本集简介
双语字幕
仅展示文本字幕,不包含中文音频;想边听边看,请使用 Bayt 播客 App。
嘿,Startup Hustle 的听众们。
Hey, Startup Hustle listeners.
在进入今天的节目之前,我有一些令人兴奋的消息要分享。
Before we get in today's episode, I've got some exciting news to share.
如果你喜欢 Startup Hustle 中的见解和故事,你一定会爱上我们全新推出的播客《Product Driven》。
If you've enjoyed the insights and stories here at Startup Hustle, you're going to love what we have in store at our brand new podcast called product driven.
我一直以来都把自己首先定义为一个产品人,然后才是创业者、软件工程师,但本质上我还是一个产品人。
I've always described myself as a product guy first, entrepreneur, software engineer, but really a product guy.
我热爱打造产品。
I love building products.
然而,许多人不知道如何将一个产品想法转化为技术产品,而软件工程师则常常难以理解商业层面的东西,看不到全局。
Many people struggle though with how to take a product idea and build a tech product, while software engineers struggle to understand the business side of things and they just don't see the big picture.
我的新播客《Product Driven》正是关于商业与技术构建软件之间的这一鸿沟。
My new podcast, Product Driven, is about that gap between business and the tech side of building software.
它专为初创创始人、技术领导者、软件工程师以及所有热爱科技和初创企业的人打造。
It's designed for startup founders, tech leaders, software engineers, and anyone who loves tech and startups.
感谢你成为这个社区的一员。
Thank you for being part of this community.
享受本期的Startup Hustle节目,并请在你的播客应用中订阅Product Driven,你也可以在YouTube上观看。
Enjoy this episode of startup hustle and please subscribe to Product Driven in your podcast app, and you can also check it out on YouTube.
非常感谢。
Thank you so much.
我们回来了,继续带来另一期《Start A Puzzle》——一档由创业者为创业者打造的播客。
And we're back for another episode of Start A Puzzle, a podcast for entrepreneurs by entrepreneurs.
如果你想创业、拥有或打造一家企业,那你来对地方了。
If you wanna start, own, or build a business, then you're in the right place.
我们将为你揭示从概念到产品上线的真实历程。
We bring you the real truth about what it's like to take something from concept to launch.
无论是增长、创新、经验、失败还是大获成功,我们都能为你提供全面的见解。
From growth, innovation, experience, failing, or winning big, we've got you covered.
那么,让我们开始本期由Full Scale dot I o赞助的Startup Hustle节目吧。
So let's get down to business with another episode of Start Up brought to you by Full Scale dot I o.
我们回来了。
And we're back.
又是一期《Startup Hustle》,我是马特·德科西,和马特·沃森一起。
Another episode of Startup Hustle, Matt DeCorsi here with Matt Watson.
嗨,马特。
Hi, Matt.
老兄,最近怎么样?
What's going on, man?
哦,只是回来再做一次。
Oh, just back to do this again.
你知道,我得说,能和你们以及今天到场的嘉宾们共度这段时光,真是太棒了。
And, you know, I I gotta say, it's just it's just amazing to be able to spend a little time with the greatness that we have with you and today's guests here.
但在解释这些之前,我得先处理一些繁琐的事。
But before I explain any of that, I gotta get some heavy lifting out of the way.
本期《Startup Hustle》由fullscale.io赞助,帮助你快速且经济地组建软件团队。
Today's episode of Startup Hustle is brought to you by fullscale.io, helping you build a software team quickly and affordably.
今天我们请到了一位堪萨斯城的传奇人物,许多当地人都以他为榜样,经常向他请教,而且他在我们的家乡做了许多非常酷的事情。
With us today, we've got a Kansas City legend, someone that many in the area aspire to become, often mentored by, and someone who's just done some really cool stuff in our hometown.
我很高兴欢迎托比·拉什做客《创业奋斗》。
I'm pleased to welcome Toby Rush to Start Up Hustle.
托比,最近怎么样?
Toby, what's up?
嘿,各位。
Hey, guys.
今天早上能和你们在一起真是太好了。
Great to be with you here this morning.
是的,我可以。
Yeah, I can.
我想我本该介绍你是我们这里的企业家、投资人和意见领袖,但没错,老兄。
I guess I should have introduced you as an entrepreneur, investor and influencer here in the area, but yeah, man.
所以,再次说,我们已经很久没把你请上节目了。
So once again, It's been a while since we've been trying to get you on the show.
所以我们今天很高兴能聊这么多话题。
So we're really happy to talk about so many things today.
太好了。
Great.
我们开始吧,可以全面覆盖一下。
Let's jump in, we can cover the canvas.
是的,我们其实有太多话题可以今天讨论了。
Yeah, so we were, you know, we have so much subject matter we could have discussed today.
而我们最终谈到了初创阶段的困境。
And we've arrived at talking about early stage struggles.
我们每个人都经历过不少创业历程,可以说都有不少经验了,你们两位——马特·沃森和托比·拉什——都曾成功退出过几家公司,但任何大的退出都离不开早期阶段的顺利推进。
And having all of us have a lot of, you know, we'll say a few notches in our belt when it comes to starting businesses, had wins, loses, both of you guys, meaning Matt Watson and Toby Rush are very well documented for some big exits with companies, but big exits never occur unless early stage stuff goes well.
所以,托比,我先让你来谈谈这方面的情况。
So Toby, I'm gonna go ahead and let you get started in that regard.
我知道,对于在听的朋友们,托比,如果你能简单介绍一下自己以及你参与过的那些非常棒的创业项目,那就太好了。
I know that, you know, and for those of you listening, Toby, if you could give it, I'll let Toby give a little background about himself and some of the businesses he's been involved in some really neat stuff.
那你开始吧,先生。
So take it away, Mr.
拉什。
Rush.
不用了。
No.
我很感激。
I appreciate it.
是的。
Yeah.
所以我的第一份正式工作,可以说,是在埃森哲。
So my really, it started my first comp job, if you will, with Accenture.
对吧?
Right?
那是一家庞大的IT咨询公司。
So massive IT consulting group.
最终在2001年2月左右加入了位于德克萨斯州休斯顿的一家小型软件初创公司,最初负责产品。
Ended up joining a small software startup company in Houston, Texas back in, like, 02/2001, initially owning product.
之后在我任职期间,我全面负责工程、质量保证和产品营销,真正爱上了这份事业。
And then after my time there, do owned all of engineering QA and product marketing and really fell in love.
早期阶段,全靠临场发挥。
Early stage, fly by the seat of your pants.
当时我们有一些大客户,比如埃克森美孚和雪佛龙,主要服务于石油和天然气行业。
You know, had some big accounts with ExxonMobil and Chevron and kind of the oil and gas industry.
这大概是我第一次真正体会到创业是什么样子。
And it's probably where I first kind of got my first taste of what entrepreneurship looked like.
我于2003年回到堪萨斯城。
Came back to Kansas City in 2003.
当时还没有孩子,已经结婚但尚未为人父母。
Did not have kids at the time, so married but no kids yet.
所以我感觉那是我尝试创业的绝佳时机。
And so I felt like that was the the right time to try my hand at the start up y thing.
所以第一家公司的名字叫Rush Tracking Systems。
So the first company was called Rush Tracking Systems.
我们主要做RFID、机器视觉,以及工业制造、供应链和仓储领域。
We did kind of RFID and machine vision and industrial manufacturing and supply chain and warehousing.
所以我们最终的产品是在叉车上安装摄像头和RFID读取器。
So the product we ended up with was we put cameras and RFID readers on forklifts.
我们在叉车顶部安装摄像头,天花板上有我们自己的二维条码,构建了室内GPS系统,然后在叉车前方安装摄像头和RFID读取器,这样就能知道我们取了什么、放了什么,从而提升库存准确性和运营效率。
So put a camera on top of a forklift, little two d barcode in the ceiling, had our own indoor GPS system, and then we put cameras and RFID readers on the front of the truck, and we knew what we picked up, what we put down, and kind of inventory accuracy and operational efficiency.
我们在2009年把这家公司卖给了一家私募股权公司,并做了一点整合。
We're able to sell that to a private equity in 2009 and did a little bit of a roll up.
坐在私募股权这一边真的很有趣,用他们的资金和分析师进行尽职调查,评估四五家公司,收购其中两家,然后把它们合并起来。
So it was a really fun to sit on the private equity side of the table, kind of with their money and their analyst, you know, diligence four or five companies, acquired two of those, you know, rolled those together.
两年后,也就是2011年,我离开了那家公司,当时我对机器视觉产生了浓厚兴趣,想想我们的眼睛能接收海量信息,而即使在2011年,摄像头已经越来越普及,我完全被机器视觉的潜力所吸引,于是开始四处结识人脉,问:‘谁在做机器视觉方面有趣的事情?’
I rolled off of that two years after that, so 2011, and was really captivated by machine vision on what we could do with it, you know, think about our eyes take in an enormous amount of information and as cameras are becoming more and more prevalent, even back in 2011, I was just captured by the general kind of capabilities of what machine vision could do for us and so I started networking around saying, hey, who's doing anything interesting with machine vision?
有人推荐我认识了密苏里大学堪萨斯城分校的一位教授,他正在研究血管和眼白部分。
And I got pointed to a professor at UMKC, looking at the blood vessels and the whites of your eyes, right?
他当时把这些血管当作一种生物识别特征来使用。
And so he was using those blood vessels just like a biometric.
所以不是指纹,我们最终称之为眼纹,而且他用普通摄像头就能实现。
So instead of a fingerprint, eventually what we ended up calling an eye print, and he could do it with regular cameras.
当时,这所大学正在研究机场、移民和安全领域。
At the time, the university was looking at airports and immigration and security.
我当时就想,天啊,这些对初创公司来说简直是难啃的市场。
I'm like, man, those are terribly hard markets for a startup.
对吧?
Right?
政府、大型企业,监管极其严格。
Government, really, really big business, super regulated.
但那时智能手机的密码已经过时了,而且只会越来越糟。
But passwords on smartphones were painted at that point and were only going to get worse.
所以如果我们能用这项核心技术,但应用到另一个市场,这感觉会是一个巨大的机会。
And so if we could use that core technology but simply apply it to a different market, that felt like something really big.
当时还没有触控ID,也没有面容ID,任何手机上都没有生物识别技术,但我们强烈感觉到,这是一个正在增长的痛点,而我们的技术能以独特且用户友好的方式解决它。
So at the time, there was no Touch ID, there was no Face ID, there was no biometrics on any phone, but felt really that that is a growing pain point that this would solve in a really unique and user friendly way.
所以我们于2012年推出了EyeVerify。
So we launched EyeVerify back in 2012.
我们一直与密苏里大学堪萨斯城分校和雷扎·德里克·沙尼博士保持紧密合作。
You know, we continue to work very closely with UMKC and doctor Reza Derek Shani.
在四年时间里,我们筹集了超过一千万美元,四年后以超过一亿美元的价格将公司出售给了阿里巴巴。
Over the course of four years, we raised, just over $10,000,000 and then four years later sold that to Alibaba for just over a 100,000,000.
这听起来像是一个一路向上的成功故事,但实际上经历了无数起伏、曲折,曾三次濒临破产,被竞争对手起诉,还遭遇过专利流氓的骚扰。
And it, know, that sounds like a just an up and to the right story, and there were many, many ups, many downs, lefts, rights, almost ran out money three times, got sued by a competitor, vet patent trolls.
我们还遇到过,有两家所谓的国际合作伙伴试图剽窃我们的技术并据为己有,诸如此类的疯狂事情简直数不胜数。
We had, you know, two supposedly, you know, a provider or partners of ours internationally tried to rip off the technology and claim it as their own and just all sorts of of craziness that that you gotta go through.
但我们非常幸运,能在2016年成功将公司出售给阿里巴巴。
But we're very fortunate to have a successful exit to Alibaba back in 2016.
我随后在阿里巴巴继续工作了三年。
I stayed with them for three years.
所以两年来,我负责蚂蚁金服的生物识别和身份业务,那是它的金融服务部门,之后又在投资团队工作了一年。
So for two years, I ran biometrics and identity for Ant Financial, kind of the financial services arm, and then, was on the investment team for a year.
在投资团队工作真的非常有趣。
So it was really fun to sit on the investment team.
这叫做企业风险投资。
It's called a corporate venture capital.
当企业进行风险投资时,我花了很多时间在以色列和旧金山考察区块链、人工智能、安全和物联网领域的初创公司,学到了很多,非常享受这段经历。一年前我退出了,花了一些时间陪伴家人,把精力投入到生活中一些新的领域。
So when corporations do venture capital, and spent a lot time in Israel and San Francisco looking at block chain and AI and security and IoT computing, startups and learned a ton, really enjoyed that, rolled off of that, right out a year ago and took some time off to hang out with the family, invest in a little different area of my life.
现在我正在考虑重新投身于几件不同的事情。
And now I'm thinking about jumping back into a couple different things.
你显然做了很多事,恭喜你取得的成功。
So you've you've clearly done a lot of stuff and congratulations on your success.
我肯定为此付出了难以想象的辛勤努力。
I'm sure there was an insane, insanely high amount of hard work that went into that.
是的。
It was.
我们过去曾做过一些关于早期常见错误的节目。
So we've had episodes in the past where we've talked about some common early stage mistakes.
回顾你自己在Rush Tracking和EyeVerify的经历,以及你与其他人的经验,这些错误通常是从哪里开始的?
When you look back at your own experience with rush tracking and EyeVerify along with your experience with other people, where do, where do those mistakes usually begin?
比如,有哪些比较常见的错误?
Like what are some of the more common ones?
是的,我觉得
Yeah, you know, I would
我所犯过的,以及看到别人犯过的最大错误,其实都是心理层面的问题,对吧?
say the, some of the biggest mistakes that I've made and I've seen others make are really, it's the mental game, Right?
通常不是因为我用错了工具,或者做错了产品,或者财务模型有点偏差。
So it's not usually I use the wrong tool or I built the wrong thing or I had a slightly wrong financial model.
通常,CEO的心理状态才是关键。
It's usually, the head game is usually a part of the CEO.
对吧?
Right?
我给你举几个例子,在我早期创业时,我真的很困惑自己的身份到底是什么,对吧?
So I'll give you a couple examples, where, you know, I really struggled in my early days of where did I get my identity, right?
因为当你开始取得成功时,很容易陷入这个陷阱。
Because it's easy to fall into the trap when you start having success.
报纸想赞扬你,各种支持机构也惊叹:‘哇,你做得真棒!’你的投资者也在拍你的背,你收获了无数赞誉。
The newspapers want to praise you, organ is, you know, various support organizations wonder like, wow, look how great you're doing, your investors are patting you on the back and you get all these accolades.
于是你感觉自己站在前台,背后有一整套公关和营销机器,它们的目标就是让公司看起来很出色。
And and so you feel like this front stage and you've got this PR machine and this marketing machine and their their purpose is to make the company look great.
而它们确实做到了。
And it does.
但随后,你开始把外界对公司的好印象内化,认为那就是你自己。
But then you start to take that perception of the company and start to internalize it and think that it's you.
当你开始觉得这些赞誉和表扬就是针对你本人,开始把公司的成功或公司形象与你的个人身份混为一谈时,迟早你会经历极其艰难的时刻——员工爆发、客户爆发、竞争对手暗中偷袭,各种问题接踵而至。
And when you start to think those accolades and though that praise is really you and you start to intertwine the success of the company or the identity of the company with your identity, invariably, you're going have super hard days, things are not going to go well, you're going to have an employee blow up, you're going have a customer blow up, you're going to have a competitor come in and inside swipe you to so many things that go wrong.
然后你开始窥视自己的后台,却拿它去和别人的前台做比较。
And then you start looking at your backstage and comparing that to other people's front stage.
因此,有一种疯狂的动机和压力,让你看起来一切尽在掌握,维持这个故事,维持你有多优秀、一切有多顺利的假象。
And so there's this insane incentive and this push to look like you have it all together, right, to keep up the story, to keep up this facade of how great you are and how great everything is going.
但事实上,你觉得自己有点神经质。
And the reality is you feel it'd be neurotic.
你觉得自己是个骗子。
You feel like a fraud.
对吧?
Right?
你觉得自己根本不知道自己在干什么。
You feel like, no, I don't know what the hell I'm doing.
这是我第一次做这个。
This is my first time at it.
我都不确定哪个是上。
I'm not sure which is up.
我想确保自己正在给投资者信心。
I want to make sure I'm trying to give my investors confidence.
我试图让我的团队感到安心。
I'm trying to get my team comfort.
我试图在客户面前表现得好像我知道自己在做什么。
I'm trying to look like I know what I'm doing in front of my customers.
而我看到,每个人都会到达那个阶段。
And where I see can everybody comes to that point.
对吧?
Right?
因此,这是一个非常普遍的时刻,人们开始分道扬镳,有些人坚持认为必须独自承担一切,继续维持这场伪装。
So that's that's a very common point where I see people start to diverge or some people kind of hold up and think they have to take that on all themselves and they keep up a charade.
对吧?
Right?
而这
And this
这在一定程度上就是‘假装直到你成功’的综合征吗?
is partly the fake it till you make it syndrome?
是的。
It is.
但如果你装得太久,又没有足够多的人知道真实的你,最终就会犯下一些非常愚蠢的错误,比如资金耗尽、从不良投资者那里拿钱,或者对团队做出错误的决策。
And and but then you you start faking it too long and you're just not real with enough people that you end up making some really stupid mistakes, whether that's you start running out of money, you take money from from bad investors, You start making bad decisions with your team.
你以为自己必须像史蒂夫·乔布斯那样,而他是个混蛋。
You think you're supposed to be Steve Jobs, who is an asshole.
他确实非常成功。
Like, he was incredibly successful.
但我绝不想为史蒂夫·乔布斯工作,也不想和他合作。
I would never wanna work for or with Steve Jobs.
所以人们会扮演某种角色,他们以为……
And so people take on these personas, what they
我认为这取决于创始人的个性和类型。
think And they should I think it depends on the persona the personality type of the founder.
对吧?
Right?
有些创始人只想让自己的名字出现在TechCrunch上。
So some some founders just wanna see their name on TechCrunch.
他们想在证券交易所敲钟。
They wanna ring the bell at the stock exchange.
他们希望自己的名字出现在巨大的霓虹灯上,对吧?
They want their name in big, big lights, right?
比如,还有些人说:我讨厌人类。
Like, and then you have people that are like, I hate humans.
我根本不想和任何人交谈。
I don't ever want to talk to humans.
我要回实验室了。
I'm going back to the lab.
对吧?
Right?
不同的人格特质会适合这些不同类型,你知道的,适合这种情况。
You have different personalities that fit into these kind of, you know, that fit into this.
你提到的这种现象,其实说的是冒名顶替综合症,我认为很多人都会经历,不管最终是否成功,我的意思是,在任何人成功之前,他们其实都不是真的觉得自己配得上。
What you're referring to, I mean, you're talking about imposter syndrome, which I think a lot of people go through regardless of whether you make it out alive or not, you know, meaning like, I I think any of us before anyone was successful, they weren't.
那你怎么才能适应这种状态呢?
And then it's how do you grow into that?
我认为成功会改变很多人,就像你之前说的,托比,而且当你谈到那种感觉自己是个骗子的感觉时,你也必须逐渐适应这种身份。
And I think success can change a lot of people much like you said, Toby, and kinda like, you know, but at some point you talk about that quote kind of feeling like a fraud, you have to grow into that identity as well.
你现在有没有想过,但凡那些成功的创始人,大概都会在某个时刻对自己说:天啊,我是不是超出了自己的能力范围?
Do you have any like, now, I think that at any point, most founders that have been successful would tell you they're kinda like, shit, am I in over my head?
你知道的,当你在做一些像你之前做的那些事情时,以前从来没人做过。
You know, like, but know, when you're doing stuff like some of the stuff that you were doing, no one had done it before.
所以你本质上是个先驱者,第一个吃螃蟹的人。
So, you're kinda like a first or a trailblazer.
你有没有什么建议,能帮助人走出这种状态,重新成为一个正常、有生产力的人,而不是一个自我膨胀、离经叛道的狂人?
Do you have any input about how you get past that and like kind of become a regular productive human again, rather than an ego maniacal, you know, outlaw?
我觉得其中一部分原因在于,我生命中拥有一些非常牢固的人际关系。
I think part of that has been, I've been really fortunate to have some super strong relationships in my life.
那些在我董事会里的人、我的朋友,还有我妻子,他们完全不参与业务,却总能提醒我我是谁、什么才是重要的。
People that have been on my board, people that have been friends are simply outside the business altogether, my wife, and they kind of remind me of who I am and what's important.
对吧?
Right?
我以前讲过一个故事,我尽量简短地说:一家银行坑了我们,我们几乎没钱了。
You know, one one story I've told in the past, I'll try to give you really abbreviated version, a bank jacked us over, we're almost out of money.
这是我第一次几乎身无分文,当时我们公司特别尴尬。
The first time I was almost ever out of money, my first company, we're super embarrassed.
我没有备选计划。
I didn't have a backup plan.
我以为自己必须把一切都想明白。
I thought I had to fit it all figured out.
现在,距离我资金耗尽只剩三周了,我觉得一切都要崩盘了。
So now I'm three weeks from running out of money, and I think it's all gonna go blow up.
事实上,我们增长得太快了,现金流已经跟不上了。
Rally, we're just we were growing too fast, like we're outgrowing our cash.
在所有这些兴奋和乐趣中,我根本没有好好沟通,也不清楚发生了什么,结果陷入极度困境。
And in all of that excitement and all that that fun, like, I just didn't communicate well, didn't know what was happening, and then got caught really, really short.
于是我打电话给我的朋友特蕾西,说:老兄,这下全完了。
So called up my friend, Tracy and said, dude, it's all gonna go blow up.
我把这事搞砸了。
I've screwed this thing up.
我没有制定备用计划。
I didn't make a backup plan.
我以为我已经把一切都想明白了。
I thought I had it figured out.
我不想告诉任何人,但现在我完蛋了。
I didn't want to tell anyone and now I'm screwed.
他没有问我二十个关于怎么搞到更多钱、怎么去解决或修复问题的问题,而是问:托比,如果这件事彻底崩了,你还会把我当朋友吗?
And instead of asking me 20 questions about how to get more money or how to go do this or try to fix that, it's like, so Toby, if this whole thing blows up, do you still think I'll be your friend?
对吧?
Right?
你觉得你妻子还会爱你吗?
You think your wife's still gonna love you?
你觉得上帝还有计划吗?
Think God still has a plan?
那些我真正在乎的事情,一样都没变。
Like, all those things that I really cared about, none of those changed.
现在,我第一次领悟了这个道理。
Right now was the first time I learned this lesson.
我已经多次学到这个教训了。
I've learned it multiple times.
所以,要把你的身份和公司区分开来,如果说公司失败了,那确实很糟糕、很痛心,我会感到丢脸、生气,但作为一个人,我并没有改变。
So to separate your identity from that of the companies and say if the company fails, it'll suck, it'll hurt, I'll be embarrassed, I'll be angry, but I as a person will not have changed.
如果我的公司失败了,我并不是一个失败者,对吧?
I am not a failure if my company fails, right?
光是这个想法,我认为人们真的需要好好思考。
And that thought alone, I think people really have to wrestle with.
如果我的公司失败了,这并不意味着我这个人就是个失败者。
If my company is a failure, that does not mean I am as a person am a failure.
对吧?
Right?
所以能够把这两者分开,实际上就是要活在这种奇怪的二元性中:是的,我的产品很烂,但同时它也很棒。
So being able to separate those two things, and it's really to live in this weird dichotomy of, yes, my product sucks and yes, it's awesome.
是的,我的公司正面临严重困境,但同时我们一定会挺过去。
Yes, my company is in terrible trouble and yes, we're going to make it.
没错。
Right.
并且要同时接纳这两种状态,因为它们都是真实的。
And to sit in both of those and cause they're both true.
我认为有时候我们觉得必须在二选一中做出决定。
And I think sometimes we feel like we have to choose the binary.
不,这太棒了。
No, it's awesome.
这事儿嘛——不,不,没什么问题。
It's bla-, no, no, nothing's wrong.
一切都很好。
It's all great.
一切都很好。
It's all great.
不,现实是有很多糟糕的事情正在发生,情况非常艰难,但我依然相信这个愿景,依然认为我们会成功。
No, the reality is there's a lot of bad stuff happening and it's super hard And I still believe in the vision and I still think we're gonna make it.
要在这种情况下同时保持‘是的’,我认为这是CEO必须跨越的一个极其艰难的成熟门槛。
And to to to be the yes and in that, I think is a really hard maturity hurdle that CEOs have to be able to make.
如果他们做不到,最终他们就不会成功。
And if they don't, eventually, they they won't succeed.
我觉得你说得完全对。
I think you're absolutely right.
我觉得很多人会把自己的身份与他们创立的公司纠缠在一起。
I think a lot of people, their identity gets entangled between them as a human being and the company that they founded.
就像你之前说的,史蒂夫·乔布斯就是苹果,很难把两者分开,对吧?
Like, almost like you said earlier, like Steve Jobs was Apple, and it's hard to separate that, right?
但作为创始人,我们必须能够看着我们的妻子、孩子和家人说:你知道吗?
But as a founder, we have to be able to look at our our wife and our kids and our family and say, you know what?
即使这件事彻底失败了,我依然会幸福。
I'm still gonna be happy if that thing goes down in flames.
你和他们都必须能将这两者区分开来。
They and you gotta be able to separate that.
否则,你会因为工作的压力每天24小时都感到痛苦。
Or otherwise, you're kind of miserable twenty four hours a day from the stress of work.
你必须能够把自己和公司分开。
Like you got to be able to separate yourself.
但这真的很难做到。
And it's really difficult to do.
是的。
Yeah.
这没关系。
And it's okay.
无法寻求帮助。
The inability to ask for help.
我的意思是,要成为企业家和创始人,某种程度上必须有一种近乎疯狂的自我信念,这本质上就是自负。
I mean, that's a very, so in order to be an entrepreneur and a founder, there has to be kind of an insane sense of belief in yourself at some point, which is basically defined ego.
而通常来说,寻求帮助并不是我们擅长的事情。
And that typically asking for help isn't something that we're always great at.
因为正如你所说的,托比,你必须放低姿态,打电话给某人,尤其是那些你可能想求助的人,得说:嘿,哥们,我现在真的很糟糕。
Because like you said, Toby, you have to kind of like humble yourself and call someone, especially some of the people that you might want help from, have to be like, Hey, man, I suck right now.
而且我公开承认这一点,这可能是不再糟糕的第一步——那就是承认自己哪些方面不行。
And I'm admitting that openly, which might be the first attempt, that might be the first step to not sucking is admitting the things that you suck at.
马特,你一路上有没有遇到过难以寻求帮助的问题?
Matt, have you ever had a problem asking for help along the way?
是的,绝对有。
Yeah, absolutely.
我的意思是,我绝对是第一个承认自己从未真正有过导师的人。
I mean, I, I'd be one of the first to say that, like, I've never really had a mentor.
而且,你知道,我的性格是那种我会回到实验室去解决这个问题的人。
And, you know, my personality is, you know, more the I'm going to go back to the lab and work on this problem.
而不是去找人帮忙,我会试着想出办法自己摆脱困境。
Instead of going to find help, I'm going to try and, you know, concoct some way to get out of this.
这就是我的性格风格,对吧?
And that's my personality style, right?
但你必须学会了解自己,明白什么时候需要寻求帮助。
But and that's where you have to learn about yourself and learn when you need to ask help.
这仅仅是了解自己的性格,并能坦诚面对它。
And it's just understanding your personality and being able to be real about it.
托比,十年前的我跟你很像,就像你提到的那样。
Toby, I was a lot like you, like you mentioned like that ten years ago.
在开始录制之前,我们聊到了一些十年前会比较难做到的事情。
Well, before we hit record, we were talking about a few things that ten years ago would have been a little harder.
十年前,我非常不擅长寻求帮助。
Ten years ago, I was terrible at asking for help.
现在我感觉更年长、更有经验了,才意识到这是其中的一部分。
Now that I feel older and more experienced, I just realized that's part of it.
如果你不问,就永远得不到。
And I think so much, if you don't ask, you'll never get.
所以我认为,对于在听的你们来说,那些你们向往成为的人、视为同辈或非常尊重的人,他们都经历过类似的事情。
So I think most of the people that, for those of you listening, most the people that you aspire to be, or consider your peers, or have a lot of respect for, they've all gone through the same stuff.
所以每当有创始人或创业者找我——我昨天就刚遇到一个,有人跟我说:嘿,我有几个问题。
So anytime a founder or an entrepreneur, I just did this yesterday, I had someone kinda give me that, Hey man, I got a couple of questions.
你有时间吗?
You have some time?
这其实就是那种感觉:嘿,我觉得我需要一些帮助或一些建议。
And it was just that same kind of like, Hey, I think I need some help or I need some input.
我认为这正是任何创业者社群的一部分。
And I think that's part of like being a part of any entrepreneur community.
我的意思是,我们甚至在播客里也尝试这样做。
I mean, we even try to do that here on the podcast.
这就是我们现在讨论这些事情的原因。
That's why we're talking about these things right now.
好吧。
So, all right.
所以关于导师制,顺便说一下,在三百五十期节目中,当我们谈到人们犯过的错误时,这是一个新出现的观点,非常有洞察力:你从哪里获得你的身份认同,又从哪里寻求指导?
So mentorship, and by the way, in three fifty episodes, when we've talked about mistakes that people have made, that's a new one that's come up and that's great insight is just where do you get your identity and where do you obtain some guidance from?
在你前两家公司里,有没有谁特别成为你的导师,或者你效仿的对象?
Was there someone at your first two companies that really was a guide or someone that you modeled your stuff after?
是的,我觉得我有两个非常好的。
Yeah, I'd say I had two two really good.
我的意思是,我一直都有很棒的董事会。
I mean, I've had a great boards all the way.
除了那两个领域,我可能要特别提一下。
I'm aside the two fields I probably call out.
所以我的第一家公司在创业初期,可能我们时间不够,没法讲太多故事。
So my first company, maybe we don't have enough time, give stories and stories.
所以我最初找来投资的是一些年纪较大的朋友,他们都是成功的企业家。
So the first group of people I approached to raise money from were some older friends of mine, business people been successful.
我去跟他们说:嘿,我正在做这件事。
I went in terms of, hey, I'm trying to do this thing.
我们做生意已经一年半到两年了,但一直勉强维持,还没融到任何资金。
We've been in business about a year and a half, two years, just barely scraping along, hadn't raised any money yet.
他们对我说:托比,我们完全不懂你在说什么。
And they're like, Toby, we have no idea what you're talking about.
但我们的朋友卡斯珀懂。
But here's our friend Casper.
他懂。
He does.
不管他让我们做什么,我们都会照做。
And whatever he tells us to do, we're gonna go do.
Casper曾经创办过四五家初创公司。
So Casper had done four or five startups.
他是芝加哥大学的MBA,非常非常聪明。
He was an MBA from University of Chicago, super, super smart.
他来了之后,像个街头斗士,简直是个狠角色。
He came in, he was a street fighter, like a just a brawler.
每次我们聊天的时候,我都感觉自己在上一堂迷你MBA课。
And we I felt like every time we'd have this conversation, I was getting a little mini MBA.
所以他总是把我打得落花流水,你知道的,每次见面都是这样,但这是好事,对吧?
And so he kicked my butt, you know, every time we got together, I mean, a good way, right?
所以我们之间有着深厚的信任。
So deep trust.
是的,他很爱我。
Yeah, he loved me.
他真的希望我成功,但他从不手下留情。
He really wanted me succeed, but he did not pull any punches.
所以当我带着我的董事会和投资人一起推进时,他非常挑剔。
And so going through on my feet on my board with an investor, You know, he was super critical.
我看到的是他的坦诚,当他不知道的时候,他会直接说‘不知道’。
I'm just seeing the honesty, like when he didn't know, he's fine saying, don't know.
他毫不介意问一些愚蠢的问题。
He was fine asking dumb questions.
他也不介意自己犯错。
And he was fine being wrong.
甚至当他问一个问题,我给他解释后,发现他其实是错的。
It's like, even when, like, he'd ask a question, and I'd walk him through and it turned out he was wrong.
他会说,好的,明白了。
He's like, okay, great.
那有什么问题呢。
Was wrong with that.
他就直接继续往前了。
He just moved on.
我当时就想,他能如此直面问题,坦然接受自己错了,然后继续前进,完全不会因此感到情绪受挫,对吧?
I'm like, oh, he could like come at it really hard, be okay being wrong and just move forward and didn't feel like he had to, it didn't hurt his emotion, right?
他并没有因此显得低人一等。
He wasn't like he was a lesser person.
另一个对我影响特别大的人是保罗·莫里斯。
So the other person that has been, you know, super powerful for me is Paul Morris.
他是本地人,当过投资人、CEO,也担任过多个董事会职务,可能是我见过的最擅长提问的人之一。
So he's a local guy, you know, been an investor, been a CEO, been a bunch of boards, probably one of the best question asker that I've ever been around.
他非常有耐心。
So he's getting just he's patient.
他从不拐弯抹角。
He doesn't pull any punches.
他会提出尖锐而深刻的问题,非常诚实,而且他的诚实是主动的。
He asked great hard questions and he's really honest and he's kind of proactive in his honesty.
对吧?
Right?
他并不总是等我主动提问,即使我们之间的关系还没那么深厚,只要他观察到什么,就会主动坦诚地告诉我。
He doesn't always ask he doesn't always wait for me to ask him the question that we've got developed the relationship enough of, he'll proactively be honest with me if he's observing something.
让我们说,这两个人在商业方面都非常重要。
Let's say both of those folks were super important on the business side.
然后我还有很多不了解我工作、但了解我的家人和我的个人朋友,他们能提醒我:我是不是在这一面失去了重心?
And then I got a lot of personal friends outside that know nothing about my work, but know my family, that know me and can call me on, you know, am I am I losing focus on that side?
所以导师关系和这类事情也接近于伙伴关系。
So mentorship and this stuff is also close to partnership.
我们经常讨论的一件事是,选择商业伙伴就像选择配偶。
And one of the things that we have discussed a lot is, you know, choosing a business partner is like choosing a spouse.
在很多情况下,我甚至在书中写过,解除婚姻关系比解除商业伙伴关系更容易。
And in many cases, I've even written about this in a book, it's easier to get rid of your spouse than it is your business partner.
所以要慎重选择。
So choose wisely.
马特和我都经历过很棒的,也可能不太理想的合作伙伴。
Matt and I have both had experiences with great and maybe not so great partners.
关于寻找和选择联合创始人,你有什么建议或学到的经验吗?
What advice would you have or what lessons have you learned about finding and choosing co founders?
是的,两个都是初次创业的联合创始人会非常困难。
Yeah, having two first time co founders is super hard.
如果你不能迅速为他们配备一个优秀的董事会、一群好的导师,或者能帮助他们的人,事情会变得极其艰难。
Like, if you don't quickly surround those with a good board or a good set of mentors or someone who can kind of help them along, it's going to be really hard.
你知道,从第一天起,你们就结婚了,还有了一个叫公司的‘孩子’,对吧?
You know, because, you know, day one, you get married and you have this thing, a baby called the company, right?
然后你们开始引入其他重要的关键利益相关者,比如投资者和客户,等等。如果你和这位合伙人没有长期相处,也没有一起做过一些共同的项目,你知道,这并不是说不可能成功。
And then you start introducing other really strong key stakeholders like investors and customers and, you know, so finding that partner, if you haven't known each other for quite a while and haven't done some sort of common projects together, you know, not that it doesn't work.
当然,它也可能成功,但风险会大大增加。
Surely, it can work, but the risk goes way up.
另外,我认为两个人都必须具备相当成熟的人际关系能力。
The other is, I'd say both people have to be fairly relationally mature.
就像进入婚姻一样,你愿意去和解吗?
So just like going into a marriage, are you willing to reconcile?
你愿意说‘哎呀,这真疼’吗?
Are you willing to say, ouch, that hurts?
你愿意坦诚相待吗?
Are you willing to be honest?
你们是否具备互补的技术或商业技能,或者至少拥有相似的智商,以及处理艰难对话和和解的情商?
Do you have complimentary technical skills or business or technical, but, you know, very common IQ, kind of that emotional quotient to ability to engage on hard conversations and reconcile.
现在,这对任何初创公司来说最大的风险就是创始团队。
Now that's probably the biggest risk to any startup is the founding team.
沃森,你对此有什么看法?
Watson, what do you what's your take on that?
我觉得你关于有经验的联合创始人的观点很棒。
I think I love what your opinion about having founder cofounders that have done this before.
在我做VinSolutions的时候,我们确实遇到过这个问题,有几个创始人完全不知道自己在做什么。
That was definitely the issue we had from my VinSolutions days is, you know, we had a couple founders that had no idea what they were doing.
然后我们又加入了三位商业伙伴,他们也不知道自己在做什么。
And then we added three more business partners that also didn't know what we were doing.
而且,我的意思是,如果团队里有个人之前做过类似的事情,那会很好。
And yeah, I mean, that it would be nice to have somebody on the team that had done this before.
我觉得这是一个很好的见解。
And I think that's a great insight.
我确实认为这是一个很好的见解。
And I definitely think that's a great insight.
如果你是初创公司的潜在投资者,至少有一位创始人知道他们在做什么吗?
If you're a potential investor in a startup, do at least one of the founders know what they're doing?
我觉得这确实是个不错的见解。
I think that's I think that's good insight, actually.
但当你说到‘知道你在做什么’并有过相关经验时,这并不总是可行的。
But that's not always possible when you say know what you're doing and having been there before.
比如,我并不觉得‘知道你在做什么’这个说法是个明确的定义。
Like I don't, that's kind of a vague definition.
作为商业伙伴,就像你在Full Scale的合作伙伴一样,你显然经历过VinSolutions的退出以及其他一些事情。
Like as a business partner, as you might business partner at Full Scale, you've obviously had a VenSolutions exit and some other stuff.
我和马特聊过很多次,我们在作为合作伙伴时带来的技能非常不同,这是一种互补,非常好。
And Matt and I have talked a lot, like we're very different in the skills we bring to the business as partners and that's compliment, that's great.
这实际上很棒。
That's actually great.
而且我们在很多方面都不同。
And we're, I mean, we're different in a lot of ways.
现在你提到了关系上的安全感或成熟度。
Now you talk about that relational security or maturity.
这正是我一直注意到的马特的特点。
And that's, I mean, that's something that I've always noticed with Matt.
比如我们可能会争吵,甚至为某些事情闹脾气,但五分钟之后就能放下。
Like we can argue and like, I mean, even be kinda like pissy about something, and five minutes later move on.
因为这些都是我们关于业务需要讨论的事情,事情就是这样。
Because it's just, it's things that we need to talk about with the business and it is what it is.
我之前用了‘二元’这个词,因为我说得太绝对而常惹麻烦,人们会问:那情感和其他因素呢?但我说,这些其实都是通向零或一过程中的东西,你知道的。
I used the term binary earlier and I get in trouble for being binary because people are, well, what about emotions and all the things I'm like, those are all the things on the way to zero or one, you know?
但在这方面,很多都是关于业务的,我认为你必须培养一种环境,让大家能够坦诚交流,说‘嘿,我觉得这太糟了’。
But with that, so much of it, it is business and you have to, I think you have to culture and foster an environment where you can really share and say, Hey, look, I think this sucks.
如果你对此充满热情,我们会试一试,但我们也必须知道何时该放手。
Now, if you're passionate about it, we'll give it a shot, but we got to know when to say when.
而这有时是最困难的部分。
And that's sometimes a hard part.
你有没有遇到过公司发展方向上的问题?
Have you had any issues with the direction of the company?
就像马特提到的,他曾经和另外四位合伙人发生过冲突,了解End Solutions的这段经历后,几乎可以认为他们每个人在某个时刻都有不同的目标和对公司不同的期望。
Like Matt mentioned, having fought four other business partners, just from having known that story of End Solutions, it's almost as if all of them had different objectives and wanted different outcomes with the company at some point.
你有过类似的经历吗,托比?
Have you had that kind of experience, Toby?
是的。
Yeah.
我的第一家创业公司,我也有一个联合创始人。
My first company, I had a co founder myself.
我们俩都没做过,都很年轻,完全不知道自己在做什么,当然也经历了不少艰难时刻。
Neither one has had done it before, both pretty young, no idea what we're doing, you know, and we had some really rough patches for sure.
有一段时间,我甚至不得不把他开除了,但后来找到了一个让他回归的方案,他确实为公司做出了巨大贡献,这真的非常困难。
You know, at one point, actually had to fire him, but then found a scenario where he was able to come back and really make a great contribution to know it's super hard.
当你完全不知道自己在做什么时,一旦投入进去,真的会特别艰难。
When you have no idea what you're doing and you get into it, it's really hard.
第二个公司,我基本上是自己起步的,但很快便拉来了实质上的联合创始人。
The second one, you know, I kinda started on my own, but quickly brought on effectively co founders.
不过,其中一个来自我之前的公司,另一个是首席科学家。
But, you know, one of them was from my previous company, the other was the chief scientist.
杰里米·帕宾是个很棒的人,来自我的第一家创业公司,很快加入我的第二家公司,全面负责工程和技术工作。
So Jeremy Pabin, great guy, was from my first company, joined me quickly, my second company really to run all of engineering technology.
雷扎·德里克·沙尼是密苏里大学堪萨斯城分校的教授。
Reza Derek Shani was the professor at UMKC.
所以我们三人基本上是那个项目的创始核心。
So kind of we were kind of the threesome that really began that.
杰里米之前有过相关经验,而雷扎在业务和技术或创业方面非常信任我。
So Jeremy had been in it before and Reza really trusted me to a large extent on the business side of the technology or the startup side.
而我在科学方面也深深信任他。
And I really trusted him deeply on the science side.
但我的第一家公司在创始人问题上差点倒闭。
But yeah, my first company, it almost blew up because of founders.
现在,我认为我们从未隐瞒过创业很难这个事实。
Now, I think we've never been we've never kept it a secret that startups are hard.
创业很难。
Entrepreneurship is hard.
你知道还有什么很难吗?
And you know what else is hard?
筹集资金很难。
Raising capital.
你们两位都经历过这一点。
Now, both of you have done that.
展开剩余字幕(还有 366 条)
我做过。
I've done it.
我们所有人,这里每个人都做过。
We've all, everyone here has done that.
但在早期融资时,你会犯一些错误,这些错误会像鱼叉一样迅速刺穿你的初创公司。
But there are some early stage mistakes that you can make when it comes to raising capital that are gonna shoot a harpoon into the side of your startup pretty quickly.
托比,你有什么经验?在早期阶段融资有哪些该做和不该做的事?
Toby, what experience have you had and what are some do's and don'ts about raising capital in early stages?
是的,老兄,我觉得我犯的错误比做对的还多。
Yeah, man, I've felt like I've made more mistakes than than not.
我个人成长了很多,也见过足够多他人的经历。
Personally, I've grown a lot and I've seen enough of others.
我认为,拥有经历过这些的人作为导师和周围的支持者,可能比任何其他事情都更重要,对吧?
I think this is probably where mentorship and experience having people around you that have done that is probably more important than anything, right?
因为投资者时间非常有限,注意力也很短,他们要看很多项目。
Because there is investors have very little time and they have short attention spans, and they look at a lot of deals.
所以,在进入之前,了解市场情况、什么是常态、他们希望你如何呈现信息,非常重要。除非你身边有最近刚经历过这些的人,或者十五年前做过的人,否则这两者根本不一样,对吧?
And so going in understanding kind of what's market, what's normal, how do they think you're supposed to present information, like going in unless you have someone who's kind of been there and done it and done it in a relatively near term, or someone who did this fifteen years ago, it's just not the same, right?
前者有点帮助,但完全无法跟过去三到五年内刚做过的人相比。
It's kind of helpful, but not anything like someone who'd done in the past three to five years.
而且,即使是今天,在新冠疫情期间,对吧?
And even in today and in COVID, right?
就在过去的六个月里,情况又变了。
So in the past six months, that's even changed again.
所以,有经历过融资、有经验的人在身边指导你,这一点非常关键。早期我去见投资人时,常常只有我一个人,从没想过要带上我的整个团队。
So having people alongside you that has raised, that have experience, that can coach you, like early on, I would go into these investors meeting and it would be just me and not think to bring the rest of my team.
我当时觉得,他们都很忙。
It's like, well, they're busy.
我希望他们专心把公司做起来。
I want them building the company.
我为什么要打扰他们呢?
Why why would I why would I bother them?
而且没有意识到投资者多么看重团队之间的互动。
And not realizing how important it was for the investors to see how the team interacted.
并不是我无法介绍公司。
And it wasn't that I couldn't present the company.
对吧?
Right?
他们看不到团队的其他成员。
They didn't get to see the rest of the team.
对吧?
Right?
所以我应该更早地带上我的团队。
So I should have brought my team along much earlier on.
你知道,投资者寻找的是那种极具韧性、积极主动、自信、谦逊且愿意接受指导的人。
You know, investors are looking for someone who's super tenacious and aggressive and confident and humble and coachable.
对吧?
Right?
这就是那种奇怪的‘是的,但是’:是的,你要非常有进取心、坚韧不拔、积极主动,同时也要有谦逊,敢于问出‘嘿,我不懂这里在做什么’这样的问题。
And that's kind of that weird yes and thing of like, yes, super aggressive and tenacious and aggressive and a go getter and humility to ask the question of, hey, I don't know what I'm doing here.
我对这个领域也不是很确定。
I'm not sure about this area.
所以在早期阶段,机会越早,投资就越具有关系性,对吧?他们更是在押注CEO;到了后期阶段,他们就会更多地关注财务数据和指标,比如流失率、销售模式和增长情况。
So being able to demonstrate that the earlier stage the opportunity, the more relational the investment, right, the more they're betting on the CEO, the later stage, the more they're getting into the financials and the metrics and kind of the the churn and you know, the the sales model and the the growth.
在早期阶段,真正重要的完全是CEO以及他周围的团队。
In early stage, it really is heavy, heavy, heavy, the the the CEO and the team around them.
我认为早期的CEO们太专注于推销公司,却忘了推销自己。
And I think early stage CEOs pitch the company too much and not let themselves pitch themselves.
所以,托比,我其实是你向EyeVerify融资时接触过的人之一,我拒绝了,我确实拒绝了。
And so, Toby so, Toby, I was actually one of the people you pitched EyeVerify to, and I passed and I passed.
我们来聊聊这件事。
Let's talk about that.
当时情况怎么样?
How did that go?
我也拒绝了。
And I passed.
对吧?
Right?
而且
And
嗯。
Mhmm.
所以我很想多听听你早期为EyeVerify融资的故事,因为你知道,你当时想把一些知识产权推向市场。
And so I'd love to hear a little more of your story of the early days of raising for EyeVerify because, you know, you were trying to take some intellectual property and basically bring it to market.
但你并不完全清楚该如何使用它,谁会为此付费,以及如何实现盈利。
But you didn't necessarily know exactly how you would use it, who would pay for it, how you would monetize it.
这真的很难。
Like, that's really difficult.
对吧?
Right?
所以这就是为什么我仔细看了它。
And so that's why I'm look I looked at it.
我想,好吧,这真的很棒。
I'm like, okay, this is really cool.
如果你能想出怎么利用它,它可能会非常成功,否则你永远也搞不清楚该怎么用它。
And if you can figure out to do something with this, it could be really big, or you're never gonna figure out what to do with it.
所以法院
And so the court
在你回答之前,我有个问题,马特。
Before you answer, I have a question, Matt.
你为什么放弃了?
Why did you pass?
因为我真的不知道如何实现盈利的路径。
Because I didn't I just didn't know I didn't know what the path to monetization was.
你怎么能把这项技术转化成实际的产品呢?
Like, how are you gonna take the technology and make something out of it?
所以我认为这花了好几年时间,这也是我想听的故事的一部分:你是怎么为这种新型创业项目融资的呢?
And so and I think it took several years, and that's part of the story I'd like to hear is, like, how was it raising money for that sort of, you know, new venture?
你一开始经历了一段很长的时期,但最终还是做出了点名堂。
And you had, like, a very long and then eventually, you were able to make something out of it.
所以我觉得这是一个很有趣的故事。
So I think it was an interesting story.
不。
No.
确实是。
It is.
而且是的。
And yeah.
所以当时有不少像马特这样的人,他们说:嘿。
So there were a number of folks like Matt that was like, hey.
所以有个有趣的故事。
And so a funny story.
当我第一次为EyeVerify筹集资金,进行首轮预种子轮融资时,我用了标准的演示文稿,在财务页面上留了空白。
When I first raised money, my first kind of a pre seed round for EyeVerify, I had, you know, the standard deck and on my financials page, had a blank.
我懂财务。
I know financials.
因为说实话,我不知道它会是什么样子,这毕竟是预种子轮。
Because like, I don't know what it's going to be like, this is a pre seed.
我不知道它会属于医疗健康领域。
This is I don't know whether it's going to be healthcare.
它可能是企业级市场,也可能是金融服务领域。
It could be enterprise, it could be financial services.
我们还太早,无法确定。
And we're too early to know.
对吧?
Right?
所以你说得对,这是一场关于愿景和痛点的押注。
And so you're right, it's a bet on vision and pain point.
对吧?
Right?
所以,如果你相信智能手机上的密码是个痛点,而生物识别技术能够解决这个问题,那么这就是一个不错的投资。
So if you believe that passwords on smartphones are Pain and something like biometrics is going to solve that problem, then this is a good bet.
但我并不清楚具体的商业模式。
But I don't know the exact business model.
不确定它是SaaS模式。
Don't if it's a SaaS model.
我不知道它是不是授权模式。
I don't know if it's a licensing model.
因此,有不少人说,我觉得这很酷,但我没搞懂它的商业模式。
And so there was a bunch of folks that just said, hey, I think it's cool, but I don't get the business model.
我现在选择放弃。
I'm going to pass right now.
我完全理解,对吧?
And I totally get it, right?
所以并不是这样,你知道的,就连对马特,我也完全理解他的立场。
So it wasn't, you know, so even like with Matt, like I totally understood where he came, he was coming from.
所以我得找到一些足够相信我的人,让我能进入下一阶段,开始取得一些进展。
So I had to get people that would believe in me enough that would get me to the next stage where I could start getting some traction.
于是我很快学会了,这一点在早期阶段尤其明显,也许是个很好的例子:你越早期,就越需要有人愿意稍微相信一下你的梦想。
And so I quickly learned, again, early and that's maybe a great example, The earlier stage you are, you've got to get people that are going to a little bit believe in the dream.
他们在押注
They're betting
在我身上。
on you.
是的,他们在很大程度上押注在我身上。
Yeah, they're betting on me to a large degree.
他们确实如此。
They are.
因此他们必须了解我。
And therefore they have to get to know me.
我们得花点时间在一起。
We got to spend some time together.
你知道,我很幸运,之前我的公司已经取得过一次成功。
You know, I was fortunate that I'd already had one win with my previous company.
所以很多老投资者都见证过我某种程度上的成功。
So a lot of my old investors had seen me kind of, you know, be successful.
而且,2009年的时候,正值金融危机,对吧?
And again, in 2009, that was the financial crisis, right?
2008年的时候,世界彻底崩盘了,一切都乱了套。
So 2008 was when the world fell off its wheels, when the wheels came off.
所以我们卖掉了公司,我记得是2009年5月或6月,把钱返还给了投资者。
And so we sold, I think May or June 2009, returning money back to investors in 2009.
我的投资者们非常支持我。
My investors loved me.
因此,我确实从这段经历中获得了不少助力。
And so I definitely had some wind in my sails from that.
但第一轮融资非常艰难。
But it was hard the first round.
即使是第二轮,我们的进展也远没有达到我预期的程度。
And even the second round, we did not have nearly the traction that I wanted to have.
让我极度自信的是,我们交谈过的每一个客户都说,这确实是个问题。
What gave me just extreme confidence of not a single customer we talked to said, this wasn't a problem.
每个人都说,我们讨厌密码。
Everybody said we hate passwords.
我们想在手机上操作。
We wanna do on mobile.
我们知道未来会在手机上做更多事情。
We know we're gonna do a lot more stuff on mobile.
如果你能解决这个问题,我们一定会使用它。
And if you could figure this out, we would love to use it.
但他们并没有直接明了地说:‘你现在的用户体验太差了。’
But they didn't quite say this bluntly, today, your user experience sucks.
确实如此。
And it did.
太糟糕了。
It was terrible.
但同样,我们知道这是一个值得解决的问题,并且知道我们有机会以一种非常独特的方式解决它,这正是让我们能够完成第二轮融资的原因。
But again, we knew we had a problem that was worth solving, and we knew we had a chance to to solve it in a really unique way, which is what allowed us to raise the second round.
实际上,前种子轮和种子轮都非常艰难。
It's really the first the pre seed and the seed round were both really hard.
之后情况稍微好了一些,开始获得更多的用户增长,我们也逐渐积累了一些势头。
We got a little bit easier after that, started to get little more traction, we started to get some more momentum.
头两年超级艰难。
Those first two years were super hard.
我认为这正好引出了另一个常见的创业错误:不了解自己的盈利路径。
I think that's a perfect layup for another common startup mistake is not understanding your path to revenue.
而且,我经常和人们谈论这一点。
And, I mean, that's something that I talk to people a lot.
顺便说一下,我想告诉你,我非常尊重你拿出一份财务数据为空的融资演示文稿的做法。
By the way, I wanna tell you, I completely respect the fact that you threw out a pitch deck with blank financials.
我真的感谢你,感谢你这么做,因为这背后附带了一个解释,比如:‘嘿,我在努力搞清楚这件事。’
Like, I thank you, Like, thank you for, I mean, on behalf of everyone that because it but it came with an explanation like, Hey, look, I'm trying to figure this out.
对很多人来说,这听起来像是:‘你为什么要这么做?’
And I think to many people that sounds like, Oh, why would you ever do that?
这是因为但凡见过足够多初创公司路演的人,都知道预测数据等于错误。
It's because anybody that's seen enough startup pitches knows that projections equal wrong.
每当我听到‘预测’这个词,我就直接想到‘错误’。
Like when I hear the word projection, I just think wrong.
因为实际情况肯定会变,事情总是在变化。
It's because it's gonna be, and things change.
但你必须对一件事有一定理解:多久才能拿到一笔不是来自投资人的真金白银?
But one thing that you have to have some kind of understanding of is how long is it gonna take to put a dollar in the bank that isn't an investor dollar?
我知道我经常遇到一些早期公司,他们说:‘我们再过六个月就能占据10%的市场份额’,还说什么总潜在市场有三千万人之类的。
And I think that I run, well, I don't think, I know I run into a whole lot of early stage companies that, you know, they're well in six months, we'll have 10% of market share and they're like total addressable markets, like 30,000,000 people and, you know, stuff like that.
就像你提到的,第六个月时,如果你的用户体验还没彻底崩盘,或者你至少有了一个最小可行产品,或者事情开始有进展、能正常运行,那就算幸运了。
And like you mentioned, like, I mean, in month six, you're lucky if your user experience isn't a complete train wreck, or if you even have an MVP or if things learn or things even work.
我现在想从Watson说起,因为对于Stackify来说,你们有没有惊讶于拿到第一笔收入花了这么长时间?
You know, I'll actually start with Watson at this point, because, know, with Stackify, were you surprised at how long it took to get a dollar in the bank?
是的,绝对如此。
Yeah, absolutely.
我们花了好几年时间。
It took us a couple years.
最初的想法在过程中发生了转变,而且至今仍在不断调整。
And, you know, the original idea, you know, kind of pivoted along the way and continues to to maneuver around a little bit.
这比看起来难得多。
And it's way harder than it seems.
我的意思是,至少我们有一个更清晰的路径。
Mean, at least we I mean, we had a more clear path.
好吧,我们知道我们要做什么。
Like, okay, we know what we're we're gonna do.
确实有人在做这样的事情,而且人们愿意为此付费。
And there are people that do things like this, and people will pay for this.
但没错,这比看起来难多了。
But, yeah, it's way harder than it seems.
我的意思是,这条路上很多人最终都失败了。
I I mean, that's a that's a path that many die on.
你知道吗,托比,你对这个怎么看?
And you know, Toby, what's your take on that?
就是通往收入的路径吗?
Just kind of the path to revenue?
我的意思是,甚至是那些错误。
I mean, or even the mistakes.
因为就像我说的,嘿,我们六个月就能占据巨大的市场份额。
Because like I said, like, hey, we'll have this huge market share in six months.
但六个月后,人们根本不会知道你是谁。
I'm like in six months, people aren't gonna know who you are.
所以这是最有趣的一个。
So here's the really, really funny one.
我以前真的很糟糕。
I I used to be so terrible.
我会构建这些非常复杂的模型和大型电子表格,所有东西都连在一起,你在这里增加一个人力,它就会自动增加所有相关部分。
I'd build these really sophisticated models and these big spreadsheets and everything tied in and you could add a headcount here and it would add everything.
我的意思是,这真的非常——你知道的——非常复杂。
I mean, it was really, you know, really sophisticated.
我记得卡斯珀曾提到过我最初的投资者、董事会成员和导师。
I remember like Casper was remembering about one of my initial investors, board members and mentors.
你知道,他会看一眼,然后说,托比,我并不怀疑你电子表格里的计算。
You know, he'd look at it and he's like, Toby, I don't doubt the math in your spreadsheet.
我怀疑的是你的假设。
I doubt the assumptions.
因为我从未听说过有创业者来找我,说他们在预测时过于激进或乐观。
Because I've never yet heard an entrepreneur come to me and tell me they're being overly aggressive and optimistic on their forecast.
每个人都很保守。
Everybody is conservative.
每个人都是。
Everybody.
而且每个人都错了。
And everybody's wrong.
对吧?
Right?
所以我只能不断尝试,你也得坚持尝试、持续迭代,我记得当时感觉特别尴尬。
And so I just gotta try and you gotta keep trying and keep iterating and I just remember feeling pretty sheepish.
现在每次我看到创业者展示他们的商业计划书和财务数据时,都会笑出来。
And now I laugh every time because every time I see an entrepreneur pitch their pitch deck, their financials.
这是我们非常保守的模型。
So this is our very conservative model.
我心里想:当然了,因为从来没人会拿出一个乐观或激进的模型来演示。
I'm like, sure it is because no one ever pitches an optimistic or aggressive model.
我觉得你得去尝试。
I think you gotta try.
在你还不确定之前,你必须去尝试,必须进去闯一闯。
Until you don't know, you gotta try, you gotta get in there.
我们最初以为企业市场会率先行动,觉得那是最大的痛点,也是最容易切入的市场路径。
You know, we initially thought enterprise would move first, but we thought that was the biggest pain point, easiest path to market.
但进展实在太慢了。
And it was just super slow.
市场规模不够大。
The numbers weren't big enough.
我们开始有点担心了,天啊,底特律的医疗健康领域,我们稍微涉足了一下医疗行业,这可是监管极其严格、市场进入难度很高的领域,而且还有很多既得利益者,他们不愿意共享资源,也不愿意好好合作。
You know, we're starting to get concerned of like dang, okay, Detroit healthcare, we pushed a little bit into healthcare, crazy regulated, hard path to market, a lot of entrenched players who don't like to share and don't like to play nice.
然后苹果推出了触控ID和Apple Pay,整个世界对我们敞开了大门,而我们之前已经做了一些银行和金融服务方面的工作。
And then Apple came out with Touch ID and Apple Pay, And that entire world opened up to us and we've doing already done some work in banking and financial services.
所以一切都立刻变得清晰了。
So it immediately became clear.
所以我们很快关闭了医疗和企业业务,说:好吧,所有赌注都押在这里了。
So we shut down healthcare and enterprise in very short order and say, okay, all our eggs, here we go.
我记得和我的投资者们谈过,我记得那些都是我的董事会成员。
I remember having the conversations with my investors, I remember those are my board.
我认识的一些人说,我们认为这不是企业市场。
I've had guys, we don't think it's enterprise.
我们认为这不是医疗市场。
We don't think it's healthcare.
我们知道我们在那个领域已经做了很多工作。
We know we've done a lot of work in that space.
我们认为应该止损,彻底关闭那部分业务,把所有资源都投入到金融服务和支付领域。
We think we got to cut our losses, shut everything down there and pour everything into the financial services and payments.
我记得有一位董事会成员问:我明白,但你意识到你把所有鸡蛋都放在这个篮子里了吗?
And I remember one of the board members asked like, I get it, but you realize you're putting all your eggs in this basket.
如果你错了,可能就没有下一次机会了。
If you're wrong, there's probably not another iteration on this.
是的,我明白。
And like, yep, I understand.
这正是我想说的。
And that's exactly what I'm saying.
我们确实这么做了,付出极大努力,也有一点运气。
And we did and we got a little bit lucky and worked our tail off.
但当然,你必须去尝试,保持开放心态接受可能犯错,多交流,并根据反馈的数据来调整。
But yeah, you just gotta try and and and be open to being wrong and have conversations and kind of look at the data as it comes back.
所以当你说到为公司关停时,是指重新分配业务拓展和销售资源吗?
So when when you say shut it down for your company, did that mean redirecting like biz dev and sales efforts?
还是指改变工程团队的投入方向?
Or did that mean like changing engineering effort?
对你来说,这具体意味着什么?
Or what did that mean for you?
我只是有点好奇。
I'm just kinda curious.
是的,很好。
Yeah, great.
业务拓展和销售。
Biz dev and sales.
核心产品在各个领域都适用。
Core product works across the board.
有一些集成方式不同,但你知道的,95%的核心产品始终是一样的,只是它如何集成到不同人的平台中有所变化。
There's some integrations that were different, but, you know, 95% of the core product was always the same, kind of how it got integrated into different people's platform changed.
但你知道,无论是在医疗、金融服务还是企业领域,它本质上都是将你的眼睛图像转化为替代密码的密钥。
But, you know, whether it was healthcare or financial services or enterprise, it was always basically transforming a picture of your eye into a key to replace passwords.
所以我想稍微回退一下,谈谈融资的部分,因为马特,我还没来得及问你,我想问你一个问题:在融资过程中,你犯过什么错误?
So I want to backpedal for a second to the raising capital part because Matt, I didn't get to ask, I wanted to ask you the question, what's a mistake that you've made that you look back at when it came to raising capital?
比如,你有没有在哪些方面疏忽了,或者有所改进,或者一路上有什么经验?
Like what's something that you might you either dropped the ball on or got better at or anything along the way?
我跟你说,对我来说,就是以为融资不会花太长时间。
And and I'll tell you, for me, it was thinking that it wouldn't take a long time.
我觉得,光是觉得自己能做成这件事就已经很难了。
I would say just thinking you can even do it.
就像认为每个人都能尝试去申请和投资吗?
Like just gen like that everyone can try to check and invest?
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是,这件事花费的时间比你想象的长十倍,难度也高十倍,这是一份全职工作,你每天都有想跳楼的冲动。
The I mean, the it's it takes ten times longer than you think it's gonna take, and it's 10 times harder, and it's a full time job, and you wanna jump off a cliff most days.
我的意思是
I mean
我觉得这很公平。
I think that's fair.
除非你有一个公司正以惊人的速度增长,人人都想投资你,但这种情况大概百万分之一。
Unless you have this company that is growing at some astronomical pace that everybody is beating down your door, which is like one in 100 or one in 1,000.
对吧?
Right?
其余时间,你知道,你只是在经营某种普通生意,然后你拼命地到处奔走,戴着帽子乞求风投把钱投给你。
The rest of the time, you know, you've just got some kind of normal business and whatever, and you're, like, desperately running around with your hat out, and you're trying to get VCs to throw money in it.
而他们,不。
And they and no.
这根本行不通。
It just doesn't work.
你够大。
It you're big.
你太小了。
You're too small.
你所在的行业不对。
You're the wrong industry.
你是这个。
You're this.
你是那个。
You're that.
我的意思是,有一千个理由。
I mean, there's a thousand reasons.
他们都拒绝。
They all say no.
你得跟上千个人谈,才能找到一个说好的。
And you got to talk to, like, a thousand of them until you find one that says yes.
然后新冠疫情来了,他们还是说不。
And then coronavirus happens, and then they say no.
这就是它的运作方式。
That's the way it works.
他们要么拒绝,要么修改投资条款。
They say no or they change the term sheet.
是的。
Yeah.
对,你提到花费的时间。
Yeah, you talk about the amount of time.
我的意思是,这可能是我在和早期阶段的任何人交谈时最常遇到的问题之一。
I mean, that's probably one of the most common things I run into when talking to early stage anybody.
他们谈论着,你知道的,我看着他们说,你们的现金流只够撑六周了。
They're talking about how, you know, I'm looking at them and say, You guys have like six weeks of runway.
是的,但我们正在寻找投资者。
Yeah, but we're looking for investors.
这会没问题的。
That's gonna be okay.
我心想,你们可麻烦大了。
I'm like, You guys are in huge trouble.
我的意思是,你们有和任何人谈过吗?
Like, you know, have you talked to anyone?
你们在兑现支票吗?
Are you cashing a check?
所以,我们刚刚开始做融资路演。
So, you know, we just started giving out pitches.
我们认为进展会很顺利。
We think it'll go pretty well.
我心想:天哪。
I'm like, Oh man.
为了确认这一点,托比,你觉得从一个不认识你的真正天使投资人、真正的风投、基金或补助机构那里拿到钱,通常需要多长时间?
So, and just to verify that, Toby, how long do you think or how long does it typically take to get money from an investor that isn't someone that already knows you, that's a true angel, that's like, sure, I'll put in because I believe in you, an actual VC or a fund or a grant or any of that.
是的,我认为平均需要六到九个月。
Yeah, I'd say probably average would be six to nine months.
如果你运气好,三到四个月就能搞定。
You're lucky, could do it in three or four.
我见过花了一年时间的。
I've seen it take a year.
影响因素真的太多了。
It really so many variables.
对吧?
Right?
有多容易理解?
How how easy is it to understand?
这又是我学到的另一件事。
This is also like here's another thing that I learned.
他们喜欢找模式。
They like to pattern match.
对吧?
Right?
所以,当你去见风投时,如果能说明他们过去投资了哪些项目,以及你觉得你在哪个不同行业里和他们投资过的公司比较相似。
And so if you can say, so going into the VC, knowing what investments they've made and who do you think you kind of look like, but in a different industry.
这样能帮助他们快速判断,避免浪费你和他们的时间,看看这是否是个合适的项目,对吧?
So that really helps them quickly assess and not waste your time or theirs, is this a good fit, Right?
另外,如果你觉得自己和他们投资的某些其他公司有相似之处,他们已经投资了那些公司。
And what also helps there, if you feel like you pattern match with some of their other portfolio companies, they've already invested in those portfolio companies.
所以本质上,你是在说:我们看起来就像这些公司,你们已经投资过它们了,而这里是我们为什么仍然合理的原因。
So essentially, you're making the case, hey, we look like these, you've already made investments in these, and here's why we still make sense.
不过有个注意事项,我以前这么做过,而那个被投公司实际上是风投基金里的‘累赘’。
A caveat though, I've done that before and that particular portfolio company was like the dog in the VC fund.
后来我才意识到,哦,等等,可能我不该举这个例子。
I found out later like, oh, wait, probably should not have made that example.
是的。
Yes.
我们就像那匹每次比赛都垫底的马。
We're a lot like this horse that finishes last in the race every time.
但如果你非要打个比方,那就是最贴切的了。
But if you wanna make a comparison, that's the one.
我觉得这很有趣。
I think that's interesting.
还有,同样地,我看到很多人去追逐那些从不投资于他们特定领域或行业的公司。
Know, another thing too, is in that same boat, I see a lot of people chasing investment from companies that never make investments in their particular focus or industry.
而且,我觉得你可以把这种申请模式再精简一点。
And, you know, I think that you can narrow that application pattern down a little bit.
比如,如果有一家公司只投资软件,而你是家服务公司,我们在Full Scale就学到过这一点,你知道的,比如,我们很喜欢这家公司,但我们不会向服务公司投资,诸如此类。
And like, if there's a company that only invests in software and you're a service company, So we learned some of that at Full Scale, you know, like, hey, love the company, but we don't write checks to service companies, you know, or something like that.
所以,我的意思是,你只需要做一些基本的假设,根本不需要数据科学,大家只需要一些常识就行。
So, I mean, you can, through a little bit of just general assumption, you don't need data science to do this people, just some general assumption.
不知道,去找那些看起来支持你业务的人吧。
Don't know, aim for the people that seem to be supporting what you do.
马特,你有什么评论吗?
Did you have a comment, Matt?
嗯,时不时会有人来找我,想让我投资房地产。
Well, I was gonna say people come to me every once in while and they want me to invest in real estate.
我会说,我对房地产一窍不通啊?
And I'm like, what the fuck do I know about real estate?
我不会投资房地产。
I'm not investing in real estate.
我的意思是,这属于一部分
Mean, that's part
是同样的事情。
of it the same thing.
情况都一样。
It goes the same way.
比如,你投资你懂的东西,对吧?
Like, you invest in what you know, right?
你得找到合适的投资者。
You gotta find the right investors.
要寻找那些能为你带来重大影响的投资者。
Well, look for investors that are able to move the needle for you.
对。
Right.
你知道,即使在Full Scale,就像Toby一样,我们也做过一些本地项目。
You know, and that's, I mean, we've even at Full Scale, and you know, Full Scale is much like Toby, we've done some local stuff here.
我们面前有过很多很棒的创始人,他们的项目非常值得投资。
And I've had great founders in front of us that had stuff that was very much investment worthy.
我曾经说过,我真的什么都不懂。
And I've said like, I just don't know anything.
我知道沃森对这个行业一无所知。
I know Watson doesn't know anything about this industry.
我的意思是,医疗保健就是其中之一。
I mean, well, healthcare is one of them.
这根本不是我们俩有太多经验去寻找解决方案的领域。
Like that's just not something that either of us have had a lot of experience finding solutions around.
我一年甚至不去看一次医生,只有当他们打电话威胁我如果不来就怎么样时我才去,你知道的,这根本不是我们的专长。
I don't even go to the I go to the doctor once a year and that's because they call and threaten me if I don't come in, you know, and it's just not our wheelhouse.
托比,你觉得找那些真正有智慧的投资者来对齐方向怎么样?
Toby, how do you feel about getting aligned with investors that have the like that true smart money investor?
是的。
Yeah.
我觉得最终你得到的是,你知道,在投资界我逐渐深刻理解的一个术语叫逆向选择。
Think it's what you end up with is, you know, there's a phrase that I've also come to to really appreciate in the investment world is called adverse selection.
对吧?
Right?
所以真正聪明的资金往往能获得非常好的项目渠道,因为人们知道他们是谁以及他们想要什么。
And so really smart money tends to get really good deal flow because people know who they are and what they want.
当你遇到那些只是提供资金的人——称之为傻钱时,他们通常投资的是那些无法吸引聪明资金的公司。
When you get people who are just money, call it dumb money, they tend to be the companies that haven't been able to get smart money.
对吧?
Right?
因此,这就会导致逆向选择。
And so you get adverse selection with that.
你知道的?
You know?
所以当人们来找我,或者当我总是鼓励他人时,我总会认真思考:这些人真正聪明的地方在哪里?
So when, you know, people approach me or when I've always pushed others, I've always really tried to think of, okay, where are these guys smart?
我该如何表达,真正清晰地说明他们的价值——那种不是金钱带来的价值——对我而言意味着什么?对吧?
And how do I say and really articulate where their, you know, value add, that's not money makes a difference for me, Right?
因为他们想知道自己的优势在哪里,他们能带来什么价值,是人脉、行业经验、技术,你知道的,有很多不同的方面,但关键是理解逆向选择从何而来,以及大量的交易机会。
Because they want to know where they're smart, how they add value, is it relationships, is it experience in a domain, is it the technology, you know, there's a lot of different areas, but kind of understanding where adverse selection comes in, and a lot of deal flow.
很多时候,如果你遇到的人对你所在的领域一无所知、毫无联系,那你接触到的就是逆向的交易机会,赶紧跳过,继续前进。
A lot of times, if you get people who have no idea, have no connectivity to your area, you're getting adverse deal flow and pass quickly, move on.
我觉得这些建议相当不错。
I I think that that's some pretty good advice there.
那么,你认为那些处于逆向选择阶段的早期公司,是因为拿不到聪明钱,还是仅仅因为它们根本不懂其中的区别?
Now, do you think that some of those early stage companies that are in that adverse selection area, do you think it's because they can't get smart money, or it's just because do you think they just don't know the difference?
这是一个混合情况。
It is a mix.
有时候,他们根本分不清区别。
You know, sometimes they don't know the difference.
这就是我们面临的问题之一,尤其是在旧金山、奥斯汀、纽约这些非高度集中的城市里,资源集中度这么高,获取反馈和指导相对容易,比如谁在融资、你处于什么位置、如何做路演。
And that's, you know, one of the issues that we have and when in these non, you know, heavily concentrated cities like San Francisco or Austin, New York, there's so much concentration is so, let's say it's easy, it's easier to get feedback and guidance on who's raising, where do you fit, how to make the pitch.
所以他们更容易获得这类反馈。
So they just it's easier to get that kind of feedback.
像堪萨斯城或美国中西部许多地区、较小的市场,密度不够,所以你们通过Startup Hustle所做的工作,以及Startland和其他人努力传播信息、为人们提供提问场所的做法,至关重要。
And places like Kansas City or a lot of the Midwest or the smaller markets, the density isn't there, you know, so some of the stuff that you guys are doing with Startup Hustle, you know, a lot of the stuff that folks are doing with Startland and others of getting the word out, giving people a place to come to ask questions is super important.
有时候他们真的不知道。
Sometimes they don't know.
有时候初创公司根本不该获得融资,对吧?
And sometimes startups shouldn't be funded, right?
并不是每个初创公司都是好点子。
Not every startup is a great idea.
每个提出想法的CEO,也许这个想法还不错,但他们根本不是优秀的创始人,就不该获得融资,对吧?
Every CEO that comes up with an idea, is maybe it's a decent idea, is just not a good founder and they shouldn't be funded, right?
所以我觉得,有时候我们误以为只要你是CEO、有个初创公司,就理应获得融资,但答案是否定的,其实并不然。
So I think sometimes we think if you're a CEO and you've got a startup, you deserve to be funded and the answer is no, not really.
你可能值得,但并不是每个项目、每个CEO都该获得融资。
You might be, but every deal and every CEO that comes along shouldn't be.
因此,我认为建立这样的生态系统,让有人积极现身、为人们提供接入点,是至关重要的。
And so I think having this kind of, you know, ecosystem and people trying to be visible and giving people touch points to get plugged in is super important.
所以,如果你确实具备正确的性格、坚韧不拔的精神和足够的毅力,并且有一个不错的点子,那你就能获得资金支持,有机会站上舞台。
So that at least if if, again, you do have that right personality, that right tenacity, that right grit, and you've got a decent idea, then you're gonna get fun and you get a chance to get up there.
因此,我们不希望人们因为错误的原因而失败。
So again, we don't want people to lose for the wrong reasons.
今天我们再次邀请到托比·拉什,他是我们堪萨斯城市场的投资者、企业家和意见领袖,也受到许多人的关注。
So with us today once again, Toby Rush, investor, entrepreneur, influencer here in our Kansas City market and to many people all around.
另外,托比,感谢你成为我们生态系统中如此重要的一员,也感谢你今天加入我们。
And by the way, Toby, thanks for being such an important part of our ecosystem and also for joining us today.
我知道我经常在各种活动和场合见到你。
I know that I've seen you around at a lot of different events and stuff like that.
我认为像你这样的人传递知识非常重要。
I think it's really important that people like yourself transfer knowledge.
也就是说,这是我们主要的使命之一。
Mean, that's one of our main mission statements.
在继续之前,今天的《Startup Hustle》节目由fullscale.io赞助,他们帮助你快速且经济地组建软件团队。
Now, before we move on, today's episode of Start Hustle is brought to you by fullscale.io helping you build software teams quickly and affordably.
Toby,我们会在《Startup Puzzle》每期节目的结尾进行一个叫做‘创始人自由发挥’的环节,这今天正好是个完美的过渡,因为我们已经谈到了经验教训。
Toby, we end episodes of Startup Puzzle with what we call the founders freestyle, which is a perfect segue for today, as we have talked about lessons learned.
总的来说,如果你必须分享一条作为初创企业创始人的经验,给未来的初创创始人,你最先想到的是什么?
Overall, if you had to share one lesson as a startup founder that you could give to future startup founders, what comes to mind first?
人际关系。
Relationships.
我的意思是,人际关系常常是公司成功或失败的原因。
I mean, relationships are often why companies succeed and why they fail.
这适用于你的联合创始人,适用于你的团队,适用于你的董事会,适用于你的投资者,甚至适用于你生活中真正享受的那些事情。
That goes for your founder, that goes for the team, that goes for your board, that goes for your investors, and just honestly, the things that you enjoy in life.
因此,我们生命中最珍视的财富就是人际关系,今天如此,明天如此,直到我们生命的尽头也是如此。
So the treasure that we care most about in life are relationships and that's true today, it'll be true tomorrow, and it'll be true at the end of our life.
有时候我们会感到困惑,甚至误入歧途,以为金钱才是目标,才是我们真正追求的东西。
And sometimes we get confused and I would say misdirected in thinking that money is the goal and money is the thing that we'll love.
但真正重要的是人和人际关系。
But it's really about people and relationships.
在创业过程中,永远不要牺牲或妥协人际关系,这会对你大有裨益。
And to never sacrifice or compromise people relationships on the journey and that will that will serve you well.
马特,你呢?
Matt, how about you?
是的,我也想呼应托比刚才提到的观点。
Yeah, to echo what Toby mentioned there too.
托比,你提到很多早期投资者都是你有关系的人。
I think, Toby, you mentioned that a lot of your early investors were people you had relationships with.
Stackify 的许多投资者也是我认识的人。
And a lot of the people that were investors in Stackify were people I had relationships with.
但我也想说,一个关键的建议是倾听并向周围的人、导师和社区成员提问。
But also, I want to say, I think a key advice is listening and asking questions from those around you, from mentors, people in the community.
这个周末,有人在 StartupKC 上分享了一个商业点子。
Like there was somebody on StartupKC posted this weekend about some business idea.
我一看就想到,这个商业点子我至少见过二十次了,而且每次都失败了。
And immediately, I'm like, seen this business idea about 20 more times, and it's failed all 20 of them.
所以我实际上联系了那个人,跟他说:我不明白你到底想做什么。
So I actually reached out to the guy and I'm like, I don't know what you're trying to do.
但你需要去跟那个人谈谈。
But you need to talk to that guy.
因为我知道这个方向会走向哪里,但它是行不通的。
Because I see where this is going, and it's not gonna work.
但之前我们作为创始人也讨论过这一点,你知道,我们往往孤注一掷,无所畏惧,诸如此类。
But we talked about this a little bit before as a founder, you know, we tend to bet the farm and be fearless and all those things.
但我们也必须倾听他人、倾听导师的意见,我认为这极其关键。
But we also have to listen to others listen to mentors, and that I think that's super critical.
但这很难。
But it's hard.
所以
So
我呢,马特,我想接着你刚才说的继续讲。
I, you know, I'm gonna parlay off of that, Matt.
在结束之前,我再提一下,今天的节目《Start Up》由Full Scale赞助。
And you know, before I go, once again, today's episode, Start Up Also brought to you by Full Scale.
所以,在你跳进去之前,你得先看看悬崖下面是什么,稍微了解一下你要面对的情况。
So yeah, I think it before you jump in, you got to look over the cliff and see what you're jumping into a little bit.
是的,我在Gigabook上就这么做过,我们推出了Gigabook,但很快发现竞争比我们最初想象的要激烈得多。
Yeah, I've kind of did this with Gigabook and you know, we launched Gigabook and quickly realized the competition was a lot deeper than we had originally thought.
而且,你会听到一些说法,比如‘兔子洞’。
And, you know, you hear phrases and things like the rabbit hole.
一旦你深入下去,就会像打扑克时已经投入太多筹码一样,发现自己陷入了一些棘手的困境,比如:我该不该就此退出?
And once you get far enough down it, you kind of mean similar to poker and being pot committed, you know, you find yourself in some having some interesting dilemmas, like, do I walk away from this?
我的一些尝试和失败经历表明,如果早点放弃,我反而会赚得更多,因为省钱就是赚钱。
And I mean, there's things that I've tried and failed at that it would have been a lot more profitable for me to quit earlier because saving money is making money.
我认为,对我而言,最重要的教训就是,通往收入的路途充满危险,要重新回到正轨并不容易。
I think, and for me, the overall thing is, I think the one lesson I've learned is just that that path to revenue and getting back to that and understand that it's a treacherous road.
你知道,对于服务公司、特许经营之类的企业,实现收入的路径可能要短得多,因为你能快速提供服务;而软件则不然。
You know, but a service company or a franchise or something like that, your path to revenue can be a lot shorter because you can provide services quickly with something like software.
而且你知道,当我们谈论从零开始开发软件时,我能感受到今天所有嘉宾和主持人正在掉头发,因为你真的完全没底。
And, you know, I can feel all of today's guests and hosts losing hair when we talk about building software from the beginning, because you really just don't know.
所以这就是为什么,当我们与Full Scale的潜在客户交谈时,我们会告诉他们:他们问,这要花多少钱?要多久才能完成?
And that's why, you know, when we talk to potential clients at Full Scale, we tell them, I'm like, they say, Well, how much is it gonna cost and how long will it take?
完全没概念。
No clue.
这完全取决于你。
That depends so much on you.
这不在预测范围内。
It's not in the forecast.
是的,确实没法确定,没错。
Yeah, can't, yeah, right.
我应该直接给他看,我就拿个托比的照片给他,我会说:这家伙告诉我这得花多长时间。
I should just give it, that's, I'm gonna take the Toby, I'm gonna just give him a picture of Toby a I'm blank gonna be like, this dude told me this is how long it would take.
但我认为这很关键。
But I think that's key.
我认为,不管你多么成功、多么有动力、多么充满热情,你都会遇到大量问题。
And I think that if you think that despite how successful you've been, how driven you are, how passionate, you're gonna run into a hell of a lot of problems.
如果你没有意识到这一点,人们应对这些问题的方式会各不相同。
And if you aren't, people handle those differently.
我们经常引用迈克·泰森的话:每个人都有计划,直到他们被一拳打在脸上。
We quote Mike Tyson a lot by saying everyone had a plan until they got punched in the face.
那么,你打算怎么应对这种情况呢?
So how are you gonna figure that out?
而且,你知道,你打算怎么度过这一关?
And, you know, like, how are you gonna get through that?
我的意思是,如果你花点时间观察一下,就会发现像托比、马特或者我自己这样的人,都非常愿意回答问题,因为当初也有人这样帮助过我们。
I mean, I think if you take some time and look around, there's people like Toby or Matt or myself that are probably very willing to answer questions because someone did that for us.
所以,环顾四周,看看你能找到谁。
So look around and see who you could find.
我知道第一个对我影响特别大的导师是拉雷尔·霍尔特,他曾经是我们的嘉宾,大概是第15位左右的嘉宾吧。
I know one of the first people that was a mentor to me that really stood out was Larel Holt, who's been a guest on, now he was what, maybe like guest 15 or something like that.
但他也出现在我的书《平衡自我》中。
But he was also in my book, Balance Me.
现在坐下来和Larel交谈,感觉就像见到了尤达,你知道吗?他提供的信息和建议如此深刻,需要时间去消化,有点像你得一层层剥开它的内涵。
Now sitting down with Larel feels like you just visited Yoda, you know, like you almost to the point that some of the info and input so deep, it takes time to, it's kind of like, you gotta peel back the layers of it.
当Liral登上《创业奋斗》节目后离开时,我看着Matt,Matt说:‘我想长大后成为像Liral这样的人。’
When Liral was on Startup Hustle, he left and I looked at Matt and Matt's like, I think I wanna be like Liral when I grow up.
你点了点头,我猜你见过Liral,Toby。
And you nodded your head, I'm assuming you've met Liral, Toby.
我见过,是的。
I have, yeah.
L'Errol很棒。
L'Errol's great.
我的第一家创业公司,是的,他太棒了。
My first company, yeah, he's awesome.
是的,你只需要找到这样的人,他会如实告诉你真相。
Yeah, so you just find, but he's someone that'll tell you what's up.
就像你所说的,去听一听。
And like you said, listen to it.
所以我们通常不会这么做,但这次我要把话筒再传一圈,因为我们聊到了一些不同的内容。
So now normally we don't do this, but I'm gonna pass the mic back around because we got into some different stuff here.
你们对早期阶段的成功或失败有什么总结性看法吗?
Do you guys have any closing arguments about about success or failure in the early stages?
没有?
No?
我想说的是,这其实是一个迭代的过程,你知道,公司在成功或失败,并不等于你个人的成功或失败,这让你能够真正地畅想更大的目标。
Oh, the only thing I'd say is, again, it's iterative, you know, success or failure at your company is not success or failure of you as a person, which allows you to actually dream a lot bigger.
你会不断猜测,你知道,当一件事失败时,如果它不代表你是个失败者,你就能梦想得更远。
You guess a lot, you know, you can dream so much bigger when if that thing happens to fail, it doesn't mean you're a failure.
所以,别把身份和结果混为一谈,大胆去闯。
So, yeah, separate that identity and go big.
是的。
Yeah.
我的沃森,还有别的吗?
My Watson, anything else?
是的。
Yeah.
我唯一想说的是,稍微跟进一下。
My my only thing there is just to follow a little bit.
你必须追踪资金流向,而不要过于死板地坚持某个所谓的北极星目标,比如‘我就是要做X、Y和Z’,但那根本行不通;相反,你应该发现可以做出微小的方向调整,从而取得成功。
You have to follow the money and not get too overly rigid on following some north star of like, no, I wanna do x, y, and z, but that's literally never gonna work, where you figure out you can make a slight change in direction and be successful.
有些人失败了,只是因为他们不愿意做出这种小小的调整。
And some people fail because they just fail to be willing to make that small change.
是的,这种方向的调整正是这一点的关键。
Yeah, and that's something that's important to that that change in direction.
我引用沃森的话:也许你离伟大只差一次转型。
I quote Watson, maybe you're just one pivot away from greatness.
好了,说到这儿,今天我听到了太多宝贵的建议, guys,我得回去工作了。
So now with that, man, I got so much great advice today, guys, I gotta get I gotta get back to work.
那我下次再和你联系。
So I'll catch up with you next time.
太棒了。
Awesome.
谢谢大家邀请我参加。
Thanks, guys, for having me on.
Startup Puzzles 由 fullscale.io 赞助,帮助您快速且经济地组建软件团队。
Startup Puzzles brought to you by fullscale.io, helping you build a software team quickly and affordably.
别忘了点击订阅按钮,然后去 Instagram 找我们。
Make sure you reach down and hit that subscribe button, then come find us on Instagram.
下次见。
See you next time.
关于 Bayt 播客
Bayt 提供中文+原文双语音频和字幕,帮助你打破语言障碍,轻松听懂全球优质播客。