2026年全球最大风险 | 伊恩·布雷默

您正在收听每日TED演讲，我们每天为您带来新思想，激发您的好奇心。

You're listening to TED Talks daily where we bring you new ideas to spark your curiosity every day.

我是您的主持人，伊莉丝·胡。

I'm your host, Elise Hu.

政治科学家、欧亚集团和GZERO媒体的创始人兼总裁伊恩·布雷默，每年一月都会发布一份当年全球主要风险的清单。

Political scientist Ian Bremmer, president and founder of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media, publishes a list of the year's top global risks each January.

今天，我们为您带来伊恩与TED的海伦·沃尔特斯之间的一场特别对话，他们深入探讨了他认为2026年最重大的全球风险。

Today, we're bringing you a special conversation between Ian and Ted's Helen Walters where they dig into the biggest global risks that he sees for 2026.

大家好。

Hello, everyone.

无论您身在何处，祝您2026年快乐。

Happy 2026 wherever you are.

我是海伦·沃尔特斯。

I am Helen Walters.

我是TED的媒体与策展负责人。

I'm the Head of Media and Curation at TED.

今天是1月5日。

It is January 5.

我在布鲁克林。

I am in Brooklyn.

我感冒了，如果声音哑了，请多包涵。

I have a cold, so apologies if my voice gives out.

但幸运的是，今天大部分时间将由唯一一位伊恩·布雷默来发言，他是欧亚集团的总裁，经常来为我们解释世界上到底发生了什么。

But luckily, most of the talking today will be done by the one and only Ian Bremmer, the president of the Eurasia Group, who often comes to explain what on earth is going on in the world to us.

他今天也来分享他和欧亚集团刚刚发布的全球风险清单。

He's also here today to share the list of global risks that he and Eurasia just published.

所以，伊恩，非常感谢你来到这里。

So, Ian, thank you so much for being here.

海伦，新年快乐。

Helen, happy new year.

除了讨论全球风险环境，还能怎么庆祝呢？

How else could one possibly celebrate but to talk about the global risk environment?

原来你真是个大扫兴的人。

You really are a massive downer, it turns out.

但事实上，还有很多话题可谈。

But it turns out there is also a lot to talk about.

因此，这份内容丰富的报告中，很多部分都与美国有关。

And so a lot of the report, which is so meaty, relates to The United States.

但我认为，我们其实应该从委内瑞拉开始谈起，因为目前它正成为新闻焦点。

But I actually think that what we need to do is start with Venezuela, which is wildly in the news at the moment.

我想去年每个人都清楚，委内瑞拉即将发生一件重大的事情。

It was clear to everybody, I think, last year that something pretty major was gonna happen in Venezuela.

但我怀疑是否有人真正预料到，这件事会涉及绑架一位外国领导人及其妻子，并将他们带到布鲁克林接受指控。

But I'm not sure that anyone really anticipated that that was gonna involve essentially kidnapping a foreign leader and his wife and bringing them to Brooklyn to stand charges.

你预见到这一点了吗？

Did you anticipate that?

你认为发生了什么？或者你能告诉我们最近到底发生了什么吗？

And what do you think happened or what can you tell us about what has just been going on?

我们确实知道这个消息，但我要告诉你，我两个月前第一次听到这个故事时，感到非常惊讶。

Well, we did because we heard the story, but I have to tell you the first time I heard it about two months ago, I was quite surprised.

这个计划并不是仅仅让特朗普推翻马杜罗或施压迫使他离开。

The idea that this wasn't just going to be Trump taking out Maduro or forcing him under pressure to leave.

显然，这种压力已经加剧了数月之久，但与此同时，各方一直在努力获取马杜罗确切行踪的情报，并争取他身边愿意与美国合作的人，以便将他抓获并带到美国。

And clearly there's been a lot of that pressure that's escalated, but that for several months now, has been an effort to get more information intelligence on Maduro's whereabouts with precise capacity, as well as get people around him that would be willing to work with The US so that he could be extracted and brought to The United States.

事实上，是把他带到媒体最集中的纽约市，以便获得最戏剧性的报道。

In fact, brought to New York City where most of the media is located and where the coverage is going to be the most dramatic.

特朗普数周前就批准了这一行动，但他们需要一个合适的时机来实施行动。

Trump gave the approval on that weeks ago, but they needed to have a proper window to make the strike.

显然，这件事我不能谈，《华尔街日报》或《纽约时报》也不能谈，因为这会危及任务本身，尤其是那些在委内瑞拉与美国合作的人员的安全。

Obviously not something that I could talk about or The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times could, because it would have put the mission and the people, especially the people on the ground in Venezuela cooperating with Maduro in danger.

所以，是的，我们早就知情，但这件事仍然令人极为震惊。

So yeah, aware of it, but still extraordinarily striking.

而且，这里还有几点值得说一说。

And I mean, a few things to say here.

首先是这次军事行动的成功。

The first is the success of this military operation.

我们这里谈论的不是诺列加和巴拿马。

And this is not Noriega and Panama we're talking about.

这是一次严肃的军事行动，资金充足、资源丰富，部队忠诚且根基深厚，还有大量古巴顾问提供支持，他们也非常专业，同时还得到了俄罗斯的军事援助，包括防空系统等。

This is a serious military operation, well funded, well resourced, pretty loyal, and entrenched with lots of Cuban advisors providing support who are also quite professional, Russian military aid, air defense, all of that.

美国不仅成功抓获了他和他的妻子，而且没有一名美国人阵亡。

And The United States not only went in and got him and his wife, but there wasn't a single American fatality.

因此，首先，这次行动对美国军队和特朗普而言取得的巨大成功，其意义绝不能被低估。

And so, I mean, first of all, staggering nature of how successful this was for the US military and for Trump should not be underestimated.

我不是在讨论合法性，也不是在讨论后续影响，我只是在谈论‘被移除’这一头条新闻本身。

I'm not talking about the legality, I'm not talking about the knock on implications, I'm just talking about the headline of the removal.

越来越多的人不断问我，这跟毒品有关吗？

And what increasingly, people asking me all the time, they're saying, well, is this about drugs?

这跟石油有关吗？

Is it about oil?

这跟民主有关吗？

Is it about all of these, democracy?

当然不是，至少对特朗普来说不是。

Of course not, not for Trump anyway.

但我们应该认识到，这其中很大一部分是你所看到的。

But we should recognize that a big piece of this is what you see.

这关乎推翻马杜罗。

It's about removing Maduro.

特朗普希望马杜罗下台。

Trump wanted Maduro out.

他与一小群核心顾问讨论过此事，包括总统副幕僚长史蒂芬·米勒、参议员马尔科·卢比奥、国务卿和国家安全顾问（双职）、以及中央情报局局长约翰·拉特克利夫，他们共同推动了这一决定。

He was having this discussion with a small group of top advisors, Stephen Miller, the deputy chief of staff, Marco Rubio, secretary of state and national security advisor, Dual Hatted, and John Ratcliffe, director of the CIA, were the core participants in driving this decision.

他们达成的共识是，任何情况都比马杜罗好，真的是任何情况。

And they had come to the decision that anything would be better than Maduro, literally anything.

混乱也比马杜罗强。

Chaos would be better than Maduro.

一个新的军政府会比马杜罗好，任何情况都行。

A new military government would be better than Maduro, anything.

这就是做出这一决定的基础，尤其是当尼古拉斯·马杜罗一直在挑衅特朗普的时候。

And that was the basis of making this decision, especially as Nicolas Maduro was taunting Trump.

他不愿意接受所谓的‘金苹果’和黄金签证，去土耳其过平静的流亡生活，而是选择继续掌权。

He was not willing to take, you know, sort of the brass ring and the golden visa and travel to Turkey and live out his days quietly, but out of power.

他跳起了特朗普式的舞蹈，基本上就是在说：‘来啊，你敢动我吗？’

He was doing the Trump dance and basically saying, I dare you, you're not gonna take me out.

特朗普对此感到暴怒。

And Trump was enraged by that.

因此，特朗普试图实现的很大一部分目标，他已经完成了。

And so a big piece of what Trump was trying to accomplish, he has accomplished.

他推翻了马杜罗，把他带到美国，带到纽约，让他接受审判，这一过程将持续数月，并伴随着正面新闻，展示出特朗普的形象：你别惹我，我把你搞掉了。

He has removed Maduro, he has brought him to The United States, he has brought him to New York, he is going to face justice, and that will play out over months with positive headlines showing Trump, you don't mess with me, I took you out.

我认为我们需要从这一点开始，因为对特朗普来说，这个故事的开端和结局都在于此。

And I think we need to start with that because for Trump, a big part of the story begins and ends there.

你不需要去关注石油、毒品、选举，或者中国、俄罗斯、真主党和伊朗。

You don't need to go to the oil and the drugs and the elections or the Chinese and the Russians and Hezbollah and Iran.

还有很多其他的故事。

There are lots of other stories.

海伦，你和我现在可以逐一梳理所有这些事情，但我们应该先认识到，对特朗普来说，这件事的很大一部分就是：我对马杜罗感到愤怒。

You and I, Helen, can now unpull all of them, but we should start with the recognition that for Trump, a very large piece of this is I'm angry about Maduro.

他让我显得很糟糕。

He is making me look bad.

我给了他最后通牒。

I have given him an ultimatum.

我必须将他赶下台。

I must remove him from power.

就此为止。

Period.

故事结束。

End of story.

所以，问题当然在于你说这还没完。

So the problem, of course, is you say that it doesn't end there.

而现实是，如今美国在委内瑞拉的介入比以往任何时候都更深。

And the reality is that now The US is more involved in Venezuela than ever before.

正如你所说，它已经将一个外国领导人从一个国家中带走。

It has extracted, as you say, a foreign leader from a country.

我们以前也见过这种情况：即使一个可怕的独裁者被推翻，如何维持那里的力量？或者接下来会发生什么？

And we've seen this play out before where even if someone, even if a terrible dictator is taken out, actually sustaining any type of force there, or like what happens next?

你知道，特朗普谈论的是要掌控委内瑞拉。

And, you know, Trump talks about running Venezuela.

那么，接下来到底会发生什么？

Like what actually is gonna happen next?

为此项撤离行动，进行了大量的规划。

So there was an enormous amount of planning that went into this extraction, this operation.

在过去的数月里，美国根本不知道尼古拉斯·马杜罗三个月前身在何处。

Over many, many months, The US had no idea where Nicolas Maduro's whereabouts were three months ago.

当他们发动袭击时，他们已经掌握了他每分每秒的行踪和活动情况。

By the time they made those strikes, they had minute by minute sense of where he was, what he was doing.

他们没有从马杜罗身边的人那里获得任何情报。

They had no intelligence coming from people around Maduro.

到他们发动袭击时，已有许多人完全倒戈，向美国提供情报。

By the time they made the strikes, they had many people that were fully compromised and providing information to The US.

因此，这项军事计划在战略上执行得极为出色，实施过程也异常精准。

So the military plan was extremely well done in terms of strategy and it was also exceptionally well executed.

我的意思是，普京要是能像这样在乌克兰做成一件事就好了，当然他根本做不到。

I mean, Putin wishes he could have pulled something like that off in Ukraine and of course he couldn't.

但是海伦，目前关于委内瑞拉未来将如何治理，根本没有任何规划。

But Helen, there is no planning around what governance is going to look like now in Venezuela.

当你听到特朗普说‘现在我们接管了委内瑞拉’时，我认为这句话让马可·卢比奥感到震惊，因为美国根本没有计划去接管委内瑞拉，完全没有任何计划。

And when you heard Trump say, well, now we're running Venezuela, I think that that statement was surprising to Marco Rubio because there's no plan for The United States to run Venezuela, not at all.

这根本不是政权更迭。

And this is not regime change.

这是一场政权轮盘赌。

This is regime roulette.

你已经推翻了马杜罗，现在掌权的是一个美国人没有关系、没有理由相信其友好、也没有任何交往或接触历史的新人物，对吧？

You have taken out Maduro and now there's somebody new in charge that the Americans don't have a relationship with, have no reason to believe as a friendly, have no history in dealing with or engaging with, right?

我的意思是，她本人可能并非如此，而且美国也不认为她是罪犯，但围绕她的人中有很多是罪犯，他们头上还有悬赏，而且他们仍然在那里。

I mean, it could be, and a whole bunch of, and The US does not consider her to be a criminal, but many of the people around her are criminals, do have bounties on their heads, and they're still there.

所以，如果有任何计划的话，这个计划就是美国刚刚表明：如果你不按美国的意愿行事，而你又是一个弱小的国家，代价将会极其巨大。

So the plan, to the extent that there's a plan, the plan is that The United States has just shown that if you don't do what America wants and you're a really weak little country, the costs will be enormous.

特朗普已通过尼古拉斯·马杜罗明确传达了这一点，并震惊了全球许多盟友和对手。

Trump has made that very clear with Nicolas Maduro and has shocked many around the world, allies and adversaries.

中国政府表示他们感到震惊。

The Chinese government said they were shocked.

我从未见过中国高级外交官就美国的决定发表过‘我们感到震惊’这样的公开声明。

I've never seen a Chinese public statement from a top diplomat in response to a US decision that says we're shocked.

请记住，当时有一支中国高级代表团刚刚在加拉加斯与马杜罗会面，距离此事发生仅数小时。

And keep in mind, there was a senior Chinese delegation in town in Caracas that had just met with Maduro hours before.

然后特朗普并没有阻止美军发动突袭。

Then Trump didn't stop Trump from launching the military raid.

他也没有通知中国。

And he didn't tell the Chinese.

他没有提前告知他们，对吧？

He didn't give them a heads up, right?

所以他们感到震惊。

So they were shocked.

这就是刚刚发生的事情。

So that's what has just played out.

那么接下来会发生什么？

And now what's gonna happen?

特朗普认为，因为他展示了这种能力，下一个委内瑞拉政府将会听从他的意愿。

Trump believes that because he has shown that capacity, that this next Venezuelan government is going to do what he wants.

我们会按他的要求处理石油，按他的要求打击毒品，切断与真主党、俄罗斯和伊朗的关系，并接受美国遣返的非法移民回委内瑞拉。

We'll do what he wants on oil, we'll do what he wants on drugs, will do what he wants on cutting off relations with Hezbollah, Russia, Iran, and will do what he wants in terms of accepting Venezuelan migrants, illegal migrants from The United States back to Venezuela.

这正是特朗普议程上的首要愿望清单。

That is the wish list that is on top of Trump's agenda.

特朗普议程上的首要目标并不是我要确保举行民主选举。

On top of Trump's agenda is not, I want to make sure there are democratic elections.

马可·卢比奥希望随着时间推移实现这一点，但这对特朗普来说并非优先事项。

Marco Rubio wants that over time, but that is not a priority for Trump.

你看到特朗普迅速把玛丽亚·马查多抛在一边，尽管她是合法的反对派领袖，还获得了诺贝尔和平奖。

And you saw that Trump was quick to throw Maria Machado under the bus, even though she is the legitimate opposition leader, won the Nobel Peace Prize.

她的政党在一场被马杜罗操纵的选举中赢得了65%的选票。

Her party took 65% of the vote in an election that was stolen by Maduro.

特朗普根本不关心。

Trump doesn't care.

好像她根本无法治理国家。

It's like she can't run the country.

我要和这些人合作。

I'm gonna work with these guys.

除非他们不按我的要求做。

Unless they don't do what I want.

我要说，海伦，在过去48小时内，第一点，德尔西尔·罗德里格斯和其他人与特朗普政府私下进行的对话，比她公开谴责行动并称马杜罗仍是总统时的态度要更加同情和积极。

And I will say, Helen, over the last forty eight hours, first point, the conversations that Delsier Rodriguez and others have had with the Trump administration privately have been much more sympathetic and engaging than what she has been saying publicly condemning the actions and that Maduro is still the president.

她已经稍微退让，表示愿意合作，但在私下与美国人交流时态度明显更为缓和。

She's already backing down somewhat talking about a desire to cooperate, but considerably more conciliatory with the Americans privately.

这并不奇怪，她需要在确保委内瑞拉境内局势稳定之前，维持自己核心圈子内的某些信誉。

Not surprising, she needs to maintain some level of credibility with her own inner circle until she has a sense that there's stability on the ground in Venezuela.

特朗普政府理解这一点，并愿意给她一些时间。

And the Trump administration understands that and is prepared to give her some time.

所谓的时间，是指一两周，而不是几天。

Time meaning a week or two, not a matter of days.

但特朗普政府明白，如果她决定不按美国人的意愿行事——而她是否会这样做尚无把握，毕竟她从未有过相关经验——那么美方将采取进一步行动。

But the Trump administration understands that if she decides that she's not going to do what the Americans want, and there's no certainty that she will, again, there's no experience with her, then there's gonna be further action.

美国在委内瑞拉周边部署的军队将保持部署状态，以使这一威胁更具可信度。

And the military that The US has arrayed around Venezuela will stay in position to make that threat more credible.

所以他们不会突然转移到东地中海去威胁伊朗。

So they're not gonna suddenly move to the Eastern Mediterranean to start threatening Iran.

他们需要在原地保留这些能力。

They're gonna need those capabilities in situ.

我已经听说，特朗普政府在初期可能会采取的一些行动，比如占领那些防御薄弱的海上石油平台，美国可以以相对较低的风险做到这一点，从而向委内瑞拉政府表明：我们是认真的。

And I've already heard that, you know, the sorts of things that the Trump administration might do in the early stages would be to, for example, capture the offshore oil rigs, which aren't well defended, which The US could do with relatively low risk, and which would show the Venezuelan government, we really mean this.

你们没有筹码，我们才有筹码。

You don't have the cards, we have the cards.

你们没有盟友。

You don't have allies.

你们没有任何人会支持你们。

You don't have anyone that's gonna support you.

俄罗斯和中国都袖手旁观，什么也没做。

The Russians and the Chinese stood by and did nothing.

没有人提供任何实质性的支持。

No one provided any real support.

所以我们才是老大。

So we're the boss.

所以当特朗普说我们要掌控委内瑞拉时，他的意思就是这个。

So when Trump says we're gonna run Venezuela, that is what he means.

他并不是说马可·卢比奥会去当总督。

He doesn't mean that Marco Rubio is gonna be pro console.

他也不是说要派托尼·布莱尔去加拉加斯掌权。

He doesn't mean he's sending Tony Blair into Caracas to run it.

他的意思是，委内瑞拉政府，这个新政权轮盘赌，必须听从该地区的新权威——多诺修正案，否则就等着瞧。

He means that the Venezuelan government, the new regime roulette is going to listen to the new authority in the region, the Donro doctrine, or else.

这就是他的意思，而这一前提将在未来几周内接受考验。

That is what he means, and that is a presumption that will be tested over the coming weeks.

所以，正如你所说，多诺修正案实际上是你们报告中排名第三的最高风险。

So the Donro doctrine, as you say, is actually the third top risk that you have in this report.

请给我们稍微解释一下这里的双关语，以及你具体指的是什么，因为这显然不仅仅关乎委内瑞拉。

Just give us a little bit of a context about the pun that's happening here and exactly what you mean by this, because it's obviously not just about Venezuela.

完全不是。

Not at all.

事实上，就在过去几个小时里，特朗普本人首次公开表示他相信唐罗主义，这准确地描述了他对该地区外交政策的取向，本质上是特朗普所定义的‘美国优先’在西半球的体现。

And the fact that Trump himself, just over the past few hours, has for the first time publicly said that he believes in the Don Roe Doctrine, that accurately describes his foreign policy orientation towards the region, which is essentially a manifestation of America first in the Western Hemisphere as defined by Trump.

这意味着在该地区，美国将对国家安全和战略利益事务拥有最终决定权。

And it means that in that part of the world, The United States is going to have final authority over what happens in national security and strategic interest.

而且他们有很多方式可以做到这一点；顺便说一句，既然特朗普在委内瑞拉短期内取得了成功并拥抱了唐罗主义，他就非常注重品牌塑造。

And there's a lot of ways that they, and by the way, now that Trump has had that success in Venezuela in the near term and has embraced the Don Roe doctrine, He's all about the branding.

这现在就是他在做的事情。

This is now what he's doing.

他将试图寻找其他方式来推广唐罗主义，也就是说，可能在哥伦比亚境内打击某些毒品目标，甚至可能在墨西哥采取行动，我们可以谈谈这一点。

He's gonna try to find other ways to populate the Don Roe doctrine, which, you know, means maybe striking some drug targets inside Colombia, or maybe even in Mexico, we can talk about that.

前者比后者更有可能发生。

The former is more likely than the latter.

这意味着将对地区内反对美国的政府施加更大压力，比如尼加拉瓜和古巴，特朗普和马尔科·鲁比奥已经就这些问题展开过讨论。

It means more pressure on governments that are opposed to The United States in the region like Nicaragua and Cuba, where Trump and Marco Rubio have already been talking about that.

这意味着美国愿意制定计划，试图通过政治、经济和军事压力从一个坚定的前盟友丹麦手中夺取格陵兰，尽管丹麦是一个小国且实力不强。

It means that The United States is willing to put plans in place to try to take Greenland, not with boots on the ground, but with political, economic and military pressure against a committed erstwhile US ally, Denmark, but a small and not very powerful one.

同时，让我们认识到，如果去年一月你我交谈时——事实上，海伦，你我一月确实谈过，那时我们更多讨论的是关税，当时特朗普手中主要的权力工具是他的关税手段。

And let's also recognize that last year, if you and I had been talking in January, and actually Helen, you and I were talking in January, we were talking a lot more about tariffs, the principal US tool to project power in Trump's hands was his tariff man.

他利用进入美国市场的机会，对全球各国——无论朋友还是敌人，无论富裕还是贫穷，无论大小——施加压力，迫使它们达成美国所希望的协议。

And he was weaponizing access to The US market against countries all over the world, friends, foes, rich, poor, small, big, to get them to cut deals that the Americans wanted.

但他已不再能在2026年像2025年那样使用这一工具。

He no longer has the ability to use that tool in 2026 the way he did in 2025.

他需要达成更多协议。

He needs to cut more deals.

中国人已经向他表明，他们具备经济上强力反击的能力。

The Chinese have shown him that they are economically capable of hitting him back really hard.

因此，他必须对中国更加谨慎。

And so he needs to be more cautious with the Chinese.

这一点正在以多种方式显现出来。

That's playing out many ways.

他在美国面临可负担性问题，这也是佐兰·马姆达尼现在成为我所在城市纽约市市长的部分原因，而他在经济问题上的民调表现不佳。

He's got affordability issues in The US, part of why Zoran Mamdani is now mayor in my city, New York City, and he's not polling well on the economy.

他即将面临中期选举。

He's got midterm elections coming up.

最高法院将就IEPA作出裁决，可能会在一定程度上限制特朗普的关税权力。

The Supreme Court is gonna rule on IEPA and probably constrain Trump's tariff authority to a degree.

所有这些因素都使他更难使用关税手段。

All of those things make it harder for him to use tariffs.

从经济上看，世界正日益走向多极化。

And economically, the world is increasingly multipolar.

美国不再是唯一能决定结果的玩家。

The Americans are not the only player that can determine outcomes.

但在军事上，世界仍然是单极的，美国仍是主导力量。

But militarily, the world is still unipolar and The United States is still the dominant player.

这一点在西半球尤为明显。

And that is particularly true in the Western Hemisphere.

因此，特朗普在经济和外交政策上感到挫败时，将会更加积极地采取行动。

So Trump is going to lean in as he's frustrated on the economic side in foreign policy.

他很可能在国家安全方面采取更加强硬的立场。

He's likely to lean in much more heavily on the national security side.

这首先将在西半球显现，但也可能在伊朗发生。

That will play out first and foremost in the Western Hemisphere, but it can also play out in Iran.

还可能在其他地区发生，只要美国和特朗普认为你，先生，的行为不可接受。

It can also play out in other areas where The United States and Trump decides we don't like the way you, sir, are behaving.

让我感兴趣的是，你提到了丹麦，而且丹麦领导人以越来越强硬的措辞回应，甚至试图将北约拉入这一议题。

It's interesting to me that you bring up Denmark, and it's interesting to me that Denmark's leader has been responding in kind of increasingly stark terms, actually citing, trying to bring NATO into the picture.

实际上，我认为他是在试图表明，丹麦不是一个可以被美国轻易碾压的小国。

And actually, I think trying to establish that Denmark is not a small force that can be just kind of rolled over by The United States.

你是否也这样认为？

Is that what you see there?

你觉得格陵兰正在发生什么？

Do you think that the Like, what do you think is going on in Greenland?

首先，格陵兰对特朗普来说不是个笑话。

Well, first of all, Greenland is not a joke for Trump.

这样说有点令人痛苦，因为格陵兰显然是一个盟国的领土。

It's a little painful to say that because it obviously is the territory of an allied nation.

但事实上，特朗普和白宫有一群人正在研究他们想要在格陵兰获得的诸多利益，包括国家安全、政治忠诚和经济准入——其中大部分（并非全部）其实可以通过与丹麦谈判获得。

But the fact is that Trump and the White House have a number of people that are working on relevant pieces of what they want in Greenland, in terms of national security, in terms of political allegiance, in terms of economic access, much of which, not all, much of which they could get by negotiating just with the Danes.

但到目前为止，仅靠这一点还无法达成协议。

But that by itself so far is not getting to yes.

其原因不仅在于丹麦被视为弱小，还在于欧洲整体被视为软弱。

And the reason for that is not only because Denmark is seen to be as small, but also because the Europeans are seen to be weak.

在这里，我们应该稍微拓宽一下视野。

And here we should broaden the aperture a little bit.

已经有两个缩写词被不同群体用来解释特朗普的行为方式。

There have been two acronyms that have been described by very different populations in understanding how Trump behaves.

其中一个就是‘taco’。

And one is taco.

特朗普总是临阵退缩，这是他的对手和反对者用来形容他的说法：特朗普手套里没有拳头，他嘴上说要干X、Y、Z，但最后却退缩了。

Trump always chickens out, used by his adversaries and his opponents to say, you know, Trump doesn't have a fist in his glove and he says he's gonna do X, Y, and Z, but then he backs down.

第二个是FAFO，即‘瞎搞自取其祸’。

And then the second is FAFO, fuck around and find out.

这是特朗普的支持者、其政府内部成员，有时甚至是特朗普本人自己说的：你如果不按特朗普的意思办事，他就会让你吃苦头，后果会很严重。

And that is Trump's supporters and members of his own administration, and sometimes Trump himself, that says, you you don't do what Trump wants you to do, and he's gonna hurt you, and the consequences are gonna be serious.

当然，现实情况是，就像我们这个极度分裂、火烧眉毛的政治环境中许多事情一样，这两种情况其实同时存在，只是存在于一个连续谱系中。

And of course, the reality, like so many of these things in our very, very divided hair on fire political environment, the reality is that both of these things exist at the same time, but they exist along a spectrum.

你有一些非常强大的国家，它们既有能力也有意愿对特朗普的单边主义采取强硬回应。

You have, you know, certain very powerful countries that are capable and willing to actually respond with strength to Trump's unilateralism.

你可以把习近平领导的中国排在第一位，但普京领导的俄罗斯以及其他国家也属于这一类。

And you'd put Xi Jinping's China number one in that category, but you'd also put Putin in that category and others.

它们就是所谓的‘taco’国家，甚至包括巴西。

And they are the taco countries, Brazil even.

你知道，尽管有‘多恩主义’，巴西人还是被施加了巨大压力。

You know, the Brazilians were pushed really hard despite the Don Roe doctrine.

你知道，特朗普说，如果你不改善你们的社交媒体监管，我就要对你加征关税。

You know, Trump said, I'm gonna tariff you unless you do something about your social media regulation.

我不喜欢你们对待我们公司的那种方式。

I don't like the way it's treating our companies.

我不喜欢你们针对我的朋友博索纳罗，他儿子一直在马阿拉歌为我游说，而你们却因为他捏造新闻、试图推翻选举并策划刺杀卢拉，判了他27年监禁。

And I don't like the way you're going after my buddy, Jer Bolsonaro, whose son has been lobbying me down at Mar A Lago, and you just gave him a twenty seven year jail sentence for fake news, you know, trying to overturn the election and organize the assassination of Lula.

所以我打算对你们加征关税。

And so I'm gonna tariff you.

但特朗普最终退缩了。

And Trump has backed right down.

他退缩了，因为巴西是个大经济体，他需要巴西的原材料出口到美国以降低物价。

Backed down because Brazil's a big economy and he needs Brazilian commodities to be exported to The United States to bring prices down.

因此，卢拉和特朗普现在正朝着达成协议努力。

And so Lula and Trump are actually now working towards a deal.

他们处于TACO阵营的一侧。

They're on the TACO side of the equation.

但我们还有FAFO这一面。

But then we've got the FAFO side of the equation.

委内瑞拉显然属于FAFO这一面。

And Venezuela is obviously on the FAFO side of the equation.

马杜罗已经明白了。

Maduro has figured that out.

他直到大约48小时前还以为自己属于TACO阵营。

He thought he was TACO until about forty eight hours ago.

我向你保证，马杜罗现在清楚地知道，他们已完全陷入FAFO境地。

I assure you that Maduro now understands that they are solidly in FAFO territory.

还有其他人，墨西哥人也明白他们身处FAFO境地。

And there are others, the Mexicans understand that they're in FAFO territory.

古巴人肯定很快就会明白。

The Cubans certainly should understand that in very short order.

在特朗普看来，欧洲人，J。

The Europeans, in Trump's mind, in J.

D.

D.

万斯的脑海中，欧洲人已陷入FAFO境地。

Vance's mind, the Europeans are in FAFO territory.

他们需要更加认真地对待如何应对一个可能具有敌意的美国的威慑问题，以防止美国削弱自身的主权。

And they need to be much more serious about what deterrence looks like against a potentially adversarial United States to prevent The US from undermining their own sovereignty.

这正是丹麦首相发表声明并得到所有北欧领导人支持的原因：如果你们试图侵犯我们的主权，那就是北约的终结。

And that is what has motivated the statement by the Danish prime minister and the support from all of the Nordic leaders that this is the end of NATO if you try to transgress our sovereignty.

这实际上就是问题的核心。

And that's really what it amounts to.

这在国内的美国也同样适用：哪里会出现抵抗，哪里又会表现出力量？

And it's also what it amounts to domestically inside The United States is where will there be resistance and where will there be strength?

你知道，从历史上看，我们明白这个道理：你拿着刺刀，如果碰到钢铁，就会停下；如果碰到软泥，就会继续推进。

You know, I mean, historically we understand this, this idea that you've got a bayonet and if you hit steel, you stop, And if you hit mush, you press on.

这就是地缘政治中丛林法则的体现。

And this is the law of the jungle as applied to geopolitics.

这完全是特朗普对外政策的取向，如今正被全球各国所察觉。

And it is absolutely Trump's orientation towards foreign policy, which is now being seen as manifest by countries all around the world.

让我们暂时回到风险报告上。

So to get back to the risks report for a moment.

你在报告中写道，2026年是一个转折点年份。

So you, in the report, you wrote that 2026 is a tipping point year.

你列出的首个风险正是关于美国——世界上最强的国家正经历一场政治革命。

Actually the very first risk that you cite is about America, the fact that the world's most powerful country is in the throes of a political revolution.

但我其实想跳到报告后面你提到的一个短语，即美国正处于自己的‘戈尔巴乔夫晚期’。

But I actually want to skip to a phrase that you have later on in the report, which talks about America being in its own late Gorbachev era.

这个国家正朝着某种方向狂奔，但没人知道那会是什么。

The country is careening towards something, but nobody knows what.

我想请你谈谈这一点，因为我不认为任何人会自愿接受俄罗斯后戈尔巴乔夫时代的那种版本。

And I want you to talk about that because I don't think anyone would actually willingly sign up to be sign up for a version of Russia's own post Gorbachev era.

那么，我们究竟要去向何方？

So what do you where are we going?

你说得对，海伦，但很多人确实会支持一场针对他们认为不合法且无法为他们服务的体制的政治革命。

Well, you're right, Helen, but lots of people would sign up for a political revolution against the system that they believe is illegitimate and not working for them.

而这，当然，正是你得到特朗普的原因。

And that, of course, is exactly how you got Trump.

我们之前讨论过那篇文章，特朗普并不是美国政治体系 dysfunction 的根源。

You and I have talked about that piece before, that Trump is not the cause of the dysfunction in The US political system.

他只是一个症状、一个受益者，也是一个加速器，但并非根本原因。

He is a symptom, he is a beneficiary, and he is an accelerant, but he's not the cause.

在2024年，投票支持特朗普的人中，认为民主是投票的重要理由的人，比投票反对他的人更多。

And more people that voted for Trump believe that democracy is an important reason to vote than voted against him in 2024.

因为他们认为政治体系已经彻底崩溃，并被民主党武器化来针对特朗普，导致他前所未有的两次弹劾、前所未有的重罪定罪，以及令人痛心的近乎暗杀事件。

And it's because they thought the political system was so broken and had been weaponized by the Democrats against Trump, leading to his unprecedented two impeachments, leading to his unprecedented felony convictions, leading to his sadly precedented near assassination.

因此，他们不得不将美国的权力部门——司法部、联邦调查局、国税局——武器化，政治化整个行政体系，以确保这样的事情再也不会发生。

And that they, as a consequence, had to weaponize The US power ministries, the Department of Justice, the FBI, the IRS, had to politicize the administrative state to ensure that that would never happen again.

所以我们现在处于一个许多美国人、包括总统本人在内的环境中，他们认为美国的主要对手不是俄罗斯人，也不是中国人，而是国内的政治反对派。

So we are now in an environment where many, many Americans, and certainly including the president, believe that the principal adversary of The US is not the Russians, not the Chinese, but is inside the country, is the political opposition.

因此，这就是推动这场政治革命的原因。

So that is what is driving this political revolution.

在我这一生中，曾发生过三次具有宏观影响的大规模政治革命。

Now, in my lifetime, there have been three political revolutions at scale that have had macro impact.

第一次是邓小平在中国推行的经济革命，而非政治革命。

The first was Deng Xiaoping's economic revolution, not political, in China.

这场革命取得了成功。

And that was successful.

它使中国融入全球市场，并带来了长达五十年的前所未有的中国经济增长，如今使中国成为美国在经济和技术上的主要竞争对手。

It opened China up to the global market and it led to fifty years of unprecedented Chinese growth that now shows China to be an erstwhile economic competitor and technological competitor to The United States.

没有其他国家能与之相比。

No one else is close.

第二是戈尔巴乔夫的革命。

Number two was Gorbachev's revolution.

当时我作为一名年轻的政治学家，正在积累经验，亲历了这场变革。

I was cutting my teeth as a young political scientist as that was going on.

这既是一场经济革命，也是一场政治革命。

That was both an economic and a political revolution.

它失败了。

It failed.

因此，苏联解体了。

And as a consequence, the Soviet Union fell apart.

但在1989年、1990年，你并不知道它会成功还是失败。

But in 1989, 1990, you didn't know if it was going to succeed or fail.

你正身处其中。

You were in the middle of it.

很多人都参与其中。

And a lot of people were signed up for it.

现在，我们在美国经历了一场政治革命，而不是经济革命。

And now we have a political revolution in The United States, not an economic revolution.

特朗普正在推动这场革命。

Trump is driving it.

到2026年，这一进程显然已远远超出了2025年初任何观察者的预期。

It, in 2026, has clearly gone much farther than any observers at the beginning of 2025 believed it would.

而美国国内的抵抗力量也比2025年初任何观察者预期的都要弱。

And the resistance inside The United States has been weaker than any observers at the beginning of 2025 believed it would be.

因此，美国的政治革命显然是当前全球最大的风险。

And that's why the political revolution in The US is clearly the top global risk out there.

这并不意味着政治革命一定会成功，但可以肯定的是，它将继续推进。

That's not to say the political revolution will be successful, but it is to say that it will proceed.

随着我们向中期选举和2028年迈进，它将变得更加具有破坏性，而非减弱。

It will become more disruptive, not less, as we move towards midterm elections and 2028.

在我们看到抵抗的地方，当特朗普能够打破现有体制时，我认为其后果至少在部分层面上将对美国和全球权力格局产生永久性影响。

And where we see resistance, where Trump is able to break the system, I believe the consequences will be permanent, at least in part, for The United States and for the global power balance.

你是否看到美国境内有任何力量正在崛起，主张采取不同的路径？

Do you see any stabilizing force emerging within The US to espouse a different tack?

当然有，但目前还为时过早。

Sure, but it is still early days.

因此，我们在本报告中做的一件事是，审视了2025年期间所有可能被视为支持政治革命的政策。

So one of the things we did in this report is we took a look at all of the policies that could be seen as supporting a political revolution over the course of 2025.

我们对这些政策进行了分类，建立了一种方法论，并从它们对美国政治规范的侵蚀以及对行政权力制衡机制的影响角度进行了分析。

And we characterized them, we developed a methodology, and we looked at them in terms of the impact they had on norms, eroding political norms in The US, and on impacting the checks and balances on the executive.

对于那些显著侵蚀制衡机制和政治规范的政策，我们将其归类为政治革命的范畴。

And for those that were actually eroding in a significant way, both the checks and balances and the norms, that was the group of activities that you would see as political revolution.

那些仅侵蚀规范但未破坏制衡机制的，属于规范破裂，但不属于系统性破坏。

Those that just erode norms, but not the checks and balances are norm breaking, but not system breaking.

而那些既不侵蚀规范也不破坏制衡的政策，很多之所以登上头条，是因为人们在政治议题上情绪激动。

And those that neither erode norms nor checks, a lot of them make headlines because people's hair is on fire on the politics.

因此，'橙色男人坏'，一切都糟透了。

And so orange man bad, and so everything is horrible.

但实际上，这些是我们不应该关注的事情。

But in reality, those are things we shouldn't be paying attention to.

于是，我们做了所有这些分析，并将结果呈现在一个二维图表上。

So we did all of that and we put it on a two by two graph.

如果你仅关注过去一年中真正侵蚀规范和制衡机制的行为——如机构关闭、IEPA关税、国民警卫队部署、ActBlue调查、解雇独立委员、新闻机构诉讼、律师事务所制裁、口袋否决、丽莎·库克被解雇、大学拨款冻结、科米和詹姆斯的起诉，等等，不一而足。

And if you just look at the acts that were taken that really truly erode norms and checks and balances over the last year, agency shutdowns, IEPA tariffs, National Guard deployments, ActBlue investigation, firing independent commissioners, news organization lawsuits, law firm sanctions, pocket rescissions, Lisa Cook firing, university grant freezes, Comey and James prosecutions, on and on and on.

我的意思是，这种程度的行动在第一年就出现，是前所未有的，前所未有的。

I mean, this is unprecedented in the first year, in the first year.

不过，并非所有这些努力都取得了成功。

Now, not all of those efforts have been successful.

这就像你往墙上扔很多东西，看看哪些能粘住，然后在没有遇到阻力时继续推进。

It's like you throw a lot at the wall and you see what sticks and then you keep going when you don't see resistance.

有些措施被阻止了，有些还在待定中，有些则已被特朗普成功实施。

Some of these things have been prevented, some of these things are still to be determined, some of them have been successful by Trump.

我认为，你看到有效抵抗的地方，首先是法院——最高法院并未愿意对所有事项作出裁决，其反应速度显然比特朗普的挑战要慢得多。

I would say that the things, the places where you see successful resistance, number one, the courts, the Supreme Court has not been willing to rule on all things and certainly is slower in response and the courts in general than Trump's ability to challenge.

我们在最近的一些行动中，比如委内瑞拉的行动，就清楚地看到了这一点。

And we certainly see that with actions, most recent actions, for example, in Venezuela.

但也有许多领域，法院展现了其独立性，陪审团制度当然也继续由美国公民随机组成并保持独立。

But there've been many areas where the courts have shown that they continue to be independent, that the jury system of course continues to be independent and randomized from American citizens.

最高法院本身是独立的，并且作为对总统的制衡，包括制约总统无法竞选第三个任期。

And the Supreme Court itself is independent and acts as a check on the president, including as a check on the president's inability to run for a third term.

尽管军队高层被政治化，尽管许多监察长被撤职，我认为军队中资深的专业人员仍然忠于宪法和国家，而非忠于总统个人，这至关重要。

The military, despite the politicization of the top of the military, despite the removal of many of the inspectors general, I would say that the solid senior corps of military professionals are loyal to the constitution and the country and not loyal to the president individually, and that really matters.

美国的联邦制度，即美国仍然拥有各州，这些州有红州和蓝州，由更具技术官僚倾向的人治理，包括市长，而非国会众议员和参议员那样的同事。

The federal system in The US, the fact that The US still has states and that those are red and blue states, and those are governed by people that are much more technocratic in orientation, mayors as well, than their colleagues in the House and Senate.

他们掌控着许多对美国国内事务至关重要的政策决策，包括即将举行的美国中期选举和联邦选举的运作方式。

And they have control over a lot of policy decisions that matter for The US domestically, including the way elections are conducted in the US midterms coming up and federal.

以及总统选举。

And presidential.

因此，基于所有这些原因，都存在制衡机制。

So for all of those reasons, there are checks.

如果你现在让我打赌，我会说我相信特朗普的政治革命将会失败。

And if you made me bet today, I would say I believe that Trump's political revolution will fail.

但目前我对这一判断并没有很强的信心。

But I do not have a strong level of confidence in that call at this point.

事情进展得很快。

It's moving quickly.

我非常有信心，特朗普的政治变革将继续下去，而且在我们确定这一结果之前，事情就会崩溃。

I have a strong level of confidence that Trump's political revolution will continue and that things are going to break before we determine that outcome.

而且这种状况是不可持续的，我们很可能在2028年之前就经历某种宪法危机或接近宪法危机。

And that it's also unsustainable, that it's quite likely that we will experience some kind of constitutional or near constitutional crisis or crises well before we get to 2028.

好的，我们来看看欧洲，这也是你提到的另一个风险。

All right, let's go to Europe, which is another of the risks that you cite.

你将其描述为‘处于萌芽状态的欧洲’。

You describe it as Europe under seed.

你已经提到，欧洲必须挺身而出，建立某种针对特朗普的威慑机制，以表明他们并不像美国——尤其是JD·万斯——似乎认为的那样软弱。

Now you already talked about the fact that Europe kind of needs to step up and develop some form of deterrence against Trump in order to kind of show that they're not as weak as apparently The US, especially JD Vance seems to think that they are.

同时，正如你在报告中所写，英国、法国和德国目前都面临着巨大的内部压力，难以集中精力完成发展必要威慑机制等任务。

At the same time, as you write in this report, The UK, France and Germany are all facing incredible internal pressure currently and are not really able to focus on doing what is necessary to develop whatever deterrence is necessary, etcetera.

所以，请跟我们谈谈欧洲，以及今年我们应当关注什么。

So talk to us about Europe and what we should be looking for this year.

是的，我的意思是，欧洲人基本上赌的是，世界将继续依赖一个具有特殊地位且不可或缺的美国，这个美国会推动自由贸易和集体安全，而跨大西洋关系对美国至关重要。

Yeah, I mean, the Europeans have basically made a bet that the world was gonna continue with an exceptionalist indispensable America that would promote free trade and collective security and that the transatlantic relationship would be critical for The US.

他们做出了这个赌注，几十年来一直如此。

They made that bet, they've made it for decades.

这是一个错误的赌注。

That was a bad bet.

说这话很痛苦，因为我希望它是个正确的赌注，但它不是。

And it's painful to say that because I would like it to have been a good bet, but it wasn't.

当我第一次在2012年撰写关于GZERO世界的文章时，我提出了美国更可能走向独立而非不可或缺的轨迹，而欧洲人显然并不相信这一点。

And when I wrote about the GZERO world for the first time in 2012, and I wrote about independent America as opposed to indispensable America as the more likely trajectory for The US, the Europeans clearly did not believe it.

即使他们相信，也没有准备采取行动。

And if they did believe it, they weren't prepared to act on it.

而现在，已经太晚了。

And now it is getting very late.

我认为北欧国家、波罗的海国家、德国和波兰现在确实理解并接受了这种紧迫性。

I do think the Nordics, the Baltics, the Germans, the Poles, I do think that they now understand and accept the urgency.

我不确定他们是否有能力做出足够强有力的回应以产生实质性影响。

I am not sure that they are capable of responding sufficiently strongly to make it matter.

他们有德拉吉报告，正努力提升竞争力，提高生产率和经济增长，支持创业，增加研发和基础设施投资，降低能源成本，并发展能够与美国竞争的技术公司。

They have the Draghi report, they are trying to become more competitive, they're trying to improve their productivity and growth, support entrepreneurship, invest more in research and development and infrastructure, bring energy costs down and develop technology companies that can compete with The United States.

他们离这个目标还很遥远。

They're remotely close to that.

他们正试图大幅增加国防开支，并推动欧洲内部以及与加拿大等国的防务整合，以减少对美国的依赖。

They are trying to spend much more on defense And they're trying to integrate that defense across Europe and with the Canadians and with others, so that they don't need the Americans as much.

而他们把所有资金都花在了乌克兰身上。

And they are spending all the money on Ukraine.

美国纳税人如今并不支持乌克兰。

The American taxpayers are not supporting Ukraine today.

一年前他们还支持。

They were a year ago.

当时几乎是五五开。

It was almost fiftyfifty.

今天，欧洲人正在做所有这些事情。

Today, the Europeans are doing all of it.

但我是否相信欧洲人能在外部面临俄罗斯直接压力、以及美国不认为强大的欧盟对美国有利、希望欧盟分裂、希望出现更多英国脱欧、支持德国的AfD、英国的改革派、法国的国民联盟等疑欧政党等重重压力下，做得足够多？不，我不相信。

But do I believe the Europeans will be able to do enough given the extraordinary pressures externally from Russia directly, from a US that does not believe that a strong European Union is good for The US, wants the EU to fragment, wants more Brexits, wants to support Eurosceptic parties like the AFD in Germany, like reform in The UK, like the national rally in France, no.

不幸的是，如果你让我下注，我不会押注欧洲人能通过这一过程取得成功。

Unfortunately, I would not, if you made me make the bet, I would not make the bet that the Europeans will succeed through this process.

某种程度上，我会押注中国人能通过这一过程取得成功。

And in a way that I would make the bet that the Chinese will succeed through this process.

但这不是我想下的注。

That is not the bet I wanna make.

我更愿意说，欧洲人将会成功，而中国人将面临更多困难，他们必须更多地与所谓的西方政治和经济体系靠拢。

I would rather say that the Europeans are gonna succeed and the Chinese have a harder time and they have to align more with quote unquote Western political system, economic system.

但正如你所知，这并不是我喜欢什么的问题。

But as you know, this is not about what I like.

这也不是我更希望什么的问题。

This is not about what I would prefer.

没人真的在意。

Nobody really cares.

这关乎我的评估，关乎欧亚集团——我们有250名全球分析师——基于我们的分析以及我们与世界各地领导人交流所获得的信息，我们相信将会发生什么。

This is about what I assess, what Eurasia Group, two fifty people, analysts all over the world, what we believe on the basis of our analysis and the basis of the people that we talk to, the leaders all over the world, what we believe is gonna happen.

因此，欧洲在今年的报告中成为如此重大的风险。

And that's why Europe is such a significant risk in the report this year.

所以我想就这一点提一个后续问题。

So I have a follow-up question about that.

当然，我们都非常关心你的看法，伊恩。

Of course we all care deeply what you think, Ian.

让我们说得清楚一点，但是——

Let's be very clear, but-

不，我想强调的和我的个人看法完全不同。

No, I want, very different from what I think.

你想要什么？

What do you want?

没错。

That's right.

抱歉。

Sorry.

我脑子一片混乱。

My head is very foggy.

但我很好奇。

But I'm curious.

如果欧洲没有采取必要的措施，会是什么样子？

What does it look like if Europe doesn't do what is necessary?

接下来会发生什么？我甚至都不明白这会带来什么后果。

What is the next what I I don't even understand what the implications of that really are.

欧盟将更加分裂。

The EU becomes more divided.

它将变成一次失败的实验。

It becomes more of a failed experiment.

他们变成了攫取者，而不是技术与规则的创造者。

They become makers, I mean, takers as opposed to makers of technology and of rules.

欧洲一直是一个监管超级大国，能够制定出世界上许多其他国家必须遵守的规则。

The Europeans have been a regulatory superpower that have been able to make rules that a lot of the rest of the world have to align with.

如果你想进入欧洲市场，他们就必须接受由其他国家制定的规则，否则就无法获得准入。

If you want access to the European market, they will have to tolerate rules that are basically being set by other countries or else they won't get access.

这意味着他们的增长将继续减弱。

And that means that their growth will continue to diminish.

这也意味着欧洲的社会契约将开始瓦解。

And it also means that the social contract in Europe will start to fall apart.

问题是，如果你思考全球经济以及经济体系的运作方式，美国并不是一个自由市场，而中国是国家控制的。

The thing is, if you think about the global economy and how economic systems work, The United States is not like a free market and China is state controlled.

其运作方式是，在中国，国家掌控企业。

The way it's worked has been in China, the state captures corporations.

在美国，私营部门掌控监管环境。

In The US, the private sector captures the regulatory environment.