's an upper out system and if you don't get promoted you have to leave. Wow. So that was a motivator. I'd gone to Cal and had good colleagues here both academically and professionally, and through a colleague named David Tease, I was able to find a position that allowed me to come back to Cal.

真了不起。你是在伯克利期间还是之前开始研究‘开放式创新’这个你创造的术语的？

Amazing. Did you start working on open innovation, the term that you coined at Cal or before Cal?

从伯克利的视角看，这简直完美。我在哈佛期间完成了所有研究，这包括大量实地考察——每年夏天通常花一个半月到两个月去硅谷调研。我在施乐帕洛阿尔托研究中心（Xerox PARC）度过了很长时间。哈佛为所有这些实地研究买单，但当我被迫离开时，这本书于2003年出版，正是我从哈佛转投伯克利那年，于是伯克利收获了荣誉，而哈佛承担了费用。

So this worked out beautifully from Cal's perspective. I did all the research while I was at Harvard and this involved a lot of fieldwork going out every summer for typically, a month and a half or two months to Silicon Valley. Spent a lot of time at the Palo Alto Research Center of Xerox PARC. And so I did all this fieldwork and Harvard paid for all of that, but when I was forced to leave, the book was published in 2003, the year that I made the move from Harvard to Cal, so Cal got the glory and Harvard got stuck with the bill.

能和我们聊聊开放式创新吗？实际上在此之前，能否先为听众介绍一下伯克利哈斯商学院的加伍德企业创新中心？

Can you talk to us about open innovation? Actually, before that, can you describe for our listeners what is the Garwood Center for Corporate Innovation at Berkeley Haas?

当然可以。伯克利哈斯商学院通过其创业项目（原称莱斯特中心，现已升级）拥有卓越的课程体系。当这些初创企业成长壮大后，就会逐渐超出我们创业课程的服务范围。2019年，美国初创企业获得的风险投资超过1000亿美元，但同年美国成熟企业在研发上的投入接近4000亿美元。

Absolutely. So Berkeley Haas has amazing programs through the Berkeley Haas Entrepreneurship Program. It used to be called the Lester Center, but now it's, been upgraded since then. But once these startups age out, they get older, and they scale up and get bigger, they kind of outgrow the entrepreneurship part of our offerings. Last year in 2019, there was more than a $100,000,000,000 invested in venture capital in startup companies in The US, but in that same year there was nearly $400,000,000,000 spent on R and D by established companies in The US.

加伍德中心专注于第二类活动。随着企业成长壮大、发展成熟，它们也必须进行创新。我们关注的重点就是企业如何创新，以及哪些方法更有效或效果不佳。

So the Garwood Center is for that second set of activities. Once you get older, once you get bigger, once you grow up, corporations have to innovate as well. And how they innovate and what works better or worse is the stuff that we look at.

那我们直接进入主题吧。什么是开放式创新？您如何定义这个概念？

So let's jump right into it. What is the term open innovation? How do you define that?

开放式创新是我们研究企业创新领域的一个切入点。它并非企业创新的唯一方式，但我认为其受欢迎程度出人意料。开放式创新的核心理念是：并非所有聪明人都为你工作。事实上，大多数聪明人都在别处效力。

So open innovation is an entry point for us into the domain of corporate innovation. It's not the only approach to corporate innovation, but it's I think a surprisingly popular one. The idea of open innovation is that not all the smart people work for you. In fact, most smart people work somewhere else.

嗯。

Mhmm.

因此无论企业规模多大、实力多强，都无法独自完成所有事情。保持开放、开展合作、共享资源才是更好的选择。这既包括为创新活动引入外部知识（由外向内），也包括让闲置资源流出供他人用于创新（由内向外）。更正式的定义是：开放式创新是一种分布式创新流程，涉及知识在组织内外的双向流动。这就是我们所指的开放式创新。

So no matter how big you are, no matter how good you are, you can't do it all alone. It's better to be open, to collaborate, to share, and this can involve both bringing in knowledge from the outside for your innovation activities, the outside in, or allowing things that you're not using to go outside for others to use in their innovation and that would be the inside out. And a more formal definition of open innovation would be a distributed innovation process that involves these flows of knowledge into and out of organizations. So this is what we mean by open innovation.

您之前提到历史上大多数创新都是垂直整合模式，这与开放式创新有何不同？

You had mentioned before that historically, most innovation was done in a vertically integrated way. How does that differ from open innovation?

确实。就像今天我们讨论的，英国政府刚批准了首批新冠疫苗，这令人振奋。制药行业就是从封闭转向开放的典型范例。如果观察20年前辉瑞的化合物研发管线，90%的化合物都始于其自家实验室，经历临床前测试、建模、动物实验、早期人体试验，再到大规模临床试验，最终获得FDA批准上市。所有这些步骤过去都由辉瑞等大型药企在内部独立完成。

Sure. So right now as we talk just today, The UK Government has approved the first vaccines for COVID nineteen, which we're all excited about. And the pharmaceutical industry is a classic example of an industry that has really undergone a transformation from closed to open. If we were looking at Pfizer's pipeline of compounds twenty years ago, nine out of 10 of those compounds would have been compounds that started in their laboratories, underwent the preclinical testing, the modeling, then animal tests, then early human trials, and then later larger clinical trials and then finally FDA approval and into the market. All of those steps would have been performed by Pfizer or all of the other big pharma companies inside their own four walls.

本质上这将是从实验室到市场的垂直整合。或者说，如果用比喻的话，就像跑马拉松，因为要历经多年才能完成这些步骤，而且全靠自己完成。以辉瑞疫苗获批为例，那是与一家名为Moderna的公司合作完成的，如今辉瑞及其他大型药企的化合物大多并非源自其实验室，通常来自学术医学中心，往往还经由专业制药公司或初创企业之手——这些初创企业常由学术医学中心的大学教授协助创立——然后才授权给这些大药企推向市场，就像Moderna与辉瑞的合作那样。

Essentially it would be vertical integration from the lab all the way through to the market. Right. Or if you like metaphors, would be like running a marathon because it takes years to go through these steps and you do it all yourself. With the approval of the Pfizer vaccine, that was done with a company called Moderna and the pharma compounds of Pfizer and all of the other big pharma companies today, most of them are compounds that originated outside of their laboratories, usually from an academic medical center, often passing through a specialty pharma company or a startup that one of the university professors at the academic medical center helped to start, and then it's, licensed on to one of these big pharmas to go to market like with Moderna and Pfizer. Right.

所以马拉松已被接力赛取代，接力棒从起跑的选手传递给继续推进赛程的选手，再交接给将其推向市场的大型药企——它们负责管理监管流程和临床试验，最终收获巨额收益。

So the marathon has been replaced by a relay race, and the baton is now passed from one runner who starts the race to another runner who maybe continues the race and advances it further, and then a a further handoff to the big pharma company who takes it into the market, manages the regulatory process and the clinical trials, and collects the big money right at the end.

你用的这些比喻很有意思，因为当我思考产业周期时——实际上上周我在一个关于媒体娱乐的专题讨论会上也谈到过——我们常见到行业先整合，十到二十年后又分拆。科技领域也有类似故事，互联网等技术最初都源自教育机构和政府资助的研究，然后接力棒传给私营公司以进一步发展技术。但过去十年、二十年或三十年间，一切都整合成了这些庞然大物。

It's interesting you give us these metaphors because when I think about the cycles of industries, we actually had this conversation on a panel that I was a part of last week on on media entertainment, we commonly see a consolidation of industries and then ten or twenty years later, they break up, right? You know, we hear similar stories in technology as well. Internets, all these things came out of educational institutions and government backed research that then that baton was passed on to private companies, right to take that technology further. However, in the past, I would say ten, maybe twenty or three decades, things have consolidated to these behemoths, right? The way in in shapes.

是啊，就是那些科技巨头（FAANG）对吧？这让我思考：在创新方向的曲线上，我们正处于什么位置？是处于开放创新蓬勃发展的阶段，还是困于缺乏开放创新的境地？

Yeah. The fangs, right? Yeah. It makes me wonder what point are we in the curve in terms of the direction of where innovation is. Are we in a state of business where there's a lot of open innovation right now or have we been stuck in a place without open innovation?

肖恩，我很喜欢你的问题。这其实正是促使我在2020年1月出版新书《开放创新成果：超越炒作，务实经营》的动机。该书第一章就提出了我称之为'指数悖论'的概念，你的问题恰好切中这一章的核心，因为指数悖论始于一个观察：技术正在加速进步。

So Sean, I love your question. And it actually was a motivation for me to write a new book that just came out in January 2020, and it's called Open Innovation Results, Going Beyond the Hype and Getting Down to Business. And the book opens in chapter one with something I call the exponential paradox. And your question touches really well on that chapter because the exponential paradox starts with the observation that technology is advancing at an accelerating rate.

没错。

Right.

无论是摩尔定律、梅特卡夫定律，还是这些新的社交媒体动态，事物传播的范围和速度都前所未有。企业停留在财富500强榜单上的时间越来越短，CEO的任期也越来越短。一切似乎都更具颠覆性、更加动荡。这就是所谓指数级技术的概念。

Whether it's Moore's Law or Metcalfe's Law or these new social media dynamics, things are spreading further and faster than ever before. The length of time a company spends on the Fortune 500 is getting shorter and shorter. The lifespan of CEOs is getting shorter and shorter. Things seem to be more disruptive, more tumultuous. So all this is this idea of exponential technology.

仔细想想，这应该意味着我们周围确实充满了大量实用技术。因此我们变得越来越高效、越来越富有成效。但矛盾之处在于：当我查看经济生产率数据时，尤其是经济增长率数据——无论是美国、其他G7国家还是经合组织40个成员国中的大多数——我们并没有看到生产率加速提升的迹象。相反，我们看到的是生产率增长放缓，这与指数级技术发展带来的预期完全相反。

And if you think about it, that should suggest that we would have really a bounty of useful technologies all around us. Therefore we become more and more productive, more and more efficient and effective. And here's where the paradox comes in. When I look at data on economic productivity, and in particular the growth of productivity in the economy, whether it's in The US or the other G7 countries or most of the 40 countries in the OECD, we don't see an acceleration of productivity improvement. If anything, we see a slowing down of productivity growth, which is the opposite of what you would expect with exponential technology.

所以这正是第一章的核心内容，与您所说的观点高度吻合。我们尝试用多种方式来解释这个现象，我试图拆解这个问题并提出解释。但要设计一个能完全验证和解决这个问题的测试很难，所以我并没有能一锤定音的'确凿证据'。不过我在章节中提供了大量证据来证明几个关键点。

So that's actually the whole focus of the first chapter, very much along the lines of what you're talking about. Right. And so we're having multiple ways you could explain this, and I try to unpack this and try to come up with an explanation. It's hard to design a test to fully identify and solve this, So I don't have what would be considered the smoking gun that would conclusively show this. But there is a lot of evidence that I put in the chapter that show a couple of things.

其一是我们在基础科学领域的投入不如从前，特别是在联邦政府层面的自然研究体系。二战后我们取得的生产力提升很大程度上得益于政府对科研投资的持续支持。但现在这种支持正在减弱。第二个现象是我们看到顶尖群体与其他群体之间的差距正在扩大。

One is that we are not investing as much in the underlying science as we used to at the federal government level in the basic natural research system that we have. So a lot of the productivity gains that we made after the second world war were fueled by sustained support for public scientific investment in research. That's slowing down now. We're not doing as much of that. Second thing that's happening is we're seeing a growing gap between the best and the rest.

就像您提到的那些科技巨头，无论是人工智能领域还是其他数据密集型公司，顶尖企业正在以越来越快的速度变得越来越大。它们或许能跟上指数级技术的发展，但在这个过程中正与其他企业拉开差距。所以我们查看生产率数据时，看的是整体经济状况，而不仅仅是苹果、亚马逊或谷歌这些公司。

So you were talking about the behemoths, the fangs, and whether it's artificial intelligence or some of these other data intensive companies, there seem to be the best are getting bigger and bigger, faster and faster. They perhaps are keeping up with exponential technology, but in the process, they're pulling away from the rest. So when we look at productivity data, we're looking across the whole economy. We're not simply looking at Apple or Amazon or Google.

我们关注的是

We're looking

所有企业，包括各地零售商和IT机构。由于这种日益扩大的差距，整体平均水平正在落后。我认为这些就是驱动我所观察到矛盾现象的核心因素。

at everybody, all the retailers, all the IT organizations everywhere. And on average, because of that growing gap, things are not keeping pace. So I think these are the things that are driving this paradox that I'm seeing.

听您讲述这些时，我确实看到了这些趋势，尤其在风险投资领域。随着越来越多企业风投的出现，这某种程度上是在实践开放式创新——他们投资于自身业务之外的小型创意和公司，从中获取灵感并最终吞并这些企业。

As you're talking about all this, I I do see these trends, especially in the venture capital world. Right? Yeah. With more and more corporate VCs. And I imagine this is in one way practicing open innovation where they're investing in much smaller ideas and companies outside of their business to see where they can gain inspiration and then ultimately swallow these businesses.

我不认为这个词用对了，但我想问，你觉得Fangs（科技巨头）还在进行开放式创新吗？他们还在践行良好的开放式创新吗？或许更广泛地说，是否存在'良好的开放式创新'与'过度创新'的区别？

I don't think that's the right word for it, but I guess, do you feel like the Fangs are still innovating openly? Are they still practicing good open innovation? And I guess maybe with everything, is there such a thing as good open innovation and overdoing it?

对，我们先讨论这点再回到Fangs。就像我之前提到的2008、2009年金融危机时期，糟糕的开放式创新就是简单外包——砍掉所有内部活动，只在需要时外购所需。这不是道德层面的问题，而是说如果你总是通过收购来获取技术，让被收购团队暴富后离开，你就无法培育自身组织的创新能力。你能获得现有资产和技术，但真正需要的是他们未来将创造的新事物。如果没有培育创新的文化，并购就徒有其表。

Yeah, let's start there and then come back to the Fangs. As I mentioned with the financial crisis, the one we had before in 2008, 2009, bad open innovation would be simply outsourcing, cutting all of your internal activity, and just going out and buying what you need when you need it. Now it's not bad in a moral sense, but it's in a sense that you're not investing and nurturing the innovation capabilities of your own organization and your internal technical staff, if you're always going out and making acquisitions and really cashing out those people, making them very wealthy, they usually don't stay. So you get the assets and you get the technology they've already developed, but what you want is the next thing they're gonna do, the new ideas. And if you don't have a culture that nurtures and sustains that, you can get the form but not the substance of the innovation when you do the M and A.

因此我认为企业重视这点很正确，开放性是培育这种文化的途径——它提醒你并非所有聪明人都为你工作，需要对世界保持谦卑与好奇：外界正在发生什么？我遗漏了哪些该关注的事物？我们应该关注哪些新动向？该进行哪些实验？

So I think this is something that companies really rightly pay attention to, and openness is a way of nurturing such a culture because it says not all the smart people work for you, so there's a certain humility toward the world and a certain curiosity toward the world. What is going on out there? What am I not seeing that I should be seeing? And what new things should we be paying attention to? What experiments should we be running?

我们该观察别人正在进行的哪些实验？

What experiments should we be observing that others are running?

没错。

Right.

现在说到企业风投，你说得对——它正占据风投领域的更大份额，不仅在美国。据说中国比例更高。企业风投可以成为创新的有效工具，但正如我之前所说，必须保持内部创新文化。因为当你收购这些项目后，需要留住人才并推动他们突破原有成就，否则仍是徒有其表。

So now when we come to corporate venture capital, you're absolutely right that it's becoming a larger portion of all of venture capital and not just in The US. I'm told that in China it's even a higher percentage. So corporate venture capital can be a very effective tool to innovate. With all the things I was saying before, you've got to still have a culture inside your own organization because once you find and acquire these things to bring them in, you've got to keep the people and you've got to get them to do the new things that extend beyond what they've done before. And without that you get the form but not the substance.

这很有道理。确实不能只靠购买解决问题。最贴切的比喻是...你提到'89年真有意思，我最近刚读到关于苹果新芯片的文章。

That makes a lot of sense. Yeah, you can't just buy your way through life. The most apt phrase for So it's so funny you bring up 'eight'nine. I just recently read an article on Apple's new chip.

哦对了，苹果把这款芯片命名为M1。而且

Oh yeah and Apple calls the chip the M1. And

所有评测都出来了，他们都说，这款芯片首次在性能上超越了英特尔，同时能耗仅为后者的一小部分。

all the reviews are coming out and they're saying, know, this chip is for the first time is surpassing Intel's processing capabilities at a fraction of the energy consumption.

没错。

Right.

所有这些创新都源于英特尔在2008年拒绝为iPhone投入任何研发资金。他们说这是当时CEO犯下的最大错误，因为苹果被迫自主研发芯片，对吧？由于小电池的限制必须采用ARM技术——虽然ARM能效极高但当时性能不足。而经过短短十余年发展，现在这款芯片不仅性能更强还如此惊艳，不过话说回来，英特尔在创新道路上迷失方向也不足为奇。

And all this innovation happened because Intel back in 2008, refuse to put any money towards r and d for the iPhone. And they're saying this was the biggest mistake that the CEO had made at the time because an Apple was forced to have to build their own chip, right? Using ARM technology because with that little battery, you had to use ARM because ARM was so much more efficient, but it wasn't that powerful yet. And now over the span of little over a decade, you have this chip that is more powerful and it's amazing, but same time, it's not surprising how Intel somehow lost its way with innovation.

我们可以补充几个因素。其一是台积电（TSMC）的崛起，这家与英特尔竞争二十年的半导体制造公司。过去十年英特尔虽在制程技术和资金上遥遥领先，但台积电始终为其他公司代工芯片设计——采用更开放的创新模式，而英特尔只在自己的晶圆厂生产自家设计。台积电则承接各类设计订单，事实上他们不自主研发芯片，专精于代工生产。

We could add a couple of elements to it. One is the rise of TSMC, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, which has been a manufacturing rival to Intel for twenty years now. But in the last ten years, Intel had a big lead in process technology and had a lot more capital. But over the last ten years, TSMC who's been providing semiconductor manufacturing to other companies for their designs, so again a more open innovation process, Intel would only build Intel designs in their foundries. TSMC would build any design in their foundries and in fact did not make their own designs, but only manufactured other people's designs.

过去十年间，由于移动设备转向追求更长续航、更低发热和功耗，英特尔芯片虽在持续供电的AC系统环境中表现出色，但增长点恰恰来自其他领域。当时由加州校友保罗·欧德宁（已故）执掌的英特尔，虽然与苹果在Mac产品上有合作，却在iPhone机遇前错失良机，为今日局面埋下伏笔。如今我们看到高通等公司基于ARM架构设计芯片，

In the last ten years, because of this shift to mobile, the emphasis on longer battery life and lower heat, less power consumption, Intel's chips were optimized for performance, but usually for a system that's running off of AC power that's running all the time. And Intel's chips did a great job in that environment, but so much of the growth came in these other environments. And Intel, who was led at the time by Paul Otellini, was a Cal alum, now deceased, but he was the CEO at the time who fumbled Intel's future. They already had a relationship with Apple in the Mac products, but they missed the boat on the iPhone and left the door open for this massive result. And so now we have these ARM architectures with companies like Qualcomm designing chips.

苹果则通过自研芯片团队为iPhone等特定产品精准设计，能完全掌控所需的功耗与性能表现，将芯片面积利用到极致。反观英特尔，其x86芯片仍主要面向运行Windows和Linux系统的高端服务器市场——这固然是重要市场，但增长速度已远不及移动领域。

We have Apple's own internal chip group designing chips really for very targeted applications for things like the iPhone, and now they can really engineer the power they want, the performance they need, and use the chip real estate on the chip to its maximum advantage. Whereas for Intel, they're still designing their x 86 chips primarily for the high end servers that are still running Microsoft based operating systems and Linux based operating systems and that's also a very big valuable market, but it's not growing the way this mobile market is.

在我们进行这番对话时，回顾整个行业的周期性模式，我不禁思考：开放式创新最终是否会导向封闭式创新，乃至垂直整合的创新模式？

As we're having this conversation, going back to the whole cyclical patterns of industries, it makes me wonder, does open innovation ultimately lead to closed innovation, to vertically integrated innovation?

我认为确实存在周期性的规律。作为企业，有时你会希望更开放，但另一些时候则不然。以谷歌为例，多数人认为它是一家非常开放的公司——他们将大量代码开源，Hadoop就是处理海量数据集的绝佳范例，安卓系统同样基于开源代码构建。

So I think there are cycles and there are times when I think if you're a company you want to be more open. But there are other times where maybe you don't. And, if I look at a company like Google, most people think of Google as a very open company and they've done a lot of things to put a lot of code into the open domain. Hadoop would be a very good example of a program for very large dataset processing. Android was built off of open source code as well.

确实如此。

That's right.

他们在开源领域贡献良多，总体被视为开源社区的优秀成员。但观察谷歌当前销售的应用程序，这些最初都是开源项目，当发展到特定阶段后，谷歌就分叉这些项目，放弃开源版本而专攻私有分支。这并非要背弃开源社区，而是为了追赶苹果提供的用户体验。安卓开发者面临的问题是：软件版本和设备类型过于碎片化，你永远无法预知用户实际运行的代码环境。

So they've done a lot in the open source world and they're viewed as a good citizen in the open source community for the most part. But if you look at some of the Google apps that they sell now, well those apps all started as open source projects and then when they got to a certain level of development, Google forked those projects, abandoned the open versions, and focused only on their own forked proprietary versions. Now why did they do this? I don't think they were trying to shaft the open source community, I think they were trying to keep up with the user experience that Apple provides. And there are times when if you're doing development for Android, there are so many versions of the software running on so many different kinds of devices that as a developer you don't know what your user is going to be seeing when they're running your code.

在这种环境下很难打造极致流畅的体验，最终只能为最低配置做适配。相比之下，苹果可以强制用户升级系统，几年旧的设备会明显卡顿，从而刺激用户换新——这既为苹果创收，也换来了高度集成的用户体验。我认为这正是促使谷歌分叉某些项目的驱动力之一。

So it's hard to develop a really good tight user experience in such an environment. You end up having to design for the lowest common denominator. Apple by contrast can actually force its users to upgrade, and when you upgrade you'll find the hardware that is like two, three, four years old doesn't work very well anymore. So you get motivated to buy the new stuff, which of course makes more money for Apple, and in return they give you a much more tightly integrated user experience. And this I think has been one of the things driving Google to fork some of these projects and enclose them so that they too can be a better user experience for their customers.

始终保持开放并非必胜策略。虽然安卓设备销量远超iOS，但中国正在孕育既非安卓也非iOS的第三极。三星在韩国推出的Tizen系统表现平平，但中国13亿用户的市场规模与韩国6000万用户（仅为中国的5%）不可同日而语，这种临界质量足以支撑第三大生态系统的崛起。

So it isn't the case that being more open all the time always wins, but on the other hand Android is selling a lot more units than iOS for Apple. And then we're gonna see something in China that will be neither Android nor iOS. And Samsung has tried in South Korea to create its own operating system called Tizen, and Tizen hasn't done so well so far, but the difference between Samsung and a Chinese version is China has you know 1,300,000,000 users in its market, and South Korea I think is on the order of 60,000,000, so maybe 5% of what's available in China. So that critical mass I think will support a third version of something and it probably won't run either Android or iOS.

在你的研究中，是否发现那些深陷'集成化用户体验至上'思维的企业存在这样的困境：他们自以为掌握最优解，但现有模式终将迎来失效的转折点？

So in your research, I'm wondering if you've come across this where for companies that are now stuck in this tightly integrated ultimate user experience mode where they think they know what's best. But at a certain point, what's working is not gonna work anymore.

因此我认为，像苹果这样的公司有个好消息是：当你开始忽视客户时，可能会陷入大麻烦。FANG这类大公司之所以能做大，通常是因为它们很好地满足了一个或多个客户需求，然后实现了规模化。在规模化过程中，它们效率提高了，但也变得不够灵活、适应力下降。当客户需求开始演变时，这些已规模化但更僵化的流程可能无法随客户需求灵活调整。我认为这正是导致某些公司衰败的根源——比如通用电气，它曾是我们眼中优秀管理实践的典范多年，如今却被迫分拆出售。部分问题在于它们变得过于庞大和成功，却迷失了最初服务客户需求的本质。

So I think the good news for someone like Apple is that when you start to lose track of the customer, you can get yourself in a lot of trouble and these the FANG's large companies in general, what makes them large is they usually have done a very good job of serving one or more customer needs very well and then they scale up. And in the process of scaling, they become more efficient. They also become less flexible, less adaptable, and when customer needs begin to evolve and change, these now scaled up but more brittle processes that you've put in place may not flex in the right way with your customers. And I think this is one of the root causes for when companies like GE that were exemplars to us of good management practice for many years and now they're being sold off per piece parts. I think part of the problem is they got very big, very successful, but lost the thread on what customers really processes that they scaled up to serve a customer's set of demands.

当这些需求变化时，这些流程却无法随之调整。

When those demands change, these processes couldn't shift with them.

这真是场有趣的对话。

This is a really fun conversation.

太好了，我也很享受。

Great. I'm enjoying it too.

感觉学到了很多。在这次访谈前的最后一个问题，我们简单讨论过开放创新的风险和局限性。在这次对话中，你也提到了开放创新的一些风险和局限性能否再分享一下，在哪些情况下开放创新可能不是最佳选择？

Feel like I'm learning so much. The last question I had prior to this interview, had talked a little bit about some of the risks and limitations. And even in this conversation, had, you know, you had mentioned some of the risks and limitations of open innovation. Can you share a little bit more about just where open innovation may not be most beneficial?

好的，我会从两三个角度来谈。首先是对小企业而言，开放创新意味着什么？这里既有好消息也有坏消息。好消息是作为小企业，你们通常更灵活、适应力更强。如果能关注组织外部动态，你们可能发现其他公司看不到的机会，或能比大公司更快采取行动。因此开放创新可以成为提升敏捷性的机制，让你们快速行动，且不必所有事都亲力亲为。

Yeah, I'm gonna come at this from two or three different angles. One angle is what does open innovation mean for smaller companies? And here I think there's good news and bad news. The good news is as a smaller company hopefully you're more flexible, you're more adaptable, and if you are paying attention to what's going on outside of your organization, you may be able to see things that other companies don't see and or you may be able to act on that before these other larger companies are able to act on it. So open innovation can be a mechanism to allow you to be more agile, to move more quickly, and you don't have to do it all yourself.

相反，你们可以寻求与初创企业、高校等合作。只要行动够快，就能在市场上获得优势。但作为小企业，你们的容错空间较小，还存在管理这些合作关系的风险——可能人手不足或缺乏合适人才来管理，因为这些合作者并非你的员工。他们与你协作但不隶属于你。这需要特定的双赢思维模式。如果发现合作伙伴表现不佳，或言行不一导致信任破裂，你就会陷入困境。

Rather you seek out collaborations with startups, with universities, and other sources and as long as you're able to move relatively fast, you could really get an edge in the marketplace. But as a smaller company, you don't have as much room for error and you also run the risk that in managing these collaborations you don't have enough people or you don't have the right people to manage these collaborations because these people are not your employees. They work with you but they don't work for you. Right. And so you need a certain mindset, very much a win win approach to it, and if you sense that your partner is not performing or worse is maybe saying one thing to you but doing another, and you don't trust them, then you're really in a difficult spot.

在这方面，开放式创新可能会严重出错。通过开放合作，你可能让自己陷入非常困难的境地。这是事情可能出问题的一种方式。另一种出问题的方式是——现在我又回到大公司的话题——开放式创新不仅涉及跨组织边界的知识流入流出，还需要组织内部更多的知识共享。因为如果你在某个新领域与初创公司合作，这家初创公司通常需要从你这里获取许多资源来开展活动，而这些资源来自你组织的不同部门。如果你在职能部门周围建立了内部壁垒，导致市场人员不与销售人员交流，工程人员不与制造人员沟通，那么当外部初创公司试图推进工作并需要从公司所有这些部门获取资源时，这些壁垒就会真正显现并成为摩擦点。但在这些大公司里，部门之间很少沟通，事情进展也非常缓慢。

In this respect open innovation can go badly wrong And by opening up and collaborating, you may have set yourself up for a very difficult experience. So that's one way things can go sideways. Another way it can go sideways, and now I'm back to a bigger company, is open innovation isn't only about these inflows and outflows of knowledge across organizational boundaries, it also requires more sharing of knowledge within an organization. Because if you're collaborating with a startup company in some new area, that startup often needs a number of things from you for their activities and that draws from different parts of your organization. And if you have internal silos that you've created around functional groups so that the marketing people don't talk to the sales people, and the engineering people don't talk to the manufacturing people, These silos can really surface and become friction points when the external startup is trying to do things and get things done and they need things from all of these parts of the company, but in these large companies they don't talk to each other very much and things don't move very fast.

讽刺的是，你的组织内部可能过于封闭，这会阻碍你快速响应合作伙伴的需求。这是事情可能严重出问题的第二种方式。第三种出问题的方式是，你的商业模式与我的商业模式无法真正契合。我们签署了谅解备忘录，同意共同开展这个项目，但如果要让你的商业模式顺利运转，就需要牺牲我的商业模式，反之亦然。如果存在这种错位，最终很可能会以失败告终。

So ironically, you can be too closed inside your organization and that can get in the way of responding rapidly to the needs of your collaborating partners. So that's the second way that things can go badly wrong. A third way things can go wrong is that your business model and my business model don't really align with each other. We have a memorandum of understanding and we've agreed we're going to do this project together, but if what in order for your business model to work well for you, that comes at the expense of my business model or vice versa. If that mis alignment is there, that's also likely to end in tears.

举个我自己在磁盘驱动器行业的例子——天啊，这个例子本身已经有35年历史了，但我认为它完全适用于今天。当时我们为自己研发的新型驱动器寻找日本制造合作伙伴，对此我们非常兴奋，因为它们在技术上确实领先一步。我们知道内部无法实现所需规模的生产，因此需要强大的制造伙伴。我们前往日本与多家公司洽谈，但特别关注了松下（当时还叫Matsushita）和京瓷。这两家公司都拥有非常强大的制造技术。

An example from my own disk drive days, geez, the example itself is 35 years old, but I think it's completely relevant to today. We were looking for a manufacturing partner in Japan for a new class of drives we had come up with we were very excited about, and they were really a step ahead. And we knew that we couldn't do the manufacturing at the scale we needed internally, so we needed a strong manufacturing partner. And we went to Japan and had conversations with a number of companies, but in particular focused in on Matsushita and Kyocera. Matsushita today is called Panasonic and both Kyocera and Matschusta had really strong manufacturing skills.

但当我们研究它们的商业模式时，发现松下多年来一直以私有品牌或OEM方式为其他公司生产录像机，这些合作关系持续了很久。而京瓷的主要业务都是使用自有品牌开展的，它没有长期维持过内部OEM业务。这时我们意识到，要让京瓷成功，它需要以自有品牌销售磁盘驱动技术。我明白了。而这将损害我们的利益。

But when we looked at their business models, Matschusta had been making video cassette recorders for other companies on a private label basis or an OEM basis for many years and these relationships had endured for a long time. When we looked at Kyocera, their major businesses were all done under the Kyocera brand. They didn't really have an internal OEM business that had lasted for any period of time, and that's when we realized for Kyocera to win, they needed to be selling disk drive technologies under Kyocera's brand. I see. And that was going to come at our expense.

所以我们最终选择了松下，由此开启了长达十五年的合作，这段合作关系对双方都非常成功。

So we ended up picking Matshusta instead and that became a fifteen year collaboration that worked quite well for both sides.

这让我突然想起了一些往事。不知为何，这让我想起了Iomega的Zip驱动器。

This is just giving me flashbacks. For some reason, it remind me of of Zip drives, back the I omega Zip drives.

Iomega。

I omega.

好的。那件事后来怎么样了？不过你之前提到的另一个领域与失败成本有关。你能稍微谈谈这一点，以及失败成本如何限制开放式创新吗？

Sure. And whatever happened to that. But another area that you had mentioned before, it pertained to the costs of failure. Can you talk a little bit about that and how costs of failure has its limitations on open innovation?

在我们生活的许多IT领域，如果出现故障，我们只需重启。这虽然烦人，需要几分钟时间，但之后就能恢复正常运行，实际上几乎没什么损失。所以失败的成本只是一些不便，并不算太高。

In many of the IT parts of our lives, if something glitches, we have to reboot. And it's annoying, it takes a few minutes, but then you're back up and running and you really haven't lost much at all. So the cost of failure is some annoyance and not a lot more.

对。

Right.

低失败成本让你可以尝试和实验很多东西。相比之下，我们一开始讨论的是疫苗。劣质疫苗的失败代价是人们的生命。没错。因此那里的失败成本非常高。

A low cost of failure allows you to try a lot of things and experiment with a lot of things. By contrast, we began our conversation talking about vaccines. The cost of failure with a bad vaccine are people's lives. Right. And so the cost of failure there is very high.

这就是为什么我们需要FDA来审查所有临床数据，研究人们生病的具体案例，特别是重症情况，试图理解发生了什么及其原因。是否有措施能减少或避免未来发生类似情况，因为失败成本太高？所以在推向全球之前，我们会经过非常谨慎的流程，这会减慢创新速度。但考虑到成本要高得多，从社会角度看这是正确的权衡。

And so this is why we have the FDA to look at all the clinical data, look at the specific cases where people got sick, especially if they got really sick, and try to understand what happened and why it happened. Are there any things that could be done to reduce or eliminate that from happening in the future because the cost of failure is high? So before we shoot it out to the world, we're going to go through a pretty careful process and that slows down the rate of innovation. But given the cost is much higher, think socially it's the right trade off.

对。

Right.

我记得有个机场，应该是英国的希思罗，已经运营着自动驾驶的接驳车，但这是在无普通交通的封闭区域内。车速较慢，由于是受控的封闭环境且速度不快，失败成本适中。所以我的预测是，自动驾驶车辆会先出现在这类能管控失败成本和风险的场景中，这将是最早普及的领域。之后技术会不断完善，代码会优化，逐渐更广泛地推广。

I think there's an airport, I think it's Heathrow in The UK, that has a shuttle that is autonomously operated already, but it's in a confined area without general traffic. The rate of speed is fairly slow and because it's a contained controlled environment and the speed is not so fast, the cost of failure is moderate. Right. So I think my prediction is we're going to see autonomous vehicles in those situations first, where you can manage and contain the cost and risk of failure and that will I think penetrate early. And then from there we'll get better and the code will get better and it will gradually become more widespread.

随着自动驾驶技术日益普及，其应用场景将更加多样化，既会带来惊喜，也会出现一些失败案例。另一个我认为尚未解决的问题是：如果自动驾驶车辆发生事故致人死亡，我该起诉谁？如果起诉司机，现有机制可以处理——我们有汽车保险，整个理赔流程都很成熟，但赔偿金额有限，因为保险公司只承担部分责任。

As it becomes more widespread, the use cases are going to be more diverse, there will be more surprises, and there will be some failures. And the other thing that I think hasn't really been sorted out yet is if an autonomous vehicle crashes and kills somebody, who do I sue? If I sue the driver, we have that today. We have auto insurance and there's there's a whole process for that, and you don't get a lot of money because the insurance company covers it but they only cover it to a certain point. Right.

但如果事故是由谷歌Waymo技术导致的，而某位精明的律师能证明是代码本身的漏洞引发了事故，更糟的是，若能证明谷歌某些管理者明知漏洞存在却判断其无关紧要而允许技术投入使用——那我就能起诉谷歌母公司，追讨其全部资产。我认为这将成为影响自动驾驶发展的另一因素。在失败成本较低的案例中影响不大，但当技术广泛应用时，这个问题必须得到解决。

But if it's Google's Wayra technology and some enterprising attorney can show that there was a bug in the code itself that caused this, and worse, if the attorney can show that some managers in Google knew that there was this bug but made the judgment that it wasn't a big deal so they let it go forward. Now I can sue mother Google. I can come after all of that balance sheet. And so I think that's something else that's going to impact autonomous vehicles. Not so much in the cases where the cost of failure is low, but when they do get into more widespread use, I think this will also be something that has to be kind of sorted out.

很有道理。Chesbrough博士，与您交谈非常愉快。我们一定会在本期节目描述中附上您最新著作的链接。再次感谢您今天抽空参与我们的播客节目。

It makes sense. Well, Doctor. Chesbrough, it's been a real pleasure. We will definitely include a link to your latest book in the description of this episode. I just want to thank you again for taking the time to come on the podcast with us today.

Sean，和你交谈很愉快。最后让我以'加油小熊'作为结束语吧。

Sean, it's a pleasure to talk with you, and let me just conclude by saying go bears.

感谢收听本期Haas播客。如果您喜欢今天的节目，请在您常用的播客平台上点击订阅或关注按钮。若能给予五星好评，我们将不胜感激。您也可以访问我们的网站haaspodcast.org（注意podcast末尾有s字母）查看更多内容，订阅我们的月度通讯，并探索伯克利Haas其他播客节目。

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下次节目再见，加油小熊。

Until next time, go bears.