布鲁金斯学会的帕特里夏·金评估特朗普第二任期的对华政策

欢迎来到愤世嫉俗的播客，每周探讨中国时事的节目。

Welcome to the cynical podcast, the weekly discussion of current affairs in China.

在本节目中，我们将关注书籍、思想、最新研究、知识潮流以及文化趋势，帮助我们更好地理解中国政治、外交、经济和社会正在发生的变化。

In this program, we look at books, ideas, new research, intellectual currents, and cultural trends that can help us better understand what's happening in China's politics, foreign relations, economics, and society.

每周请与我一起参与深入对话，让关于中国的话题更加清晰明了，少一些情绪化。

Join me each week for in-depth conversations that shed more light and bring less heat to how we think and talk about China.

我是凯泽·库奥，本周从北卡罗来纳州教堂山的家中向大家问候。

I'm Kaiser Kuo coming to you this week from my home in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

今年，SYNNICA 由威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校的东亚研究中心支持，该中心是东亚研究的国家级资源中心。

SYNNICA is supported this year by the Center for East Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin Madison, a national resource center for the study of East Asia.

《塞内卡》播客将一直免费提供。

The Seneca podcast is and will remain free.

但如果你所在的机构认同我所做的节目和通讯工作，请考虑给予支持。

But if you work for an organization that believes in what I'm doing with the show and with the newsletter, please consider lending your support.

我知道你们现在觉得这些话是老生常谈，但我真的、真的在寻找新的机构支持。

I know that y'all think of this as boilerplate by now, but seriously, seriously, I am looking for new institutional support.

热线已开通。

The lines are open.

您可以通过 cynicapod@gmail.com 联系我。

You can reach me at cynicapod@gmail.com.

听众朋友们，请通过 cynicapodcast.com 成为我的付费订阅用户，支持我的工作。

And listeners, please support my work by becoming a paying subscriber at cynicapodcast.com.

真的，帮帮我吧。

Seriously, help me out.

我知道现在有很多 Substack，加起来确实不少，但我认为这个频道提供的价值是实实在在的。

I know there's a lot of substacks out there and they start to add up, but I think this one delivers, you know, serious value.

您不仅能收到我的内容，还能获得《中国全球南方》播客，以及 Trivium 的精彩内容——包括他们每周出色的播客和非常实用的周末回顾。

You get not only my stuff, you get the China Global South podcast, the fantastic content from Trivium including not only their excellent weekly podcast, but also their really, really useful weekly recap of the weekend.

您还能获得詹姆斯·卡特精彩的《本周中国历史》专栏，提供文字版甚至音频版。

You get James Carter's wonderful, wonderful This Week in China's History column in text and even audio.

我每周都会亲自朗读这一部分。

I narrate that every week.

我真的很努力为你们辛辛苦苦赚来的钱提供价值，所以请注册吧。

I'm really trying to deliver value for your hard earned dollars, so please sign up.

我知道现在日子不好过，但请考虑帮助我一下，因为说实话，我的日子也不好过。

Things are tough, I know, but consider helping me out because, know, things are tough for me too.

今天，我们将聚焦于唐纳德·特朗普第二任期一年后的美中政策现状，不是通过口号或日常头条，而是通过清醒、客观地评估哪些真正发生了变化，哪些没有，以及战略在何处遭遇了现实的制约。

Today, we are turning to the state of US China policy one year into Donald Trump's second term, not through slogans or, you know, the daily headlines, but through a clear eyed assessment of what has actually changed, what hasn't, and where the strategy is running up against reality.

我的嘉宾是帕特里夏·金，布鲁金斯学会的研究员，她专注于美国对华及更广泛的亚太地区政策。

My guest is Patricia Kim, a fellow with the Brookings Institution where she focuses on US policy toward China and the broader Asia Pacific.

帕蒂曾先后在政府行政部门和智库界担任政策职务，她以在常常充满空谈而缺乏实证的辩论中注入分析严谨性和实证严谨性而广受尊重。

Patty has served previously in policy roles spanning the executive branch to the think tank world, and she's widely respected for bringing analytical discipline and empirical rigor to debates that are often long on rhetoric and short on evidence.

上个月，帕蒂联合撰写了一份布鲁金斯学会的评估报告，对特朗普执政一周年时的对华战略进行了全面盘点，深入审视了政府在再工业化、人工智能领导力、战略依赖性和全球地位等方面所宣称的目标。

So last month, Patty coauthored a Brookings assessment taking stock of Trump's China strategy at the one year mark, looking hard at the administration's own stated goals on reindustrialization, AI leadership, strategic dependence, and global standing.

并提出了一个简单却令人警醒的问题：这些政策真的实现了它们所承诺的效果吗？

And and asking, you know, a simple but quite bracing question, are these policies actually delivering the results they promise?

这份报告剔除了大量噪音，我早就想深入讨论它，尤其是考虑到自它于1月16日发布以来，这一周内又发生了许多新事。

It's a piece that cuts through a lot of noise, and it's one, you know, I've been eager to discuss, especially given how much has happened in the week since it was published on January 16.

所以乔伊斯·杨也是这篇报告的合著者。

So Joyce Young was was, the coauthor of this as well.

帕蒂，能终于邀请你来到《Syndicate》节目，我感到非常高兴。

Patty, though, it is just such a pleasure to finally have you on Syndicate.

这次对话真的拖得太久了。

This conversation is long overdue.

热烈欢迎你来到我们的节目。

A warm welcome to the show.

谢谢你，凯撒。

Thank you, Kaiser.

能上你的节目真的很棒。

It's great to be on your show.

所以，帕蒂，让我从一个很高的视角开始，因为你知道，这是一直在听到的批评。

So so, Patty, let me start at a really high altitude because, you know, this is a criticism that you hear constantly.

你在拜登政府时期也听过这种说法，但人们总说特朗普政府其实并没有一套对华战略。

You you heard it in the Biden administration as well, but that the Trump administration doesn't actually have a China strategy.

还没有发表过重大演讲。

There's been no major speech.

没有一套理论，也没有一份总结性的文件来全面阐述这一点。

There's no doctrine, no capstone document that sort of lays it all out.

你可以试着拼凑出一个轮廓，当然，正如你最近在节目中提到的，特朗普本人就像自己的中国事务官员一样行事。

You can, you know, sort of piece it together, but and, of course, you got Trump acting as your colleague Ryan said on the show recently, very much as his own China desk officer.

但正如你在论文中指出的，该政府所宣称的目标却有着令人惊讶的一致性。

And yet, as you point out in the paper, there is a surprising degree of consistency when it comes to the administration's stated objectives.

再次强调，通过再工业化来重新平衡美国的经济关系，这一直是一个重要优先事项。

Again, so rebalancing The US economic relationship through reindustrialization, that's been a big priority.

保持在关键科技领域，尤其是人工智能领域的主导地位，减少对受中国控制的供应链的依赖，并尽可能恢复美国在国际上的声望。

Maintaining, you know, dominance in in critical technologies, especially in AI, reducing dependence on China controlled supply chains, and restoring, insofar as that's possible, American respect abroad.

那么，我们该如何调和这两者呢？

So how should we reconcile these two things?

这是否意味着目标相对明确，但执行方式高度灵活？还是说，缺乏一种制度化的、可以明确指认和阐述的战略，本身正在成为实现成果的制约因素？

Is this a case of relatively clear objectives paired with highly improvisational execution, or does the sort of absence of an institutionalized strategy, something you can point to and articulate clearly, is that itself becoming a limiting factor when it comes to delivering results?

是的，凯泽，这些问题提得非常好。

Yeah, I mean, Kaiser, those are great questions.

在深入讨论实质内容之前，我想先感谢我的合著者，并感谢你提到她——杨 Joyce。

And real quick, before we get into the substance, I want to acknowledge my coauthor and thank you for pointing her out, Joyce Yang.

Joyce 是布鲁金斯学会中国中心最出色的助理研究员之一。

Joyce is one of our top research assistants at the Brookings China Center.

她不仅是出色的智力伙伴，更是这份报告背后的推动力量。

She's and she was a wonderful intellectual partner and a driving force behind this report.

关于特朗普政府对中国政策的定位，我认为，中国问题观察家们之所以长期争论特朗普政府是否拥有连贯的对华战略，是因为我们确实没有看到一篇重大演讲或政策文件，系统性地阐明一个完整的对华框架。

So turning to your question about the Trump administration's framing of China policy, I think there's, you know, there's the reason why there's such a ongoing debate among China watchers about whether the administration actually has a coherent China strategy is because, you know, we haven't really seen a single major speech or a policy paper that lays out a comprehensive, China framework.

特朗普总统没有像以往政府那样，将对华政策交由正式的跨部门流程来处理。

President Trump, he hasn't delegated China policy to a formal interagency process in the way that past administrations have.

正如你刚才提到的，他对华采取了一种高度个人化的方式。

As you just mentioned, he's taken a very personalized approach to China.

事实上，特朗普常被描述为他自己的‘中国事务官’。

And in fact, Trump is indeed described often as his own China desk officer.

官员。

Officer.

很明显，他非常重视与习近平主席的个人关系。

And it's very clear that he places significant weight on his personal relationship with president Xi Jinping.

对。

Right.

这种信念认为，领导人层面的外交能够在官僚程序失效时取得成功。

And this conviction that leader level diplomacy can succeed where bureaucratic processes fall short.

话虽如此，我认为特朗普对中国的看法相当一致，而且这些看法早在他的第二个任期之前就已形成。

That said, I think Trump has held fairly consistent views about China that long predate his second term.

这些观点在最新的国家安全战略中表述得非常清晰。

Those views are articulated quite clearly in the latest national security strategy

对。

Right.

该战略指出，三十多年来，美国对中国的一系列错误假设，以及开放美国市场、鼓励美国企业投资中国、将制造业外包等决策，造就了一个富裕而强大的竞争对手，同时掏空了美国工业，削弱了美国的经济自主性，并造成了严重的国家安全漏洞。

Which says, you know, three decades of mistaken American assumptions about China and the decisions to open US markets to China, encourage American firms to invest in China, and to offshore manufacturing helped create a rich and powerful competitor while hollowing out US industry, weakening America's economic autonomy, and creating serious national vulnerabilities.

因此，这是政府所持的核心观点。

So this is sort of the core view that the administration holds.

有趣的是，在第二任期，他们有意识地避免使用‘大国竞争’这一说法。

And what's interesting is that in the second term, they've been very deliberate about stepping away from the language of great power competition.

这是一种转变，是的。

And this is a shift Yeah.

而在第一任期，这一框架曾被官方明确采纳。

From the first Trump term when this, you know, this framework was officially sort of or explicitly Embraced.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

Exactly.

由政府方面。

By the administration.

但同样，即使不使用这种表述，我们仍能看到特朗普及其高级官员经常强调的一系列相对一致的目标。

But again, even without this framing, you know, we do see a fairly consistent set of objectives that Trump and his senior officials often emphasize.

这些目标围绕着重新平衡中美经济关系，通过以下方式恢复美国相对于中国的实力：一是推动美国再工业化，保持美国在关键技术领域的主导地位，减少对受中国控制的供应链的战略依赖，并在全球范围内恢复对美国的尊重。

And these revolve around rebalancing The US China economic relationship and restoring American strength vis a vis China by, one, reindustrializing The US, maintaining US dominance in critical technologies, reducing strategic dependencies on Chinese controlled supply chains, and restoring respect for The US globally.

最后我想指出的是，这些目标中的许多并非这一届政府所独有。

And what I'd finally note is that, you know, none many of these goals are not necessarily unique to this administration.

事实上，对于这些目标的重要性，美国两党之间存在广泛共识。

In fact, there's broad bipartisan consensus that many of these objectives matter.

拜登政府也推进了许多相同的目标，只是采用了不同的政策工具和方法。

The Biden administration pursued many of the same ends, though with a different set of policy tools and approaches.

但无论如何，这些正是我们认为特朗普政府用来评判其对华政策的目标，也是我们在报告中所关注的那些目标。

But in any case, these are the aims that we think the Trump administration has set out for judging its own China policy, and they're the ones that we look at in the report.

是的。

Yeah.

你提前说出了我本来想问你的问题，那就是尽管特朗普如此个人化地处理这些问题，但制度惯性依然存在，你知道，特朗普的对华政策很大程度上取决于他的直觉、对程序的不耐烦、以及如你所说，他更倾向于领导人之间的互动，而非制度化的合作关系，他还偏爱交易、杠杆和戏剧性场面。

You've anticipated what I was gonna ask you, which was about that sort of, you know, institutional inertia despite the fact that he's just so personalistic about it, you know, that that so much of Trump's China policy comes down to, you know, his instincts, his impatience with process, his preference as you say for, you know, kind of leader to leader dynamics, you know, which he puts over institutionalized relationships, you know, his fondness for the deal and the leverage and and a spectacle, frankly.

但我感觉，如你所说，拜登政府时期仍存在大量延续性。

But I I sense that, as you say, you know, there's a lot of continuity from the Biden administration.

这些目标有很多是相同的，只是表述方式不同，而且他们可用或偏好的工具也大相径庭。

There are a lot of the same goals articulated maybe differently and and with very different tools available to them or that that they prefer.

但坦白说，如果特朗普突然不在了，你认为这种趋势在实质上会有多少改变，而不仅仅是语气和执行方式上的变化？

But, you know, I I mean, just candidly, if Trump were suddenly removed from the picture, how much of this trajectory do you think would actually change in substance as opposed to tone and and and execution?

如果哈里斯在十一月获胜，这些大概就是美国的目标。

I'm these would be sort of the American goals if Kamala Harris had won in November.

对吧？

Right?

是的。

Yeah.

这真是个好问题。

I mean, that's a great question.

我认为我同意这一点。

I I I think I agree with that.

我认为总体上目标会保持一致，但显然，实现这些目标的政策工具可能会发生变化。

I think they would broadly stay consistent, but, obviously, the policy tools for changing achieving these ends would would probably change.

是的。

Yeah.

当然还有风格。

And then the style, of course.

所以这是在捕捉这一点吗？

So is it picking up on that?

让我把你的回答当作前提，即美国对华政策存在强烈的结构性延续。

Let me let me take your answer as a given that there are strong structural continuities in American China policy.

我确实同意。

I I I certainly agree.

这些政策早于特朗普。

These predate Trump.

它们可能会在他之后继续存在，尽管他的个人风格和情绪化特点如此。

They would probably outlast him, you know, despite his personal style and his volatility, you know.

基于这一框架，我想在我们开始逐一探讨之前，先勾勒出整体局面。

With that framing in mind, I I wanna lay out the terrain before we start walking through it.

在你的论文中，你围绕这四个明确的目标组织了你的评估。

In your paper, you organize your assessment around those four stated objectives.

为了再次强调，分别是：再工业化、人工智能领导力、供应链去风险化，以及美国的全球地位。

Just to reiterate, reindustrialization, AI leadership, derisking, you know, in supply chains, and global standing of The US.

所以在我们逐一讨论这些目标之前，也许我们可以每进入一个领域时都记住这一点：假设我已经提出了这个问题。

So before we take those in order, and may maybe we could just as we enter each of them sort of keep in mind that that, take it as given that I've asked this question.

想想听众应该如何理解每个领域中‘成功’会是什么样子。

Think about like how listeners should think about what success would even look like across each of these domains.

我的意思是，你特别关注哪些信号？比如，有哪些迹象表明某项政策正在朝着正确的方向发展，或者有哪些预警信号表明某个策略并未实现其预期目标？当我们从一个领域转向下一个时，这些都很重要。

I mean, are there signals that you're particularly attentive to, you know, signs that something is moving in the right direction or or warning lights that a strategy maybe isn't doing what it was supposed to, you know, as we move from from one area to the next?

我想，我们在讨论这些内容时，不妨始终记住这一点，但让我们先从这四个目标中的第一个开始——美国经济的再工业化。

I guess, you know, just keep that in mind as we go through these, but let's just start with the first of those four goals with reindustrialization of the The US economy.

在正式问你问题之前，帕蒂，我想先提一下最近让我印象深刻的一点，这触及了政府做法中的一个真正矛盾。

And, Patty, before we I I I actually ask you a question, let me let me flag something I've been struck with lately, which gets at a real tension in the administration's approach.

目前有一种越来越强的观点，我认为我们已经看到一些具体的例子，即广泛的关税实际上可能阻碍再工业化，因为它使在美国建设和运营工厂变得更加昂贵。

There is this growing argument, and, you know, I think we've seen some concrete examples of this, that broad tariffs can actually work against reindustrialization by making it more expensive to build and operate factories in The United States.

你知道，如果你对进口的机器设备和零部件以及大量美国没有的工业投入品征税，可能会反而提高国内生产的成本，而不是降低它，甚至在某些情况下直接阻止企业在美国新建产能。

You know, if you're taxing imported machinery and components and a whole bunch of the industrial inputs, which we don't have in America, you may be just raising the cost of domestic production rather than actually lowering it, and in some cases, even just discouraging firms from from citing new capacity in The US at all.

因此，基于这一点，你如何评估政府在再工业化方面的表现？

So with that in mind, how do you assess the administration's record so far in the reindustrialization?

毕竟，他们主要依赖的是关税这种粗放的工具。

I mean, because they've been using the blunt instrument of tariffs mainly.

关税和其他一些贸易工具在多大程度上真正支持了重建国内制造业这一目标？这一点我们有着广泛的两党共识。

To what extent do tariffs and some of the other trade tools meaningfully support the goal of rebuilding domestic manufacturing, which is something, you know, again, that we have a lot of bipartisan support for.

我们的分歧在于实现难度有多大，但你认为这些目标在多大程度上与投资、供应链和成本竞争力的基本经济规律相冲突？

I mean, we have differences as to how difficult it is, but where do you see these goals colliding with the the underlying economics of of investment and supply chains and and and cost competitiveness?

是的。

Yeah.

在深入讨论之前，我想先做一个总体说明：我们在这份报告中力求尽可能客观地评估政府的施政表现，通过寻找具体的指标来实现这一点。

And and before I get to that, just sort of a general note, you know, what we try to do in this report is to look at the administration's record as objectively as possible by looking for concrete indicators.

没错。

Right.

比如制造业数据、行业情绪调查、近期贸易和投资协议的分析，以及全球民意调查。

Things like manufacturing data, industry sentiment surveys, analysis of recent trade and investment deals, as well as global polling.

我们这样做是为了尽可能公正地评估：在政府所宣称的目标上，我们是否看到了切实可衡量的成果？

And we do this in order to try to fairly assess, have we seen deliverable, measurable results on the administration's stated objectives?

简而言之，我认为在所有四个目标上，我们都发现了一致的模式：尽管政府显然提升了非常重要的优先事项，并部署了多种政策工具，其中关税最为突出，但其雄心与言辞已超越了实际成果。

And to put the bottom line at fraught, I think across all four objectives, we find a consistent pattern that while the administration has clearly elevated very important priorities and it's deployed a variety of policy tools, tariffs being the forefront of them, Its ambition and rhetoric have outpaced tangible outcomes.

真不出所料。

What a surprise.

当然，这并不意味着什么都没发生。

And and, of course, you know, this doesn't mean that nothing is happening.

确实，像再工业化或供应链多元化这样的目标需要时间才能显现。

It's true that a lot of these goals like reindustrialization or supply chain diversification take time to materialize.

但即便考虑到这些滞后因素，迄今为止的进展仍受到政策不确定性、不稳定性、关税波动以及美国合作伙伴日益增长的怀疑态度的制约。

But, you know, even accounting for these lags, the progress to date has been constrained by factors like policy uncertainty and instability and tariff volatility and growing skepticism among US partners.

现在转向再工业化这一问题，这确实是核心所在。

Now turning to the question of reindustrialization, which really is the centerpiece Yeah.

特朗普政府的对华战略，或者说‘让美国再次伟大’的框架。

Of the Trump administration's China strategy or really the make America great again framework.

而这，再次说明，这一诊断引起了众多美国人的共鸣——美国确实需要重建其工业基础。

And this is, again, this is a diagnosis that resonates with a lot of Americans that The United States really needs to rebuild its industrial base.

因此，我们考察了是否取得了可衡量的成果，美国是否正在出现制造业的复兴？

So we look at had there been measurable results, and is there a manufacturing revival underway in The United States?

我们观察了制造业活动的核心指标，如就业人数、工厂建设、产能利用率和工业产出。

And what we find looking at core indicators of manufacturing activity like employment numbers, factory construction, capacity utilization, and industrial output.

情况是，我们并没有看到真正的起飞。

The story is that we're not really seeing a takeoff.

自特朗普总统重返白宫以来，制造业就业人数一直在下降。

Manufacturing employment has declined since president Trump returned to office.

尽管月度波动是正常的，但持续下滑与所谓制造业复苏的说法很难相符。

And while, you know, month to month fluctuations are normal, a sustained drop is difficult to square with claims of a manufacturing resurgence.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

当然。

For sure.

与新冠疫情后的初期相比，制造业建设支出仍保持在较高水平，但自2025年1月以来，这一趋势已趋于平稳，而非加速上升。

And construction manufacturing construction spending also remains elevated compared to the immediate post COVID period, but it's plateaued rather than accelerated since January 2025.

而且，这一水平仍低于上一届政府末期达到的峰值。

And it remains below the peak that was reached at the end of the previous administration.

产能利用率反映了企业对其现有工厂的使用强度，目前大致维持在一个区间内，在这个区间内，企业没有充分理由进行重大新投资或新建工厂。

Capacity utilization, which tells us how intensively firms are using their existing factories, hover around a a range where it doesn't make sense for them to necessarily make major new investments or to build new factories.

因此，我们在报告中考察的这些以及其他许多指标，都不支持制造业复苏的说法。

And so these and many other indicators that we look in the report are not pointing to a manufacturing revival.

这些数据最多只表明该行业保持稳定。

It's it's pointing to a sector that is holding steady at best.

你认为背后的原因是什么？

What do you think is behind this?

我的意思是，我之前提到的关税实际上让增加投资变得经济上不合理，或者让获取制造所需的机床等设备变得困难，这是原因之一吗？

I mean, is that that that thing that I suggested that tariffs are actually making it simply not economically sensible to increase investment or, know, making it difficult to source the machine tools, things that are necessary to manufacture in America?

是什么阻碍了再工业化？

What is getting in the way of reindustrialization?

这绝对是主要原因之一。

That is absolutely a big part of it.

如果你看看行业高管们自己的说法，看看调查和匿名访谈，就会发现他们对推进投资普遍持犹豫态度。

So if you look at what industry executives themselves are saying, if you look at surveys and anonymous interviews, there's a lot of hesitation to move forward with investment.

理论上，关税本应鼓励企业在美国境内增加生产。

In theory, tariffs are meant to encourage companies to produce more in The United States.

但在现实中，企业正面临劳动力成本上升、中间投入品价格上涨、以及对贸易和经济政策走向的不确定性等多重压力。

But firms, reality, are facing a combination of higher labor costs, higher prices for intermediate inputs, uncertainty about where trade and economic policies are headed.

制造业投资是长期决策。

And manufacturing investment is these are long term decisions.

你不可能一夜之间就建起一座工厂。

You don't just build a factory overnight.

这需要三到五年，甚至更长时间。

It takes three to five years, if not longer.

因此，当关税规则不断变化、未来成本难以预测时，企业很难做出这类重要承诺。

And so it's very difficult for companies to make these kinds of important commitments when tariff rules keep shifting and future costs are hard to predict.

因此，与其看到企业争相回流，许多公司反而在观望、缩减计划，或寻找美国以外的替代方案。

And so instead of seeing a rush to reassure, many firms are waiting, they're scaling back plans or looking alternatives outside of The United States.

所以我认为，这种动态有助于解释我们数据中看到的脱节现象——关于就业和工厂复苏的言辞很强烈，但现实中却尚未出现广泛的实质性收益。

And so I think this dynamic helps explain the disconnect that we're seeing in the data, like the strong rhetoric about jobs and factories roaring back, but actually fewer signs of broad based gains that are showing up on the ground so far.

所以我在自己思考，我想知道关税在特朗普本人心中究竟扮演着什么角色。

So I'm I'm thinking out loud here, but I I I wonder what the role of tariffs in Trump's own mind actually is.

我的意思是，你在这篇论文中的方法，我认为非常可敬，就是认真对待政府的说法，把关税视为旨在推动再工业化的工具。

I mean, your approach in this paper, I think very admirably, is to to take the administration at its word and evaluate tariffs as tools that are aimed at at at reindustrialization.

我必须承认，我很难相信，对特朗普本人而言，关税真的只是为了或主要是重建国内制造业。

I have to admit, I find it hard to believe that for Trump himself, tariffs are really just or even just primarily about rebuilding domestic manufacturing.

我的意思是，撇开他长期以来特立独行的重商主义信念——即贸易逆差本质上是坏事——

I mean, setting his, you know, his long standing idiosyncratic mercantilist belief that trade deficits are inherently bad, setting that all aside.

对他来说，关税似乎是一种万能的打击工具。

Tariffs for him seem to function as a kind of all purpose bludgeon.

对吧？

Right?

这是一种惩罚他不喜欢的行为的方式，无论是来自竞争对手还是盟友。

It's it's a way to, like, punish behavior he doesn't like whether, you know, by rivals or even by allies.

它就像一种杠杆来源。

It's like a source of leverage.

它也是一种政治表演，能够激发他的支持者，并强化他的个人品牌。

It's also just kind of a piece of political theater that that energizes his base and, you know, reinforces his brand.

所以我想知道你是怎么看的。

So I'm curious how you see this.

我的意思是，你认为目前关税在多大程度上是真正作为产业战略的工具在使用，又在多大程度上只是在执行其他类型的政治或象征性功能，这些功能可能与再工业化这一经济目标几乎没有关联，甚至完全无关？

I mean, to what extent do you think tariffs at this point are genuinely being deployed as an instrument of industrial strategy and to what extent they're just kinda doing other kinds of political work or symbolic work that may be just very loosely connected or even disconnected entirely from reindustrialization as an economic project.

是的。

Yeah.

我认为以上所有因素都有。

I think it's all of the above.

正如你所说，我认为特朗普总统将关税视为最终的杠杆工具，甚至是一种能够纠正他所看到的诸多问题的神奇手段。

And as you say, I do think president Trump sees tariffs as the ultimate source of leverage and perhaps even a magic tool to to right many wrongs that he sees.

我们已经看到他通过威胁加征关税，将世界各国拉到谈判桌前。

I mean, we've seen him use the threat of tariffs to bring countries around the world to the negotiating table.

因此，我们看到白宫与多个国家达成了多项外国投资协议，并将此作为证据，表明各国正在对美国进行投资。

And as a result, we have seen the White House strike a bunch of foreign investment deals with countries, and they've pointed to that as, again, proof that countries are investing in The United States.

这将推动美国的再工业化。

This is going to lead to a reindustrialization of the country.

白宫网站上有一个专门列出这些重大交易的网页。

There's a web page on the White House website that's devoted to listing these blockbuster deals.

但我们在报告中尝试分析的是，这些协议究竟实际说了什么。

But again, what we do in the report is that we try to look at what do these deals actually say.

它们真的能带来可衡量的成果吗？

Are they going to deliver measurable results?

我们发现，虽然有一些非常引人注目的 headline 数字，但它们的实际可靠性却不如表面看起来那么坚实。

And, what we find is that there are some very impressive headline numbers out there, but they're less solid than they appear.

在外国投资协议方面，我们看到许多这类协议建立在非约束性的框架或谅解备忘录之上，或者其时间跨度非常长，远远超出了特朗普政府的任期。

On the foreign investment deal sides, we see that many of these deals rest on nonbinding frameworks or MOUs, or they have very long time horizons that go that are gonna go well beyond the Trump administration.

而且，在许多情况下，美国政府及其合作伙伴对同一协议的描述大相径庭，这引发了关于执行和持久性的疑问。

And in many cases, the US government and its partners describe the same agreement in very different ways, which raises questions about implementation and durability.

当然，对于许多美国的合作伙伴，尤其是盟友而言，他们对本国主权、财务风险、以及谁最终掌控这些投资协议及其相关项目，都深感不安。

And, of course, for many US counterparts, especially allies, there's deep unease about their country's sovereignty, financial exposure, who ultimately controls these investment deals and the projects that are supposed to be part of them.

而且，我认为这种政治摩擦确实很重要，因为它可能减缓、削弱，甚至彻底阻碍未来的落实进展。

And, again, I think this political friction really matters because it can slow or dilute or even derail follow through in the future.

确实如此。

For sure.

没错。

For sure.

在我们继续之前，最后再问一个关于再工业化的问题。

So one last question on on reindustrialization before we move on.

我的意思是，即使你并没有明确说明，你的分析中这一点也十分清晰，你刚才谈到的那些被勉强达成的投资协议，它们的时间跨度都非常非常长。

I mean, it it comes through very clearly in your analysis even if it's not, you know, always stated explicitly, and you just talked about this in terms of the sort of, you know, arm twisted investment agreements that that that they're on very, very long time horizons.

但这种矛盾在于，再工业化所需的时间跨度，与本届政府的政治紧迫性之间产生了巨大张力，这带来了许多困难。

But it's this tension between, you know, the time horizons that are involved in reindustrialization and and the the sort of political exigencies of this administration that, you know, causes a lot of of difficulty.

我的意思是，重建制造业能力，从定义上讲就是一个非常长期的项目。

I mean, rebuilding manufacturing capacity is, by definition, a very long term project.

这需要数年的规划，以及对市场准入等问题的稳定预期，还需要相当高的信心，确信政策环境不会突然转变——但事实是，它确实会变。

I mean, it's gonna require years of planning and actually, you know, stable expectations around, like, and and market access questions and actually, quite a a high degree of confidence that, you know, the policy environment isn't gonna shift abruptly, but it does.

在美国，它确实会变。

You know, in America, it does.

它可能在中期选举后就变。

It it might after the midterms.

它也可能在2028年后变。

It might after 2028.

与此同时，正如我们一直所说的，本届政府所依赖的工具——也就是这些广泛使用的关税，它们可以随时被单方面实施、调整或威胁，完全取决于一时兴起。

At at the same time, you know, the the tool, as we've been saying, you know, that the administration has leaned on, which is in these sweeping tariffs, which are, you know, imposed and adjusted or threatened on super short notice at whim.

你知道的。

You know?

这本质上是不稳定的，它给这些投资决策带来了巨大的不确定性，无论是外国企业对美投资，还是美国本土企业。

That's like inherently destabilizing, and it it introduces a ton of uncertainty into these investment decisions whether by foreign countries in into America or by American firms.

对吧？

Right?

那么，你是怎么看待这种不匹配的呢？

So, I mean, how do you think about this mismatch?

这种政策的波动性，在多大程度上成为了再工业化的一大障碍？

To what extent does this kind of policy volatility itself become a big old constraint on reindustrialization?

我的意思是，有没有办法调和长期的产业目标与这种充满变数的关税政策影响？

I mean, is there a way to reconcile kind of the long horizon industrial goals with these, you know, high variance policy effects of of of this this crazy tool of tariffs?

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，我们只能拭目以待。

I mean, I think we're gonna have to watch and see.

这是个大问题。

That is a big question.

对吧？

Right?

我认为，对于许多美国盟友来说，尽管他们被这一届政府反复摆布，甚至一夜之间面临关税威胁，但他们仍然选择留下，因为他们重视与美国的伙伴关系。

And I think for many of The US allies, they've kind of stuck around despite being whipped around by this administration and threatened tariffs overnight because they value their partnership with The United States.

他们的安全依赖于美国。

Their security depends on The United States.

因此，我们看到他们还没有完全离开。

And so we've seen they haven't quite walked away yet.

所以我们得拭目以待。

And so we'll have to see.

我们得拭目以待。

We'll have to see.

但我认为，不断抛出新的威胁，对政府自身或总统并没有什么好处。

But I don't think the administration is doing itself any favors or the the president by continually wielding new threats.

比如，韩美协议。

For instance, South the South Korea deal.

我们在报告中进行了深入分析。

We look at in-depth in the report.

自从我们撰写报告以来，出现了一个新进展：特朗普总统公开威胁，要将韩国的关税税率从原本协商的15%提高到25%，理由是韩国迟迟未批准该贸易协议。

And since we've written it, there's now a new development where president Trump publicly threatened to raise South Korea's tariff rates up to 25% from the 15% that it was negotiated to, citing South Korea's slow ratification of the trade deal.

韩国国会最初之所以要仔细审查这项协议，是因为许多人对这是否符合韩国国家利益感到忧虑。

The very reason why this deal was being scrutinized to begin with by South Korea's national assembly was because there was a lot of anxiety about, you know, is this the right thing for the for the country to do?

在如此多的不确定性，尤其是对美国承诺的不确定性面前，我们真的应该向美国投入3500亿美元吗？

Should we be spending $350,000,000,000 in The United States if there's so much uncertainty and especially uncertainty about The US commitment.

这就是我们所面对的现实，我们只能拭目以待。

And, you know, that so that's kind of the the reality that we're looking at, and we'll see.

我们会看看未来三年乃至更长时间内事情会如何发展。

We'll see how it pans out, over the next three years and beyond.

但我想确实如此，许多美国的合作伙伴都感到措手不及，他们只是在尽力应对。

But, you know, I think it's very true that many US counterparts have been caught off guard, and and they're just trying to navigate it as well.

把那些韩国电池工程师铐起来并驱逐出境，恐怕并没有真正建立起信心。

Putting those South Korean battery engineers in shackles and deporting them probably didn't, you know, build confidence exactly.

是的。

Yeah.

这太棒了。

That's fantastic.

帕蒂，我们来谈谈你论文的第二个支柱，也就是保持美国在人工智能领域的领导地位。

Patty, let's turn to the second pillar of your paper, which is, you know, maintaining US leadership in AI.

所以在提出这个问题之前，让我先提一个让我注意到的巧合。

So before we frame this up as a as a question, let me briefly note a coincidence that that struck me.

就在上周，这个领域的真正先驱之一扬·莱库恩在《纽约时报》上接受了专访，文章严厉批评指出，业界对大型语言模型的过度关注，可能只是通向更具通用能力的人工智能系统道路上的一个死胡同。

So just last week, Jan Lecun, who's one of the field's true pioneers, he he was profiled in The New York Times with a scathing critique arguing that, you know, the industry's overwhelming focus on on large language models may actually be just a dead end on the path toward more general capable AI systems.

你知道，美国对通用人工智能的这种执念。

You know, this this fixation with artificial general intelligence that The United States has.

我们已经全面押注在这上面了。

We've we've we've gone all in on this.

这是一场巨大的赌注。

It's a a giant bet.

但除了这一批评本身外，引起我注意的是，他明确称赞中国公司正在探索更广泛的技术路径，而不是把所有希望都押在单一主导范式上，即大型语言模型能带我们通往通用人工智能。

But what caught my attention beyond the critique itself was that, you know, he explicitly praised Chinese companies for pursuing, you know, a wider range of approaches rather than betting everything on a single, you know, dominant paradigm of, you know, large language models are gonna take us to AGI.

因此，在这种背景下，我想知道你如何从战略角度看待人工智能的领导地位。

So against that backdrop, I'm curious how you think about AI leadership in in strategic terms.

在你的论文中，你指出美国的真正优势非常明显，比如前沿计算和芯片设计，以及领先的平台，但也提到了日益增长的自我约束，比如出口管制的不稳定性、基础设施瓶颈，以及人才压力。

So in your paper, you point to real US strengths are pretty undeniable, you know, frontier compute and chip design and leading platforms, but also to growing self constraints from, you know, export control volatility, infrastructure bottlenecks, you know, pressure on on talent.

你是否担心，美国的政策和市场激励措施，恰恰在竞争日益激烈的时候，进一步缩小了创新空间？

How worried are you that US policy and market incentives may actually just be narrowing the innovation space even just as competition is really, you know, heating up as it intensifies?

当我们谈论人工智能领导力时，我们是否应该少关注谁在当前的规模竞赛中胜出，而更多地关注谁最有可能探索、维持和吸收下一代技术路径——无论它们最终会是什么？

And when when we talk about AI leadership, should we be thinking less about who is winning the current race to scale existing models and maybe more about who's best positioned to, you know, to explore, to sustain, to absorb the the next generation of approaches, whatever those end up being?

因为我觉得，我们现在把所有鸡蛋都放在了一个篮子里。

Because I I feel like we have all our eggs in one basket right now.

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，我认为该领域的许多专家都指出，实际上并不存在单一的AI竞赛。

I mean, I think, you know, many experts in the field have pointed out that there isn't a singular AI race per se.

在AI领域肯定会存在竞争，美国和中国将在不同的领域和不同方面展开较量。

There's going to be, you know, competition in the AI space, and there's, of course, different lanes and different different aspects that The US and China will be competing over.

因此，我们不能把这看作是一场单一的竞赛。

And so we can't see this as a singular race.

特朗普政府在描述这场竞争时，似乎更加笼统。

The Trump administration has been, I think, a bit more general in the way that it's framed the competition.

它只是泛泛地说，美国需要在AI领域保持领先，超越中国。

It's just said generally that The US needs to maintain a lead in AI and stay ahead of China.

正如你所指出的，美国目前确实仍拥有实实在在的优势。

And as you pointed out, The US does retain real advantages at the moment.

它在先进芯片设计方面占据主导地位。

It has domination in the advanced chip design.

它控制着全球大部分前沿算力。

It controls a large share of the global frontier compute.

美国仍然是众多世界领先的AI公司、平台和研究实验室的所在地。

It remains home to many of the world's leading AI firms platforms and research labs.

这些是重要的优势，不应被忽视。

And these are meaningful strengths, and they shouldn't be understood.

但我们在报告中指出，这些优势正日益承受压力，且无法保证长期维持。

But what we point out in our report is that these advantages are increasingly under stress, and they're not guaranteed to hold over time.

其中一个压力来源是政府对出口管制政策的不断调整。

And one, you know, source of strain is the administration's evolving approach to export controls.

是的。

Yeah.

在过去一年中，特朗普政府最初收紧了对先进芯片的限制，随后又放宽了这些限制。

Over the past year, the Trump administration initially tightened, and then it loosened restrictions on advanced chips.

最近，它基于这样的逻辑取消了对英伟达H200芯片的限制：让中国继续依赖美国技术，同时让美国企业从进入中国市场中持续获益。

And most recently, it lifted restrictions on NVIDIA's h 200 chips based on the logic that it's better for China to remain dependent on US technology and for American firms to continue benefiting economically from access to the Chinese market.

但这一决定在政策界引发了强烈反对。

But there's been significant pushback as well across the policy community on this decision.

而且，批评者指出，美国正在中国全力缩小差距、并加速减少对美国芯片依赖的关键时刻，主动放弃其计算优势。

And, you know, the critics point out that The United States is essentially handing away its compute advantage at a time when China is racing to close the gap, and it's doubling down on reducing its reliance on US chips as quickly as possible.

因此，尚待观察的是，政府能否成功平衡其两大目标：一方面支持美国企业的商业利益，另一方面在计算领域保持对中国的长期技术优势。

And so it remains to be seen whether the administration can successfully balance its two stated objectives of, one, supporting US firms' commercial interests, while, on the other hand, preserving long term US technological leverage over China in the compute domain.

但当然，人工智能的领导地位不仅仅关乎计算能力。

But, of course, AI leadership isn't just about compute.

支持大规模计算的物理基础设施。

Physical infrastructure that enables compute at scale.

比如数据中心、电网容量、稳定的能源供应。

Think data centers, electric grid capacity, a reliable energy generation.

你知道，这些也同样重要。

You know, all of this matters as well.

我们已经看到政府采取了一些措施，试图加速人工智能基础设施的建设，但这一领域的许多关键决策超出了联邦政府的直接控制范围。

And we've seen the administration take steps to try to accelerate AI infrastructure build out, but many of the consequential decisions in this area sit outside of direct federal control.

例如，我们已经看到许多州和地方对数据中心建设提出反对，原因是切实担忧

We've seen a lot of state and local objections to data centers, for instance, because of real concerns about

水。

Water.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

Exactly.

环境问题和当地社区的反对。

Environmental concerns and pushback from local communities.

所以这就是美国所面临的情况。

And so this is, you know, kind of where what The United States is dealing with.

而相比之下，中国在人工智能基础设施方面，正如其在经济政策的各个方面一样，采取了更加集中的方式。

Whereas China, by contrast, you know, has a far more centralized approach to AI infrastructure, as it does in all facets of its economic policy.

这使它在电力生产等领域能够更快推进。

And this has allowed it to run much faster in areas like power generation.

因此，当把美国和中国的模式并置时，挑战就显而易见了。

And so when you put The US and Chinese model side by side, you know, the challenge becomes clear.

我认为，美国基础设施治理的分散性，加上真实的环境限制和能源瓶颈，阻碍了为保持人工智能领先地位所必需的快速大规模建设。

I think the decentralized nature of US, infrastructure governance combined with real environmental constraints and energy bottlenecks creates obstacles to the rapid large scale build out that will be important for sustaining a leading edge in AI.

我不会强迫你表明你在出口管制辩论中的立场，但我想指出的是，当你把中国和美国的这些政策并置时，还有一件事会显现出来，而我们在节目中已经多次讨论过这一点。

I'm not gonna try to pin you down on where you come down on the export controls debate, but I I do wanna like, there's another thing that that that shows up when you you lay down these policies side by side, the approaches of China and The United States, and and and I think this is something that that we've talked about quite a bit on on on the show.

但关键可能不在于谁拥有最前沿的先进模型，而在于人工智能能力如何真正渗透到这两个国家的经济中。

But maybe it's not down to who has the most advanced models at the frontier, but how AI capabilities are actually diffusing into the economies of of both of these countries.

而且，我认为有很多人——我本人不一定有明确立场——认为中国在这方面领先，得益于其‘AI+’战略，积极推动模型从企业层面一直渗透到街边小店。

And, you know, there, I think there are a lot of people, I don't I don't have my own position on this necessarily, but who see China as as ahead in that regard with its, you know, AI plus strategy with these real efforts to see their models diffusing into, you know, all the way down to through the firm level to, you know, mom and pop shops.

对吧？

Right?

是的，没错。

I mean, it's it's Yes, sir.

这是一个相当令人印象深刻的理念。

It's it's a pretty impressive idea.

另一点是，中国的AI能力也在向全球南方和其他地区扩散。

The other thing is that of or it's China's AI capabilities are diffusing into the global South, into the rest of the world as well.

这也是中国人工智能战略中另一个有意为之的部分。

And this is another deliberate part of of China's AI approach.

所以我不确定你是否认为这是这场竞争中的一个重要方面，以及特朗普政府对此有何说法或采取了什么措施。

So I don't know if you feel like that is a a significant piece of this this contest and what the Trump administration has said or what it's doing about this.

我注意到，在戴维·萨克斯的人工智能战略中，现在更加重视开放权重甚至开源模型。

I noticed that, you know, in David Sacks' AI strategy, there's there's much more emphasis now on on open weight or even open source models.

而且我觉得，他们似乎正在学习，可能是在观察中国，并从中汲取了一些想法。

And and I think I I sense that they're sort of learning maybe looking at China and and and maybe taking some ideas.

这是你的看法吗？

Is is that your sense?

这是个很好的问题。

That's a great question.

老实说，凯泽，我还没有足够仔细地关注这一点。

Honestly, I haven't, Kaiser, I haven't looked at at left that close enough.

所以也许，我可以不具体讨论戴维·萨克斯及其动向，先回答一下你关于技术扩散的问题。

And so maybe, you know, I could sort of answer your diffusion question without looking you know, talking about David Sachs and where he's going and

当然。

Sure.

当然。

Sure.

在向中国学习之前。

Before learning from China.

我们非常清楚地看到，中国公司不仅在与模型竞争，更在与系统竞争。

One thing that that we're we're seeing very clearly is that, you know, Chinese firms are competing not just with with models, but with systems.

他们正在将人工智能融入物流、制造、医疗、教育和公共管理等领域。

You know, they're embedding AI into logistics, into manufacturing, into health care, education, public administration.

这通常与硬件、融资和培训捆绑在一起。

This is often, you know, bundled with hardware, with financing, with training.

当然，正如我所说，这种日益开放源代码的方式，使得采用既更容易又更便宜。

And, of course, like I said, this this increasingly open source approach, you know, that makes adoption both easier and cheaper.

AI加战略，以及对开源相对宽容的态度，至少在我看来，正从我听到的消息来看，在硅谷产生强烈共鸣。

The AI plus strategy, you know, relatively permissive attitude toward open source, does seem to me at least to be really resonating even in Silicon Valley from what I'm hearing.

所以，当你从战略角度思考人工智能的领导力时，我们是否因为过于关注前沿控制和封锁策略，而忽略了真正影响、标准和依赖关系可能在现实生活中通过采用、整合和日常使用而非前沿突破形成的领域？

So when you think about AI leadership in strategic terms, are we at risk of losing by focusing too much on frontier controls and denial strategies, you know, that we're maybe losing sight of where influence, standards, where dependency actually might be forming in real life, you know, through adoption, through integration, through through, you know, everyday use rather than the cutting edge breakthroughs.

这正是我的担忧。

That's that's my my worry.

嗯。

Mhmm.

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，确实有人担心美国公司过于关注通用人工智能，而忽视了人工智能的实际应用。

I mean, there's definitely concerns that US companies are too focused on AGI versus practical applications of AI.

我认为这与美国和中国拥有根本不同的生态系统有关。

And I think this has to do with the fact that The United States and China have fundamentally different, ecosystems.

如果你想想中国，它是一个制造强国。

If you think about China, it's a manufacturing powerhouse.

它正在认真思考如何将人工智能的进展真正应用于医疗工具之类的产品，正如你所说，它们正在开发这些应用，而这可能与美国公司的关注点有所不同。

It's thinking really hard about how do you take AI advancements and actually apply them, to, as you say, health care tools or whatever it is, that that they're that they're that they're creating and that's, you know, perhaps different from where the focus is when it comes to American companies.

还有一个重要的问题，即其他国家是采用与美国一致的AI系统、基础设施和标准，还是与中国一致的。

There's also the an important question of diffusion, whether other countries adopt US aligned or China aligned AI systems, infrastructure, and standards.

我们已经看到，特朗普政府确实强调加速美国AI技术栈的出口。

And we've seen the Trump administration indeed put an emphasis on accelerating exports of of the American AI tech stack.

但你知道，中国比美国更早进入这一领域，方式也不同，它专注于将AI系统与融资、基础设施以及长期还款周期打包，尤其是在全球南方国家。

But, you know, China has been in this game earlier and in a different way than The United States with a focus on on packaging its AI systems with financing, infrastructure, and long repayment timelines, particularly in the global South.

对于许多政府，特别是新兴市场国家来说，这非常有吸引力。

And for many governments, especially in emerging emerging markets, that's very attractive.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

它们所采用的模型或产品不必是全球最前沿的。

Models or the products that they adopt don't have to be the absolute cutting edge in the world.

它们只需要价格合理、可靠且易于部署。

They just need to be affordable and reliable and easy to to deploy.

因此，这带来了真正的风险。

And so this creates a real risk.

美国或许能在AGI或真正前沿的技术上领先。

The US perhaps might lead an AGI or, you know, really cutting edge stuff.

但如果中国在AI实际应用、嵌入和全球普及方面不断追赶，那么它可能在其他关键方面已经领先了。

But if China's gaining ground where AI is actually being used and embedded and normalized around the world, then, you know, it it may be running ahead in the competition in other ways that matter.

那么我们现在转向你分析的第三个支柱，帕蒂，即减少对中国的战略依赖，也就是常说的去风险化。

So let's move now to the third pillar of your analysis, Patty, about reducing strategic dependence on China, what's often described as derisking.

对吧？

Right?

我在阅读你论文的这一部分时，有一件事让我印象深刻，那就是一旦你超越了这些口号，问题的面貌就完全不同了。

One thing that struck me in reading this section of your paper is how different the problem looks once, you know, you move beyond the slogans.

对吧？

Right?

你提到的稀土事件，也就是去年十月发生的那件事，清楚地表明，美国感受到的脆弱性不仅在于上游开采，还在于下游环节。

The Rare Earths episode that you discussed made, you know, from October, it made very clear that, you know, the vulnerability that The US feels isn't just upstream extraction, but, you know, it's downstream.

而是加工。

It's processing.

而是制造。

It's manufacturing.

是中国长期掌控价格和塑造市场的能力。

It's China's ability to, you know, set prices and shape markets over time.

这表明，依赖关系并不是说停就能停的。

And it suggests that dependence isn't something you can just switch off.

它深深植根于我们花了数十年才建立起来的工业生态中。

It's embedded deeply in industrial ecosystems that took us decades to build.

所以我想知道，你如何看待实际操作中的去风险化？

So I'm curious how you think about derisking in practice.

我明天其实要和你的同事凯尔·陈聊聊，为下下周播出的节目做采访。

I'm actually gonna be talking to your colleague Kyle Chan tomorrow for a show for the week after this one runs.

接下来会有三位布鲁金斯学会的人连续出场，瑞安和斯威特哈特。

It'll be three Brookings people right in a row, Ryan and Sweetheart.

所以我们也会继续讨论这个话题。

So we'll be talking more about this as well.

但我很好奇你是怎么看待这个问题的。

But I'm curious how you think about it.

在降低风险方面，真正的进展究竟应该是什么样子，而不是仅仅做些象征性的举动或政治表态？

What does meaningful progress actually look like here in derisking as opposed to just the symbolic moves or the political signaling?

我们该如何权衡韧性与成本、速度与可持续性、国家能力与盟友协调之间的取舍？尤其是考虑到许多供应链不可能在短期政治时间表内真正重建，就像我们之前讨论过的再工业化一样。

How should we think about the trade offs that are involved between resilience and cost, between speed and sustainability, between national capacity and allied coordination, especially given that many of these supply chains can't be realistically reconstituted on short political timelines, you know, see our discussion about reindustrialization.

对吧？

Right?

嗯哼。

Mhmm.

当然。

Absolutely.

而且我认为，当你邀请凯尔来时，他能对这个问题提供更多的见解。

And and I think, you know, Kyle will be able to shed a lot more light on this question when you have him on.

但在我们的报告中，我们指出，去年中国对稀土出口实施限制时，这无疑是一个警钟。

But in our report, we point out that, you know, that there was a wake up call Yeah.

当中国去年对稀土实施出口限制时，这立即扰乱了供应链。

When China's export restrictions on rare earths hit last year.

它使一个长期存在但只要贸易流未中断就容易被忽视的脆弱性变得非常明显。

It really disrupted supply chains almost immediately, and it made very visible a vulnerability that had long existed, but it was easy to overlook as long as trade flows were were uninterrupted.

公平地说，政府已经采取了多项应对措施。

And to be fair, the administration has taken a number of steps in response.

正如我们的报告所详述的，他们增加了对国内稀土生产的政府投资，并推动了多项与盟友和伙伴合作以实现采购多元化的举措。

As our report details, they've increased US government investments to support domestic rare earth production and a variety of initiatives to work with allies and partners to diversify sourcing.

就在本周，政府宣布了一项新的关键矿物战略储备计划。

Just this week, the administration announced a new initiative to stockpile critical minerals.

它

It's