伊朗遇袭——为何选在此时？| 伊恩·布雷默

你好，TED Talks 每日听众。

Hello, TED Talks daily listeners.

我是TED的媒体与策展负责人海伦·沃尔特斯。

I'm TED's head of media and curation, Helen Walters.

今天，我们将为大家带来一场关于美国和以色列对伊朗袭击的特别对话。

And today, we're bringing you a special conversation on the attack on Iran by The United States and Israel.

我认为，伊朗在很短的时间内将不再具备直接威胁该地区其他政权的能力，这是有可能的。

I I think it is plausible that in very short order, Iran will no longer have direct capacity to threaten other regimes in the region.

但这与说伊朗将不再有能力镇压本国人民截然不同。

But that's very, very different from saying that Iran won't have the capacity to repress their people on the ground.

这一点，美国人目前并没有军事计划去应对。

That that is not something that the Americans right now have a military plan for.

我正在与欧亚集团和GZERO Media的创始人兼总裁伊恩·布雷默对话。

I'm talking to Ian Bremmer, the president and founder of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media.

我认为，特朗普如今在许多问题上完全没有兑现承诺，这正是他支持率持续流失的原因。

I do think that the fact that Trump now on a number of issues has absolutely not, followed through on promises are are why he is hemorrhaging support.

因此，他可能会变得更加愿意承担风险，这很可能在其他国际军事事件中显现出来。

And he's likely to become much more risk acceptant as a consequence of that, which may well play out in other military episodes internationally.

我们于2026年2月28日星期六为我们的系列节目《TED解读世界》录制了这段内容。

We recorded this for our series, TED explains the world, on Saturday, 02/28/2026.

大家好。

Hello, everyone.

今天是2026年2月28日，星期六。

Today is Saturday, 02/28/2026.

今天早上，在数周的威胁升级后，美国和以色列轰炸了伊朗多个地区，包括伊朗最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊在德黑兰的住所。

This morning, after weeks of escalating threats, The United States and Israel bombed several parts of Iran, including the supreme leader Ali Khamenei's compound in Tehran.

伊朗随即以导弹回应，向以色列以及四个驻有美军基地的海湾阿拉伯国家——巴林、科威特、卡塔尔和阿联酋——发射了导弹。

Iran responded in kind with missiles launched towards Israel and four Gulf Arab countries which host US military bases, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, The UAE.

目前局势发展迅速，形势异常脆弱，因此我们立即再次联系了欧亚集团创始人布雷默，帮助我们理解当前正在发生的事情以及未来可能的发展。

Now this is a fast moving situation which feels extraordinarily tenuous, so we obviously returned immediately to Eurasia Group's founder, Bremmer, to help us make sense of what is happening now and what is to come.

伊恩，你好。

Ian, hi.

海伦，像往常一样很高兴见到你。

Helen, good to see you as always.

伊恩，正如我所说，这些威胁已经累积了好几个星期。

Ian, as I mentioned, the threats have been stacking up for weeks now.

所以这次升级并不完全出人意料，但请告诉我们，为什么特朗普现在要这么做。

So this escalation isn't exactly a surprise, but tell us why Trump is doing this now.

嗯，有几个原因。

Well, there are a couple reasons.

首先，特朗普对自己充满信心，这得益于他在委内瑞拉的成功——他推翻了尼古拉斯·马杜罗，没有暗杀他，而是将其绳之以法，尽管在行动中有很多委内瑞拉人和古巴人丧生。

First, there is a level of confidence that Trump has, both on the back of his success in Venezuela, having removed Nicolas Maduro, not assassinated him, actually bringing him to justice, though a lot of Venezuelans and Cubans were killed in the operation.

没有美国人丧生。

No Americans were.

这一行动广受好评。

It's gone over well.

美国人觉得这很受欢迎。

The Americans find it popular.

大多数拉丁美洲国家对此表示支持。

Most of the Latin American countries find it popular.

他认为，这种做法也可以在其他地方推行。

And he's like, well, can do this in other places too.

所以这是其中一个原因。

So part of it is that.

另一个原因是，他之前有过对伊朗的军事经验。

Part of it is that he's had experience with Iran before, military experience.

在第一个任期内退出伊朗核协议（JCPOA）后，他曾多次警告伊朗。

After withdrawing from the Iranian nuclear deal, the JCPOA in his first term, he's put the Iranians on notice on a couple of occasions.

当他对伊朗发动军事打击时，伊朗要么没有能力，要么不愿意进行反击。

And when he is engaged in military strikes against Iran, the Iranians have not been able or willing to hit him back.

因此，他觉得伊朗并没有真正的威慑能力，所以并不认为自己冒了多大的风险。

And so he he doesn't feel like he there's a deterrent capability here, so he's not taking a particularly big risk.

最后，他确实进行过谈判，但他的要求远超伊朗愿意接受的范围。

Finally, he did engage in negotiations, but his demands were much greater than the Iranians were willing to engage.

事实上，这一点已经很明显好几个月了。

And that's been clear for months now, frankly.

但他确实希望确保该地区有足够的军事能力，既包括美国即将开展、我们现在已看到开端的打击行动，也包括美国保护以色列、自身基地以及该地区盟友的能力。

But he did want to ensure that there was adequate military capabilities in the region, both in terms of the strikes that the Americans were going to engage in that we're now seeing the beginning of, but also in terms of America's ability to help defend Israel and its own bases and its allies across the region.

这些措施的最后部分直到几天前才部署到位，随后，当美国和以色列获得对最高领袖和最高军事领导层的绝佳打击机会时，他们下达了命令。

The final components of that only got into place days ago, and then this was the first window of opportunity after that when the Americans and Israelis had a clean shot at the Supreme Leader and the top military leadership, and they gave the order.

所以，这就是引发这一切的原因。

So that's you know, what precipitated all of this.

还有一个更广泛的问题，那就是：我们如何看待美国在全球各地单方面行使军事力量，推行政权更迭政策，暗杀政治领导人？

There's a broader question about, you know, how do we feel about The United States exercising unilateral military power all over the world, engaging in a policy of regime change, assassinating political leaders.

这对美国的未来意味着什么？

What does that mean going forward for The US?

这对世界其他国家又意味着什么？

What does it mean for other countries around the world?

但就导致这一系列打击行动的原因而言，这确实丝毫没有让我们感到意外。

But in terms of what led to this series of strikes, this certainly did not surprise us.

我认为市场对此并不感到意外。

I don't think it was a big surprise to the markets.

军事打击的规模比普遍预期的要大，但任何认真关注此事的人都不认为谈判会取得突破，也不认为这会是特朗普临阵退缩的‘玉米卷时刻’。

The scale of the military strikes were greater than were generally anticipated, but nobody credible following this believed that the negotiations were heading for breakthrough, nor did they believe that this was a taco moment that Trump was going to chicken out.

他们确实觉得，我们也是这么认为的，他会兑现自己的威胁，以色列人也是这么想的，而且过去几个月来，双方一直就此事密切协调。

They they did feel, and we did feel, that he was going to make good as it were on his threats, as were the Israelis, and they've been coordinating on this very closely for a couple of months now.

所以，正如你所知，特朗普几分钟前在Truth Social上宣布哈梅内伊已死。

So as you know, Trump just announced a few minutes ago on Truth Social that Khamenei is dead.

那接下来会发生什么？

Is like, what happens now?

这感觉非同小可。

That feels huge.

我觉得这确实很重要。

I think it is a big deal.

而且，关于这件事，有几点值得说一说。

And I mean, there are a few things to say about it.

首先，让我们记住，这是一个极其残暴的政权，霍梅尼不仅亲自对政权的暴行负有责任，而且在过去几个月里一直坚持强硬立场，拒绝与美国进行有效谈判。

The first is that let us remember that this is an incredibly brutal regime and that Khamenei has not only been personally responsible for the brutality of the regime, but also has been a hardliner in terms of refusing effective negotiations with the Americans over the past months.

我的意思是，毫无疑问，成千上万的伊朗平民，甚至可能多达数万人，在一月份示威期间被霍梅尼下令杀害。

I mean, certainly many thousands of Iranian civilians and believed tens of thousands of Iranian civilians were killed under the order of Khamenei in January when they were demonstrating.

而其中大多数是手无寸铁的，对与他们对峙的军队并未构成直接的安全威胁。

And most of these were unarmed and not posing a direct security threat to the troops that they were facing off against.

坦率地说，我们在该地区其他地方从未见过如此短期的暴行。

And that is, frankly, we haven't seen that kind of short term brutality in the region anywhere.

你必须回溯到苏丹，或者卢旺达，才能找到类似的大规模屠杀。

You'd have to look to Sudan, you'd have to look to Rwanda before you saw that kind of killing.

你所谈论的是在几周内发生的死亡人数，这相当于加沙地带整整一年战斗造成的死亡总数。

You're talking about the sort of deaths over a course of a couple weeks that you saw in Gaza over an entire year of fighting.

因此，这种暴行确实非同寻常。

So that's really an extraordinary brutality.

因此，很少有人会为霍梅尼的死感到惋惜。

And as a consequence, there aren't a lot of people that are going to shed a tear over the death of Khamenei.

话虽如此，他并不代表整个政权。

Having said that, he is not the regime.

他已经86岁了。

He's 86 years old.

他们早就开始规划权力交接了。

They've been planning for transition for a long time.

他被杀的事实，无疑会让那些支持政权的伊朗国内民众将他视为烈士——这类支持者人数众多，至少占人口的15%到20%，而这次暗杀将进一步强化他们的忠诚。

The fact that he has been killed will make him seem to be more of a martyr in the eyes, certainly of those that support the regime inside Iran, of whom there are many, a minimum of probably 1520% of the population that are hardened regime supporters and will become more so on the back of this assassination.

伊朗军方在去年为期十二天的战争中遭受了重大打击，但他们迅速恢复了实力。

The Iranian military leadership has taken substantial strikes over the twelve day war last year, and they reconstituted themselves quite quickly.

这并未影响他们镇压国内民众的能力和意愿。

It didn't affect their ability and willingness to repress internally.

似乎还有其他一些军事领导人可能已经身亡，但总统很可能不在其中。

It does appear that a number of other military leaders may well be dead, probably not the president, but others.

总统在伊朗民众眼中并不重要，也并非真正掌握权力的核心人物。

The president's not a very important figure, frankly, in the eyes of the Iranian people or in driving power.

但伊斯兰革命卫队的负责人很可能已经死亡，也就是伊斯兰革命卫队。

But the head of the IRGC may well be dead, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

以色列方面已宣布他已被杀，此外还有几位最高领袖在军事方面的高级顾问也一同被除掉。

The Israelis have announced that he has been killed, as well as other top advisers to the supreme leader on the military side.

但从这一点推断政权已经终结，还为时过早。

But it's very far to go from that to it's the end of the regime.

因为别忘了，当特朗普与以色列联手发动这些打击时，他曾说我们要攻击所有军事设施，他们确实这么做了。

Because remember, when Trump launched these strikes with the Israelis, he said, we're attacking all of the military installations, installations, and they've certainly done that.

他们正在摧毁所有能找到并够得着的弹道导弹设施。

They're attacking all the ballistic missile installations that they can find, that they can get to.

他们确实在这么做。

They're certainly doing that.

但他还表示，这次行动的目标是政权更迭。

But he also said this is meant to be an operation of regime change.

他说：‘既然我们已经除掉了领导层，这就是伊朗人民千载难逢的机会，去推翻你们的政府。’

He said, now that we're taking out the leadership, it is your once in a generation opportunity, the Iranian people, to take your government.

但要夺取政权，就需要推翻那些伊朗革命卫队、军队、巴斯基民兵、准军事组织、街头警察以及其他一直乐于并有能力对伊朗平民使用致命武力的成员。

But taking the government requires overthrowing those members of the IRGC, the military, the Basij, the paramilitary groups, the police officers on the streets, and others that have been very willing and capable of using lethal force against the Iranian civilians.

没有理由相信这种情况即将改变。

And there's no reason to believe that that's about to change.

也许会改变，我们可以希望它会改变，但目前还没有任何依据。

It might, we can hope that it's about to change, but there's no reason yet.

没有任何证据让我们相信这一点。

There's no evidence that makes us believe that.

而且，美国地面部队也并未介入。

And there's certainly no American boots on the ground.

以色列地面部队也没有介入。

There are no Israeli boots on the ground.

目前并没有像委内瑞拉那样的有组织、有领导的反对派协调行动。

There's no coordinated opposition with leadership the way there has been in Venezuela, for example.

所以，一方面，在委内瑞拉，特朗普原本完全准备在推翻马杜罗后继续与同一政权合作，到目前为止，这至少证明是一种相当有效的短期策略。

So, I mean, on the one hand, in Venezuela, Trump was fully prepared to continue to work with the same regime having removed Maduro, and that has so far proven to be a pretty effective short term strategy, at least.

但在伊朗，特朗普并不愿意与现有政权合作，这在很多方面是可以理解的。

But in Iran, Trump isn't prepared to work with the existing regime, understandably in many ways.

但目前还不清楚我们如何从这一点走向人民的政府，这对伊朗、整个地区乃至全世界来说都将是一件非凡的事。

But it's not clear how we get from that to the government of the people, which would be an extraordinary thing for Iran and for the entire region and for the world.

但总得有人真正让这件事发生。

But someone's gotta actually make that happen.

而截至目前，要说伊朗人民有能力做到这一点，还显得过于牵强。

And for now, as of today, it'd be quite a stretch to say that the Iranian people have the capacity to do that.

所以，当然，巴列维的儿子雷扎·巴列维表示，他愿意从流亡中回国。

So Reza Pahlavi, who is of course the son of the shah, has said that he's willing to come back from exile.

你认为这有多现实？

How realistic do you think that is?

我的意思是，如果有足够的支持，比如为他提供安保，他有可能回国并在某地安顿下来。

I mean, with sufficient support, I mean, policing around him, it is perhaps plausible that he could be there and he could set up camp someplace.

我认为这是有可能的。

I think it's plausible.

这不是今天的事，但也许是有可能的。

It's not today, but it's perhaps plausible.

但这需要某种程度的干预，对吧？

But that requires some level of intervention, right?

我的意思是，你现在不可能直接飞进去，带着友方人员，然后在德黑兰国际机场受到欢迎。

I mean, it's not as if you're able to, right now, fly in friendlies and you're gonna be welcomed at the Tehran International Airport.

这种事情根本不可能发生。

Like, that's not a thing.

而且再说一次，特朗普一直非常谨慎。

And again, I mean, Trump has been very careful.

大家都在谈论特朗普是个鹰派，是个强硬派，愿意使用军事力量。

Everyone is talking about how Trump is a hawk and Trump is a hardliner and he's willing to use military force.

显然，过去一年里，许多国家都曾遭受过美国的炸弹和导弹袭击，就像在拜登政府时期以及以往的政府时期一样。

And clearly, are lots of countries that have been on the wrong side of American bombs and missiles over the last year, just as they have in the Biden administration, as they have in previous administrations.

但特朗普不希望美国士兵丧生。

But Trump does not want American troops getting killed.

他不想要持久战争。

He doesn't want forever wars.

记住，他在阿富汗战争持续约二十年后结束了这场战争。

Remember, he brought the war in Afghanistan after some twenty years to an end.

拜登最终完成了撤军，但正是特朗普与塔利班达成了一项协议，这项协议在很大程度上是单方面的，因为他只想让美军撤离。

Biden concluded it, but it was Trump that took a deal with the Taliban that in many ways was one-sided because he just wanted the American troops out.

因此，特朗普将继续极其不愿意派遣任何美军地面部队。

And so Trump is gonna continue to be extremely reluctant to commit any American forces on the ground.

而如果没有地面部队介入，至少就今天而言，我们距离那种可以说‘我预测这个政权即将垮台，沙阿可以回归，伊朗人可以举行民主选举，并建立一个真正代表他们的政权’的境地还很遥远。

And absent that, we are pretty far, at least, again, as of today, from a place that you would say, I predict that this regime is over and the Shah can come back and the Iranians can have democratic elections and they can actually put in place a regime that would represent them.

我们离那种情况还很远。

We're very far from that.

现在仍会有很多军事攻击，美国人预计这种行动将持续数天到一周多一点，以摧毁伊朗所有的海军能力，消除其无人机和导弹能力。

Now there's still gonna be a lot of military attacks and the Americans expect this to go on probably for a matter of several days to a little over a week in terms of destroying all of Iran's naval capabilities, extinguishing their UAV, the unarmed aerial vehicles, and their missile capabilities.

有可能他们已经发射了大部分仍存的武器。

It is possible that they've already fired off a lot of what they still have.

但如果还没有，一周之内这种能力就会被彻底摧毁。

But if they haven't, within a week that that capacity will be done.

所以，我认为在很短的时间内，伊朗将不再具备直接威胁该地区其他政权的能力。

And so, you know, I think it is plausible that in very short order, will no longer have direct capacity to threaten other regimes in the region.

他们可能仍会通过代理人保持非对称作战能力。

They may have asymmetric capabilities through proxies.

他们当然可以资助恐怖活动之类的行动。

They could certainly fund terrorist activities, that sort of thing.

他们可以从事间谍活动。

They could engage in espionage.

但就常规军事行动而言，伊朗投射力量的能力正接近终结。

But conventional military activities, we are nearing the end of Iran's capacity to project power.

这是一件大事。

And that's a big deal.

但海伦，这与说伊朗将不再有能力镇压本国人民截然不同。

But that's very, very different, Helen, from saying that Iran won't have the capacity to repress their people on the ground.

美国人目前并没有针对这一点的军事计划。

That is not something that the Americans right now have a military plan for.

目前没有理由相信，也没有任何证据表明，伊朗政权在没有这样的计划的情况下将无法继续镇压民众。

Right now, there's no reason to believe, there's no evidence that would show that the Iranian regime is going to be incapable of continuing to repress, absent such a plan.

我对此有太多后续问题。

I have so many follow-up questions to that.

但我想问的是，你认为谁会崛起成为领导者？

But one, I guess, is who do you see emerging then as a leader?

还是说，鉴于伊朗境内正在发生的混乱，现在下结论还为时过早？

Or is it just too early to say, given the chaos that is happening on the ground in Iran?

我想问的另一个问题是，空袭结束后，明天对伊朗人民的计划是什么？

And I guess the other question is, what's the plan for tomorrow or what's the plan for after the strikes stop for the Iranian people?

特朗普在乎这个吗？

Like, does Trump care about that?

或者看起来这一切都在发生，但对地面上的民众根本没有任何计划。

Or like, it just seems like this is all happening and there is actually no plan for the people on the ground,

所以这是两个不同的问题。

which So two different questions.

截至目前，你的预期是伊斯兰革命卫队仍将掌权。

As of right now, your expectation would be that the IRGC will still be in charge.

他们的许多高级领导人将被杀死。

A number of their top leaders will be killed.

会有新的领导人接替他们。

There will be new leaders that will come and replace them.

我们已经看到真主党在去年遭受以色列的全面斩首行动——包括寻呼机袭击等——之后，依然补充了人员。

We have seen that with Hezbollah, with complete decapitation by Israel over the last year, the pager attacks and all of that, and they have refilled their ranks.

对吧？

Right?

而且他们的能力已远不如从前。

And they are nowhere near as capable as they used to be.

他们今天对以色列不再构成重大威胁，但他们仍具备在黎巴嫩南部维持治理的大量能力。

They don't pose a significant threat to Israel today, but they still have a lot of capacity to govern on the ground in Southern Lebanon.

黎巴嫩政府和军队一直无能或不愿解除他们的武装，这就是为什么停火难以维持的原因。

And the Lebanese government and army has been incapableunwilling to disarm them, which is why the ceasefire has been hard to maintain.

所以，这就是你目前所预期的情况。

So that's what you would expect to see right now.

现在需要认识到，在近期内，他们彼此之间的沟通将会非常困难。

Now that recognizes that it's gonna be very hard for them to communicate with each other for the near term.

他们可能难以通过中央集权的方式下达命令，并在全国范围内有效执行。

It might be hard for them to actually have orders that are given in a centralized way that are then followed out across the country.

但就目前而言，我们看到的仍然是这种情况。

But still, for now, that's what we're looking at.

而这也是过去几年国家运作的方式。

And that's kind of the way the country has been run for the past years.

因此，这个政权并不陌生于如何有效地在国内镇压民众。

So this not a regime that is new to figuring out how to effectively repress its people domestically.

所以这就是——Do

So that's- Do

你看，不好意思打断你，但鉴于这种状况，你并不认为伊朗革命卫队真的会瓦解吧。

you see, and sorry to interrupt you, but do you see, so given that state, so you don't see the IRGC actually kind of falling apart.

你觉得他们会维持权力，虽然他们并不有序。

You think that that will kind of, they'll maintain their power, they're not organized.

显然，全国正处于一片混乱，但伊朗革命卫队仍会作为一个整体团结一致，继续掌控国家。

Obviously there's a total disarray happening in the country but the IRGC will actually stick together as a unit and will continue to run the country.

现在就想象伊朗国内可能会涌现出民主派领导人，是不是为时过早？

Is it too early to imagine that you might see kind of democratic leaders emerging from within the organization on the ground in Iran?

我知道许多领导人已经被关进了监狱。

I know that many leaders have been put into prison.

你觉得他们会获释吗？

Do you think they would get out?

我的意思是，你所有

Like, what do All you

这一切都为时过早。

of this is too soon.

我希望我是错的。

I hope I am wrong.

现在就说伊朗革命卫队将在三个月后掌控这个国家，还为时过早。

It is too early for me to be saying the IRGC is going to be in charge of this country in three months' time.

现在说这个还太早。

It is too early to say that.

我是在回应你的问题：目前，我认为谁在掌权。

I am responding to your question saying, right now, who That's do I expect is in right now.

这些袭击刚刚开始不到24小时。

That is less than twenty four hours after these strikes have begun.

目前仍然是伊朗革命卫队在掌控。

It is still the IRGC.

随着时间推移，很多事情都可能发生变化。

There are many things that could change over time.

而目前地面的信息非常有限。

And there's very little information on the ground.

但关键在于，与委内瑞拉不同，美国在委内瑞拉曾积极接触并准备在推翻马杜罗后与之合作的高层领导人，而在伊朗，他们并没有这样的力量。

But the key point here is that unlike in Venezuela, where the Americans had active ongoing engagement with senior leaders that they were prepared to work with after taking Maduro out, they do not have that in Iran.

他们曾尝试过。

They have tried.

他们获得了一些伊斯兰革命卫队成员的支持，这些成员向他们提供了关于伊朗最高领袖及其他高层领导人行踪的情报和信息。

They have gotten some support from some IRGC members who have given them information and intelligence on the whereabouts of the Supreme Leader and other senior leaders in Iran.

这些信息对他们在此次袭击中取得的成功起到了帮助作用。

That has been helpful in getting them the success that they have just seen in these strikes.

所以，这并不意味着他们没有进行情报收集，但他们缺乏一个内部的、愿意与之合作的政府团体。

So it's not like they haven't engaged in intelligence collection, but what they don't have is a group inside the government that they're prepared to work with.

而目前的反对派非常分散，根本不存在有组织的地面力量，尽管大多数人反对政权。

And the opposition at this point is very fragmented, doesn't really exist on the ground in an organized way at all, even though most people oppose the regime.

那么你的另一个问题，特朗普会怎么做？

So then your other question, what does Trump do?

你知道，这意味著什么？

You know, what does this mean?

特朗普有一系列目标。

Well, Trump has a series of goals.

想想他是如何提出这些目标的，因为他希望这能成为一场重大胜利。

And think about the way he's presented them because he wants this to be a big win.

其中一个目标是摧毁伊朗的核能力。

One goal is the destruction of Iran's nuclear capabilities.

去年他在这方面已经做了不少工作。

He did a fair amount of that last year.

他说伊朗的核设施已被彻底摧毁。

He said they were obliterated.

其中一部分确实被摧毁了，但并非全部。

Some of them were, but not all of them.

在国际原子能机构检查员缺乏监督的情况下，他们迅速重建了设施。

And they rebuilt as quickly as they could without oversight from the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors.

所以，这是其中一个方面。

So there's that.

弹道导弹方面，伊朗人根本拒绝谈判，其中许多已被摧毁，剩下的大部分已被发射至以色列，也发射到了海湾国家。

The ballistic missiles, the Iranians were refused to even negotiate on, lot of those have now been blown up, and those that haven't, a lot of them have been launched against Israel, but also against Gulf states.

是的，这些国家确实驻有美军基地，但迄今为止我们看到的大多数袭击实际上针对的是这些国家的民用目标，比如迪拜、利雅得——而利雅得本身并不驻有任何美军基地。

And yes, they do host American military bases, but most of the strikes that we've seen so far have actually been against civilian targets in those countries, like in Dubai, like in Riyadh, which does not actually host any American bases itself.

那些基地都在很远的地方。

Those bases are far outside.

因此，弹道导弹已不再像以前那样构成威胁。

And so the ballistic missiles are no longer the threat that they used to be.

所以，特朗普在决定对伊朗开战时提出的三个目标中，你已经实现了其中两个，特朗普可以说：我已经实现了这些目标，等到这些军事行动结束时，我将完全实现这些目标。

So you already have two of the three goals that Trump announced in his decision to go ahead with a war against Iran, that Trump can say, I've already achieved, and I will have achieved by the time these military operations have concluded, I will have achieved those goals.

现在第三个目标——政权更迭，他给自己留了退路。

Now the third goal, which is regime change, he's given himself an out.

他说：好吧，我已经发动了这些袭击，目前局势依然危险，因为我还会继续打击，以色列也仍会打击这些军事和领导层目标。

He said, okay, I've done all of these strikes, and right now it's too dangerous because I'm still gonna hit, and Israel is still gonna hit all these military and leadership targets.

但一旦我们完成行动，伊朗人民就会自己接管。

But once we're done, Iranian people take it over.

如果他们没有，那他就会说，我已经尽我所能了。

And if they don't, then he'll say, well, I did everything I could.

我给了他们机会。

I gave them the opportunity.

但他们没有做到。

They didn't do it.

他想这么说吗？

Does he want to say that?

他不想这么说。

He doesn't want to say that.

但他不会自己承担这个责任，因为他并不打算亲自实施政权更迭。

But he's not going to take responsibility for this himself because he is not intending to engage in the direct regime change himself.

他在这些行动初期就已经表示，将负责政权更迭的行动者将是伊朗人民。

He's already said in the initial hours of these operations that the actors that will engage in changing the regime will be the Iranian people.

他对伊朗人民没有任何控制权。

He has no control over the Iranian people.

他对伊朗人民没有任何影响力。

He has no influence over the Iranian people.

许多伊朗人并不特别信任他。

A lot of the Iranian people don't particularly trust him.

他说他要拯救伊朗人民，但在他声称要拯救伊朗人民之后，数以万计的伊朗人丧生。

He said he was gonna rescue the Iranian people, and tens of thousands of Iranians died after he said that he was gonna rescue them.

而且，你知道，他直到一个月后才采取军事行动。

And it was, you know, a month later before he took military action.

所以，我的意思是，如果你今天是伊朗公民，你会感觉压力很大。

So, I mean, I think that if you're an Iranian citizen today, you know, you're feeling pretty squeezed.

无论在什么情况下，你都不太会觉得前方有很好的机会，而你接下来的决定将非常危险。

You're not necessarily feeling like there are great opportunities in front of you in any circumstance, and it's gonna be very dangerous what you decide to do going forward.

再次强调，我希望这个政权能以最少的暴力方式崩溃。

Again, my hope is that this regime collapses with a minimum of violence.

我认为这是每个人的希望。

I think that's everyone's hope.

这是每个人的愿望。

It's everyone's hope.

无论你是否支持美国的军事行动，每个人都希望伊朗人民能够拥有一个真正尊重并体现其价值观、权利、希望和抱负的政府。

Whether you supported The US attacks or you didn't, everyone hopes that the Iranian people can have a government that actually respects and reflects their values, their rights, their hopes and aspirations.

但我们离这个目标还很遥远。

But we are very far from that.

美国或许在一定程度上促成了这一局面，但绝对不是造成它的原因。

And The United States may have facilitated that to a degree, but they certainly are not causing it.

而且，从现状到目标之间仍有很长的路要走。

And again, we're very far from here to there.

对。

Right.

还有很长的路要走。

There is a very long way to go.

我很好奇，这可能是个很蠢的问题，但你尽管说吧——为什么伊朗要轰炸迪拜和利雅得？

I am curious, and this is probably a really stupid question, so you're welcome, but why did Iran, why have they bombed Dubai, Riyadh?

他们为什么要轰炸其他阿拉伯国家，尤其是没有美军基地的情况下？

Like why are they bombing other Arab states, especially without the kind of The US base?

我明白这一点，但我听说迪拜机场被击中了。

Like I get that, but I'm I'm hearing about the Dubai Airport being hit.

为什么他们会

Why would

现在看来，迪拜机场确实遭到了袭击。

they Just now the Dubai Airport looks like it was hit.

我的意思是，考虑到一些意大利人的情况，我不惊讶他们会向海湾国家发射导弹和无人机，但根据我们之前在十二天战争后看到的情况，我本以为攻击会针对那里的美国基地，就像我们在卡塔尔看到的那样。

I mean, clearly, in some of the Italians, I'm not surprised that they sent missiles and drones into the Gulf States, But I would have expected, as we saw after the twelve day war, that the attacks would have been against American bases there, as we saw in Qatar.

而且，也许他们失败了，也许被拦截了，也许在被拦截的过程中，这些伊朗武器或防空系统意外击中了其他目标。

And, you know, maybe they fail, maybe they get knocked down, maybe in the process of getting knocked down, those Iranian weapons or the air defense, the missile defense ends up hitting other targets.

这种情况当然可能发生。

That can certainly happen.

但我们现在看到的并不是这样。

But that's not what we're seeing.

我们已经看到无人机直接针对迪拜、科威特和沙特阿拉伯的平民区域。

We're already seeing drones that are directly targeting civilian areas in Dubai, in Kuwait, in Saudi Arabia.

我必须告诉你，伊朗以前从未这样做过。

I have to tell you that we've not seen that before from Iran.

那么，他们为什么要这么做呢？

So why would they do that?

我的意思是，一方面，这些国家被伊朗视为敌对者。

Well, I mean, on the one hand, these countries are seen by Iran as belligerents.

原则上，它们是中立的。

They are in principle neutral.

它们没有加入美国和以色列的战斗，但也没有阻止。

They've not joined the fight with The United States and Israel, but they didn't prevent it.

在过去的几周里，它们的态度逐渐从反对转变为悄悄表示愿意支持美国和以色列，协助实施打击。

Over the past couple weeks, they increasingly went from opposing it to quietly saying that they would provide support for The United States and Israel in helping facilitate strikes.

因此，我认为伊朗现在准确地将它们视为对伊朗生存构成威胁的敌对势力。

So, I mean, Iran now, I think, accurately sees them as hostile to Iran's survival.

想想伊朗吧，如果你是今天伊朗的领导人，你会意识到自己可能时日无多了。

Think Iran, if you are a leader in Iran today, you recognize that you may not be long for this world.

目前正有人积极试图暗杀伊朗境内每一个仍然在世的最高决策者，这简直令人震惊。

There is an active attempt to assassinate every decision maker, active top level decision maker, that is still alive in Iran today, which is a staggering thing to say.

因此，他们的行为可能不再那么理性。

And so they may not be acting quite as rationally.

他们可能不再那么考虑长远。

They may not be thinking quite as long term.

而且他们也无法很好地沟通。

And they also can't communicate very well.

所以，在我看来，这感觉像是绝望之举。

So this to me feels like desperation.

如果你知道，任何针对坚固设施——比如军事基地或关键能源基础设施——的行动都可能被击落，而你又想表明自己有能力采取行动，不会坐以待毙，一定会让对方付出代价，那么，这或许就是你选择攻击那些目前非交战国的平民目标的逻辑。

If you know that anything you do against hardened facilities like bases or like critical energy infrastructure is likely to be shot down, and you wanna show that you can do something, that you're not going to just sit and take it, that there will be costs and consequences, that that is, you know, perhaps the logic that leads you to engage in those strikes against civilian targets among countries that are presently noncombatants.

这是我能想到的唯一逻辑。

That's the only logic I can come up with.

我不认为这些是伊朗的导弹操作员和无人机操作员在没有接到任何命令的情况下擅自采取的行动。

I don't believe these are rogue actions by missile operators and drone operators in Iran that are not getting orders from anyone.

我不相信这一点。

I don't believe that.

我认为仍然存在足够的集中控制。

I think there's still sufficient centralized control.

好的，我们来谈谈全世界的回应。

All right, let's talk about the response from around the world.

所以跟我讲讲你和欧洲人在这方面的互动吧。

So tell us about your dealings with the Europeans on this.

我看到你们之间有一些挺有趣的互动。

I saw some pretty funny interactions that you had had.

欧洲人说打算在周一召开会议，而今天是星期六。

The Europeans are talking about convening on Monday, today is Saturday.

这看起来确实像是应该引起你高度重视的事情，但欧洲人到底在做什么？

This does feel like something that maybe would come to the top of your attention, but what are the Europeans doing?

他们基本上表现得非常关切。

They're basically acting concerned.

你知道，就好像他们会写一封强硬的信。

You know, it's kind of like they'll write a strong letter.

他们在这里其实并不重要。

They're not really relevant here.

但这并不意味着他们在任何事情上都不重要。

And that doesn't mean they're not relevant on anything.

我的意思是，我们看到当特朗普威胁要拿下格陵兰时，他们表示要采取对等关税报复，还要使用反胁迫工具，结果特朗普退缩了。

I mean, we saw that when Trump threatened them on Greenland, they said that they were going to hit back with reciprocal tariffs, and they were going to hit back with the anti coercion instrument, and Trump backed down.

他退缩了，却没有得到任何东西。

He backed down without getting anything.

所以，并不是说欧洲人在所有事情上都毫无根据。

So it's not as if the Europeans are uniquely factless on everything.

但在这个问题上，特朗普已经做出了决定，根本没听欧洲人的建议。

But on this issue, Trump made his decision and he wasn't taking any advice from the Europeans.

他并没有要求他们加入。

He was not asking them to join.

在涉及伊朗的美国军事决策方面，他们实际上无关紧要。

They are functionally irrelevant to American military decision making vis a vis Iran.

这对欧洲人来说是一个令人不安的处境。

And that is an uncomfortable position for the Europeans to be in.

所以，如果你是乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩，并且说你打算在周一召开会议讨论此事，那么你周一所能产生的影响，大概和周六时一样微乎其微。

And so if you're Ursula von der Leyen and you say you're going to convene a council to discuss it on Monday, you're going to have probably just about as much effect on Monday as you did on Saturday.

我会表现出更多的紧迫感。

Now, I would have displayed more urgency.

英国人在这方面稍微做了一点，他们说，我们已经有飞机在空中了，我们希望确保自己能参与对本地区盟友的集体防御。

The Brits did a bit of that in saying, you know, that we've got, you know, planes in the air and we wanna make sure that we're part of a collective defense, you know, of our allies in the region.

他们本可以那样做，本可以采取那样的行动。

So they could have been that, they could have done that.

那本是一件重要的事情。

That would have been an important thing to do.

其次，有许多欧洲公民身处当地。

Secondarily, there are lots of European citizens on the ground.

因此，他们显然希望确保自己能够妥善照顾，确保所有人安全，并尽可能撤离所有这些相关事宜。

And so they obviously want to make sure that they are, you know, taking care, that they're all secure, that they're, you know, evacuating as best as they possibly can, you know, all of these sorts of things.

但他们对伊朗并没有一个统一的立场。

But they don't really have a collective position on Iran.

他们没有任何实际手段能够改变这场冲突的走向。

They don't have anything that they can functionally do to change the trajectory of this conflict.

与在伊拉克、在阿富汗不同，他们实际上并未发挥作用。

And unlike in Iraq, unlike in Afghanistan, they're not actually playing a role.

这里并没有所谓的‘意愿联盟’。

There is no coalition of the willing here.

因此，欧洲人对这一结果无足轻重。

So the Europeans are irrelevant to this outcome.

更广泛地说，现实是，中国人和俄罗斯人对这一结果也无足轻重。

And more broadly, there is the reality that, the Chinese are irrelevant to this outcome, the Russians.

伊朗在外部没有朋友。

Iran has no friends externally.

自10月7日以来，我们看到以色列和美国能够针对也门的胡塞武装、黎巴嫩真主党、去年或最近的伊朗，以及加沙的哈马斯进行打击。

You know, we've seen since October 7 that Israel and The United States have been able to target, whether it's the Houthis in Yemen, or whether it's Hezbollah, or whether it's Iran last year or just now, or whether it's Hamas in Gaza.

在所有这些情况下，以色列和美国偶尔会发动军事打击，但伊朗及其代理势力——所谓的抵抗轴心，或其全球范围内的朋友和支持者——无论是反对美国的全球南方国家，还是与伊朗密切合作、为其提供无人机以帮助其对抗乌克兰并发动四年战争的俄罗斯，抑或是大量购买伊朗石油的中国——都几乎没有做出任何有效回应。

In all of these cases, the Israelis and the Americans on occasion have engaged in military strikes, and there's been really no effective response whatsoever, either by Iran and its proxies, the so called axis of resistance, or their friends and supporters around the world, whether it's global South countries that really oppose The United States or it's the Russians who have been working with Iran closely to get more support for drones to help them fight against Ukraine and the war that they started four years ago, the Russians, or whether it's China that buys a lot of oil from Iran.

我的意思是，他们都表达了批评。

I mean, they've all expressed criticism.

目前，就在我们交谈之际，联合国安理会正在召开紧急会议，我非常确定中国和俄罗斯正在表达他们对美国和以色列所下达命令的反对意见，但他们并不准备采取任何行动。

Right now, we've got a secure, as you and I are talking, there is a Security Council emergency session that is going on, and I am quite certain that the Chinese and Russians are expressing their disagreement with what has been ordered by The US and by Israel, but they're not prepared to do anything.

事实上，我甚至不认为中国会因为这些打击而推迟特朗普总统定于四月访问北京的峰会。

In fact, I don't even believe that the Chinese will postpone the upcoming summit meeting of President Trump to visit Beijing in April on the back of these strikes.

实际上，由于美国和以色列在伊朗及该地区确立了军事主导地位，目前几乎没有人采取任何行动。

There's really virtually nothing that anyone is doing as a consequence of the Americans and the Israelis establishing military dominance against Iran and in the region.

这与特朗普第二任期第一年的情况截然不同，当时他主要聚焦于关税和经济工具，而全球许多国家当时有能力反击，不仅没有屈服，还积极谈判，并运用自身的强制性手段，最终达成比最初被要求的条件更好的结果。

And that's wildly different than the first year of Trump's second administration when he focused primarily on tariffs and economic tools, and where many countries around the world were very capable of hitting back and not just capitulating, and actively negotiating, but also using their own coercive tools mechanisms and getting to a place that they felt was better than what they were initially being demanded.

在委内瑞拉或伊朗，甚至我推测未来的古巴，军事上都不是这种情况。

That is not the case militarily, either in Venezuela or in Iran, or I suspect in Cuba going forward.

特朗普总统还可能在哪些地方决定，他特别喜欢采取无人敢回应的单边军事行动？

And where else might President Trump decide that he really likes taking unilateral military action that no one is willing or capable to respond against?

但这对MAGA群体来说意味着什么？

How does that play though with MAGA?

这对那些根本不希望美国卷入冲突的人又意味着什么？

How does that play with people who really didn't want America to get involved?

他能够实现这种短暂而迅猛的入侵，而且没有地面部队驻扎，这难道不是关键吗？

Is the fact that he manages to make this kind of short, sharp kind of invasions and that there's no boots on the ground.

这是否就是特朗普规避这一问题的方式？

Is that kind of the way that Trump skirts round that?

因为感觉在上一届总统竞选中，他实际上是以不发动战争为竞选主张的。

Because it feels like in the last presidential campaign, he actually campaigned on not starting wars.

但实际情况并非如此，当然，如果没有实际的士兵和部队驻扎，战争的定义确实会有所不同。

And instead that really has not been the case, although of course the definition of war is a little different if there aren't actually soldiers and troops on the ground.

对。

Right.

我的意思是，如果没有任何美国士兵丧生，那么他就更容易向支持者解释这种做法。

I mean, if no American soldiers are getting killed, then it's a much easier proposition for him to square with his supporters.

在委内瑞拉，但愿如此，没有美国军人阵亡。

And in Venezuela, knock on wood, no American servicemen and women have been killed.

有几个人受伤，但没有人死亡。

There were a few injuries, but no one was killed.

到目前为止，同样地，还处于初期阶段，没有美国人丧生。

And so far, again, early hours, no Americans have been killed.

但你知道，特朗普确实已经做好了美国人会阵亡的准备。

But, you know, certainly Trump is prepared for Americans to be killed.

战斗人员，以及很可能的平民，都会因此受到牵连。

Combatants and quite plausibly noncombatants on the back of this.

如果因一场在伊朗的主动战争导致大量美国人死亡，这将不被特朗普的MAGA基本盘中相当一部分人所接受。

And large numbers of Americans killed because of a war of choice in Iran will be unpopular with significant numbers of Trump's MAGA base.

MAGA阵营内部在以色列问题上出现了分歧。

There is a break in MAGA on Israel.

有不少坚定的MAGA支持者，尤其是塔克·卡尔森，但也有其他人公开表示：绝对不行。

There are a number of strong MAGA supporters, and you've seen this with Tucker Carlson in particular, but there have been others that have been out there publicly saying, absolutely not.

我们为什么要为以色列承担这么多？

Why are we carrying so much water for Israel?

我们为什么要向他们提供数千亿美元的军事援助？

Why are we providing them billions and billions of dollars in military support?

我们为什么要参与军事行动，支持他们在自家后院的诉求？

Why are we engaging in military actions that are supporting what they want in their backyard?

就乌克兰而言，美国已经停止提供军事援助。

I mean, on Ukraine, The United States has stopped providing military aid.

为什么？

Why?

因为乌克兰太远了，我们认为欧洲人应该去承担。

Because it's far away, and we think the Europeans should do it.

那我们为什么支持以色列？

So why are we supporting Israel?

而且有很多MAGA支持者并不喜欢这一点。

And and there's a lot of MAGA supporters that don't like that.

也有很多MAGA支持者支持，还有很多MAGA捐助者也支持。

There are a lot of MAGA supporters that do, and there are a lot of MAGA donors that do.

比如米里亚姆·阿德尔森，但还有很多经常去海湖庄园的人，就像迈阿密流亡社群中那些支持委内瑞拉和古巴军事行动的人一样。

I mean, Miriam Adelson in particular, but there are many, many that go to Mar A Lago all the time, just as there are those that support military operations in Venezuela and Cuba among the Miami exile community.

但这并不是普遍受欢迎的。

But it is not uniquely popular.

而且这里有一个更广泛的问题，你应该问过我，你知道，特朗普是如何应对他做出这些承诺、竞选时宣扬这些主张的事实的。

And here there's a broader, we should address the broader issue, which is because you asked me, you know, how is Trump dealing with the fact that he made these promises, he campaigned on this stuff.

当时有那么多MAGA支持者说，卡玛拉·哈里斯会是那个好战的候选人，而特朗普不会。

And there were so many people pro MAGA that were saying that, you know, Kamala Harris was gonna be the war candidate, but Trump wouldn't.

特朗普并不是好战派。

Trump's not a hawk.

查理·柯克，你知道的，他在那之前就被暗杀了。

And Charlie Kirk, I mean, you know, he was assassinated before that.

他强烈反对攻击伊朗的主张，并且对此有明确的公开记录。

He was extremely opposed to the idea of attacking Iran and is on record in doing so.

我确信，许多反对特朗普的人，包括一些NAGA内部的人，将会利用这一点。

And I'm sure that there are many opponents to Trump, including some in NAGA, that are gonna be using that.

现在，特朗普已经兑现了多项承诺。

Now, Trump has made good on a number of his promises.

他承诺将使用关税，并努力将制造业带回美国，迫使其他国家在美国花钱。

He promised that he was gonna use tariffs and he was gonna work to bring manufacturing back to The US and force other countries to spend money in The US.

他已经与日本、韩国、英国、欧洲人、沙特阿拉伯及其他国家达成了一系列协议，承诺将大幅增加在美国的支出。

And he's cut a bunch of deals with promises from the Japanese and the South Koreans and The UK and the Europeans and the Saudis and others to start spending a lot more money in The US.

所以，不管你是否喜欢这项政策，不管你是否认为关税是个好主意，当然它也带来了 affordability 的问题，但他确实兑现了这一承诺。

So he's whether you like the policy or not, whether you think tariffs are a good idea or not, and certainly there's an affordability problem on the back of it, he's made good on that.

他承诺要关闭边境。

He promised he was gonna close the border.

他已经在关闭边境方面做了大量工作。

And he has done a lot of work in closing the border.

他承诺要打击芬太尼。

He promised he was gonna, you know, fight fentanyl.

他在打击芬太尼方面做了大量工作。

He's done a lot of work in fighting fentanyl.

墨西哥人在这一问题上成为了美国非常重要的合作伙伴。

And the Mexicans have been very, very significant partners of The US on that.

但他还承诺要奉行美国优先，结束这些战争。

But he also promised that he was going to America first to end these wars.

尽管目前没有地面部队，但显然美国正单方面动用军事力量来实现他所期望的结果，这让许多MAGA支持者感到不安，尤其是在中东地区。

And while there are no troops on the ground, it is now clear that unilateral American military power is being used to project outcomes that he wants that a lot of MAGA's clearly uncomfortable with, especially in The Middle East.

显然，爱泼斯坦文件也如此——特朗普曾说，我要清理这个地方，我们要公布这些文件，因为存在双重司法体系。

It's also clear that the Epstein files, where Trump said, I'm gonna clean this place up, and we're gonna release those files because there's a two tier justice system.

然而，你知道，比尔和希拉里·克林顿会被传唤作证，但霍华德·卢特尼克却不会。

And yet, you know, Bill and Hillary Clinton will be brought in to testify, but not Howard Lutnick.

所以他是在保护自己的人。

And so he's protecting his own.

大家都看在眼里。

And everyone sees that.

他曾说要清除腐败。

He said he was gonna drain the swamp.

他现在再也不提这件事了。

He doesn't talk about that anymore.

事实上，不仅美国在之前的政府时期腐败严重，如今在特朗普执政下腐败更甚。

And in fact, it turns out not only was there a lot of corruption in The US under previous administrations, but it's even more corrupt now under Trump.

这已经变成了一种掠夺性统治，直接让特朗普和他的家人受益，同时也惠及许多政府内部人士及其家人。

It's kleptocratic, benefiting him and his family directly, and many insiders in the administration and their families.

因此，我认为，特朗普在许多重要议题上完全未能兑现对MAGA群体至关重要的承诺，正是他支持率持续流失、很可能在十一月以显著优势输掉众议院选举的原因。

So I do think that the fact that Trump now, on a number of issues, has absolutely not followed through on promises that matter deeply to MAGA are why he is hemorrhaging support, and why he is very likely, overwhelmingly likely to lose the House, probably by a substantial margin, in November.

他时间不多了。

He's running out of time.