How Ridge’s Annual Revenue Hit +$250M & Sean Became a Dad

那事儿没搞成。

That did not go well.

后来好像还出了点刀具方面的问题。

There was some knife thing at some point.

有些人吧，我不太清楚，反正就是有点状况。

For some, I don't know, there was like something.

现在到底哪里不一样了？

What has shifted?

比如明星联名这事，我以前没听你这么说过，是说要跟明星合作推广，但还有别的吗？

So like the celebrity thing, that's I haven't heard you say that before, it's like launch, pair it with celebrity, but what else?

到底是什么让你们现在这么擅长这个？

Like what's making you guys so good at this now?

我们只是更清楚什么样的产品容易吸引新用户了。

We just understand what makes products good for acquisition.

问题就在于手表，根本没人买。

The here's the problem with watches, nobody buys them.

所以你去试试卖根本没人买的东西吧。

So like, go try to sell stuff nobody buys.

对吧？

Right?

可人家会说，哎，不是有劳力士、爱彼嘛，现在还有不少联名款呢。

And people are like, oh, you know, there's Rolex and there's AP and like people are starting to swatch collab.

我说，兄弟，那完全是两码事。

I'm like, dude, it is, that's a different thing.

你懂我的意思吧？

You know what I mean?

你现在就像在卖马，还说市场大得很。

That's like you're trying to sell horses right now, and you're like, well, there's a huge market.

人家买的是纯种赛马。

People are buying thoroughbred horses for racing.

可你手里拿的，是匹小马驹。

And it's like, yeah, but you got pony.

根本没人想要这东西。

It's like nobody wants this thing.

这其实就是手表市场的现实。

And like, that's like the reality of watches.

确实有市场，但完全是高端小众，数量极其有限。

It's like there is a market, it's incredibly high end, it's incredibly limited.

总市场规模看着很大，因为交易价格超高，但说白了，根本卖不动。

It's a very, very big TAM because the dollar values are so high in what they trade for, but it's like there's no market for it.

刀具也是同样的情况。

The same thing with knives.

普通人一辈子可能就买0.01把刀，真的。

The average guy buys probably point zero one knives, right?

虽然有一群狂热收藏者，特别喜欢刀具，也讲究品质，但这市场根本谈不上增长。

There's a huge collector community of people who buy knives and love it, and they're rugged or whatever, but it's just like it's not a growing market.

这生意太难做了。

It's hard to serve.

我们做过T恤。

We did we did t shirts.

T恤也不怎么样。

T shirts suck too.

为什么T恤就不行呢？

Why did t shirts suck?

因为True Classic做的T恤，八美元一件，质量特别好。

It's because True Classic makes amazing t shirts for $8.

对吧？

Right?

Cuts和Buck Mason做的T恤，三十五美元一件，也很棒。

Cuts, Buck Mason, they make great t shirts for $35.

James Purse做的T恤，八十五美元一件，同样出色。

James Purse makes great t shirts for $85.

话虽如此，这些T恤本质上都差不多。

With that being said, all those shirts are basically the same.

它们之间的差别其实微乎其微。

It's like the smallest differences between them.

对吧？

Right?

到底是什么让这些T恤有别于其他？

What is what makes those those shirts what they are.

普通消费者根本不在乎这些。

And the average consumer just simply doesn't care.

他们就是看到哪件就买哪件。

They just buy whatever shirt they got introduced to.

这简直就是一场血战。

And it's knife fight market.

想脱颖而出太难了。

Like it's so hard to stand out.

根本没什么真正能打动人的卖点。

There's no value props you can really have.

所以我们卖T恤根本没赚到钱。

So we made no money selling t shirts.

总之，我们试过很多东西了。

So anyway, we've tried a bunch of stuff.

我还提过不少其他点子。

There's bunch of some more stuff I've pitched.

说说我如何在推动商业进步方面当了先锋。

Talk about like me being the driver of pioneering in the business of progress.

我经常提各种想法。

I pitch a lot.

团队会挑他们觉得靠谱的，然后全力推进。

The team picks up what they're comfortable with and then they run as far as they can with it.

他们会反对吗？

Do they push back then?

他们会直接跟你说，‘西恩，这主意太烂了’吗？

Do they actually tell you like that's a terrible idea, Sean?

对，我和康纳因为我想卖肥皂吵了一大架。

Yeah, me and Connor got into a huge fight about, I wanted to sell soap.

我说，你看，大家都会买肥皂。

I'm like, look, people buy soap.

他说，哥们，我们卖的是钱包。

He's like, dude, we sell wallets.

大家怎么会在这儿买肥皂呢？

Why are people going to buy soap here?

我是说，大家会买肥皂，也会买钱包，谁知道呢？

I'm like, people buy soap, people buy wallets, who knows?

也许我们总能摸索出门道。

Maybe we'll figure it out.

不过这个方案我不打算亲自写。

But I'm not drafting that.

我觉得到某个阶段，我可能也会去卖肥皂，就这样吧。

I think at some point I'll be selling soap too, so.

我想深入聊聊这个，Sean，因为我觉得这是你提到过的最有趣的话题之一，也就是Shark Ninja可能对你产生的影响，以及它如何改变了你看待品牌的方式，尤其是在产品发布方面。

Well, I want to dig on this, Sean, because think it's one of the most interesting things that I've seen you talk about, is the influence that maybe Shark Ninja has had on you and the way that you think about brand when it comes to product launches.

这正好能引出我要说的第二个重要观点。

This is gonna pair with a really good second point I'm gonna make.

我最近跟很多银行家聊过，明白吗？

I've been talking to a ton of bankers, okay?

因为我想在孩子出生前就把公司卖掉。

Because I wanted to sell my business before I had my kid.

我刚有了孩子。

I just had my kid.

我就想，也许我该去跟银行家聊聊。

I'm like, maybe I should talk to bankers.

现在市场情况怎么样？

What's the market looking like right now?

结果市场很糟糕。

And the market is bad.

你知道的，这完全是两种截然不同的情况。

You know, it's very much a tale of two cities.

有一类企业就像山顶上那盏最亮的灯，虽然规模很小，但非常耀眼，明白吗？

One city is shining bright on top of a hill, but very tiny, okay?

这些品牌主要做订阅制，集中在保健品、大健康领域，而且客户终身价值很高。

These are brands that are subscription, that are in supplements, that are in health and wellness, that have LTV.

它们的估值大概在12倍到15倍左右。

They're trading at, you know, 12x, 15x.

刚才聊天里，朋友比尔说他竞标没成功。

Today in chat, our friend Bill said that he got outbid.

他出价15，结果有人出了19，对吧？

He bid 15, somebody bid 19, okay?

所以确实存在这种情况。

So there is that world.

对于一家EBITDA达到400万的公司来说，这规模也不算特别大。

For a 4,000,000 EBITDA company, not even like a huge company.

EBITDA只有四百万，估值却这么高，真够离谱的。

That's a crazy multiple for only four in EBITDA, yeah.

我要是能拿到19倍EBITDA的估值，简直做梦都要笑醒。

I would kill for 19 x EBITDA.

明白吗？

Okay?

这种好事根本轮不到我。

It's not happening for me.

所以啊。

So, yeah.

我的EBITDA可远不止四百万。

And I have a lot more than $4,000,000 in EBITDA.

那个世界确实存在，但我跟你们说，这种品牌只占极少数。

So that world does exist, but I'm telling you guys, it a very small percentage of brands.

我认识一家大型银行，他们既有私募股权部门，也有投行业务，对方告诉我，自2022年以来，超过七成的交易根本没人出价。

I talked to a very, very large banking institution who has a private equity arm, who has a investment banking arm, and they said, Over 70% of deals since 2022 have not got a bidder.

所以他们搞了个SIM，跑市场、签了投行、开了所有会议、参加了所有非正式交流，结果一个出价都没有。

So that means they put together a SIM, they went to market, they signed a banker, they did the meetings, they did all the fireside chats, and they got zero bids.

明白吗？

Okay?

现在市场上烂公司太多了。

There's just a lot of junk out there.

把这两点连起来看，市面上一堆经营不善的企业，都觉得自己品牌有多特别，非得搞什么客户社群、用户画像、忠诚度，还死活不推第二款产品。

To tie those two points together, there's a bunch of bad businesses out there, and they all believed that brand was special, that you have to build a tribe of customers, you have to have this avatar, you have to build loyalty with them, never sell a second product.

Allbirds、Casper，还有这些公司，全都被这种思路带偏了。

That is like Allbirds, is Casper, that is all of these companies are influenced by that.

现在这些公司根本卖不动。

Those companies aren't selling right now.

你知道现在什么公司能卖到25倍EBITDA吗？

You know what's trading at 25X EBITDA?

Shark Ninja。

Shark Ninja.

Shark Ninja今年增长了40%？

Shark what's growing 40% this year?

Shark Ninja。

Shark Ninja.

Shark Ninja的策略是什么？

What's Shark Ninja's approach?

有人买，我就做。

People buy stuff, I'm gonna make stuff.

我知道这听起来太简单了，但Shark Ninja卖水杯、冷藏箱、手机壳，甚至体检服务。

And I know that's very simplistic, but Shark Ninja has drinkware and coolers and whatever, phone cases, and blood work.

他们愿意尝试几乎所有他们觉得能卖得出去的东西。

They're willing to try almost anything that they think they can sell.

是的，他们特别 opportunistic，只要有人买，他们就敢卖。

Yeah, they are opportunistic in a way that if people will buy it, they will try to sell it.

要是卖不掉，又有什么关系呢？

And if it fails, who the cares?

他们还会尝试别的东西。

They're gonna try something else.

我们生活在一个不对称的世界里。

We live in an asymmetric world.

想象一下回到2012年，我推出了钱包，结果失败了。

Imagine going back to 2012 or whatever, and I launched the wallet and it didn't work.

或者我推了别的产品，也没成功。

Or I launched some other product and it didn't work.

然后我就觉得，我的人生完蛋了。

And I'm like, well my life's over.

不会的，你会继续推出新产品，最后才找到钱包，而它十年累计销售额高达一百亿。

No, you would keep launching stuff, and then you find the wallet, and on the wall it's done 1,000,000,000 in lifetime sales.

所以说，这就是一个不对称的世界。

So it's like, that's an asymmetric world.

就靠这一款产品的轮廓，十年就赚了上亿甚至十几亿的EBITDA，谁都能做到，对吧？

Tens of millions, hundreds of millions of dollars in EBITDA from this one product silhouette over ten years, Anybody can do that, right?

因为这是一个非对称的世界。

Because it's an asymmetric world.

所以想成为像Shark Ninja那样的公司，就得尝试各种各样的东西。

So wanna be Shark Ninja, try a bunch of stuff.

那些从小就被灌输品牌至上理念的人，现在手里攥着根本没人买的品牌。

The people who are born and bred, brand is everything, have brands that nobody will buy right now.

所以还不如干脆做Shark Ninja，做一个什么产品都敢做的‘大杂烩’，不管用什么手段，就是对产品进行各种混搭和改造。

So you're better off just being Shark Ninja and being the whorehouse of products, whatever it takes, just bastardization of products.

我是说，Shark Ninja 其实算是两个品牌。

I mean, Shark Ninja is even like two brands.

他们就是把这两个牌子合并在一起了。

They just stuck them together.

你想想看。

Well, think about it.

一个是吸尘器，一个是搅拌机，这俩在哪个世界里能有什么天然的协同效应呢？

It was vacuum cleaners and blenders, which is like, in what world is there natural synergy there?

就像我们之前聊过 BIC 那样，比如他们要是出钢笔和剃须刀呢？

It's like we've talked about BIC before, it's like, what if we did pens and razors?

那听起来是个好主意。

That would be a great idea.

但事实是，消费者根本不在乎这些。

But I think it's true that the customer doesn't care.

消费者只关心：这东西好不好用？

The customer's just like, is it a great product?

价格合我心意吗？

Is it a price I like?

搞定。

Done.

我不是说品牌不重要，因为我觉得品牌确实很重要，但我认为更重要的是，你有没有什么能让人心动的东西？

It's not to say that brand doesn't matter, because I think that brand really does matter, but I think what matters more is do you have something that people find compelling?

我能深入探讨一下这个问题吗，Sean？

Can I drill into that, Sean?

你是说25倍吗？指的是他们股价的25倍，对吧？毕竟他们是上市公司。

What do you what 25 times like, it's a 25 p, right, is what you're referencing because they're public.

那除此之外还有什么？

So what else is there?

没错，他们什么都能卖，五花八门。

I mean, yes, they sell everything and anything.

但投资者是怎么看待他们的收入质量的呢？你是怎么想的？

But like, how how do investors or how do you think they're looking at like quality of revenue?

他们现在还在卖蒸汽拖把、电饭煲、华夫饼机这些玩意儿。

Because they're still selling like steam mops and rice cookers and waffle makers.

我看到的还有火盆、刀具套装、烤盘、空气炸锅、榨汁机。

And I'm reading fire pits, knife sets, bakeware, air fryers, juicers.

这些产品线太杂了，但单独来看，哪一样都值不了25倍的估值。

Like, they're all over the dim, but, like, none of these on their own would fetch any multiple near 25 times.

这些在纸面上看，都只是一个个普通品类。

Like, these are all categories on paper.

这完全是低质量的收入。

This is, like, low quality revenue.

全部都是。

All of them.

不管Shark Ninja在哪儿卖，都没区别。

Doesn't matter where Shark Ninja sells them.

那又怎样？

So what?

那为什么合在一起就值这么多钱？

Why together are they worth so much?

因为你看。

Because look.

这可不是股票推荐节目。

This is not a stock show.

也不是股票建议。

This is not stock advice.

不过我们的好朋友罗曼跟我提过关于AppLovin的事。

But our good friend Roman told me this about AppLovin.

他说，你对AppLovin怎么看根本不重要。

He's like, it doesn't matter what you think about App Lovin.

别去交易AppLovin的股票。

And like, don't trade App Lovin stock.

他说，关键在于市场对你们盈利预期的反应。

He's like, it's just an expectation around what you think earnings are going to be.

他说，AppLovin是个年EBITDA达60亿美元的生意。

He's like, App Lovin is a 6,000,000,000 EBITDA business.

我觉得它完全有潜力做到100亿美元的EBITDA。

I think it can be a 10,000,000,000 EBITDA business.

只要你有个年EBITDA一百亿的生意，他们干啥我都无所谓。

I don't give a fuck what they do if you have a 10,000,000,000 EBITDA business.

差不多就是这个意思，对吧？

Something like that, right?

鲨鱼 Ninja 也是同样的情况。

And it's the same thing with Shark Ninja.

说白了，人们并不是真的爱上 Shark Ninja 这个品牌。

It's like, look, people are not falling in love with the brand of Shark Ninja.

投资者真正着迷的是，它每年增长百分之四十，利润增长得比这还快，而且每年利润高达十亿美元。

The investors, they're falling in love with is growing 40% year over year, earnings are growing faster than that, and earnings are $1,000,000,000 a year.

不管你怎么说，这都是个非常吸引人的生意。

That's just an attractive business, no matter what you say.

再看看 Lululemon，它有那么强的品牌故事，可现在股价却跌到了十年最低点。

Compare that with Lululemon, which has this brand story, and it is at ten year lows right now.

股价简直被砸得稀巴烂，对吧？

Like, the stock just got destroyed, right?

耐克也是，股价同样惨不忍睹。

Nike, the same thing, stock got destroyed.

要说品牌力，Lululemon 和耐克可都是最强的。

There's no stronger brands than Lululemon and Nike.

它们是最顶尖的。

They're the best of the best.

它们迟早会反弹，但强大的品牌其实就是好盈利、高增长、优异EBITDA的代名词。

They're gonna rebound, but strong brand is just shorthand for very good earnings, very good growth, very good EBITDA.

现在我们所处的世界里，品牌已经被抽象化了，我只关心什么能带来持续增长、什么能带来优异的EBITDA。

And now we're in a world where we have abstracted brand, and now I'm just talking about what gets you good growth, what gets you good EBITDA.

对我而言，推出新产品就能做到这一点。

And for me, new product expansion does that.

你尽管说我是个极客，但我最喜欢的就是，当我现有的软件合作伙伴——比如Northbeam——推出一些我原本得额外花钱买的功能时。

Call me a nerd if you want, but one of my favorite things is when one of my existing software partners, in this case Northbeam, adds something that I would have had to have normally paid more and separately for.

之前增量分析一直有问题，Northbeam决定把它修好了。

Incrementality was broken and Northbeam decided to fix it.

马特，你不止是极客，你还特别抠门。

Matt, you're not just a nerd, you're also cheap.

对啊。

Yeah.

我们团队最期待的一点，就是现在能把多触点归因和增量效果清晰地结合起来。

And one of the things my team and I are looking forward to with this is now having MTA and incrementality cleanly tied together.

能在一个系统里看到多个测试视角，真的特别舒服。

It's really nice having multiple views of a test totally integrated.

从设计到监控，我们只需要专注洞察，不用操心那些琐碎的流程。

From design to monitoring, we can just focus on the insights and not the logistics.

现在，你的增量效果测试结果会直接同步到我们每天都在用的Northbeam多触点归因仪表盘里。

So now your incrementality test results, they just feed right into your Northbeam MTA dashboards that we're just used to looking at every day.

对。

Yeah.

我觉得没人会拒绝少干点活儿，让所有团队的工作更轻松。

I I don't think any of us are gonna say no to less work and making life easier for all of our teams.

如果你对这个感兴趣，去northbeam.io申请个演示吧，别忘了跟他们说是个老用户推荐的。

If this is interesting to you, go to northbeam.io and ask for a demo, and feel free to tell them that the operator sent you.

我想说一个观点，Shark Ninja之所以这么成功，还能拿到溢价，其实是因为他们在分销环节上实现了规模效应。

I'm gonna make an argument, actually, that the reason why Shark Ninja has been so successful and also why they're getting the premium is actually because of scale economies when it comes to distribution.

你看看他们是怎么扩张的，他们直接进了塔吉特和沃尔玛这些大型零售商的专区，比如一个采购员一次性采购三排连着的商品，像家用电器这类，他们就决定把整个专区的所有产品都卖了。

If you look at the way that they've expanded, what they've done, is they've gotten in a section of Target and Walmart and these mass retailers, and so you'll be in a section that one buyer buys, you know, whatever, three rows in a row of stuff, like household appliances, and they've just been like, We're just going to sell everything in this section.

他们进入的品类越多，占据的货架空间就越大。

And the more of those categories they get into, the more shelf space they take up.

货架空间越大，他们在该品类中的重要性就越强，也就越有能力把其他品牌挤出去。

And the more shelf space they take up, the more important they become to that category success, and the more ability they have to box other people out.

他们实际上已经逐步掌控了大型零售店的整个专区。

And they've just kind of functionally started to own entire sections of mass retail.

这跟联合利华或宝洁的情况是一样的，对吧，迈克？

That's the same argument as Unilever or P and G then, right, Mike?

没错。

Yes.

我觉得他们的做法挺特别的，而联合利华通常的做法是等别人把规模做起来，然后直接收购。

I think they're an interesting approach, whereas a lot of times with Unilever, with Unilever, what they'll do is they'll just go out and buy it.

他们等着别人达到规模经济，再出手收购，但这样一来，他们对大型零售商就有了极强的议价能力，因为零售商根本离不开他们。

They'll wait till somebody gets to scale economies and then they'll buy it, but then they have tremendous negotiating power with the mass retailers because the mass retailers absolutely have to have them.

他们就靠几个核心品牌，宝洁可能是最典型的例子。

They just have some essential brands, and P and G is probably the most extreme example of that.

事实上，道格·麦克米伦我见过他一次讲话，他说别人总说沃尔玛对供应商太苛刻，但他反问：你看看过去三十年宝洁和沃尔玛的股价走势，宝洁涨得比我们还猛，对他们来说甚至比对我们更有利。所以我觉得，确实有一种模式，就是成为大集团能极大提升分销能力。

Fact, Doug McMillan, I saw him talking once and he was talking about how people will accuse Walmart of being really hard on his suppliers, and he's like, Look at the stock price of P and G versus Walmart over the last thirty years, they've gone up even more than we have, it's been even better for them than it has been for us, and so I do think there's a model out there that becoming a conglomerate can really help on the distribution side.

我觉得肖恩就是个很好的例子，因为他们已经打造了一个非常清晰的品牌核心和目标客群。我怎么理解你的品牌肖恩呢？如果我是个要给爸爸买父亲节礼物、或者买圣诞礼物、或者给男朋友买生日礼物的人，我直接就会去Ridge，因为那里是我能想到的最靠谱的选择。当然你们也卖男性的产品，但你们的主力人群非常明确。有意思的是，你们已经展示了两种不同的扩展方式：一种是零科技的，比如戒指和手链，这些东西跟人类历史一样古老；另一种是往科技方向走。我不知道你们到底发现了什么秘诀，但显然有什么东西在起作用，让你们能这么顺利地拓展产品线。

I think Sean's actually an example of that because they've really built a strong hub of a brand and a type of target customer, that they can add, I mean the way that I think about your brand Sean, is if I'm a woman that needs to buy a Father's Day gift, or needs to buy a gift for Christmas, or my guy's birthday, I'm just gonna go to Ridge, because they are going to be the best place that I can go and shop, and obviously you sell to men as well, but you just have a very clear core demographic, and what's interesting is you've shown the ability to expand out in two different ways, one of it is like zero tech, rings and chains are as old as mankind basically, and then you have this other arm that's going into tech, So I don't know, I think there's gotta be, there's something there that you found that's really working, that's allowing this product expansion.

我特别好奇，在你们一路扩张的过程中，什么时候会遇到边界，比如：‘嘿，卖口香糖好像不太合适’——当然也说不定合适，我也不确定。但至少到现在，你们的举动真的让我很惊讶，居然同时要大力进军充电宝和金属手链，这听起来压根不像是能成功的组合。

And I'll be really curious as you're going through this to find out where you start to find boundaries where you're like, Hey, it doesn't make sense to get into gum, or maybe it does, I don't know, but at least right now I've been pretty amazed, you've made some, I mean like to say we're gonna be going big in power banks and metal chains at the same time is not necessarily something I would guess would work.

如果品牌不重要了，那为什么不在Ridge里加个益生菌产品呢？

If brand matters less, then why not put gut culture in Ridge?

对，所以我们得先推出益生菌概念。

Yeah, so we need

得先让益生菌文化在市场里站稳脚跟，才能谈这个。

to actually introduce gut culture before that.

我来问个问题，让肖恩先说说这个，然后再回来讨论。肖恩，你们之前做了手链，现在又搞了这么多科技产品，但你们也做了 hydration 和纤维类的产品——我之前帮你们对接了我们用的 Trevy 团队，你们现在已经有这方面的商品了。

So let me ask a question so that Sean can talk about that and then we'll come back to it because, okay, so Sean, we've talked about, you've done chains, you're doing all of this tech based stuff, but you're also, I helped connect you to our command that we use for Trevy, and you've got a product in the kind of hydration, you know, fiber space.

能跟我们说说这个吗？

Can you tell us about that?

对。

Yeah.

在开始之前，Mike，谢谢你帮我铺垫，兄弟。

Before I do, Mike, thanks for setting me up, dude.

如果我是马克·扎克伯格，那你就是我的埃文·斯皮格尔。

You've been my Evan Spiegel, if I'm Mark Zuckerberg.

我也在做粉末类产品。

I'm doing powder like you.

我打算像你们一样做水瓶。

I'm gonna do water bottles like you.

所以哥们儿，你得小心点了。

So dude, better watch out.

我可能很快就要做锅具了，哥们儿。

I might do pans pretty soon, dude.

我接下来要收拾所有人。

I'm coming for everybody.

你就等着瞧我的戒指收藏吧。

Just wait till you see my Rings collection.

绝对超酷。

It's gonna be awesome.

迈克的钱包也要一起上。

Mike's wallet's coming too.

哎呀，我觉得迈克太聪明了，不会去搞什么钱包的。

Oh man, think Mike's too smart to launch a wallet.

所以嘛，去年增长确实不太理想。

So yeah, last year growth wasn't awesome.

我们经历了很长一段时间以来增长最慢的一年。

We had our slowest growth year in, I don't know, a long time.

其中很大一部分原因是内部问题，而且那时候我们还没有推出过什么爆款科技产品。

And a lot of it was meta issues, a lot of that was like, this was before we had a smash hit in tech products.

就在它发布之前不久。

It was right before it came out.

我当时就想，我们得把业务多元化一下。

I'm like, okay, we should diversify this business.

我生意里最薄弱的环节就是客户终身价值。

The weakest part of my business is LTV.

直到现在，它依然是我生意里最薄弱的环节。

To this day, it's the weakest part of my business.

我跟不少银行家聊过，也做了一番调研。

Talking to bankers, I did a bunch of research.

如果我们上市，客户留存率会是消费类或耐用品类上市公司里最差的。

If we went public, we would have the worst customer retention rate out of any public company in the consumable space or the durable space.

我们的12个月复购率只有1.2左右，明白吗？

Our 12 repeat rate is like 1.2, okay?

Yeti卖的那种连熊都啃得动的保温箱，复购率都有1.3呢。

Yeti, which sells coolers that bears can eat is 1.3, right?

Figs的数据大概是三。

Figs is like a three.

根本没人会回头再来买我们的钱包。

Nobody's coming back and buying wallets from us.

我老跟人说，大家总以为我们在故意把别人挡在钱包市场外面。

It's like, I always tell people this, people think we're trying to keep them out of the wallet space.

我跟你说，这真的是最糟糕的产品品类了。

I'm like, I'm telling you, man, it is the worst product category to possibly be in.

这跟客户终身价值完全没关系。

It has no LTV tied to it.

所以我们一直都知道这是个问题。

So we've always known that was an issue.

说真的，你现在卖的东西就跟棺材差不多，Sean，买一次就完事了，再也不会回头。

You're basically selling caskets at this point, Sean, where it's like, you're buying one and then you're done.

对啊，兄弟，至少棺材还能配点枕头之类的配件呢。

Yeah, dude, at least caskets might have like, you know, maybe extra pillows or something.

我根本没什么能卖给他们的东西。

Like I got nothing to sell these people.

我们其实早就知道这是个问题。

We ended up, like, we've always known this as an issue.

我想解决这个问题。

I wanted to solve it.

要提升用户终身价值，最简单的方法就是做订阅制。

And the easiest way to solve LTV, something on subscription.

怎么才能做订阅制呢？

How do you do something on subscription?

就得让人天天离不开它。

You make people eat it.

所以我们才决定进军粉剂产品。

So that's why we got to get into powders.

内部争论了很久，我就说，干脆就做Ridge营养补充剂吧。

Doing a lot of debate internally, I was like, let's just do Ridge supplements.

我们就给那些老客户做补充剂，也就是那些本来就会从我们这儿买链条或者钱包的人。

We'll make supplements for the same guy we know we're talking about, a guy who would buy a chain from us or a wallet from us.

内部讨论挺激烈的。

There's a lot of debate internally.

大家的意思就是，干脆直接推出产品吧。

It's like, Let's spit it out.

或者做成一个独立的品牌线。

Let's do a separate thing.

所以我们推出了 Gut Culture 这个品牌。

So we launched Gut Culture.

它是一种纤维粉。

It is a fiber powder.

这款产品其实酝酿挺久了，等这个内容发布的时候，它面向公众已经有八九个月了。

It's probably been cooking for, it's been out to the public eight months, nine months by the time this is out.

目前来看，生意做得还不错。

It is a decently successful business.

第一年销量可能达到一百万美元，甚至好几百万美元。

It'll a million, maybe a multi million dollar product in the first year.

它还为我们提供了一个绝佳的试验场，让我们真正搞懂了订阅模式是怎么运作的。

And it also created a playground where we could actually learn how subscriptions work.

话虽如此，我刚说了链条产品可能卖到八千万美元，相比之下，粉末产品卖几百万就显得没那么耀眼了。

With that being said, I just told you that chains might do $80,000,000, so by powder doing a couple million is less exciting.

但它是个不错的缓冲，因为如果链条业务失败了，科技项目也垮了，公司整体业绩停滞不前，那我光靠 Gut Culture 能赚两百万美元，就已经非常高兴了。

But it was a good hedge, because if I did if let's say chains failed and tech failed, and my business was flat year over year, I'd be super excited about the $2,000,000 I'm gonna make off gut culture.

我会毫不犹豫地把所有资源都押在这个产品上，对吧？

I'd be going all in on that product, right?

当时这么做，纯粹是为了对冲核心业务可能面临的挑战，是个明智的布局。

It was just a good hedge to make at the time, understanding the challenges to the core business.

现在只要一出问题，我就会立刻去寻找多种不同的解决方案。

Now, anytime there's a problem, I'm gonna look for a bunch of different solutions.

所以 Ridge 面临的问题就是：增长开始放缓了。

So the problem in Ridge is like, Hey, growth is slowing down.

所以我们推出了一系列产品，找到了增长点。

So we launched a bunch of products, we found growth.

到2026年5月，我的年增长率已经达到了90%。

And now in May 2026, I'm growing like 90% year over year.

我想，好吧，我总算把增长问题解决了——

I'm like, okay, I've solved the growth of-

话说回来，你这规模真是惊人。

Which is wild, by the way, your size.

这个数字太吓人了。

That's a wild number.

是啊，没错。

Yeah, yeah.

我感觉自己就像那边的杰森·潘泽尔。

I feel like Jason Panzer over here.

但我还是想，好吧，

But I'm like, okay,

我从来没注意到他姓潘泽。

I've never noticed that his last name is Panzer.

这名字真是太贴切了。

That's so appropriate.

这么明显的事，怎么以前没人提过？

How has that not come up before now?

我觉得这儿笑点太多了。

I'm like, I got There's so many jokes here.

继续说啊，肖恩。

Keep going, Sean.

增长问题解决了，现在文化成了很好的缓冲。

We solved the growth problem, and now we still have the culture as a good hedge.

学订阅模式挺有意思的，对吧？

It's been fun to learn how subscriptions work, right?

我懂电商，但他们对续订、自动扣款这些完全一窍不通。

As much as I know about e commerce, they don't know about anything about recharge or know anything about rebilling.

我以前从来没做过这些事。

I've never done this stuff before.

所以能进去实际学一学，挺好的。

So it's been good to go in there and actually learn that.

我们有很棒的导师，比如来自'It's In Hydration'的扎克和乔丹，他们的商业模式完全不同——别人都是花大价钱拉客户，结果客户只留四到六个月，他们真正琢磨的是怎么提高留存率。

And that's where we have great mentors like Zach and Jordan from It's In Hydration, who like, the business model is so different because everyone loses so much money acquiring customers, and then it's just like a prey that they stick around for four to six months, and optimizing that actual retention.

你怎么才能把获客成本压到最低，好让三个月就能回本？

And how do you get your CACs as low as possible so that you can break even at three months instead?

总之，我们一直在学这一整套玩法，这种能拿工资学东西的机会太难得了。

Anyway, and we've been learning that whole game, which is It's very rare you get to get paid to learn stuff.

所以这就是Gut文化最棒的地方。

So that's the beauty of gut culture.

为什么不呢？

Why not Okay.

那你为什么不把Gut文化也带到Ridge来呢？

So you kind of have to Why not put gut culture in Ridge?

如果重点是学习以及那些东西，而且品牌并不重要，Shark Ninja 什么都能造，我的意思是，他们迟早会推出补充剂产品。

If it's about learning and it's about all that stuff, if brand doesn't matter and Shark Ninja can make everything, I mean, they'll probably launch supplements at some point.

你知道的，为什么不把它加进去呢？

You know, why not put it in?

为什么不在 Ridge 里加入呢？

Why not put it in Ridge?

对。

Yeah.

意思就是我在内部争论中总是输。

I mean, that is me losing debates internally.

就像我说的，我是推动进展的人，但其他人也有发言权。

Like I said, I'm the driver of progress, but there's other people who get a vote.

我就说，伙计，这产品就叫Ridge软糖，我们明天就上线。

I'm like, dude, it's just gonna be called Ridge gummies, and we're gonna launch them tomorrow.

在Ridge内部，大家对推出Ridge软糖这类产品没那么热情。

Internally at Ridge, people are less enthusiastic about the Ridge gummies of the world.

那现在是他们的立场或者论点吗？

That now is that their defense or their argument?

他们的论点是品牌和客户吗？

Is their argument brand and customer?

我们会让康纳来上我们的播客。

We'll have Connor on the podcast.

我们已经考虑这个问题五年了。

We have thought about this for five years.

如果墙分支能卖肥皂、卖软糖、卖肠道纤维，或者其他任何东西的话。

If the wall branch can sell soap and sell gummies and sell gut fiber or whatever else.

所以呢，这是个不错的折中方案。

So look, a good compromise.

同一支团队在做同样的事，我们只是新成立一家有限责任公司，建个新网站，Ridge借点钱给他们，再通过这家公司采购库存。

It's the same team working on the same stuff, and we just spin up a new LLC, we just do a new website, and Ridge can loan the money to it, and we can buy inventory through it.

最后我们就是这么做的。

That's what we ended up doing.

所以我没什么可抱怨的。

So I'm not complaining.

我觉得这样完全没问题。

I think it's totally fine.

我喜欢把它单独做成一个项目。

I love having it on a separate thing.

不过将来，也许我们会独立推出Ridge的营养补充品。

But yeah, in the future, maybe we do Ridge supplements independently.

另外，第一个产品，我们有很大机会把它做起来。

Also, the first one, good chance we could it up.

所以如果将来还有第二次机会的话，也许这个就是你最不能搞砸的那个。

So maybe that's one that if you think there's gonna be a second shot on gold, maybe that's that's the one you don't want to mess up.

没人会在意我们做T恤然后停掉，但如果你做的补充剂味道难吃，别人可能就不会再买我们的第二款产品了。

Nobody cares if we do shirts and take them away, but you know, if we make a supplement and it tastes disgusting, maybe people aren't gonna buy a second one from us.

或者你推出一个产品，吸引了两万个订阅者，结果又把它取消了。

Or if you create something and you get 20,000 subs and then decide to kill it.

你知道，这其实有点复杂，因为你是在给用户持续制造一种期待。

You know, I mean, it's just a little bit messier because you're kind of creating an ongoing expectation with people.

我观察你团队的情况，肖恩，你们在数字获客方面特别厉害，这种能力能迁移到很多产品品类上。

My observation of your team, Sean, would be that you have a team that's elite at digitally acquiring new customers, and that that cross applies to many product categories.

没错。

Yeah.

咱们还是回到鲨鱼尼inja占据货架这件事吧。

I mean, let's go back to the Shark Ninja owning aisles.

我觉得没错，他们确实占了货架，但关键在于他们愿意在研发上冒险。

I think that's kind of yes, they own aisles, but it's because they're willing to risk R and D.

塔吉特和沃尔玛从来不搞研发。

Target and Walmart do not do R and D.

他们只是紧跟别人的产品。

They are fast follows of products.

他们会抄你的产品，但得花上十二个月才能做出来。

They will make knockoffs of your products, but it takes them twelve months to do that.

对吧？

Right?

十八个月。

Eighteen months.

而且这已经是他们动作非常非常快的情况了。

And that's them acting very, very fast.

Shark Ninja 的承诺是，嘿，我们每六个月就会推出一款顾客想要的新产品，然后我们会走进你的商店把它买下来。

What Shark Ninja promises is, Hey, we'll have a new thing every six months that customers are gonna want, and we'll go into your store and buy.

不管是冰沙机、Ninja Freezy，还是玻璃空气炸锅，我们都会推出新品，并且比你反应过来之前就把货摆上你的货架。

If it's the slushie machine, or the Ninja Freezy, or the glass air fryer, we're gonna make new stuff and put it on your shelves faster than you even know what hit you.

对吧？

Right?

所以Target根本没法推出Shark Ninja的仿冒品牌。

So there's no way for Target to launch a knockoff brand of a Shark Ninja.

对吧？

Right?

因为Shark Ninja帮他们做了所有的测试，还有新产品的研发，以及推向市场。

Because Shark Ninja is doing all of the testing for them, and doing all the new product development, and releasing out into the world.

这就是为什么你去Target能看到山寨微波炉，却看不到山寨Ninja Freezy，因为Ninja Freezy太新了，根本来不及出山寨版。

And that's why you go to a Target and there's knockoff microwaves, but there's no knockoff Ninja Freezy because the Ninja Freezy, it's too new to have a knockoff out.

这也是他们的超能力之一，就是能吸引顾客进店，同时他们还在做研发。

And that's part of their superpower, is that they're driving people in store and they're doing R and D.

Ridge的超能力在于，他们有一个非常出色的产品团队。

Ridge's superpower is we have a very good product team.

我们在直面消费者的业务里，产品迭代速度非常快。

We're able to make products very fast in terms of the DTC world.

而且我们第二天就能上线数字渠道，马上开始卖，对吧？

But also we can put it on digital the next day and start selling it immediately, right?

所以我们的核心优势是，我们不一定非要占据货架，而是可以掌控广告渠道，也就是在Facebook、Google、YouTube这些平台上高效地砸钱推广。

So our superpower is, instead of owning the aisles, we can own the ad channels, which is just spending a ton of money very effectively on Facebook, or Google, or YouTube, or whatever else.

我觉得我们还能通过引入名人代言等方式，获得新的竞争优势。

And I think we'll get new superpowers by putting in celebrities to it, or whatever other thing.

我们内部已经开始重新思考如何推出新产品，以前我们总是把它叫做产品发布。

Internally, we've started to talk about just rethinking certain parts of how we bring new products to market, and we would always talk about it like a product launch.

我建议我们换个说法，增加一个我称之为‘验证阶段’的环节。

And I've suggested that we change up our terminology, and that we add what I call a validation stage.

因为在我看来，任何新产品发布之前，都必须先验证两件事，才算真正准备好发布。

Because it seems to me that with any new product launch, you really have to validate two things before it really becomes a product launch.

第一件事是验证产品本身的质量。

And one is you have to validate the product quality.

我觉得我们在这一点上已经做得不错了。

And I'd like to think we're pretty good at this.

这些年我们确实做了很多，但说实话，你永远没法完全预测客户会怎么反应，有些问题只有在内部测试时根本发现不了，所以你必须先在市场上小范围卖一些，听听真实用户的反馈，才知道这东西值不值得大规模推。

We've done a lot of it over the years, but I think the reality is you never can totally tell how customers are going to respond to something and things that they're going to maybe not like when you're just playing with it internally, so you just have to sell a certain number into the wild and hear people's feedback before you know if this is something that you wanna go big with.

第二件事是，得摸清楚有没有自发的需求。

And then I think the second thing is you have to get a feel for is there organic demand?

你刚才也提到了，肖恩，有意思的是，就算我们入行这么多年，还是会被一些事情打个措手不及，比如你对‘Chain’s’的火爆程度就完全没料到——你肯定觉得它能成功，但可能根本没想到客户会这么自发地追捧，对我来说，这种由用户自然推动的需求，才是最终能成为爆款产品的标志。

Even you mentioned it, Sean, it's interesting for as long as we've been in the game, we'll still get caught off guard by things, like it sounds like you were caught off guard by how well chains is going, like you probably, I mean, you obviously thought it could be successful, but maybe you didn't think it could be, you would have this much kind of natural organic demand from your customers, and to me, that's the hallmark of products that end up turning into winners.

挺有意思的是，最初采购单订了多少，跟产品最终会不会成功，几乎没什么关系。

It's interesting how there's so little correlation between how much you buy in the initial PO, and whether or not they're likely to be successful.

我觉得真正能预示成功的，是客户对产品质量的评分和反馈特别高，而且你根本不用主动去推销，顾客自己看到就会想买，这类产品通常都会大卖。

I think the things that I've seen as the predictors of success is that your ratings and customer feedback about the product quality come back extremely high, and you see natural organic demand of not having to sell it to anybody, they just kind of see it and get it and wanna buy it, and those are the ones that usually rip for us.

大多数AI工具和软件每个月都很难带来直接的投资回报，但Postscript不一样。

Most AI tools and software don't give you direct ROI every month, but Postscript does.

我在Ridge负责两个Postscript的AI产品，它们的收益都直接体现在我们的损益表上。

I run two Postscript AI products at Ridge, both show up on our p and l.

Infinity Testing会后台自动持续对我们短信自动化流程做A/B测试。

Infinity Testing runs continuous AB tests on our SMS automations completely in the background.

它带来了44万6千美元的额外收入，不是估算的，是实实在在的增量。

It's driven $446,000 in incremental revenue, not just attributed, incremental.

这相当于投资回报率提升了32倍，点击率也提高了43%。

That's a 32 x incremental ROAS with click through rates up 43%.

还有Shopper，一个AI销售助手，能每条客户短信都在40秒内回复。

Then there's Shopper, an AI sales agent that answers every inbound text in under forty seconds.

单靠短信营销，我们的投资回报率就达到了23倍。

We're running 23 x ROI on messaging cost alone.

如果你想要一款能带来可验证回报的短信工具，就去用Postscript吧。

If you want SMS software that gives a proven ROI, go to postscript.

赶紧预约一个免费演示吧。

And book a free demo.

Mike，我能不能问你们俩一个问题？

Can I ask you both this question then on that, Mike?

Sean，你们是怎么评估一个新产品的投入风险的？

How Sean, how do you size the bet for a new product?

比如说，你们要推出一条新品线。

So, like, you're gonna launch chains.

这中间会有研发成本。

There's an R and D cost.

也就是产品开发的投入。

So there's a product development cost.

还得算上初始库存的成本。

There's an initial inventory cost.

在新产品上，所有的投入都是一样的吗？

Are all the bets the same when it comes to new product?

你是说，我们直接定个上限，就当这是最后一次赌注了？

Like, you basically say like, hey, we're committing like this is the max we'll spend on a shot on goal?

还是说你们会评估出哪些更有把握，然后多投一些资源到那些项目上？

Or do you have ways where you come up with higher conviction on some versus others, and then like you're gonna put more money into some versus others?

我从来没认真想过，该怎么确定投入的规模。

I've never really thought about like, how do you size the bet?

你根本没法提前知道哪个会爆。

You never really know what's gonna be a hit.

在Ridge，我通常对每一件上马的产品都太过乐观了。

The big problem at Ridge is I am usually overly enthusiastic about everything we put on the board.

你是个创业者。

You're an entrepreneur.

舒克。

Shucker.

对，我当时就想，哇，这玩意儿绝对能让我们变成亿万富翁。

Yeah, I'm like, Oh, that's actually gonna make us billionaires.

然后我对上面的每一个产品都这么想。

And I put that for every single product on there.

这也导致我们过去买多了，惹了不少麻烦，真是挺糟心的。

And it's got us into problems in the past where I buy way too much that sucks.

所以，我们把它标准化了。如果你是职业赌徒，这叫做‘注码单位’。

So, we've standardized it to If you're a professional gambler, it's called units.

所以通常情况下，你花多少钱并不重要。

So typically, it doesn't matter how much money you spend.

你会把这笔钱分成10份或20份。

You break that much money into either 10 or 20 units.

然后，根据你认为自己的优势有多大，来决定下注多少份。

And depending on what you think your advantage is, you bet more units.

所以如果你没什么优势，只是想留在牌桌上，那就只押一个单位。

So if you don't really have an advantage and you're just trying to stay in the game, you bet one unit.

明白吗？

Okay?

要是你觉得自己稳赢，那就把全部单位都押上，比如十个单位或者二十个单位，看你怎么分的。

And if you really think you have a guaranteed chance to win, you bet 100% of your units, 10 units or 20 units or whatever.

所以你们应该去学学职业赌客是怎么玩的，因为我们本质上就是在赌博，只是把这套逻辑搬到了这里。

So that's like You should learn how professional gamblers play, because we're basically gambling, and you bring it over here.

所以我们是按单位来定注码大小的。

So we size our bets based on units.

你知道的，如果是个我们打算免费赠送或者根本不在乎的产品，那一个单位就是五万美元，这样算下来，每个产品的平均投入大概是三十五万美元。所以基本上我们推出的每个新项目，投入都是三十五万左右，稍微变动一点。

And you know, if we're doing a product that we're just gonna give away for free, or we don't care about, it's $50,000 one unit, the average buy for a product ends up being $350,000 So like every new thing we launch is basically 350,000 Change is a little bit less.

变动的话，大概是两到三个单位，也就是十万到十五万美元的注码。

Change is probably two or three units, like 100 or $150,000 bet.

而现在我们得加大投入，因为这次肯定会大获成功。

And now we have to go and crank that up, because it's gonna be a big hit.

所以我们会多进点货，而且你的供应链得足够灵活，能在三到六个月内追到货源，再把它弄回来。

So we're gonna buy more of them, and you have a supply chain that's nimble enough that you can chase stuff in three months or six months and get it here again.

电池这块可能更贵一些，据我了解，电池周围涉及的环节很多，订货难度应该更大。

And batteries is probably more expensive, because there's like a bunch of stuff around batteries, from what I understand, that should make it harder to order.

我觉得我们在这块学到的一个教训是，我们陷入困境的时候，往往是因为太贪心、盲目追求增长。

I think that one of the things that we've learned in this area is that the times where we've gotten ourselves into trouble has been when we've been greedy for growth right now.

我记得几年前看过一篇文章，好像是贝佐斯说的，亚马逊把下注看作种树。树长得慢，所以他们种下的东西，可能三四年甚至五年内都吃不到果子。

I remember years ago reading, I think it was Bezos said something about how on Amazon, they think about their bets as planting trees, and trees take a while to grow, and so they'll plant things that they don't expect to really be able to eat the apples off of for three, four, five years.

在 Simple Modern 的早期，我们的想法是，嘿，产品一上线就能立刻火起来。

And in the early years of Simple Modern, was like, hey, you launch it and it's gonna rip immediately.

如果是个爆款，它会从起步阶段就极大地拉动你的营收增长。

If it's a winner, it's gonna dramatically impact your top line from Go.

但到了我们现在这个公司规模，这就难多了，尤其是因为我们现在的业务更多是批发和亚马逊渠道，而不是直接面向消费者。

And now at the scale of company that we're at, that's harder to do, especially because we're more wholesale Amazon than DTC.

所以我一直在跟团队强调，你们不用像过去那样急着把产品推向全面规模。

So I've just really kind of been drilling into my team, like, you don't have to be in a hurry to get this thing to full scale like we have been in the past.

你可以先小批量推出，看看市场反应如何。随着公司逐渐成熟壮大，大家都会开始制定一到三年的产品规划。

You can launch it in limited quantities and see if we've got something, and this is what companies do as they mature and they get bigger, is they start to have roadmaps that are one, two, three years out.

听起来你们也在朝这个方向走，Sean。你们正在构建一个清晰的路径，把那些明年、后年，甚至2028年才能落地的想法都规划进去。

It sounds like that's where you guys are going as well, Sean, where you're really starting to build a roadmap where you've got good ideas that'll hit next year and next fall and maybe in 'twenty eight.

我觉得随着公司规模扩大，这种纪律性是必不可少的。

And I think that that's just a necessary discipline as you get bigger.

对，我给正在看这段视频的朋友最大的建议就是：你需要有规划，但千万别太死板。

Yeah, and my biggest advice to people watching this is like, you need the roadmap, but don't get too rigid.

因为我跟 YETI 聊过，他们有一个五年的产品路线图。

Because I talked to YETI once, and they had a five year product roadmap.

我当时就想，这意味着如果他们今天有个好点子，也得等到十年末才能推出。

And I'm like, that means if they have a good idea today, it's not coming out till the end of the decade.

对吧？

Right?

这可不是什么好事。

And like, that's not good.

你也见过他们因为太死板而措手不及。

And you've seen them get caught flat footed.

你也见过他们因此变得停滞不前。

You've seen them become stagnant because of that.

他们完全错过了 Tumblr 那波热潮。

They totally missed the Tumblr trend.

他们完全错过了印花图案那个趋势。

They totally missed, you know, prints patterns.

像迈克现在做的那些能赚大钱的事，他们完全没抓住，就是因为他们搞了个五年产品路线图。

Like everything Mike's doing that's making him a ton of money, they've totally missed that, because they have a five year product roadmap.

所以以前我们是个两天的产品路线图，东西一出来就开始卖，现在变成了这种中间状态，明年全规划好了，这也是我们历史上推出得最好的一次。但我有点郁闷，因为我特别想现在就把它推出来，对吧？

So it's like, we used to have a two day product roadmap, where as soon as stuff showed up, we'd start selling it, and we've moved to this in between where we have next year totally planned out, and it's the best that we've ever launched, and I'm bummed because I want to launch it right now, right?

不过话说回来，这确实是个最理想的状态。

And it's like, that's the perfect place to be.

所以如果你是用数量来衡量投入的话，比如说是十万到三十万、四十万这样的量级。

So if you are sizing the bets in units, so it's like, you know, a 100 to 300, 400,000.

一个新产品在第一年至少要卖多少，你才会继续保留它？

What is the minimum amount you need to see in like year one from a new product to keep it?

比如一个新的品类。

Like a new category.

是的。

Yeah.

可惜我们总是把一些品类保留得太久。

So we unfortunately keep categories too long.

这事儿我们内部其实可以聊聊，比如我们的笔类产品。

That's something we can talk about internally, that we have pens.

笔倒是没问题。

Pens are fine.

笔每年能卖几百万美元。

We do a couple million dollars in pens.

我早就想停掉笔线了，但一直没动，毕竟还有收入呢。

I've wanted to shut pens off forever, but we don't do it because, oh, what about the revenue?

对吧？

Right?

到了某个阶段，你就发现背了一堆包袱。

And at a certain point, it's like, you have all this baggage.

我们还得开会讨论铅笔的颜色怎么选。

We have to have meetings about ordering pen colors.

你看，我们业务里现在有火箭级的产品。

And it's like, look, we have rocket ships in the business right now.

这些火箭产品才该优先照顾好，而不是花时间开铅笔颜色的同步会。

We should make sure that they're taken care of before we have this sync about pens or whatever else.

所以我希望我们能早点砍掉它们。

So I wish we could cut them sooner.

我觉得Ridge下一阶段的重点，是早点砍掉那些表现不佳、没达到潜力、不值得继续投入的产品。

I think the next phase of Ridge is cutting stuff sooner that is underperforming, or just isn't living up to the potential, isn't worth the dollars going into it.

所以没错，我觉得我们该早点砍掉它们。

So yeah, I think we should cut them sooner.

至于成功的项目，我们通常看第一周的表现。如果广告跑得好，就说明有戏。

And then in terms of successes, we just know kind of the first week, if it's working in ads, we have something there.

如果市场反馈积极，那就说明这笔投入没白花。

If there's market pull towards it, it's like, okay, this bet wasn't wasted.

这时候我们就可以加大投入，下单备货，全力推广。

We can double down and order it and chase into it.

没错，汤姆。我非常想强调一下肖恩刚才说的观点，因为大家的思维惯性通常是这样的：你推出一类产品，也许它一开始表现不错，或者一直平平淡淡，但也还能接受。

No, Tom, totally want to emphasize what Sean just said, because the way that the thought process from people will go is you launch a category and maybe it's great at one point, or maybe it's never great, but it's fine.

然后大家就会觉得，反正都花了这么多功夫，干脆就留着吧。

And then it's kind of like, well, we've done all the work, we should just leave it up.

毕竟有人买，我们之前也做了那么多工作，干嘛不再进货呢？

Like, why wouldn't we reorder it?

我觉得关键其实在于做减法。

Like, people are buying some of it and we've done all the work, but I think it's about editing.

我现在越来越觉得，公司运营就得不断做加法，也要不断做减法。

What I'm kind of coming to believe is that you have to constantly be adding things to your company and editing things away.

所以随着时间推移，公司的整体形态真的会慢慢发生变化。

And so that over time, the very shape of your company does start to change.

有时候你会有一个真正稳固的核心，就像肖恩围绕钱包建立的那个核心。

And sometimes you have a, hopefully you have a real core, like Sean has a real core around wallets.

我觉得Ridge永远不会把钱包业务砍掉。

I don't think they'll ever edit wallets out of Ridge.

当然，也说不定，谁说得准呢？

Although they could, who knows?

如果科技类产品真能爆发到某个程度，可能会到一个阶段，觉得咱们干脆把所有非科技类的东西都砍了。

If tech stuff took off to a certain point, there might be a point where it's like, Hey, we're going to edit out all the non tech stuff.

但如果你打算不断加新东西，就得愿意做取舍。

But if you're going to keep adding, you have to be willing to edit.

我们最近搬家了，搬的时候经历了一次特别糟心的过程，要把老房子里的东西全清出去。

We moved recently and when we moved, we had just a really bad experience having to move all the stuff out of our old house.

原因就是过去十年，东西只进不出，越积越多。

And the reason why was for ten years, all that happened was stuff flowed in.

我们有了孩子，每天都有十来个亚马逊快递上门，简直像在解数学题。

We had kids, every day 10 Amazon boxes showed up and it's just like a math problem.

最后家里到处都堆满了东西，实在没法住下去了，只好搬走。

And eventually we had stuck stuff everywhere you could I mean, we moved out of that place.

有些角落放的东西，连我都忘了那里原来还有空间。

We had stuff stuck in parts of the house I didn't even remember existed.

公司也可能会变成这样，对吧？

And your company can get that way, right?

如果你只顾着不断推出新产品、增加新功能，就会出现类似范围蔓延的问题。

Where it's like, if all you're doing is launching new things and adding things, then you get the equivalent of scope creep.

所以，如果你想拓展新产品的技能，就必须同时培养一种能力——敢于把某些东西彻底砍掉。

And so if, if you want to add the, the skill set of new products, then what you have to do is pair it with the skill set of being willing to put things in the ground.

如今要扩大一个电商品牌，光靠广告已经不够了。

If you're scaling an e commerce brand today, ads alone aren't enough.

Aftersell 专注在每个品牌都已拥有的那个时刻——下单之后，把售后体验变成更多利润。

Aftersell focuses on the one moment that every brand already owns after checkout and turns the post purchase moment into more profit.

通过购买后的优惠和感谢页面提升每笔订单的收益，同时不影响结账流程或降低转化率。

Monetize every order with post purchase offers and thank you page experiences without disrupting checkout or hurting conversion.

盖普、票务大师、梅西百货和塔吉特都在使用的高端技术，现在正帮助True Classic、Hexclad、Ridge和Jones Road等品牌取得成果。

Enterprise grade tech used by Gap, Ticketmaster, Macy's, and Target now driving results for brands like True Classic, Hexclad, Ridge, and Jones Road.

我再清楚不过了。

I would know.

这就是我最后买了三口锅，而不是两口的原因。

This is the reason I ended up buying three pans from Hexclad instead of two.

Aftersell 已经为电商品牌创造了超过十亿美元的额外收入，而且这些收入不需要增加流量或提高获客成本。

Aftersell has already generated over $1,000,000,000 in additional revenue for ecommerce brands, revenue that doesn't require more traffic or higher CAC.

去试试 Aftersell，记得告诉他们是运营团队推荐的。

So check out Aftersell and tell them that the operator sent you.

迈克，这么说合适吗？会不会有例外情况？

Would it be fair to say there is if there are exceptions to that, Mike?

我第一个想到的是我们在《泰坦》节目里请过的那位嘉宾，Jabron，他是不是来自 Utopia？

Like, the the guy that jumps to mind for me is who we had on the titans, Jabron from, was it Utopia?

对吧？

Right?

他可是覆盖了500个品类。

Like, he's in 500 categories.

他们一年的销售额能达到七八亿美元。

They're doing 780,000,000 or $800,000,000 a year.

500个品类？

And I'm like, 500 categories?

我就是在心里算一笔账。

I'm like, I'm just doing the math.

你想想，有些品类一年能卖上百万美元。

I'm like, so you have categories that might do like a million bucks.

这得看你的销售渠道了。

Well, think it depends on your distribution channel.

杰布伦的亚马逊业务做得特别出色。

I mean, Jebron has an amazing Amazon business.

所以呢，这绝对是世界上最好的。

So like, I mean, it's the best one in the world.

他们确实不断拓展新品类，但说实话，要是问他们，我打赌他们会说，自己已经淘汰了四到五成曾经推出过的商品。

So for them getting into more things, but you know what, I bet if we asked him, I bet he would say, they've probably killed 40 to 50% of the SKUs they've ever rolled.

对，最后就剩下这500个，另外300个都被砍掉了。

Right, and so they're left with the 500, they shot 300 other ones.

是的，是的，不好意思，我们根本不可能什么都做，每次推出新产品，这都是一场高风险的赌注，我得天天跟团队强调这一点。

Yeah, yeah, I'm sorry, well because we're just not gonna, I mean like, when we launch a product, it's an asymmetric exercise, and I'm really having to drill it in my team's head constantly.

这个产品八成会失败。

This most likely will fail.

绝大多数新产品都会死掉，创业是这样，推新品也是这样，最可能的结果就是失败。

The odds are that this will die, that this will fail, and every time you launch a business, just like every time you start a business, every time you launch a product, the most likely outcome is that it's going to die.

所以如果你能让整个团队都接受这个现实——我们真正要找的是能带来十倍、百倍、甚至千倍回报的爆款，就不会陷入误区了。问题在于，公司里每多一个产品，就要占一份精力，总得有人管，反而增加了复杂度，分散了你对最重要事情的注意力。

And so if you can institutionalize that where everybody understands that, that what we're searching for is the 10X, 100X, 1000X, then you don't get because here's the problem, is that everything in your business takes mindshare and somebody's got to manage it, it adds the complexity and it drags you away from the thing that's the most important.

就像肖恩刚说的，结果你又得开个会讨论别针，而不是去专注充电宝，这对整个公司来说完全是负收益。

Like Sean was just saying, That you end up having another meeting about pins, instead of having another meeting about power banks, and that's a net negative for the organization.

我不会去教Utopia品牌该怎么运营，毕竟他们做得相当出色。但我觉得，如果他们今年要做800个产品，分布在500个品类里，那他们完全可以把这700个产品集中在100个品类上。

Look, I'm not gonna tell Utopia brands how to run their stuff, because they're obviously killing it, But I bet they could do if they're gonna do 800 this year on 500 categories, I bet they could do 700 on a 100 categories.

归根结底，就看这1亿美元的收入值不值得花这么大力气。

And then it just comes down to, is a $100,000,000 worth the effort?

如果是亚马逊，那 probably 值得。

And if you're Amazon, probably is.

对吧？

Right?

在亚马逊上推新品类其实很容易，只要那边有自然流量就行。

Like, there's, It's very easy to run a new category on Amazon if there's organic demand there.

但在独立站就完全不同了，你得每周投几百条广告，那难度高多了。

It's very hard to do it on DTC where you're launching 500 ads a week or whatever.

没错，你的付费投放系统难度确实更大，对吧？

Yeah, your paid machine is more The level of difficulty is higher, right?

需要投入的精力也多得多。

There's a lot more effort.

可能没有其他渠道比亚马逊更容易拓展产品品类了。

There might be no other channel as easy to have product categories as Amazon.

因为如果你做批发，就得去见供应商。

Because if you're in wholesale, you're meeting with suppliers.

你还得去见采购负责人。

You have to meet with that buyer.

你还得请人家吃饭，对吧？

You have to take them to dinner, right?

做一个年销售额一百万美元的品类，对吧？

To have a category that does a million dollars a year, right?

这对任何公司来说都不值得去做。

That's worth nobody's business.

但在亚马逊上，货架空间和用户注意力几乎是无限的。

But on Amazon, in kind of like infinite shelf, infinite brain space.

挺有意思的，因为Brian最近在搞的项目带点DTC（直面消费者）的性质。他就感慨说，以前真没意识到在亚马逊上做这些有多轻松，现在有点习以为常了。

It's funny because Brian, the new thing that Brian's working on has a more DTC element of it, He's just like, Man, I'd take him for granted how easy a lot of this stuff is with Amazon.

因为他的角色在 Simple Modern 公司随着时间的推移发生了变化，虽然他负责所有的电商业务，但主要是在管理亚马逊。

Because his role had over time of morphed at Simple Modern where he was primarily managing Amazon even though he was over all the e commerce stuff.

而且，一旦你在亚马逊上待了一段时间，习惯了那种轻松的模式，然后你突然意识到，哦等等，我其实还得做所有这些繁琐的事情。

And, once you have kind of been on the juice of Amazon for a while, and then you're like, oh wait, I've got to do all of this stuff.

这其中的复杂程度，远远超过只是把订单发给亚马逊，然后让他们去搞定仓储、发货给客户、处理退款等等这些事宜。

Like it's just way more complexity than sending orders into Amazon and saying, you guys figure out, you know, storage and shipping it to the customer and refunds and whatever else.

我很想就你刚才提到的批发业务再深入聊聊，Sean，因为像处理供应商关系，你知道的，还有亚马逊那边的采购方，对吧？

I would love to expand on the wholesale thing that you just mentioned, Sean, because like dealing with suppliers, you know, Amazon just the buyer, right?

他们的供应商。

Their vendor.

所以你是从纯线上转型到现在，你们其实已经有了相当规模的零售业务了。

How does so you've gone from purity to so you guys actually have, like, pretty sizable retail business now.

对吧？

Right?

比如你们已经进驻百思买了。

Like, you're in Best Buy.

你们可能正在扩大这块业务。

You're you're probably expanding that.

这对产品开发有什么影响吗？

How does that factor into the product development now?

还是说完全没关系？

Or does it at all?

Chain这个品牌并没有批发业务。

Know, chains doesn't have a wholesale element to it.

我希望人们能更现实地看待自己能拿到的批发资源。

And like, I wish people would be more realistic about what's available in wholesale to them.

这正是财富模式最大的问题。

And that's the big problem with wealth.

我和康纳也聊过这个。

And I think I've talked about with Connor.

我们的钱包业务年收入刚过八位数， barely。

Our wallet business does 8 figures, but barely.