中国是伊朗战争的赢家吗？

今天，思考伊朗战争的长期后果，以下事物有什么共同点：苏联的解体、现代共和党的崛起以及任天堂？

Today, thinking about the long term consequences of the Iran war, what do the following things have in common: The death of the Soviet Union The rise of the modern Republican Party and Nintendo?

答案是能源危机。

The answer is an energy crisis.

1973年10月，欧佩克中的阿拉伯成员国对美国及其盟友实施了石油禁运。

In October 1973, Arab members of OPEC launched an oil embargo against The US and its allies.

几个月内，一桶原油的价格翻了四倍。

Within months, the price of a barrel of crude quadrupled.

在美国，你肯定从照片中看到过或亲身经历过的一些直接影响包括加油站排长队和全国限速。

In The US, the immediate effects that you surely know from looking at photographs or having lived through it were gas lines and a national speed limit.

1979年伊朗革命期间又发生了第二次冲击，汽油价格再次飙升。

A second shock followed during the Iranian revolution of nineteen seventy nine, and gas prices surged again.

这两次能源危机的综合影响，是滞胀与通货膨胀的有毒结合——这两种现象曾被经济学家认为几乎不可能共存。

The combined effect of these two energy crises was the toxic union of stagflation and inflation, two things that economists had previously suggested were practically incapable of coexisting.

加油站排长队、经济衰退等直接后果，实际上并不是这一历史时刻最引人注目的影响。

Those immediate effects, gas lines, recession were actually the least interesting consequences of this historical moment.

20世纪70年代的石油危机影响遍及全球。

The arms of the 1970s oil crisis truly reached around the world.

在苏联，石油冲击为苏联的石油经济带来了意外之财，石油收入使莫斯科得以多年掩盖其计划经济的弊端。

In The USSR, oil shocks were a windfall for the Soviet petro economy, and oil money allowed Moscow to paper over the dysfunction of its planned economy for years.

但在20世纪80年代，油价下跌，戈尔巴乔夫的石油经济崩溃，极大加速了苏联帝国的瓦解。

But in the 1980s, oil prices fell, and Gorbachev's petro economy collapsed, contributing significantly to the demise of the Soviet empire.

在日本，依赖廉价石油的重工业曾在20世纪60年代推动了经济发展，但高昂的油价威胁到了这一增长模式。

In Japan, heavy industry relying on cheap oil had powered that economy in the 1960s, but expensive oil threatened that model of growth.

在20世纪70年代，产业政策转向了能耗更低的中小型制成品，如计算机芯片、电路和机器人。

In the 1970s, industrial policy was rerouted towards smaller manufactured goods that required less energy, things like computer chips, circuits, robotics.

日本20世纪80年代著名的消费电子革命——随身听、录像机、任天堂——正是20世纪70年代石油危机的回响。

The famous consumer electronics revolution of the 1980s in Japan, the Walkman, the VCR, Nintendo, was an echo of the 1970s oil crisis.

在美国，历史学家加里·格舍尔描述了滞胀如何摧毁了自20世纪30年代以来主导美国政治的新政共识。

In The US, the historian Gary Gershell has described how stagflation shattered the New Deal consensus that had ruled American politics since the 1930s.

美国人对罗斯福、杜鲁门和林登·贝恩斯·约翰逊所代表的积极型政府失去了信心。

Americans lost faith in the sort of activist government associated with Roosevelt, Truman, and Lyman Baines Johnson.

20世纪70年代诞生的政治秩序推崇个人主义，颂扬市场，甚至公开嘲讽有效治理的理念。

The political order that emerged from the 1970s prized individualism, celebrated markets, and even outwardly mocked the idea of effective governance.

罗纳德·里根的当选，以及现代共和党的崛起，在一个1970年代经济像1950年代那样平稳的世界上是难以想象的。

The election of Ronald Reagan, and thus the rise of the modern Republican Party, is very hard to imagine in a world where the economy of the 1970s was as copacetic as the economy of the 1950s.

所以，事情就是这样。

So there you go.

苏联帝国的解体、任天堂、里根。

The fall of the Soviet empire, Nintendo, Reagan.

这些事件都不是完全由20世纪70年代的能源危机造成的。

None of those things were entirely caused by the energy crises of the 1970s.

我不是这个意思。

I'm not saying that.

但在每一种情况下，70年代的石油冲击都重塑了政治和经济环境，增加了这些世界历史性事件发生的可能性。

But in each case, the oil shocks of the '70s reshaped the political and economic environment in a way that increased the odds of these world historical developments.

最近在这场伊朗战争期间，我一直在思考过去能源危机那庞大而蔓延的触角——这场战争已经导致通过霍尔木兹海峡的大部分贸易中断，而该海峡承载着全球超过20%的石油运输、20%的海上液化天然气、30%的海上化肥，以及越来越多的全球集装箱运输。

The vast and sprawling tentacles of past energy crises have been on my mind recently during this Iran war, which has already shut down most commerce passing through the thin Strait Of Hormuz, through which pass more than 20% of global oil transits, 20% of seaborne liquefied natural gas, 30% of seaborne fertilizer, and a growing amount of global container traffic.

正如我所说，霍尔木兹海峡就像全球经济的前交叉韧带，一个细小而脆弱的连接肌腱，当它正常运作时你根本不会注意到它，但一旦功能受损，就会引发剧烈的痛苦。

The Strait Of Hormuz, as I've said, is a little bit like the global economy's ACL, a small and vulnerable connective tendon that you don't have to think about when it's working perfectly, but causes very loud anguish when normal functioning is ruptured.

根据某些衡量标准，这场伊朗战争已经是现代历史上最大规模的石油供应突发中断，其关闭带来的余波确实波及全球。

By some measures, this Iran war is already the largest sudden disruption of oil supply in modern history, and the aftershocks of its closure are truly global.

世界各国政府都在告诉民众减少能源使用。

Governments around the world are telling their citizens to use less.

在澳大利亚，总理罕见地发表全国讲话，呼吁公民少开车。

In Australia, the Prime Minister gave a rare national address to ask his citizens to stay out of their cars.

请，”他说，“乘坐公共交通、骑自行车或坐火车。

Please, he said, take public transit, bikes, trains.

在欧洲，欧盟能源专员呼吁各国政府鼓励远程办公并降低高速公路限速。

In Europe, the EU's Energy Commissioner called on governments to encourage remote work and cut highway speed limits.

在泰国，总理穿着短袖上班，并呼吁其他人也这样做，以避免使用空调。

In Thailand, the prime minister wore short sleeves to work and asked others to do the same to avoid using air conditioning.

在埃及，购物时间已缩减为每周五天。

In Egypt, shopping hours have been cut to five days a week.

在菲律宾，公务员被要求停止使用电梯。

In The Philippines, civil servants were asked to stop using the elevator.

在斯里兰卡，星期三现在是公共假日。

In Sri Lanka, Wednesday is now a public holiday.

在老挝，学周现在缩短为三天。

In Laos, the school week is now three days.

这些措施本质上都是相同的措施。

Each one of these measures is at bottom the same measure.

少用一些，可用的就更少了。

Use less there is less to use.

需求正在被摧毁。

Demand is being destroyed.

这些只是直接后果。

And those are just the first order consequences.

正如20世纪70年代教会我们的那样，能源危机的特别之处不仅在于其直接影响，更在于其连锁反应。

As the 1970s taught us, energy crises are notable not only for their effects, but for the effects of their effects.

今天的节目完全围绕着理解这些正在全球范围内迅速蔓延的第二层影响展开。

Today's show is all about trying to understand these second order consequences, which are now billowing throughout the world.

今天的嘉宾是金融分析师兼作家亚历克斯·特纳布尔。

Today's guest is the financial analyst and writer Alex Turnbull.

我们讨论了伊朗战争如何已经重塑了这个世界，特别是这场战争如何改变了美国与其头号地缘政治对手的对决格局。

We talk about how the Iran war is already remaking the planet, and in particular, we talk about how this war is reshaping America's showdown with its number one geopolitical adversary.

看待这场战争的一种方式是：美国斩首了伊朗的领导层，但这颗子弹穿透了伊朗神权政体，击中了海湾能源生产国的手臂，反弹后击中了太平洋岛国的脚，又弹回日本，重创了他们的塑料制造业，然后席卷全球，最终落在一家美国加油站，把三美元的汽油价格推到了四美元。

One way to see this war is that The US decapitated Iran's leadership, But that bullet passed through the Iranian theocracy and hit the Gulf energy producers in the arm, ricocheted off and struck the Pacific Islands in the foot, bounced up into Japan and ripped through their plastic manufacturing industry, and then swung around the world until it landed on an American gas station, turning the three in $3 gas into a four.

这场战争几乎没有赢家。

This is a war with very few winners.

但其中一个可能的赢家是中国。

But one of those winners might be China.

我是德里克·汤普森。

I'm Derek Thompson.

这是《Plain English》。

This is Plain English.

亚历克斯·特纳，欢迎来到节目。

Alex Turnbull, welcome to the show.

非常感谢，德里克。

Thank you very much, Derek.

很高兴能来参加。

Good to be on.

所以，如果一个美国电视观众、报纸读者或播客听众关注伊朗战争，他们绝大多数听到的都是油价、油价、油价。

So if an American television viewer or a newspaper reader or podcast listener tunes into the Iran war, they're overwhelmingly likely to hear about the price of gas, the price of gas, the price of gas.

他们极不可能听到的是太平洋岛屿的情况。

What they're very unlikely to hear about are the Pacific Islands.

这正是我想从太平洋岛屿开始的原因。

That's precisely why I want to begin with the Pacific Islands.

亚历克斯，太平洋岛屿上正在发生什么？

Alex, what's happening in the Pacific Islands?

对大多数美国人来说，这些岛屿不过是他们从不关注的地球上的随机小点，也难以理解。

Well, to most Americans, they're random dots on the part of the globe they don't really look at and understandable.

然而，这些地方如果中国建立永久性军事存在，将严重削弱美国在台湾或其他太平洋国家事务上的行动能力，而这些地区才是美国的更高优先事项。

However, they are places where if, for example, China were to establish a permanent military presence, it would severely undermine The US's ability to do much in tie on with regards to Taiwan or other countries in the Pacific, which are a higher priority.

因此，如果这些岛屿无法获得柴油，而它们的电力和交通又严重依赖柴油——因为大量物资需要海运——它们就有可能崩溃。

And so if these islands cannot get diesel and they run on diesel for their power, for their transport, because there's lot of it's shipping, then they can potentially collapse.

届时，它们将面临要么崩溃，要么从中国等国采购柴油的选择，而中国届时必然会提出条件。

And they will face the choice of either collapse or sourcing diesel from, say, China, and China will have an ask there.

如果中国对他们说：嘿，伙计们。

And if China were to ask them, hey, guys.

我想建一个港口，把一些东西放在那里。

I'd like to build a deport a port and put some stuff there.

别问太多问题。

Just don't ask too many questions about it.

在面临全面经济崩溃的关头，他们很可能就会答应。

They're probably gonna say yes at the point of which they're facing complete economic collapse.

而这将严重削弱美国投射力量、保卫盟友以及确保从韩国、台湾及其他国家获取关键物资的能力。

And that would severely undermine The US's ability to project power, to defend its allies, to secure a supply of critical inputs from countries like Korea, Taiwan, and others.

所以它们在地图上看起来只是小点，但如果局势紧张且这些地方倒向另一方，它们就绝对重要。

So they look like small dots on a map, but they absolutely matter if they go to the other side and things get hot.

那么这些岛屿今天的柴油危机有多严重？

And how severe is the diesel crisis in these islands today?

已经相当严峻了。

Already quite acute.

整个亚洲都存在柴油短缺。

There is an overall shortage in Asia.

这些地方并不是世界上最富裕的地区。

These are not the wealthiest places in the world.

因此，当人们不得不为更少的柴油支付更高价格时，能够负担得起的将是韩国、日本、新加坡和台湾。

So where, you know, people have to pay up for a smaller supply of diesel, the places that are gonna be able to afford it are Korea, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan.

这些地方无法承担这样的价格，将会变得绝望。

These places will not be able to pay that, and they will get desperate.

我认为这将会带来严重后果。

And they I think there will be consequences to that.

为了明确一下，我们这里说的是哪些岛屿？

And just to be clear, what islands are we talking about here?

比如斐济、汤加、该地区众多其他岛屿，还有瓦努阿图和新喀里多尼亚。

Any Fiji, Tonga, numerous others around that area, Vanuatu, and New Caledonia.

我的意思是，它们可能投票决定完全脱离法国，成为类似中国的附庸国。

I mean, that they could vote for full separation from France and become a quasi Chinese client state.

它们同时也是镍的重要生产地，而镍对电池至关重要。

They're also a big producer of nickel, which is quite important for batteries.

所以，即使这些地方看起来位于世界的偏远角落，也可能出现很多问题。

So there's a lot of things that could go wrong here even if these places look like they're in the middle of nowhere.

德里克，我想说的是，亚洲离得很远。

And, Derek, I just wanna say Asia's a long way away.

很多美国人容易忽视它，但我不认为人们意识到这里的能源短缺有多严重，以及它正在多快地加剧。

It's a lot of Americans, it's easy to ignore, but I don't think people realize how acute the crunch is getting and how quickly it is here.

你知道，韩国已经在出现我们上一次见到的上世纪七十年代那样的燃油短缺迹象。

There are you know, Korea is already going towards language and sightings on fuel that we last saw in the nineteen seventies.

该地区一些较贫穷的国家正面临可怕的危机，其中一些国家还驻有美军，比如菲律宾。

There is a horrific crunch in the poorer countries in the region, some of which host the US military, like The Philippines.

太平洋岛屿正经历着极度的痛苦。

There's an acute level of pain in the Pacific Islands.

我认为，如果这种情况再持续一两个月，这里的政治格局将发生根本性变化，而且很难再逆转。

I I I think if this goes on for a month or two, politics here will change in a way that will be very hard to change back.

对于美国的战略利益而言，我认为一些本不该被放弃的东西将会消失，任何理智的政府都不会允许这种情况发生。

And for US's strategic interests, I think that will things will go away that no other administration would have let go away in their right mind.

这非常可怕，但我正每天目睹着它发生。

And it's it's quite scary, but I'm watching it happen day by day.

所以，如果你是美国国务院或五角大楼，为什么这令人担忧？

So if if you're the American State Department or the Pentagon, why is this concerning?

因为特别是在台湾或其他安全突发事件的情况下，中国完全可以切断澳大利亚和美国之间的联系，而我是澳大利亚人。

Because particularly in the case of some sort of Taiwan or any other security contingency, China could essentially put a blocking presence between Australia and The US, and I'm Australian.

我非常关心这一点。

I care about that.

他们还可能阻止美军在台湾发生冲突时进行兵力投送或补给。

They could also prevent US force projection or resupply to Taiwan in some sort of conflict there.

这将实际上使美国无法在太平洋任何地区，甚至几乎延伸到夏威夷的范围内，自由无阻地开展行动。

That would essentially be able to prevent The US having free or unmolested operations anywhere in The Pacific or pretty much all the way to Hawaii.

因此，美国希望在太平洋保持存在，维持军事存在，以保护其利益，特别是保护台湾，我们稍后就会谈到台湾。

So the idea is that The US wants a presence in The Pacific, a military presence in The Pacific, to protect its interests, in particular to protect Taiwan, and we're going get to Taiwan in just a second.

让美国帮助这些太平洋岛国，以便它们允许美国在其领土上保留基地和军事存在，这非常合理。

One thing that makes a lot of sense is for The US to help out these Pacific islands so that they allow The US to keep bases, keep a military presence, on their land.

但在美国给这些国家制造巨大痛苦和危机的世界里，中国突然可以以好人的形象介入，我们是否正预见一个美国军事存在被彻底驱逐的世界，而中国则提出了一种互惠交换？

But in a world where The US is creating an enormous pain point, a crisis for these countries, suddenly China can come in looking like the good guy, and are we foreseeing a world in which The US military presence essentially gets booted out because China proposes a kind of quid pro quo?

我们会提供能源和岛屿支持，作为交换，你们要更倾向于中国的军事利益，而非美国的军事利益。

We will give you islands energy in exchange for you being more favorable to Chinese military interests rather than American military interests.

这是完全有可能的。

It's it's entirely possible.

这种压力现在在亚洲正变得非常严重。

This this crunch is now getting very severe in Asia.

你正看到中国向菲律宾和越南等地区提供特定数量的柴油燃料，如果对方没有提出任何要求，我会感到惊讶。

You are seeing China allow select cargoes of diesel fuel oil to places like The Philippines and Vietnam, I'd be shocked if there wasn't an ask on the other side of that.

转向台湾。

Turning to Taiwan.

台湾即将进入夏季，也就是降温季节。

Taiwan is going into the summer, the summer cooling season.

它们的电网依赖天然气。

They have a gas dependent grid.

它们对中东的依赖程度非常高。

They have really heavy exposure to the Middle East.

现在描绘一下，未来几个月台湾将面临怎样的危机。

Paint the picture now of what kind of a crisis is facing Taiwan in the next few months.

台湾的电网严重依赖燃气发电，所有电力都来自液化天然气。

So Taiwan's grid relies very heavily on gas fired power, all supplied by LNG.

夏季是亚洲炎热潮湿的时候，那时家庭和非工业用电需求非常高。

Summer is when it's really hot and humid in Asia, and that's when, you know, the household and nonindustrial demand is very high.

台湾其他主要的电力需求来源当然是石化产业，这涉及到半导体行业。

The other large sources of power demand in Taiwan, of course, are things like petrochemicals, and that goes into things like the semiconductor sector.

因此，台湾很快就会面临一个不是‘大炮与黄油’，而是‘空调还是芯片’的困境。

So we're very quickly gonna get into a not so much guns and butter, but air con or chips type scenario in Taiwan.

这将迫使一个民选政府做出极其艰难的抉择：是支持想要空调的选民，还是支持美国大规模建设人工智能的需求。

And that's gonna lead to some very hard choices in a democratically elected government as to whether you support your voters who want air con or support US interest to do a massive AI build out.

为了澄清一下，对听众来说，这里的‘空调’就是空调。

Just to be clear, for for listeners, air con here is air conditioning.

对吧？

Right?

还有能源。

And Energy.

抱歉。

Sorry.

我只是想确认一下。

I I just wanna make sure.

不。

No.

不。

No.

不。

No.

没错。

It's right.

这里的金融术语完全没问题。

The finance lingo is totally fine here.

但你的意思是，能源总量是有限的，如果能源稀缺，它要么用于在台湾高达95度、100度且湿度很高的天气里让人们的公寓保持凉爽，要么就用于不给住宅制冷，而是生产全球最宝贵的计算机芯片——这些芯片是全球经济中最关键的投入之一。

But, I mean, you're you're saying that, right, there there's only so much energy to go around, and the energy, if it is scarce, can either give you full air conditioning when it's 95, a 100 degrees, I don't know, in Taiwan and also quite humid, or you can use that same scarce energy to not cool people's apartments, but rather to make the most valuable computer chips some of the most valuable inputs in the global economy.

稍微展开说一下，因为我觉得这是全球能源危机中一个非常重要、但美国人还没怎么讨论的方面？

Just unpack that a little bit, because I do think that this is one of the more important aspects of the global energy crisis that people in America aren't quite talking about?

当然。

Sure.

到了夏天，你基本上得将能源需求削减15%左右。

So you get into the the summer, and you essentially have to cut your energy demand by 15% maybe.

你必须在为出口行业运行工业之间做出选择。

And you will have to essentially choose between running your industries for the export sector.

比如生产台积电等公司的硅芯片，还有内存。

So producing silicon chips from the likes of TSMC and others, you know, memory.

当然，目前的AI设计对内存的需求非常大。

And of course, AI is very memory intensive as it is currently designed.

或者，你不得不大幅削减家庭和商业能源需求，要么就限制芯片的产量。

Or you can and you'd have to somehow go into a massive crunch in household energy demand and commercial energy demand, or you can somehow curtail the output of chips.

坦白说，即使没有能源限制，芯片供应也可能受限，因为如果由于石油供应不足导致石化原料短缺，你可能根本无法生产芯片，无论是氦气还是半导体制造所需的其他化合物都可能短缺。

And frankly, the supply of chips might be curtailed anyway because if you have a lack of petrochemical supply, because of lack of oil supply, then you might not be able to make the chips, whether you're restricted on helium or other compounds that are required in the manufacturing of semiconductors.

这肯定会严重打击美国在AI基础设施建设方面的进展。

And that's where it would hit The US quite hard in terms of the AI build out for sure.

有一件事我不太明白：如果台湾面临迫在眉睫的能源困境，这个民主国家必须在让人民舒适地享受空调和维持推动经济的产业之间做出选择。

One thing I'm not sure I understand is that if Taiwan is facing an imminent crunch where the country, a democracy, has to choose between keeping our people comfortably chilled and running the industry that powers our economy.

其他一些国家，比如韩国，也在制造船舶，可能也面临类似的选择。

Other countries, like Korea, that are making ships might also be facing similar choices.

为什么我们听不到这些国家公开对美国领导层大喊：立即结束这场战争，你们根本不知道自己正在对盟友造成什么影响？

Why aren't we hearing these countries scream publicly at American leadership, end this war right now, you don't realize what you're doing to your allies?

为什么我们在公共新闻中听不到这样的公开抗议？

Like, why aren't we hearing about this screaming in public news?

在大多数国家，通常不会通过Truth Social这样的平台进行外交沟通。

It is generally uncommon in most countries to conduct your diplomacy over truth social.

所以也许他们已经非常强硬了。

So maybe they've been very forceful.

我听说他们确实非常强硬，但他们是通过私下渠道、封闭会议或其他保密方式表达的。

I've heard they've been very forceful, but they're doing it behind closed doors or private lines or sources of for matters of communication.

让我们把几个点联系起来。

So let's connect a few dots here.

世界上最为脆弱的地区之一，就是那些依赖柴油燃料的太平洋岛屿。

One of the most exposed parts of the world are the Pacific Islands that rely on diesel fuel.

柴油价格正在飙升，这是因为美国在中东与以色列发动的战争，这可能导致太平洋岛国对美国的看法从盟友转变为一个不可再信任的肆意妄为的超级大国。

Diesel fuel prices are skyrocketing because of a war that America chose to start with Israel in the Middle East, that could tip leadership in the Pacific Islands from thinking of The US as an ally to thinking of The US as a kind of rogue superpower that they can no longer trust.

随着这种平衡逐渐转向——我们或许应该为了换取中国的柴油或能源，允许中国在这些太平洋岛国拥有更大的军事存在。

And as that balance shifts toward maybe we should, in exchange for receiving diesel or energy from China, allow China to have a larger military presence in these Pacific Islands.

这使得中国能够在太平洋建立一种军事屏障。

That allows China to build a kind of military shell in the Pacific.

与此同时，台湾正面临双重危机，本质上他们不得不在使用稀缺能源用于空调还是芯片制造之间做出选择。

At the same time, you have this dual sided crisis in Taiwan, where essentially they're having to choose between using scarce energy for air conditioning or chip manufacturing.

让我们稍微发挥一点想象力。

Let's allow ourselves to get a little bit speculative here.

你认为，2026年4月新闻中所呈现的这一切，是否预示着太平洋地区权力格局的转变，最终可能导致中国将整个太平洋、尤其是台湾，变成其军事附庸？

To what extent do you think what we're seeing right now in the news of April 2026 is the beginning of a shifting balance of power in the Pacific that could end with China essentially just taking the Pacific, and Taiwan in particular, as its as a kind of, you know, military vassal?

这是有可能的。

It's possible.

我的意思是，这种情况短期内或许可以维持，但长期下去，这些国家的普通民众将承受严重的痛苦与苦难。

I mean, this can go on for a short period of time, but not a long period of time without incurring serious pain and suffering on the man in the street in a lot of these countries.

而民主国家，这些事情不会被忽视，也难以被遗忘。

And the democracies, these things will not be unab essentially, will not be ignored or easy to forget.

因此，我们正开始经历一个可能难以逆转，甚至永远无法逆转的过程。

So we're starting to go through a process which may not be reversible easily or perhaps ever.

所以我会说，这种情况持续得越久，这种可能性就越大。

So I would say the longer this goes on, that becomes a possibility.

你的意思是，这种情况持续得越久，中国在太平洋这场较量中成为明确赢家的可能性就越大。

You're saying the longer this goes on, the larger the possibility essentially that China is the declarative winner of this contest in The Pacific.

当然。

For sure.

我想谈谈欧洲，因为欧洲正在发生的事情也让我非常关注其长期影响。

I wanna turn to Europe because what's happening in Europe also really interests me in terms of its long term effects.

你已经看到欧盟能源专员宣布，他们鼓励人们不要开车。

You've seen the EU Energy Commissioner announce that they're encouraging people to not drive.

他们鼓励人们远程工作。

They're encouraging people to work remotely.

这些是直接影响。

Those are the first order effects.

这本质上是欧洲在说：我们输入的能源不够了。

That's just Europe essentially saying, We don't have enough energy coming in.

我们要进行政府主导的需求削减。

We're gonna do government induced demand destruction.

我们要请人们减少能源需求。

We're gonna ask people to demand less energy.

你能描述一下你所看到的那里的状况吗？

Why don't you describe the situation there as you see it?

然后还有一些欧洲的第二层影响，我想和你聊聊。

And then there's sort of the some second order effects in Europe that I wanna talk to you about.

当然。

Sure.

我的意思是，在电力市场方面，这取决于各个国家。

I mean, well, in the in power markets, it depends on the country.

西班牙拥有大量的可再生能源。

So Spain has a lot of renewables.

西班牙没有关闭其核电站。

Kip didn't shut down its nuclear.

到目前为止，他们的电力价格一直比较平稳。

Their power prices have been pretty orderly so far.

法国也有大量的核电。

France, also plenty of nuclear.

还有大量的可再生能源，非常平稳。

Also a lot of renewables, very orderly.

像德国这样的地方，仍然以天然气为边际定价，意大利则严重依赖天然气，从各方面来看都处于困境之中。

Places like Germany, which still prices on the margin on gas, Italy, which is very gas heavy, you know, back in back in the bad place for all intents and purposes.

至于用于驾驶和柴油的液态燃料，虽然没有亚洲那么灾难性，但情况已经相当糟糕。

And then on on terms of liquid fuels for driving, for diesel, it's not quite as apocalyptic as Asia, but it's quite bad already.

而且已经开始影响到石油产品的某些部分。

And it's already starting to hit certain parts of the barrel.

例如，航空燃油在那里已经变得非常紧张且价格高昂，尽管还不到亚洲那么严峻的程度。

For example, aviation fuel is already getting very tight and very expensive there, though it's not quite as dire as Asia just yet.

为了让我最清楚地了解，目前欧洲谁受到的冲击最大？

Just to give me the clearest picture, who in Europe is getting hurt the the most right now?

那些大量使用天然气的国家，他们的电网受到了重创。

People that were gut that use a lot of gas in the pan, their power grids.

因此，意大利受到的打击非常严重。

So Italy is getting hit very hard.

德国因为储存能力不足，而且关闭了核电站。

Germany, because they don't have enough storage, and they shut down their nuclear.

斯堪的纳维亚地区情况良好。

Scandinavia is fine.

拥有大量的核电和水电。

Lots of nuclear, lots of hydro.

西班牙基本没什么问题。

Spain, mostly fine.

葡萄牙，没问题。

Portugal, fine.

法国，到目前为止基本没问题。

France, mostly fine so far.

所以有一些国家正在经历严重的困境，而其他国家则更具韧性，这要么是因为它们拥有核能，要么是因为它们拥有可再生能源，比如太阳能、电池和风能。

So there's a handful of countries that are really, really struggling, and there's others that are more resilient either because they have nuclear or because they have renewables, which is solar, batteries, wind

是的。

Yeah.

水力。

Hydro.

我好奇的是，你是否知道，你之前提到过中国在太平洋地区可能获胜的一种可能性。

One thing I wondered is whether you know, you talked about one possibility of China winning in The Pacific.

在一个越来越多的欧洲国家意识到全球化石燃料经济在霍尔木兹海峡存在严重弱点、可能断裂或崩溃的世界里，它们可能会认为我们需要加速增加可再生能源，特别是太阳能和电池的部署。

In a world where more European countries realize that the global fossil fuel economy has this very weak ACL in the Strait Of Hormuz that can crack, that can rupture, they might think we need to accelerate the rate at which we are adding renewables, adding solar and batteries in particular.

你环顾世界，会想，好吧，谁在制造最多的太阳能电池板？

You look around the world and you think, okay, who's making the most solar panels?

谁是全球太阳能技术的最大制造商？

Who's really the number one global manufacturer of solar technology?

是中国。

It's China.

这场战争的一个结果，会不会反而加速可再生能源的消费，比如大量采购太阳能电池板？这也会帮助中国，因为他们在销售这方面是最大的玩家。

Is there a way in which one outcome of this war could be a re acceleration of renewable consumption, that is buying up solar panels, in a way that also helps China, because they're the biggest guy in town when it comes to selling this stuff?

我觉得是的。

I think that yeah.

我的意思是，你几乎肯定会在世界各地看到这种情况。

I mean, you you'll almost certainly see that everywhere.

我认为，短期内为缓解这一冲击，你会紧急安装太阳能和电池系统。

I think the in the short run, the to attenuate this shock, you install, you know, solar and batteries with your ears pinned back.

特别是在亚洲，他们现在正重新启动大量核能设施。

And in Asia, in particular, they're now restarting a lot of nuclear.

在韩国和日本，有大量核能设施可以重启，他们已经连续几年在这么做，但我认为这一趋势会加速。

So in Korea, Japan's got an enormous amount of nuclear they can restart, and they've already started been doing that for a few years, but I think that will accelerate.

台湾终于开始认真对待这个问题了。

Taiwan is finally taking that seriously.

所以我认为那里将会出现巨大的反应。

So I think there'll be a massive response there.

但确实，这将导致对中国产品的更多需求。

But, yeah, I mean, this will lead to more demand for Chinese products.

欧洲面临的有趣问题是，在应对完眼前的危机之后，你是否希望确保自己拥有生产这些产品的能力，否则你只是用一种依赖取代了另一种依赖？

The interesting question for Europe is, past the immediate crisis, do you then want to ensure you have the industrial capacity to produce these goods because otherwise you traded one dependency for another?

我认为，明智的做法是不要从一个火坑跳入另一个火坑。

And I would think it will be wise to not leak from the frying pan into the fire.

但在短期内，我认为他们会疯狂行动。

But in the short term, I think they will go bananas.

是的。

Yeah.

亚历克斯，我想继续探讨伊朗战争如何可能讽刺性地推动全球能源格局向可再生能源转变，也就是太阳能、电池、风能、水能，以及虽然不属于可再生能源但低碳的核能。在我看来，这场战争的一个教训必然是，海上化石燃料尤其脆弱——不仅因为战争初期的轰炸，也可能因为我们正看到伊朗和胡塞武装发射能从该国数百英里外飞来的无人机，威胁那些运输化石燃料的船只。

Alex, I wanna hold on this topic of the way that the Iran war could ironically shift the global energy picture toward renewables, that is solar and batteries, wind, hydro, nuclear, which is not renewable, but low carb, it seems to me like one lesson of this war has to be the degree to which seaborne fossil fuels, in particular, are incredibly fragile, not just because of the initial bombardment of this war, but maybe also because of the fact that we're seeing Iran and the Houthis launch drones that can fly hundreds of miles away from that country and threaten the ships that are carrying these fossil fuels.

在我们继续讲述这场战争如何加速向可再生能源转型之前，我们能不能先谈谈这场战争是否揭示了全球化石燃料市场的巨大脆弱性？

So before we continue to tell the story of how this war could accelerate the shift toward renewables, can we just talk a little bit about the possibility that this war has revealed an enormous vulnerability of the global fossil fuel market?

当然可以。

Certainly.

我认为，过去化石燃料得以运作的基本假设是，它们长期以来都是最便宜的选择，人们可以忽略公海上的安全问题，要么依靠美国海军，要么因为当时还没有无人机，无法轻易飞行500英里并击中远距离的船只，而且无人机的成本也远不像现在这样，只相当于一辆中型汽车的价格。

I think the underlying assumption of what made fossil fuels work was that they were the cheapest thing going for the longest time, and you could assume away the security in the open ocean, either by dint of the US Navy or by dint of there was no such thing as drones, and they couldn't travel 500 miles readily and and hit a ship at that distance, and they didn't cost, you know, like, the price of a midsize car.

现在，所有这些假设都错了。

All those assumptions are wrong now.

我认为我们一直低估了一点：看看乌克兰战争中发生的情况——一个中等规模的国家在遭受攻击的情况下，竟能够在全球各地打击俄罗斯的油轮，这种能力现在正被美国的敌人、非国家行为体以及其他威胁所复制。

And so one thing that I think we've underappreciated is how seeing what has happened in the Ukraine war with Ukraine, a midsize power, under assault, being able to hit Russian tankers all over the place, that that capacity can be developed by America's enemies, by non state actors, by other threats.

这应该改变我们对全球任何地方化石燃料供应的成本与风险权衡的思考方式。

And this should change how one considers the overall price versus risk calculus of fossil supply everywhere.

当你运输一艘大型原油油轮时，你原本会默认保险费用低廉、船只能准时抵达，并且在公海上不会受到任何干扰。

If you move a very large crude carrier, you assume the insurance is cheap, that it's gonna turn up on time, and that it can be unmolested in the open ocean.

但现在的问题是，由于当前的地缘政治冲突，某些海域的运输正面临威胁。

And now the problem we have is that you are under threat through certain bodies of borders due to current geopolitical conflicts.

你可能长期面临非国家行为体的威胁。

You could be longer term under threat from non state actors.

其结果是，这是一种风险极高的能源供应来源。

And the result of that is that that's a very risky source of supply.

因此，你需要考虑依赖于从某个可能长期中断供应的地区签订长期购销合同所带来的风险。

And so you need to consider the risk associated with depending on having signing an off take from a place where that supply could get shut down for an extended period of time.

地缘政治冲击的问题在于，它们往往会持续很久。

And the problem with geopolitical shocks is they tend to drag on.

我的意思是，战争通常不会只持续一周。

I mean, wars tend to not last a week.

如果你在墨西哥湾沿岸或澳大利亚遭遇风暴，情况当然不好，但生活还是会继续。

If you have a storm in the Gulf Coast or Australia, okay, not great, but life goes on.

一周之内就结束了。

It's over in a week.

你会把事情修好。

You you fix things.

但这类冲击具有持久性，可能造成巨大的长期损害。

But with these sorts of shocks, they are persistent and can do extraordinary long term harm.

这就改变了对这是否真的是一个稳定供应来源的评估。

And this changes the calculus of is that really a stable source of supply?

很多人说，太阳能在没太阳或没风的时候效果不好。

Many people say, okay, solar's not good when the sun's not shining or when it's not blowing.

但太阳第二天还是会升起。

But the sun rises again the next day.

对吧？

Right?

是的。

Mhmm.

如果你在关键海峡爆发战争，无论是在红海还是波斯湾，这些问题通常不会在第二天早上就消失。

If you have a war kickoff over critical straits, whether it's in the Red Sea or in the Persian Gulf, those problems tend not to go away the next morning.

是的。

Mhmm.

我认为这是一个深刻的变革，人们需要内化并认真思考。

And I and I think this is something which is a a deep change which people need to internalize and think about.

让我确认一下我是否准确总结了你刚才的意思：伊朗战争不仅给全球化石燃料运输带来了风险。

Tell me if I'm summarizing what you just said accurately, that the Iran war did not just introduce risk into the global transport of fossil fuels.

它还揭示了可能比战争本身持续更久的风险，因为现在出现了无人机四处飞行攻击船只的情况，而每个人都清楚无人机具备这种能力。

It also illuminated risks that might last longer than the war itself, because it's created this situation where now you've got drones flying around attacking ships, and now everybody knows that everybody knows that drones have the capacity to do this.

因此，即使战争明天、一周后、一个月后结束，在随后的几个月乃至几年里，全球能源界的人们可能会意识到：我们刚刚了解到全球化石燃料对无人机袭击有多么脆弱。

And so even if the war ends tomorrow, in a week, in a month, in the months and years that follow, you know, maybe people in the global energy community are going to think, We just learned how incredibly vulnerable global fossil fuels are to drone attacks.

也许我们应该提高保险费率。

Maybe we should price insurance higher.

也许这种整体能源来源的成本将会更高。

Maybe the cost of this overall source of energy is just going to be higher.

这将总体上推动能源从化石燃料转向更本地化、不依赖于易受无人机攻击的公海的能源形式。

And that is going to, on balance, shift energy from fossil fuels towards something that is more local, that doesn't travel on the open seas that are vulnerable to drones.

在我看来，在其他条件相同的情况下，这种转变就是可再生能源和核能。

And that sort of thing is, I mean, it seems to me all things equal, renewables and nuclear.

把这个分析叠加到你的分析上，是否公平？

Is is that a is that a fair analysis to sort of layer onto your analysis?

绝对如此。

Absolutely.

是的。

Yeah.

我认为这最终必然会走向这个方向。

I think that is that is where it will invariably have to go.

你会将能源来源本地化，因为长期以来这些风险都被低估了。

You will in source energy because there are risks that have been underpriced for a long time.

如果你对这些风险进行定价，它们看起来就像安全成本，与碳成本非常相似，但其实并不重要。

And if you do price them, it kind of looks like a security cost, which looks a lot like a carbon cost, but it doesn't really matter.

这只是更好的风险调整后的能源供应来源。

That's just the better risk adjusted source of supply.

对。

Yeah.

这很有趣。

It's interesting.

我记得曾和另一位澳大利亚人索尔·格里菲斯讨论过推广太阳能的理由，以及如何向美国的MAGA保守派阐述太阳能的优势。

I remember talking to another Aussie, Saul Griffith, about the case for solar and making the case for solar to MAGA conservatives in America.

他说了一些起初立场迥异、但最终与你得出的结论有些相似的话。

And he said something that started in a very different place, but somewhat arrived at the same conclusion that you're reaching.

他说，我可能会告诉那些反核的MAGA保守派一件事：当你驾驶使用汽油的汽车，或者用石油和天然气为房屋供电时，是的。

He said, one thing I might tell them, MAGA conservatives who are anti nuclear, is when you drive a car that uses gasoline or you power your house with whatever, oil and natural gas, Yes.

也许这些石油或天然气来自美国——美国是巨大的能源出口国，但它参与的是一个全球石油市场，而这个市场常常使中东或俄罗斯的神权专制政权获利。

Maybe that oil or natural gas came from The US, which is a huge energy exporter, but it's participating in a global market of oil that often enriches theocratic tyrannies in The Middle East or Russia.

我们不希望自己的能源市场资助地缘政治对手。

We don't want our energy markets to enrich our geopolitical adversaries.

我们更希望，为我们的汽车供电的太阳能板，就安装在我们那座传统共和党小镇的邻居屋顶上。

We should want the solar panel that powers our car to be on the roof of our neighbor, who we love in our good old Republican town.

因此，太阳能和可再生能源在某种意义上，是一种小写的保守主义。

So there's a way in which solar and renewables are kind of small c conservative.

这是本地的。

It's local.

对吧？

Right?

我觉得你刚才说我们在把能源生产内化。

I think you said you're we're insourcing our energy.

这还挺讽刺的。

And so it's kinda funny.

他提出了一个虽然有些偏颇但很巧妙的论点，试图让共和党人认识到，太阳能的好处在于它不依赖这些全球性网络。

Like, he he was making this this, you know, somewhat tendentious but clever argument for getting Republicans to see the benefits of solar as being something that didn't rely on these sort of global networks.

而你则从另一个角度提出了类似的论点。

And you're making a similar argument from another perspective.

你说这场战争让我们意识到，全球能源市场未来可能更不稳定，因而成本更高。

You're saying this war is teaching us that global energy markets might be riskier and therefore more expensive in the future.

许多国家可能会决定说，你知道吗？

And a lot of countries might make the decision to say, you know what?

我们可以依赖太阳能发电站的价格，比如亚利桑那州的太阳能电站，或者荷兰的水电，这些都不太可能受到霍尔木兹海峡战争的干扰。

We can count on the price of and that is very unlikely to be disrupted by a by a war in the Strait Of Hormuz is a solar farm in Arizona or, you know, hydropower in, you know, The Netherlands.

因此，想想全球事件可能会重新加速向核能的转变，这挺有意思的。

And so that's it's it's kind of interesting to think that global events might be reaccelerating this shift toward nuclear.

这是一个有趣而间接的后果。

It's a it's an it's an interesting second order consequence here.

我的意思是，那个人以前经常练柔术和柔道。

I mean, I the guy used to do a lot of jujitsu and judo.

你不会主动给对手优势，我认为我们应当这样看待我们的能源系统：你愿意让敌人影响你国家的通货膨胀率吗？这可是民主国家推翻政府的绝佳方式。

You don't give someone an advantage willingly, and I think we've gotta think of our energy systems in the sense of, do you wanna give your enemy a vote on things like your country's inflation rate, which is a great way to kick your government out in a democracy?

因此，这种不安全感正是他们可以利用的，伊朗政府疯狂发推特的行为已经充分说明了这一点。

And so having this insecurity is something they can lever, and it is abundantly clear by all the compulsive tweeting of the Iranian government.

他们正试图利用这一点，声称：我会让你吃苦头，这就是我要除掉你的方法。

They are trying to lever this, and they are saying, I will inflict pain on you, and that's how I'll get rid of you.

好了，亚历克斯。

Alright, Alex.

我觉得我们已经讨论过这场战争的两个潜在的二级影响。

I feel like we've talked about two potential second order consequences of this war.

这两个影响都相当讽刺。

Both of them quite ironic.

第一，中国的增强。

Number one, the strengthening of China.

对吧？

Right?

唐纳德·特朗普试图暗杀伊朗的神权领导层。

Donald Trump attempts to assassinate the theocratic leadership of Iran.

子弹穿过伊朗领导层后反弹，不知怎的击中了我们，反而增强了中国。

The bullet passes through Iran's leadership and then ricochets and somehow hits us, strengthening China.

我们讨论过的第二个后果是，唐纳德·特朗普这位曾经的太阳能和电池的狂热倡导者，这场战争却可能推高海上化石燃料的风险溢价，促使全球许多国家开始思考：我是否还愿意像过去几年或几十年那样依赖霍尔木兹海峡？

A second consequence that we've discussed is the irony of Donald Trump, ironic champion of solar and batteries everywhere, that this war could increase risk premia on seaborne fossil fuels in a way that encourages many countries around the world to say, I'm not sure I want to rely on the Strait Of Hormuz the way that I have for the last few years or decades.

我更愿意建设本地化的能源来源。

I would much rather build a local energy source.

这种本地能源更可能是太阳能、电池、风能、水能或核能。

That local energy source is more likely to be solar, batteries, wind, hydro, nuclear.

让我们谈谈你所关注的这场战争的第三个二级后果。

Let's talk about a third second order consequence of this war that you're looking at.

在我看来，如果中东的石油和天然气生产国因这场战争而削弱，那么其他有能力生产石油和天然气的国家就会得到加强。

It seems to me that if the Middle East oil and gas producers are going to be weakened by this war, Other countries that have the capacity to produce oil and gas are going to be strengthened.

你认为还有谁可能是这场中东战争的赢家？一个讽刺性的赢家？

Who else do you think could be a winner here, an ironic winner of this war in The Middle East?

我认为，任何有能力生产化石燃料、且能直接进入公海、无需经过任何地缘政治热点区域的国家都有优势。

I think anyone with the capacity to produce fossil who is acts who has access to open ocean doesn't have to transit any geopolitical hot zones.

因此，这包括阿根廷、巴西，可能还有未来的委内瑞拉，以及许多目前拥有海上石油开发项目的西非国家。

And so that would be Argentina, Brazil, probably Venezuela at some point, and also a lot of West African countries which have offshore oil developments right now.

所以我认为，人们会转向这些地区来实现多元化，获得更简单的供应链，而无需担心无人机或其他类似威胁。

So I think that's where people will go to diversify, to have uncomplicated supply lines where they don't have to worry about drones and other such things.

因此，这可能会加强一些中南美洲的化石燃料生产国。

So it could potentially strengthen some of the Central South American fossil fuel producers.

我想确保我们也谈谈俄罗斯，因为在20世纪70年代的石油危机中，俄罗斯的石油经济确实迅速崛起。

I want to make sure that we touch on Russia as well, because in the 1970s oil crisis, Russia's petro economy really took off.

一些地缘政治分析人士认为，这有点像皮洛士式的胜利，因为俄罗斯的石油经济在20世纪70年代迅速发展。

There's some geopolitical analysts who say that it was a little bit of a Pyrrhic victory, because Russia's petro economy took off in the 1970s.

但到了80年代，当油价下跌时，苏联石油经济的衰退加剧了苏联的解体。

But then when the price of gas fell in the 1980s, that weakening of the Soviet Petroeconomy contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

他们几乎把所有赌注都押在了这种商品上，而后来这种商品贬值，直接促成了苏联的垮台。

They sort of went all in on this commodity that then depreciated, and that contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union.

我们先暂时搁置俄罗斯的问题，因为密切关注新闻的人可能知道，现在俄罗斯已被允许向印度出口商品，而此前这是被禁止的，因为我们试图通过打压俄罗斯经济来帮助乌克兰军队对抗普京。

Let's hold on on Russia a bit because, you know, people following the news closely probably know that Russia has now been allowed to sell commodities to India, which previously was verboten as we were trying to squeeze the Russian economy to allow the Ukraine's army to to win against Putin.

但我们现在对俄罗斯的情况了解多少？

But where are we right now with Russia?

嗯，毫无疑问，油价确实上涨了。

Well, they're not actually certainly, the price has gone up without a doubt.

问题是，他们的石油装运港口正越来越频繁地起火，因为乌克兰一直在全俄境内发动袭击，甚至波及波罗的海地区。

The problem is is that their oil loading ports are increasingly and frequently on fire because they are getting hit by Ukraine all across Russia, even in the Baltic.

普里莫尔斯克、奥卢斯加等地已多次遭到袭击。

There have been numerous hits on Primorsk, Osluga, and so on.

因此，他们在产量方面难以真正获益，同时由于乌克兰持续不断的袭击，他们的国内炼油系统也面临困境。

So they are struggling to really benefit in volume terms, and they're also struggling with the internal domestic refining system due to all these hits by Ukraine, which are just ongoing.

这一切的核心事实是，战争工具的变革带来了巨大影响。

And this is the central fact of all this is that the tools of warfare of change, that changes a lot.

因此，我认为我们需要将此视为一种范式转变，它将对地缘政治和全球经济产生深远影响，必须深入思考。

So I think we need to consider that as sort of a paradigm shift, which is gonna has a lot of downstream impacts and geopolitics and needs to be contemplated very deeply.

那我们现在就来谈谈这些后果。

Well, let's talk about those consequences right now.

你认为无人机战争的兴起——这显然是这场战争的一个重要特征——将如何改变全球化石燃料市场，以及未来的全球经济和地缘政治格局？

What do you think are the most important ways in which the rise of drone warfare, which is clearly a major feature of this war, is gonna change not just, you know, global fossil fuel markets, but the global economy and geopolitics in the future.

历史学家卡罗尔·奎格利写过一本很棒的书，讲述武器系统如何推动历史。

There's a great book by a historian called Carol Quigley, which is about how weapon systems drive history.

这本书实际上是在七十年代出版的，是作者去世后出版的。

It was published in the seventies actually, posthumously.

我认为，观察这些平台的作用，有点类似于步兵和公民军队的兴起，因为你现在可以拥有公民无人机操作员。

And I think looking at what these platforms do, it's a little bit like the emergence of the rifleman and the sort of citizen army in the sense that you can have the citizen drone pilot.

在这些无人机的覆盖范围内，你可以建立一种非常实用的领土军队，这种军队不再像过去那样严重依赖集中化和力量投射——而正是这些因素曾让美国长期有效地投射军事力量。

And within that range of those drones, you can have a very functional kind of territorial army, which doesn't lean as hard on the centralization and force projection that, you know, allowed The US to project military power so effectively for so long.

因此，只要你具备生产这些平台的工业能力，作为中等强国，你在未来的地缘政治中将拥有更大的话语权。

So provided you have the industrial capacity to produce these platforms, you as a mid sized power get a much bigger vote in geopolitics going forward.

所以我认为，这对美国构成了挑战，尤其是在当前的中东地区。

So I think this is a challenge to The US, certainly in The Middle East right now.

但我认为，如果中国未来在其他地方采取扩张政策，这同样会成为它的挑战，就像对俄罗斯和乌克兰造成的巨大挑战一样。

But I think it's also gonna be a challenge to China if they were to get expansionist elsewhere, much as it has been extremely challenging for Russia and Ukraine.

因此，我认为在某种程度上，这正在使力量格局趋于平等，而关键问题变成了：你的社会是否具有韧性？

So I I think this is kind of to a certain extent, it's a flattening of the field, and I think that's it becomes more about, is your society resilient?

你能否以分布式或更具韧性的模式提供粮食和能源，然后你才能进行战斗。

Can you provide food, power on a distributed or more resilient basis, and then you can fight.

这样一来，一个国家就很难被彻底击垮了。

And then it's very hard to get rolled as a country.

我认为，作为一个中等国家，这本身并不是一件糟糕的事，但对美国来说，接受这一变化确实非常具有挑战性，因为这与美国自20世纪30年代以来所形成的一切认知构成了结构性断裂。

And I think that's not a terrible thing coming from a mid sized country myself, but it is does really it is I think it's a very challenging thing for The US to take on that this change has occurred because it is a it a structural break with everything The US has learned since really the nineteen thirties.

你是在暗示，无人机应该像核武器那样产生一种威慑效应吗？

You suggesting that drones should therefore have a kind of deterrence effect the way that atomic weapons clearly do?

是的。

Yes.

但显然，威慑效应并不足以阻止美国轰炸德黑兰。

Clearly, deterrence effect wasn't enough to stop The US from, you know, bombing Tehran.

但你是否认为，在未来，如果我们观察俄乌战争、伊以冲突，考虑到未来几年主要大国即便出现像超级智能这样的重大技术突破，它们仍可能意识到：如果没有无人机，军事行动本会更容易；而无人机使得战场更加扁平化，让较小或较弱的国家也能造成巨大破坏，从而打乱发动战争的决策逻辑？

But you're saying perhaps in the future, looking at the Ukraine Russia war, looking at the Iran war, major powers in the next few years, notwithstanding some major development, superintelligence that again changes the landscape of war, future future major powers might say, this military campaign is not going to be as easy as would be without drones because drones allow for this flattening of leveling of the battlefield such that a smaller or weaker country can nonetheless do enormous damage in a way that messes up the calculus of beginning a war?

是的。

Yeah.

我认为目前正是这种情况。

I think currently that is the state of play.

我认为这既不是好事也不是坏事。

And I think it's a it is a not it is neither good nor bad.

这仅仅是战略组合和工具组合的变化，而这将带来新的战略。

It is simply a change in what the strategy set is, and the tool set, and that will lead to new strategies.

但我觉得，目前美国的这种模式——B-2轰炸机起飞、摧毁目标、然后飞回，而无需担心伊拉克、阿联酋等地的本地基地遭到袭击——已经不复存在了。

But I think at this point, the sort of the sort of paradigm in The US where you could have a b two take off, and then flatten stuff, and then fly back, and then not have to worry about your local bases being attacked in Iraq or UAE or what have you.

我认为这种情况现在已经结束了。

I think that's over now.

事实就是如此，无可奈何。

And and it's it is what it is.

我想在这里做个总结。

I wanna round things out here.

在公开讨论中，我提到过上世纪七十年代的能源危机如何产生深远影响，其触角遍及全球，你可以将七十年代的石油危机与苏联石油经济的兴衰联系起来，而后者最终导致了苏联帝国的崩溃。

In the open, I talked about how the nineteen seventies energy crisis had these enormous tendrils, these tentacles that wrapped around the world, that you can attach the nineteen seventies oil crisis to the rise and fall of the Soviet petro economy that led to the downfall of the Soviet empire.

你也可以将其与日本经济联系起来，日本从高能耗的重型机械转向了成本更低的机器人技术。

You can associate it with the economy of Japan, which switched from energy expensive heavy machinery to less expensive robotics.

因此，讽刺的是，像随身听、任天堂这样的产品，都是上世纪七十年代石油危机的遗产。

And so ironically, things like the Walkman, Nintendo are part of the legacy of the nineteen seventies oil crisis.