第244期……《德性之后》——阿拉斯代尔·麦金泰尔（为何道德对话总令人感到不满）

大家好。

Hello, everyone.

我是史蒂文·韦斯特。

I'm Steven West.

欢迎收看《哲学化》。

This is Philosophize This.

请访问 Patreon.com/philosophizethis。

Patreon.com/philosophizethis.

我还在 Substack 上撰写哲学文章，平台是 Philosophize This。

Philosophical writing on Substack at Philosophize This on there.

我希望你们会喜欢今天的节目。

I hope you'll love the show today.

我想让你想象一个世界，在这个世界里，科学界发生了一场重大危机，危机之后，人们不再相信科学方法是获取关于世界知识的可靠途径。

So I want you to imagine a world where some kind of major crisis goes down in the sciences, where then after it happens, people no longer believed in the scientific method anymore as a reliable way of arriving at knowledge about the world.

换句话说，在这个世界里，人们不再相信科学家外出实地考察、进行实验是有效的，所有这些都被视为不可信；但在文化层面，人们仍然继续使用各种科学术语来描述周围的一切。

In other words, imagine in this world people no longer believe that it's valid for scientists to go out into the field, run their experiments, imagine all that stuff's just not trusted anymore, But that at a cultural level, people still go on and use all kinds of scientific terminology as a way to describe all the things around them.

想象人们在日常对话中仍然使用像重力这样的术语。

Imagine people still use terms like gravity in everyday discussion.

他们可能在谈话中谈论某物的原子核。

They may talk about the the nucleus of something in a conversation.

可能会说自己的职业生涯具有惯性。

May talk about the inertia of their career.

但想象一下，他们使用这些科学术语时，却失去了最初使这些概念有意义的基础。

But imagine they use these scientific terms without the foundation that made sense of these things in the first place.

最终，你可能会发现，有些人对重力有自己的定义，或者对重力有自己的理解。

Well, eventually, you might see there are people that have their own definitions of what gravity is or what gravity means to them.

你知道，就重力而言，这就是我的真理，他们可能会这么说。

You know, this is my truth when it comes to gravity, they might say.

对我来说，原子的行为方式与对你来说的原子完全不同。

Atoms to me just behave differently than atoms do to you.

这个画面初看可能有点荒谬，但对我们今天要谈的这位人物——阿拉斯代尔·麦金太尔而言，这正是他在《德性之后》开篇所用的隐喻，用以解释我们在现代道德对话中常遇到的混乱究竟是怎么回事。

The whole picture of this may seem kind of ridiculous at first, but to the guy we're talking about today, Alasdair MacIntyre, This is a metaphor he uses at the beginning of his book After Virtue to explain what he thinks is actually going on when it comes to the confusion we often run into in our modern conversations about morality.

简单来说，他认为我们今天生活在一个情感主义的地狱中，在这个世界里，关于道德的对话几乎毫无成效，也从不令人满意；如果我们想再次生活在一个能够进行道德对话而不总是各说各话的世界里，就必须理解导致我们陷入这种境地的道德思想史，以及多年前被移除的、曾让这些对话富有成效的关键部分。

To put it simply, he thinks we live today in something like a hellscape of emotivism, in a world where conversations about morality are rarely productive, never satisfying, where if we ever wanna live in a world again where we can have conversations about morality without constantly talking past each other, then we have to understand the history of moral thought that got us into this spot and the important piece that was removed many years ago that made these conversations productive.

他在这本书的前半部分所做的，正是这件事。

And he spends the first part of this book doing just that.

这成了一部道德思想史的谱系学。

It becomes a genealogy of the history of moral thought.

为了不浪费你的时间，我就直接切入正题，这样我们还有充足的时间来讨论他提出的核心论点。

Out of respect to your time, I'm just gonna get right into it, so we have plenty of time to get to the arguments he makes after he lays it out.

你看，如果你回溯足够久远的历史，他会说，最终你会遇到一种过去人们谈论道德的方式——这种方式以故事和人们在社会中扮演的角色为中心。

See, you go back far enough into history, he says, and eventually, you'll run into a way that people used to talk about morality that was centered around storytelling and the roles that people used to play in their society.

具体来说，关于荷马史诗《伊利亚特》和《奥德赛》所处的时代，大约公元前六世纪左右，那时称一个人为有德之人，就等同于说他很好地履行了自己在社会中的某种角色。

Talking specifically about the period of time surrounding stories like the Iliad and the Odyssey by Homer, about the sixth century BC, give or take, where to call someone a virtuous person back then was the same thing as saying that they're doing well at some role that they play in the world.

在这个世界里，有德就是成为一个优秀的战士、优秀的国王或优秀的朋友。

To be virtuous in this kind of world is to be a good warrior or a good king or a good friend.

正是在像《伊利亚特》这样的故事中，社会中这些理想角色的典范被展现出来，供人们效仿。

And it's in stories from around this time, like the Iliad, that the picture of the good versions of these roles in society were put on display for people to be able to emulate.

他想在这里强调的一点是，当时据我们所知，并没有像后来那样复杂的道德理论论证。

His point that he'd wanna underscore starting out here is that at this time, as far as we know, there's no elaborate theoretical argument about morality that's going on like there would be later.

当时只有相对简单的道德观念，比如荣誉与羞耻，以及通过故事展现出来的卓越典范，好人会因为感到责任而遵循这些典范。

There's just the relatively simple moral concepts of honor and shame, and then there's a model of excellence that's laid out in stories that a good person is likely to follow because they feel a sense of obligation.

他认为，这一重要差异值得我们铭记，它能帮助我们更好地理解当今社会。

He thinks that's an important difference that we should keep in mind that'll help bring context to our modern day.

无论如何，这种道德实践方式只持续了一段时间。

Anyway, this way of doing morality only went on for a while.

他说，随着时间推移，这种整个道德观的缺陷开始变得显而易见。

As the years went on, he says, it starts to become obvious that this whole way of approaching it has some very serious holes in it.

他说，人们之所以越来越意识到这一点，部分原因在于，多年来一些伟大的艺术作品揭示了这些局限性。

This becomes more evident to people in part, he says, because there are great works of art over the years that show us these limitations.

比如古希腊的悲剧，由我们最近在节目中讨论过的人物创作，如索福克勒斯、埃斯库罗斯、欧里庇得斯，麦金泰尔说，正是通过他们的作品，我们开始思考人类生命常有的道德复杂性。

The tragedies of ancient Greece, for example, written by people we've talked about recently on the show, people like Sophocles, Aeschylus, Euripides, and it's through their work, MacIntyre says, we can start to consider the moral complexity of what a human life often is.

事实上，一个人并不仅仅是一个战士，仅此而已。

See, it it turns out someone isn't just a warrior, and then that's it.

所以现在我这一生都可以一直当个战士。

And so now I can spend the rest of my life just being a warrior all the time.

去超市购物时也带着盾牌，像战士那样咄咄逼人。

Bring a shield into the grocery store, you know, really aggressively like a warrior does.

不行。

No.

生活比这复杂得多。

Life's more complicated than this.

你不仅仅是个战士。

You're not just a warrior.

一个人在一生中通常会扮演许多不同的角色，而在每个角色中，为了做好它，你可能需要完全不同的行为。

A person usually occupies many different roles in their life, and in each of these roles, a totally different behavior might be required of you to be able to do it well.

例如，照顾生病的奶奶所需的同情心，远比冲上战场要多得多。

It takes a lot more compassion, for example, to help care for your sick grandma than it does to storm a battlefield.

战场显然需要你付出更多的勇气，而不是同情心。

Battlefield's obviously gonna require a lot more courage from you than compassion.

关键是，尽管这两种美德各自都完全合理，但同时践行两者确实可能让人在生活中产生内在冲突。

And the point is, while both of these virtues are totally valid by themselves, having to live by both of them simultaneously can definitely cause some inner conflict to someone's living their life.

毫无疑问，这是现代人大多都能感同身受的处境。

No doubt something most people can relate to in the modern world.

我们该如何将生活中所需的各种美德以及不同情境区分开来？

How do we compartmentalize all the different virtues that are required of us and all the different settings we have to be in?

因此，麦金泰尔认为，希腊悲剧若有什么成功之处，就在于它展现了角色在扮演不同身份时必须做出极其艰难的选择。

So MacIntyre thinks if these Greek tragedies did anything well by featuring characters who need to make incredibly difficult choices between different roles they play.

这些角色常常面临这样的抉择：无论选择哪一条路，都是次优的，尽管他们本身并没有做错任何事。

When these characters often have to make decisions where every choice they have is suboptimal despite them having done nothing wrong.

对麦金泰尔而言，这带来了两个效果。

For MacIntyre, this does two things.

第一，它揭示了生活真实的道德模糊性。

One, it puts on display the moral ambiguity of what a life is truly like.

第二，它凸显了任何严肃道德对话中人们都会面临的一个重要问题。

And two, it draws to the surface a pretty significant question people face in any serious moral conversation.

那么，任何人该如何区分这些角色中哪一个应该优先于其他呢？

How is anyone supposed to differentiate between which of these roles takes priority over any other?

正是这类问题，麦金泰尔认为，柏拉图随后在道德哲学中的作品正是对此作出的回应。

And it's this class of question that MacIntyre thinks Plato's work on morality, which comes shortly after this, can ultimately be seen as a reaction to.

柏拉图通过提出一个观点来回应这种张力：存在一种普遍的善，所有这些美德都源于此，这是一种更高的善的形式，我们所认为的一切美德都从属于它。

See, Plato reacts to this tension by presenting the idea in his work that there's a universal good that all these virtues stem from, a higher form of the good from which everything we consider to be a virtue is subordinate to.

当他这样做的时候，这一概念在指导我们如何做出道德选择时变得极为有用。

And when he does this, it turns out to be a massively helpful concept when it comes to ordering how we should be making moral choices.

突然间，我不必再纠结于抽象地争论哪个美德应该胜出。

All of a sudden I don't have to sit around anymore agonizing over which virtue wins or loses in the abstract.

对柏拉图而言，这场对话变得稍微简单了一些。

Now for Plato, the conversation becomes a bit more simplified.

美德都是善的不同个体表现。

Virtues are all different individual expressions of the good.

因此，在这个框架下，如果我想决定下一步该做什么，关键问题是：此刻我能做些什么，来让我的生活更有秩序，从而更贴近善？

So in that world, the key question if I'm trying to choose what to do next is what can I do in this moment that helps bring order to my life to where there's more of an alignment of my life with the good?

麦金太尔认为，关于跨越时代的道德对话，柏拉图的这一做法将整个体系凝聚起来，非常有帮助。

MacIntyre thinks when it comes to having productive moral conversations between people over the ages, this move by Plato consolidates the whole thing in a way that's really helpful.

它将我们带入了一个比早期某些德性伦理形式更为成熟的状态。

It brings us into a more mature place than some of the earlier forms of virtue ethics.

但对于麦金太尔来说，紧随其后的下一步发展不仅像这样有帮助，更是道德哲学史上最重要的突破之一。

But it's the next thing that happens after this for MacIntyre that he thinks is not only just helpful like this, it's one of the most important breakthroughs in the history of moral philosophy.

这一发展体现在柏拉图的学生亚里士多德的著作中，他在探讨道德时引入了目的论的概念。

And it goes on in the work of a student of Plato's named Aristotle in his introduction to the concept of teleologies when it comes to how we talk about morality.

正如你可能已经从我们之前关于亚里士多德的研究中了解到的，简单来说，他认为宇宙中的许多事物，尤其是生物生命，都有一个它们存在应当追求的终点或目的。

See, as you may already know from the work we've done around Aristotle, to put it simply, he thought many things in the universe, especially when it comes to biological life, have an end or a purpose that their existence should be aiming for.

他部分基于这样的逻辑：我们人类创造的每样东西都有其功能，比如一把刀，好的刀就是能切得好。

He bases this partly on the logic that there's always a function to the things we create as people, like a knife, for example, where a good knife, you might say is a knife that cuts well.

换句话说，一把好刀就是能有效实现其设计功能的刀。

In other words, a good knife is one that performs the function that a knife is designed to perform.

按照这种逻辑，你可以想象世界上存在大量糟糕的刀。

And under this logic, you can imagine there's a lot of bad knives out there.

到处都是扭曲、破损、长得怪异的刀。

A lot of mangled, broken, freaky looking knives out there.

但对亚里士多德来说，这些刀之所以不好，是因为它们无法实现刀应有的功能。

But for Aristotle, what makes any one of those knives bad is that it doesn't do what a knife is designed to do.

这种逻辑也适用于你能想到的其他各种事物。

And this goes for all sorts of other things you can imagine.

一把好的小提琴，是能够真正演奏出美妙音乐的。

A good violin is one that can actually play well.

一支好的笔，是能够真正写字的。

A good pen is one that can actually write.

同样，亚里士多德认为，这种逻辑也适用于生物领域的事物。

And again, this extends for Aristotle, the things that exist in the realm of biology too.

比如，一双好的眼睛，是能够看得清楚的。

A good eye, for example, you might say is one that sees well.

一双好的手，是能够很好地完成手的功能的，你大概已经明白这背后的意思了。

A good hand is one that performs the functions of a hand well, and you can probably see where all this is going.

对亚里士多德而言，人类存在有着特定的功能与卓越性。

There is a function and an excellence that is tied to what it is to be a human being for Aristotle.

当然，我们生活中有无数种错误的方式，这些方式大多只会对自己和周围的一切造成伤害。

With, of course, clearly many many wrong ways we could be living that are mostly just going be toxic to yourself and everything else around you.

要接受亚里士多德的这种观点，至少需要我们对人性抱有一定的信念。

Now for us to accept this whole view from him, it requires at least some kind of a belief in human nature.

它要求你相信，存在某种终极目标或目的论，这才是人类这种生物在宇宙这种环境中应有的正确存在方式。

It requires you to believe that there's some end or teleology that is just the correct way for the kind of creature a human being is to exist in the kind of place the universe is.

但需要明确的是，这并不意味着它为你的一生制定了完整的计划。

But to be clear, this doesn't have to be something that's laying out an entire plan for your life.

举个简单的例子，你可以说，作为一个人，意味着是一种对压力应对能力有限的生物。

Just as a basic example of this, you could say something like, you know, to be a human being is to be a creature with a finite capacity for dealing with stress.

而宇宙则是一个会周期性地向你抛出完全压垮你的事物的地方。

And the universe is the kind of place that periodically will throw things your way that are completely overwhelming to you.

当这些时刻来临，恐惧是人们对此类情境的常见反应，有时甚至会达到令人瘫痪的程度。

And when those moments come up, fear is a common response that people have to that situation, sometimes at a level that is debilitating.

亚里士多德的观点是，如果你希望在这个星球上继续良好地发挥作为人类的功能，勇气几乎肯定是人持续前行所必需的美德。

Now the argument from Aristotle is, if you are going to continue to function well as a human being on this planet, courage is almost certainly going to be a virtue that a person needs to keep going.

因此，培养勇气不仅仅在亚里士多德看来是主观上好的，它本身就是一种近乎道德事实的善——这种善几乎可以从对周围事物本质的观察中推导出来。

So cultivating courage becomes a virtue that is not just subjectively good in the eyes of Aristotle, it is just good to be a courageous human being at a level that is almost something that starts to resemble a moral fact, a level you can almost derive from just looking at the nature of things around you.

我的意思是，明确地说，他并没有明确使用‘道德事实’这样的表述，但这种情感正是美德背后的核心，以及它们对人的潜在价值。

I mean, to be clear, he doesn't talk about moral facts explicitly in that way, but this is the sentiment behind the virtues and the potential value to people.

美德能够开辟通往美好生活的道路，这并不是一种主观意见。

It's It's not an opinion that virtues are gonna open up avenues to living the good life.

像勇敢这样的品质，本身就足以让人更好地在这个世界中生活。

Something like being courageous just is going to equip a person to live better in this world.

现在，简单澄清一下，亚里士多德认为有许多事物都属于这一大类。

Now real quick just to clarify Aristotle, he had all sorts of things he thought fell into this general category.

他认为我们是理性的政治动物，属于社群，应当通过塑造品格和实践智慧、建立友谊等方式来生活。

He thought we were rational political animals that are part of communities, that we should live our lives building character and practical wisdom, friendship among other things.

他确实描绘了一幅美好生活的图景，但请记住，为了理解麦金泰尔在本书中所表达的观点，你并不需要完全认同他所描绘的这种美好生活图景。

There's certainly a picture he paints of the good life, but just know for the sake of the rest of this episode, you don't need to believe in this exact picture of the good life to get value from the point being made by MacIntyre in this book.

麦金太尔的观点在于亚里士多德所使用的那种道德目的论。

The point from MacIntyre lies in Aristotle's concept of a moral teleology that he just used there.

他会说，当我们对人类生活的终极目标达成共识，当我们能就人类繁荣达成某种共同理解时，这种目的论一方面使人们能够进行有意义的道德对话，另一方面它也让我们能够将美德视为一种直接的桥梁，帮助人们从当前的状态走向更符合人类繁荣的生活。

He'd say that when there's an end we can agree on about where a human life is headed, when there's some mutual understanding of flourishing that we can assign to a human life, that teleology, one, allows for people to have moral conversations that are intelligible, and two, it allows us to talk about things like virtues as a direct bridge for someone to use to go from where they are now to a life more in alignment with that human flourishing.

换句话说，美德成为一个人从现状走向潜在自我的桥梁。

Put a slightly different way, the virtues become a bridge for a person to go from as they are to a person as they could be.

顺便提一下，作为后续内容的铺垫，想想这与大卫·休谟的‘是—应当’区分形成了多么直接的对比，我们稍后会谈到这一点。

And just as a bit of foreshadowing here for whatever it's worth, consider how this sounds as a direct contrast to David Hume's is ought distinction, which we'll talk about here in a bit.

想想看，美德确实让我们能够从对现状的描述，过渡到对应该做什么的思考。

Consider how the virtues do allow us to go from mere descriptions of what we are to what we should be doing.

提前打个招呼。

Just a heads up.

因为这个故事一直延续到启蒙运动时期发生重大转变为止。

See, because the story continues until a big change happens during the enlightenment.

古希腊雅典来了又去。

Ancient Athens comes and goes.

古典世界转变为基督教成为欧洲主导道德框架的世界。

The classical world turns into a world where Christianity is the dominant moral framework in Europe.

后来，伊斯兰教也成为一个主导性的道德力量。

Later on, Islam becomes a dominant moral force as well.

亚里士多德的这种目的论理论在两种情况下都经过多年的争论，随后被翻译和传播。

And this teleological theory from Aristotle becomes something that in both those cases gets argued for over the years, then it gets translated.

它最终被融入这些更宗教化的伦理形式中，成为道德对话的一种规范。

It eventually gets woven into these more religious forms of ethics as a norm of moral conversation.

换句话说，在这漫长的岁月里，目的论始终是我们即使在宗教框架内进行道德讨论的核心组成部分。

In other words, over all these years, teleology remains a core piece of how we have our moral discussions even within religious frameworks.

麦金太尔说，这种情况一直持续到启蒙运动到来，正如你们许多人所知，出于非常良好的意图，那个时代的目标是摒弃我们过去对事物所预设的所有目的，而这一时期的哲学家们试图从零开始重建我们对道德的理解。

MacIntyre says this goes on all the way until the Enlightenment comes along when, as many of you out there know, for very well intentioned reasons, the goal becomes to remove all these predefined purposes that we used to assume about things, and the philosophers of this period are gonna try to rebuild the way we see morality starting from zero.

问题变成了：道德能否建立在纯粹世俗的基础上，并依然作为人类行为的可靠指南？

The question becomes, can morality be based on a purely secular sort of foundation and still be reliable as a guide for human behavior?

对阿拉斯代尔·麦金太尔而言，整个计划的问题在于，它从一开始就是注定要失败的。

Now the problem with that whole plan for Alasdair MacIntyre is that it was doomed to fail from the start.

就像我们这一集开头提到的科学例子一样，启蒙思想家们抛弃了所有关于什么是美好生活的目的论，但他们却继续使用那些仅在拥有充分基础来支撑这些概念的语境中发展出来的道德术语。

See much like the science example that we began the episode with, what ends up happening is that these enlightenment thinkers throw out any kind of teleology where we can talk about what a good human life is, but then they continue using the same moral terms that were only developed in a setting where we had an adequate foundation to ground the concepts.

启蒙思想家最终产生的是阿尔萨斯·麦金泰尔所称的道德的仿制品。

What the enlightenment thinkers end up producing is what Alasdair MacIntyre calls a simulacra of morality.

他们仍然使用‘善’、‘正义’和‘德性’等术语，但却割裂了那些经过数百年激烈理性思辨才孕育出这些概念的道德传统。

They keep using terms like good and justice and virtue, but they cut out the moral tradition that through hundreds of years of intense rational deliberation gave rise to these concepts in the first place.

必须指出的是，这绝非启蒙时期思想家们缺乏努力所致。

And it should be said, it's certainly not for lack of effort by the thinkers in the Enlightenment.

我的意思是，多年来人们尝试了无数种方法，试图将道德建立在不预设任何目的的基础上。

I mean, there's so many attempts over the years to reground morality in something that doesn't assume an end.

麦金泰尔认为，在所有这些尝试中，哲学家们要么彻底失败，要么偷偷引入了实际上起到了过去目的论作用的前提，却声称自己是从一种‘无任何视角’的立场得出这些结论的。

MacIntyre just thinks in every single one of those cases, the philosopher either fails entirely or smuggles in premises that end up doing effectively what teleologies used to do for us, but then they claim that they arrived at it from a kind of view from nowhere.

例如，康德就曾试图将道德建立在纯粹的实践理性之上，这是他著名的主张。

Kant, for example, tries to ground morality in pure practical reason, famously.

他竭尽全力避免引入任何必要的先验假设，认为一条道德规则的有效性在于，任何理性人都必须愿意接受这一规则，无论他们个人的欲望如何。

Trying his hardest not to bring in any prior assumptions that are necessary, where a moral rule is valid because any rational person would have to will that rule regardless of whatever their individual desires may be.

但麦金泰尔认为，一旦你摒弃了关于人类真正目的的共同图景，康德的方法就无法为我们提供任何道德答案。

But MacIntyre thinks once you've thrown out any shared picture of what human beings are actually for, then Kant's method can't actually create any moral answers for us.

除非你偷偷引入了这些旧道德传统中的假设——而这些假设恰恰是康德工作试图抛弃的部分。

That is without smuggling in assumptions from these older moral traditions that part of the whole point of his work was to leave behind.

这当然是对伊曼努尔·康德的常见批评。

This is, of course, a common critique of Immanuel Kant.

还有一种功利主义的尝试，试图做同样的事，像边沁和密尔这样的人试图在最大化幸福和最小化痛苦的基础上重建道德。

There's a utilitarian attempt at doing the same thing where people like Bentham and Mill try to rebuild morality on top of maximizing happiness and minimizing suffering.

表面上听起来不错。

Sounds good on the surface.

麦金泰尔对这种观点的问题在于，这种意义上的幸福永远无法成为一个真正解决不同善观念之间冲突的单一标准。

Well, MacIntyre's problem with this one is that happiness like this can't ever actually function as a single standard that settles conflicts between different ideas of the good.

也就是说，在实践中，你最终总是面对一些基本问题，比如事业成功还是陪伴家人。

Meaning in practice, you're always just left with basic questions like career success or time with the family.

这两者中哪一个应该胜出？为什么？

Which one of those two wins out and why?

言论自由还是人们的感情安全？

Free speech or emotional safety for people?

我们该选哪一个呢？

Which one do we choose there?

对麦金泰尔来说，按照这种功利主义逻辑，我们没有共同的理性方式来决定该支持哪一个。

To MacIntyre, under utilitarian logic like this, we have no common way to rationally choose which of these to go with.

所以，理论再次失败了。

So once again the theory ends up failing.

他认为，启蒙运动时期另一种尝试是人们试图通过情感或欲望路径来建立道德。

Another attempt at this during the Enlightenment, he thinks, is the whole sentiment or desire route to morality that people tried.

这个计划试图将道德建立在人类所认可或同情的事物之上。

Where the whole project is to try to ground morality in whatever human beings approve of or sympathize with.

正如我们可以猜到的，对麦金泰尔而言，这同样存在问题。

As we can guess, same problem though to MacIntyre.

如果没有我们可以依赖的目的论，这就会把道德权威简化为当前对话中占主导地位的任何情感。

Without a teleology we can rely on, this just reduces moral authority to whichever sentiments in people end up dominating the current conversation.

所有这些观点的核心在于，当没有任何东西建立在共同的善的观念之上时，道德讨论就会变得像他所说的那样不可通约。

And the point with all of these is that when nothing's grounded in a shared conception of the good, moral discussions become what he calls incommensurable.

我们最终陷入了一个多元化的世界，这听起来或许并不糟糕，但在这个世界里，关于富有成效的道德对话，我们所能期待的最好结果，也不过是幻想有朝一日能找到解决之道。

We're left with a pluralistic world, which may not sound so bad, but it's a world where the best we'll ever have when it comes to productive moral conversations is the dream that maybe we'll figure out how to do it someday.

我们显然至今尚未找到实现这一目标的方法。

We we certainly haven't worked out how to do it yet.

我们正在努力解决这个问题，但如果我们继续以同样的方式看待道德，就永远无法真正解决它。

It's a problem we're trying to figure out, But we won't ever figure it out if we keep approaching morality in the same way.

麦金太尔认为，大卫·休谟提出的‘是’与‘应当’的区分，代表了启蒙运动道德观失败的终极体现。

MacIntyre thinks the is ought distinction from David Hume represents the ultimate expression of the failure of the Enlightenment approach to morality.

事实上，他对休谟抱有相当的尊重。

He actually has a lot of respect for Hume, turns out.

至少休谟是直话直说。

At least he's saying it like it is.

更不用说，他认为休谟在某些时候实际上确实从‘是’推出了‘应当’。

Not to mention he thinks Hume actually does derive an from an is at times.

总之，关键是，当你整个逻辑都建立在没有任何终极目标可以用来判断哪种行为更好或更差的基础上时，那么是的，你确实无法从‘是’推出‘应当’。

Anyway, point is when your whole logic relies on the fact that there's no ends we can draw from to determine which action is better or worse than any other, then, yes, you can't derive an ought from an is.

因此，对现实的科学描述成了你擅长的事情，但你始终缺乏进行令人满意道德对话的坚实基础。

So scientific description of reality becomes something you're really good at, but you'll always lack the proper foundation to have moral conversations that are satisfying.

他认为，在这一切发展完毕之后，你所剩下的就是一个以情感主义为根基的世界。

And what you're left with, he thinks, after all this is left to play out, is a world built around emotivism.

情感主义是一种我们之前在这个播客中讨论过的元伦理立场。

Emotivism is a meta ethical position we've talked about before on this podcast.

简单提醒一下，因为我知道在座的各位都不是那种能记住一切的行走式外置硬盘。

And real quick, just a reminder, because I know nobody out there is a, you know, a walking external hard drive that remembers everything.

情感主义并不是一种关于道德本身的理论。

Emotivism isn't a theory that's about morality.

它实际上是一种关于我们如何谈论道德的理论。

It's really a theory about how we talk about morality.

它是元伦理的，而不是伦理的。

It's meta ethical, not ethical.

你看，在道德层面上，情感主义者被称为道德反实在论者。

See, an emotivist in moral terms is what's called a moral anti realist.

意思是，他们认为善与恶等范畴根本就不存在。

Meaning, they believe the categories of good and evil among other things don't actually exist at all.

如果善与恶并不是真实存在的东西，而只是人们事后发明出来的，那么持这种观点的人必须回答的第一个问题是：当我们看似在进行关于哪些事情是善是恶的复杂争论时，我们实际上在做什么？

And if good and evil aren't things that really exist, these are just inventions by people after the fact, then the first question someone has to answer who holds that position is what are we actually doing then when we seem to be having all these elaborate arguments about which things are good or evil?

这就是为什么情感主义最适合被描述为一种关于我们如何谈论道德的理论。

This is why Emotivism is best described as a theory of how we talk about morality.

情感主义者认为，每当有人做出一个道德主张，比如‘谋杀是错误的’。

And Emotivists believe that whenever somebody says a moral claim like murder is wrong.

尽管这表面上看起来像是在描述某种现实，但更准确的理解是，道德陈述根本没有任何真值内容。

Although this may sound on the surface like it's describing some piece of reality, the more accurate way to read that is that there's no truth content behind a moral statement whatsoever.

说‘谋杀是错误的’，相当于有人说‘呸，谋杀’。

Saying murder is wrong is the equivalent of someone saying boo murder.

说‘慈善是好的’，相当于有人说‘耶，慈善’。

Saying charity is good is the equivalent of someone saying yay charity.

换句话说，他们实际上并没有表达任何其他内容，只是情感的表达。

In other words, they're not really saying anything other than an emotive expression.

因此，从真理的角度来看，这里根本没有什么可批评的。

So there's really nothing to critique there in terms of truth.

于是，道德话语就变得类似于体育赛场上的观众，双方为各自的球队欢呼。

Moral discourse then becomes something that's not unlike a crowd at a sports stadium where opposite sides cheer for their respective teams.

他们对穿着自己球队球衣的人更加宽容，而对穿着对手球队球衣的人则更加苛刻。

They give more of a free pass to people wearing their team's jersey and are more critical of people wearing another team's jersey.

对阿拉斯代尔·麦金泰尔而言，这不仅完美地描述了我们今天所生活的世界，也代表了在目的论已被抛弃的背景下，道德话语所能达到的顶峰。

And for Alasdair MacIntyre, this becomes not only a perfect description of the sort of world we live in today, but also the pinnacle of what moral discourse can ever be given the poverty of our situation since teleologies have been removed.

因为当人们意识到，今天试图与持不同观点的人讨论道德显得如此徒劳时，对话就开始呈现出完全不同的形式，变得更加侧重于说服或胁迫。

Because when people realize how pointless it feels today to try to discuss morality with people who disagree with them, conversations start to take on a whole different form where they become much more about persuasion or coercion.

有时，人们会直接试图强迫他人接受自己的想法。

Sometimes people will downright try to force others to think the way they do.

这种想法认为，在情感主义文化中，这种情况的发生是理所当然的，因为这确实是人们仅剩的一切。

And the thinking is this should be expected to occur in an emotivist culture because this is really all the people have left.

为了不让我们的节目在之后的任何环节被打断，我想感谢今天支持我们的唯一赞助商——Nord VPN。

And just so we don't kind of interrupt the show at any point beyond this, I wanna thank everybody that goes through our single sponsor today, Nord VPN.

VPN 是虚拟专用网络。

A VPN is a virtual private network.

想象一下你电脑或手机上的一个应用程序。

Imagine an app on your computer or your phone.

你打开它，点击一个按钮，从那一刻起，你的互联网连接就会被加密并通过安全服务器传输。

You open it, you click a button, and from that moment forward, your Internet connection is encrypted and routed through a secure server.

再想象一下，这个应用还附带了一系列服务。

Imagine that app also gives you a set of services along with it.

额外的安全保护、威胁监控、更改你虚拟位置的功能，更不用说所有帮助你在浏览时保护数据的工具了。

Added security, threat monitoring, the ability to change your virtual location, not to mention all the tools you need to help protect your data while you browse.

这就是 Nord VPN 所做的事情。

That's what Nord VPN does.

当你坐在咖啡馆使用公共 Wi-Fi 时，VPN 会加密你的连接，让那些试图窃取你数据的人更难截获你的信息。

When you're sitting in a coffee shop using public wifi, a VPN encrypts your connection so all the stuff you're doing is harder to intercept for people trying to.

当你出国旅行、住在酒店时，它能让你切换虚拟位置，从而访问家乡的流媒体服务。

When you're traveling abroad, staying in a hotel, it allows you to switch your virtual location so you can access streaming services from back at home.

事实上，在某些情况下，更改位置甚至能让你看到航班或其他商品的不同价格。

In fact, in some cases, changing your location can even allow you to see different pricing on flights or any of the other stuff you buy.

Nord VPN 还包含威胁防护 Pro 功能，可以扫描文件中的恶意软件。

Nord VPN also includes Threat Protection Pro, which can scan files for malware.

它能为你屏蔽广告。

It can block ads for you.

更不用说他们的暗网监控功能，一旦你的登录信息在数据泄露中被发现，它会立即提醒你。

Not to mention their dark web monitor, which alerts you if your login's discovered in data breaches.

你可以迅速采取行动应对这种情况。

You can take action on that quickly.

一个 Nord VPN 账户可支持多达 10 台不同设备，这意味着你全家人都能受益，就连小蒂米在他婴儿房里打造他的代发货帝国时也能覆盖到。

One Nord VPN account works on up to 10 different devices, and that means everyone in your family's covered, even little Timmy, as he builds his drop shipping empire from the comfort of his nursery.

顺便说一句，所有这些服务每月只需一杯咖啡的价格，这也是支持这个播客的好方式。

By the way, all of this only costs about the price of a cup of coffee per month, and it's a great way to support the podcast.

要获得Nord VPN计划的最佳折扣，请访问 nordvpn.com/filo this。

To get the best discount off your Nord VPN plan, go to nordvpn.com/filo this.

我们的链接还会让你在两年计划上额外获得四个月。

Our link will also give you four extra months on the two year plan.

Nord的30天无风险退款保证让你无后顾之忧。

There's no risk with Nord's thirty day money back guarantee.

链接在播客剧集的描述框中。

The link is in the podcast episode description box.

现在回到播客。

And now back to the podcast.

他在书中举了一个很好的例子，两个思想家最终以这种方式各说各话。

He gives a great example in the book of two thinkers that ultimately end up talking past each other in this way.

我已经做过关于这两个人的节目。

Done episodes on both of them.

他提到的是约翰·罗尔斯和罗伯特·诺齐克，两位在二十世纪做出重要贡献的哲学家。

He's talking about John Rawls and Robert Nozick, two highly influential philosophers who did their work in the twentieth century.

即使你对这两位的思想细节已经记不清了，麦金泰尔的观点是，他们都代表了启蒙时代那种支离破碎的道德对话方式，而他们之间的分歧恰恰揭示了我们文化中一套完整的前提假设——当目的论被剔除后，我们就完全丧失了彼此解决真实分歧的能力。

Now even if you don't remember the specifics about either of these two, the point from MacIntyre is that they both represent a very enlightenment era broken method of trying to have a moral conversation, and that their disagreement here can reveal to us the entire set of assumptions that leaves us as a culture utterly incapable of resolving real disputes between each other after teleologies have been cut out.

他在书中用他们两人对财产权的不同观点来说明这一点。

He uses each of their views on property rights as a way of illustrating this in the book.

罗伯特·诺齐克会说，财产权的核心在于确保获取和应得权利的正义性。

See Robert Nozick would say that property rights are about ensuring justice at the level of acquisition and entitlement.

更简单地说，如果你的祖父去世了，留下了一大堆房产，这些是他八十年代建立房地产帝国时积累的财产——当然，那些具体是怎么赚来的，现在没人愿意提了。

Put a bit more simply, if your grandpa dies and he leaves you a bunch of houses that were part of his real estate empire he built back in the eighties doing, you know, a bunch of stuff nobody likes to talk about anymore.

从基本层面来说，这些房子你有权继承。

You are entitled to those houses at a basic level.

你拥有它们是你的权利，因为它们是别人赠予你的。

It is your right to own them because they were given to you.

诺齐克可能会问：这有什么好困惑的？

Nozick might ask, what's confusing about that?

这关别人什么事呢？

And why would it be anybody else's business anyway?

正如你所想象的，诺齐克的思想完全属于通过我们作为人的权利来确保正义的范畴。

As you can imagine, this places Nozick's thought squarely in the realm of ensuring justice through the rights we have as people.

他会说，权利非常重要，你有权获得财产。

He'd say rights are very important, and you have a right to the acquisition of property.

但必须指出的是，罗尔斯另一方面也会说权利非常重要，但他却完全不同意诺齐克刚才说的几乎所有内容。

But should be said, Rawls on the other hand would also say rights are very important, and yet he disagree with almost everything Nozick just said entirely.

对于约翰·罗尔斯而言，人们的财产权包括不降生在一个财产高度集中于少数既得利益者手中的世界，在这样的世界里，新来者几乎不可能参与真正为普通人服务的财产市场。

For John Rawls, people's property rights include not being born into a world where property is so consolidated into the hands of the people that have already existed that new people coming along find it next to impossible to participate in property markets that work for the people.

换句话说，人们有权基于实际人群的需求获得分配上的正义。

People have a right, in other words, to justice in terms of distribution based on the needs of actual people.

他会说，你不能买下大量房屋，任其空置，然后看着其他人为了仅剩的几套房子拼命抢购、支付天价。

He'd say you can't buy up a ton of houses, sit on them doing nothing, and then watch as other people scramble and overpay for the few that are left to choose from.

麦金太尔在这里的观点是，这两种论点在各自内部都是自洽的。

Now MacIntyre's point here is that both of these arguments are coherent internally.

并不是说其中一个正确，而另一个完全是胡说八道。

It's not like one of these is right and the other one's nonsense.

可以说，他们两者都提出了一个完全正当的现代正义观，即为人们提供正义。

Both of them you could say point to a totally legitimate modern argument for providing justice to people.

但更大的问题是，我们该如何裁决——关键就在这里——在这两种不同的正义观念之间做出选择？

But the bigger question becomes, how do we ever adjudicate, keyword there, between these two different ideas of justice?

我们如何理性地决定哪一个更符合正义？

How do we rationally decide which one is really more in line with justice?

如果我们摒弃了目标或目的，那么采用这种启蒙式的方法，就不可能回答这个问题。

Well, if we remove teleologies or ends that we're aiming for, then using an enlightenment style method like this makes answering that question impossible.

这两种观点永远无法说服对方，历史也证明了他们确实从未做到过。

These two will never be able to convince each other of much of anything, and that's supported by the history that they never did.

麦金太尔预测，这两个人将一直各说各话，永远无法取得进展，因为他们没有共同的目标，无法用理性工具来接近彼此。

And MacIntyre predicts that these two will just keep arguing past each other, never able to make any progress because they have no common end that they can use the tool of rationality to try to get closer to.

而这两种观点尤其如此。

And this is especially the case with these two.

我的意思是，罗尔斯的无知之幕，诺齐克对人权的关注。

I mean Rawls and his veil of ignorance, Nozick and his focus on human rights.

对麦金泰尔而言，很明显，这两个人都深陷于那种破碎的启蒙时代道德逻辑之中。

To MacIntyre, it's obvious both these guys are still heavily situated in that broken Enlightenment era kind of moral logic.

他们都在试图将正义和权利等概念建立在一种不存在的‘无视角’观点上，而没有回归这些概念最初赖以产生的真正基础。

They're both still trying to ground terms like justice and rights on a view from nowhere that doesn't exist and without the proper foundations that gave rise to those terms in the first place.

再次回想播客开头的例子，这就像人们试图争论他们对重力的不同定义，却完全不提及科学。

Again, call back to the example at the beginning of the podcast, these are people trying to argue about their different definitions of gravity, but they're trying to have the conversation without referencing science at all.

如果我们把这种分析从枯燥的学术哲学扩展到你与周围人进行的日常对话，你同样可以用这种方式来看待堕胎辩论。

And if we extend this from dry academic philosophy to just conversations you have with the people around you, you can do this exact same thing with the abortion debate.

你也可以用它来看待毒品政策。

You can do it with drug policy.

这就是为什么我们的道德对话感觉如此令人不满的原因。

This is the reason our moral conversations feel so unsatisfying.

这也是为什么人们谈论道德时所使用的策略发生了如此多变化的原因。

And it's also why so much has changed about the tactics people use when they talk about morality.

因为当我们生活在这种道德对话的贫瘠状态中时，人们会如何反应？

Because when we live in this kind of poverty towards moral conversations, how do people react?

当事情如此令人不满时，世界会如何变化？

How does the world change in response to things being so dissatisfying?

对麦克因泰尔来说，世界上一些常见的角色开始出现，并在社会中扮演更具影响力的角色。

Well, for MacIntyre, certain common characters you can see out there in the world start to emerge and take on more influential roles in the world.

当功利主义文化变得更加注重说服、胁迫和操纵时，我们看到管理者、治疗师和抗议者等群体的权力大幅上升。

When a motivist culture becomes much more about persuasion, coercion, and manipulation, then what we see is a massive increase in the power levels of managers, therapists, and protesters, among other things.

这些只是麦克因泰尔提出的几个有趣例子，我接下来会详细讨论。

These are just three interesting ones MacIntyre lays out that I'll talk about right now.

那么，为什么这种情况会导致管理者权力的增加？

So first of all, why would this situation lead to an influx in the power of managers?

也就是说，这到底有什么道理？

Like, why does that make any sense at all?

想想看，一个管理者在工厂里的角色是什么，比如。

Well, think of a manager and what their role is at a factory, for example.

为了论证方便，假设这是一家生产钓鱼竿并将其运出销售的工厂。

For the sake of argument, imagine this is a factory that makes fishing poles and ships them out for people to buy.

作为这个整个运作的临时领导者，任何有正常思维的员工都不会指望他们的经理来给他们提供道德指导。

Well, as a makeshift leader of that whole operation that's going on, nobody in their right mind that works there ever expects their manager to come around and try to give moral guidance to people.

实际上，如果经理真的试图这么做，很可能反而妨碍了他们真正的工作，也就是在这里促进钓鱼竿的制造和发货。

Actually, a way, if a manager ever tried to do that, very possible it gets in the way of what their actual job is, which in this case is clearly to facilitate the making and shipping of fishing poles.

就这么简单。

And that's it.

这就是每个人每天在工厂里真正要完成的任务。

That's the real task everybody's there at the factory to do every day.

因此，经理变成了一个精通语言的人，用语言让所有人朝着这个目标运作。

So a manager turns into someone that becomes a master of the language that keeps everybody operating towards that task.

想想他们会说些什么。

Think of the kind of things they say.

听着，我不是来评判你的。

Look, I'm not here to judge.

明白吗？

Alright?

我不是来站队或指责任何人的。

I'm not here to take sides or to shame anyone.

我只是想让我们重新专注于制造钓鱼竿，各位。

I'm just trying to get us back to making fishing poles, people.

我们能就这么做吗？

Can we just do that?

这听起来在表面上非常调解且美好，但麦金泰尔会说，想想那表面之下潜藏的东西。

Now that sounds very peacekeeping and wonderful on the surface, but MacIntyre would say, think of what's just beneath the surface there.

经理所采取的这种姿态所暗示的一切。

All that is implied by this whole posture that the manager gets to take.

首先，他们从未花一秒讨论过工厂的宗旨、工厂的目标如何与外界互动，以及整个运营是否值得追求。

First of all, they never talk for a second about what the factory is for, how the goals of the factory interact with the rest of the world, whether the whole operation they're a part of is worth pursuing at all.

如果你打算在那里工作，这些事情都被视为理所当然。

All that stuff's taken for granted if you're someone that wants to work there.

事实上，任何类似这样的道德对话似乎都超出了职场的讨论范围。

In fact, any kind of moral conversation like that seems to be a bit beyond discussion for the workplace.

其次，管理者的角色实际上变成了某种官僚专家，其职责是运用管理技能，使员工尽可能保持价值中立，并每天遵循一套价值中立的程序，最终实现更高效的产出。

Secondly, the manager's role becomes effectively to be a kind of bureaucratic expert whose job is to use their management skill to keep people as value neutral as possible and working with some kind of value neutral set of procedures every day that ultimately produces more efficient pulls.

所以仔细想想。

So think about it.

这种将关于何者重要的冲突，转化为‘只管做好你的工作’这类技术性问题的能力，在一个无人能理性达成关于目标应为何物共识的世界里，变得极为宝贵。

That whole skill of being able to take a conflict about what matters and translate it into a just do your job kind of technical problem, that becomes super valuable in a world where nobody can rationally settle what the ends should or shouldn't be about.

对麦金泰尔而言，能够运用此类激励手段，精通使用精心挑选的语言来获得员工持续的日常服从，这种能力正是操纵的艺术，它使管理者在我们这种情感主义文化中变得格外有价值。

And to MacIntyre, to be able to use incentives like this, to be so good at using carefully chosen language to get consistent daily compliance out of people, this is the art of manipulation that makes managers so much more valuable in an emotivist culture like ours.

不过，这种世界中还出现了另一种角色，我们再举个例子吧？

How about another example though of a character that emerges in this kind of world?

治疗师。

The therapist.

对麦金泰尔来说，治疗师提供的产品与此类似。

For MacIntyre, similar products being provided by the therapist.

只不过这种互动更偏向一对一，发生在个人生活的层面。

It just goes on more one on one at the level of someone's personal life.

你看，治疗师也不会太多谈论终极目标。

See, the therapist also doesn't really talk about ends too much.

决定如何生活才是客户的职责。

It's the client's job to decide what the right way to live is.

他们会说，你看，我并不是来告诉你什么是好生活的。

They'll say things like, look, I'm not I'm not here to tell you what a good life is or isn't.

我只是来帮助你实现生活中想要的东西。

I'm just here to help you get what you want out of life.

换句话说，他们的工作不是讨论终极目标。

In In other words, their job is not to talk about ends.

而是探讨客户如何到达他们想去的地方的手段。

It's to talk about the means by which a client can get to wherever they want to go.

因此，治疗内容主要集中在自我管理和应对策略上，而不是质疑客户对美好生活的整体构想是否值得追求。

So the content of the sessions becomes mostly about self management and coping strategies instead of questioning whether the client's entire idea of a good life in the first place is something that's worth pursuing.

但这并不是要贬低治疗师以及他们为人们提供的服务。

Now, none of this is to hate on therapists and the service that they provide to people.

只是想说，在历史上其他各个时期，关于美好生活的整个道德对话一直都在进行。

It's just to say that there's this entire moral conversation about a life well lived that's gone on at all these other points in history.

而我们生活在一个麦金泰尔所描述的世界里，这种对话被完全绕过，取而代之的是那些声称价值中立的技术性讨论。

And we live in a world to MacIntyre where it gets completely sidestepped in favor of this conversation about techniques that claim to be value neutral.

在这种世界里，治疗师变得更为抢手。

And the therapist becomes much more of a hot commodity in that kind of world.

如果管理者将道德冲突转化为关于工作效率和流程的语言，那么治疗师则将我们内心深处的道德冲突转化为一种日常需要管理与调整的东西，而一个人生活观的根本问题，却被视为一种只需通过掌握技巧来解决的个体性不适。

If the manager is translating moral conflicts into language about efficiency and processes at the workplace, then the therapist translates moral conflicts we have inside into something we just manage and adjust every day, Where fundamental issues at the base of a person's entire approach to life get thought of as a kind of individual malaise that just needs to be solved somehow by mastering it.

但当理由再也无法解决我们的道德争论时，还有更多变化随之而来。

But there's even more that changes when reasons can no longer settle our moral conversations.

事实证明，当人们希望改变周围环境时，施压于身边的人成为了一种更常被使用的手段。

Turns out putting pressure on the people around you becomes a far more commonly used technique by people when they wanna change the things around them.

这为麦金泰尔所描述的抗议者崛起提供了背景，抗议者是我们在情感主义文化中产生的另一种反应。

And this queues up for MacIntyre the rise of the protester as yet another reaction to the emotivist culture we're living in.

抗议者与治疗师或管理者略有不同，因为没有抗议者会假装在面对生活问题时保持价值中立。

Little different than the therapist or the manager because no protester marches around their life pretending to be value neutral about things.

但再次强调，在一个试图说服他人几乎感觉无用的环境中，如果人们真的想改变些什么，他们还能依靠什么？

But again, in an environment where trying to persuade people feels almost useless to them, what else do people have if they truly want to change things?

在这种情况下，人们在公共抗议中使用的所有工具。

Well, in this case, all the tools people use during a public protest.

他们把谴责作为一种工具。

They got condemnation as a tool.

他们可以制造可见度，让自己的诉求广为人知。

They can force visibility and get their cause out there.

他们拿着从米凯尔商店手工区做的闪亮炫目的标语牌。

They got their glittery, bedazzled signs they made from the hobby section at Michaels.

从情感主义的角度来看，一群人说谋杀是错误的，和一群人只是喊‘谋杀，呸！’几乎没有区别。

Remember from an emotivist perspective, a crowd of people saying murder is wrong is very similar to a crowd of people just going boo, murder, boo.

因此，根据麦金太尔的这种逻辑，抗议只是对某种道德立场的强烈公众动员。

So under that kind of logic to MacIntyre, protests becomes just a strong public mobilization of a particular moral position.

如果道德争论的赢家只是那些能拉更多人站在自己这边喊‘呸’或‘耶’的人，那么抗议就成了迫使他人选边站队的非常有效的方式。

And if whoever wins a moral argument is just who can get more people on their side of the line saying boo or yay to whatever they believe in, then protest becomes a pretty effective way to put pressure on people to take a side.

这正是为什么在后目的论的世界里，抗议比进行无意义的道德对话更让人感到满足。

Again, this is why protesting feels so much more gratifying than having pointless moral conversations in a post teleology world.

不管怎样，你可能听了以上这些，想知道麦金泰尔到底想把这引向哪里。

Anyway, so maybe you hear all this so far, and you're wondering where MacIntyre could possibly be going with it.

我的意思是，假设他是对的。

I mean, let's say he's right.

我们摒弃了过去认为内在于事物中的目的论，如今生活在一个无法就应追求的目标达成共识的世界里。

We remove the teleologies we used to assume were embedded into things, and now we live in a world where we can't agree on which ends we should be aiming for.

但你可能会问，我们到底该怎么做呢？

But what exactly are we supposed to do, you might ask?

因为事实是，看啊，麦金泰尔，人们再也不相信这些目的论了。

Because fact is, look MacIntyre, people don't believe in these teleologies anymore.

什么？

What?

我们难道要回到亚里士多德那样的思维方式吗？

Are we supposed to go back to a time where we think like Aristotle?

你到底打算怎么洗脑人们，让他们再次相信这些东西？

How exactly do you plan on brainwashing people into believing this kind of stuff again?

而且在你回答之前，关塔那摩湾未来十年左右都已经满员了。

And and and before you answer, Guantanamo Bay is already booked solid for, the next ten years or so.

我查过了。

I checked.

好消息是，麦金泰尔并不认为我们应该回到亚里士多德时代的那种目的论，但他确实认为，我们周围存在着一些目的论，或者至少是功能类似目的论的东西，只是我们没有充分利用它们。

Well, the good news is MacIntyre does not think we should be going back to the teleologies of the time of Aristotle, but he does think there are teleologies or at least things that function just like teleologies, all around us that are not being utilized as much as they could be.

换句话说，也许我们完全可以用现代生活中已经存在的事物，重新创造出目的论曾经为我们提供的作用。

In other words, maybe it's possible to recreate what teleologies used to do for us using nothing but things in the modern lives we're already living.

回头看麦金泰尔对美德谱系的分析，我们已经讨论过，在不同历史时期，人们如何运用美德。

See, to bring this back to the genealogy he did for a second, we've already talked about several ways that virtues have been used by people at different points in history.

在荷马时代，美德被用来指导人们更好地履行社会角色。

In the time of Homer, they were used to guide people on how to fill a role in society better.

在基督教时代，美德被用作让人生活更接近上帝的方式。

In Christendom, they were used as a way to align someone's life closer to God.

对麦金泰尔而言，如果我们想进行更有成效的道德对话，这正是我们现代人必须重新构建的东西。

And to MacIntyre, this is really what we're gonna have to recreate for our modern times if we wanna be able to have these more productive moral conversations.

不仅是我们追求的目标，还包括一种方式，让我们能将美德作为具体行为，帮助我们更接近这些目标。

Not only ends that we're aiming for, but also a way that we can then use virtues as specific behaviors that can get us closer to those ends.

换句话说，我们需要把美德重新变成能够让人从现状走向潜在自我的东西，就像它们在历史上曾经发挥的作用一样。

In other words, we need to turn the virtues back into things that can take someone from who they are to who they could be, like they functioned throughout history.

那么，我们该如何做到这一点呢？

So how do we do that?

在现代世界中，有什么东西内置了目的性，却不需要我们相信两千年前亚里士多德所信奉的任何东西？

What's something in the modern world that has teleology built into it, but it doesn't require a belief in anything that Aristotle used to believe in two thousand years ago.

麦金泰尔的答案是：那些拥有自身内在价值的共同实践，它们紧密依附于维系这些共同实践的社群与道德传统之上。

The answer for MacIntyre are shared practices that have internal goods of their own existing closely alongside the communities and moral traditions that keep those shared practices alive.

要全面涵盖这些内容，远超我本期节目剩余的时间，我只希望有众多观众和我一样，对阿拉斯代尔·麦金泰尔对此问题的解决方案感兴趣。

This is going to take far more than the time I have left in this episode to cover all of it, and I'm just hoping there will be many of you out there that are as interested as I am in Alasdair MacIntyre's solution to all of this.

今天我们讨论的这本书《德性之后》，只是他对问题所做的诊断。

This book After Virtue we've been talking about today is really just the diagnosis of the problem he gives.

他在后期的作品中花了相当多的篇幅讨论我们能为此做些什么，这正是我未来想探讨的话题，如果你觉得有趣的话。

He spends quite a bit of time in later work talking about what we can do about it, and that's what I wanna talk about in the near future if that sounds interesting to you.

如果你有空在评论区告诉我，这是否可以作为一个短期的前进方向。

If you get a second in the comments, let me know if that's okay as a short term path forward.

无论如何，今天至少我想谈谈共享实践，作为他所认为的美德重新发挥作用的现代版本。

Anyway, wanna talk today at least about shared practices as a modern version of the way he thinks the virtues can function again.

所以他想表达的是，要从目的论的角度来思考。

So what he's getting at is to think along the lines of teleology.

这并不需要一个宏大的形而上学图景，将人类应有的固定状态嵌入宇宙之中。

It doesn't require there being some big metaphysical picture connected to the teleologies where there's a fixed way to be a human being that's embedded into the cosmos.

对麦金泰尔而言，一个不需要这些前提的例子，就是我们作为人类共同进行的所有活动——这些集体活动本身就包含着我们共同追求的标准和目标。

And an example that doesn't require all that to MacIntyre are gonna be all the activities we do together as people that as a collective activity have as a part of them standards and ends that we're all aiming for as we do them.

这类活动的例子有成千上万种。

There are thousands of examples of this kind of activity you could give.

他在这本书中举的一个例子就是农耕。

Farming is an example he gives in the book.

我们快速看一下。

Let's take a quick look at it.

他在这里非常谨慎，以免让人混淆。

Now he's very careful here so as not to confuse anyone.

他不希望任何人把耕作这种实践误认为仅仅是把种子种到地里并浇水。

He doesn't want anyone to mistake farming as a practice from just the verb of planting seeds in the ground and putting water on top of them.

他有一句精彩的话：种萝卜不是一种实践，耕作才是。

He has this great line where he says planting turnips is not a practice, farming is.

他的意思是，耕作是一种复杂的合作活动，参与其中的人需要掌握各种已习得的标准。

And what he means is there's something called farming that we do that is a complex cooperative activity with all kinds of learned standards for the people that are participating in it.

如果你是个农民，你得了解土壤。

You gotta know the soil if you're a farmer.

你得明白土壤如何随季节变化，如何规划轮作。

You gotta understand how it changes from season to season, how to plan rotations.

你得照顾牲畜。

You gotta care for animals.

你得维护好你的设备。

You gotta maintain your equipment.

你得妥善储存和分发你种出来的东西。

You gotta store and distribute the stuff you grow properly.

我的天，我还能说一堆，但最近我孩子告诉我别总唠叨了，我正在努力改。

I mean, I could keep going, but, I've been told by my kids lately to stop talking so much, so I'm working on it.

关键是，农业是一种人与人之间的共同实践，其中包含许多内在的、做好农业所必需的要素。

The point is farming is a shared practice between people with things that are internally good to being able to do it well.

就像市面上有很多劣质刀具一样，农业也有很多错误的做派。

And there's a lot of bad ways you could be farming, just like there's a lot of bad knives out there.

与此相反，农业实践中那些真正的技艺和判断力，只有通过真正参与并做好农业才能获得。

And contrary to that, there's just forms of know how and judgment within the practice of farming that you only get by participating in farming well.

不仅如此，如果你真正做好了农业，或许还能在实践中创新，提出新的方法。

More than that, if you do participate in farming well, maybe you innovate within the practice and come up with something new.

换句话说，你作为农民的卓越表现，有可能提升与你共同参与这一共享实践的其他所有农民的标准。

In other words, your excellence as a farmer has a chance of raising the bar for all the other farmers that are part of the shared practice along with you.