354 | 克里斯蒂安·利斯特论自由意志与现实的层次

大家好。

Hello, everyone.

欢迎收听《思维空间》播客。

Welcome to the MINDSCAPE podcast.

我是你们的主持人，卡罗尔。

I'm your host, Carroll.

嘿。

Hey.

大家听说过自由意志这个概念吗？

Has everyone heard about the idea of free will?

就是说，每个人都能基于自己的理由做出选择和决定，这些选择会真正影响世界的发展？

The idea that, you know, individual people have the ability to make choices and decisions based on reasons that can have a causal influence on how the world behaves?

是的。

Yes.

你听说过。

You have.

我知道你听说过。

I know you have.

别担心。

Don't worry.

我就是开个玩笑。

I'm just kidding.

你早就听过自由意志这个说法了。

You've heard about free will.

我明白这话题很热门，但说实话，我也不太懂为什么自由意志会这么受关注。

It's a hot topic for reasons that I will admit, I do not completely understand why, free will is such a hot topic.

尤其是在网上，人们总爱发表各种观点，但我总觉得他们根本没在认真听对方说什么。

But, on the Internet in particular, people like, you know, making claims, and I I really think that they're not always listening to each other.

关于决定论、非决定论、相容论、不相容论、责任、责备这些概念，大家吵来吵去，说法一大堆。

There are claims about determinism, indeterminism, compatibilism, incompatibilism, responsibility, blame, whole bunches of things that are bounced around.

这让我挺惊讶的，按理说自由意志是个挺抽象的哲学问题，没想到这么多人在意，我想我该为此感到高兴才对。

It surprises me and I guess I should be happy that so many people care about what is in some sense a relatively abstruse philosophical point.

我确实没看出，那些说自己相信自由意志的人，和那些说自己不相信自由意志的人，在行为上有什么不同——他们对待选择、责任，或者把责任归咎于他人的方式，完全没差别。

I've certainly not noticed any difference between people who say they believe in free will and people who say they don't believe in free will in how they act, in how they behave, in how they treat what it means to make a choice or to place responsibility or blame on anyone else for making a choice.

所以我想，至少这场哲学讨论还在进行，这倒也挺好。

So I guess I should be happy that there's some sort of philosophical discussion going on here.

你们很多人都知道，我对自由意志有两点一直想说。

As many of you know, I have two things that I like to say about free will.

第一点是关于决定论和非决定论的，我一直觉得，物理定律是不是决定论的，其实根本不重要。

One is about the determinism versus indeterminism thing, which is I like to say, it doesn't matter whether the laws of physics are deterministic or indeterministic.

这个问题挺有意思，但跟自由意志毫无关系。

That's an interesting question to ask, but has nothing to do with free will.

就算物理定律是非决定论的，你照样可以相信自由意志，也可以不信。

Even if the laws of physics were indeterministic, I would still think that you could either believe in free will or not.

量子力学跟自由意志根本扯不上关系。

In particular, quantum mechanics has nothing to do with free will.

量子力学确实说，世界本质上是非决定论的，两个观察者看到的结果可能不一样。

Quantum mechanics does say that two observers in the world, the world is indeterministic.

有些人偏偏用一种颠倒的逻辑：他们先认定自由意志不存在，然后就推论说世界一定是决定论的，因此量子力学不可能说世界不是决定论的——这种推理在我眼里既颠倒又错误。

And there's this weird backwards logic according to which people start from a conviction that there is no free will and convince themselves that must mean that there is determinism in the world and therefore quantum mechanics can't possibly say that there's not, which is very backwards and very wrong to me.

这是我个人的看法。

So that's one thing I think.

我另一个观点是，相容论大致是对的。

The other thing I think is that compatibilism is roughly right.

这是我的个人立场。

That's my personal take.

相容论的意思是，即使底层是决定论的，我们依然完全有理由、也应该在更高层次上——比如人的层面和他们的行为层面——来讨论自由意志。

Compatibilism is just the idea that even if there's determinism at the lower level, you can still talk very fruitfully and should talk very fruitfully about free will at higher levels, the level of people and their their actions.

我早就多次在不同场合说过这一点。

So I've said that many times in many different places.

现在是时候把这个问题说清楚了。

It's time to get it right.

换句话说，该去听听真正精通这些问题的专家是怎么想的了，看看他们经过深思熟虑后得出的结论。

In other words, time to talk to somebody who is really truly an expert in these questions and who has thought through through them very, very carefully and see how the experts think.

不出所料，我和这些专家交流时，有很多观点是一致的，也学到了不少新东西。

And unsurprisingly, there's many points of agreement and many points at which I learn new things by talking to these experts.

克里斯蒂安·利斯特是一位哲学家。

So Christian List is a philosopher.

他在慕尼黑的数学哲学研究所工作，不是数学物理，是数学哲学。

He is at the Institute for Mathematical Philosophy, not mathematical physics, mathematical philosophy in Munich.

他在很多领域都做过研究，尤其在社会选择理论方面成果很多。

And he's done a lot of work in many different areas, a lot on social choice theory.

他还写过关于量子力学的论文。

He's written papers about quantum mechanics.

但我认为，他最出名的还是对相容论自由意志的辩护。

But I think that he's probably most well known for his defense of compatibilist free will.

也就是说，他解释了：基于世界的结构、我们的形而上学立场、对涌现的理解，以及世界如何以不同层次呈现，我们最该采取的态度，就是把人当作拥有自由意志、因而负有道德责任的主体。

That is to say, he is explaining why given how the world is structured and given the metaphysical commitments we have and our understanding of emergence and how the world appears to us in layers and different levels and so forth, the right stance to take is treating people as agents who have free will and therefore moral responsibility.

他不仅这么说，还深入论证了这句话的含义——什么是主体？必要条件是什么？这些概念如何相互关联？又如何从个体扩展到群体、国家，甚至可能扩展到大型语言模型或其他类型的AI？

And not only does he say that, but he defends it and he investigates what it means to say that, what it means to be an agent, what are the necessary criteria, how it fits together, how you can extend these ideas from individual human beings to groups, to nations, potentially even to large language models or other kinds of AIs.

你什么时候会认为人工智能拥有自由意志？

At what point do you say that the AI has free will?

正如克里斯蒂安待会儿会强调的，这个问题和人工智能是否有意识是两回事。

As as Christian will emphasize here, that's a different question than whether the AI is conscious.

事实上，这个问题更容易回答，也可能更重要，所以我们真该多花点时间思考这些议题。

In fact, it's a much easier question and maybe a more important question, so we really should start thinking about these questions more than we do.

要是能有一个严谨的哲学框架来处理这些问题，那就再好不过了。

It'd be nice to have a rigorous philosophical, framework with which to do that.

他正好就是研究这个的人，咱们就来弄清楚这个框架到底是什么。

He's the guy who has it, so let's figure out what that framework is.

咱们开始吧。

Let's go.

欢迎来到《心灵景观》播客，克里斯蒂安·利斯特。

Christian List, welcome to the MINDSCAPE podcast.

你好，肖恩。

Hi, Sean.

很高兴能上你的播客。

Nice to be on your podcast.

是的。

Yeah.

很高兴你能来。

It's very good to have you on.

你一直从事哲学研究，涉猎了很多领域，包括量子力学。

You've been a philosopher working on a lot of things, including quantum mechanics.

奇怪的是，今天我们主要不会谈量子力学。

Weirdly, we're not gonna talk about quantum mechanics for the most part today.

也许最后我们会提一下。

Maybe at the end, we'll we'll we'll bring it up.

但正如我们这里常说的，眼下还有别的要紧事要办。

But we have other fish to fry, as we say, in this part of the world.

对于不懂哲学的听众来说，哲学其实有很多不同的分支。

For the listeners who are not philosophy experts, you know, there's lots of different kinds of philosophy you can do.

有道德哲学、政治哲学之类的。

There's moral philosophy and political philosophy or whatever.

你属于哪一类哲学家？

What kind of philosopher are you?

你的研究领域到底是什么？

What what is the world, the specialty in which you live?

我的正式研究方向是哲学与决策理论，这也是我在慕尼黑的职位描述。

Okay, so officially my area is described as philosophy and decision theory, so this is at least my job description here in Munich.

我在所谓的慕尼黑数学哲学中心工作，这是一个跨学科性很强的地方。

I work at the so called Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, which is a fairly interdisciplinary place.

这里的研究人员都是哲学家，但会和多个邻近学科互动。

The people working here are philosophers who interact with several neighboring disciplines.

我们有研究领域与数学、物理、经济学、认知科学、人工智能、神经科学等多个领域重叠的人。

So we have people in areas overlapping with maths, with physics, with economics, with cognitive science, with AI, with neuroscience, and with a whole bunch of different things.

所以这是一个本质上高度跨学科的环境。

So it's an inherently very interdisciplinary place.

所以我觉得我的兴趣一直很分散，主要围绕个人和集体决策，以及由此引发的种种形而上学问题。

And, so I think my interests have been all over the place around individual and collective decision making and a whole bunch of metaphysical questions that are raised by this.

我特别喜欢‘数学哲学中心’这个概念。

I love the idea of a center of mathematical philosophy.

这种地方真的存在吗？

Is that a thing?

其他地方也有数学哲学中心吗？

Do other places have centers for mathematical philosophy?

我觉得，像慕尼黑数学哲学中心这样命名的机构，可能就我们这一个。

I think the MCMP Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy is probably the only place with that kind of name and label.

不过当然，其他地方也有研究方向相近的机构。

But of course there are other places with related interests.

阿姆斯特丹有个非常不错的机构，叫ILLC，逻辑、语言与计算研究所。

So there is a very good place in Amsterdam called the ILLC Institute for Logic, Language and Computation.

他们做的很多工作和我们有重叠。

They do a bunch of things that overlap with what what we do.

我以前在伦敦政治经济学院的哲学、逻辑与科学方法系，也专攻类似的方向。

My former department of philosophy, logic, and scientific method at the London School of Economics also specializes in similar things.

所以，我们在这个领域确实算得上是规模不小的团队，但绝不是唯一的。

So, yeah, we are we are quite a big place in this area, but by no means the only one.

我想这倒也说得通。

I guess it does make sense.

我觉得这个想法特别有意思，我知道物理哲学家很常见，但经济学哲学家、生物学哲学家、计算机科学哲学家，还有逻辑学家，也都带着很强的数学倾向。

I love the idea that, you know, I I'm well aware with philosophers of physics, of course, But philosophers of economics, philosophers of biology, philosophers of computer science also have this mathematical bent, logicians, I suppose.

所以，让他们彼此交流，一定特别有意思。

And so it it must must be fun to have them talking to each other.

当然。

Absolutely.

没错。

Yeah.

当初我选择来这里，很大程度上就是因为这里的跨学科氛围特别吸引我。

So now the interdisciplinary nature of the place was one of the big attractions for me when I chose to to come here.

而且，我真的特别喜欢。

And, yeah, I I absolutely love it.

所以

So

我想先直接把我们讨论的核心结论说出来。

And I I wanna sort of give away the punchline of a lot of our discussion right away.

然后再回头慢慢铺垫背景，不过我们今天主要谈的是自由意志。

And then we then we can back up and and lay the groundwork, but we're gonna be talking about free will.

自由意志这个话题在网上出奇地受欢迎。

And there's a free will is weirdly popular topic on the Internet.

我不知道你有没有注意到，很多人特别喜欢争论自由意志。

I don't know if you know this, but people love debating free will.

是的。

Yes.

没错。

Yes.

你能给我们简单梳理一下各种观点吗？

And maybe you could just lay out the options for us.

我知道你倾向于决定论，但其实……

I know that there's this idea that you're a determinist or not, but Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

哲学家们并不是这么看待这个问题的。

That that it's not really how philosophers think about it.

明白了。

Yeah, okay.

哲学界主要的分歧在于相容论和不相容论之间。

So the big distinction in the philosophical landscape is that between compatibilism and incompatibilism.

我相信很多观众都知道，长期以来一直有个争论：如果世界是决定论的，我们还能不能有自由意志？

I mean, as I'm sure a lot of your viewers know, there's a long standing debate about whether we could have free will if the world is deterministic.

决定论的意思是，只要我们确定了宇宙在某一时刻的状态，那么根据自然法则，未来就只有一种可能的发展路径，这似乎排除了任何真正的选择节点——也就是说，你明明可以选A，也可以选B。

So determinism would obviously be the idea that if we fix the state of the universe at a given point in time, then there's only one possible trajectory of future states under the laws of nature, and that seems to prevent the idea that there are forks in the road, decision nodes, where I can do one thing or I can do something else.

而自由意志这个概念，和能在多种可能性之间做选择紧密相关，因此很多人——也就是所谓的不相容论者——认为，如果宇宙是决定论的，那自由意志就不可能存在。

And the idea of free will is so much bound up with having choices between alternative possibilities, and so that leads many people, the so called incompatibilists, to say well if the universe is deterministic, then there can't be free will.

而另一端则是相容论者。

And then on the other side of the divide are the compatibilists.

他们说，即使宇宙是决定论的，我们依然可以拥有自由意志，于是他们试图给出一种对自由意志的解释，这种解释往往更微妙、更细致，目的是在决定论的框架下让自由意志说得通。

They say that even if the universe is deterministic, we could still have free will, and then they try to give us an account of free will, which is often gonna be a little bit more subtle or nuanced, that then tries to make sense of free will in this scenario.

这个嘛，我也不确定。

And I don't know.

其实我也可以讲讲两种主流的观点。

I mean, I could also go into the the sort of two conventional options.

大致来说，目前主流的两种看法是这样的。

I mean, two sort of two conventional options on the map are roughly the following two.

一种观点认为，把自由意志定义为‘本可以做出不同选择’根本就是错的。

One would be to say it's just a mistake to define free will in terms of the possibility of doing otherwise.

也就是说，对自由意志来说，关键不在于有没有其他可能性，而在于行动者是否能认同自己的行为。

So here the idea is what matters for free will is not alternative possibilities, but what matters is simply that an agent can endorse their actions.

所以，如果我做的这件事符合我的目标、动机，我认同它，也真心想做，它体现了我的个性——当然，这个说法可以有各种不同的表达方式——兼容论者就会说，这样就已经足够算作自由了。

So if I do something which is in line with my goals, my motives, I believe in it, I want to do it, it expresses my character, mean, can spell this out in a variety of different ways, then those compatibilists say that's sort of good enough for counting the whole thing as free.

没错。

Right.

而另一类兼容论者采取了不同的思路，他们会说，某种形式的选项选择对自由意志确实很重要，所以我们得解释清楚，我们到底如何能做到‘本可以不一样’。

And then the other type of compatibilist takes a different strategy, so they'd say, well, some form of choice between alternative options is actually important for free will, so we must give an account of, you know, how we could do otherwise.

但他们又试图通过重新定义‘我本可以做得不同’这句话的意思，来让这个观点与决定论兼容。

But then they try to render this compatible with determinism by redefining what it means to say I could have done otherwise.

举个简单的例子：今天早上我喝了咖啡，而不是茶。

So for instance, I mean, a trivial example: This morning I had coffee rather than tea.

我想说：‘我本可以选茶的。’

I want to be able to say, oh, I could have done otherwise, I could have had tea instead'.

这些兼容论者会说，其实并不需要在做选择的那一刻，喝茶真的在物理上是可能的——也许在决定论的世界里，只有咖啡这一条路径是真实的可能。

So what those compatibilists then would say is that it wasn't required that at the time of the choice it was genuinely possible for me to have tea, because maybe if the universe was deterministic only one thing was possible, maybe only the coffee trajectory was a real possibility.

但他们强调的是：如果世界稍微有点不一样，比如我的过往经历略有不同，我原本更想喝茶，那么整个事件的走向就会随之改变，而这种‘如果当时不同，结果就会不同’的反事实可能性，就已经足够支撑自由意志了。

However, what those compatibilists would say is What matters is that if the world had been a little bit different, so if I had had a slightly different back history, maybe I'd had a desire for tea instead, but then things would have been ever so slightly different, then if things had been a little bit different, then the trajectory would have unfolded in a different way in the in the t direction, and then that's good enough for for free will.

所以第二种相容论者实际上是用反事实条件来重新定义‘不可能有其他选择’。

So those that second kind of compatibilist basically redefines can't do otherwise in terms of a counterfactual conditional.

而这些就是目前主流的几种观点。

And those are sort of the conventional options out there.

你能告诉我们，你支持哪一种吗？

Can you can you tell us which one you are?

其实我想换个角度来重新审视这场争论。

So actually like to reframe the debate.

我刚才跟你说的，其实是标准的表述方式。

So I I mean, what I've just given you is the sort of standard framing.

当然，我给学生上自由意志入门课的时候，也是这么讲的。

Of course, that's also what I present to my students when I give an introductory lecture on free will.

简单来说，我的观点是，这场传统争论的框架本身就有问题，因为它没有区分我们看待世界的不同层次——一方面是物理层面，另一方面是能动性层面。我的主张是，一旦我们清晰地划分了这些层次，就能为自由意志开辟出一种更深刻、更有意义的辩护路径。当然，我们后面应该会深入讨论这一点。

I mean, maybe in a nutshell, my point is that this standard debate frames things in the wrong way because it fails to distinguish between different levels of description at which we can think about the world, namely a physical level on the one hand and a level of agency on the other hand, and then my claim, and I'm sure we'll get to discuss this properly, my claim is that once we carefully draw the distinction between levels, this opens up new space for for defending free will in a more interesting way.

很好。

Good.

这说得通。

That makes perfect sense.

谢谢你的提前介绍，我们一会儿会谈到这一点。

Thank you for the for the preview, and and we will get there.

有人会说你不是在捍卫自由意志，只是在重新定义它，你对此有什么标准回应吗？

Do you have a quick standard response to the claim from some people that you're not defending free will, you're just redefining what it is?

我的回应是，我接下来要详细解释的这种策略，恰恰能很好地反驳这个反对意见。

Well, my my response is that actually the strategy that I'm then about to explain more properly gives us a wonderful rebuttal of this objection.

我想说的是，我刚才简要提到的那些传统兼容论观点，确实容易被指责为重新定义或弱化了自由意志。

So what I would say is that some of those standard compatibilist roots that I very quickly summarized earlier on really can be accused of redefining free will or watering down free will.

比如说，如果我们说自由意志根本不需要‘本可以有其他选择’，完全不需要替代可能性，那确实和普通人对自由意志的直觉理解相去甚远。

I mean, if I for instance, if we say that free will does not require the possibility of doing otherwise at all, will does not require alternative possibilities at all, then we have definitely watered down free will compared to our common sense understanding of free will.

如果你去问非哲学圈的人，我觉得大多数人会认为，某种意义上的选择能力，是自由意志的核心。

I mean, if you ask people outside academic philosophy, I think most people will think that some notion of choice is really essential for free will.

是的。

Yeah.

如果把这一点去掉，那我们就是在重新定义或者削弱自由意志。

And so if you take this away, we have redefined or watered down free will.

但即使我们只是用这种反事实的方式重新定义‘本可以做得不同’，严格来说，自由意志还是被轻微地重新定义或稀释了。

But even if we redefine can do otherwise, just in this counterfactual way, arguably we've still ever so slightly redefined free will or watered it down.

因为我想说的是，今天早上我本来完全可以做出别的选择。

Because, you know, I want to say, you know, this morning I really could have chosen to be instead.

这不只是说，如果世界稍微有点不一样，我就会选别的。

It's not just if the world had been a little bit different I would have chosen to show.

我的意思是，如果世界不一样了，很多事情都可能不同。

I mean, the world had been different, a lot of things could have been different.

但我想强调的是，在做决定的那一刻，选项对我而言是敞开的。

But what I want to say is, at the moment of choice, you know, it was open to me.

我当时可以选择喝咖啡，也可以选择喝茶，最后我选了一个，但整个过程完全在我掌控之中。

I mean, I could have gone the coffee way and I could have gone the tea way and I opted for one, but the whole thing was under control.

所以没错，我完全理解，有些版本的相容论看起来确实在重新定义或削弱自由意志。

And so yes, I totally get the point that some versions of compatibilism look like they are redefining or watering down free will.

关键是，如果我们换个角度来讨论这个问题，其实可以避开这个困境。

And whole point is, you know, if we reframe the debate in the right way, we can avoid that.

明白了。

Okay.

这真的特别有帮助，太有用了。

That's that's very actually super duper helpful.

说实话，我知道很多长期听节目的听众都清楚，我早就完全认同你的看法了，但这并不是我的专业领域。

I mean, I'll I'll confess, and I think a lot of my longtime listeners know, I'm already totally on board with your way of thinking about it, but it's not my professional expertise either.

所以听到真正的专家来厘清这些基本概念，真的很有帮助。

So hearing the the true experts explain the ground rules is very helpful.

我还想快速提一下，你刚才说的大部分内容其实都没用到‘决定论’或者‘非决定论’这类词。

The other thing I wanted to very quickly get on the table is most of what you just said doesn't involve words like determinism or indeterminism.

我的意思是，你根本没怎么用这些词。

I mean, you didn't use those words that much.

所以看起来，相容论和不相容论——就像你说的，哲学家们通常这么区分——其实和决定论与非决定论的争论是两码事。

And so it seems like compatibilism versus incompatibilism, which is like you say, the way that philosophers generally think about it, is just kind of orthogonal to determinism versus indeterminism.

网上很多争论，我就是因为发了一条社交媒体帖子惹上麻烦了，那帖子说：如果你一谈到自由意志，马上就扯到物理定律是不是决定论的，那说明你根本没搞懂这个争论。

And a lot of the online debate, I I got in trouble for putting a social media post that says, if you start talking about free will and immediately talk about whether the laws of physics are deterministic or not, you clearly don't understand the debate.

争论。

Debate.

你能解释一下吗？

So could you could you explain?

我那样说是不是有点过头了？还是说，这其实跟你想的差不多？

Is that was I a little bit too much or is that basically in is compatible, I guess, with what you're thinking?

嗯，你的方向完全是对的。

Well, think it it definitely goes in the in the right direction.

方向没错，不过我想提前说一下关键点。

Direction, but I mean, maybe to anticipate one of the key points.

我觉得与其问宇宙是不是决定论的，

I think to just ask, is the universe deterministic or not?

如果只是这样来设问，其实很多形而上学教材就这么讲，彼得·范·英格伦那篇影响深远的非相容论论证，也是这么提问题的。

If we just frame it like this, and that's actually the way it gets framed in a lot of metaphysics textbooks, that's the way the question is framed in the influential work of Peter van Inwagen who developed one of the most famous arguments for incompatibilism.

如果只是问宇宙是不是决定论的？

If just ask, is the universe deterministic or not?

我觉得这个问题有点模糊，不够明确。

My view is that that's a somewhat underspecified or ill defined question.

决定论和非决定论之间的区别确实可以划分，但只有当我们清楚界定讨论所处的描述层次时，这个区别才真正有意义、才够清晰。

I think the distinction between determinism and indeterminism can be drawn, but it becomes fully meaningful, fully well defined only once we carefully specify the level of description at which we're trying to draw that distinction.

一旦我们把系统描述清楚，并且明确知道是在哪个层次上讨论，这时候才能问：在这个层次上，系统是不是决定论的？

So, once we have a system carefully described and we are crystal clear about the level of description, then we can actually ask, relative to that level of description, are we dealing with a deterministic system or or not?

没错。

Right.

当然，那些认为基础物理理论给出了自然界确定性规律的人——至少在爱因斯坦之前，这算是主流观点——他们可以说：是的，在某个描述层次上，物理宇宙确实是决定论的。

And and and sure, you know, those people who think that, you know, some fundamental theory of physics gives us deterministic laws of of nature, so I suppose that was the mainstream view, at least until Einstein, they would be able to say, yes, there is a level of description at which the physical universe behaves deterministically.

所以，如果我们在那个层次上固定了宇宙在某一时刻的演化轨迹，那么根据自然定律，这条轨迹就只允许一种可能的后续发展，也就是唯一符合物理定律的延续方式。

And so then that would mean if you fix the trajectory of the physical universe at that level of description up to a particular point in time, then this trajectory admits only one nomologically possible continuation, so only one possible continuation among the other trajectories that are admitted by the laws of nature.

到目前为止，都还说得通。

So far so good.

但我们现在也完全有可能发现，如果用不同的视角、比如更宏观的层面来重新描述同一个系统，决定论与非决定论的区分可能会呈现出完全不同的结果。当我们不再关注那些极其精细的微观状态，而是观察一系列更粗略的宏观状态，直到某个时间点，再问：在系统所遵循的规律下，这个宏观状态序列可能有哪些后续发展？

But now it is also entirely possible that if we re describe the very same system at a different level, at a more macroscopic level for instance, the determinismindeterminism distinction can come out in a different way such that if we now look at a sequence not so much of these super finely described microstates, but we look at a sequence of macrostates, each of which is more coarse grained, up to a particular point in time and we then ask, well, what are the possible macro level continuations of this sequence of macro level states under the laws governing the system?

这时候，完全可能出现两种或多种不同的宏观状态序列，它们都与系统的基本规律完全兼容。一旦出现这种情况，就意味着在宏观层面我们面对的是某种非决定论，而在微观层面却仍然是决定论的。

Well then it could actually be that two or more distinct sequences of macrostates are fully compatible with the laws governing the system, and whenever you've got this kind of pattern you'd have some form of indeterminism relative to the macro level of description while having determinism relative to the micro level of description.

总的来说，科学中研究的系统往往可以被描述为多个不同的层次。

And the general point is, of course, systems that we study in the sciences admit many different levels of description.

比如，我们知道有粒子物理的层面，再往上是化学层面，这已经更粗略了；还有各种生物学层面，比如单个细胞，再往上是更大的生物系统，比如整个生物体。

I mean, we know there is the level of particle physics, there's a level of chemistry which is already more coarse grained, There are various biological levels, so the level of, let's say, individual cells, but then there is also the level of larger biological systems, organisms.

我们可以继续这样一层层往上走，世界上有无数个描述层次，每个层次的精细程度和细节密度都不一样。

We can keep going like this, so there's many different levels of description that differ in the level of grain or detail with which we describe the world.

所以，某种层面是决定论的，另一些层面是非决定论的，这根本没什么奇怪的。

And so there's nothing weird about recognizing that at some levels you might have deterministic dynamics, deterministic behavior of the system, and at other levels you have indeterministic behavior of the system.

举个例子，我和我的合作者马库斯·普里瓦托在做思想实验时，为了帮助理解，就设想了一个场景。

I mean, in thought experiment you could even have so with my friend and co author Markus Privato, we just for conceptual intuition pumping, we we considered this thought experiment.

你甚至可以构想一个假想系统，它拥有无穷多个描述层次，越来越精细，然后在奇数层是决定论的，在偶数层是非决定论的——整个设定完全自洽，毫无矛盾。

You could even conjure up a hypothetical system which admits infinitely many different levels of description, maybe ever more fine grained, and you could have determinism at odd numbered levels and you could have indeterminism at even numbered levels, and the whole thing would be a coherent scenario.

我的意思是，我们当然不是说世界真的就是这样，但这个设想完全说得通。

I mean, of course, are not saying that the world is like this, but it's a perfectly coherent scenario.

这说明了，对于这样的系统，你不能简单地说它要么是决定论的，要么是非决定论的。这个思想实验真正揭示的是，决定论与非决定论的区分，本质上是依赖于描述层次的。

What it does show is that in the case of such a system you can't really say this system is deterministic simplicita or this system is indeterministic simplicita, but what this kind of thought experiment highlights is that the distinction between determinism and indeterminism is really very much a level relative or level specific distinction.

回到你刚才的观点，是的，我完全同意：如果有人说‘基础物理学是决定论的’——这其实还是个开放问题，但至少在原则上，这是一个值得认真考虑的可能性。

And so back to your point, yes, I wholeheartedly agree that if someone says, oh, you know, fundamental physics is deterministic, which is, I suppose, an open question, but let's let's let's call it at least, in principle, live possibility.

对。

Yeah.

所以，当有人声称基础物理学是决定论的，这并不自动否定自由意志，哪怕你用‘替代可能性’来定义自由意志。原因很简单：自由意志所需要的非决定论，不是微观物理层面的那种，而是我所说的‘能动性层面’的非决定论——这是完全不同的描述层次。

So someone says, okay, fundamental physics is deterministic, then the reason why this doesn't automatically refute free will, even on the sort of alternative possibilities characterization of free will, is simply that the kind of indeterminism, if any, that is required for free will is not the form of indeterminism at that microphysical level of description, but it would be indeterminism at what I call the level of agency, the agential level, which is a completely different level of description.

既然我们接受了这种层次依赖的逻辑，那么在能动性层面的非决定论，完全可以和基础物理学层面的决定论并存。

And given this whole logic of level specificity of the distinction, indeterminism at the level of agency is actually fully compatible with determinism at the level of fundamental physics.

所以，我基本上就是顺着你刚才那个观点，往这个方向去理解的。

So that's sort of the direction in which I would, you know, spin or take the comment that you made.

不，我特别喜欢这个说法，完全说得通。

So, no, I love that, it makes perfect sense to me.

我这样理解对吗？也就是说，即使物理学的基本规律是百分之百决定论的，就像台球原子彼此碰撞互动那样。

Am I paraphrasing it correctly to say or or exemplifying it to say, even if the fundamental laws of physics were a 100% deterministic and it was little billiard ball atoms bumping into each other and interacting.

对。

Yes.

没错。

Yes.

当我抛硬币的时候，我不知道它会正面朝上还是反面朝上。

When I flip a coin, I don't know whether it's gonna come up heads or tails.

所以在人们抛硬币这个层面上，世界是不确定的，我们就该这么看待。

And so at the level of people flipping coins, the world is indeterministic and we should treat it that way.

是的。

Yeah.

所以，没错，我基本同意，只是在细微处有点不同看法。

So, yeah, I mean basically I agree, just maybe with a slight twist on nuance.

你说你不知道硬币会怎么落地。

I mean you say I don't know how the coin is going to land.

我的意思是，确实，我们不知道硬币会落地哪一面。

I mean it's true, we don't know how the coin is going to land.

但这种说法容易让人觉得这仅仅是个认识论问题，也就是我们无法掌握微观状态的细节，所以才显得不可预测。

But that framing makes it sound as if it is just an epistemic phenomenon, so just something to do with unpredictability or our informational limitations when comes to figuring out the details of the microstate.

这就引出了一个反对意见：比如说，当我谈到自由意志涉及能动层面的不确定性时，别人可能会以为，我们其实只是在说能动层面的不可预测性，但这跟真正的选择开放性根本不是一回事。

And that would then invite the objection that, you know, when let's say when I talk about free will involving indeterminism at the level of agency, then, you know, this could look like oh, what we really have is just unpredictability at the level of agency, but that's not the same as kind of genuine openness of choices.

所以，反对者会说，这种解释对自由意志来说还不够好。

And so once more the objection would be this is not good enough for free will.

但对此，我想回应一下。

But, I mean, here's my response to that.

我的看法是，我们并不会只把那些在最微观层面上能精确描述的属性、模式或现象才视为真实存在的。

My response is, I mean, it's not the case that we only treat properties, patterns, phenomena at the absolutely most fine grained microscopic level as real.

我的意思是，如果我们非得说，只要不能在粒子物理层面、或者弦理论之类的最基础层面上精确定位的东西，就都不是真实的，那也太荒谬了。

I mean, would be absurd if we if we said, you know, anything that you can't identify or pinpoint at the level of particle physics or at the level of, you know, whatever it is, superstrings or something.

任何在最根本层面上无法被定位的东西，就不是真实的——这种想法根本站不住脚。

And any such thing you can't pinpoint at that most fundamental level is somehow unreal.

那一大堆东西就都变得不真实了。

I mean, then a whole bunch of things become unreal.

物体的 solidity、生物、社会、大学、失业、战争，全都不真实了——你跟人说这些都不是真实的现象。

Solidity of surfaces becomes unreal, organisms become unreal, societies become unreal, universities become unreal, unemployment becomes unreal, war becomes unreal, and I mean, you know, tell people that these are not real phenomena.

这些可都是实实在在的现象。

Mean, are just absolutely real phenomena.

所以我们得从一种哲学立场出发，认真对待人类的视角，也认真对待日常生活中对世界的常识性理解。

So we've we've got to start with a philosophical view that that takes the human perspective seriously and that also takes the sort of common sense ontology of the world seriously.

我们需要一种哲学图景，能够承认普通宏观物体和属性的实在性。

So we we need to have a philosophical picture that can recognize the reality of, for instance, ordinary macroscopic objects and properties.

因此，我想说的是，哪怕从科学角度看，我们对某些宏观现象的最佳描述都指向它们以非决定论的方式运行——比如掷骰子或抛硬币时，用随机模型才是科学上最恰当的做法——那我们就该直接承认：这跟我们对基本粒子物理的断言一样，有充分的科学依据，理应被当作真实来看待。

And for this reason, what I'm saying is if our best descriptions, even from a scientific perspective, of certain macroscopic phenomena lead us to treat these phenomena as behaving indeterministically, for instance because in the case of dice or coin tosses because stochastic modeling is the right way to go from a scientific perspective, then we should just say, well, that's as scientifically well supported as anything we say in particle physics and we should just take it at face value, and that's, you know, just as real as the kind of thing that we say about a more fundamental physical level.

所以，我想强调这种高层次的非决定论——马库斯·普里瓦托和我称之为‘涌现的非决定论’——我们不该把它仅仅看作认识论上的局限，不是因为信息不全才显得不确定，而应该把它当作一种真实存在的现象。

And so therefore, I want to say this form of high level indeterminism, you know, Markus Privatto and I have also called this phenomenon sort of emergent indeterminism, we shouldn't think of this as just epistemic, so we shouldn't think of it as just to do with informational incompleteness or something like that, but we should really think of it as on take, as a real phenomenon.

说得对。

Good.

这正是我想补充到你这种表述方式里的关键点。

That's the little piece that I would put on your way of framing it.

我更喜欢你这么说。

I like that much better.

这显然是个经典例子，你说的完全就是我想表达的意思，只是你考虑得更深入，说得更到位。

It's classic example of course, what you said is absolutely what I wanted to say, but you said you said it better having thought of it more.

那我们不妨顺势聊聊，是不是该把世界看作是分层次呈现的。

So this is a wonderful segue into maybe we should, you know, give this picture of the world as appearing in levels.

确实该这么看了。

It's due.

先暂时放下自由意志这个问题，我觉得你已经讲了不少了，但我还是想给你机会，把我们需要理解的部分再补充完整。

So put aside free will just for a moment, but and I think you've said a lot of it, but I'm I wanna give you a chance to sort of fill in whatever we need to understand here.

你认为存在不同层次的描述，它们之间通过粗粒化关联，而在这个框架里，总有个问题：我们该给各个层次多少独立性或自主性。

You're you're claiming that there are different emergent levels of description related by coarse graining, and there's always a question in that picture of how much sort of independence or autonomy we should grant to the different levels.

那你对这个问题怎么看？

So what what what would you feel about that?

是的，好吧。

Yeah, so okay.

正如我之前说的，我们可以从很多不同的层次来理解这个世界。

As I already explained, we can think about the world at many different levels of description.

我举了从物理、化学、生物，到心理学、社会学、经济学，还有微观和宏观经济学这些例子。

I gave these different examples from physics to chemistry to biology to psychology to sociology, economics, micro, macroeconomics and so on.

重要的是，当我们从更精细的微观描述转向更粗略的宏观描述时，不只是简单地简化信息、丢掉一些细节。

Now, what matters is not just that when we move from more fine grained microscopic descriptions to more coarse grained macroscopic ones, we we sort of coarse grained and we throw out information.

没错，我们确实会丢掉一部分信息，进行抽象。

I mean, we do throw out some information, we abstract away.

对。

Mhmm.

但这么做不只是因为计算能力或认知上的限制，更是为了在剔除噪音和无关细节的同时，发现真正的模式。

But we we do this not just because of computational epistemic limitations, but we do it in order to identify patterns while sort of getting rid of noise or of extraneous details.

有些底层的细节对微观层面很重要，但在宏观层面可能完全无关。所以，如果我们能提取出关键信号，去掉干扰，专注于宏观模式，反而会更有启发性。

Because there's some low level details that are relevant for the lower level but that may not be relevant at all for the macroscopic description and so then in a sense it's illuminating if you extract the signal and get rid of the noise and focus on the macro pattern.

首先，这种粗粒化是有明确理由的。

So for a start the coarse graining is done for a principled reason.

其次，从低层次描述转向高层次描述时，我们不只是改变了粒度，还用了完全不同的概念和分类来理解世界。

Secondly, of course it's not just that we cause grain when we move from low level descriptions to high level descriptions, but we also use different concepts and categories to think about the world.

就连化学哲学家也指出，像‘酸性’这样的化学概念，并没有一个清晰对应的物理概念。

So, I mean, even philosophers of chemistry point out that a concept such as acidity, which is a chemical concept, doesn't really have a neat physical counterpart.

仔细想想，酸性根本没法简单地还原成纯粹的物理概念，而当我们沿着这个解释层级往上走时，这一点就更加明显了。

If you think about it already, acidity can't be easily translated just into purely physical concepts, and that becomes all the more significant as we move up this kind of explanatory hierarchy.

很明显，大量心理学概念也无法还原为纯粹的物理、化学或生物概念，甚至心理学本身——我认为学界普遍接受，它无法被还原为神经科学。

And, I mean, it's pretty clear that a whole bunch of psychological concepts can't really be reduced to purely physical, chemical or biological concepts or even, you know, psychology I think it is fairly widely accepted it's not reducible to neuroscience.

最重要的是，如果我们放眼全局，我认为最关键的分界线，在于无意向性与意向性解释层次之间的区别。

And the most important I mean if we look at the sort of big picture, I think the most important dividing line is one between sub intentional and intentional levels of explanation.

比如说，物理解释、化学解释，显然都属于无意向性的。

So, let's say physical explanations, chemical explanations, they're clearly sub intentional.

我们用动力学或概率模型来描述这些过程，但完全不会用到任何带有意图的词汇。

We use some form of dynamic or stochastic modeling to describe the relevant processes, but we don't use any intentional vocabulary there.

没有目标，没有目的，没有信念，也没有任何东西具有语义内容，更谈不上什么表征。

There are no goals, there are no purposes, there are no beliefs, there are no there's no semantic content of anything, there are no representations.

但另一方面，一旦我们进入心理学、认知科学这些领域，开始思考能动性、理性、心智，以及社会现象时，我们就大量依赖语言和意向性概念。

And on the other hand, you know, once we once we move into the domain of psychology, cognitive science, the kinds of domains where we then also think about agency or think about rationality, think about mind's mentality, then also think about social phenomena, we make very significant use of language or intentional concepts.

我认为有充分的理由说明，意向性语言和意向性概念无法被还原为非意向性的概念或语言。

And I think there are very good reasons why intentional language, intentional concepts can't really be reduced to sub intentional concepts or sub intentional language.

当然，关于为什么这种还原不可能，有很多独立的论证；但如果我们接受这样一个观点——即意向性解释所需的某些概念和范畴，无法被还原到更低层次的描述中，那我们就有了充分的理由说，高层次在解释上具有相对于低层次的自主性。

And, you know, if we are sold again, there is a whole bunch of separate arguments as to why this reduction is not quite possible but if we are sort of sold on the idea that some of the concepts and categories required for intentional explanations are not reducible to concepts and categories from one of those sub intentional levels of description, then that gives us a good case for saying there's a kind of explanatory autonomy that the higher level enjoys relative to the lower level.

这很好，因为我真的很想深入探讨一下这种可还原性的说法。

So this is great because I I wanna really press on this claim about reducibility.

当然，这一点对这类论证至关重要，但我一直不太清楚它到底指的是什么。

Of course, it it's crucial to the these kinds of arguments, and I'm never quite sure what is being meant.

我知道在菲利普·安德森那篇著名的论文里，他反复说，还原论当然是对的。

I know that in Phil Anderson's famous paper on Moore is different, he says over and over again, of course, reductionism is true.

他反对的其实是建构主义，也就是试图从低层次出发，推导出高层次的含义。

What what he doesn't like is constructivism where you actually go from the lower level to derive what you mean at the higher level.

我的意思是，酸度在底层应该有一些明确的前身。

I mean, I would think that acidity has some definite precursor at the lower level.

对。

Yeah.

也许只是我们还没法识别出来，或者吧。

And maybe it's just we can't identify it or Yeah.

底层层面我们并不直接使用这个概念，但它在某种意义上仍是一个粗略的表述。

We don't use that concept in its own right at the lower level, but it's still a coarse grained notion in some sense.

对。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

你是想表达得更多、更少，还是就刚好是这个意思？

Do you mean more than that or less than that or exactly that?

好的。

Okay.

很好。

Good.

很多人之所以会被还原论的观点吸引，是因为他们接受了随附性的概念。

So one of the reasons why a lot of people are tempted by various reductionistic positions is that they accept the idea of supervenience.

随附性是个很自然的想法，简单说就是，所有高层级的事实，都是由低层级事实所必然衍生出来的。

So supervenience is a very natural idea, it's basically the idea that all the high level facts that obtain are some kind of necessary byproduct of low level facts.

比如，如果我们把这个世界的所有基本组成单元——所有基本粒子——完全按照我们物理宇宙中的样子排列好，那么你和我，包括我们的大脑和意识，也就自然而然地出现了。

So for instance, if we put all the low level building blocks of this world, all the elementary particles and so on, in place exactly as they are in our physical universe, then you have also thereby put you and me in place, you know, with our brains and minds and everything.

也就是说，关于肖恩和克里斯蒂安作为人、作为主体的一切事实，都由底层物理系统中极其复杂的状态所决定。

So the supervenience ideas, you know, everything that is true about Sean and Christian as people, as agents, is necessitated by a bunch of extraordinarily complex things that are true about the underlying physical system.

到目前为止，没错。

So far so Yep.

凡是接受这一观点的人，都是随附性物理主义者。

And everyone who accepts the the claim that this is true is a supervenience physicalist.

明白了。

Okay.

但现在，一个看似诱人却站不住脚的说法是：既然还原论物理主义成立，既然所有高层事实都依赖于底层事实，那我们就应该也能用底层术语来解释一切。

And now the tempting but nonetheless kind of invalid argument would say, well, because supervenience physicalism holds, because all these high level facts, high level properties supervene on on low level ones, we should therefore also be able to explain everything in in low level terms.

或者说，我们应该能把高层描述完全翻译成底层描述。

Or we should be able to translate high level descriptions into into low level ones.

而正是在这一步，所谓的非还原论物理主义者——我觉得他们的观点更有说服力——就不会再认同了。

And and that's actually the step where the so called non reductive physicalists, which I find the much more compelling position, would no longer agree.

关键在于，依赖关系并不等于解释上的可还原性。

So the point is supervenience does not imply explanatory reducibility.

我其实可以举好几个例子来说明这一点。

And I can I mean there's different ways one can make this point?

我的意思是，如果你愿意，我可以给你一个最硬核、最技术流的论证，就是那个……

I mean I can if you want I can give you the sort of absolute nerdiest argument, which that

我能说那个最硬核的吗？

can I say the nerdiest?

光是这么说，你就得给我们讲讲那个最硬核的论证，毕竟我们真需要听这个。

I think you have to give us the absolute nerdiest argument just by saying that, yeah, we we need that.

好的。

Okay.

其实我都不敢说这是最硬核的论点，毕竟肯定还有人能想出更硬核的。

So the well, I mean, I well, I'm I'm not even claiming this is the absolute nerdiest argument because I'm sure people people can come up with even nerdier arguments.

不过至少我可以给你一个非常硬核的论点作为例子。

But I mean, here's let's let's let's say at least one candidate for a very very nerdy argument.

好的。

Okay.

我们用来描述系统的语言，都是可数语言。

So the kinds of languages that we use to describe systems are all countable languages.

也就是说，这些语言能生成的表达式数量，跟自然数一样多——虽然无穷，但属于可数无穷。

So that means they permit us to form as many expressions as there are natural numbers, you know, that's infinitely many, but it's countably infinitely many.

你很容易就能看出，逻辑教材里那些标准逻辑系统是可数的，英语、德语这些自然语言也一样。

So you can easily convince yourself that any of the standard logics you find in logic textbooks are accountable, but also English is a countable language, German is a countable language.

只要是用有限字母表能写出来的语言，都逃不开可数这个性质。

I mean, anything that you can write down with the help of a finite alphabet and so on is gonna be a countable language.

所以我们用的语言都是可数的。

So languages that we use are countable.

科学中使用的语言也是可数的。

Languages that we use in the sciences are accountable.

好，到目前为止都还清楚。

Okay, so far so good.

既然我们有可数的语言来描述事物，那就意味着能构造出无穷多的描述，但仍然是可数的无穷。

Now, it follows immediately that if you have accountable language available for describing things, that means you can come up with infinitely many but still countably infinitely many descriptions.

明白吗？

Okay?

也就是说，用可数语言，你可以描述可数无穷多个属性，比如。

So that means with a countable language you can describe countably many properties, for example.

好。

Okay.

现在，假设下面这种情况成立。

Now, suppose that the following is the case.

我们讨论的是一个物理宇宙，假设这个物理宇宙，或者任何其他物理系统，可能处于的微观状态集合是无限的，也就是说有无穷多种可能的微观状态。

We're dealing with a physical universe, and let's suppose the set of possible microstates that this physical universe can be in, or any other physical system, let's suppose the set of possible microstates is infinite, so there are infinitely many possible microstates.

这听起来完全合理，因为初始条件可以有不同的选择，也就是说，只要系统足够真实，原则上它就可能拥有无穷多种微观状态。

That seems completely reasonable because initial conditions could be chosen in different ways, so we're always dealing with systems, I mean, with sufficiently realistic systems would in principle admit infinitely many possible microstates that they can be in.

现在，我们在诸如生物学、心理学这些高层次科学中研究的宏观性质，其实都对应着一组状态，对吧？

Now, macroscopic properties that we might be studying in, you know, one of these high level sciences, you know, be it biology, be it psychology and so on, they always correspond to sets of states, right?

因为任何一种性质，都是由一整组状态实现的。

Because any property is realized by a whole set of states.

但一旦你有了无穷多个微观状态，哪怕只是可数无穷多个，你也会自动得到不可数无穷多个可能的子集。

But once you've got a countably once you've got a countable sorry, once you've got an infinite set of possible microstates, you automatically have uncountably many possible subsets.

啊，明白了，即使微观状态的数量是可数的，也一样。

Ah, okay, even if it's a countable number of microstates.

是的，哪怕微观状态只是可数无穷多个也一样。

Yeah, so even if it's a countable number.

我的意思是，当然，像那些用实数来描述的系统，甚至可能本身就包含不可数无穷多个微观状态，那样的话，根本就不用想了。

I mean, yeah, so of course it might even with systems that you describe with the help of the real numbers you might even have uncountably many microstates, well, you know, then you don't even have a chance.

但即使你为了论证而承认，可能的微观状态只有可数无穷多个——就像自然数那样多——这些状态的集合仍然有不可数无穷多个。

But even if you concede for the sake of argument there are only countably many possible microstates of your as many as there are natural numbers, then still there are uncountably many sets of of these states.

这意味着，至少在理论上，这纯粹是个组合数学的思想实验：我们能考虑的性质有不可数无穷多个。

And, so that means, at least in principle, I mean, is really just a purely combinatorial thought experiment, there are uncountably many properties that that we could be considering.

当然，其中绝大多数性质根本毫无意义，也没有解释价值，等等，但关键是，从外延上说，存在的性质远多于一个可数语言所能描述的范围。

Now, of course, most of those properties are of absolutely no interest, no explanatory relevance so on and so on, but the point is that at least, extensionally speaking, there are far more properties out there than a accountable language would allow us to describe.

所以，如果你用一个可数语言来描述微观状态，单凭组合数学的原因，几乎每一个对应微观状态集合的性质，都无法用这个语言中的表达式来描述。

So if you have accountable language for talking about microstates, just for pure combinatorial reasons, almost every property that corresponds to a collection of those microstates will not be describable by an expression in this countable language.

现在，当我们思考宏观性质时，如果你接受随附性，那很好，根据随附性可以推出：任何宏观性质都必然对应某个微观状态的集合，也就是它的外延。

And now, when we think about macro properties, if you accept supervenience, okay, good, then what we do know from supervenience from supervenience would follow that any macro property does have a kind of extension or corresponds at least to an extension that would be a collection of microstates.

但如果你只按这种组合数学的思路来看，宏观性质恰好能被低层级的可数语言描述出来，那简直是个天大的巧合。

But it would have to be, at least if you just go with this combinatorial light of reasoning, it would be some kind of mega fluke if that turned out to be one that your low level countable language allows you to describe.

当然，你也许运气好。

I mean, you might be lucky.

也许只有那些具有解释相关性或解释显著性的性质，恰好能被低层级语言捕捉到。

It might be that somehow the only explanatorily relevant or explanatorily salient properties are those that can be picked up with the help of the low level language.

但我觉得我们现在其实把举证责任给颠倒了，因为主张解释性还原的人得证明这一点，而组合数学的逻辑对还原论者并不有利。

But I think now we've kind of reversed the sort of burden of proof, because I think the proponent of explanatory reducibility would have to show that, and combinatorics are kind of stacked against the reductionists.

所以这就是一个有点技术性的论点，说明即使你接受随附性，也不能保证宏观层面的属性描述一定能还原为微观层面的分布。

So this is the kind of nerdy argument as to why even if you grant supervenience, there's still no guarantee that high level descriptions of properties are reducible to to low level distributions.

我喜欢这个说法，现在观众应该明白什么是真正做好的数学哲学了。

I like it, and I think now the audience knows what mathematical philosophy looks like when it's when it's done properly.

没错。

Yeah.

当然，也不是所有数学哲学都像这样。

Of course, could also say not not all mathematical philosophy is is quite quite like this.

这个论点确实需要一点品味，有些人会更喜欢，有些人可能就觉得没那么吸引人。

And and this argument admittedly is an acquired taste, so I think some people will, like it more than others.

但我觉得，至少它算得上是和一个至今仍不清楚的问题建立了友好联系——那就是层级、涌现这些概念里的问题，虽然我总体上很支持这些观点。

But but I think it it's at least a friendly acquaintance of a question that, to my mind, is still unclear in the world of levels and emergence and things like that, even though I'm a big fan in general.

如果你接受了随附性这个观点，听起来你也是愿意接受的。

It seems that if you if you do buy the supervenience thesis, which it sounds like you're willing to do.

如果你拥有完全相同的微观物理系统，那么你也会拥有完全相同的宏观性质。

So if you had exactly the same micro physical system, you would also have exactly the same higher level properties.

而且，宏观层面的理论在很大程度上是独立的。

And also, the higher level theories are more or less autonomous.

你不需要了解微观理论也能理解。

You know, you don't need to know the micro theory.

我可以做热力学，或者抛硬币，完全不用管粒子物理的标准模型，对吧？

I can I can do thermodynamics or flip coins without knowing about the standard model of particle physics?

这时候其实有两件事在同时发生。

Then there's two things going on simultaneously.

一方面，宏观的概念和对象能融入一个独立的动力学框架。

One is that the higher level concepts and objects fit into an autonomous dynamical framework.

也就是说，我们能描述它们的行为。

Like, we can describe what happens with them.

另一方面，它们也是可以被观测到的。

But also, they're observable.

对吧？

Right?

比如说，你谈到流体时会用温度和密度这些概念，它们是从海量的原子分子信息中提炼出来的少数关键变量。

Like, you know, if you talk about a fluid and it has a temperature and density, those are the quantities you need out of the vastly reduced set of information you had about the atoms and molecules.

而且，我们确实能测量这些量。

And also, we can measure them.

我的意思是，这两件事是自然就配套发生的，还是说这只是世界恰好给我们提供的一种幸运？

I mean, is that do those two things go hand in hand automatically, or is that some nice miracle that the world provides us?

当然，很多宏观性质之所以引起我们的关注，正是因为它们直接影响我们的生活。作为生物体，人类在进化过程中也恰好被筛选得对环境中某些特性特别敏感，而对另一些则不敏感。

Well, course, it's true that a lot of the high level properties are of interest to us precisely because, you know, they play a role in our lives and, you know, we as biological organisms have also been kind of evolutionarily selected in such a way as to be sensitive to certain properties of the environment and not others.

所以，从我们的角度来看，某些微观性质更容易测量，这我并不觉得特别意外。

So I don't find it particularly surprising that microscopic properties are particularly well measurable from our perspective as compared to certain microscopic properties.

另外，原则上，描述一个系统可以有无数种层次，而哪些层次具有解释力或值得关注，很大程度上取决于观察者的目标、兴趣和看待世界的方式。

And I mean I would also add that, I mean in principle there's many different levels of description that one could use to think about a system and now which levels of description are explanatorily relevant or interesting is of course somewhat dependent on, you know, what your goals as an observer are, what your interests as an observer are, what your perspective on the world is.

因此，作为生活在特定尺度上的生物体，人类觉得某些描述层次特别重要和突出，这我一点都不觉得奇怪。

So I mean I don't find it very surprising that we as humans operating at a particular scale, biological organisms of a particular size, find certain levels description particularly interesting and salient.

而且，谁知道呢？如果我们是生活在完全不同的尺度上的智慧生命，也许我们会对世界中完全不同的特征更加敏感。

And, you know, who knows, if we were intelligent beings at a completely different scale, you know, maybe we would be sensitive to different features of the world at a very different level of description.

所以，我们选择哪个层次来关注，确实带有一定的主观相关性。

So there's definitely a certain amount of kind of interest relativity to our choice of levels.

说得对。

Good.

我觉得这些背景信息已经足够了，现在我们可以回到自由意志的问题上。

I think that's that's a good amount of background where we can now circle back to the free will question.

你之前说得很好，宏观层面的自由意志并不仅仅是关于我们知道什么、能预测什么的认知问题。

You know, you made a good case earlier that free will at the macroscopic level is not just an epistemic matter of what we know and what we can predict.

它确实有一种真实的感觉——事情本可以有别的结果。

There's a sense of genuinely, it could have gone the other way.

但更深入一点，说这个层次上的主体拥有自由意志，和说这个层次上存在某种不确定性，这两者之间到底有什么区别？

So but at a more detailed level, what is the difference between saying that agents at this level of description have free will versus just there's some indeterminism at this level?

有没有什么标准，能让我们最终断定：眼前这个物体，确实是一个拥有自由意志的主体？

Are there conditions under which we can finally say, yes, that that that object in front of me is an agent with free will?