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大家好。
Hi, everyone.
欢迎收听a16z播客。
Welcome to the a16z podcast.
我是Sonal，今天这一期节目完全围绕网络效应展开，内容基于我们之前举办的一场活动，而那场活动又是根据我们发布的一组幻灯片做的，你们可以在bit.lee/networkeffectsa16z上找到这些资料。
I'm Sonal, and today's episode is all about network effects, and it's based on an event we did that was itself based on a set of slides that we released that you can find online at bit.lee/networkeffectsa16z.
欢迎来到我们的网络效应专场活动。
Welcome to our network effects event.
在开始之前，我先简单介绍一下我们的嘉宾，你们应该都认识，毕竟你们是冲着他们来的。
Before we get started, let me actually just quickly introduce our guests who you probably know because you came here knowing who they are.
不过我还是快速说一下他们的背景。
But just quickly tell you about who they are.
Anu 是电气工程专业出身。
Anu is an electrical engineer by training.
她以前在高通工作，负责开发那里的视频流解决方案。
She used to work at Qualcomm where she built the video streaming solution there.
后来她去了波士顿咨询公司，现在是我们交易与投资团队的合伙人，和 Jeff 一起负责所有平台类业务。
And then later, worked at BCG, and she's now a partner in our deal and investing team, and she covers all things marketplaces with Jeff.
Jeff 是我们这里的普通合伙人。
Jeff's a general partner here.
他之前是 OpenTable 的 CEO，这也是为什么我们网络效应团队特别强的原因，他还曾任 PayPal 总裁和 eBay 的 SPP，目前担任的董事会席位包括我们很多具有网络效应的公司，比如 Airbnb，还有很多其他企业。
He was previously the CEO at OpenTable, which is why the network effects team is particularly strong here, and president at PayPal and SPP at eBay before And his board seats include a lot of our companies that have network effects like Airbnb and many more.
其实挺有意思的是，这份演示文稿最初源于一次内部讨论。
It's actually funny because this whole deck started off as the result of an internal debate.
我们团队文化一向很有主见，各种强烈观点层出不穷。
And, you know, we're pretty opinionated as a culture, and there's a lot of strong opinions floating around.
没错。
Yep.
但我觉得挺有意思的是，这可能是我们内部关于‘网络效应’到底是什么争论得最激烈的一次。
But I think it's kind of funny because this is probably one of the most internal contentious debates we've had around what is a network effect?
我觉得这是因为这个概念听起来很简单，但真正掌握起来却很难。
And I think it's because it's one of those concepts that's really easy to learn but difficult to master.
既然说到这儿，咱们先来明确一下，什么叫网络效应。
So on that note, let's just start off by defining what's a network effect.
简单来说，我认为核心就是：用户越多，平台对现有用户的价值就越大。
Yes, simply put, I think the simple definition is as more users join the platform, it's more valuable to existing users.
就这么简单，对吧？
So it's really as simple as that, right?
其实网络效应最早是从硬件开始的。
And it actually started with hardware.
想想20世纪初的电话。
So think of the telephone in the early nineteen hundreds.
当时能打电话的人越多，电话的用处就越大。
The more people that had telephone you could actually make a phone call.
所以当用电话的人越多，对你来说就越有价值，因为你能联系到的人也越多。
So there was a network effect if more people it was valuable to you because if more people had telephone you could reach more people.
一开始听起来很简单，但我觉得大家最大的误解，包括我们内部也争论过的是，增长和网络效应的区别。
So it sounds very simple at the onset but I think the biggest misconception people have, in fact we internally have debated about is growth versus network effects.
增长是不一样的，特别是初创公司早期，用户增长很快，那就是增长。
So growth is different because especially as a startup in your early days, you're growing really fast, that's growth.
但网络效应真正体现的是价值。
But network effect is really value.
随着用户越来越多，你的服务对用户来说到底有多大的价值？
How valuable is your service to the users as more users join the platform?
不过我要澄清一下，增长和价值是两回事，那这种价值和用户活跃度有什么区别呢？
So to be clear though, it's growth and value, but what's the difference between that value and engagement?
光说我们用户活跃度很高，就能证明有网络效应吗？
Is it enough to just say, we've got a lot of engagement and therefore we have a network effect?
你怎么确定真的存在网络效应？
How do you actually know there is a network effect?
我的意思是，我们经常为这个概念争得不可开交，因为显而易见的是，拥有网络效应的企业通常非常有护城河，而且很容易形成垄断。
I mean, we we brawl over this concept because the easy observation is businesses with network effects typically are very defensible and often are prone to monopoly.
你懂的。
You know?
我们想在公司早期就介入，但那时候网络效应还没那么明显。
And we're trying to get in early in the company, so that's not completely apparent when we're investing.
所以，你知道的，我们有时候会有人拍着桌子争论。
So, you know, you're brought you know, we'll have people standing on the table.
这明显是网络效应。
There's a network effect.
理由在这儿。
Here's why.
但其实不是，理由是这样。
And no, there's not, and here's why.
所以说，这确实是我们在很多消费类和部分企业类业务中做投资决策的关键因素之一。
And so, I mean, it is one of the key drivers investment decision on a whole bunch of our consumer side businesses and some of the business side businesses.
我的意思是，去年我们还真做过一张幻灯片，专门讲过这个事。
I mean, we actually told it, put a slide up to our, please, last year.
网络效应就是护城河。
Network effects equals moats.
只要你能做到这一点，你的业务就很难被撼动。
And, you know, if you if you can achieve it, you're defensible.
你也不用太担心价格战的压力。
You're less susceptible to price pressure.
像用户获取成本这类问题，你也不用太焦虑，因为只要你的服务比别人更有价值，这种优势就能在整个过程中不断积累。
You're less susceptible to pressure of, you know, consumer acquisition economics and things like that because if your service is more valuable than the other, you can accrete that value, through throughout the entire process.
没错。
Right.
而且对用户来说确实很有价值，这一点特别关键。但说实话，我们内部有时候对网络效应到底是什么理解得不太准，经常误以为只要产品有病毒式增长，那就是网络效应。
And it's I mean, I think it's valuable for users, which is really key, but that is actually where I think we get tripped on up what a network effect really is internally because I think we sometimes confuse, Oh my god, the product has viral growth.
病毒式增长就算网络效应吗？
Is that a network effect?
那你怎么区分这两者呢？
How do you tease those apart?
对。
Yeah.
我觉得这确实很难，尤其是当你是一家高速增长的初创公司时，所以我们内部一直在争论公司到底有没有网络效应。
And I think that it's hard to do it especially when you're a hyper growth startup which is why we have our own internal debates whether the company has network effect or not.
我觉得病毒式增长讲的是用户采纳的速度。
I think viral growth is speed of adoption.
可以把速度理解为病毒式增长。
Think of speed as viral growth.
通常如果你有病毒式增长，就意味着你几乎不用花什么钱在用户获取上。
And usually if you have viral growth, it sort of implies that you're not spending anything in customer acquisition costs.
没错，Facebook就是个很好的例子，很长一段时间以来，直到今天，他们几乎不花什么钱去拉新用户。
Right, so Facebook is a great example for the longest time, even to this day, they hardly spend money on acquiring users.
对吧？
Right?
尤其是在最初的几年里，他们一分钱都没花。
And especially in the initial years, they spent $0.
用户量却疯狂增长。
It was growing wildly.
那你怎么判断Facebook到底有没有网络效应呢？
So how do you actually decipher whether Facebook has a network effect?
因为他们的月活跃用户和日活跃用户增长得很快。
Because their MAUs and DAUs were growing quite fast.
月活跃用户。
The MAUs
你是说每月的活跃用户吧。
you mean the monthly
月活跃用户和日活跃用户。
active Monthly active and the daily actives.
但有一项指标，扎克伯格在很多采访中都提到过，他在前两年最关注的就是留存率。
But the one metric, Zuckerberg has done a great job of saying this in so many interviews, the one metric that he really focused on in the first two years was retention.
他衡量留存率的方式是用每日活跃用户除以每月活跃用户。
And the way he measured retention was daily actives by monthly actives.
如果你看他们前十八个月的数据图表，留存率一直在从52%升到55%，再到57%。
And if you see their chart in the first eighteen months, it kept going from 52% to 55% to 57%.
这说明用户真的一直在平台上留下来。
That showed that people really stayed in the network.
这才是网络效应的体现，而不仅仅是用户数量的病毒式增长。
That was a measure of the network effect and not just the viral growth in their users.
顺便说一句，你想想这个数字有多高。
And by the way, just think about the level of that number.
我2006年的时候跟马克聊过。
I was talking to Mark in 2006.
他主动联系我，说想见个面，我们正聊着生意，他手机突然响了，看了一眼就笑了。
He reached out and asked to get together and we're chatting about the business and he got a text at the time, dinged and he reads it and he smiles.
我就问他，什么事让你笑成这样？
I go, what made you smile?
他说：‘哦，我们每天的运营数据都是通过短信收到的。’
And he goes, oh, this is we get our daily metrics via text.
我问：‘什么数据？’
I go, what metric?
他回答：‘就是这个指标。’
And he goes, it was this metric.
他问我：‘你猜猜，昨天有多少我们历史上所有注册用户是活跃的？’
He goes, how many of our cumulative historic users do you think were active yesterday?
我说：‘我刚从eBay和PayPal出来。’
And I'm like, I'm just came out of eBay and PayPal.
我说：‘大概3%吧。’
I'm like, 3% maybe.
我胆子大了点，说可能6%，结果他说53%，也就是说，所有曾经注册过这个服务的人里，有53%的人前一天还在用，而且你知道吗？随着用户基数越来越大、时间越来越久，这个数字还在持续上升，我当时就愣住了。
I think I got bold and, you know, 6%, and he goes 53%, and, you know, 53% of everyone who had ever signed up for the service was active the day before, and that, by the way, has only grown as, you know, their installed base age, it gets bigger and ages, that number's grown, and you're just kinda like, okay.
这真是一个网络效应的体现
That's a network
效果。
effect.
而且
And
我觉得这场讨论最有趣的地方在于，这根本不是偶然，但听起来就像偶然一样，因为你总听到这样的说法，天哪。
I think the thing that's most interesting about this whole discussion is it's not by accident, but it feels like it's by accident because you hear these narratives, you know, like, oh my god.
Facebook当时在各个校园里迅速走红，但事实上，这是有人真正在背后努力的结果，我想这里的人们也想听听具体是怎么做的，毕竟，人们到底做了些什么？
Facebook reached this number and it was taking off at campuses everywhere, And in reality, it's something people actually work at, and I think people here wanna hear about how because, I mean, what are some of the things that people do?
比如，他们是怎么开始的？
Like, how do they start?
Facebook是个特例。
I mean, Facebook's a unique case.
对。
Mhmm.
也许我们可以先从Facebook说起。
Maybe we can start with Facebook.
可以举其他例子，但人们在还没产生效应之前，通常会做些什么来搭建这个网络呢？
Can have other examples, but what are some of the things that people do to get to that network before there's an effect?
对。
Yeah.
我觉得第一个问题应该是，如果你有个产品，该怎么从零开始启动？
I think the first question you want to ask is if you have a product is how do you bootstrap?
在初期，你该用哪些方法来快速积累用户？
What are some of the early growth hacks that you want to do to build the user base?
然后，在用户增长的过程中，你其实是在测试产品和市场的匹配度。
And then the second step is you're sort of testing your product market fit as you grow the users.
接下来，你必须迅速搞清楚：究竟是哪个关键时刻，让用户愿意回头继续使用你的产品，从而真正推动网络效应？
And then what you have to quickly hone on, what is the moment that gets the user back to continue to use my product which actually drives the network effect.
就拿Facebook来说，大多数人以为它是随机扩张的，其实它采取的是非常集中的策略。
And so in Facebook's case, to what most people think, they actually went in a very clustered approach.
他们先在哈佛大学上线，你可能会想，他们为什么不直接推广到所有学校呢？
So the first was they first launched in Harvard and you could argue that they could easily expand to all the schools, right?
但他们当时的目标是，至少要让80%的哈佛学生注册Facebook，并且保持超过50%的日活跃度。
But I think their goal was they needed to get at least 80% of Harvard signed up on Facebook and sort of have that high bar of 50% plus engagement.
他们希望每天有超过一半的人回来使用，这目标可不低。
So they wanted more than 50% to come back daily, which is a very stretched goal.
其实如果你回过头去看早期的投资人，有人就批评说，你们增长太慢了。
And in fact if you go back to some of the early investors, one of the criticism of Facebook was, well you didn't grow fast enough.
当然，后来的事实是，他们在十八个月内几乎渗透了80%的大学，而且用户留存率非常高。
I mean it's a different story that they did penetrate almost 80% of the colleges in eighteen months and had high retention.
但他们完全是靠一种非常有策略的方式做到的。
But they did it in a very strategic way.
在哈佛达到那个高门槛之前，他们根本没考虑向斯坦福扩展。
Until they hit that high bar on Harvard, they did not roll it out to Stanford.
这种自律让他们不断优化产品，找到最合适的体验。
And the discipline that they got as a result were they were tweaking the product to get the right fit.
比如一些看似简单的小功能，像情感状态设置。
So simple things like the relationship status.
他们发现，这个功能极大地提升了活跃度，因为人们不好意思当面问别人感情状况，但在Facebook上却能轻松查到。
They realized actually drove engagement really high because people felt uncomfortable asking someone else like what is your relationship status while you could go to Facebook and figure that out.
第二点是，他们发现，如果新用户在14天内加了10个好友，他们回头使用的概率会高很多。
Second thing that they did was they realized that if someone was connected to 10 friends in fourteen days, they were much likely to return to Facebook.
意识到这一点后，他们对每个新用户都刻意引导，确保他们在14天内凑够10个好友。
When they realized that they started, every new user that they joined, they worked on making sure that they got to 10 friends within fourteen days.
他们简直会死缠烂打，非得让你凑够10个好友不可。
They would actually bludgeon the crap out of you to get you to 10 friends.
比如你一上线，他们就问：‘你认识这12个人吗？’
It would be like, you'd show up and like, Do you know these 12 people?
马克当时用的一个绝招，后来还因此惹了麻烦——他偷偷抓取了各宿舍的通讯录，把哈佛全校的学生都提前导入了Facebook，让用户自己认领身份，一上线就能看到一堆已填充的好友。
So, one of the best hacks Mark had was, he even is well known, he got in trouble for it, he hacked the directories in each of the houses and so he pre populated everyone on the Harvard campus into Facebook and then let people claim their identities but you could then friend it was populated when the first person showed up.
虽然这样做的实际用途可能没那么大，但至少页面不是空荡荡的，不像你一个人走进体育馆，四下无人。
It might not have had the same utility but it was populated versus being the person to show up, it's like, you know, I'm in a stadium by myself.
所以，虽然他因此被叫去见了校长，但这个操作确实让平台快速填满了内容，带来了实实在在的使用价值。
And so, I mean, I think he did end up in front of the president of the university for that hack but the hack populated it and brought a bunch of utility.
所以，人们就会用‘增长黑客’这个词。
And so, you would use the word growth hack.
几乎每一个平台都有一些巧妙的办法，来解决这个看似无解的鸡生蛋还是蛋生鸡的问题。
Virtually every marketplace we can think of had some hack or hacks that enabled them to solve the impossible chicken and egg problem.
比如说OpenTable，这就是个典型的鸡生蛋蛋生鸡问题。
The chicken and egg problem is, okay, OpenTable.
对餐厅来说，只有当顾客来了，这个平台才有用。
It's only useful to restaurants if consumers are there.
对顾客来说，也只有当餐厅都在上面，才值得用。
It's only useful to consumers if restaurants were there.
那到底该从哪儿开始呢？
Where do you start?
所以，很多创业者都想出了各种各样的办法来破解这个难题。
And so, you know, there's a whole bunch of different hacks that different entrepreneurs have used to try to address that.
怎么才能让这个循环转起来？
How do you get the flywheel spinning?
是的。
Yeah.
那你还见过其他人用过哪些别的方法来解决这个问题吗？
Well, what are some of the other ways that you've seen people stumble on this?
有时候人们是偶然发现这个窍门的，还是说都是有意为之？
Because sometimes people discover the hack by accident, or is it deliberate?
我的意思是，他们到底是怎么做到的？你真的会某天早上醒来，突然决定：
I mean, how do they really I mean, do you actually wake up one day and say, okay.
我要
I'm gonna
为这个平台找到那个关键的突破口吗？
figure out the hack for this marketplace?
对，确实如此。
Oh, yes.
你真的会。
You do.
没错。
Exactly.
不对。
No.
不是这样的。
No.
我们在和创业者交谈时，会问他们：你的冷启动计划是什么？
You're when we're talking to entrepreneurs, you're looking for the What's your theory on how you're going to bootstrap?
你打算怎么让增长飞轮转起来？
How are you going get the flywheel spinning?
你怎么解决先有鸡还是先有蛋的问题？
How are going solve the chicken and egg problem?
你会先从哪一边入手？
Which side are you going to start on?
OpenTable 最后是从餐厅端开始的，因为如果没有足够的餐厅入驻，对消费者来说根本没什么用。
So, OpenTable ended up starting completely on the restaurant side because there was zero utility to the consumer until you had a selection of restaurants.
那么，当还没有消费者使用的时候，你怎么让餐厅愿意采用它呢？
And so, how do you get a restaurant to adopt it when no consumers are using it?
OpenTable 的情况就是克里斯·迪克森说的：冲着工具来，留下来是因为网络。
So, in OpenTable's case is what Chris Dixon, come for the tools, stay for the network.
他们开发了一整套工具，每套收费 200 美元，一个一个餐厅地慢慢推广，全国铺开。这些工具本身就有足够价值，让餐厅即使没有用户网络也愿意用。
They build a suite of tools that they charge $200 for and laboriously rolled out one restaurant at a time throughout the country that had enough utility that a restaurant was saying, Okay, I'll adopt that in the absence of a network.
随着他们一点点建立起餐厅基础——我说的是真的慢，一个靠谱的销售每个月只能拿下三到四家新餐厅，而旧金山就有两千家餐厅。
As they slowly built that base of restaurants, and I mean slowly, I mean a good salesperson would do three or four new restaurants a month and there's 2,000 restaurants in San Francisco.
这速度太慢了。
That is slow.
但后来，系统里的餐厅数量终于达到了一个临界点。
Then there was a point where there was enough restaurants on the system.
虽然只是全部餐厅中的一小部分，但在线预订的便利性太强了，消费者会说：管它有没有 80% 的餐厅，只要这 20% 能用，就足够吸引我了。
It was a subset of the restaurants in the system but the utility of making an online order was so great that they'd say, I'd ignore the fact that you don't have 80% of restaurants because the 20% you do have has a huge amount of utility.
一旦消费者开始通过 OpenTable 预订，整个系统就突然爆发了，因为餐厅老板一看：天哪，座位真的被填满了！
As soon as the consumer started booking any reservations through OpenTable, the system exploded because all of a sudden the restaurateur is saying, Oh, they're filling the seats.
所以当时的情况是，客户因为工具而来，后来因为网络而留下。那些最初在旧金山和纽约每个月只签下三家餐厅的销售代表，七八年后，同样的人每个月能签下二十家。
So that case was come for the tools but then stay for the network and so the sales rep that initially in San Francisco and New York sold three restaurants a month, the same reps in most cases, seven, eight years later were selling 20.
我的意思是，他们现在几乎每天都能签下一单，因为突然间，我有了这么多工具，挺有意思的，能帮你把餐厅坐满。每个人来消费五十块，你的毛利是百分之三十，也就是赚十五块，而你只付给我一美元，全天下来，这个飞轮就开始转起来了。
I mean, they're ripping off one a day because all of a sudden, I have got all these tools, they're kind of interesting, I'm going to fill your restaurant and, you know, each person I'm going put in the restaurant is going to bring $50 and your margin on that $50 is 30% so you're earning $15 and you're paying us a dollar, you know, all day long and so that then, you know, the flywheel goes.
顺便说一句，这是按城市一个个来的。你在旧金山有了足够多的餐厅，并不意味着迈阿密就能自动搞定，你得从头开始，在迈阿密、东京、慕尼黑，一个城市一个城市地推进，这过程非常缓慢。
By the way, that was city by city so the fact that you had sufficient restaurants in San Francisco meant nothing in Miami so you started again in Miami and in Tokyo and in, you know, in Munich and it's a slow roll up.
那你是不是会建议别人，换个思路来规划策略？因为我觉得，如果只能在本地做起来，却没法扩展到全球，很多人可能会犹豫不决。
Do you actually advise people then to, like, think about their strategy differently, you know, to go like, because I would think people would stall if you you can only get a local but not get global.
你到底是怎么平衡这两方面的？
Like, do you how do you sort of balance?
我的意思是，现在大家压力都很大，总觉得得赶紧全球化。
I mean, I feel like there's a pressure these days to, like, go global fast.
那你怎么权衡这些取舍和决策？
How do you make those trade offs and decisions?
我的意思是，不同的平台市场，其特性都不一样。
I mean, different marketplace have different characters.
本地市场特别难做，进展也慢，但一旦做起来了，价值会非常大，别人想超越也很难。
The local ones are are really hard and really slow and it but if you build them, they can be really valuable and really tough to overcome.
现在想取代OpenTable几乎是不可能的。
So, you know, it is virtually impossible to displace OpenTable at this point.
它是最强的网络平台。
It's the strongest network.
我以前待过几家网络效应特别强的公司，比如eBay、PayPal、Airbnb和Pinterest。
I've worked for some great network effects businesses, eBay, PayPal, Airbnb, Pinterest.
目前想从餐厅里把OpenTable挤出去几乎是不可能的，但他们当初也是一城一城慢慢打下来的。
It's virtually impossible to displace OpenTable from a restaurant right now, but they had to go market by market to do that.
eBay就不一样了，一上线就全国铺开，几乎瞬间全球化——只要你平台上有个收藏古董的人，就有机会。
I mean, eBay was instantly national, almost global because if you were a take there's 10 antique collectors on the service.
不管这个人是在密歇根、迈阿密，还是在柏林，都没关系。
It didn't matter if one's in Michigan, one's in Miami, one's in Berlin.
只要他们在收藏同一件古董，就有价值，所以这个平台能非常顺畅地快速启动。
If they're collecting the same antique, there's utility there, and so that one was able to spin up much more seamlessly.
本地市场这个概念，我知道在座有些人正在做，确实多了一层复杂性。
The notion of the local marketplace which I know some of you in here are doing, you know, it has that extra complexity.
我觉得你要问的问题，还得看你做的是哪种生意。
I also think the question that you have to ask depends on what type of business you're operating.
一开始大家的直觉总是想直接做全球，用户越多越好，但你真得想想，如果你离这些用户很远，又没法掌控你所进入的市场，你真能准确判断产品是否契合市场需求吗？
I think initially the hunch is always let's go global, get as many users, But I think the question you have to ask is can you truly measure your product market fit if you are not close to those consumers or you don't control the zones you're in?
比如 WhatsApp。
So for example, WhatsApp.
它确实迅速走向了全球，但当初并不是这样的。
It went global really fast, but it didn't start that way.
事实上，简最初经常和西圣何塞的俄罗斯社群混在一起，WhatsApp 最早的功能就是简单地显示状态。
In fact, Jan used to hang out a lot with the Russian community in West San Jose and the first feature of WhatsApp was literally just to show status.
他当时就想，为什么手机不能有个状态消息，告诉大家‘我在健身’，这样别人就不会打电话来打扰？
He just said, Why can't there be just a status message on the phone that shows that I'm at the gym so that someone won't call me?
于是他就推出了这个功能，他的用户群其实就是每周五一起吃晚饭的那五十个人，他们会给反馈，告诉他产品怎么用才顺手。
And so he rolled out that and he told, I mean his focus group was literally the 50 people that he used to hang out with over dinner on Fridays in that community and they would give him feedback on how they're using the product.
他很快发现，人们其实是在用它给俄罗斯的家人发消息。
Quickly he realized that they were using it to send messages to their family in Russia.
他当时就说：‘这可不是我设计这个应用的初衷啊。’
And he was like, well, that was not why how I designed this app for.
但他还是围绕这个用途加了新功能，让体验更顺畅，WhatsApp 真正就是这样起步的。
But he sort of built features around that to make it more seamless and that's really how WhatsApp started.
所以，这看起来恰恰相反，也很反直觉——你看到他们增长这么快，会觉得他们一开始就全球扩张了，这没错。
So contrary, again counter intuitive because you see their growth and you're like wow they went global really fast which is true.
但跟 Airbnb 不一样，Airbnb 是花了很长时间才积累起足够多的用户。
Unlike say Airbnb which took time to build critical mass.
即便如此，他们在早期也极其专注，只在小范围用户群里打磨产品，确保真正找到市场契合点。
But even then they actually in the initial days were so focused in their small control groups to make sure that they got the right product market fit.
你们刚才提到的 Facebook、OpenTable，这些例子都是大家比较熟悉的模式。
Both of those examples that you guys shared with Facebook, OpenTable, those are familiar behaviors for people.
那像 Airbnb 早期那样，根本还没有‘共享经济’这个概念的时候，又该怎么看呢？
What about a case like Airbnb in the early days where there is no such thing as the so called sharing economy?
对别人说‘你可以住在我房间里’，这在当时简直是完全无法理解的概念。
Like, it's actually a completely foreign concept to say to someone, yeah, you you can stay in my in my room.
那时候，这简直太疯狂了。
Like, that's just that's crazy at the time.
你觉得他们当时是怎么做到的？对于那些在做全新事物、试图构建网络效应的公司，你又怎么看？
How do you think about like, what did they do there, and how do you think about other businesses that have kind of a situation where they're doing something really new and they're trying to build a network effect?
是的，我觉得 Airbnb 是一个典型的具有强大网络效应的平台，但他们一开始根本没有病毒式增长。
Yeah, I think with Airbnb, and it's a classic case of a marketplace with strong network effects where they did not have any viral growth, right, to that.
别说租别人家了，比手机更私密的东西，就是你的家。
Because forget about renting someone's home, you would not let, I mean something more personal than your phone is your home.
他们能看见你的卧室，还能看见你的洗手间。
They see your bedroom, they see your restroom.
你不可能让一个陌生人进你家门。
You're not gonna let a stranger in.
你想想，这样的公司怎么可能会发展起来。
So imagine how a company like that could take off.
所以他们早期的日子真的非常艰难。
So their early days was really really hard.
但他们最大的优势是，能提供远低于酒店的价格，尤其是在城市举办大型会议或活动、所有酒店都满房的时候。
But their biggest value proposition, it was that they could offer homes at much cheaper rates, especially when there were big conferences or events in the city and all the other hotels are sold out.
说白了，这个点子就是这么来的，对吧？
I mean that's literally how the concept was born, right?
他们自己把家里的气垫床租出去，然后想，为什么不能把这个做成一家公司呢？
They rented their own place, literally rented their own air bed and they said well why can't we spin this into a company?
他们确实为自家房子做过几次，但并没有立刻火起来。
But they did that for their own home a few times but it did not take off instantly.
所以他们不得不靠传统的营销和出色的设计，来打造这个增长突破口。
So they really had to use traditional marketing and good design to sort of build that growth hack.
他们开始做的简单事情，就是瞄准各地的各种活动，专门在那些地方打广告，问：‘酒店满了吗？’
So simple things they started doing was they started targeting all events in various places and they would make specific advertising in those areas saying, Oh, is the hotel sold out?
为什么不试试AirBnB呢？
Why don't you try Air Bread and Breakfast?
事实上，早在早期，流传的说法是他们融资特别困难，于是干脆把麦片盒子改成了奥巴马和麦凯恩主题的包装，靠卖这些盒子赚的钱来维持公司运转。
In fact, even in the early days the story that goes around is that they found it very difficult to raise so they actually remarketed their cereal boxes, as Obama and McCain cereal boxes, and they actually used that money to sort of bootstrap the company.
这说明了
So it goes to show
在选举期间。
During the election cycle.
在选举期间。
During the election cycle.
这说明了，他们为了自力更生，不得不走过的那些不同步骤。
So it goes to show, you know, the different steps that they needed to take to bootstrap.
他们花了将近三十六个月才积累起足够的用户规模，看到网络效应，过程一点都不轻松。
It almost took thirty six months for them to build critical mass and see network effect, so it was not easy.
但一旦你建起了这个关键规模，就拥有强大的护城河。
But once you build that critical mass, have huge defensibility.
创始人故事里最有趣、也最明显不真实的，就是所谓的‘一夜成名’。
So one of the founder stories so entertaining and almost always so patently false is the overnight success.
我昨晚跟布莱恩一起吃了晚饭。
I had dinner with Brian last night.
他在Airbnb已经待了九年了。
He's been at Airbnb nine years.
最近三四年，情况真的开始好转了。
Mean, kind of like so in the last three or four have gone really well.
最早的时候，本·西尔弗曼在Pinterest，前两三年啥进展都没有。
The first, Ben Silverman at Pinterest, nothing happened there for two, three Nothing.
他就一直埋头做产品，找市场契合点，用户从几十个到一百多个，后来终于找到了突破口，搞定了内容增长的关键方法，这才吸引来更多用户。但在我们看来，所谓的‘一夜爆红’其实非常罕见。
He just kept working for product market fit with his dozens of users and then a 100 users or whatever and then he got it and figured out the hack to get critical mass of content that then attracted the users but overnight success is is is rare in our in our experience.
所以我觉得。
So I
那我们不妨深入聊聊，如果我是那个创始人，我怎么知道该不该坚持下去？
think we should drill down then because if I'm in those founder's shoes, how do you know to hang in there?
有什么具体的信号或者指标可以参考吗？
Like, what are the signs, the metrics?
好吧。
Like, okay.
我再坚持个十年，或者得有个明确的信号才行。
I'm gonna just stick around for another ten years or I have some sign here.
那我们怎么判断呢？
So how do we tell?
咱们拿几个案例具体看看吧，毕竟咱们刚才说了好多抽象的话。
Let's walk through some case studies just to have the data because we use a lot of words.
你看看数据就知道了。
I mean, look at the numbers.
所以。
So
第一个例子我们来讲Facebook，选它是因为想搞清楚病毒式增长和网络效应之间的区别。
the first example we are going to share is actually Facebook and the reason we used Facebook was to tease out the difference between viral growth and network effect.
这张图通常是初创公司刚起步时拿出来的，说：‘瞧，我们增长得多快。’
So this is the chart usually startups show at the start like, hey, we're growing really fast.
你看，他们在很短的时间内就达到了八亿多的月活跃用户。
You can see that we reached 800,000,000 plus MAUs in a very short timeframe.
这个图表看起来非常漂亮。
The chart looks great.
Facebook 几乎没花一分钱在用户获取上，对吧？
And Facebook did this with pretty much zero customer acquisition costs, right?
他们连一毛钱都没投。
They didn't spend a dime.
但这只是我们说的用户增长速度，属于增长的一种。
But this is what we would call a speed of adoption which is growth.
这并不能说明是否存在网络效应。
This does not tell us whether there is a network effect.
真正能说明网络效应的是这个。
What tells us whether there is a network effect is actually this.
也就是，即使他们持续提升用户留存率，这张图显示的是日活跃用户与月活跃用户的比率。
Which is even if they kept growing their retention, so this chart shows daily actives divided by monthly actives.
你可以看到，这个比例从45%持续增长到了57%。
And you can see that it kept growing from 45% to 57%.
Facebook其实是最早这么做的平台之一。
And Facebook was actually one of the first platforms to actually do that.
通常人们都不会去关注，用户数量增加了，使用频率是不是也跟着提升了。
Because usually you've never heard where, oh you increase users, do you actually increase usage.
这在以前可不是常态。
That was not the norm.
所以，这才是网络效应的真正体现。
And so that's the sign of network effect.
这个指标会根据你公司的类型有所不同。
And this metric is different depending on what type of company you are.
比如像Airbnb这样的平台，就得看预订房间的客人数量，以及它随时间的变化趋势。
For a marketplace like for Airbnb, you would actually look at the number of guests that booked rooms and how that trended over time.
这才是网络效应的标志。
That would be the sign of the network effect.
我们还想再举一个例子。
And we wanted to show the other example.
《愤怒的小鸟》也有类似的曲线。
Angry Birds, they have a similar curve.
他们获得了大量下载，如果你看用户数据，活跃度确实很高。
They did lots of downloads and if you looked at the user graph it was high.
他们实现了病毒式增长，因为玩家玩得开心，还会主动分享推荐。
So they had viral growth because people were playing the game and they really liked it and they talked about it.
所以，他们可能以零获客成本就吸引了这么多用户。
So they may have acquired all those users with zero customer acquisition cost.
但他们真的具备网络效应吗？
But did they really have a network effect?
其实没有，因为我和你各自玩这个游戏，并不会因为我俩都在玩，我的体验就变得更好。
Not really because if I'm playing the game and you're playing the game that doesn't necessarily mean I'm getting more value just because you're playing the game as well.
这也解释了为什么在游戏行业，新游戏总是不断涌现。
And which is sort of why in the gaming world you do see where new games come.
就像下一个《愤怒的小鸟》是《糖果传奇》之类的，对吧？
Like the next Angry Birds was Candy Crush and so on, right?
所以我觉得关键是要分清楚，这到底是病毒式增长，还是网络效应。
So I think the key is really to tease out is this viral growth or is this network effect.
我最后想举的例子是Medium。
The last example I'd share is with Medium.
它是我们的一个近期投资组合公司，我们想加入一个案例研究，虽然有点早，因为网络效应的迹象不容易看出来。
It's one of our recent portfolio companies and so we wanted to include one of the case studies which was slightly early because it's not easy to sort of see signs of network effects.
Medium的用户增长曲线很不错。
So Medium's user growth chart is quite good.
他们每天新增大量独立访客，而且几乎没花什么获客成本。
They're adding a lot of unique visitors and they're acquiring them with pretty much zero customer acquisition cost.
但你怎么判断是否存在网络效应的迹象呢？
But how do you actually say whether there is a sign of network effect?
所以我们想弄清楚的是，人们到底是怎么发现Medium上的文章的？
So what we wanted to find out is, well how are people finding Medium articles?
如果我是通过 Twitter 或 Facebook 发现 Medium 的，那我如果特别喜欢，是会直接回 Medium，还是会继续从别的网站找那些文章？
Because if I discovered Medium through Twitter or Facebook then if I really liked it that much am I coming back to Medium directly or am I still finding those articles through other sites?
他们专门追踪的一点是，用户在 Medium 上花很多时间读文章，但这些阅读量里有多少是直接来自 Medium，有多少是通过社交平台，比如 Facebook、Twitter，或者其他渠道来的。
So one of the things they explicitly measure is how much people spend a lot of time reading articles on Medium but how much of that came directly from Medium versus through social which is Facebook or Twitter or even other channels.
你可以看到，尤其是那些不属于病毒式传播的文章——他们称之为长尾，因为最火的那几篇总是会到处被转发。
And you can see especially for the non viral post which is what they call the tail because the top viral post will always be viral.
人们会到处分享，传播得停不下来。
People will refer it everywhere and it goes.
但对于非病毒式文章来说，Medium 本身反而是最大的流量来源，这说明他们早期就已经开始有效匹配了。
But for the non viral post, Medium is actually the biggest source for the traffic which was early indicators that they are able to match.
这就像一个市场，他们能把读者和合适的作者匹配起来，所以这些文章也能获得关注，而且整个过程都发生在 Medium 平台内部。
It's like a marketplace, they are able to match the readers to the right writers and so those posts are also getting attention and it's happening directly on Medium.
所以你要判断网络效应，得看你做的这个业务或公司，用户在什么时刻会不费劲地主动回到你的网站或 App。
So the question you have to ask for network effect is depending on your business or company that you're building, what is that moment that gets the user back to your site or your app without much effort.
还有一点是，我意思是，所有的宏观阅读数据。
And the other thing is, I mean, are all macro reads.
我们正在努力做出这个判断。
We're trying to make that call.
你们想尽早做出这个判断。
You're trying to make that call early.
我们想在你们公司早期就做出这个判断。
We're trying to make that call early on your companies.
所以你们要找出哪些迹象能预示这些宏观趋势会逐渐显现，而通常这些迹象都体现在微观层面。
So you're trying to tease out what might suggest that these macro things will kick in over time and typically that's micro things.
在OpenTable，我评估这家公司时，只看一件事：给我看看旧金山的数据。
And so in OpenTable, the entirety of my diligence on the company was, Show me San Francisco.
你们在旧金山运营的时间最长。
You've been in San Francisco the longest.
给我看看旧金山的关键指标是怎么变化的。
Show me how the key metrics are going in San Francisco.
结果发现，销售团队的效率随着时间推移大幅提升了。
And so it turned out, sales force productivity exploded over time.
每家餐厅的预订数量随着时间推移急剧增长。
The number of reservations per restaurant exploded over time.
通过OpenTable官网而非餐厅官网产生的预订比例，也发生了巨大变化。
The percentage of those reservations that came from the OpenTable website versus the restaurant website changed dramatically over time.
餐厅的流失率随着时间下降了，因为公司提供的价值越来越多。
The, you know, the I mean, just every the attrition of restaurants went down over time because, you know, the company is providing more value.
早在OpenTable初期，只要看清楚旧金山这个小市场的表现，就能明显看出趋势——这给了管理层和董事会信心，让他们还没正式扩张，就决定全力推进，快速进入大量新市场，哪怕这些市场要好几年才能盈利。
So it was pretty obvious early on at OpenTable when you took the micro thing that, okay, San Francisco is working and that gave, before you even got there, the management team and the board the confidence, okay, we are going to step on the gas and start opening tons of new markets even though what they took years to turn profitable.
他们说，只要把产品做出来，用户自然会来。
They said, okay, this case, if you build it, they will actually come.
不过，不同市场的情况也不一样，我们进入新市场时就得重新评估。
Now, different you know, so we go into markets.
扎克伯格的情况就很清楚。
You know, Zuckerberg was pretty obvious.
在哈佛校园里，产品已经跑通了。
On Harvard, it was working.
当时并不明显这个生意能成，但如果你进到自己的培养皿或试管里，发现至少在那里行得通。
It wasn't necessarily obvious the business was working but if you went into your petri dish or your test tube and said, okay, I made it work there.
我在圣何塞的俄罗斯社群里把它做成了，他们的行为显示出明显的规模效应。
I made it work in the Russian community in San Jose, their behavior is showing increasing returns to scale.
所以我给的最好建议是：尽量先做个小实验，先启动，再观察，如果能跑通小范围测试，就证明它对你有用。
And so, the best advice I have is try to, and typically both to launch and then to measure, if you can run the smaller experiment, validate that it's working for you.
如果真有效，那就告诉我们，但说到底，这就是你要做的全部。
If it is working, tell us and then, but that really is how you do it.
eBay 早期的突破口是收藏品。
In eBay, the early thing was collectibles.
收藏品在平台上突然爆火，因为那个群体在现实世界里交易的需求根本得不到满足。
Collectibles just exploded on the platform because the needs of that community trading in the analog world were so horribly not met and it turns out the venture guy who made the investment at eBay was Bob Cagle at Benchmark Capital.
投资 eBay 的那位风投人是 Benchmark 资本的鲍勃·凯格尔。
Bob happened to come from Michigan and there's a craftsman in Michigan who does really beautiful, and I'll remember the name, decoy ducks for hunting.
鲍勃恰好来自密歇根，那里有个手艺人专门做特别精美的猎鸭诱饵。
Oscar Peterson was the craftsman's name because it's also the name of the pianist.
我之所以记得，就因为这个原因。
That's the only reason I remember it.
鲍勃上了那个黑白网站，上面还挂着埃博拉病毒和51区，皮埃尔的主页就这三样东西，他搜了奥斯卡·彼得森的鸭诱饵，结果找到了五个。他说：‘我整个夏天都开车在密歇根到处找这些玩意儿。’
Bob went on this black and white website that was also had the Ebola virus and Area 51 on it, three things on Pierre's homepage, and searched for Oscar Peterson duck decoys and found like five and he goes, I spend my summer driving around Michigan looking for these.
我上网一查，居然真有五个。
I went online and there are five here.
所以说，正是这件事让他决定投资，但你知道，关键就在于这些早期的细微迹象——你要找的就是小范围里是否真的有行为在发生。
And so, I mean, he was in that literally what put him in deal, but, you know, it's those little early you know, you're seeking those early signs that, the behavior is happening at a small scale.
如果小范围里已经出现了，那大概率你也能在大范围内复制出来。
If it's happening at a small scale, you probably can replicate it on the larger scale.
如果小范围都看不到苗头，那你就得琢磨怎么实现产品与市场的契合了。这时候如果你在考虑去雅虎拿个稳定薪水，那要是连这些小实验都搞不定，你真该好好想想了。
If it's not happening on the small scale, you have to, you you've got to figure out how do you get product market fit and that's where if you're thinking of going to work at Yahoo, you know, for a steady paycheck, you know, if you can't get any of the small experiments working, that's when you might wanna start thinking about it.
不过我想反驳一点：如果你在旧金山，你会觉得这里发生的事，别的地方根本不会出现。
I wanna push back on one thing though, which is if you're in San Francisco, it it feels like what happens in San Francisco is not gonna happen everywhere else.
这事不会留在旧金山吗？
It doesn't stay in San Francisco?
不是。
No.
没错。
Exactly.
它也不会只留在拉斯维加斯。
It doesn't stay in Vegas.
没错。
Exactly.
所以如果你在硅谷创业，那里确实像个封闭的泡泡，很多事情都挺特别的。
So if you're building a business in Silicon Valley where you do we are in a little bubble in a lot of ways.
人们在做很多独一无二的事，这正是我觉得你提到密歇根那个Pinterest的例子特别好的原因。
Like, people are doing very unique things, and I think that's why I'm glad you brought up the example of, like, the Michigan example of Pinterest.
对。
Yeah.
我很想听听你对如何判断是否存在网络效应的看法。
I'd love to hear your thoughts on what that means for figuring out whether there is a network effect.
所以稍微修正一下，在本地生意里，我们通常会看它能不能复制到其他地方。
So to to amend it a little bit, in local businesses, we typically look that they can replicate it Mhmm.
因为这说明了它具备扩展的潜力。
Market outside of the market they live in because that kind of suggests scalability.
比如旧金山的一个好例子，我觉得他不会介意我提，就是Cherry公司。
If someone in San Francisco, you know, a great example and I don't think he would be upset if I used it, Cherry.
Cherry做得特别好。
Cherry worked great.
就是那种按需洗车的服务。
I mean, the Cherry car washers, it was on demand car washing.
他们每天都在Sandhill路沿线来回穿梭。
They were up and down this strip outside of Sandhill Road every single day.
有时候能看到三四个Cherry的员工给风投们的车洗车，还挺尴尬的，然后你就会想，那在明尼阿波利斯的冬天，这模式能行得通吗？
There'd be like three Cherry guys washing VC's cars, a little embarrassing, and then you're like, Okay, can I see this working in Minneapolis in the winter?
然后你心里就嘀咕，嗯……
And you know, you're just kind of like, oh.
所以，这其实就是一个例子。
So, I mean, that that was an example.
明白了。
Okay.
我们希望看到它能在那些经济特别富裕、或者极度便利导向的环境之外也复制成功。
We want to see it, you know, replicate outside of an environment where it's, you know, either uniquely economically affluent or, you know, highly convenience focused and and things along those lines.
不过没错，我们通常还是关注本地企业。
But yes, we typically look in local businesses.
它们能否在初始市场之外复制，这才能说明有没有扩展的潜力。
They can replicate it outside of the initial market because that then talks to scalability.
对。
Right.
说到底，城市本身就是网络效应的原型，毕竟那里人口密度够高。
Mean, the city a city is the original network effect, so there is a certain density there.
说到趋势，我们之前聊过共享经济。
Well, speaking of the trend side of things, we talked about the sharing economy.
我们来聊聊像网约车和众筹这样的例子，这些都属于新兴技术。
So let's talk about examples like ride sharing and crowdfunding, and those are new technologies.
我的意思是，以前根本不存在这些，或者即使有过，现在有了智能手机，才让人们的使用方式发生了变化。
I mean, they haven't been around before or maybe they've happened, and now smartphones are here to sort of give us new behaviors around them.
这些趋势有没有网络效应？
Do those trends have network effects?
有的。
Yeah.
我觉得可以把网约车、外卖配送这些都归到一个大类里，就是按需服务这个类别。
So I think I would combine, you know, I would call ride sharing, even food delivery, all of those I would put them, like the on demand category in general.
我觉得这是移动互联网出现之后才兴起的一种新现象，让消费者用起来特别方便。
I think it's a new phenomenon after mobile, which has made it really easy for consumers.
你可以这样理解，比如看看网约车服务，对吧？
So the way to think of it is, so if you look at ride sharing services, right?
它的体验比打出租车好上十倍。
It's 10 times better than taking a taxi cab.
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这个产品好太多了，消费者自然就用了。
The product is way better and consumers use it.
但它的推广很大程度上是一城一城来的，就像OpenTable那样。
But it's a city by city rollout to a large extent like OpenTable.
不过我觉得，打车服务的不同之处在于，它是一对一的服务。
However, the difference I would say in a ride sharing service, it's a point to point service.
OpenTable是给餐厅提供工具，餐厅用了之后，你再把顾客这一边拉进来，把两边匹配起来。
In OpenTable you offer the tools to the restaurants and then that sort of, the restaurants used it for the tool and then you brought in the network which is the diners and you match sort of the two sides.
但打车服务完全是点对点的。
In ride sharing it's really point to point.
所以我觉得，打车这类服务更偏向于供给端的规模效应。
So I would say the general ride sharing, we think it's more supply side economies of scale.
意思是，平台上司机越多，你就能保证用户五分钟内叫到一个靠谱的司机。
What that means is the more drivers you have on the platform you can make sure that you get a good quality driver within five minutes.
这就是它的现状了，说白了，有点像亚马逊的自营模式，但依然是个不错的生意。
But that's where it stands, So it's almost like the Amazon first party if you wanted to think of it, which is like, it's still a good business.
我们只是把它称为供给侧的规模经济，也就是规模效应，而不是网络效应。
We just call it as different, is supply side economies of scale, which is scale economy versus a network effect.
但如果你看看Lyft Line和Uber Pool，我觉得它们可能具备网络效应。想想看，你是个乘客，你希望有更多人用这些服务，这样你就能从帕洛阿尔托拼车去旧金山，车费也更便宜。
However, if you look at Lyft Line and Uber Pool, I think those could have network effects because think of this, you're a rider, you want more riders using those because then you can share a ride to San Francisco from Palo Alto and therefore have a cheaper ride.
对吧？
Right?
你希望每个地方都有更多乘客。
And you want more riders every place.
比如你去纽约，也希望那里有人在用Lyft Line和Uber Pool。
Maybe you travel to New York and you want people to be using Lyft Line and Uber Pool there as well.
所以我们的看法其实有个微妙的差别。
So I think there is a subtle nuance is what our view is.
说说那些小技巧吧。
Talk about hacks.
Uber早期的一个小技巧就是，他们补贴足够多的司机在城市里跑，提供一个让顾客觉得有吸引力的基础服务。等顾客觉得方便了，开始越来越多地叫车，补贴就慢慢减少，最后在某个城市彻底不再需要补贴。
Uber's early hack was they're going to subsidize enough cars to drive around a city to provide a minimum level of service that the consumer found attractive and then as consumers find it attractive and start booking more sites, they have to subsidize less and ultimately the subsidize disappears in the city.
Instacart的诀窍是，用户能从任何超市下单，他们会帮你去采购、送货，而且一开始还会加价。但他们早期会向这些超市展示：你看，有人真心想要生鲜配送，需求其实不小。
Instacart's hack was, you can order from any grocery and they will go get it to you, they will mark the crap out of it and but early on, they will be showing those grocers that, hey, you can get some pretty good demand for people who can who want to have groceries delivered.
后来他们又回去找这些超市谈合作，现在我相信，他们超过一半的订单都不再加价了。
They went back to those same grocers and they're cutting deals and now I believe well over half of their entire deliveries are not marked up.
他们和全食超市这类商家达成了协议，但当初启动的关键是：我没时间，也没底气去跟超市谈合作。
They're through deals with grocers like Whole Foods, but the hack to jumpstart it was, okay, I don't have time.
在超市还没看到订单流之前，我根本没资本去谈。所以他们的做法是：先加价，先撑一段时间，等订单量上来，再快速用规模去换合作，最后给用户更好的服务。
I I I don't have the time or credibility to do those deals with the grocers until they experience the flow of orders, so the hack was, okay, I'm gonna mark it up and then I can afford to do it for a while and then as quickly as I can, I'm gonna try to leverage the volumes into into deals and then let me provide a better consumer service.
我们看到的每个生意，背后都有这么一个‘破局点’。
So every business we see has an attempted hack.
如果你一上来就说：‘我不知道怎么解决鸡生蛋还是蛋生鸡的问题’，这可不算好答案。
If you come in and say, Oh, I don't really know how this I'm going to fit the chicken and egg, not the best answer.
你得想清楚：怎么让这事先转起来？哪一边该先出现？问题核心其实就一个——在双边网络里，到底谁该先来？这份PPT里列出了很多公司用过的不同策略。
You have to try to figure out how can I get this going, which side starts, what is this, and the deck lays out a whole bunch of different approaches that different companies have used to try to solve that one fundamental problem is in a two sided network, who shows up first?
除了这份关于网络效应的PPT，你们还参与了我们写的那篇关于16个初创公司关键指标的文章。
Besides this network effects deck, you guys participated in a post we wrote around 16 metrics and 16 more startup metrics.
我觉得这一点值得提一下，因为你提到折扣和补贴是这种破解方式的一部分。
I think it's worth bringing that up because you're talking about discounts and subsidies as part of a model to create that hack.
另外，在同一篇文章里，我们还讨论了付费营销和自然营销的区别，以及它们各自的价值。
And then the other thing is in that same post, we talked about the difference between paid versus organic marketing and the value of those.
所以，如果你在做网络效应型业务，作为投资者，你可能会想：好吧。
So if I'm doing a network effects business and you see as an investor, like, okay.
你为了建立这个网络，投入了大量付费营销，而不是靠自然增长，这算不算坏事？
Well, you've done a lot of paid marketing versus organic marketing to get this network.
这算不算好事？
Is that a bad thing?
我的意思是，你怎么区分这两种情况？
Is that a good thing?
我觉得这个问题其实没有标准答案。
I mean, how do you tease it apart?
I think that it really I mean, it's there is no definite of answer.
I think that it really I mean, it's there is no definite of answer.
这得具体情况具体分析。
It really depends.
我就拿Airbnb举个例子吧。
So I'll take the example of Airbnb.
一开始要达到临界规模特别难，他们的模式本身也很让人费解。
You know, it was very difficult to build the critical mass initially, and it was a strange concept for them.
但在需求端，他们用传统营销手段玩出了花样，拉新那套方法简直太绝了。
But on the demand side they were able to hack with traditional marketing and they had really great hacks around how they bootstrap demand.
其实他们初期在需求侧花的钱并不多。
So they were really not spending much on demand.
这跟常理完全相反——人们一年才旅行两次，这怎么搞？
It's contrary to everything we know because travel, people travel twice a year, how do I do it?
但他们早期确实把这事做得特别到位。
But they were really good at doing that in the initial days.
但供给端就太难了。
But supply was really hard.
你怎么让房东愿意把房子挂出来？
How do you get a host comfortable to list their home?
你该怎么找到这些房东？
How do I target the host?
所以他们最后还是在上面花了钱。
So they did end up spending dollars on it.
有时候你得想清楚，这方面的研究很多，得弄明白平台的收入端和补贴端分别在哪里。
So it's not that we are, sometimes you may have to figure out, there are lots of papers on this, on marketplaces which is what is your money side and what's your subsidy side.
我觉得 Airbnb 当初供给端特别难搞，所以从一开始他们就砸钱去拉房东。
I think for Airbnb the supply was really hard so they spent dollars right from the early days to acquire the host.
但这时候你得问自己，花这么多钱拉来的用户，回报率到底怎么样？
But in those cases you have to ask yourself, what is the return on investment if I am paying to acquire the user?
每笔交易的订单金额是多少？用户的终身价值又有多高？
So what is my order value per transaction and what's my lifetime value?
如果你的客户获取成本和用户终身价值之间的回报比确实不错，那
If you do have good ROI economics like the CAC versus LTV, then
不好意思，我只是想提一下获客成本和客户终身价值。
I'm sorry, just to say CAC versus LTV.
我只是随便说说。
Me just talk
就是你从客户身上获得的终身价值，跟投入的成本之间的对比。
about the cost versus the lifetime value that you're getting from the customer.
这样的话，你就可以大胆投入了，因为有些行业确实必须这么做。
Then you can spend because there are certain sectors where you have to.
旅行行业就是其中之一，因为用户使用频率太低了。
Travel is one where you have to because the velocity of use case is really low.
但你得小心，最怕的就是花大价钱拉来用户，可一旦减少营销投入，增长就立马停摆。
But you just have to be sent, the thing that you don't want happening is where you're paying lots of marketing dollars to acquire users and then when you sort of dial down your marketing dollars the growth also slows down.
这说明你一直在砸钱拉新、推动增长，但产品本身根本留不住用户。
Because that means you've been spending a lot of money to acquire and drive the growth but the company itself or the product itself is not sustaining that.
所以我们最想搞清楚的是：如果在做付费营销，为什么要这么做？回报率是多少？真的能带来用户留存吗？
So that's the thing we really try to tease out is if you're doing paid marketing, why are they doing paid marketing, what's the ROI, return on investment from that marketing, and is it truly showing retention?
有一个观察，很多
One observation, a lot
这里那些最成功的平台型网络，根本没在用户获取上花钱。
of the best networks that are platformed here aren't spending anything on acquisition.
这在平台型市场里其实挺有意思的。
I mean, it's kind of an interesting thing in marketplace.
Facebook，没有。
Facebook, no.
WhatsApp，也没有。
WhatsApp, no.
Medium，也没有。
Medium, no.
只有OpenTable，他们也没在用户获取上花钱。
Just OpenTable, They're not spending on acquisition.
他们的模式本身就能带来用户。
The model is delivering it.
如果他们真在投广告获客，那我当年在eBay的时候，可是全球最大的数字广告主，连续好几年都是。
If they are spending on acquisition eBay, I was the biggest advertiser in the world, digital advertiser in the world for a number of years.
他们确实花钱，但奇怪的是，花得越多，用户觉得这服务越有价值。
They were spending but what happened is the more they spent, the more valuable the service was to the user.
所以这算进损益表里，但这些用户表现出的是网络效应，相反的例子是电商——你往里砸钱就行。
So, it was a component of the P and L but those users demonstrated network behavior and the contra example is, okay, an e commerce business, you can pour money on it.
你能飞速增长。
You can grow like crazy.
我投过几家这样的公司，现在都消失了，它们曾经增长得特别猛，但唯一的原因就是广告烧钱。就像Anu说的，一停投，用户就全没了。
I've been an investor in a few of them that actually are no longer around that grew like crazy, but the only reason you're growing is the marketing spend and when Anu said, when you pull back on it, they don't come anymore.
那里根本不存在网络效应。
There is no network effect there.
那只是增长假象，关键是怎么把这两者区分开。
It was just a growth effect and so the key is how do you tease out that.
不是说不能花钱，真正让人意外的是，最有价值的那些网络型业务，几乎没怎么花过钱。
It's not that you don't spend, it's surprising how a lot of the most valuable network businesses didn't spend virtually anything.
他们找到了窍门。
They figured out the hack.
我再提最后一个问题，之后就开放给大家提问。
Well, I'll do one last question, then we'll open it up to everyone for questions.
这是一个创业者通常不太想从投资人那里听到的问题，或者说，他们其实也很想知道：什么时候该盈利，该怎么搞。
It's a question that probably, you know, your entrepreneurs hate getting from their investors, which is or maybe they want to know, which is when to monetize and how do you
怎么判断呢？
figure that out?
作为投资人，我们不会催着谁去盈利，因为我知道这确实是大家普遍在纠结的问题。
I should say that as investors, we're not going to push anybody to monetize because I know it is sort of a debate everybody has.
更重要的是，你要思考什么时候开始盈利，以及你计划采用哪些盈利方式。
It's more you should think about when to monetize and what types of monetizations do you have in the plan.
我们见过各个阶段的公司，对吧？
But we've seen companies at all stages, right?
比如Facebook，很长时间都没开始盈利。
So Facebook didn't monetize for the longest time.
他们当初做的是以用户为中心的社交网络， monetization 拖得很晚，但现在做得特别漂亮。
They were building a social network focused on users and now they monetized quite later but they're doing it beautifully now.
相比之下，平台类业务通常会更早开始盈利。
Versus marketplaces on the other hand, you do tend to see them monetizing a little earlier.
这是为什么呢？
Why is that the case?
因为平台本身已经在发生交易了。
Because there is a transaction that is flowing through the marketplace already.
拿我们投资的 OfferUp 来说，对吧？
So let's take OfferUp, our portfolio for example, right?
平台上每天都有大量的交易在进行。
There's a lot of transactions going on.
卖家在上架商品，买家想买，交易自然就发生了。
People, the sellers are listing their items, buyers want to buy the items, and so there is a transaction happening.
如果你在平台里接入支付功能，其实能大大提升整个流程的体验。
Now, if you actually turn on payments in marketplaces, it actually improves the overall process, right?
你根本不想见了卖家之后再发消息约见面，而是希望直接在线支付，让交易一步到位。
You don't want to meet the seller and then message them and just say let's meet outside versus you actually want to be able to send the credit payment directly so that the transaction is done.
这样体验更好，也能更早地实现盈利，市场平台通常都是这样。
So it improves the experience and so you can actually turn on monetization sooner and you tend to see that in marketplaces.
我觉得这真的取决于公司的阶段、你所处的位置、产品与市场的契合度，以及什么时候适合开始盈利。
So I think it really depends on the stage of the company, where you are, and what sort of product market fit you have and when you can turn monetization.
我觉得这两种商业模式本质上就很不一样。
I mean, I think the business models are really different.
其实网上有个梗，把增长和盈利搞成非此即彼的二选一，这根本是误导。
Actually think there is a meme with a false dichotomy that it's either growth or monetization.
就好比公司有一百号人，你非得说只能选一个方向——要么全搞增长，要么全搞赚钱，其他人一点都不能跨界。
And, you know, it's it's just a little bit like, okay, you've got a 100 people in the company and you can't have, you know, anyone and, you know, you have to pick one or the other and no one else is allowed to cross over.
这种想法有点太死板了，其实没那么绝对。
You're just a little, you know, it's there.
我们有几家公司，在当前资本环境不确定的情况下，已经从不惜一切代价增长，转向了更理性、更聪明的增长模式，随便你怎么叫它。
We had a couple of companies that shifted in the current capital environments and the uncertainty there shifted from growth at all costs to kind of smart growth mode or whatever you want to call it.
最惊人的是，盈利能力大幅提升。
The amazing thing, the profitability improved dramatically.
很多情况下，增长并没有放缓，你就在那儿想，等等，你们怎么突然从大把烧钱变成花得很少，可增长还是照旧？
The growth in a lot of the cases didn't slow down and you're just sitting there kind of like, You know, just like, Oh, wait, you went from spending all that money to not spending much money and it's still growing the same.
所以对我来说，我有时觉得这种非此即彼的说法是个误区。
So, for me, I worry sometimes it a false dichotomy.
我觉得在平台型业务里，只要资金在流动，你就应该能尽早证明自己能分到一杯羹。
I think in a marketplace business, if there is money flowing through it, you should be able to demonstrate you can capture some of it early on.
如果不是这样，那我真想不通，你们到底给买卖双方带来了什么价值，为什么他们不愿意付费？
I mean, if not, I am trying to figure out if you are actually adding value to both sides of the marketplace why wouldn't they be willing to pay?
所以，一个没有盈利模式的平台，听起来有点让人怀疑。
So, a marketplace without a monetization model is a little bit like, Oh, really?
像Facebook或者Pinterest这样的，它们在还没赚钱的时候就已经值几十亿美元了。
Something like Facebook, you have a little more of a call on or Pinterest being one, they're a multi billion dollar value pre revenue business.
这个问题确实值得讨论，但一般来说，我们觉得早点开始盈利的理由通常比拖着不做的更多。
The question is there is a legitimate one question but, yeah, I mean, typically, we think there are more reasons to do it early than not to do it early on average.
所以别搞什么虚假的二元对立。
So no false dichotomies.
现在开放提问。
Let's open up to questions.
当你想到OpenTable的商业模式时，最初你们是向餐厅销售软件，我猜当时也有其他公司在卖类似的产品吧？
So when you think about the OpenTable business model and, originally, you were selling software into restaurants, I'm guessing you had competition that was also trying to sell similar software.
那时候是不是陷入了一场功能大战，典型的市场竞争？
At what point did so and that must have been like a feature war and classic competition.
你们的预订量达到什么程度时，才让餐厅觉得非你们不可，哪怕竞争对手有些小功能更全，也无所谓了？
At what point did the amount of reservations that you were driving become enough of a hook for why restaurants would always choose you guys for the software that it didn't matter that a competitor had a certain feature or, you know, a couple small things?
这是个很棒的问题，而且结局出人意料。
It's a fantastic question and it's got a it's got an unexpected ending.
在九十年代末、两千年初，有三家公司在做完全相同的事。
There were three companies trying to do exactly the same thing at exactly the same time in the late nineties, early two thousands.
其中一家在金融灾难来临前刚完成融资，紧接着整个2000年代初期，新创公司融资进入了长达五年的冰河期。
One raised a round right before financial Armageddon came in and a nuclear winter set in for literally, it was a half decade in terms of funding new companies in the 20000.
OpenTable筹到了足够的钱，又花得特别慢，这才撑了过来。
OpenTable got raised enough money and spent it so slowly they were able to survive.
而两家直接竞争对手都没能挺住。
The two direct competitors didn't.
OpenTable整整五年没有对手，这正是他们能建立起网络效应的唯一原因。
OpenTable ran unopposed for five years which is the only reason they were able to get to their network effect.
我在eBay工作那会儿，也经历过同样的情况。
EBay, when I was there during that time, enjoyed the same thing.
整整五年，根本没人敢新创公司。
I mean, was no company formation for five years.
那时候，很多市场和产品线都才刚起步，我们纯粹是没人竞争，一晃就是五年。
So, you know, we were nascent in a lot of markets and a lot of product lines and we just had we were unopposed for five years.
所以当人们担心当前的市场环境时，别光害怕，也要看到其中的好处。
So when people get scared of the current market, it's like, yes, be scared but also there's advantages in it.
如果竞争对手融不到钱，而你还能拿到资金，这反而成了优势——当然，OpenTable是这样，Grubhub最近也刚经历了一轮类似的状况。
If, you know, capital dries up to your competitive set and you've got access to capital or whatever it is, it actually can be an attribute in there but I mean, if OpenTable had actually, Grubhub just went through this.
他们没遇到那种绝境，最后只能靠收购三四家公司才拿下市场。
They didn't have nuclear winter and they ended up having to roll up three or four companies to to win the market.
Seamless和Campus Foods这类公司，比如Campus Foods主要在校园里做，Seamless拿下了纽约几个关键市场，而Grubhub本质上是个并购整合的产物。
They Seamless Campus Foods, you know, they camp Campus Foods set out campus, Seamless won a couple key markets like New York, you know, Grubhub's a roll up.
HomeAway也是靠并购起来的。
HomeAway was a roll up.
除了地域上的本地化优势，他们没什么真正的差异化，只能拼拼凑凑地把业务搭起来。
There wasn't a source of differentiation that was meaningful other than local geographic and so they pieced it together.
结果最后都倒闭了。
They went out of business.
OpenTable之所以没人竞争，是因为对手连工资都发不出来，这也恰恰说明了这家公司有多特别——他们的网络效应 buildup 得太慢了。
So OpenTable ran unopposed because they couldn't make payroll and then that was incredibly informative of that company because the network was so slow to build.
这是我见过最慢的网络效应增长案例。
It was the slowest network I've ever seen to build.
真没想到他们居然能撑下来。
It's amazing it worked.
如果没有当前这种资本环境，这事根本不可能成，不过我们确实有一些本地投资。
It wouldn't have worked without the capital environment in anything like its current form and we have some local investments.
他们得比OpenTable走得更快。
They have to go faster than OpenTable went.
Instacart已经在加速了，OfferUp也在提速，关键是他们更偏向虚拟模式。
I mean Instacart is going faster, OfferUp is going faster, just get their more virtual.
他们不用一家一家上门去说服餐厅入驻，而OpenTable上的餐厅老板平均只经营一家店。
They didn't have to physically convert each restaurant one at a time and the average owner of restaurants on OpenTable owns one unit.
简直是挨家挨户地跑，硬生生推上去的。
It literally door to door trying to do it.
所以这种模式在今天根本行不通。
So it's a business that wouldn't work today.
你好。
Hi.
我有个问题想问你，可能跟品牌有关，也可能不是。
I have a question for you that I think is maybe about branding, but maybe not.
你在OpenTable工作的时候，有没有想过为那些特别想被优待的群体推出一个专属版本？
When you were at OpenTable, were you ever tempted to offer a private label version of OpenTable for a segment of the population that really wanted to be special?
有啊。
Yeah.
我们现在就面临类似的情况，有机会为某些群体提供定制化服务，他们觉得既然自己这么特别，就该为同样的会计服务多付十倍的钱。
That's kind of what we're facing right now where we have an opportunity to private label to a certain population that thinks that they should pay 10 x for the same accounting because they're just really special
某种程度上是这样。
in some way.
我们确实需要与众不同。
We that need to special.
所以，当初餐厅市场吸引我的一个原因，是我第一次见前任托马斯·莱顿时，觉得这个模式太巧妙了。
So, one of the things that made restaurants an attractive marketplace well, when I first met with my predecessor, Thomas Layton, the first thing I this is an ingenious model.
我还能在哪些领域复制这个模式，自己创业呢？
Where else can I apply it and start my own company?
结果没成功。
That didn't work.
让OpenTable有意思的地方有两个。
What made OpenTable interesting was two things.
一个是高度分散，这在你试图整合的时候是个问题，但一旦整合成功，就成了优势。
One was the incredibly high degree of fragmentation, which was a bug when you're trying to aggregate it, but once you've aggregated it, it's a feature.
第二个是获客对餐厅体验来说特别重要。
And the second was lead gen was a really important part of the restaurant experience.
大多数人并不想每晚都去餐厅吃饭，所以OpenTable能帮你带来新顾客，那些从来没来过、但你正想吸引的人。
Most people don't want to eat restaurant every night and so OpenTable, you know, would put new butts in your seats, butts who've never been there that you're trying to get.
我们一开始从夫妻小店做起，后来才进入连锁餐厅。
So we when we we started with mom and pops, started went in the chains.
好消息是，这些连锁店每家也就一百来家店，比如麦考密克和施密特、马吉亚诺斯，还有其他几个以M开头的。
The good news is the chains would only have a 100 restaurants, you know, McCormick and Schmidt, Maggiano's, there are couple other M's in there.
我是说，莫顿斯，他们也就一百家店左右，但他们就会说，‘我们是莫顿斯’，然后提出各种要求。
I mean, Morton's, they they only had like a 100 restaurants but they would say like, which we're Morton's and you know, they they demanded.
我们始终坚持了两点。
We we held firm on on two things.
第一，我们把所有东西都统一 branding，如果他们不接受，就根本用不上。这个服务太独特了，他们自己在一百家店的规模下根本没法独立搭建。
One is we branded everything and so if they didn't want it, they didn't get it and it was such a unique service that they couldn't afford to build it on their own at a 100 units.
第二，我们强制把Morton's官网的流量跳转到OpenTable上的Morton's专属页面，以此提升品牌认知。
The other was we forced a redirect from the Morton's website to the OpenTable Morton's page on OpenTable to create the brand awareness.
正是这个强制跳转——把那些在谷歌上搜索‘Morton芝加哥’的食客，直接转化成OpenTable用户——这才是OpenTable真正的增长秘诀。
And that forced off that forced redirect, the fact that we converted restaurant people searching on Google for Morton Chicago into OpenTable users is the OpenTable growth hack.
说真的，这绝对是OpenTable最核心的增长手段。
I mean, was the OpenTable growth hack by far.
因为餐饮业的供给端太分散了，我们才能做到这一点，也才能这么操作。
Because the supply base was so fragmented, we were able to pull that off and able to do that.
我拿这个跟Fandango对比一下。
I'd contrast that with Fandango.
Fandango基本上就只有六七个大客户。
Fandango basically has probably six or seven customers.
都是那些大型影院连锁，比如AMC，还有其他几家，他们完全有能力自己开发系统，时不时就有人退出Fandango——比如AMC两年前就退出了，他们有这个规模，做得到。
They're the large movie theater chains, it's AMC, it's whoever and those guys could build their own thing and every once in while they pull out a Fandango, AMC two years ago I think pulled out a Fandango and they could because they had the scale.
我去AMC红木城的影院。
I'd go I go to AMC Redwood City.
如果他们不在Fandango上，我就直接去AMC买票，因为他们已经够大了，能自己搞定。
If they're not on Fandango, I'll go to AMC and it's like, I can buy it through them because they have that level of critical mass.
所以这跟你们所处的市场有关。
So part of it is the market you're at.
供应商有没有话语权？还是市场本身更集中？
Do you have do suppliers have power or is the marketplace more?
是的，听起来确实挺分散的。
Yeah, then that sounds pretty fragmented to me.
至于品牌化的平台，我们肯定会更看重，因为白标平台只是卖软件，卖工具；而平台卖的是用户。
And then branded marketplaces we would value much more highly than white label because white label becomes you're selling a utility, you're selling software, and the marketplace standpoint you're selling customers.
你好。
Hi.
你相信品牌能产生网络效应吗？
Do you believe in the idea of network effects with brands?
比如，觉得耐克很酷的人越多，耐克就越酷，就越多人觉得它酷，
So for instance, the more people that think Nike is cool, the cooler it gets, the more people think Nike is cool and
对。
Yeah.
我觉得我们之前也说过，大家的看法其实不太一样，不是因为
I think we've had again, you will hear differing views, not from
我觉得我们都各有不同的
I think we all have different
看法，这点我们之前聊过，品牌确实有网络效应。
opinions on And this we've talked about this, but the brand has a network effect.
你明白吗？
The see?
其实挺有意思的。
We actually and it's funny.
在我们的演示文稿里，就有一个图表是这么来的——我不知道你们有没有看过，我们把它叫做三种定律：萨诺夫定律、梅特卡夫定律和里德定律。
In the deck, we actually that's why one of the charts that made it there was I don't know if you've seen it, but there are three types of laws we call it, which is Sarnoff's Law, Metcalf's Law, and Reed's Law.
所以对于品牌来说，我们觉得更像萨诺夫定律。
So for brands, we actually think it's more like Sarnoff's Law.
有些人认为，确实有网络效应，但对用户直接带来的价值没那么大，因此价值增长不像梅特卡夫定律那样陡峭。
Some people argue, yes, it has some network effect, but not directly incredibly value to the user, which is why the value is not as steep as Metcalf's Law for example.
但另一方面，你常听到的说法是，这就像《愤怒的小鸟》，热度一过就慢慢消退了。
But the other side of the argument you usually hear as well, it's almost like Angry Birds you can argue, they die down and they go.
但当你在玩的时候，游戏正火，大家还在讨论，可你得问一句：这真的是价值吗？是可持续的价值吗？
But when you're playing the game and the game is hot and still having conversations about it and, you know, but you have to start the question is, is that really value and sustainable value?
这算得上是网络效应吗？
And is that something we would call a network effect?
这确实是个很有趣的问题。
See, it's a really interesting question.
我觉得这是另一种价值来源，可持续性也不一样。
I I think it's a think it's a different source of value and a different sustainability.
而且当人人都在穿耐克的时候，反而有人开始不穿了，这就出现了反规模效应。我很久以前在迪士尼工作过。
You also run into the diseconomies once everyone's wearing Nikes and people stop wearing Nikes, so you're kind of I worked at Disney when it was a long time ago.
那时候消费产品特别火，我们根本卖不过来，可五年后，同样的人群却连送人都不要了。我记得我在迪士尼工作的时候，正好是《狮子王》那会儿，迪士尼动画一片繁荣，可后来突然就停摆了，皮克斯一上来就把他们打得落花流水，那时候迪士尼的东西根本送不出去。
It was very, very hot on the consumer product side and, you know, we couldn't sell enough and then five years later, you can't give it away to the same audience and, you know, just kind of, you know, Disney became know, that I was there in the years of Lion King and all those and then Disney Animation hit a a pause button, Pixar cleaned their clock and you you literally couldn't give away Disney stuff.
所以啊，世界上最值钱的品牌之一就这么经历过起落，耐克其实也差不多。
So it's, you know, know, one of the most valuable brands in the world has done and Nike's done a little bit of it too.
它们有时候火得不行，有时候又冷得发慌，来回折腾。
They're they're hot and not back and forth.
我觉得品牌和时尚这种东西，价值真的高得不得了。
So I you know, the brand and the fashion overlay, I think they're unbelievably valuable commodities.
不过我不太愿意把这叫作网络效应。
I'm not sure I'd call it a network effect.
回到你刚才说的，人们因为工具便利留下来，却因为社区或网络而长期留存——其实很多最强的网络效应，恰恰来自用户不只是被动使用工具，比如穿耐克鞋、用优步，而是主动贡献数据、创作内容，这些内容反过来丰富了整个网络。就像在Facebook发帖，或者用某个创意工具生成内容，这种参与让整个系统变得更强大、更连贯。
Going back to your statement about comfort the tool and stay for the network or the community, It seems like that some of the strongest network effects actually happen when people not only use a tool from the top down, so Nike branded shoes or an app from Uber, but when customers or users give back data or create something which then adds to the network that we benefit in a stronger and more coherent way when we have a creative tool or something that someone even if it's a post on a Facebook wall.
我很好奇，你觉得这些工具还能在激发创造力方面做得更好吗？是不是能更快、更强地形成网络效应？比如Pinterest，它花了很长时间才起来，但我特别想听听你的看法。
And I guess I'm curious to know if you think that there's room for more creativity there, that these tools are actually better at creating network effects or faster or it looks like Pinterest took a long time, but I'd be interested in that perspective.
Pinterest刚起步的时候其实很慢，但你知道的，它花了挺久才找到真正适合市场的产品方向。
When Pinterest started working, it went very But, you know, so it took a long time to get the product market fit to make it work.
有些创业者特别有意思，他们进来的时候就想明白：怎么让更广大的人群愿意用？
There are some fascinating ways entrepreneurs come in with what is the value that more masses come.
我们现在看到越来越多基于数据和网络的效应。
We're seeing more and more data, network based effects.
公司们都说：我做这个就是为了收集数据，有了数据，就能提供远超对手的服务，理由嘛，A、B、C、D，样样都成立。
I mean, companies are saying like, I'm doing this to get the data and with the data, I can provide a vastly superior service and here's why, A, B, C, D.
现在全球最吃香的工作，就是数据科学家。
The hottest job right now in the world is the data scientist.
我两个孩子都在上大学。
Both my kids are in college.
我就问他们：你真不打算去读机器学习的博士？
I say, You sure don't want to get a PhD in machine learning?
数据科学。
Data science.
但你知道，现在越来越多的东西扑面而来，要么是海量内容，要么就是我们常说的数据网络效应，有些效应特别强，关键在于系统里积累的那些综合数据。
But, you know, we're getting more and more things coming at us with either a corpus of content or basically a data we've called it database network effect and there can be some really powerful ones where the aggregated data in the system.
Pinterest 能比任何人都更精准地给你推荐内容，因为它掌握的信号和内容多太多了。
Pinterest should be able to put better content in front of you than anyone else because they have so many more signals and so much more content.
是的，这可以通过个性化来实现。
Yeah, it could either in the form of personalization.
它在 B2B 领域也能带来更大好处，我觉得这一点被低估了。
It can also come in the benefit of B2B, I think, a lot more.
比如，很多中小商家都在用物流服务，对吧？
For example, a lot of these SMB players use shipping, right?
他们没法像亚马逊那样拿到优惠价，因为亚马逊能集中发货。
They can't negotiate great discounts like how Amazon does because they consolidate.
但如果有一个物流平台专门为这些商家服务，收集所有数据，就能给出更实用的建议，比如：‘你要是住在达拉斯这个区域，就选这个服务商。’
But if there is a shipping provider that is sort of servicing all of them, a tech company, and is collecting all the data, they can actually give better information back to the players in terms of, Hey, if you're in Dallas or in this micro zone, use this.
或者，明明标的是‘优先两天达’，实际上有 80% 的情况是一夜送达，那用户就能省下钱。
Or if they say it's priority, two day priority, but it actually goes overnight 80% of the time, so you can do money saving.
现在我们看到一些初创公司正在用客户在平台上产生的交易数据来解决这些问题，基于这些数据给出更优的推荐，告诉你该选谁。
So we're seeing interesting startups that are tackling those problems using data that customers are contributing because the transaction happened on the platform and using that to sort of give recommendations, better recommendations on who to use.
我很好奇，你有什么建议吗？
I was really curious if you had any advice.
如果出现不利的经济、社会、政治或地理因素，甚至季节性影响，可能会削弱网络效应，你有什么看法？
If there are adverse socioeconomic or political or geographic effects or even seasonal effects that could adversely affect the network effect.
我知道我说‘影响’这个词有点多。
I realize I'm saying effect
确实说得不少。
quite a bit.
有没有什么影响？
Is there is there any With effect.
面对这些可能破坏网络效应的不利因素，你有什么建议？比如如何提前防范、规划或做好缓冲？
Advice on how to guard against or at least plan or buffer for these adverse effects as they're coming in that could actually disrupt this
你说的是季节性波动吗？
Are these, like, seasonality?
对，就是那种情况。
Or the yeah.
你能做到吗，我
Can you get I
季节性因素可能是最好的例子，比如9·11事件，那时候整个市场都崩了。
think seasonality or probably the best example is nine eleven where everything kinda took a crash.
如果你那天刚创业，想拉到客户几乎不可能。
And if if you started a company that day, odds are you would have very hard time getting customer acquisition.
类似的情况也发生在占领华尔街运动刚开始的时候。
Same thing for you know, at the onset of the Occupy Wall Street movement.
对。
Yep.
如果你当时想向富裕人群推销产品，大概很难成功。
If you were trying to sell something to affluent individuals, probably wouldn't have as much success.
我
I
说真的，9·11期间我正好在管理eBay这个网络效应业务。
mean, was managing a network effects business during 09/11, which was eBay.
你知道吗，我们的订单量一夜之间直接跌了一半。
You know, our volume literally just dropped 50% overnight.
新用户彻底停了下来。
New users stopped completely.
生意连续两三周都跌得厉害，但后来又慢慢恢复了。
It was a big divot in the business for two or three or four weeks and then everything popped back.
那个月流失的用户，我们再也没能拉回来。
We never regained the lost users we had during that month.
他们没再回来，但整个业务重新调整了方向。
They never came back but it recalibrated.
我在金融危机爆发时负责管理OpenTable。
I was managing OpenTable during the financial crisis meltdown.
我们原定在2008年8月中旬召开全员会议，为IPO做准备。
We did our org meeting on a mid August for the IPO in mid August two thousand and eight.
就在周一会议前的周四，我们通知了那些投行接手业务。
We told the banks on Thursday before the Monday org meeting who got the business.
雷曼兄弟没拿到这笔业务。
Lehman Brothers didn't get the business.
他们就在周六因为这消息破产了。
They went bankrupt Saturday on that news.
美林证券拿到了业务，所以周日就和美国银行完成了交易。
Merrill Lynch did get the business, so they traded the Bank of America on Sunday.
整个周末，由于恐慌，餐饮消费市场整体下滑了15%，我们周一早上还得照常工作。
Over the weekend, the business the entire restaurant consumption market dropped 15% because of the panic and we worked Monday morning.
那次冲击持续了大约十五个月，但大多数初创公司都撑不到那么久。
That one lasted for like fifteen months, but very few of the startups are long term.
你需要资金来挺过去，但如果是一个月的波动，通常也不会直接把你拖垮。
You need capital to pursue it, but just, you know, the if it's a month, you typically you know, it's it's not going to completely bury it.
如果冲击超过一个月，那真是个巨大的打击。
You know, there if the shock's more than a month, it's a it's a hell of a shock.
所以我觉得，除了我本身资本就不太充裕之外，其他外部影响也挺要命的。
And so it's I mean, I think the externalities other than, you know, I am thinly capitalized.
我没太多时间来做这个实验。
I don't have a lot of time to run the experiment.
除此之外，通常你能在外面看清楚它的本质。
Other than that, typically, you you can understand it outside of it.
谢谢大家提出这么好的问题。
Thank you guys for your great questions.
很好。
Great.
是的。
Yeah.
说得真好。
That was great.
对。
Yeah.
谢谢。
Thank you.
咱们明天再约着聊聊吧。
And let's hang out and talk tomorrow.
谢谢大家。
Thanks, everyone.
谢谢。
Thank you.
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