吉姆·陈诺斯：我们正处在一个欺诈的黄金时代

我觉得这依然是市场面前那个最关键的六十四万亿美元问题，因为我们目前还没看到太多这方面的实际成果。

And that that I think is still the the the 64, you know, trillion dollar question before the market because we haven't seen a lot of that yet.

也许会有，也希望会有，但这还得时间验证。

We might, and hopefully we will, but that that will remain to be seen.

你提到的情景中，未来十二到十八个月内可能出现的转折点，似乎就是大型科技公司的高管们坐下来讨论，然后说：我们不确定这样做到底有没有意义。

It seems that the breaking point that you outline in your scenario of what could happen over the next twelve to eighteen months, the turning point is when the people in the c suite at big tech have that conversation and say, we're not sure that this actually makes sense.

考虑到我们在AI领域，至少在消费端还没有看到明显的投资回报率，你对这种情况至今尚未发生感到惊讶吗？

Are you surprised that that hasn't happened yet given the fact that we haven't really seen the ROI yet in AI, that we haven't seen it, at the consumer level at least.

你提到了增量投入资本的回报率，正如你所说，这对大型科技公司来说正在下滑。

You know, you point out the the return on incremental invested capital, which as you correctly point out is declining for big tech.

我的意思是，为什么大家还没开始讨论这个问题？你觉得这事会

I mean, why hasn't that conversation happened yet, and do you think that it will

很快发生吗？

happen soon?

人性还是那个样子，这东西就像个闪闪发光的新玩具，人们依然对它着迷。

Human nature is still human nature, and this is the shiny new object, and people are still enamored with it.

董事会也还没开始提出尖锐的问题，因为公司们还在发布盈利预期，而且总体上要么得到市场奖励，要么至少没被彻底否定。

And the boards of directors haven't yet started to ask difficult questions because companies are still making their earnings estimates and and generally being rewarded or not completely trashed for it.

但就像我说的，如果过去两年我们清楚看到的趋势继续下去，那么资本支出每年增长50%，而营业收入只增长10%，这种局面就很难一直维持下去了。

But as I say, if the trends continue that we clearly see over the past two years, it's going to be hard to keep justifying growing your capital spending, you know, 50% a year if your operating income is only growing 10% a year.

这种情况会被注意到，而且会被市场注意到。

That will get noticed, and it will get noticed by the market.

也许市场已经注意到了。

And it might be already noticed by the market.

那些超大规模云服务商的表现并不好。

The hyperscalers are underperforming.

你知道，那些大量购买算力的大客户，在过去三四个月里表现都不太理想。

You know, the the the big buyers of compute have under underperformed in the past sort of three, four months.

谁知道呢？

So who knows?

我们只能等着看了。

We'll have to see.

我一直觉得特别有意思的是，你提到的这些观点，市场到底已经消化了多少？

That has been a fascinating question to me is to what extent are the points that you're making already priced in?

从很多方面来看，市场有些角落已经消化了这些信息，但有些角落却完全没有体现。

And in a lot of ways, it seems that there are certain corners of the market where it is priced in, certain corners of the market where it doesn't exist whatsoever.

我有点搞不清楚这到底意味着什么，更重要的是，从投资的角度来看，该怎么应对这种情况。

And I can't quite understand what to make of that, and more importantly, what to do about that from an investing perspective.

你怎么看这个问题？

What is your view on that?

对。

Yeah.

我觉得你说得对。

I mean, I would agree with you.

你知道，现在还是有一些投机资金在到处流动，不断寻找新的热门领域。

You know, there there is there there's still these buckets of speculative capital that keeps sloshing around, that keep looking for the hot new area.

所以我们放弃超大规模云服务商，转投Neo Cloud。

So we we give up on hyperscalers, we buy Neo Clouds.

如果放弃新云，我们就去买芯片公司和存储公司。

And if we give up on Neo Clouds, we buy chip companies and memory companies.

如果对这些也腻了，就再买点别的。

And and if, you know, we're we're tired of those, we buy something.

比如买苹果，它创了新高，却没什么资本开支。

We buy Apple, which is hitting a new high, who's not spending any money.

这其实跟股市的历史一样古老。

So it's it's it's as old as stock markets.

对吧？

Right?

说白了，人们就是一直在找最热门的领域。

I mean, people just keep looking for the the hottest area.

但我觉得，如果整体上因为回报率下降，AI投资开始收缩，那么整个生态系统——就像2024和2025年那样——都会受到影响。

But I would think that if overall, the AI spend begins to to get pulled back because of lower returns, I think the whole ecosystem, much like the whole ecosystem, really prospered in 2024 and 2025.

那时候所有东西都在涨。

Everything went up.

现在我们开始看到一些辨别力了，而且我认为如果投资回报率继续下降，这种情况还会持续。

Now we're starting to see some discernment, and and I think that'll that'll continue if the if the ROIICs continue to drop.

这种辨别力，你是根据我们在债券市场上看到的——比如CDS价格飙升，或者甚至是对股票市场的兴趣——来判断的吗？

That discernment is are you seeing that based on what we're seeing in the bond markets, whether CDS prices are exploding or perhaps even interest in the in the stock markets?

我是说，纳斯达克已经进入回调区间了。

I mean, the Nasdaq is in correction territory.

我们在股票市场上看到了。

We're seeing in the stock market.

现在有很多分化现象。

There's a lot of there's a lot of bifurcation going on.

我是说，我们在做空方面今年表现很好，而标普500指数离历史高点只有一步之遥，等权重标普500指数也创了历史新高。

I mean, we're having a very good year on the short side, and I think the S and P is within a stone's throw of of its all time high and the equal weighted S and P is at all time highs.

但在表面之下，有很多股票已经跌了20%、30%、40%。

And yet under the surface, there are a lot of stocks that are down twenty, thirty, 40%.

所以，这其实已经开始了。

So so it it has started already.

顺便说一句，回到那个危险期，其实是从99年底开始的。

It and by the way, just to go back to the peril, that started in late ninety nine.

我想指出的是，并不是所有股票都在持续翻倍——就像我提到的，我朋友那只股票在抛物线末端还在涨，但早在99年中期，有些股票就已经开始下跌了，而且没有跟随大盘走势。我记得亚马逊是在99年秋天或夏天见顶的。

I would point out that for every stock that kept going doubling, as I indicated, my friend's stock did, you know, at the end of the parabola, there were stocks that were starting to break down starting in mid ninety nine and and and not following generally the I think Amazon peaked in the in the fall of ninety nine or summer of ninety nine.

这种情况以前也发生过，但你看，指数和某些板块仍然能继续冲向历史新高。

So this has happened before, and and yet, you know, you can still see indices and and certain sectors continue to race to to all time highs.

不过，就像我之前说的，更广泛的问题是，市场其他部分并不便宜。

But but as I indicated, you know, before, the broader problem is is that the rest of the market ain't so cheap.

所以资金在四处流动，把公司股价推来推去。

So sloshing around is is is moving, you know, companies around.

我最近没怎么看苹果。

I I I haven't looked at Apple recently.

斯科特可能知道。

You know, Scott maybe Scott knows.

苹果现在又回到40倍市盈率了吗？

Is Apple back at 40 times earnings?

50倍？

50 times?

差不多就是这个数吧。

I mean, something something like that.

我觉得盈利基本没增长。

Nongrowing earnings, I think.

这正好印证了你说的。

It defines what you said.

一家成熟的公司，却被当成成长型公司来定价。

It's a it's a mature company being priced as a growth company.

你之前说的一句话让我很感兴趣——我在找做空机会的时候，自然会先看那些看起来最不理性的定价。

The you said something that fascinated me that when I think about looking for shorting opportunities, you naturally go to the stuff that's most appears to be most irrationally priced.

但我发现，这些定价不合理的股票，上涨风险很大，可能一觉醒来就翻倍了。

But I find there's there's ups there's risk to the upside that these irrationally priced prod stocks, you could wake up and they can double.

而你提到一个我之前没想过的点，就是像WD-40这样的公司。

And whereas you you mentioned something fascinating that I hadn't thought about, and that is a company like WD forty.

我觉得你醒来发现它翻倍的风险，比我们醒来发现SpaceX翻倍的风险要低得多，尽管后者看起来很不理性。

I don't I think the risk that you wake up and it's doubled is much lower than we wake up and find out that as irrational as it is that SpaceX has doubled.

对。

Yeah.

从你自己的风险评估来看，你觉得那些随着大市上涨的普通股票，它们上涨的风险更小，是不是反而在你看来，比我们常讨论的那些股票提供了更好的做空机会？

Do you find that in terms of your your own risk calculation that the the lesser risk to the upside of some of these stocks, that these mundane stocks that have risen with all with the tide, do you find that those in fact create, in your view, better shorting opportunities than some of the names we talk about?

跟你说我有多分裂吧，我的投资组合里两种都有。

To tell you how bifurcated I am, I have both in the portfolio.

怎么说？

How's that?

所以，对。

So Right.

对。

Right.

我有些公司，用任何传统公司金融指标来看，都只是被高估了100%。

I had some some companies that just are are just simply overpriced by any kind of traditional corporate finance metric by by a 100%.

一般来说，这些股票不会一夜之间翻倍。

And generally, those stocks, you know, they're not going to double on you overnight.

而且通常来说，它们是我们所说的相当不错的阿尔法做空标的。

And generally, they've been what what we call pretty good alpha shorts.

对吧？

Right?

它们多年来一直横盘，而市场却在上涨。

They've been flat for years as the market has gone up.

然后还有那些“希望与梦想”的股票。

Then you have the hopes and dreams stocks.

对吧？

Right?

对于这些“希望与梦想”的股票，你需要市场来帮你一把。

And and and for the hopes and dream stocks, you need the market to help you out.

对吧？

Right?

需要股市下跌，散户投资者真的亏钱，那些希望和梦想股才会跌掉90%。

You need the stock market to go down and retail investors to actually lose money, and that's when the hopes and dream stocks go down 90%.

你看，WD-40不会跌掉90%。

You know, w d forty is not going down 90%.

但那些希望和梦想股才是风险最高的，所以投资组合里应该相应控制仓位，要么用小头寸，要么用看跌期权，或者用各种不同的方式来表达你的观点，而不是承担传统做空那种固有的无限风险。

But but but the hopes and dream stocks really are are are the ones that that, you know, have the most risk and should therefore be sized accordingly in your portfolio at smaller positions or via puts or, you know, variety of different ways you can express your view without taking inherently unlimited risk that you have on on a on a classic short position.

所以，经过四十年，我们摸索出了几种办法来应对。

So there's there's there's a few ways we figured out how to do that after forty years.

但你看，你躲不开的。

But but look, you can't you can't avoid it.

那些类型的股票就是能让散户兴奋。

Those types of names are the ones that excite retail people.

我想带你回到几年前，当时我们做空类似的东西，比如Peloton和Beyond Meat，没过多久，那些股票先涨了10倍，然后跌掉了95%。

I would take you back just a few years when we were short similar kinds of things like Peloton and Beyond Meat, and it wasn't so long ago that those stocks were up 10 x before they dropped ninety ninety five x.

所以，这是个刺激的游戏，也让我着迷。

So it's it's an exciting game, and and and mad me.

所以我想深入聊聊这个机制的问题。

So I I wanna double click on the idea of the mechanics.

SpaceX上市时估值是营收的80倍。

So SpaceX comes out at 80 times revenues.

后来涨到了营收的120倍。

It goes to a 120 times revenues.

你可以说我老派。

And call me a boomer.

我实在想不通这个逻辑。

I just I just can't I can't wrap my head around that.

于是我就想，这是个做空的机会。

And so I think, okay, this is an opportunity to short it.

然后我琢磨着，我知道该怎么操作。

And I think, I know what I'll do.

我其实对做空并不精通。

I'm I'm not a sophisticated investor around shorting.

我打算去买看跌期权。

I'm gonna go buy puts.

结果我发现看跌期权特别贵，市场已经传出消息说这只股票可能被高估了。

And what I find out is that puts are really expensive, that word is out that this might be overvalued.

然后我就想，好吧。

And then I think, well, okay.

我打算卖出看涨期权。

I'm gonna sell calls.

但这本身也有它自己的风险。

That creates its that has its own inherent risk.

对吧？

Right?

你们会从各种角度反复琢磨，想找到风险回报比最有利的方式来表达观点，同时明白市场对定价还是挺准的。

What you guys look at every which way but loose to express a viewpoint in the most advantageous way in terms of risk to reward, recognizing the market's pretty good at calibrating stuff.

但就表达一只股票被高估这个观点而言，你觉得哪种操作方式是最理想的？

But what mechanics around expressing a viewpoint around a stock being overvalued is in your view your optimal means of expressing that viewpoint?

那你觉得，像吉姆·查诺斯那样做空，最稳妥、最考虑风险的方式是什么？

How do you go and you how does Jim Chanos go short in what you think is the most thoughtful risk adjusted way?

嗯，首先我们会调整投资组合的贝塔系数，这是第一点。

Well, again, we we beta adjust our portfolio, number one.

所以像SpaceX这种波动性特别大的情况，仓位会非常小，而核心仓位可能会大得多。

So so really highly volatile situations like a SpaceX or whatever will be very small positions relative to to a core position that that might be much greater.

这是第一点。

That's number one.

而且一个包含40只股票的投资组合能很好地分散风险，特别是如果你持有像WD-40这样的股票。

And and a portfolio of 40 names goes a long way of diversifying you, particularly if you're in things like WD-forty or whatever.

你分散掉了很多个股特有的风险，比如做空时股价上涨的风险，当然也牺牲了潜在的回报。

You diversify away a lot of that idiosyncratic, you know, short side risk on the upside, kinda give away the potential reward as well.

所以做空本质上是个阿尔法游戏，关键在于找到足够多真正糟糕的商业模式，这样即使有一两个像特斯拉在2019和2020年那样让你头疼的股票，也不至于全盘皆输。

So it's it's an alpha game on the short side and the idea is you find enough enough really bad business models that that that the one or two that are gonna just be devil you like Tesla did for us in 2019 and 2020.

顺便说一句，特斯拉在那段时间只占我们投资组合的2%到3%，我们不得不一直减仓，因为它一直涨一直涨，我们得把它控制在2%或3%的比例。

And by the way, Tesla Tesla was a two to 3% position during that period for us, and, you know, and we just had to keep cutting it back because it just kept going up and up and up and up and to keep it at two or 3%.

所以你还得采用动态风险管理。

So you have to you have to do use dynamic risk mitigation as well.

如果做空时某只股票走势不利，你不能放任不管。

If something's going against you on the short side, you can't just let it run.

你得削减仓位，把它控制在风险参数范围内。

You have to trim it to keep it within your risk parameters.

反过来，如果股价下跌，你反而要加仓。

And and the same thing on the downside, you have to add to it.

做空有很多矛盾之处，这是最大的一个。

So there's a lot of paradoxes in the short side, and that's that's the biggest one.

对你不利的仓位会变大，对你有利的仓位反而变小。

Things that go against you become bigger, and things that go your way become smaller.

这在单个股票上对你很不利。

It works against you in an individual way.

不过，在一个包含40只股票的投资组合里，总会有一些表现好的，一些表现差的，大部分则是不温不火。

However, in a portfolio of 40 names, you know, you're always going to have, you know, names that are working, names that aren't working, and most of them just mucking about.

所以关键在于构建合适的投资组合，不要过度集中在某个领域，比如人工智能。

So it's a matter of structuring the right portfolio, not being too concentrated in one area like AI.

我们确实做空了不少人工智能股票。

You know, we have a number of AI shorts.

但这并不是一个专门做空人工智能的基金。

It is not an AI short fund.

我们涉足各种不同的消费行业、金融领域，以及各种各样的东西。

You know, it's it's we're in all kinds of diverse consumer industries, financials, all kinds of things.

所以，我们努力为客户构建一个最合理的投资组合，针对那些商业模式天生不盈利、永远无法盈利或即将陷入亏损的公司，同时在另一边搭配正确的被动指数。

So again, trying to for our clients just build a portfolio that makes the most sense for business models that just inherently are unprofitable or will never be profitable or about to be unprofitable, and and then combine it with the right passive indices on the other side.

所以，做空SpaceX的对冲方式，和做空WD-40的对冲方式是不一样的。

So a SpaceX the hedge against the SpaceX is different versus the hedge against the w d 40.

这在资产负债表资产端也同样适用。

So it works on the asset side of the balance sheet too.

你给我的感觉让我有点意外，我一直以为吉姆·查诺斯是个特立独行的牛仔，像比尔·阿克曼那样，敢于承担巨大风险，一旦有信念就集中持仓。

The tone I'm getting from you that's surprising to me is I always think of Jim Chanos as like a maverick cowboy, like taking extraordinary risks, of the the Bill Ackman cons you know, you're concentrated if you have conviction.

如果你没有信心，那就说明你确实没把握。

And if you're not, you don't have conviction.

我从你这里听到的，正是我们经常讨论的一点——没有谁比市场更强大，关键在于分散投资。

And what I hear from you is something we talk about a lot, and that is no one individual is bigger than the market, and the key is diversification.

说实话，你听起来像一位非常深思熟虑、我不想说保守，但很稳健的对冲基金经理。

And you sound, quite frankly, just like a very thoughtful, I don't wanna say conservative, but tempered, you know, hedge fund manager.

你一直都是这样吗？

Have you always been like that?

还是说，随着年龄增长，你见识了市场的各种特性，就变得更谨慎了，意识到不能太激进？

Or as have you as you've gotten older and have registered, you know, idiosyncrasies of the market, you've become a little bit more measured and recognize that, okay.

比如，我们投40个，而不是4个。

Let's have 40, not not not four.

你是随着时间的推移改变了，还是说大家觉得你是个特立独行的人，这种看法已经过时了？

Have you changed over time, or is the perception of you being a maverick a little bit outdated?

从1985年到1995年，我们确实挺激进的。

We were cowboys from 1985 to 1995.

我们当时持仓更集中，还用了杠杆，从85年到90、91年赚了一大笔钱，但91年到95年间又吐回去不少。

We ran much more concentrated, ran ran on margin, and made a fortune from '85 to '90 1990 '91, and then gave a lot of it back from '91 to '95.

我们有个客户，跟我们合作了二十年，关系非常好。

And we had a client who was a fantastic client of ours for twenty years.

他们来找我们说，不如你帮我们管理这个对冲基金吧。

They came to us and said, well, why don't you just run this hedge for us?

别用杠杆，仓位也别满，我们只拿组合里的多头部分，然后根据你的阿尔法收益来评估你。

And and don't use don't use margin and and be less than a 100% invested, and we'll we'll take the the long side of the portfolio, and we'll judge you accordingly, I.

就是按超额收益来算。

On an alpha basis.

这一下就改变了我们的商业模式。

And that changed our business model overnight.

所以实际上过去三十年，我们管理的组合比大家想象的要分散得多。

And so really for the last thirty years, we have been running portfolios that are much less concentrated than people think.

你要是上推特看看，大家还以为我只做空特斯拉和另外三只股票呢。

And, you know, if you go on to Twitter, people would think that I'm only short Tesla and like three other stocks.

当然，我只是喜欢写写特斯拉和其他三只股票，但我们实际上做空了40只股票，仓位各不相同，远低于满仓，而且做了对冲。

And of course, I just I like to to write about Tesla and three other stocks, but we are short 40 names in various levels, well below a 100% invested and hedged.

所以在这方面，我们比大家想象的要传统得多，也比你想象的要传统。

So we're we're much more conventional in that respect than I think people think and and you thought.

我觉得我们的听众可能很想知道其中一些股票的名字。

I think our listeners are probably interested in knowing what some of those names are.

在我继续之前，你能分享一下你做空的一些股票吗？

Before I move on, could you share some of those names that you're short on?

嗯，再说一次，我们在公开论坛上写过其中一些，有些我觉得非常可疑，比如Neo Clouds和马斯克的两家公司。

Well, again, we we we've written about a number of them on public in public forums on on some of them that I just find highly questionable, like like the Neo Clouds and mister Musk's two companies.

特斯拉和SpaceX都在里面。

Both Tesla and SpaceX are in that.

特斯拉和SpaceX。

Tesla and SpaceX.

是的。

Yes.

是的。

Yes.

我更喜欢那些与事实关系更紧密的CEO，这么说吧。

I prefer my CEOs to have a a a more a more, shall we say, strengthened relationship with the truth.

我们过去很多年一直大量做空中国市场的投资组合，但现在不再这样了。

We and then for years and years, we were short we were short a significant amount of the portfolio in China, which we aren't anymore.

从2010年到2020年，这让我们保持了相当不错的收益，因为那个市场太疯狂了，而且那个经济体系完全建立在房地产之上。

And that that kept us in pretty good stead from 2010 to 2020 because of the of just how crazy that market is and how crazy that economy was based on real estate.

现在情况完全反过来了，那笔交易已经结束了。

And and that's now completely reversed, and that trade has moved on.

但重要的是要记住，这种情况并不总是只发生在这里。

But it's it's it's important to remember this doesn't always just happen here.

我们马上回来。

We'll be right back.

想要更多市场内容，请访问profgmarkets.com订阅我们的新闻通讯。

And for even more markets content, sign up for our newsletter at profgmarkets.com.

欢迎回到Prof G Markets。

We're back with Prof G Markets.

做空领域我最喜欢的一句格言，我觉得它概括了一切，就是市场非理性持续的时间可能比你保持偿付能力的时间更长。

One of the the my favorite adages in short selling, which I feel like just sums it all up, is that the market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.

我觉得这一点很重要。

And I find that to be an important point.

我的理解是，做空的关键其实不在于你判断得对不对。

And my takeaway is that the name of the game of short selling isn't actually to be correct.

而在于你能否判断市场什么时候会认同你的判断是对的。

It is to know when the market will agree with you that you are correct.

对我来说，这完全是两码事。

And to me, those are two very, very different games.

我觉得在讨论做空时，这一点往往被忽略了。

And I feel as if it's sort of under discussed when it comes to short selling.

我个人深有体会，因为我们在节目里经常聊的内容就是，看看市场上那些泡沫化的趋势吧。

I feel this personally because a lot of the content that we talk about on this show is look at all of these bubbleicious trends that we're seeing in the market.

然后每个人都说，对，但市场在涨啊。

And then everyone says, yeah, but the market's going up.

所以我想问，你怎么看待这个问题？你同意我的看法吗，就是这其实跟时机有关？

So I guess how do you think about that problem, and how do you do you agree with my takeaway, that it's actually about timing?

做了四十年，我对那句话有一个观察，那就是我往往在多头快要破产之前听到这种话。

After forty years, I will make one observation about that statement, and and that is I tend to hear it right before the bulls are the ones that become insolvent.

所以当有人说‘是啊，当然，价格是疯了，但那又怎样？’的时候，你得小心一点。

So it's you have to be a little bit careful when people say, well, yeah, of course, I I you know, prices are crazy, but so what?

它们还能更疯。

They can get crazier.

到了那个点，空头已经承受了痛苦，要么退场了，要么降低了风险，或者做了别的调整。

And and and at that at that point, the bears have already taken their pain and they've left the field or reduced their risk or whatever.

通常那些用保证金交易、缺乏经验的投资者，才是即将被收割的对象。

And it's usually the the unsophisticated investor who's on margin who's about to get killed.

但撇开这个不谈，这又回到了投资组合构建和多元化的问题上，而且有很多企业你可以去分析。

But setting that aside, it gets back to the point of portfolio construction and diversification, and and there's just lots of businesses you could analyze.

斯科特比我和埃德都更清楚这一点，这根本说不通。

And Scott knows this better than than than me or you, Ed, that that just make no sense.

对吧？

Right?

就是回报根本不存在。

Where where just the returns aren't there.

回报永远不会出现。

The returns will never be there.

要么是在兜售一个梦想，要么回报低于资本成本，他们靠借钱来维持，诸如此类。

A dream is being sold or the returns are below the cost of capital and they're using debt to to to finance it or what have you.

而且企业的失败率相当高。

And and the failure rate in business is quite high.

大多数公司都会倒闭。

Most companies fail.

你只需要避开那些——你知道的——只有2%的公司不仅成功，还能持续经营五十年、六十年、七十年，因为人们通过指数在多头市场上赚到的钱，主要就来自这些公司。

You just have to avoid the ones the the 2% that, you know, not only prosper but but go on for fifty and sixty and seventy years because that's where people make most of their money on the long side via indices.

成功的是少数，大多数公司都会失败。

It's the successes and most companies fail.

所以，再说一遍，如果你注意控制风险、降低风险，并且避开那些百倍回报的投机，通常来说，一个多元化的对冲空头组合能让你做得相当不错。

So, again, if you watch your risks and mitigate your risks and avoid the the 100 x's, generally, you can do pretty well on a diversified hedged short portfolio.

对于正在听这个节目的听众来说，如果他们完全同意你对人工智能风险的看法，也认同那些问题，以及那些被过度高估、跑得太快的公司，那他们在自己的投资组合里到底应该怎么做呢？

For a listener who's hearing this and is in total agreement with you on the risks in AI, some of the problems, and some of those names that have just gotten flat out overvalued over their skis, What should they actually do in their investment portfolio?

比如说，现在是时候了吗？我是说，你会卖掉什么吗？

Like, is this the moment where you I mean, do you do you sell anything?

你会做空什么吗？

Do you go short anything?

你的建议是什么？

What will be your advice?

我想告诉投资者的一点是，如果你的投资组合里全是那些五年内都无法盈利的公司，那你可能得开始减持了。

One thing I would just tell investors is if you have a portfolio full of companies that are based that aren't gonna be profitable for five years, you might wanna start trimming those.

对吧？

Right?

因为预测未来，我四十年的经验告诉我，真的非常非常难。

Because predicting the future I found over forty years is really, really hard.

而且你预测未来的时间越长，难度就越大。

And and the further out you go in predicting the future, the harder it gets.

所以，如果你最喜欢的卖方分析师告诉你，这只股票按2030或2035年的EBITDA算才40倍，很便宜，那你可能得留个心眼。因为真正的爆仓风险就藏在这些公司里——现在很多公司借着AI的东风，完全是建立在2030或2035年盈利预期上的空中楼阁，而且就算按那些预期算，它们也不便宜。

And and so if if, you know, your favorite sell side analyst is telling you, well, the stock is cheap at only 40 times twenty thirty five EBITDA, you know, maybe step aside because it it it really is that's where the that's where the blow up risk in your portfolio resides in terms of and there's lots of those companies right now where because of AI, whatever, they're being built literally as castles in the sky based on 2030 or 2035, you know, hopes of profitability, and they're not cheap on those metrics.

所以我觉得，如果你能找到那些现在业绩不错、正在盈利的公司，而且如果行业景气持续，它们还能赚更多，那你的处境通常会比买一个比特币矿商好得多——那种公司亏着几亿美元，却告诉你2030年每股能赚1美元，然后股价还炒到60美元。

So I think if if you can find companies that are doing well now, are making profits now, will probably make more profits if the boom continues, you'll generally be in good stead than buying, you know, a bitcoin miner that's losing hundreds of millions of dollars, but is telling you they're gonna make a dollar a share in 2030, then the stock's at 60.

这是我给投资者的一条实际建议。

That's one practical thing I can tell investors.

在周期的这个阶段，你应该开始修剪投资组合里那些讲故事的股票了。

At this point in the cycle, you should be sort of pruning your portfolio of those stories.

那现在投资指数基金怎么样？

What about investing in index funds at this point?

因为我觉得在股票投资里，这算是比较经典的稳妥选择。

Because I think that's sort of the classic safe move when it comes to equity investing.

但就像你说的，标普500里的很多股票现在都估值过高了。

But to your point, a lot of the names in the S and P are overvalued.

而且最近被动投资资金大量涌入，这很可能在支撑很多股票的价格，整体市场确实很贵。

There has also been this massive influx of passive investing, which arguably might be propping up a lot of these names, and it's generally expensive.

我是说，现在投资标普500，不管是等权重还是普通标普，是不是比以前风险更大了？

I mean, is investing in the S and P either the equal weight or regular S and P, does that hold more risk at this point than it did before?

我自己就持有。

I own it.

对。

So Yeah.

所以你不该问我，因为我手里有这40只高风险股票在做对冲。

I'm not the one to ask because I've got I've got these 40 radioactive companies against it.

对吧？

Right?

所以我不是最合适回答这个问题的人，虽然我也觉得市场很贵，但我自己还是买了指数基金。

So I'm probably not the right person to say even though I think it is expensive, you know, I own the indices.

这基本上是每个人都会面临的困境之一。

Which is one of the dilemmas for for basically everyone.

说实话，你很难找到哪个投资者对标准普尔指数没有大量敞口。

I mean, you'd be hard pressed to find any investor who isn't doesn't have significant exposure to the S and P.

但可能我们很多人也和你一样，觉得它挺贵的，这就让我们陷入了两难。

But then perhaps many of us are also agree as you do, which looks pretty expensive, which puts us in a tough spot.

不过，市场时机很难把握，而且大多数投资者，你知道的，投资组合里还是得有市场整体风险敞口。

But, it's hard to time the market, and and most investors, you know, should have beta in their portfolio.

大多数投资者都应该参与股市。

Most investors should be exposed to the stock market.

问题只在于投多少、投哪里，以及你的风险承受能力如何。

It's just a matter of how much and where and what your risk tolerance is.

但我绝不会告诉任何人，比如年轻投资者或中年投资者，因为市场贵就退出股市。

But I would never tell anybody, you know, a young investor or a mid a midlife investor, you know, get out of the stock market because it's expensive.

我完全不知道。

I I have no idea.

就像我们刚才说的，它可能还会更贵。

It might get more expensive as we discussed.

你发现了一些东西，然后心想，好吧。

You discover something you think, okay.

下行风险远远大于上行风险。

There's just way more risk to the downside than risk to the upside.

我们确实发现了一些东西。

We've discovered something.

我觉得这其实只成功了一半，因为接下来你要做的是，确保别人也能发现你已经找到的东西。

You that's half it strikes me that's kinda half the battle because then what you want is to ensure that other people discover what you've already found.

而你在这方面非常擅长，你会做研究。

And you have been very adept at you make these you do research.

你会去媒体上露面。

You go on media.

聊聊你是怎么规划的，有没有一套系统来帮你——你大概是全球最知名的做空者了，所以斯科特，你显然有这个能力。

Talk a little bit about how structured or planned do you have a system for helping you're arguably the most famous short seller in the world, so you clearly have an ability Scott, that's a

这个门槛太低了。

very low bar.

就像我一位老搭档说的，这好比被称为‘法国最强壮的男人’。

As an old partner of mine, you say, that's like being called the toughest guy in France.

我回头再谈这个，因为我想说的是，很大程度上这源于对羞耻的恐惧。大概五六年前，我发过一篇文章，说OYO、Snap和WeWork被严重高估了。

I'll come back to that because what I will say is I think a lot of that is fear of shame, and that is I put out a post, I think, five or six years ago where I said OYO and Snap and WeWork were just dramatically overvalued.

我从未见过那种程度的反弹、愤怒、人身攻击，甚至有人说我是邪恶之人——这些来自硅谷，他们的投资组合都因此受到了影响。

And I have never seen that kind of pushback, anger, character assassination, saying I'm an evil person as I registered from the Valley who had all, you know, marked their portfolios.

我当时真的无法理解。

I I just couldn't get over.

就好像我说他们的父母是战犯一样。

It it it's as if I'd said that their parents were war criminals or something.

我从未……所以我觉得，坦率地说，你经历的大部分事情都需要脸皮厚，因为你可以用别人的钱炒作一只股票而亏得精光，但你要是开始唱空一只股票，那就麻烦了。

I've never so I think a lot of a lot of what you endure, quite frankly, is you have to have thick skin because you can you can lose a shit ton of other people's money promoting a stock, but God help you if you start shitposting a stock.

你知道吗，每个人都觉得……我感受到的是，当有人质疑一只股票时，你受到的仇恨简直难以置信。

The the you know, everybody it feels like I what I've registered, I I can't believe the hate you get in when anyone questions a stock.

这简直就像是一种反主流文化的行为。

It's like it's almost like it's countercultural.

你这样做就好像是不爱国一样。

You're not you're being non patriotic.

不过，Jim，在我开始自怜之前，我想问的是，你们公司在投资资本方面，有没有一个结构化的方法，来投入自己的时间和金钱去传播信息？

But, Jim, where I was headed with this before I started feeling sorry for myself was was what did does your firm have a a structured approach in investment capital in terms of your own time and money around getting the word out?

对于你们看好的做空标的，你们的媒体策略是什么？

What is your media strategy around your favorite shorts?

其实没有什么媒体策略，就是偶尔做做播客，还有我在X上的社交媒体账号。

There is no media strategy other than doing occasional podcasts and and and my social media account on X.

而且，我们只是尽量指出那些公开的信息，以及我们对这些公开信息的看法。

And and and, again, we try to just point out things that are public and and our opinions on things that are public.

这才是决定价格的因素。

That's what makes prices.

对吧？

Right?

人们对于事实的看法。

People's people's opinions about facts.

但你说得对。

But you're right.

这里存在一个完全无法忽视的不对称性——如果你做空一家大家持有的公司，他们会觉得这是针对个人的。

There's an asymmetry there that is that is completely hard to ignore that that that if you impute a company that people own, they take it quite personally.

我经历过这个，你也在WeWork上经历过，我到现在都不敢相信它居然还能上市。

I I went through that, and and you you did it in WeWork, which I to this day, I still can't believe still came public.

但因为我们是在IPO时做空的。

But because we we got shorted on the IPO.

不过在GameStop事件之后，我们公开做空了AMC。

But in the the the post GameStop era, you know, we were we were pretty publicly short AMC.

而且，你知道，AMC的粉丝团确实是个很特别的群体。

And and and, you know, the the AMC apes were were quite the quite the group.

我的一个原则是：如果某只股票有粉丝社群，那它自动就值得考虑做空。

And one of my rules is if any stock has a community, automatically merits a look on the short side.

你懂吗？

You know?

但去年我们又经历了一次，那可能是我这辈子见过的最经典的套利交易，就是做多比特币、做空微策略公司。

But but but but we went through it all again last year in in what was maybe the greatest classic arbitrage trade I've ever seen in my life, which was, of course, being long Bitcoin and being short MicroStrategy.

在最高点时，微策略公司的市值与其持有的比特币价值之间差了800亿美元，你可以轻松对冲，而且可以通过全额融券做空微策略的那部分。

At its peak, there was an $80,000,000,000 difference in the value of MicroStrategy versus the value of its Bitcoin holdings, which you could easily hedge and you could easily short the micro strategy component of it in a full short rebate.

我从来没见过——我记得2000年那会儿的三康姆和掌上电脑分拆，还有其他一些经典的套利机会，虽然有趣，但可能也就几十亿美元的规模，而且做空那部分还很难执行。

And I I've never seen I mean, I remember the three com palm spin up back in 2000 and a variety of other sort of classic arbitrages that were interesting and maybe were a couple billion dollars of that were hard to implement by putting on the short leg, whatever.

但这次是2024年12月的800亿美元，而且你想做多少就做多少。

But this was $80,000,000,000 in December 2024, and you could do it literally as much as you wanted.

难以置信的是，这家公司还帮你忙，每周发行10亿或20亿美元的普通股来缩小价差。

And unbelievably, the company helped you out by selling a billion or 2,000,000,000 of common equity every week to to do to close the spread.

我们在网上因为质疑微策略的天才策略、质疑它创建的这个比特币金库公司是个永动机而招来的恶毒攻击，我觉得够有效市场假说的学者们研究一阵子了，因为这种情况本来就不该存在。

And and the vitriol we got online for for challenging the genius of micro strategy and in creating this Bitcoin treasury company that was a perpetual motion flywheel was just, I think, one for the efficient market hypothesis academics to study for for a while because it should never have existed.

所以你在2000年做空了安然公司，在它破产之前。

So you you shorted Enron in 2000 before it went bankrupt.

看起来有些公司的估值倍数确实太高了。

And it seems that I mean, there are there are companies where their multiples have gotten too high.

投机情绪太浓，市场过于狂热，这些倍数肯定得降下来。

There's too much speculation, too much euphoria, those multiples must come down.

还有一些公司要么是欺诈，要么业务模式行不通，要么面临破产风险。

And then there are companies which are either fraudulent or their businesses don't work or they are at risk of bankruptcy.

安然就是其中之一，而你在别人之前就看对了。

Enron was one of those companies and you were right about it before anyone else.

问题在于，你可能会发现一些公司有猫腻或者商业模式不成立。

I guess the question becomes, you know, yes, you might see a few companies that are doing something shady or their business models don't work.

但逻辑上的问题是，这是否意味着更大的问题，可能拖垮整个市场？

But the logic question is, is that indicative of a larger problem, that could bring the markets down?

这是我教的金融市场欺诈史课程中的一个主题——欺诈周期会滞后于金融周期。

It's one of the themes of the course on the history of financial market fraud I teach, and that the fraud cycle follows the financial cycle with a lag.

金融周期持续得越久，最终在衰退期被揭露的欺诈就越多。

And the longer the financial cycle goes on, the more amount of fraud is ultimately uncovered on the down cycle.

所以我已经把这个时代称为欺诈的黄金时代了，我猜等这轮周期下行时，那些问题就会像往常一样浮出水面。

So I've already dubbed this the golden age of fraud, and I suspect that when we're on the down part of this cycle, the bodies will float to the surface as they always do.

但记住，与之相伴的另一面是：一家公司最严厉的检察官和最坚定的辩护律师，就是它的股价。

But remember, the other the the corollary to that is is is the harshest prosecutor and the staunchest defense attorney of a company is its stock price.

在股价创新高的时候，没人会去追究欺诈行为。

Nobody nobody goes after frauds at all time highs.

只有在投资者亏钱之后，他们才会去追究，因为这类事情是政治性的，而起诉公司欺诈的资源也是政治性的。

They only go after them after investors have lost money because these kinds of things are political, and and and the resources to prosecute corporate fraud are political.

直到安然、世通、泰科等公司在2002年倒闭，公众才开始要求有人负责——不是因为大家买贵了股票、在股市里亏了钱，而是因为这些人是公司骗子。

And it wasn't until Enron and WorldCom and Tyco and others had collapsed in o two that the public, you know, demanded scalps because it wasn't the fact that they overpaid for lots of companies and lost money in the stock market, it's because these were corporate crooks.

我觉得这一轮周期也会重演，唯一的例外可能是，这些人里很多可能会先被赦免。

And I think we will see the same same thing happen in this cycle except with for the possible exception of the fact that a lot of these guys might get pardoned first.

这个话题我们完全可以再单独做一期播客。

So we could do a whole other podcast on that.

我来准备收尾了。

I'll start to wrap us up.

你对年轻投资者有什么建议吗？

Would you do you have any advice for young investors?

我觉得你特别擅长识破那些胡扯的东西。

I mean, you seem to be very good at spotting BS in general.

你是怎么做到的？对那些想构建自己投资组合的年轻人，你有什么建议？

How do you do that and what advice would you give to young people who are looking to build out their portfolios?

嗯，其实我觉得我们刚才已经聊到了一些。

Well, mean, again, I I think we've already talked about some of it.

保持被动投资就好。

Keep keep it passive.

跟专业人士在细节上较劲，真的很难。

It it it's it's tough to get into the weeds with the professionals.

真正深入研究这些公司、搞清楚它们值多少钱，想靠这个赚钱本来就不容易，而且大多数专业人士在这方面也创造不了什么价值。

It's hard enough to make money really digging into these companies and trying to figure out what they're worth, and and most professionals don't add value doing that.

所以作为业余投资者，你最好还是控制成本，尽量多存钱，年轻的时候就把钱投进市场里。

So as an amateur doing it, you're still probably better off keeping your costs down and saving as much as you can and just putting it in the market at a young age.

这个建议听起来可能有点老套，但确实是正确的。

That's the that's the simple and it may sound trite, but it's the right advice.

如果你作为年轻投资者想拿一部分资金玩玩，追个热门故事，或者投点你觉得会成为下一个英伟达的东西，那也行。

And and if you wanna play around with some of your capital as a young investor and and and, you know, chase a hot story or or or put money on on something that you think is, you know, is is the next NVIDIA, you know, go to it.

你可以承担风险，但别把所有资金都押上。

You can take the risk, but don't do it with all your capital.

我发现现在很多年轻投资者的问题就是太集中了。

And that's what I find most young investors right now are way too concentrated.

他们只持有一两只或三只股票，把所有赌注都压在上面。

They own one or two or three stocks and and and are betting everything on them.

一旦出了问题，就很难翻身了。

And when things go wrong, it's hard to recover from that.

所以，拿你投资组合的一小部分去追SpaceX，或者你觉得十年后能去小行星采矿的项目，都可以。

So just take a small part of your portfolio and and go chase SpaceX or whatever, you know, whatever you think might be, you know, mining asteroids ten ten years from now.

但大部分资金，还是投到指数基金里，让它慢慢增长吧。

But with the bulk of your capital, you know, put it put it in index funds and and just let it grow.

吉姆·查诺斯是查诺斯公司（原名Kynikos Associates）的创始人兼管理合伙人，这家公司是全球历史最悠久的专业做空投资机构。

Jim Chanos is the founder and managing partner of Chanos and Company formerly known as Kynikos Associates, the world's oldest exclusive short selling investment firm.

吉姆于1985年创立了这家公司，旨在实践他在华尔街职业生涯初期作为金融分析师时发现的投资策略——他先后在佩恩韦伯、吉尔福德证券和德意志银行工作过。

Jim launched the company in 1985 to implement investment strategies he uncovered while beginning his Wall Street career as a financial analyst with Payne Weber, Guilford Securities, and Deutsche Bank throughout his investment career.

吉姆曾识别并做空过多家知名企业的股票，这些企业后来都遭遇了严重的财务危机。

Jim has identified and sold short the shares of numerous well known corporate financial disasters.

吉姆曾在国会作证，并就美国证券交易委员会和英国金融服务管理局提出的监管规定提供过意见。

Jim has testified before Congress and provided comments to regulations proposed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Services Authority in The UK.

他目前在耶鲁大学管理学院和威斯康星大学商学院担任金融学讲师，教授一门关于金融欺诈史的课程，这门课很受欢迎。

He is currently a lecturer in finance at both the Yale School of Management and the University of Wisconsin School of Business, where he teaches a popular class on the history of financial fraud.

吉姆，非常感谢您抽出时间。

Jim, we really appreciate your time.

谢谢。

Thank you.

这是我的荣幸，各位。

My pleasure, guys.

谢谢。

Thank you.

斯科特，你觉得呢？

Scott, what did you think?

嗯，他绝对是个传奇人物。

Well, he's definitely a a legend.

说到这个时代的金融和投资，我觉得任何一本书都绕不开吉姆·查诺斯。

When they talk about when they talk about finance and investing in this era, I I think no book would be complete without talking about Jim Jim Chanos.

说实话，让我印象深刻的是，他其实非常理性、克制。

What struck me was, quite frankly, he's just more reasoned and and measured.

听起来他管理的对冲基金非常多元化，多头仓位很大，对冲策略也更周全、更稳健——我觉得现在用‘做空者’来形容他已经不太准确了，因为他自己也承认市场会上涨，你得参与其中。

And, I mean, it sounds like he's running a hedge fund that is really well diversified, big on the long side with perhaps more thoughtful or robust hedging as opposed I'm not sure describing him as a short seller is is an accurate description at this point because he acknowledges that the markets go up and you wanna be in the market.

但他给年轻人的很多建议，说实话，跟我们得到的建议一模一样。

But a lot of the advice he gives to young people, quite frankly, it's the exact same advice we get.

要分散投资，要参与市场，成本要低，不要在任何单一标的上押注太大，不要过度集中。

Be diversified, be in the market, low cost, don't go too big on any one thing, don't be too concentrated.

但让我惊讶的是，我原本以为他会更随意一些，甚至拍桌子说这些东西有多疯狂。

But I was struck at how I would have thought he was a little bit more, quite frankly, cavalier, and pounding the table on how insane some of this stuff is.

他给我的印象是非常稳重，而且，找不到更好的词来形容，就是非常成熟。

He just struck me as very measured and, for lack of a better firm, very adult.

对。

Yeah.

我觉得你说得完全正确。

Think that's exactly right.

说实话，我都想投资这个基金了。

I mean, I I wanna invest in this fund.

是的。

Yeah.

听起来是个不错的基金。

It sounds like a good fund.

对吧？

Right?

说实话，他说的每一句话我都同意。

I mean, there's not one thing that came out of his mouth that I don't agree with.

他说的每一点，从做空什么到做多什么，再到我们除了投资标普500几乎别无选择这个事实，我都完全认同。

Literally every everything he said, I I from from what he's short on to what he's long on to the fact that we you don't have much of a choice than to invest in the S and P.

他也承认，是的，从技术上讲，我是做多标普的。

And the fact that he recognizes, yeah, technically, I'm I'm long that.

它可能估值偏高，但这并不意味着你就要抛售手里的标普500。

It can be it can be expensive, but that doesn't mean you go out and sell your sell your S and P.

我的意思是，你承受回撤，但你也明白长期来看它还是会往上走的。

I mean, you you you take the draw down, but then you recognize that over the long term, it's gonna go up into the right.

同时你也得承认，市场上确实有一些垃圾公司，那些才是你可以做空的对象。

And then you also recognize that there are some bags of shit as well out there in the market, and those are the companies that you can go short on.

他选的所有标的我都同意。

And I agree with all of his picks.

比如Neo Clouds、CoreWeave、Nebius这些，我真的，我就是想投进去。

I mean, the Neo Clouds and CoreWeave, Nebius, like, I I'm I'm just I wanna invest.

对。

Yeah.

支撑我们讨论的一个数据点是，如果你相信社交媒体，你会以为他把房子抵押了，还加了大概三倍杠杆，就为了做空特斯拉。

The the the piece of data that buttresses what we're talking about is that if you believe social media, you'd think that he mortgaged his house and and levered up, you know, three to one to just go short Tesla.

他说的让我觉得很有启发的一点是，特斯拉在他的投资组合里，空头部分从来不超过2%到3%。

And what he said that I thought was illuminating was Tesla's never been more than two or 3% of his portfolio, the short on the short side.

而且随着股价不断上涨，他还得削减空头仓位。

And he had to trim it down as it kept on rising.

是的。

And yeah.

顺便说一句，特斯拉现在跌得很惨。

By the way, Tesla is getting crushed.

我在社交媒体上指出过一点，如果你在2021年11月投资特斯拉，到现在大概会亏20%。

And and something I pointed out on social media, if you invested in Tesla in November 2021, you would be down at this point around 20%.

所以这里有个小提醒，就是特斯拉一直波动非常大。

So have there's a little caveat there, which is it was it's been extremely volatile throughout it.

但我有点听腻了那种说法，就是特斯拉过去五年一直是一支猛涨的股票，表现非常出色。

But what I'm a little bit sick of hearing is this idea that Tesla has been this roaring stock that has just crushed over the past five years.

其实并不是这样。

Actually, it hasn't.

它一直波动非常大。

It has been extremely volatile.

而且取决于你什么时候买入，你可能在很长一段时间里都处于大幅亏损的状态。

And depending on when you invested, you might be significantly down on that position over a long period of time.

我只是想把这个事实说出来，因为我知道你一直在做空。

I just wanna put that out there because because I know that you've been short.

嗯，你知道，我从来不想说任何关于埃隆·马斯克的坏话，所以我还是保持沉默吧。

Well, you know, I never like to say anything negative about Elon Musk, so I'm just gonna keep quiet.

有道理。

Fair enough.

本期节目由克莱尔·米勒和艾莉森·韦斯制作，本杰明·斯宾塞负责音频工程。

This episode was produced by Claire Miller and Alison Weiss and engineered by Benjamin Spencer.

我们的视频编辑是Jorge Coty。

Our video editor is Jorge Coty.

研究团队包括Dan Jalon、Kristen O'Donohue和Mia Silverio。

Our research team is Dan Jalon, Kristen O'Donohue, and Mia Silverio.

Jake McPherson是我们的社交媒体制作人。

Jake McPherson is our social producer.

Drew Burrows是技术总监，Catherine Dillon是执行制作人。

Drew Burrows is our technical director, and Catherine Dillon is our executive producer.

感谢收听Prof G Media出品的Prof G Markets。

Thank you for listening to Prof G Markets from Prof G Media.

如果你喜欢这期节目，请关注我们，周一再来听听我们对市场的新见解。

If you liked what you heard, give us a follow and join us for a fresh take on markets on Monday.

本期节目由……赞助播出。经营企业已经够难了，何必再用一堆互不兼容的应用程序来添乱呢？

Support for this show comes from Running a business is hard enough, so why make it harder with a dozen different apps that don't talk to each other?

隆重推出Odoo。

Introducing Odoo.

这是你唯一需要的商业软件。

It's the only business software you'll ever need.

它是一个全集成的一体化平台，能让你的工作更轻松。

It's an all in one fully integrated platform that makes your work easier.

客户管理、会计、库存、电商等等功能一应俱全。

CRM, accounting, inventory, ecommerce, and more.

最棒的是什么？

And the best part?

Odoo以极低的成本取代了多个昂贵的平台。

Odoo replaces multiple expensive platforms for a fraction of the cost.

这就是为什么成千上万的企业已经选择了它。

That's why over thousands of businesses have made the switch.

那你为什么不试试呢？

So why not you?

免费试用Odoo，请访问odoo.com。

Try Odoo for free at odoo.com.

网址就是odoo.com。

That's odoo.com.