RWA 33 | 观看《通往地狱之路由正向利差铺就》| Sentora的安东尼

通往地狱的道路是由积极的携带铺就的。

The road to hell is paved by positive carry.

我们再次带来RWA Gluminati访谈系列的另一期节目。

We are back with another episode of the RWA Gluminati interview series.

今天我们邀请到了Centaura的CEO兼联合创始人安东尼。

We are joined by Anthony from Centaura, the CEO and cofounder.

我熟悉Into the Block，但Centaura对我来说是最近才了解的。

I'm familiar with Into the Block, but Centaura was a little bit more recent for me.

所以我很好奇这个转型是如何发生的，以及对你来说，这个转折点是什么样的，安东尼。

So I'm curious how the transition happened and maybe, you know, what the pivot was like for you, Anthony.

同时也感谢你的参与。

And also thank you for joining.

是的。

Yep.

谢谢，约翰。

Thanks, John.

我在华尔街做了大约二十二年的交易，先后在瑞银、巴克莱和汇丰工作。

So I did about twenty two years of trading on Wall Street, UBS, Barclays and HSBC.

我在2021年1月转向数字资产领域，加入了Coinbase，并领导了他们的去中心化金融和衍生品交易团队。

I moved to digital assets in January 2021 when I moved to Coinbase and led their DeFi and derivative trading team.

在管理这个团队时，我认识了Into the Block的首席执行官耶稣·罗德里格斯。

When I was running that team, I was introduced to Jesus Rodriguez, who is the CEO of Into the Block.

当我看到他们的风险管理和执行软件后，我们第一天就与他们签订了合同，并将相当大一部分资产通过IntoTheBlock进行交易。

And when I saw the risk management and execution software, we signed a contract with them as a client day one and deployed a significant portion of our assets through IntoTheBlock.

这就是我如何了解IntoTheBlock和ASUS的。

So that's what I got to know IntoTheBlock and ASUS.

然后在2023年，我为一家名为Trident的公司融资，你们可以在背景里看到他们的周边商品。

And then in '23, I fundraised for a company called Trident, which you can see the merch in the background.

耶稣帮助我们联系了本轮四名投资者中的三位。

Jesus had helped us with three of our four investors in the round.

到了2024年底，他提出了将两家公司合并的构想。

Then the tail end of '24, he came up with the idea of merging the two companies.

今年四月，我们完成了2500万美元的A轮融资，并成立了Centaura。

This April, this past April, we raised a $25,000,000 Series A and formed Centaura.

完美。

Perfect.

所以用一句话来说，Centaura如今是做什么的？你们专注于哪些问题？又有哪些问题是留给别人去解决的？这是你们的核心使命。

So in one sentence, you know, what does Centaura do today and what problems are you focusing on and maybe what problems are you leaving for others to focus on the main mission?

当然。

Sure.

我们的标语是：机构级DeFi层。

Our tagline is the institutional DeFi layer.

顾名思义，我们的目标是帮助各类机构接入DeFi的金融基础设施。

By definition, we're trying to help institutions of all flavors access the financial rails of DeFi.

无论是帮助像PayPal或Ripple这样的稳定币发行方扩大其稳定币的规模和渗透率，还是像Stellar或Inc.这样的区块链网络，

So that's whether it's helping a stablecoin issuer like PayPal or Ripple grow their size and penetration of their stablecoin or whether that's a chain link like Stellar or Inc.

或者是Katana这样的平台，试图增加用户、拓展应用场景并提升影响力，抑或仅仅是希望以机构级的风险管理和执行方式获得收益的用户。

Or Katana trying to gain users and grow in use case and prominence or very simply users who are trying to generate yield with institutional risk management and execution.

我认为我们非常专注于收益和接入DeFi基础设施，因为我们认为这是金融的未来，而当它与现实世界资产结合时，我们能获得更优质的链上现实世界资产。

You know, I think we're very focused on yield and access to DeFi rails because we think it's the future of finance and as it intermingles with RWAs we get better RWAs on chain.

我们认为DeFi基础设施最初是用加密资产进行试点的，但我认为未来将由传统资产主导。

We think that DeFi rails were piloted with crypto assets but I think will be dominated by traditional assets.

是的，完全正确。

Yeah, absolutely.

我认为这两种模式的结合与融合——无论是Robinhood试图成为Coinbase，还是Coinbase试图成为Robinhood——都是不可避免的，因为各方势力终将主导金融的未来。

I think the combination and sort of the merging of the two, whether it's Robinhood trying to be Coinbase or Coinbase trying to be Robinhood is just an inevitable merging of the powers that be to sort of take over the future of finance.

我很好奇，你刚才提到，这是为了让机构用户通过机构级别的风险管理和操作来接入DeFi的真实收益，那么他们日常是如何使用Centaura的？具体在做哪些基于数据的决策？

I am curious how so you were saying that the it's for institutional users to get access to DeFi real yields using institutional use or institutional risk management, how do they actually use Centora day to day in terms of the decisions they're making with the data?

因为很多人对这些功能可能只有抽象的理解。

Because a lot of people, I think, have sort of an abstract understanding of maybe what some of these things can do.

通常，我们会接触客户，这些客户可能是希望部署自己的资金库以获取收益的机构，也可能是像Etherfy Liquid这样的客户，我们曾为其搭建过资金库。

Typically, we'll go to a client and that could be, you know, a client looking to deploy their own treasury to earn yield, or it could be a vault created for a client like Etherfy liquid, which we were behind those vaults.

我们核心是理解客户的风崄偏好、他们期望的用户体验，以及他们希望获得的收益类型。

And essentially understanding what the client's risk appetite is, what user experience they want, and what type of yields they want to earn.

这就像一个投资组合经理，我们会去对他们说：根据您的风险偏好和目标，这是我们认为应该部署的最佳策略。

And it's almost like a portfolio manager where we would come to them and say, here's based on your risk appetite and your goals, this is the best strategies we think we should deploy.

如果客户同意，我们会编写一个完全非托管的智能合约，由客户部署，该合约不仅执行交易，还会逐块监控风险。

If the client agrees, we code a smart contract that's fully non custodial and the client deploys and the smart contract executes not only the transactions, but also monitors the risk block by block.

如果我们的任何内部风险指标被触发，比如DPEG或市场剧烈波动，限制了用户从借贷池中提取资金的能力，智能合约会立即平仓并将资金返还至客户的钱包。

If any of our internal risk metrics are triggered, so a DPEG or a well movement which constrains the user's ability to pull their funds out of a borrow lend pool, the smart contract will immediately disassemble the trade and put it back into the client's wallet.

在这种架构中，我们从不接触资金，但可以编写基于规则的风险管理机制，在不同不利市场条件下自动触发执行。

So we don't ever touch the funds in this construct, but we can code rules based risk management that will jump into action whenever different adverse market conditions happen.

明白了。

Gotcha.

完美。

Perfect.

那么，您是否认为这将占据很大一部分份额？我们假设两种情况。

And so do you see that taking over a large amount of, I mean, let's assume two things.

假设第一种情况是，传统资产管理更多地迁移到链上，我认为这一点我们都能达成共识，这相当直接。

Let's assume one that traditional money management moves more on chain, which I think we can all agree is pretty straightforward.

但第二点，传统资产管理者可能对这些技术不太熟悉，也没有你刚才描述的那种技术实施能力。

But two, that traditional money managers maybe aren't as familiar with this stuff, and they don't have the technical acumen of the implementation that you just described.

你认为这种解决方案会成为基金资产管理的未来吗？

Do you see this solution as being the future of fund management?

还是说这只是一个锦上添花的功能，可能无法全面满足客户整体的需求和风险偏好？

Or is this sort of a nice to have, but maybe not all encompassing function for the clients as you understand their sort of entire need and risk profile?

我认为这不仅仅是锦上添花，而且我认为资产管理不会仅仅从传统世界直接迁移到链上。

I think it's more than a nice to have and I don't think that asset management is just going to move from the traditional world to on chain.

我认为它会演变成一种全新的形态。

I think it's going to evolve into something different.

现在，当我把比特币看作一种资产时，能够自己交易、自己管理和自己保管，这非常独特。

Now I think about Bitcoin as an asset and being able to trade it and be able to manage it yourself and custody yourself.

我认为这正是未来更多现实世界资产上链之前的一个先驱案例——你可以用它作为抵押品进行借贷。

What's very unique and I think is kind of the of the predecessor to what's going to happen with more real world assets as they come on chain is you could borrow against it.

你把它作为抵押品了吗？

Are you posted as collateral?

在美国股市64万亿美元的总市值中，散户持有的股票高达3万亿美元。

There's 31,000,000,000,000 of retail stocks owned stocks that are owned by retail out of the 64,000,000,000,000 of the equity market.

这仅限于美国市场，但散户几乎无法利用自己完全持有的股票进行抵押借贷，以获取收益或取出资金用于购车、房屋装修等。

This is just in The US and retail users have almost no access to be able to borrow against their fully owned shares and either try to earn yield with it or take it out and buy a car or do home improvement.

因此，一个规模仅为2万亿美元的较小资产类别却具备这种能力，我认为这正是现实世界资产未来将采纳的创新类型。

So, the fact that the smaller $2,000,000,000,000 asset has the ability to do that, I think those are the type of innovations that real world assets are going to adopt.

所以，我不认为这是一种替代。

So I don't think it's a a replacement.

我认为这是利用去中心化金融基础设施为传统优质资产增添新功能。

I think it's going to adding functionality to valuable traditional assets using DeFi rails.

明白了。

Gotcha.

是的，我觉得这样说很公平。

Yeah, I think I think that's fair.

我认为，随着我们迈向未来，将会持续看到当前人们的功能需求与新兴技术的不断融合与适应。

I think, yeah, as we move towards the future, we're gonna be seeing a continuing, you know, adaptation and merging of of the current functions and needs of people.

我很好奇，很多人谈论机构是所谓的‘聪明钱’，但我认为，无论背后是谁在操作机构，他们的想法或执行是否聪明，其实就像抛硬币一样难说。

I am curious that a lot of people talk about institutions being, you know, smart money, and I think there's obviously a coin flip for whoever's behind the institution for how smart they are in their ideas or their execution.

我想知道，根据你的理解，机构或机构参与者（这两个词可以互换使用）对加密市场有哪些理解，而零售参与者却一直或目前明显忽视了这些？

They am curious about, you know, based on your understanding, what's something that institutions understand or institutional players, you know, we can just use those interchangeably, understand about the crypto markets that maybe retail participants consistently or maybe just currently are really missing out on?

我认为，零售用户对DeFi力量的理解比大多数机构更深刻，但我还是会把机构分成几类。

I think retail has a better understanding of the power of DeFi than most institutions, but I would bucket institutions into a couple of different categories.

传统上，我们的机构客户是具备加密能力的公司。

So traditionally, our institutional clients are crypto capable firms.

比如Coinbase、Kraken、Crypto.com、Aave，这些都是身处加密生态系统的机构。

So Coinbase, Kraken, crypto.com, Aave, these are institutions that are in the crypto ecosystem.

然后还有一类机构，比如我以前工作的汇丰银行、巴克莱银行这类传统金融机构，它们对DeFi的力量几乎一无所知。

Then you have institutions like firms I used to work for the HSBC's, Barclays of the world who are pretty far away from really understanding the power of DeFi.

这很大程度上是因为监管不明确，以及之前SEC主席的激进态度。

A lot of that has to do with the regulatory, the lack of regulatory clarity and the really aggressive prior SEC chair.

但我认为，新一届政府不仅稍微放宽了监管环境，还特别在稳定币领域积极拥抱加密行业。

But I think this new administration not only has opened up the playing field a bit, but is really leaning into the crypto space specifically around stablecoins.

你知道，财政部长斯科特·贝森特不仅支持稳定币。

Know, Scott Bessent, the Treasury Secretary, is not just supportive of stable coins.

他真正希望借助稳定币在全球范围内扩大美元的主导地位，并将美国国债的买家基础从那些可能今天是朋友、明天就不是的朋友国家，转向由需求驱动的稳定币——这些稳定币如果以美元发行，就必须购买美元计价的国债。

He's really looking to stable coins to really spread dollar hegemony globally and to increase and diversify the buyer base of treasuries away from countries who may or may not be friends from one day to the next to demand driven stablecoins that have to buy treasuries of dollars if they're minted with dollars.

我认为这些传统的金融机构对这种变化的速度感到有些害怕。

I think those kind of the traditional finance institutions are probably a bit scared about how quickly this is happening.

我们从曾经只要提到加密货币就可能被SEC调查，转变为财政部长预测到2030年稳定币规模将达到2万亿美元。

We went from if you even say crypto, you could be brought in front of an SEC investigation to the Treasury Secretary predicting that we're going to have 2,000,000,000,000 in stablecoins by the 2030.

然后你还会听到美国银行首席执行官布莱恩·莫伊尼汉说，如果稳定币的规模显著增长，这可能会威胁到美国银行系统的存款体系。

And then you hear comments from Brian Moynihan, the CEO of Bank of America, saying if stablecoins materially grow in scale, this can threaten the deposit systems in The US banking system.

我认为这是一种相当激进的转变，许多大型机构根本无法真正理解区块链的全部潜力，而先行者完全可以彻底颠覆传统银行业的等级结构。

I think it's a pretty radical shift and I think a lot of these big institutions are just not really equipped to understand the full power of what the blockchain does and first movers can really shake up the hierarchy of the traditional banking system.

是的，完全正确。

Yeah, absolutely.

我觉得莫伊尼汉这么说挺讽刺的，因为这根本就是设计的初衷，而不是问题。

And I think it's funny when Moynihan said that because it's like, that's a feature, not a bug.

我们正在努力构建这方面的未来，以免我们仅仅依赖美元体系，杠杆高达九倍或十倍。

Like we're trying to build the future of this stuff so that we're not you know, leveraged nine or 10 to one on just our dollar based system.

它完全由国债支持，以打造一个真正稳健且面向未来的市场。

It's a 100% backed by treasuries to be able to have an actually robust and future proof market.

所以我认为，稳定币无疑是当前最引人注目的叙事之一。

So I think it's it's def I think stablecoins are definitely one of the most interesting narratives that are coming on.

鉴于你对链上、市场和机构数据的广泛接触，你觉得哪些叙事最脱离现实？

And I'm curious with your access to so much on chain and market and institutional data, which narratives do you feel like are the most disconnected from reality?

因为我认为，到目前为止，所有人都认同稳定币将长期存在。

Because I think everybody at this point agrees that stablecoins are here to stay.

它们目前是加密货币最核心的使用场景。

They're the number one use case for crypto at the moment.

而且，美元霸权与加密货币的分布在这条叙事中已经深度融合。

And, you know, it seems like the dollar hegemony and the crypto distribution are very well integrated on that narrative.

但我很好奇，有没有哪些说法一听到就让你直摇头？

But I'm curious if there are any narratives that when you hear sort of just make you shake your head.

我觉得太多人以为发行稳定币很简单。

I think too many people think it's just easy to launch a stablecoin.

实际上，从技术上讲，这确实容易。

In reality, technologically, it's easy.

但要获得广泛使用和应用场景却极其困难，而且成本极高。

But to gain traction and adoption use cases is extremely hard and extremely expensive.

我觉得，任何认为自己能复制泰达币的人都是在让自己的项目走向失败。

You know, I think anyone thinking they can replicate Tether is setting their project up for failure.

泰达币是个特例，对吧？

Tether is an anomaly, right?

十年前、十一年前、十二年前，泰达币是新兴数字经济中唯一的货币来源，其市场主导地位非常难以撼动，它所支持的应用场景也很难在规模上复制。

Tether was the only source of currency in an evolving digital economy ten, eleven, twelve years ago, and the incumbent status is really difficult and the use cases that it facilitates are very difficult to replicate at scale.

现在，它是唯一一家能产生显著利润的主要稳定币。

Now, they're the only major stablecoin that prints significant profit.

你知道，其他所有稳定币都必须将大部分收入用于分发，才能维持其稳定币的实施和推广，因为它们的规模与泰达币相比实在太小了。

You know, every other stablecoin has to distribute a significant portion of their revenue to continue to get their implementation and distribution of their stablecoins because there's just subscale compared to Tether.

首先，我认为如果你觉得发行稳定币很容易，那是一个很大的误解。

So, one, I think if you think you're going to launch a stablecoin and it's easy, that's a big misconception.

其次，如果你把稳定币当作收入来源，那你可能误解了它的本质。

Two, if you're looking at it as a revenue driver, think you're missing the script.

我认为那些发行稳定币的机构，应该关注的是将稳定币作为其服务组合一部分所能获得的股权估值。

I think institutions that are launching stablecoin should look at what the equity valuation they can get from having a stablecoin as part of their portfolio of services.

就像Circle那样。

Similar to Circle.

Circle的市值远超其五十年的利润总和，对吧？

Circle's market cap is much larger than fifty years of their profit, right?

所以，这并不是一个印钞机。

So, this isn't a cash cow.

这对许多金融机构来说，是一种创新的股权倍增器。

This is an innovative equity multiplier to a lot of financial companies.

所以，我认为这可能是两个最大的误解。

So, I think those are probably two of the bigger misconceptions.

是的，完全正确。

Yeah, absolutely.

我的意思是，关于稳定币长期可行性这个疑问，我一周前感到很惊讶，因为当时有人告诉我，我人在印度尼西亚。

I mean, just on the stablecoin sort of question mark around the actual feasibility long term, I was surprised a week ago when somebody informed me because I'm in Indonesia.

我在这里已经两年了，学到了很多关于这个国家的知识。

I've been here for two years and, you know, learned a lot about the country.

但让我震惊的是，不仅有一个，而是有两个或三个印尼卢比稳定币。

But one of the things that shocked me was that there's not only one, but there's two or three Indonesian Rupee stablecoins.

而且它们的市值大约在1000万到2000万美元之间。

And the first thing and I think they have market caps of, like, 10 to $20,000,000.

与美国的稳定币相比，这根本不算什么。

So nothing compared to The US stablecoins.

但我第一个疑问是，它们由什么资产支持？

But one of the first thing I was questioning was just like, a, what's it backed by?

以及，为什么人们愿意使用它们？

And b, why do people wanna use this?

我至今还没得到这两个问题的答案，但这让我开始思考，嗯。

I really haven't gotten answers to either of those questions yet, but it is you know, it made me think like, okay.

也许这只是一个营销手段。

Maybe it's just a marketing play.

也许这是一种早期的政府支持型项目。

Maybe it's like an early stage government arm type thing.

但就真实价值与营销宣传而言，链上有很多现实资产代币化项目，在我看来根本毫无意义。

But in terms of, you know, real versus marketing, I there's a lot of RWAs on chain where, in my opinion, they just don't make any sense.

碳信用就是我 personally 不相信的一个例子。

Carbon credits is one that I just personally don't believe in.

我不是说碳信用本身不存在，我承认它们是真实存在的。

Not, like, fundamentally, I believe they exist.

但就标准化、流动性以及将它们上链后的整体实用性而言，我觉得这更像是营销，而非真实价值。

But in terms of the standardization and just the liquidity and the overall utility of having them on chain, feels like marketing to me more than real value.

当越来越多的链上现实资产出现时，我很好奇，在你看来，哪些类别是真正有价值的，哪些只是纯粹的营销噱头？

I'm curious when you look at RWAs on chain as more and more come on, what are maybe categories that are real versus just mostly marketing that spring to mind?

是的，我认为回答这个问题首先要问：你为什么要将这个现实世界资产代币化？

Yeah, I think I would start to answer that question by why are you tokenizing this real world asset?

我最不认同的是，让那些不需要证明自己是合格投资者的用户参与投资，这确实是美国的一项保护措施，虽然执行起来可能有点过于严苛。

The one I have the biggest problem with is basically giving users who don't need to prove that they are accredited investors and that's really, you know, that's one of those protections in The US that I maybe is a little bit too heavy handed in how it's administered.

但它确实保护了那些没有能力承受大规模亏损、去投资可能迅速归零且完全不了解自己所投项目的普通人。

But it does protect people who don't have the ability to lose money at scale to invest in things that could go to zero pretty quickly and really don't have the financial understanding of what they're investing in.

我认为，如果大型金融机构能够吸引投资者购买他们的资产，他们其实并不需要转向数字资产领域，对吧？

I think if financial institutions at scale can get investors to buy their assets, they don't really look to turn to the digital asset space, right.

与传统金融市场相比，你面对的资本市场规模要小得多。

You have a much smaller market of capital compared to the traditional financial markets.

因此，我对发行方试图将某些类型的私人信贷引入这一领域持谨慎态度。

So I'm a little bit wary of issuers are trying to bring some certain types of private credit.

显然，我们看到了一个包含首笔债券的Fessinera基金，如果你关注过这个故事，就知道这是一个传统金融领域的私人信贷工具，曾出现大规模欺诈并最终崩盘，但它牵涉到了一些最大的机构公司；不过，说实话，我交易过很多不同种类的资产，包括信贷，但我很难评估这类资产的风险回报比。

Obviously we saw a Fessinera fund that had first brands in it and if you have been following that story, you know, that's a traditional finance private credit vehicle that saw massive amounts of fraud and blew up, but it touched some of the biggest institutional firms, but you know, I don't know, I've traded many different things including credit, and I would struggle to evaluate the risk reward on something like that.

所以，要让它像购买苹果或谷歌股票一样简单，市场上有大量可获取的信息来帮助你了解所承担的风险。

So to make it as easy to buy as Apple or Google where there's plenty of consumable information about the risks you're taking.

你知道吗，我不太喜欢这种策略。

You know, I don't really love that tactic.

你知道吗，靠寻找那些傻钱来填补聪明钱的空缺，感觉并不是一个好方向。

You know, think finding kind of dumb money because you're tapped out from smart money doesn't feel like a great angle.

现在，确实有一些来自优质机构的优质资产，他们相信未来，但其中一部分只是营销手段，他们认为华尔街需要经历一个漫长的教育过程，而通常华尔街的运作模式是分为买方和卖方。

Now, there are quality assets from quality names that are, you know, believe in the forward and some of this is just marketing, but they think that there's a long educational cycle that Wall Street has to have and, you know, the way typically Wall Street works is you have buy side and sell side.

买方指的是资产管理公司，比如贝莱德、黑石、富达、高盛资产管理、先锋。

You know, buy side is your asset managers, BIMCO, BlackRock, Fidelity, GSAM, Vanguard.

而卖方则是为这些客户提供服务的银行。

And then you have your sell side, which are the banks that service these clients.

银行通常不会主动行动，而是等到客户提出要求才行动。

Banks typically don't move until the client asks them to.

所以我认为这就是为什么你看到贝莱德、富达和阿波罗在发行ACRED的原因。

So I think this is why you're seeing the BlackRocks and Fidelity and Apollo issuing ACRED.

这些就是客户，他们正试图把这些资产上链，以便最终获得银行的支持，从而提供流动性。

These are the clients and they're trying to put these assets on chain so they finally eventually get supported by the banks and provide that liquidity there.

我认为他们认为结算系统将从SWIFT和DTCC转向稳定币和区块链。

I think what they're thinking is the settlement rails are going to move from swift and DTCC to stable coins and blockchain.

我认为客户始终是推动银行实现金融体系下一个革命性变革的力量。

And I think the clients are always the ones who drive the banks into the next kind of revolutionary change of the financial system.

所以我认为，有些人确实是真心实意地想为这个生态系统提供帮助。

So I think this is kind of where people are doing it genuinely to help the ecosystem.

正是这类机构在推动整个行业向前发展。

Those are the type of those type of institutions push the place forward.

如今，我们看到大量行为是有人试图把产品推销给根本不了解自己买的是什么的人，这很可惜。

People trying to sell stuff down the credibility ranks to people who don't really know what they're buying is unfortunately a lot of what we're seeing now.

而我们一直努力避免这种情况。

And we try to avoid pretty consistently.

是的，我觉得这是一个非常好的观点。

Yeah, I think I think that's a really good point.

而且我认为，确实如此。

And I think, I mean, it's it's true.

每当我看到私人信贷基金被上链时，这首先是我想到的事情。

That's sort of the first thing that I think of whenever I see private credit funds being brought on chain.

我只是想，哦，好吧。

I'm just like, oh, okay.

所以你们现在的营销能力已经完全饱和了，正在试图从那些信息闭塞的投机者那里筹钱，这些人可能只是想说自己是信贷交易员，却根本不懂甚至无法理解底层的金融资产、状况或产品结构——在我看来，这是信贷领域最重要的一点，尽管我的理解有限。

So you guys are fully tapped out with your current marketing capabilities and you're trying to collect money from ill informed degenerates who maybe wanna say that they're credit traders without any understanding or even ability to understand the underlying financial assets or situations or even the structure of the product, I think is one of the most important things for credit in my limited understanding.

我刚读完一本关于阿根廷债务危机与重组的书，名叫《违约》。

I've been, I just finished reading the book Default about Argentina's debt crisis and restructuring with

哪一本？

Which one?

所以已经七年了。

So it's been like seven.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

不，这本书就叫《违约》，是关于一千亿美元的案例。

No, it's just called Default, the $100,000,000,000 case.

令人难以置信的是，其中涉及了如此多的契约条款、独立方、仲裁程序、地点、可执行资产，所有这些东西。

And it's just unbelievable how many covenants, you know, independent parties, arbitration, locations, attachable assets, all that stuff.

我一边读一边想，好吧，我大概永远不会投资私人信贷，甚至不会投资主权债券的公共信贷。

I'm just reading this like, yeah, I will never invest in private credit, I guess, because or even public credit for, you know, sovereigns.

对于散户投资者来说，要形成一个有根据的观点，似乎根本不可能。

It just seems impossible for a retail investor to have an educated opinion on that.

所以，我完全理解。

So I definitely, I get it.

这对我来说看起来非常可怕。

It seems quite scary for me.

我宁愿直接投资数字JPEG图，因为我知道结果是非黑即白的，而且没有国际仲裁，

I would rather just invest in digital JPEGs where I know it's fairly binary on what's going to happen and that there's no international arbitration There's

我还想提一点关于私人信贷，或者更广泛的信贷问题：比如，即使我以前交易信贷时，如果我要用自己的资金和PA去购买信贷，我总会买一个分散化的ETF或投资组合，因为即使你交易某些信贷板块，你也只是了解一个板块，对吧？

one other point I wanted to bring up on private credit, like, or just in credit in general, like, you know, even when I was trading credit, if I was going to, if I was going to deploy my own cash and my my PA to buy credit, I would always buy a diversified ETF or portfolio because my ability to even knowing even when you trade certain sectors of credit, you only have a sector, right?

所以对于汽车、金融或农业等领域，你并不了解整个谱系。

So the automotive or financial or agriculture, you don't know the whole spectrum.

你不会只投资于一个私人信贷产品，而是希望在多个行业中分散投资。

You wouldn't just buy in a one private credit vehicle, you would want to buy a diversified pool across multiple sectors.

而目前，通证化信贷大多是特定的、零散的投资项目。

And you know, right now tokenized credit is very kind of specific episodic investments.

如果你想要投资于这种孤立的资产类别，无论是链上还是链下，都很难实现有效分散；但在链上，你确实有多种分散投资的工具。

And there's really not a great way to diversify that type of an investment if you want to invest in that silo, whether it's on or off chain, On chain, you have multiple diversification vehicles.

在链上，你其实又在试图挑选赢家。

On chain, you're kind of like trying to pick winners again.

所以你根本都不理解这些东西。

So, you don't really even understand this stuff.

而你还要试图挑选出超额收益的项目，赚钱非常困难。

Then you're trying to really pick outperformers, is pretty difficult to make money.

是的。

Yeah.

而且你实际上是在链上选择中从最差的选项里挑，因为这些项目之所以上链，是因为它们在链下无法获得更多的资本。

And it's like you're already sort of picking from the bottom of the barrel for on chain selections because the incentives are that they bring it on chain because they couldn't get more capital off chain.

所以我的假设是，即使我拿到一个包含10到15个链上选项的池子或投资组合，我的基本假设仍然是，其他合格且知情的机构投资者已经错过了这些机会。

And so my assumption would be even if I was getting a pool of or a basket of like 10 or 15 on chain options, my baseline assumption would be that other qualified, informed institutional investors already passed on those opportunities.

嗯，我认为链上的人试图推销的一种方式就是这种推力和拉力并存，对吧？

Well, I think one of the ways that on chain people try to sell so there's this push and a pull, right?

一方面，像阿波罗这样的机构试图通过顶级的私人信贷来打开数字资产领域。

So you have this push of like an Apollo trying to open up the digital asset space with top quality private credit.

但另一方面，区块链和协议也在努力将现实世界资产引入链上，尤其是能产生收益的现实世界资产，因为它们理解杠杆循环的强大威力。

But then you also have chains and protocols trying to bring RWAs on chain because especially yield bearing RWAs because they understand the power of looping of leverage.

对。

Right.

所以它们所追求的都是高收益。

So what all they're looking for is a high yield.

对吧？

Right?

但问题是，他们根本不知道这些收益的构成是什么。

But the challenge with that is that they don't actually know what's making up that yield.

所以没有人坐在那里说，这个是安全的，那个不安全。

So there's no kind of arbiter sitting there saying this is safe, this isn't safe.

他们基本上就是说：给我最高的收益就行。

They're basically like, just give me the highest yield you can get.

而那些真正想做好风险管控的人则说：

Then The people who are actually trying to be a good risk steward.

我想要的是AAA级的资产。

Are like, well, I want something that's AAA.

我想要安全的资产，但他们意识到，如果资产安全，收益其实并不会很高，对吧？

I want something that's safe and what they realize is that, well, if it's safe, you don't really get paid very much, right?

我曾听人说起，哦，我有一个AAA级的CLO。

You know, I had people speaking about, oh, I got this triple A CLO.

我们应该把它通证化，非常安全。

We should tokenize it super safe.

我就说，是的，但你连比国债高100个基点的收益都拿不到。

And I'm like, yeah, but you're not even gonna get 100 bips over treasuries.

而且在某些时候，取决于当天的情况，你甚至无法实现循环借贷，因为在Aave上借款的成本超过4%。

And for some, you know, depending on the day, you couldn't even loop that because it costs you over 4% to borrow from Aave.

对。

Right.

而且这甚至还不符合合格抵押品的条件。

And that's not even eligible collateral.

所以，好的资产几乎太好而无法在DeFi中实际运作，因为收益率太低；而差的资产要么是因为信用评估不当，要么就是缺乏足够的流动性作为抵押品。

So said like the good stuff is almost too good to actually work in DeFi because yields are too low and the bad stuff is either bad because the credit is not underwritten properly or there isn't enough liquidity to use it as collateral.

对吧？

Right?

你可以直接代币化，而这正是Acred所面临的问题——Acred是个优质产品。

You could just tokenize and this is what Acred suffers from Acred is a quality product.

但它缺乏足够的二级流动性，因此人们很难进行循环借贷，尽管它的收益率达到7%，在当前环境下很有吸引力。

But doesn't have much secondary liquidity, so it's hard for people to loop, even though it gives you a 7% yield, which is attractive in this current environment.

二级流动性不足，因此如果你进行这种循环交易，一旦信用评级下调，或者更现实的情况是，借款成本超过了你获得的收益，你就会立即陷入负收益状态。

There isn't enough secondary liquidity so that if you loop this trade up and for some reason either the credit takes a price downgrade or more realistically, the price to borrow goes above the yield you're earning, so you're immediately looped into negative carry.

如果你试图平仓，但没有流动性，就会被困住。

If you try to unwind it and there's no liquidity, you get trapped.

所以，优质资产，流动性差；劣质资产，高收益。

So good asset, bad liquidity, bad asset, high yield.

因此，关于寻找合适资产的这种矩阵，我要做个陈述。

So like this kind of matrix of finding the right assets, I'm going make a statement.

我认为，从现实世界资产（RWA）的角度来看，目前值得代币化并上链的收益型资产并不多。

I really don't think there's too many yield bearing assets from an RWA perspective that are worth tokenizing and bringing on chain.

是的，没错，我认为这正是

Yeah, no, I think that's exactly

在这个阶段，作为一个纯粹的购买型产品，我真的不觉得，你知道的，我接触过很多发行方，并向他们展示了我的矩阵。

At this stage, a pure purchase product, I just don't think the, you know, I talked to many issuers and I give them my matrix.

我说，听好了，我给你说得简单点。

I'm like, listen, I'm going make it very simple for you.

我需要6%的收益率，以及每日流动性，并根据你想使用的杠杆比例，提供相应比例的流动性。

I need a 6% yield with daily liquidity and X percent of the liquidity based on how much you want to leverage.

但没人给我回电。

And no one's called me back.

也许吧

Maybe

可能是我自己的问题，也许我不喜欢自己的脸，但归根结底，要让这个矩阵真正运转起来实在太难了。

it's me, maybe I don't like my face, but like at the end of the day, like it's really hard to make that matrix work.

对我来说，这已经是基本要求了。

To me, that's table stakes.

如果你无法满足这些条件，那根本算不上真正的投资机会。

It's not actually a real investment opportunity if you can't meet those criteria.

对，当你说到每日流动性时，你指的是日均流动性，还是指每天都能赎回的能力？

Right, and when you say daily liquidity, do you mean average daily liquidity or do you mean ability to redeem daily?

所以，我是从结构的角度来看待这个问题的，因为再次强调，他们来找我的原因，是希望将这个资产上链并进行杠杆操作。

So, the way I look at structures, because again, the reason they would come to me is they want to issue this asset on chain, they want it leveraged.

对，所以我们进行我们的计算。

Right, so we run our calculations.

根据链上未偿金额和杠杆比例，短期内有多少流动性。

How much liquidity in a short period of time is there based on how much outstanding is on chain and levered.

所以可能是每天，也可能是每周，比如Athena是为期一周的平仓，但那是一种相对稳定的资产。

So it could be daily, it could be weekly, you know, like Athena is a one week unwind, but that's a relatively pegged asset.

我们的风险模型中涉及很多因素，但足够的流动性来支持你希望在链上杠杆的金额，这是大致的回答。

So there's a lot of factors that go within our risk models, but enough liquidity to support the amount you want to have levered on chain is the kind of generic answer.

然后你可以更具体一些，逐个投资来看。

And then you can get more specific, you know, investment by investment.

明白了。

Gotcha.

是的，确实有。

Yeah, there is.

这让我想起了我之前访谈过的一位嘉宾，那就是Chateau Capital。

So actually, this makes me think about one of the previous interview guests that I had on here, which was Chateau Capital.

他们做链上私人信贷或链上私人融资。

They do private on chain or private credit on chain.

我很想知道你有没有看过他们的模式，因为他们的模式相当有趣。

I'm curious if you've seen theirs because their model is quite interesting.

他们与一个链下基金合作，为大型城市中的活动主办方提供短期信贷或融资服务——这些主办方需要前期资金，但他们愿意支付20%的利息，因为他们已经锁定了所有合同。

They've partnered with an off chain fund that does an aggregate of short term crediting or financing deals for, excuse me, for, like, events producers in, you know, big cities where they need upfront money and they're fine with paying 20% because they have all the contracts locked in.

他们只是需要这种过桥贷款。

They just need that sort of, like, bridge loan.

但我觉得他们的赎回周期更接近一个月，但从你刚才讨论的诸多方面来看——比如多元化、资产的实际质量、你在资本结构中的位置，以及整体流动性——这确实非常有趣。

But I think their redemption period is closer to a month, but it is quite interesting from a lot of the things that you've been discussing, whether it's like diversification, actual quality of the asset, how high you are in the stack, and then just the overall liquidity.

所以我只是提一下，因为我们之前确实和他们聊过，他们确实很有意思。

So I just figured I'd mention that because that's one that we've talked to before, and they were quite interesting.

而且这是为数不多的私人信贷机会之一，让我觉得：哦，原来如此。

And one of the only private credit opportunities where I was like, oh, okay.

我不仅理解这个模式，而且作为一个加密货币激进投资者，20%左右的收益率确实非常有吸引力。

I not only understand that, but also even as a crypto degen, those yields around 20% are actually quite attractive.

是的，如果你认为风险收益位于有效前沿，20%的收益率其实相当于违约债券的回报，对吧？

Yeah, think so if you think risk reward sits on an efficient frontier, 20% is a yield that is like you would get on a defaulted bond, right?

在更传统的结构中。

In a more traditional construct.

你知道，对我而言，20%更像是一个警示信号，而不是有吸引力的数字。

You know, 20% is more of a flag than an attractive number for me.

这并不意味着它不可能有吸引力。

It doesn't mean it can't be.

听起来在这种情况下，收益率这么高的原因是围绕支持这种市场所需的基础设施还很不足。

It sounds like in this scenario, the reasons the yields are so high is because there isn't enough infrastructure built around supporting a market like that.

所以收益率非常高。

So the yields are super high.

不过，我得对这个领域有更多了解。

Again, I would have to know more about the space.

看起来并没有太多抵押品。

It doesn't seem like there's a lot of collateral.

我会把这看作是短期应收账款融资。

It's really short term receivables financing is the way I would look at it.

但你必须对这个领域非常专业。

But you have to kind of be an expert on the space.

我看到私募信贷最近最大的问题，尤其是在First Brands身上，是欺诈行为。

The biggest issue I've seen with private credit and more recently is with First Brands is fraud.

嗯，这种事总会被发现的。

Well, that'll always catch you.

让我再说一遍，我对这些人一无所知，我也没说任何事属实，但First Brands的欺诈问题在于他们有这些抵押品。

Well, let me again, I don't know anything about these guys and I'm not saying anything is, but the fraud component of First Brands was they had this collateral.

比如说，是机械设备。

Let's say it's machinery.

好的。

Okay.

他们会去找黑石，用这些机械设备作为抵押来贷款。

They would go to a BlackRock and pledge the machinery for a loan.

但他们还会去找另外六家银行，用同样的机器设备作为抵押申请贷款，却不让任何人知道他们已经抵押了这些资产。就像你提到的情况，我怎么知道他们没有从六家不同的公司对同一份合同进行融资呢？

But they would also then go to six other banks and pledge the same machinery for a loan without letting anybody So else know that they had the same in the scenario that you brought up, how do I know that they're not getting financing on the same contracts from six different firms?

当然。

Sure.

所以，这些只是其中的一些陷阱。

And so again, these are just some of the pitfalls.

如果这种情况真的发生了，想想所有被First Brand拖累的公司——杰弗里斯、瑞银、德意志银行、巴克莱、花旗。

If this could happen, you know, think about all the names that got hurt by First Brand, Jefferies, UBS, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, Citi.

这些都不是对这类事情掉以轻心的人。

These aren't people who take this stuff lightly.

所以，这是一个非常非常困难的领域。

So it's just a very, very difficult space.

但我认为，短期应收账款如果能提供不错的回报，那是因为它的收益率高，原因在于尚未建立起顺畅的信贷支持体系。

But I think short term receivables can provide a decent return if the reason the yields are high is because it just doesn't, hasn't built the infrastructure to give it that free flowing access of credit.

我给你举个例子。

I mean, I'll give you, I'll give you an example.

这是我们非常看好的一个项目，我们已经做了大量研究，就是Figure的Prime产品。

This is one we're really high on and we've done a ton of work on is Figure's Prime.

Figure Prime是一种代表房屋净值信贷额度（HELOC）短期融资工具的代币。

Figure Prime is it's a token that represents a very short term financing vehicle for HELOCs.

也就是房屋净值信贷额度。

So home equity lines of credit.

收益率大约在8%左右，这个收益水平非常高。

And the yields are around 8% where the yield pays and that's extremely high.

这远低于非投资级公司债券，因此收益率比那高得多。

That is way below sub investment grade corporate bonds, so the yield is much higher than that.

那是什么让我感到安心呢？

So what makes me comfortable?

在金融危机之前，房利美和房地美会购买原始贷款，然后将其证券化并出售。

So in pre financial crisis, Fannie and Freddie would buy raw loans and then securitize them and sell them off.

而在全球金融危机之后，它们大幅限制了购买的范围。

And then post global financial crisis, they really limited what they would buy.

而不在这一范围内的就是HELOC。

And what fell outside of that was HELOCs.

为什么会这样？

And why is this?

这为什么重要？

Why is this important?

因为每当银行发放一笔HELOC贷款时，这笔贷款都会留在其资产负债表上。

Because whenever a bank makes a HELOC loan, that loan sits on their balance sheet.

他们没有一种方式可以将其打包并出售，或者他们无法达到足够的规模。

They don't have a way to like package it all up and sell it right or they don't have it at scale.

所以当你去银行申请第二抵押贷款，银行只愿意以你净资产50%的额度放贷时，利率高得离谱，或者根本很难申请到。

So that's why when you go to a bank and they're giving you a second mortgage on 50% of your equity, the rates stink or that's really hard to get one.

对。

Right.

所以Figure的做法是，让我们利用这个工具，因为风险高，利率也高得离谱，而融资链条上的参与者无法对冲或转移这种风险，从银行的角度来看也是如此。

So what Figure has done is said, you know, let's take this vehicle where rates are astronomically high, because of the risk, because the people who sit in the financing pipeline don't have a way to offset that or to offlay that risk or in the bank's terms.

而且不必深入这个话题，他们的核心问题是资本。

And not to get too far down this trail, their problem is capital.

这些产品的风险应该对应4%的收益。

The risks are based on the risk these things should yield 4%.

问题是，由于他们无法将这些贷款打包出售，监管机构对这些贷款施加了沉重的资本要求。

The problem is because they can't package them up and sell them, their regulator slaps heavy capital charges on on these loans.

这就为私人资本进入创造了机会，我认为Figure正是这一模式的绝佳代表。

So it creates an opportunity for private vehicles to step in and I think figures are really great version of this.

你知道，收益率很高，但这种高收益是可以解释的，因为融资基础设施存在缺口，而通过链上方式吸引这些资本是最好的途径吗？

And you know, it's high yields, but the high yields can be explained because of the financing infrastructure has a gap and you know, Is doing it on chain the best vehicle to attract this capital?

也许不是，但他们已经在链上实现了规模化，并且现在正转向加杠杆。

Maybe not, but they've established it at scale on chain and now they're moving into getting it leveraged.

所以这对他们来说是可行的，这正是他们的专长和理解所在。

So you know it's works for them and that's their skill set and their understanding.

因此，这大概就是他们选择这个方向的原因。

So that's probably why they chose this angle.

我不认为这是在向更无知的资本兜售。

I don't think there's down selling it to dumber capital.

我认为他们只是抓住了这个机会，结果对他们非常有利。

I think they just had this opportunity set and it's really worked out for them.

是的，我的意思是，到了某个阶段，你只能去尝试各种方法，看看哪些能行得通，对吧？

Yeah, and I mean, at a certain point, you just have to try stuff and see what sticks, right?

有些东西可能会成功，有些可能不会，但我认为那些能够接受这种在有效前沿上平衡风险的公司和领导者，这种做法是有道理的，他们试图推动这一点，也许还会为市场加入新的组合元素。

Like some stuff may hit, some stuff may not, but I think the companies and the leaders that are okay with that balancing of risk along the the efficient frontier and all that makes sense to sort of try and push that and maybe try and add new compositional elements to the market and all of that.

我很好奇，关于你提到的你过去传统的经验，以及你是如何将它们融入今天的实践中的。

And I am curious, in terms of, you know, you've mentioned the traditional experiences that you've had and how you're sort of merging that in today.

在你以往的经历中，有哪些经验或教训是你现在经常应用在当前职位上，以尽可能让Centaur取得成功的？

What are some maybe lessons or things that you've experienced in previous experiences that you apply regularly in your present role to make Centaur as successful as possible?

当然。

Sure.

我曾经在我的办公桌上放着一句话：通往地狱的道路是由正利差铺就的。

I used to have this this quote on my desk that said the road to hell is paved by positive carry.

在传统世界中，我注意到一种模式：当收益率很低时，你会面临无数个问题。

And I I've noticed in the traditional world, a paradigm where if yields are low, you get a million questions.

每次你把收益率再提高100个基点，很多问题就开始消失了。

Every time you ratchet up that yield another 100 basis points, a lot of the questions start to go away.

我该去繁殖吗？还是怎样？

Should I breed or what?

是的，我的意思是，我在CLO、CMO、长期公司债和私募信贷中都见过这种情况。

Yeah, I mean, listen, we I've seen it in CLOs, CMOs, long dated corporate debt, private credit.

你知道，一旦你给它贴上越来越高收益率的标签，人们问的问题就越来越少。

You know, once you start slapping a higher and higher yield on it, people ask less and less questions.

我觉得我们经历过的许多危机其实都并不新鲜。

You know, I think a lot of the crises that we've seen are really nothing new.

只是换成了不同的资产、不同的平台而已。

Just insert different assets, different platform.

但你知道，别去管智能合约的风险或漏洞了。

But, you know, I think forget about the smart contract risks or exploits.

这实际上是杠杆管理不当。

It's really mismanaging leverage.

大多数问题的根源要么是过度杠杆化，要么是对自身流动性状况缺乏理解。

It's either getting over levered or not understanding your liquidity situation as kind of the base of most of the problems that we've had.

然后对连锁的次级影响也缺乏理解。

And then not understanding knock on secondary effects.

这是一个我学到的教训。

And this is a lesson I learned.

你知道，在2008年2月住房危机刚开始爆发时，我正在交易房利美和房地美。

You know, was trading Fannie and Freddie during 02/2008 when the housing crisis really started to kick off.

你知道，我当时在一家需要瑞士政府救助的银行工作，而不是美国政府，但我看到普遍都需要救助，问题不仅在于他们购买的资产，更在于对流动性和杠杆的误解。

You know, I worked for a bank that needed a bailout from the government, not the US government, the Swiss government, but saw across the board everyone needed bailouts and it was not only the assets they purchased, but not understanding liquidity and leverage.

你可以回溯到数十次金融危机，如果将其简化到最根本的要点，无非就是流动性和杠杆。

And you can go back to dozens of financial crisis and if you boil them down to the simplest points, it's liquidity and leverage.

所以我认为，我在Centora所秉持的原则就是这样。

So I think we, you know, I base principles at Centora.

我们看待任何资产或策略时，都会以我的退出流动性、滑点以及如何管理杠杆作为指导原则？

We look at any asset or any strategy with what's my exit liquidity, what's my slippage and how do I manage my leverage as kind of a guiding principle?

是的，完全正确。

Yeah, absolutely.

我认为，即使回溯到南海泡沫时期，杠杆、借贷、信用和流动性这些因素都是核心问题。

I think even if you go all the way back to the South Sea bubble leverage borrowing credit liquidity, all that stuff was core.

我认为这绝对是正确的。

I think it's absolutely correct.

我很好奇，当系统崩溃时，是否有一些反复出现的原因或要素导致了这些失败？

I am curious in that if there are sort of repeated causes or elements that contribute to these failures, you know, when things break.

我想知道，你们手里的数据中是否存在某些特定模式，能预示着即将崩溃，比如你们提到的流动性危机、DPEGs，或者协议层面的故障，甚至是一些你们注意到的异常现象？

I'm curious if there are specific patterns that show up in the data that you guys have that maybe indicate that things are about to break, whether it's, like you said, liquidity crises, DPEGs, or even, you know, on the protocol level failures or just strange things happening maybe that you guys have noticed?

我们关注的一件事是，努力对风险与回报进行合理定价。

So, one of the things that we look at is we try to fairly price risk reward.

但这并不是一门精确的科学，因为你需要引入大量不同的假设。

And that's it's not an exact science because you're putting in a lot of different assumptions.

所以，你可以使用相同的模型，但采用不同的假设，从而得出不同的价格。

So, you know, you could use the same model and use different assumptions and you get to different prices.

我们观察到的模式是。

The patterns we see is.

通常在崩盘之前，会经历一轮追涨情绪，每个人都试图参与，导致收益率出现大幅飙升，但你并不会在收益率最高点时崩盘。

Typically before things blow up, there's a FOMO cycle where everyone tries to you you get this big kind of explosiveness in yield, but you don't really tend to blow up at the high point yield.

真正开始崩盘的时候，是当越来越多的人涌入，导致收益率被稀释。

When you start to blow up is when people pile in more and more and more and it dilutes down.

你知道，在20%的收益率时，Terra Luna可能并不是一个糟糕的风险回报比，但这些策略在崩盘前，收益率已经跌到了10%左右。

And you know, at 20%, Terra Luna was probably not a horrific risk reward, but that thing those strategies went down towards 10% before it blew up.

我认为。

I think what

有太多人涌入，把收益率压低了。

so many people had come in to push the yield down.

是的。

Yeah.

所以这么多人采用了这种方式，每个人都依赖别人来执行。

So so many people had adopted this thing and everybody was depending on everybody else to do it.

所以就连房地产市场也是这样，对吧？

So even the housing market, right?

在市场崩盘之前，抵押贷款利差已经非常狭窄了。

Mortgage spreads were almost were super tight before the market imploded.

市场崩盘时，利差并没有大幅扩大，对吧？

It wasn't massively wider than the market imploded, right?

所以你开始时的利差在这里，然后你大量增加了抵押贷款的生产、证券化，大量资金涌入，等到抵押贷款市场爆炸时，利差已经变得极其狭窄。

So you started spreads were here, then you moved all this production of mortgages, all the securitization, all this cash came in, and by the time the mortgage market exploded, it was super tight.

因此，将这一点简化的一种方式是，对于我持有的每一个头寸，我都会逐日审视，说：嘿，我知道我从20美元时就持有比特币，现在涨到了120美元。

And so one of the ways to kind of boil this down is every position that we have on, I'll look at on a day by day basis and say, hey, I know I was in Bitcoin from $20 and now it's $120.

显然，我现在想的是更好的时光，而不是今天。

Obviously, I'm thinking of nicer times, not today.

对，是的。

Right, yeah.

我买的时候，就像大多数人一样，有近期偏差，觉得这笔交易我已经涨了80%。

What I bought like most people have a recency bias and they're like I'm up 80% of this trade.

我一直在说这一点。

I'm saying this forever.

如果现在是120，你会再买更多吗？

I look at it the other way at 120 would you buy more?

没错。

Correct.

如果答案是否定的，那你可能就不该再持有这个仓位了。

If the answer is no, you probably shouldn't have the position on anymore.

对，所以我们评估每一个仓位时，都要假设你没有任何已实现的收益，现在还会不会开这个仓？

Right, so we evaluate every position as if you didn't have any accrued gains, would you put it on now?

这一原则在我的交易生涯中救了我无数次，这种纪律已经深深融入了我们的公司文化。

And that one principle has saved me so many times in my trading career that that discipline is just ingrained in the firm.

而且，这比任何东西都更主观，但只要你投资任何东西，就问问自己这个简单的问题。

And again, it's more subjective than anything, but just ask yourself that simple question, anything you invest in.