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美国必须立即重建其整个基础设施。
America's got to rebuild its entire infrastructure, like, right now.
我们缺乏足够的稀土矿物。
We don't have enough rare earth minerals.
我们缺乏足够的电力。
We don't have enough electricity.
我们缺乏足够的制造能力。
We don't have enough manufacturing capacity.
英伟达能生产足够的芯片,但我们的内存又不够了。
NVIDIA will make enough chips, but then we won't have enough memory.
几乎每一样东西都是瓶颈。
Almost everything is the bottleneck.
中国的图表是这样的,而美国的图表是那样的。
The China graph is like this, and The US graph is like that.
我们怎样才能让这看起来不那么可怕?
How do we make this seem less scary?
科技的历史一直是不断进步的。
The history of technology is things have always gotten better.
人类在创造他们所需的新事物方面的能力简直不可思议。
Humans are kind of unbelievable in their ability to come up with new things that they need.
现在有80亿人可能脑子里有想法,
Now 8,000,000,000 people that might have an idea in
就能把想法付诸实现。
their head can get it out of their head.
我认为将会发生的是,
I do think what's going to happen is
五十年来,科技界几乎有一条神圣的规则:你无法用金钱解决软件问题。
For fifty years, one rule in technology was almost sacred: you cannot buy your way out of a software problem.
雇一千名工程师,你仍然赶不上更快的竞争对手。
Hire a thousand engineers and you still won't catch a faster competitor.
弗雷德·布鲁克斯称之为‘神话般的人月’,每个工程领导者都深信不疑。
Fred Brooks called it the mythical man month, and every engineering leader believed it.
这条规则不再成立。
That rule no longer holds.
只要有足够的GPU和正确的数据,公司现在可以将数年的开发工作压缩到几周内完成。
With enough GPUs and the right data, companies can now compress years of development into weeks.
但这种颠覆是双向的。
But the disruption cuts both ways.
让初创公司加速前进的同样力量,也在瓦解保护现有企业的护城河:客户粘性、专有数据、转换成本正在同时消退。
The same forces that let startups move faster are dissolving the moats that protected incumbents: customer lock in, proprietary data, switching costs all eroding at once.
因此,在旧有防御手段不再有效的世界里,究竟什么才使一家公司值得创建、投资或保留?
So in a world where the old defenses no longer work, what actually makes a company worth building, funding, or keeping?
a16z的联合创始人兼普通合伙人本·霍洛维茨在德爾維爾舉行的金融科技連接會議上,與a16z普通合伙人亞歷克斯·蘭佩爾對話。
Ben Horowitz, co founder and general partner at a16z, speaks with a16z general partner Alex Rampell at Fintech Connect Conference in Deer Valley.
你从事这一行已经很久了,我想也许我可以先问一下——有趣的是,我们其实完全没有排练过,因为我觉得这样会更真实,对吧?不如我们聊聊你那本书,你在书中谈到当CEO有多难,以及你在Loud Cloud和Opsware经历的一切。
So you've been doing this for a long time, and I thought maybe I'd start off, and it's funny, we actually didn't rehearse this at all because I thought that way would be more real, right, But more let's talk about, you have this book where you talked about how hard it is to be a CEO and everything that you went through at Loud Cloud and Opsware.
那是一次巨大的转变,当时市场崩溃了,金融市场也崩塌了。
That was a giant shift where it's like the market kind of collapsed, the financial market collapsed.
你不得不真正转型,彻底改变公司。
And you had to really pivot and just change the company.
现在有一些新兴公司正在涌现。
And there are new age companies that are popping up right now.
它们是AI优先的公司,希望它们已经把事情安排得井井有条。
AI first, it's like they hopefully have their shit together.
它们已经全速前进,开始打造全新的东西。
They're off to the races building something new.
但对于五年前或十年前的公司来说,虽然有巨大的机会,但也面临巨大挑战。
But like a legacy company or five or ten years ago where there's this great opportunity, but also great challenge.
一个五岁或十岁的公司的CEO该怎么做?
What does a five or 10 year old CEO do?
它们还处于AI时代之前。
Where it's like they're pre AI.
必须弄清楚自己该做什么。
Gotta figure out what they do.
金融市场讨厌他们。
Financial markets hate them.
是的,是的。
Yes, yes.
所以金融市场上不在乎你是谁。
So there's the financial Doesn't markets matter who you are.
对。
Yes.
所以我不知道,也许可以就此展开聊聊。
So I don't know, maybe riff on that.
我很想听听你的想法。
I'd love to hear your thoughts.
是的,我认为在这种巨大的动荡中,你首先必须认识到一些非常基本的、像物理定律一样的原则已经不同了。
Yeah, well, I think the first thing you have to recognize in a kind of huge dislocation like this is some very basic axiomatic like laws of physics are different.
与以往技术公司的发展方式相比,AI时代有两个真正不同的地方:第一,过去人们众所周知,你不能靠砸钱来解决问题。
And the two that are really different with AI compared to how companies have been built in kind of technology forever is, one, it used to be very well known that you cannot throw money at the problem.
例如,如果我有一个产品,落后了两年,我无法雇用一千名工程师来赶超竞争对手。
So for example, if I had a product and I was two years behind, I could not hire a thousand engineers and catch my competitor.
这就像《人月神话》里说的,九个女人不能在一个月内生出一个孩子,人人都知道这行不通,没问题。
Like it's a mythical man month, nine women can't have a baby in a month, everybody knows that, it never works, No problem.
但这已经不再成立了。
That's no longer true.
现在你可以用钱来解决这个问题。
You can throw money at the problem.
如果你有足够的资金和一些优质数据,就可以购买足够的GPU,基本上解决任何软件问题。
If you have enough money and some good data, you can buy enough GPUs and solve basically anything and software.
所以这一点已经不复存在了。
So that's gone.
第二点,我们以前非常确定的是,在软件领域,占有就是九成的法律。
The second thing that we knew for sure is like in software, possession is nine tenths of the law.
所以如果你拥有客户,你就拥有多重锁定优势。
So if you have the customer, you have multiple lock ins.
你有迁移面板的锁定、数据锁定和用户界面锁定。
You have the migration pane lock in, you've got the data lock in, you've got the user interface lock in.
这些基本上都不复存在了,对吧?
Those are pretty much gone, right?
所以复制代码非常容易。
So it's very easy to replicate the code.
移动数据也非常容易。
It's very easy to move the data.
而且接下来与你的软件交互的甚至不再是人类。
And then it's not even going to be a human talking to your software.
而是人工智能。
It's going to be an AI.
人工智能在使用用户界面时非常灵活。
And AIs are really flexible on how they use user interfaces.
所以这种模式已经消失了。
So that mode is gone.
所以我认为,作为CEO,你首先必须认识到的一点是:这种情况即将消失。
So I think that's just like the first thing you have to recognize as a CEO that like, okay, that's going away.
那么,真正的核心是什么?
So then what is it?
你的价值在哪里?
Where is your value?
你到底在提供什么?
What are you delivering?
事实证明,有很多具有价值的东西。
And it turns out there are many things that are of value.
但如果你试图通过这些方面来获得良好的定价,你将面临巨大的压力。
But if you're trying to get good pricing through any of those things, you're going to be under tremendous pressure.
你的价格必须基于你提供的某种更独特、更鲜明的价值。
Your price has to be a function of some other value that's much more distinct that you provide.
明白了。
Got it.
我们公司内部经常讨论的另一件事是,过去如果你有一个好产品,可能有十年甚至五年的时间可以持续利用它。
And the other thing that we've talked about this a lot internally as a firm is that once upon a time, like if you have a good product, you might have ten years to run with that product, maybe five years.
但现在可能只剩下五周了。
And now it might be like five weeks.
我们也会从公司上市的角度来讨论这个问题。
We also talk about this in terms of going public.
因此,企业保持私有状态的时间变得更长了,这可能是好事。
So companies are staying private a lot longer, which probably is good.
如果你正经历一场生存危机,你当然更愿意以私营公司的身份而不是上市公司的身份来应对。
If you're going through an existential crisis, you'd much rather do that as a private company than a public company.
但SaaS行业危机发生的原因,也在于人们对长期价值产生了怀疑。
But also the reason why the SaaS apocalypse is happening is because there are doubts on terminal value.
是的,没错。
Yeah, right.
所以,每个创办公司的人,都是因为他们想创造经济价值。
So everybody who starts a company, they're doing it because they want to create economic value.
他们是资本家。
They're capitalists.
他们试图从这个方程式中获得经济利益。
They're trying to actually benefit from this equation financially.
但如果你等待太久,你的公司可能一文不值。
But if you wait too long, maybe your company's worth zero.
这有点吓人。
That's kind of scary.
这一直是一种风险,但过去需要几十年才显现。
And that was always a risk, but it would play out over decades.
是的,这种风险没那么快发生。
Yeah, it's not as fast a risk.
所以我想
So I
假设你当时是CEO,我是说,Loud Cloud今天还存在,但这是个糟糕的例子。
guess if you were I mean, Loud Cloud's around today, you're the CEO and again, bad example.
抱歉。
Sorry.
抱歉让你感到害怕。
Sorry to give you scary.
我知道。
I know.
我知道。
I know.
实际上,Loud Cloud会是
Actually, Loud Cloud would be
没错。
exactly.
太棒了。
Awesome.
你会处于非常有利的位置。
You would be very well positioned.
但我想知道,CEO 可能应该采取哪些不同的做法?
But I guess what is it that a CEO should do potentially differently?
我的意思是,显然要更快行动、更快削减、更高效,砸钱进去,就像我们之前讨论的那些事。
I mean, obviously move faster, cut faster, be more efficient, throw money at them, like all these things that we've talked about.
但天啊,如果我上市了却被颠覆了,那我就得面对一个糟糕的处境——变成一支仙股。
But it's like shit, if I go public and I get disrupted, then I have this terrible life of I'm going be a penny stock.
如果我继续等待,又有可能被彻底击垮。
If I just wait, there's this chance that I get eviscerated.
这种像被车碾过的成功方程式,确实挺吓人的,对吧?
And this kind of like roadkiller success equation is kind of scary, right?
我的意思是,这一直都很吓人,但现在你
Mean, it's always scary, but you would have time and now it
感觉你已经没有时间了。
feels like you don't.
是的,你确实得诚实地面对自己,搞清楚你真正拥有什么。
Yeah, think you do have to be honest with yourself on like what it is you have really.
有些公司被牺牲是活该的,有些则不是。
Like there are companies that get thrown under the bus correctly and ones that don't.
如果你把这些观点推到逻辑尽头,就会发现什么都一文不值,因为公司里根本没人,没人会买你那破软件,诸如此类。
And then if you take a lot of these ideas to their logical conclusion, nothing is worth anything because there are no people at companies and if there are no people who's gonna buy your shitty software, so da da da da.
但实际情况更微妙,这些事情的发展往往比我们想象的要慢得多。
But like it is more like subtle and it just tends to take much longer than we think for some of these things to play out.
那么问题来了,在这期间,你是在变强,还是在衰退?
So then the question is, you getting stronger in that meanwhile, or are you degenerating?
所以发生的情况是,没人购买了,资金只是转移了,客户在买别的东西,不再买你的产品。
So is what's happening, nobody's buying like the money just shifted, the customers are buying other stuff, they're not buying yours.
如果是这样,你就面临巨大问题。
In that case, you have a huge problem.
你很可能需要大幅裁员并转型。
You probably have to cut deeply and pivot.
但另一方面,有些公司在估值上被彻底击垮,但其实根基依然稳固。
On the other hand, look, there's companies that have been slaughtered in the valuation game, but are pretty strong.
所以我在这家公司Navan的董事会里,对吧?
So I'm on the board of this company, Navan, right?
就是他们的差旅业务。
Like their travel.
显然,SaaSpocalypse来了,他们完蛋了,没人会做差旅了。
So obviously the SaaSpocalypse, like they're dead, no way you're doing travel.
但如果你深入一看,就会发现实际情况比这复杂得多,因为做差旅,你实际上需要建立明确的合作关系,尤其是对于任何一家重要的公司。
But then you look under the covers and you go, well, it actually is a little more complicated than that because on travel, like you actually need explicit relationships to find providing your travel and you're any kind of company that's important at all.
你需要全球出差。
You need to travel globally.
所以,我得跟全球每一家航空公司、每一家酒店、每列火车,所有这些都建立联系,你都得应付。
So now I need a relationship with every single airline in the world, every single hotel in the world, every train, everything, you've got to deal with that.
你还得把它们跟你们的预算系统等一切东西连接起来。
You've got to kind of connect back to their budgeting systems and all these things.
而第二件没人想做的事,包括OpenAI或Anthropic在内,就是去卖东西给该死的差旅经理。
And then the second thing that's like nobody wants to do, including OpenAI or Anthropic is sell to the damn travel manager.
根本没人能接触到旅行经理。
Like nobody has a channel to the travel manager.
这根本不是一个听起来靠谱的主意。
It's not something like and you can't even imagine that being a good idea.
你想不断进步,想效仿Intuit的做法,把自己变成一家更像AI的公司,从而留住客户。
You want to keep advancing, you want to kind of do the things that Intuit is doing where like, okay, like turn ourselves into more of an AI company and then kind of hold the customer.
顺便说一句,这种代理式的旅行体验,其复杂程度远超人们的想象。
And by the way, like the AI, like the agentic travel experience turns out to be much more complicated than one would think.
我不知道这种情况会不会一直持续下去,但这就是现状。
And I don't know if it stays that way, but that's the way it is today.
所以我觉得这非常依赖于公司本身。
So I think it's very company dependent.
我不认为所有情况都是一样的,但我确实认为这是一个崭新的世界。
Like I don't think it's all one thing, but I do think brave new world.
如果你还用旧世界的眼光来看待它,而它实际上有着完全不同的运行法则,那你肯定会失败。
And if you keep looking at it like the old world, and it's got completely different laws of physics, you are definitely gonna die.
是的。
Yep.
好吧,也许我们来谈谈风险投资。
Well, maybe let's talk about venture capital.
现在也有很多逃避现实的行为。
There's a lot of cope going on now too.
所以在这方面得小心。
So like, gotta be careful with that.
关键是,有些东西确实属于功能,以前开发一个功能要花很长时间,所以你还不如利用自己的比较优势。
Well, that's the thing, it's like there's some things that really are features and before it would take a long time to build a feature, so you might as well, know, it's comparative advantage.
大卫·李嘉图。
David Ricardo.
我可以自己焊接钢材。
I could weld my own steel.
我可以自己种粮食,但我选择不做,因为做其他事能为我创造更高的经济价值。
I could grow my own food, but I'm just going to not do that because I can do things that actually produce more economic value for me.
但现在,创建功能变得不再那么困难了。
But now it's just becoming not that hard to go create features.
但功能不等于产品,也不等于公司。
But features are not products or not companies.
我们一直都有这个区别。
And we've always had this distinction.
有功能、产品、公司这样的区分,但如今要分辨哪个是哪个有点令人困惑,因为现在创建功能、打造产品甚至获取所有数据的能力都提升了。
There's feature product company, but it's a little bit confusing figuring out which one is which right now, just because the ability to create a feature and create a product and even get all of the data.
我最喜欢的一句话是:最好的公司拥有‘人质’,而不是客户,甚至要从这些‘人质’公司里获取一些数据。
My favorite saying the best companies have hostages, not customers, like even get some of the data out of the hostage company.
是的。
Yeah.
所以现在这个世界在区分这些概念时非常混乱,这或许正好可以引出风险投资领域的话题——你是怎么想的?
So it's a very, very confusing world in terms of figuring out which one is, which is kind of maybe a good segue to venture capital land of how do you think?
我的意思是,当你在2009年创立这家机构时,正值严重的金融危机,实际上是一场非常、非常严重的全球性金融危机,是有史以来最大的一次。
I mean, when you started this firm in 2009, big financial crisis, well, actually, very, very big financial crisis, global financial crisis going on, the biggest.
自那以来,世界已经发生了巨大变化。
The world has changed a lot since then.
我的意思是,今天发生的一切在多大程度上符合当时的思维模式,又有多少是全新的世界?不妨稍微展开谈谈。
I mean, how much of what's happening today kind of fits within the mental model of back then and how much is kind of Brave New World, maybe riff on that a little bit.
是的,情况真的完全不同了。
Yeah, so it's really different.
我们的第一支基金是3亿美元,全部来自传统的有限合伙人,如捐赠基金、慈善基金会、母基金等。
So our first fund was $300,000,000 and we raised it from all the traditional kind of LPs, endowments, charitable foundations, etcetera, fund of funds.
我们刚刚筹集了150亿美元,这是第七支基金中的第四支。
We just raised $15,000,000,000 four of the seven funds, four of the seven funds.
所以,甚至还没算上整个基金体系。
So like not even the whole complex.
而我们筹集资金的对象是截然不同的投资者群体。
And we raised it from very, very different kinds of investors.
我们起步时,几乎没有任何国际有限合伙人,而现在国际资金占比已达35%,来源地多种多样。
So we, like basically none of our LP base was international when we started and we're at like 35% international money and it's from all kinds of places.
而且科技变得越来越重要了。
And just tech has gotten more, has gotten so much more important.
我认为我们必须以一种以前从未有过的方式来看待这个世界。
I think that we have to think in terms of the world in a way that we just didn't before.
比如,为什么你们筹集了这么多钱?
So for example, like with, why did you raise so much money?
顺便说一句,我有点怪自己,因为我觉得我内部表达得还不够清楚,其实我们本可以筹集更多资金。
Which by the way, I'm kind of mad at myself because I don't even think I articulated internally well enough because we could have raised even more money.
下次别担心了。
Next time, don't worry.
我们手头还有更多资金。
We had more money on the table.
但我当时的想法是,看吧,美国现在必须重建整个基础设施,因为我们不够,你知道的,我们缺乏足够的稀土矿物。
But the way I was thinking about it is, look, America's gotta rebuild its entire infrastructure like right now, because we don't have enough, you know, we don't have enough rare earth minerals.
我们缺乏足够的电力。
We don't have enough electricity.
我们的制造能力也不足。
We don't have enough manufacturing capacity.
我们拥有的芯片是错的。
We don't have We have the wrong chips.
它们消耗的电力实在太多了。
Like they take way too much damn power.
它们是为游戏设计的。
They were built for games.
我们几乎在任何方面都跟不上这个未来世界的需求,必须有人来投资,而这显然需要大量资金。
We don't have enough anything kinda to be in this future world and somebody's gotta fund it and clearly that's gonna take a lot of money.
所有这些都前所未见,某种程度上令人倍感压力,但它们确实极其重要。
So all that is brand new and I would say it's like fairly overwhelming in a sense but like it is really, really important.
在美国,我们几乎已经没电了。
Like we're pretty much out of electricity down in The United States.
不是十二个月后,就是现在。
Like not twelve months from now, like right now.
中国的图表是这样的,而美国的图表是那样的。
The China graph is like this and The US graph is like that.
是的。
Yeah.
对这些芯片的需求并不是直线上升的,但建立这种产能的能力绝对不是直线上升的。
It's not like demand for these tokens is straight vertical, but the the ability to kind of build that capacity is absolutely not vertical.
所以我们需要一个新时代。
So we need new era.
我的意思是,我们需要投资一家变压器公司,不是那种AI变压器,而是真正的电力变压器公司,因为你需要更好、更容易制造、更高效的变压器。
I mean, like, need we invested in a transformer company, not like a an AI transformer, like an actual power transformer company because you need, you know, kind of better, easier to manufacture, more efficient transformers.
自我们发明电力以来,变压器实际上就没有改变过。
And the transformer hasn't changed since really we invest, we invent electricity.
所以像这些方面。
So like these kinds of things.
我想说,有一句老话,高价格的解药就是高价格。
I guess how, so there's an old saying, the cure for high prices is high prices.
但问题是,这涉及大量的延迟。
But the problem is there's a lot of latency involved.
所以现在有些电脑出厂时没有内存。
So right now there are computers that show up with no RAM.
比如,如果你去戴尔买一台服务器,他们会说:抱歉,我们没有内存卖给你,因为所有的内存都被抢购一空了,因为是的,他们可以建新工厂,或者你我可以决定建一家DRAM工厂,但这需要五年时间。
Like if you buy, you go buy a server from Dell, they're like, sorry, we don't have any RAM to sell you because all of that has been gobbled up because yeah, they could build a new factory or you and I could decide to go build a DRAM factory that would take us five years.
是的。
Yep.
那么你怎么
So how do you
我的意思是,我们确实得现在就开始。
I mean, we don't You believe gotta start now.
你确实得现在就开始。
You gotta start now.
但如果你还记得的话——你当然记得——1999年的时候,我们不是也得建更多的光纤吗?
But this is is actually, if you remember, which you obviously do nineteen ninety nine, it's like, well, we have to build more fiber, right?
我们必须增加产能。
We have to build more capacity.
但显然情况大不相同,因为现在所有的GPU都在满负荷运行。
But it's obviously very different because all the GPUs are hot, they're all lit right now.
而那时,大部分光纤都是闲置的。
And back then, most of the fiber was dark.
但你怎么才能做到像
But how do you get like
是的,我们在建设光纤时确实也遇到过瓶颈,但瓶颈的位置不一样。
Yeah, well, were bottlenecks when we were building fiber, the bottlenecks were kind of in different places.
当时的服务器甚至无法足够快地输出数据来支持视频,对吧?
The servers weren't capable of putting bits out even fast enough to do video, right?
而且当时的软件也很原始,我们没有负载均衡器,没有应用服务器,什么都没有。
And this software was really, we didn't have load balancers, we didn't have application servers, we didn't have anything.
所以当时有大量光纤和带宽,但你根本无法构建出相应的应用,而且大多数终端用户也还没跟上,网络也太落后了。
And so you had all this fiber and all this bandwidth, but like you can actually build the applications and then most of the end users weren't, it's a network too.
所以另一端的人并没有连接上,因此根本行不通。
So people weren't connected on the other end, so it just didn't work.
然后我们经历了互联网泡沫破裂和各种事情。
And then we had the .com crash and all these things.
所以现在我们处于一个稍微不同的境地,因为几乎每一个环节都成了瓶颈。
So now we're in a little different place because almost everything is a bottleneck.
我认为接下来会发生的是,我们可能会在电力供应充足之前就先有足够的芯片。
I do think what's gonna happen is like, we'll probably have enough chips long before we have enough electricity.
所以英伟达会生产出足够的芯片,但我们却会缺乏内存,也会缺乏电力。
So Nvidia will make enough chips, but then we won't have enough memory and we won't have enough electricity.
所以我们现在就处于这种状况。
So we're in that kind of situation now.
因此,你真的需要研究供应链中每一个环节的现状,并找出如何缓解这些瓶颈。
So I think you really have to study where we are at each point in the supply chain and figure out how to alleviate those bottlenecks.
顺便说一句,天佑马斯克,那个关税下的晶圆厂,说的就是这个意思。
And by the way, know, God bless Elon, the tariff fab, you know, that's the idea.
他会亲自去解决所有瓶颈问题,这就是他的做事方式,所以我们需要他。
He's gonna just go deal with all the bottlenecks himself, which is how he does things, which is why we need him.
确实如此。
Indeed.
所以我觉得你在三件事上是专家:嘻哈、人工智能和加密货币。
So I feel like you're an expert in three things, hip hop, AI and crypto.
我对嘻哈一无所知,但从你这里听了很多,但让我们聊聊另外两个吧。
And I don't know anything about hip hop, but I've heard a lot from you, but let's talk about the other two.
特别是加密货币和人工智能。
In particular crypto and AI.
我刚刚写过关于这个的内容。
So I actually just wrote about this.
你的意思是,你记得加密货币的起源是哈希现金。
I mean, you remember the origins of crypto was hashcash.
是的,是的,是的。
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
从我的角度来看,最可怕的是,现在每个人使用Claude或ChatGPT都可以深入定制电话和邮件内容。
And the scariest thing right now from my perspective is that everybody with Claude or with ChatGPT can actually like go super deep and personalize a phone call and email.
看起来所有的沟通都将变得完全不可用。
It seems like all communication is going to be completely unusable.
是的。
Yep.
我不确定你是否同意我的看法。
I don't if you agree with me.
我完全同意。
I 100%.
因为通常我只需要直接删除、删除就行。
Because it's like normally I can just delete, delete.
我昨天收到一封邮件,发件人是Deer Allen,来自Index Ventures。
I get some email yesterday, Deer Allen at Index Ventures.
可我根本就不是Alan。
It's like, Well, I'm not Alan.
我不在指数风险投资公司工作。
I don't work at Index Ventures.
删除。
Delete.
我很感激这个人把我的名字搞错了,因为这样我就可以直接删除了。
And I'm very grateful that this person messed up my name because I could just delete that.
而如果我收到一千封邮件,看待邮箱的最佳方式就是它是一个对公众开放的待办事项列表。
Whereas if I get a thousand emails, like the best way of thinking about an email inbox is it's a to do list that has right access for the public.
是的,没错。
Yeah, right.
就像任何人都能进来,现在任何人都能个性化定制了。
It's like anybody can get in and now anybody can personalize.
电话也是一样。
Same thing for phone calls.
那我们该怎么办?
Like, what do we do?
然后看起来设备背后有很多东西。
And then it seems like there's a lot behind equipment.
这就是我提到哈希现金的原因,因为它最初是为了阻止垃圾邮件。
That's why I mentioned hashcash because it was originally intended to stop spam.
是的。
Yeah.
所以你觉得
So do you think
人工智能和加密货币之间有重叠吗?
there is overlap between AI and crypto?
我知道你这么认为。
I know you do.
所以跟我们说说吧。
So tell us about that.
是的,我认为这始于人工智能带来的问题。
Yeah, so I do think it starts with the problems that AI causes.
事实上,有一天我半夜醒来,突然想到:天哪,有人会开Zoom会议。
And actually one of the first thing I woke up in the middle of the night one day and I was like, oh my God, somebody's gonna go on a Zoom.
到时候会是AI版的我,告诉我的财务团队把五亿美元汇到尼日利亚,那就会出大问题。
It's gonna be AI me and they're gonna tell my finance team to wire like $500,000,000 to Nigeria and that's gonna be a problem.
所以我们觉得,好吧,一切都跟硬件、访问根有关。
So, and then we're like, okay, everything's hardware, root of access.
除非有我的加密密钥,否则别相信我发的任何东西,诸如此类。
Don't believe anything from me unless it's got my cryptographic key on it, all that kind of thing.
所以我早就知道这些问题会到来。
So I knew these problems were coming.
现在这些问题来得实在太快了。
They're coming so fast now.
所以我认为这些问题可以分为好几类。
So I think there's kind of several categories of things.
首先是:你是人类还是机器人?
First is just, are you a human or are you a bot?
我认为每个人都非常想知道这一点,无论是社交媒体、约会应用、Zoom通话,还是任何你想要确认的场景,你都想知道:我是不是在和一个真实的人交谈?
I think everybody is going to really, really wanna know that, be it social media, a dating app, a Zoom call, like anything you wanna know, am I talking to an actual human?
比如,我能不能证明自己是人类?
Like, okay, can I prove that I'm a human being?
然后,我能不能证明我就是我?
And then can I prove that I'm me?
接着,我能不能对内容进行签名?
And then can I sign content?
我怎么知道它是不是真的?
Like, how do I know it's true?
比如,我家人经常发给我很多AI生成的视频,但他们以为这些不是AI做的。
Like, there needs to be a distinction between I get so many AI videos sent to me from my family that they think are not AI videos.
他们会问:这事儿真的发生过吗?
They're like, did this really happen?
我会说:不,你其实可以问问Grok,它现在在这方面挺在行的。
I'm like, no, you could actually ask Grock and it's pretty good at that right now.
但我认为,Grock已经快到了连它自己都难以分辨的地步。
But I think, you know, like Grock's getting to the point where it can barely figure it out.
我认为总有一天,AI将无法分辨什么是AI,或者AI将无法识别出哪些是AI生成的内容。
And I think at some point it won't be able to figure it out or AI will not be able to tell what's an AI.
所以唯一的办法是,必须为每一份内容附加某种密码学上强效的标识,表明:是的,这是我制作的,或者这确实是马可·卢比奥发表演讲的真实视频。
So the only way is you're gonna have to have something, some cryptographically strong indication assigned piece of content that says, okay, yeah, I made this or this is like really a video of me, Marco Rubio giving a speech.
这不是别人伪造的东西。
This isn't something that somebody faked.
而且还需要有一个可信的真相来源。
And then there needs to be a source of that truth.
你打算信任谁来提供真相?
Who are you going trust for the truth?
你会信任谷歌吗?
Are you going to trust Google?
你会信任Meta吗?
Are you going to trust Meta?
你会信任美国政府吗?
Are you going to trust the US government?
我认为你更愿意信任区块链的数学博弈论特性。
I think you want to trust the kind of mathematical game theoretic properties of the blockchain.
所以我认为这将成为基础设施中非常重要的一部分。
So I think that's going to be just a very, very important part of the infrastructure.
然后你就涉及到欺诈问题。
And then you get into fraud.
你怎么知道一个人是公民,从而向他发放资金?
And how do you know somebody is a citizen to get them money?
大家都在说,好吧,我们来实行全民基本收入吧。
Everybody's talking about, well, let's do UBI.
很好。
Well, great.
但当我们实施刺激计划时,发现政府在把钱送到人们手中方面非常糟糕。
But when we did the stimulus program, we found out that the government is very bad at getting money to people.
我不知道,根据你参考的数据,大约有4500亿美元被偷走了。
I don't know, was like, depending on the numbers you read, it's somewhere around $450,000,000,000 got stolen.
所以你真正需要的是,每个人都要有一个可以接收资金的地址。
So what you really need is everybody needs an address where you can send them money.
所以我认为这是一个加密货币的问题。
And so I think that's a crypto problem.
那么最后,人工智能如何成为经济主体呢?
And then finally, how does an AI become an economic actor?
比如,我作为人工智能怎么赚钱?
Like, how do I make money as an AI?
别人怎么给我转账?
How does somebody send me money?
如果我不是人类,我能成为商户、信用卡商户吗?
Like, can I be a merchant, a credit card merchant, if I'm not a human?
我不这么认为。
I don't think so.
我觉得这其实挺难的。
Like, I think that's actually kind of hard.
而且这可能根本就不是正确的基础设施。
And it's probably not the kind of right infrastructure anyway.
所以你需要一个互联网上的基础工具。
And so you need a bare instrument on the internet.
你需要互联网货币,让这些AI能够成为经济主体。
You need internet money for these AIs to be economic actors.
我认为这非常可能是加密货币。
And I think that's very likely to be crypto.
所以我认为AI催生了加密领域中的许多机会。
So I think there are many opportunities in the crypto space that have been generated by AI.
是的,因为这感觉像是老雅吉·贝拉说的:太拥挤了,没人再来了。
Yeah, because it feels like it's this old Yogi Berra saying it's so crowded, nobody goes here anymore.
我们正进入那个时代,因为首先一个问题就是:你是个真实的人吗?
Like we're of entering that era because number one is, are you a real person?
但问题是,现在协同工作做得太好了,或者说是开放爪子。
But the problem is that, you know, co work is so good right now that or, you know, open claw.
我只是说,你是一个真实的人。
I just say you are a real person.
你曾经是真实的人,但现在你的地址被机器使用了。
You were a real person, but now your your addresses are being used by a machine.
是的。
Yeah.
对吧?
Right?
所以验证码毫无意义。
So captchas don't make any sense.
验证码,什么是验证码?
Captcha, is a captcha?
对吧?
Right?
所以感觉解决方案某种程度上在于经济学和博弈论。
So it feels like the solution lies in kind of economics somehow and game theory.
是的。
Yes.
对。
Yeah.
还有这一点。
And that too.
对吧?
Right?
没错。
Right.
没错。
Right.
就像你不得不重新考虑一下,我觉得Hashcash这个想法又相关了。
Like, you gonna just have to, maybe like I think Hashcash is kind of a relevant idea again.
是的,完全没错。
Yeah, no, totally.
所以,我们不妨聊聊你认为风险投资未来会走向何方?
So maybe why don't we talk about where you think venture capital is going?
我提到这一点是因为马克因为说‘所有工作都会消失,只剩下风险投资这一份工作’而遭到批评,这被看作是一种利己的言论。
And I mentioned this because Mark got some crap for saying, you know, all the jobs will go away except for one job of venture capital, which was seen as a self serving comment.
但为了替他辩护,我会说,这在一定程度上是因为这是一个非确定性的问题。
But in his defense, I will say it's partially because it's a nondeterministic problem.
是的。
Yeah.
对。
Right.
也就是说,你首先是在押注一位创业者。
It's like, all right, you're betting on an entrepreneur first and foremost.
你希望了解这位创业者,正如我常说的,能够调动劳动力、资本和客户。
You want to know that this entrepreneur, as I like to say, can materialize labor, capital and customers.
你不能只是,你知道的,用算法来运行,我的意思是,也许你可以,但那里根本没有多少数据。
And you can't just like, you know, run an algorithm on I mean, maybe you can, but there's just not a lot of data out there.
这非常非常困难。
It's very, very hard to do.
所以这就是为什么,以及一般来说,人际关系可能会在人工智能时代幸存下来的原因。
So that's the logic by which and also just personal relationships in general will probably survive AI.
如果有风险投资人,那就意味着现在存在创业者这个职位。
If there's a venture capitalist, then that kind of assumes there's an entrepreneur job now.
是的,这是对的。
Yes, that is true.
需要
Takes
如果没有创业者,想当风险投资人是很难的。
It's kind of hard to be a venture capitalist without a Yeah, venture
如果你非常糟糕,你也许可以筹到钱却从不投资出去,我想。
if you're very bad, you could just raise money and never allocate it, I guess.
但我想知道,你认为当今的风险投资行业是什么样子的?
But I guess what do you think the world of venture capital looks like kind of today?
我们公司内部当然已经做了很多工作,试图全面拥抱人工智能。
We've obviously done a lot of things internally as a firm to try to embrace AI like very, very fully.
但五年、十年后,考虑到白领工作可能发生的变革。
But now five years, ten years from now, just given what's potentially gonna happen to white collar work.
是的,这确实很棘手,因为你得回溯到上一次类似的转型,也就是工业革命时期。
Yeah, it's really tricky because you kinda go back to the last transition like this, which was kind of the transition to the industrial revolution.
所以,铁路和汽车行业的风险投资者最终变成了摩根大通、高盛等公司。
So kind of the venture capitalists of the railroads and the automobiles and so forth ended up becoming JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, etcetera.
因此,他们最终转型成了银行。
So they ended up becoming banks.
其中一部分原因是因为这种转变发生得太快了。
Some of the reason for that was just how fast that materialized.
所以我认为在20世纪30年代,大约有20%的美国工人在汽车行业工作,这相比今天简直是惊人的比例。
So I think in the 30s, like 20% of American workers worked for the auto industry, which is like spectacular compared to what it is today.
因此,工业革命时期的事情一开始就像我们今天在风险投资领域的情况一样,当时有大约300家汽车公司等等。
And so things in the industrial revolution kind of started out very much like we are today in venture capital where there were whatever 300 auto companies and so forth.
然后在美国,这个行业迅速整合为三大巨头等等。
And then it consolidated very hard into in The US, the big three and so forth.
接着,那些风险投资人开始向上游与这些公司合作。
And then the kind of venture capitalists went upstream with the companies.
我认为这是一种可能的情景:未来会出现少数几家极其庞大的公司,它们将掌控一切等等。
I think that's one scenario where like, okay, there's gonna be a small number of very gigantic companies and they're gonna own everything and so forth.
还有另一种可能的未来:这些公司变得非常庞大,但我们终于触及了智能发展的极限。
There's another kind of future where it's like, okay, they got really big and then we've kind of finally hit the asymptote on this intelligence idea.
它们的智能水平已经达到了顶峰,如此而已。
And like, they're smart as they're gonna be or whatever.
我们可能会将这些大型实验室国有化,把它们变成类似公用事业的存在——就像电力那样,如果你打算收取所有利润的话。
And we're either going to like nationalize the big labs and like their utilities, electricity plus plus, like if you're gonna think you're gonna collect all the money.
然后每个人都可以基于这套公用基础设施进行创新。
And then everybody's just gonna build on this utility set of things.
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那将是一个完全不同的风险投资世界。
And then that's a very different venture capital world.
所以我会说,正如我引用尤吉·贝拉的话:预测未来很难,尤其是关于未来的预测。
So I would say, as I'll quote Yogi Berra, like the problem with future, the problem with predictions are very hard, especially about the future.
我认为这个未来尤其难以预测,因为它变化太快,实在太复杂了。
And I think this future is particularly hard because it's so dynamic and it's really hard.
那么,电力短缺会如何影响局势呢?
And then like, how does the electricity shortage play into?
会不会让大公司变得无比强大,因为它们耗尽了所有电力,其他人根本得不到电,也买不到任何GPU?
Does it make the big companies all powerful because they suck up all the electricity and nobody else can get it and nobody else can get any GPUs?
还是会推动计算能力向边缘分布,从而使模型变得又小又高效?
Or does that push all the computing out to the edge and then the models just get really good and small.
每个人都会说:我的手机已经足够用了,而他们那庞大的GPU农场收费简直离谱。
And everybody's like, well, I got enough in my phone and what they're going to charge me for their mega GPU farm is just outrageous.
我就选择这么做。
And I'm just going to do that.
这种情况可能有多种走向。
There's many ways it could go.
我不知道。
And I don't know.
我想我也不知道。
I guess I don't know.
但我可以看到风险投资变得更大、更令人兴奋,因为世界上每个人都是创业者。
But I could see venture capital being much bigger and much more exciting because everybody in the world is an entrepreneur.
或者我也可能看到它像工业革命时期那样,新公司变得越来越难成立。
Or I could see it being like more like what happened in the industrial revolution and like new companies are just harder.
是的。
Yeah.
嗯,这是一个很好的跟进问题,或者说是平行问题:我们如何让这一切显得不那么可怕?
Well, it's kind of a good it's a good follow-up or a good parallel question, which is like, how do we make this seem less scary?
因为我不知道你
Because I don't know if you
我见过。
saw it.
变化很大,你知道的,
It's a lot of change, you know,
确实如此。
it is.
嗯,也不完全是。
Well, yes and no.
我的意思是,98%的美国人都是农民。
I mean, 98% of Americans were farmers.
1789年。
Seventeen eighty nine.
是的。
Yeah.
我敢肯定他们现在不是农民了。
I'm pretty sure they're not farmers right now.
我的意思是,你提出了一个有趣的观点:如果你去所谓的第三世界或第四世界国家,每个人都是创业者。
I mean, you made this interesting point where if you go to like a third or fourth world, if there is a such thing country, everybody's an entrepreneur.
是的。
Yeah.
100%就是这样,比如那个卖香蕉的人,他在这里买,然后到别处卖。
100% like the guy like I sell bananas by buying them here and selling them there.
每个人都是创业者。
Everybody's an entrepreneur.
根本没有组织化的公司。
There are no organized companies.
是的。
Yeah.
有趣的是,现在这80亿人中,任何有想法的人都能把想法付诸实践。
And the cool thing is that now 8,000,000,000 people that might have an idea in their head can get it out of their head.
也许那是个糟糕的想法。
And maybe it's a bad idea.
这很可能是个糟糕的主意,但他们现在不再有门槛了。
It probably is a bad idea, but there is no longer a gate for them.
没有资本的门槛。
There's no capital gate.
也没有那种所谓的‘灵感爆发’式的门槛。
There's no like idea, which is like boom.
这不仅仅适用于编程。
And it's not just for code.
比如,我可以写音乐。
It's like, you know, I can write music.
是的,没错。
Yeah, yeah, right.
我可以拍一部电影,这太令人兴奋了。
I can make a movie like this is super exciting.
所以这感觉就像,如果你试图让这一切看起来不那么悲观的话,我不知道你有没有看过伯尼·桑德斯采访克劳德。
So that feels like a very you know, if you're trying to make this not look dystopian, I don't know if you saw Bernie Sanders interviewing Claude.
这简直就是老男人对着云层大喊大叫。
This is literally old man yells at cloud.
是的。
Yeah.
就像,你知道的,隐喻,也不是隐喻。
Like, you know, metaphor, no metaphor.
对。
Right.
他就只是在对着云层大喊大叫。
It's just like he's yelling at the cloud.
是的。
Yeah.
而那种看法就是一种反乌托邦的视角,但这是错误的。
And like, that's the dystopian view and it's wrong.
我强烈认为这种观点是错的,
I feel very passionate that that's wrong,
但我们需要一个更好的叙事。
but we need a better narrative.
所以从宏观角度来看,历史会告诉我们,技术的发展始终在变好。
So the history kind of, would say if you look at it a macro standpoint, The history of technology is things have always gotten better.
你愿意生活在电力出现之前的世界吗?
Like would you like to live in the world before electricity?
大概不会。
Probably not.
听起来你似乎可以选择,但其实不行。
Doesn't sound that You can if you want.
但似乎没有人愿意选择回到那种状态。
But like nobody seems to opt into that.
我认为我们现在正处在一个类似的时代,但转型总是令人恐惧,因为那是一个完全不同的世界。
And I think we're very much in kind of a period like that, but it is the transition is always scary because it's a different world.
比如过去,每个人都是农民。
Like the jobs, everybody was a farmer.
比如在1750年,几乎每个人都是农民,我记得当时美国有93%到94%的人是农民。
Like everybody was a farmer in like 1750, I think it was like 93 or 94% of America was farmers.
然后,几乎所有的这些工作都消失了。
And then like almost all those jobs are gone.
就像我们现在认为是正经工作的那些岗位,在当时的人看来简直荒谬至极。
Just like the jobs that we think are jobs that they would have thought were ridiculous, like ridiculous.
如果你是个农民,你可能会觉得产品经理这类工作是最愚蠢的事情,或者任何这类工作。
If you were a farmer, would think, but I do as a dumbest thing in the world or a product marketing manager, any of this stuff.
这根本算不上一份工作。
It's like, that's not a job.
你没有生产任何食物。
You're not making any food.
你也没有盖房子。
Like, you're not building a house.
这怎么可能算一份工作呢?
Like, how could that be a job?
所以我认为很难预见事情的另一面,但我相信对每个人来说,结果肯定会好得多得多。
So like I do think it's very hard to see to the other side of that, but I think it's very, very likely to be like way, way, way better for everybody.
就像电力最终让每个人的生活都变得更好一样。
Just like electricity ended up being way better for everybody.
对我来说,最明显的一个错误观念来自约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯。
To me, like the biggest kind of the most salient, like wrong idea was from John Maynard Keane.
他写过一篇不太出名的论文,但他是大萧条时期最伟大的经济学家之一,他说:看吧,未来物质将极其丰富,每个人的需求都会得到满足。
So he wrote a paper that wasn't that famous, but the great economist of the depression, where he said, look, things are gonna be so abundant and everybody's needs are gonna be met.
每个人都会拥有房子或住所,每个人都会有足够的食物吃。
Everybody's gonna have a house or like a shelter, and everybody's gonna have enough food to eat.
一旦你的基本需求被满足了,你就会工作得少得多,每周最多工作十五小时,因为你的需求已经得到了满足。
And then once you have your needs met, like you're gonna work way less, like fifteen hours a week max, because your needs are met.
但他没意识到的是,我们不会只拥有一辆车,而是每个人都会拥有一辆车。
But like what he didn't realize was, well, we're not just gonna need one car, we're gonna need a car for every person.
我们会需要电脑、电视、各种各样的东西、令人惊叹的假期,还有那些需要厨师花十个小时准备的美食——这些在当时根本不存在。
We're gonna need computers and television sets and this and that the other and awesome vacations and like food that takes like a chef ten hours to prep and all this kind of thing, which did not exist then.
那时候根本没有什么美食家、品鉴菜单之类的我们现在有的那些乱七八糟的东西。
Like there was no like whatever foodies and tasting menus and all that bullshit that we have now.
但这些其实都是一种需求。
But like that's all a need.
这种欲望会很快变成需求。
Like that want goes to a need very fast.
人类在创造出他们所需的新事物方面,能力简直不可思议。
And humans are kind of unbelievable in their ability to come up with new things that they need.
然后你就得去制造这些东西,等等。
And then you have to make those and so forth.
我认为十五年后,事实是,美国乃至全球的每个人,都将比1980年最富裕的人生活得更好,尤其是在信息获取等奢侈品方面。
And I think it's gonna be, look, I think in fifteen years, the truth is everybody is gonna in America and probably around the world is gonna live better than the very best life from just luxury access to information, etcetera, etcetera, than anybody did in 1980.
所以,我们几乎肯定会到达这样一个世界,因此你没必要为此如此生气。
So that's the world that we almost certainly are gonna get to, so you shouldn't be so mad about it.
但这确实让人感到不安。
But it is disconcerting.
好的。
Alright.
好吧,尤其是当你在教小孩子的时候,你知道的,他们会问:我该做什么?
Well, that note Especially if you're trying to teach little kids, you know, they're like, what should I do?
我不知道。
Like, I don't know.
这确实是个难题。
That's a hard one.
说到这个,感谢霍罗威茨关于伤病的分享,霍罗威茨,非常感谢。
Well, on that note, Horowitz at at injuries and Horowitz, thank you very much.
感谢你的分享。
Appreciate this.
好的。
Alright.
谢谢。
Thank you.
谢谢。
Thanks.
谢谢
Thanks
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