本·霍洛维茨谈新基金募集与风投公司规模化

我认为，这些关系对于初次创业的人来说非常难建立。

These relationships, I think, like, you're talking about are very hard to get if you're, like, a first time founder.

你没有那些人脉资源。

You don't have the relationships with the Whatever.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

嘿。

Like, hey.

我刚创办了一家公司。

I just started a company.

你遇到了监管问题。

You've got a regulatory issue.

贾米·戴蒙，你能和我共进午餐吗？

Jamie Dimon, can you, have lunch with me?

嗯。

Yeah.

祝你好运。

Like, good luck.

所以这是一个很大的问题。

So that's that's a big one.

嗯。

Yeah.

我对于平台类的事情没有特别强烈的意见，但也不太确定。

One of the ones that I don't feel strongly about, but I'm less sure on, is, like, the platform stuff.

我想稍微深入探讨一下这个话题。

And I'm curious to pull that open a little bit.

你最有信心的是哪些平台服务？

Are the platform services that you're most confident work?

那么，你最没信心的是哪些？

And then what are the ones that you're least confident work?

我其实觉得它们都有效，因为我们已经逐渐放弃了那些不奏效的。

I actually think they all work because we've kind of moved away from the ones that didn't work.

你能谈谈一些你觉得没问题的吗？

Can you talk about some of the ones that, you know, that's fine.

嗯。

Yeah.

我的意思是，我们早期做过一些事情，比如发布一些通用的研究想法之类的，面向整个初创社区。

I mean, like, we did some things early where we were publishing sort of, you know, we had this thing where we were going to have sort of general research ideas or whatever for the entire startup community.

但结果发现，如果你针对加密货币或人工智能来做，效果会非常好，比如我们会尝试所有模型等等，我们经常和公司交流，问：哪个模型最擅长什么？

But like, it turns out that that works really well if you do it for crypto or if you do it for AI, you know, like we try out all the models and so forth, know, like, and we talk to the companies all the time about, okay, like, model's best at which?

然后我们会发布模型，尝试各种东西。

And then we, you know, post models and we try stuff out on them and so forth.

所以从工具评估的角度来看，我们可以直接加速你的进程，告诉你确切的情况。

So like from a tool evaluation standpoint, like we can just accelerate you and tell you exactly what's what.

但在通用领域这么做，嗯，我觉得我们在跨领域尝试的很多东西最后都没那么有趣。

Doing that in general, well, like a lot of things I think that we tried to do across domains ended up being not as interesting.

这一点在人才方面也同样成立。

And that's getting true for talent as well.

所以CFO大体上都是CFO，比如硬件CFO和软件CFO是不一样的，诸如此类。

So a CFO is a CFO for the most part, like a hardware CFO different than a software CFO, that of thing.

但那很简单。

But that's easy.

比如，AI研究员和全栈工程师就非常不同。

Like an AI researcher is pretty different than a full stack engineer.

那是完全不同的 talent pool（人才池）。

Like, that's a different talent pool.

他们活跃在不同的圈子中。

They run-in different circles.

他们的薪酬结构也完全不同。

Their comp structures are totally different.

因此你必须专业化。

And so you have to specialize.

我的意思是，目前来说，招聘方面我主要接触的是A轮公司，我认为招聘是我能帮助自己招募人才的最重要事情。

I mean, the recruiting stuff is probably, at this point for me, talking to mostly Series A companies, I think recruiting is the number one thing that'll just help me recruit.

你有没有发现，你可以有效地让招聘团队在特定时间段内专注于某些公司？

Have you found that you can effectively aim recruiting teams at companies for specific periods of time?

我认为这有助于找到最初的种子人才，对吧？

I think it helps to get the seed corn, right?

所以你努力要做的，就是能否找到前三到五位杰出的人才，然后建立起你想要从中招募人才的网络？

So a lot of what you're trying to do is can you get the first three to five people in who are stellar and then have networks where you want to draw from?

你的风投机构在这方面其实非常重要，对吧？

Who your VC is actually matters a lot on that, right?

对工程师来说，他们会关心：这个人会不会离开？

To an engineer like cares about like, okay, is this person going away?

这家公司背后有没有更多的资金支持？

Is there more money behind this?

我有没有听说过他？

Have I heard of him?

就是这种事。

That kind of thing.

所以这是一个重要的功能。

So that's an important feature.

我认为每个公司最终都必须在招聘、面试、录用、入职和培训方面变得极其精通，否则永远不可能成为一家优秀的公司。

I think every company has to ultimately get hyper proficient at recruiting, closing, interviewing, onboarding, training, or they're never going to be a good company.

你的意思是，某种程度上我们不能替他们做所有事，否则他们永远无法培养出这种能力？

You're saying to some degree we're like, you can't do it all for them or they'll never build the muscle?

是的。

Yeah.

在某个阶段，如果你把他们的整个团队都包办了，反而会阻碍他们的成长。

At some point, you'll end up retarding their growth if you put in like their entire team.

现在我们通过我们的网络，大概帮助Databricks在一段时间内招聘了至少一百人。

Now we've put it like we probably helped through our network, like Databricks hire like over a 100 people for sure over time.

但这就像是

But it's like

他们显然

they clearly

但他们在初期并不是这样，但他们非常擅长招聘等等。

have But their not in the beginning, but they're really good at recruiting and so forth and so on.

所以现在就是，我们的人才网络中有人对在那里工作感兴趣。

So like now it's just like, okay, people from our talent network are interested in working there.

但这和你最初招聘的那几个人是不同的。

But that's different than that first, you know, the first few people that you hire.

那些是我们拥有的关系，他们会把你介绍给某人，也许合适，也许不合适，等等。

Those are relationships that we have that will introduce you to somebody and like maybe they'll fit, maybe they won't and so forth.

但这是一种非常特定的情况。

But, like, that's a kind of very specific thing.

你对董事会席位和董事会成员资格怎么看？它们有多重要？

How about your view on, like, board seats and board membership and, like, how important that is?

也许可以为外界人们的看法做个总结。

And maybe just, like, put, like, bookends on what people out there will believe.

有一些人说，我们的卖点就是不占董事会席位。

You've got you've got some that are like, our selling point is we don't take a board seat.

我们会让你自由行事。

We'll leave you alone.

我们不会做任何事。

We don't we're not gonna do anything.

还有一些人则热情洋溢地谈论董事会成员与创始人之间那种精神上的联系，这里面大有文章。

You've got some that are sort of, like, you know, breathlessly talking about this, you know, spiritual connection between the board member and the founder, and there's a lot there.

那你在这中间持什么立场？

Like, where do you fall in this?

你怎么看待董事会成员的职责？

How do you think about what the board member

我大概不相信什么精神上的联系。

I should probably don't believe in the spiritual connection.

我刚才可能有点夸张了，但你知道我说的是什么意思。

I was sort of maybe embellishing a little bit, but you know what I'm talking about.

首先，董事会对创始人来说很重要。

So first of all, boards are important for founders.

所以，认为在你已经向员工分配了股权、向非你本人的投资者出售了股权之后，还能不设董事会，这是世界上最危险的想法。

So like the idea that you're gonna run without a board after you've given equity to employees and sold equity to people who are not you is the most dangerous fucking idea in the world.

因为如果你了解证券法，作为CEO，你避免坐牢或被个人起诉的唯一保护，就是将重大决策提交董事会审议。

Because if you know anything about securities laws, the only protection you have as CEO from going to jail or getting personally sued is that you run material ideas through the board.

这是巨大的保护。

That's massive protection.

比如，如果我说：‘我想给公司里这个人2%的股权激励’，你必须意识到，你对其他股东的受托责任已经受到质疑。

Like if I go, well, I want to give a 2% grant to this person in the company, you have to realize your fiduciary to the rest of the company that you're diluting is in question right there.

就只是这一点。

Just that.

如果你把这件事提交董事会，那就没问题了。

If you run that by the board, it's all good.

你就完全得到保护了。

You're completely protected.

没问题。

No problem.

如果你自己擅自做主，有人想起诉你，你肯定会输。

If you just make that on your own, somebody wants to sue you, they're going to win.

到那时，你几乎没有任何辩护余地。

You really have very little defense at that point.

所以，不设董事会的想法是错误的。

So, the idea that you're not going to have a board is a bad idea.

一旦你不再100%拥有公司，就必须设立董事会。

Think once you start not owning the company 100%, you've got to have a board.

这就是规则。

That's just how it goes.

我们反复讨论过这个问题，好吧，董事会到底能给公司带来多大帮助？

We went back and forth on this, okay, how much does the board actually help the company?

我想说，有几个有趣的地方。

And I would say, so there's a couple of interesting things.

所以，Y Combinator的人实际上说过，大概在2015年或2016年，他们来找我们，说：我们分析了所有有董事会和没有董事会的公司。

So the Y Combinator people actually said, it must have been around 2015, 2016, they came to us and they were like, We did an analysis of all our companies who had boards and didn't.

没有董事会的公司都失败了。

And the ones that didn't have boards failed.

表现得不好。

They didn't do well.

作为一组，有董事会的公司表现好得多。

As a cohort, the ones with boards did much better.

当然，这里面有混杂因素，对吧？

Now there's confounding factors, right?

但在他们看来，另一点是，通过观察这些公司，定期（每三个月或两个月）向公司外部的人汇报你正在做什么，这种节奏。

But in their view, the other thing was just in observing the companies, the rhythm of having to tell somebody outside of the company what you're doing every three months or every two months.

会形成内部压力。

Creates internal pressure.

这非常有价值。

It is very valuable.

这只是一个很好的组织原则，能帮助你保持正轨。

It's just like a good organizing principle to keep yourself on track.

所以我相信这一点。

So I believe in that.

我认为，在公司不同阶段，某些类型的董事会成员可以产生非常大的影响。

And then I do think certain kinds of board members can be very, very impactful at different points in the company.

就我自己而言，现在如果阿里把我从Databricks的董事会踢出去，我不确定公司会因此变得差很多。

Just with myself, like, right now, if Ali kicked me off the board at Databricks, I'm not sure that they would do much worse.

我真的这么觉得。

I honestly don't.

然而，曾经有过这样的时刻，比如C轮融资时，我主导了A轮，NEA主导了B轮，但没人愿意投资这家公司的C轮。

However, there were times, for example, the series C, I led the series A, NEA led the series B, nobody would do the series C of that company.

我和皮特·孙赛尼也主导了这一轮。

Pete Sunsini and I led that one too.

NEA和我们不仅主导了B轮和A轮，还主导了C轮。

NEA and us led the C in addition to the B and the A.

如果我不在董事会里，我觉得这件事根本不可能发生。

If I'm not on the board, like, I don't think there's any way that's happening.

所以，这是一个关乎存亡的问题。

So, that's like an existential issue.

第二件事，你知道，他们曾经在2018年或2019年左右收到过一笔收购要约，金额大约是40亿美元。

Second thing, you know, they had an offer to buy the company for like, I think it would have netted out to about $4,000,000,000 in 2018, 2019, something like that.

如果我当时不在董事会，我认为他们早就卖了。

And had I not been on board, I think they would have sold.

这可是件大事。

That's a big deal.

我想Ali也会说，他们确实会卖。

And I think Ali would say they would have sold.

所以，他们现在的估值已经达到数百亿美元了，这可是实实在在的价值。

So, they're worth, you know, they're raising now over $100,000,000,000 So, that's like a real value.

因此，如果说‘好吧，我们做个好事，不进你们董事会了’。

And so, to say that like, oh, all right, we're going do you a favor and not be on your board.

因为你看，当你在一家公司时，你整天想的都是公司。

Because look, when you're in a company, all you think about all day is the company.

你没有全局视角。

You don't have perspective.

所以，如果有一个人能帮你理清思路，并且有宏观视角，那这种价值可能就值回一切，对吧？

So if there's somebody who can help you think through things and has perspective, that can be worth the whole thing, Right?

所以这绝非无足轻重。

So it's not a nothing.

我认为我见过一些董事会成员，他们在整个任职期间都毫无价值。

I think it's not a I've seen board members that had no value the whole time they're on the board.

这种事情确实经常发生。

Like, that happens all the time, for sure.

所以我不想夸大其词。

So don't want to overstate it.

嗯，有两种方式可以产生影响力。

Well, two types of sort of ways to be impactful.

有一些高价值的时刻，是那些明确、清晰的情境，你可以这么说：原本x会发生，但我让y发生了，而y更好之类的。

There's there's sort of like these high value moments that are these discrete, crisp situations that you can say x was gonna happen, and I made y happen and y was better or whatever.

然后还有一种是日常参与型的董事会成员，他们总是不停地说话，比如面试候选人。

And then there's sort of the, like, daily engagement type of board member who's talking all the time and, you know, interviewing candidates.

比如，CEO对某件事感到沮丧。

The, you know, the CEO is upset about something.

这时候就有个人可以聊聊，等等。

It's somebody to talk to, etcetera.

是的。

Yeah.

你觉得这种类型在某些方面其实价值较低吗？还是说你认为它们是不同的，你如何看待这两者？

Do you think that that kind is actually less valuable in some ways, or do you think that they're, like, do you think about those similarly differently?

董事会及其工作，首先是治理，这一点我前面已经提到了；然后在某些特定时刻和特定事情上，董事会成员真的能发挥重要作用。

So there's, there's the board, and the work of the board, which is governance number one, as I kind of alluded to in the And then there's kind of certain points and certain things where board members can really matter.

我觉得我做的大部分工作更像是，我会每个月和CEO通一次电话，聊聊他们卡住的问题。

You know, I think most of the work that I do is more, know, like I'll have, well, I'll have a monthly call with a CEO just to talk through the things that they get stuck on.

比如，是什么让你犹豫不决？

Like, things what's causing you to hesitate?

这种做法现在才有效吗？

Does this work only at this point?

或者在你职业生涯早期，你是否需要更多地参与日常招聘这类事务，而现在才能做这种版本？

Or earlier in your career, did you need to do more of the, like, daily hire, you know, hire engagement model stuff, and only now can you do the this version?

不。

Nah.

听好了。

Look.

我认为

I think that

我其实想表达的是，风险投资界有一种观点，认为你最多只能参与八个董事会，再多就会崩溃。

Part of what I'm getting at actually is I think there's this idea in venture that you can only be on, like, eight boards before you collapse.

然后我跟玛汀聊过，她可是参与了这么多杰出公司的董事会。

And then I was, like, talking to Martine, who's, like, on all these incredible companies.

创始人说他很棒，他担任的董事会职务远不止八个或十个。

The founders say he's awesome, and he's on, like, way more than eight or 10 boards or whatever.

是的。

Yeah.

所以，好吧，我认为如果你作为董事会成员没有平台，只是投资者，那么八个可能才是正确的。

So, okay, so I think that if you're the board member and you don't have a platform, and you're the investor, then eight is probably right.

但如果你有平台，当他们说：‘我需要见个客户。’

But if you have a platform, then when they go, Hey, I need to meet a customer.

我需要帮忙招聘。

I need to like help with recruiting.

我需要处理这个政策问题。

I need to like deal with this policy issue.

我需要跟加文·纽森谈谈。

I need to talk to like Gavin Newsom.

我需要处理——

I need to deal with-

本·马丁的

Ben Martin's

做这些事。

doing that.

我们有一个完整的平台来做这些事。

Like we have a whole platform that does that.

因此，他可以扩展规模，专注于自己擅长的事情，并且高效地完成。

And so he can scale and just do the thing he does and do it very effectively.

然后他非常努力地工作，诸如此类。

And then he works extremely hard and all that kind of thing.

所以我认为，如果你有平台或没有平台，情况是不同的，因为如果所有业务开发、招聘、政策、治理的工作都落在你身上，

So like, I think it's different, know, if you have a platform or if you don't, because if it's on you to be the BD guy, the recruiting guy, the policy guy, the governance guy, and

你就不可能管这么多。

you so can't run that many.

是的。

Yeah.

这些人真是特别，愿上帝保佑那些风险投资家等等。

Those guys are, that's a special, God bless those VCs and so forth.

但我们不会要求你在我们的平台上这么做。

But we don't ask you to do that on our thing.

我认为这并不必要。

And I don't think it's necessary.

就我所做的工作而言，即帮助人们思考如何经营公司、如何考虑商业交易，诸如此类的事情。

I think for the work I do, which is helping people think through how they run the company, how they think about a business deal, this and that and the other.

这种日常的频繁干预，我认为会损害CEO的成长。

That daily frequency, I think, can be destructive to the development of the CEO.

CEO最终必须独自面对，因为最终他们只能独自承担。

The CEO ends up having to stand alone Because ultimately, they're going to stand alone.

你可以寻求建议，拥有朋友，有人帮你摆脱困境，但你必须对自己的观点有极强的信念，才能做出这些极其艰难的决定。

Get advice, you get friends, you have people unstick you, but you have to have such high conviction in your own opinion to make these very, very difficult decisions.

比如，我们必须裁员，或者我们要做这件事，或者我们要改变公司的方向。

Like, okay, we've to do a layoff, or we're going to do this, or we're to change the direction of the company.

你不希望CEO去向外部的人寻求这样的决策，因为外部的人缺乏正确的背景和做出如此重要决策所需的知识。

You don't want the CEO looking to somebody from the outside to make a decision like that, because a person from the outside does not have the correct context, the amount of knowledge required to make such an important decision.

所以，你希望外部的人提供的只是建议，比如让我从这个角度帮你看看，或者从那个角度、第三个角度来审视。

And so you want the person from the outside really to be advice like, let me tilt this this way so you can look at it from that angle, and this and that and the third.

而不是问：‘我们应该怎么做，本？’

But not like, what should we do, Ben?

你知道的。

You know?

就像，它是

Like, it's

‘我该如何思考这个问题’才是更好的提问方式。

how should I think about this is a much better question.

关于这个话题的最后一个问题是，我想听听你的想法是如何演变的。

The last question on this, I just want to sort of hear how your thinking has evolved.

你们很早就提出了这个观点，大概是2009年，认为媒体和品牌非常重要。

You guys came out early, like, I guess, 2009 with this idea that, like, media and brand are a big deal.

我认为在很多方面我并不完全确定，因为我直到2011年才毕业，但在我看来，那些年里的情况和现在显然不一样，现在每个人都知道了。

And I think in many ways I don't know exactly because I didn't graduate till 2011, but it seems to me, like, in those years, this was, like, not what was happening versus, like, now, obviously, everybody kind of knows it.

是的。

Yeah.

从2009年到现在，你的想法有发生变化吗？

Have you evolved your thinking, like, from 2009 to now?

也就是说，事情的发展是否完全如你当初所料？

Like, are you do you think it basically played out just like you thought?

你认为它现在变得更加重要了吗？

Do you think it's even more important?

你对什么样的品牌和媒体更重要这一观点有改变吗？

Has it have you changed your idea of, like, what type of brand and media and so on matters?

是的。

Yeah.

我想，最初的想法非常简单，就是风险投资公司从不为自己做营销。

So look, I think the original idea was very simple, which is VCs didn't market themselves.

在风投圈里，这就像某种潜规则。

It was some kind of code in VC land.

我们想，既然我们是新来的，没人认识我们，而这是我们擅长的——帮助人们创办公司，那我们就来推广一下。

And we're like, well, since we're new and nobody knows who we are, and that's what we know how to do, where people build companies, we'll kind of market it.

我们这么做了，而且做得不错。

And we did, and we did a good job of it.

这让我们领先了一步。

And that kind of got us ahead.

世界已经变了。

The world has changed.

媒体环境和我们刚起步时完全不同。

The world of media is completely different than when we started.

我们刚起步时，嗯，那时候有博客之类的东西，我们也开过博客。

When we started, everything I mean, there were blogs and stuff, we had blogs and that kind of thing.

但当时人们获取信息的主要渠道，毫无疑问是传统媒体。

But the primary way people got information was through the press, for sure.

新闻界的规则，以及通过新闻媒体这一间接渠道的运作规律，与直接传播的规律完全不同。

And the rules of the press are, and the laws of physics of the indirect channel going through the press, are completely different than the laws of physics of going direct.

真正重要的渠道数量非常有限，形式也极为固定，比如你只能有一个引述，或者一个五分钟的简短采访片段，他们不停地抛出你不想回答的问题，诸如此类。

The very fixed number of channels that matter, very fixed format that you, you know, you can have a quote or a short five minute interview segment where they're like hitting you with questions that you don't want to answer and all that kind of thing.

那时的品牌都是些公司，比如福特、通用汽车，等等。

And then the brands were all companies, Ford, GM, this, that.

间接传播的世界与之完全相反。

The indirect world is completely upside down from that.

渠道是无限的。

There's unlimited channels.

形式也是无限的。

There's unlimited formats.

你可以讲最长或最短的故事，都没问题。

You can tell the longest or the shortest story you want to.

这根本不是问题。

It's no problem.

而现在的品牌主要是人，对吧？

And then the brands are mostly people, right?

比如，是Palantir吗？

Like, is it Palantir?

是Alex Karp吗？

Is it Alex Karp?

是Elon吗？

Is it Elon?

还是X？

Or is it X?

是Jensen还是NVIDIA？

Is it Jensen or is it NVIDIA?

所以，你不可能拥有一个完全独立于背后人物的品牌。

So, you can't really have a brand that's completely independent of the people behind the brand.

因此，我认为我们现在进入市场的方式就是——这就是我们邀请Eric Torenberg的原因。

And so, I think the way that we're approaching the market now is, this is why we brought on Eric Torenberg.

他正在为我们构建一个全新的营销模式。

And what he's building is a completely new marketing model for us.

一切都在那里，因为物理法则不同了。

Everything is there because the laws of physics are different.

所以，你必须构建一个全新的系统。

So, you have to build a whole new system.

你看，其他风投公司之所以如此，是因为他们跟进我们太慢了，总体上还停留在旧世界。

And look, I think that what's happened with the other VCs is because they were late to copy us, they're still in the old world by and large.

他们对新世界有一些浅尝辄止的尝试，但必须做出大量改变。

And they have some light shots at the new world, but they're going have to do a lot of changing

这其实也是一种难以复制的情况，我认为，如果你自己内心无法理解其本质，就无法简单地模仿别人的行动。

to It's also kind the catch kind of thing, I think, where if you don't internally get what it's all about, you can't just replicate people's activities.

我觉得这是一类需要理解其底层运行机制的事情。

I feel like this is one of those things where you have to understand, like, the underlying physics of how it's working.

不。

No.

没错，就是这样。

That that's exactly right.

你知道，它的精神实质在文化上非常不同。

You know, there the the ethos of it, it is, like, very culturally different.

是的。

Yeah.

你不再考虑哪些话不该说。

Like, you're no longer thinking about what you shouldn't say.

旧世界里太多都是关于我不能说什么。

Like so much of the old world is what can I not say?

我该怎么回避这个问题？

How do I avoid answering that question?

我该怎么说出预设的回应？

How do I give the talking point?

在这个世界里，根本没有预设的回应。

Like, are no talking points in this world.

完全正确。

Totally.

你知道，我只是在胡说八道。

You know, like I'm just talking shit.

而且这

And that's

如果你有点冒犯，那就随它吧。

And if you, like, offensively little bit, it's like, so be it.

对。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

嘿。

Like, hey.

我的意思是，明天直接上节目吧。

I mean, just get on the air tomorrow.

下一分钟。

The next minute.

就像洪水泛滥，全面覆盖。

Just like it's a flood flood the zone.

比如，应对失误的对策是全面覆盖，而不是不犯错。

Like, that's the answer to a gaffe has flood the zone, not don't make the gaffe.

对。

Yeah.

没错。

Exactly.

永远不要道歉。

Never apologize.

全面覆盖。

Flood the zone.

对。

Yeah.

现在还有什么能像播客一样受欢迎吗？

Does anything land as well as podcasts right now?

我觉得你们在播客领域显然取得了惊人的增长。

I feel like, you guys have, like, had an amazing growth in your podcasting, obviously.

而且我看了很多，都很不错。

And it's like, watch a lot of them, and they were good.

对，没错。

And Yeah.

我正在做一个。

I'm doing one.

在我看来，似乎人们失去了注意力，也丧失了阅读能力。

And, like, it seems to me like there is some thing going on where people have, like, lost their attention and ability to read.

所以我们大家都决定，干脆就发视频之类的。

And so we've all just decided, well, we'll just put out videos and stuff.

对。

Yeah.

我认为播客现在确实是最有效的。

I think podcasts are definitely working the best right now.

我的意思是

I mean

人们还读书吗

Like, do people read

博客在变化。

blogs change.

人们确实会读博客。

People do read blogs.

如果你有一个特别打动人的博客，那真的很有用。

If you have one, that really hits.

我的意思是，实际上，我们最近推出了几个非常棒的博客。

I mean, actually, we just there's a couple of really great ones that we came out with.

其中一个是你知道的，《为什么没有上帝》视频模型，类似这样的内容是贾斯汀写的。

One was, you know, There Is Why There's No God Video Model and like that kind of Justine wrote that.

嗯。

Yeah.

好的内容确实不错。

Good ones are good.

我觉得那个嗯。

I feel like the Yeah.

但是。

But the

那些长尾的垃圾内容真的不值得做。

long tail slop ones are not worth doing, really.

嗯。

Yeah.

每天写一篇博客的想法，我觉得现在行不通了。

The write a blog every day idea, I I don't think that works anymore.

以前可能确实有用，比如为了增加内容量和曝光面，十五年前可能还行。

Where it used to, I think, just to, like, have more content and surface area probably did work, like, fifteen years ago.

嗯。

Yeah.

它有点像每日习惯，但我认为现在人们更愿意一边听播客一边锻炼，你知道的，这种做法有个很大的优势。

It was, like, kinda like the daily habit, but I think that now people would rather us like, oh, I can do a pod read a podcast and exercise, you know, like, and that kind of thing, which is like, that's a big advantage.

嗯。

Yeah.

这是一个很大的优势。

It's a big advantage.

现在有了11 labs阅读器，你可以直接把它导入11 labs阅读器，它

And now with, 11 labs reader, you can just throw it into the, the 11 labs reader and it

可以和播客并列播放。

goes beside podcasts.

但我其实认为博客和社交媒体也很有效，你知道，对于播客来说，你也得在剪辑和类似内容的制作上保持前沿水平。

But I actually think blogs and social media I also work pretty think that, you know, with podcasts, you have to be state of the art in how you think about clips and all those kinds of things as well.

播客必须对目标受众非常有吸引力，我认为这正是作为听众时对我帮助最大的一点：你知道，如果你看新闻，几乎不可能做到，对吧？

The podcast has to be very interesting to the targeted audience, which is I think one of the things that has been best for me as an audience member is, you know, if you watch the news, it's almost impossible, right?

就像你根本不需要冲它扔椅子，不管你是谁，因为他们到底想达到什么人类水平？

Like it's without throwing a chair at it, no matter who you are, because it's like, what the fuck level are they trying to reach a human being?

他们真以为能用这招骗到我吗？

Like, did they really think they're going to trick me with that?

就像那种虚假的立场，哦，显而易见，显而易见。

Like, like fake positioning on like, oh, well, duh, duh, duh.

我是这样问他问题的。

Like I asked him the question this way.

所以现在每个人都会讨厌特朗普，或者每个人都会喜欢特朗普。

So now everybody's going to like hate Trump or everybody's going to like Trump.

现在，我不是傻子了。

It's like, now I'm not an idiot.

而播客不同，如果我听的播客主持人是针对我理解世界的方式进行内容设计的，那我就会全程享受，这真是一个巨大的突破。

Whereas a podcast, if I'm listening to the podcaster that's marketing to my level of understanding of the world, then I'm going to enjoy the whole thing, which is such a breakthrough in Yes.

媒体到

Media to

至少对我来说，要想享受一场正在观看的对话，我需要信任提问者和回答者。

For me, at least, to enjoy a conversation I'm watching, I need to trust both the asker and the answer.

否则感觉就不对劲。

Or it just doesn't feel quite right.

当我在新闻中看到一些自己了解的事情，却知道它们完全错误时，简直让我抓狂。

It drives me nuts on the news when you know something about it too and you know it's just wrong.

然后他们还在那里大肆宣扬，人人都在转发。

And then they're going off and everyone's posting about it.

这让我发疯。

It makes me crazy.

这太离谱了。

It's so bananas.

是啊。

Yeah.

是啊。

Yeah.

而且，我的意思是，特别是主流媒体对人工智能的报道简直太离谱了。

And, well, I mean, and particularly, by the way, in the regular media on AI is so whack.

老兄，你谈的那些威胁都是虚构的，却完全忽视了这样一个事实：按照目前的趋势，我们很快就会在美国有上千万台中国机器人，而且它们都留有通往中国的后门。

Bro, you so like you're talking about these threats that are imaginary, and then you are just ignoring the fact that like on current course and speed, we're going to have 10,000,000 Chinese robots in The U S with backdoors to China.

这将是一个真实存在的问题。

Like that's going to be an actual real problem.

是的。

Yeah.

仅从下一次贸易谈判的杠杆角度来说就是如此。

Just in terms of leverage in the next trade negotiation.

这很棘手，因为在很多方面，从结构上看，传统媒体确实有很多问题。

It's tough because in many ways, structurally, I think traditional media gets a lot off.

我认为这些媒体机构里确实有很多优秀的记者，他们追求真相，希望正确无误，努力做到准确。

I do think there's a lot of very good journalists at these publications who, like, see truth and, like, want to be right and, like, get it correct and all of that stuff.

所以，大概一年前，我发现自己对传统媒体感到非常沮丧。

So I, like, I think, like, a year ago, I found myself just, like, so frustrated with traditional media.

在过去一年里，我觉得我接触了一些非常诚实、优秀的记者。

And then over the last year, I think I've, like, engaged with, like, a bunch of, very honest, good journalists.

是的。

Yeah.

确实有一些真正的记者，即使在那些科技圈特别不喜欢的媒体机构里。

Definitely real journalists out there, even at publications who we in tech really don't like.

他们在这方面非常出色。

And they are very good for it.

《纽约时报》和《华尔街日报》这样的媒体仍有其作用，它们并不隶属于任何公司，尽管我认为两者都很好。

There is a role for The New York Times, Wall Street Journal that don't, you know, are not attached to like a firm, even though I think both are good.

只是我觉得，整个体系至今还没找到正确的方向。

It's just like I still think it hasn't found its way yet, the whole thing.

是的。

Yeah.

某种程度上，是我们自己把事情搞成这样的，对吧？

And we did it to them to some extent, right?

比如，当科技行业打破媒体垄断时，他们是从这样的立场出发的：我们根本不在乎经济模式，因为经济模式自然会形成。

Like, so when tech broke the media monopolies, so they are coming from the standpoint of, you know, we don't even care about the economics of it because the economics are going to be there.

于是，我们就会围绕新闻业和真相，围绕‘一切适于刊登的新闻’，还有‘民主死于黑暗’之类的疯狂口号，建立起一套理想。

And so we're going to have these we're going to create these ideals around journalism and around truth and all the news that's fit to print and, you know, like democracy dies in the darkness or whatever the crazy, you know, taglines they have are.

于是，他们把自己设定为一个非常高的标准。

And so they set themselves as standard, very high standard.

但突然间，他们陷入了生存性的财务危机，必须去吸引受众。

And then all of a sudden, they're in like an existential financial crisis, and they have to get to an audience.

于是他们发现，触达广大受众实在太难、太贵了，所以我干脆只瞄准左翼人群。

And now they're going, well, going to a broad audience is just way too hard and way too expensive, so I'm just going to market to people who are on the left.

所以，我必须成为一个活动家。

And so, I've got to be an activist.

于是，我之前说的那些东西现在全都是扯淡了。

And so, then all this stuff that I said before is all bullshit now.

这是一个难题。

That's a hard puzzle.

我认为许多优秀的记者是在这种变化之前成长起来的，他们深受那些新闻伦理的熏陶。

I think that a lot of the best journalists kind of predated that change and kind of grew up with those ethics.

比如，哦，不，我必须保持客观。

That like, Oh, no, I've got to be objective.

我必须找到真实的故事。

I have to find the real story.

我必须讲述真实的故事。

I have to tell the real story.

但那已经不再是商业模式了。

But that's not the business model anymore.

那么，你该如何调和这一点呢？

So, how do you reconcile that?

我认为，现在人们正逐渐从那种变革的狂热中清醒过来，开始思考：我们到底是做活动家，还是做记者？

I think, like, right now, people are kind of coming out of the fever of that change and going, okay, are we gonna be an activist or are we gonna be a journalist?

我们会看到事情如何发展，但这一定会很有趣。

And we'll see how it plays out, but it's gonna be interesting.

这挺有意思的，因为我觉得埃里克太棒了。

It's kind of interesting because, like, I think Eric's amazing.

你们现在正逐渐壮大，有了资源去请像埃里克这样的人来打造一个大型的

You guys are now growing to a place where you have the resources to, like, bring people like Eric on to build, like, a big

是的。

Yeah.

项目。

Thing.

随着你们的公司进一步发展，你们终将拥有足够的资源，实际上，某天你们的资源可能会超过《纽约时报》。

At some point, as your firm grows even more, you're gonna have the resources to, like, really you know, you're gonna have more resources than The New York Times at some point.

这将会是一件很有趣的事，

It'll just be an interesting thing to

看看。

watch.

是的。

Yeah.

嗯。

Yeah.

不。

No.

这是一个

It's a

向埃里克招聘上千人致敬。

Shout out to Eric hiring like a thousand people.

这会很棒。

This will be great.

嗯。

Yeah.

嗯。

Yeah.

嗯。

Yeah.

不。

No.

他在招聘很多人。

He is, he's he's hiring a lot of people.

但你知道，埃里克团队最了不起的地方在于，它结合了经历过旧世界的人

But there you know, like, the thing about Eric's team that's so amazing is it's a combination of people who lived in the old world

是的。

Yeah.

和那些只生活在新世界里的年轻人。

And then very young people who only lived in the new world.

我想，很多原本可能想去《华尔街日报》之类机构工作的人，可能会给埃里克打电话。

Well, I imagine a lot of people who might have otherwise wanted to work at, like, The Wall Street Journal or something like that who might, like, give Eric a call.

不。

No.

当然。

Definitely.

我的意思是，我认为某种程度上他能接触到更多有趣的人。

I mean, I think that I think in a way he's got more access to more interesting people.

而且观众群体确实在增长，所以这可能也是原因之一。

And certainly the audience is building, so that could be.

谈到你们公司的成长，我想问你一个问题，关于所谓的‘大风险投资’的最佳版本。

Thinking about your firm's growth, I want to ask you a question both on the strongest version of let's call it big venture.

我知道这说法不太准确，因为听起来有点负面，但不管怎样。

I know it's not quite the right thing because I think it's a very negative sounding word, but whatever.

好的。

Okay.

优质的风险投资。

Good venture.

我以为

I thought

风险投资。

it venture.

是的。

Yeah.

而不是大的好风险投资。

Instead of big good venture.

所以，实际上，我们从这里开始吧。

So, actually, let's start there.

显然，你已经筹集了，比如，一个大型的新基金。

Obviously, you're you've raised, like, you know, a big new fund.

我想，我猜你的观点是，随着时间推移，这可能会变得更大。

I think, you know, I'm guessing your view is over time, this could grow much more.

风险投资公司规模能有多大，同时还能保持高效，其限制因素是什么？

What are the laws of physics on the size of how big venture firms can get and still be productive?

最大的限制是市场。

The biggest limit is the market.

那么，有多少优秀的新兴科技创业者值得投资呢？

So how many great new technology entrepreneurs are there, to fund?

风险投资市场中的资金已经多于那些拥有绝佳创意的优秀创业者。

Like there's already more money in the venture capital market than there are kind of great entrepreneurs with great ideas.

但如果你是第一名，那就没问题。

But if you're number one, then that's fine.

因为我们反正都能拿到项目。

Like, cause like, we'll just get the deals anyway.

这根本不是问题。

And it's no problem.

如果问我，为什么我们不募集一千亿美元呢？

If you ask me, well, why don't we raise a $100,000,000,000?

这才是主要的限制。

Like that's the main limit.

因为考虑到2020年市场的规模，要在风险投资中为一千亿美元实现回报会非常困难。

Because it would be hard to generate a return on a 100,000,000,000 in venture capital, probably, given the size of the market, like in 2020.

你基本上是在说，这些公司不会足够大。

Basically you're saying the companies won't be big enough.

我认为它们的数量根本不够。

Well, I think there just won't be enough of them.

我认为这最有可能是我们面临的最大规模挑战，至少以我们目前的团队来看，在我们所处的市场中，很难想象如何筹集多一个数量级的资金。

I think that's the most likely, it would be the most likely scale challenge for us that like, you know, at least with the team that we've built, when we look at the markets that we're in, it's hard to see our way to an order of magnitude more money.

这种情况可能会改变。

That could change.

但我会说，这目前是我们最主要的限制因素。

But I would say that's the current kind of number one limiter.

我认为大多数基金或公司的限制因素并不是我们所面临的这种限制。

I think the limiter on most funds or most firms is not the limiter that we have.

因此，对大多数公司来说，限制在于他们无法拥有那么多有效的合伙人。

So for most firms, the limiter is they can't kind of have that many effective partners.

合作。

Cooperating.

是的。

Yeah.

合作。

Cooperating.

这背后有两个根本原因。

There's two fundamental reasons for that.

一个是结构问题。

One is structure.

大多数风险投资公司都是共享收益、共享控制的结构。

So, most venture capital firms are shared economics, shared control structures.

如果你有共享控制，就很难有效重组。

And if you have shared control, you very likely can't reorganize effectively.

因此，要实现规模化，你就必须能够改变组织结构。

So, in order to scale, you have to be able to change the org structure.

这本身就是规模化的基本要求。

Like, it's just kind of fundamental to scale.

你是说你需要定期更新吗？

You're saying you need to periodically update?

比如每隔几年，你就需要进行一次组织调整？

Like every few years, you might need to do a reorg?

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

比如说，如果你的规模翻了一倍，任何经营公司的人都会明白，你必须审视组织结构，看看它是否仍然有效，沟通路径是否还顺畅，是否存在太多冲突，诸如此类的问题。

Just, you know, like if you double in size, anybody who runs a company, you double in size, like you have to look at the org structure and see if it still works, if the communication paths are still right, if there's too much conflict, all that kind of thing.

组织调整的副作用是权力的重新分配。

The side effect of reorganizing is you redistribute power.

所以，曾经拥有权力的人会失去权力，而没有权力的人则会获得权力。

And so, people who had power lose power, people who didn't have power get power.

这就是它的本质。

Like, it's just that's what it is.

如果你对此心存顾虑，那么你成功的可能性为零。

And if you're budding on that, the chance of you getting that right is zero.

因为我职业生涯中经历过多次重组，每当组织调整发生时，人们总是进行局部优化，而不是CEO。

Because having done many reorgs in my career, when a reorganization happens, people always do everybody does a local optimization other than the CEO.

于是，CEO向员工的需求妥协，采取民主方式，然后就结束了。

And so, the CEO gives in to the needs of the people and makes it democratic, then you're done.

这种方式根本行不通。

Like, that's never going to work.

所以，我觉得这非常困难。

So, think it's very hard.

我不知道如何才能在共享控制的情况下达到我们这样的规模。

I don't know how you could ever get to like our size with shared control.

这会非常艰难。

It'd be very tough.

你还需要一位能够应对这种规模的领导者，能够做出这些决策并管理公司。

The other thing you need is you do need a leader who can deal with that kind of scale in terms of making those decisions and running the firm.

大多数风投公司都没有具备这种运营能力的人才，虽然有些有，但非常罕见。

And most VCs don't have people of that kind of operational caliber like some do, but it's pretty rare.

如果他们有，通常也不是负责人。

And if they do, they're often not in charge.

所以，正是这两点优势让我们取得了成功。

So, we have like, those are the two advantages that have led us.

我的意思是，我们才成立16年。

I mean, we're only 16 years old.

我们大多数竞争对手都比我们年长得多。

Like most of the firms we compete with are much older than that.

但这些问题让我们得以壮大，没错。

But those issues have enabled us to get bigger Yeah.

这基本上就是现状。

It's basically the the situation.

而且，你认为在风投行业规模大能让一切变得更好，因为你能像培养马丁和克里斯那样培养更多人才。

And, basically, your view is being big in venture makes everything better because you can scale people like Martine and Chris.

你能获得更多的资源和影响力。

You can have more access to more power.

你们拥有更大的品牌，可以借给创始人使用。

You have a bigger brand you can lend to founders.

总的来说，我猜你的观点是，正如你所分享的关于你们如何运营公司的所有内容，你们规模越大，实际上每美元所能实现的效果可能越好。

And, basically, your view, I am assuming, everything you've shared of just how you're running the firm is the bigger you get, actually, it's possible the better per dollar that you might be able to do.

我觉得是的。

I think so.

我的意思是，我们已经有十六年的业绩记录了。

I mean, I think that it's kind of I mean, like, we've got a sixteen year track record.

我们刚刚筹集了150亿美元，我认为我们给投资者的产品本身就已经说明了一切。

We just raised $15,000,000,000 Like, I think the product to investors is kind of speaks for itself.

但话说回来，在风险投资领域，一般来说，获得良好回报有两个部分：选对项目并赢得投资。

But look, I think in venture capital, generally the way you did, there's kind of two parts to getting good returns, like picking the right deal and winning it.

我发现，赢得投资在这一方程中所占的比例，远比像MVC World这样的人愿意承认的要大，因为他们喜欢把自己视为超级天才。

I think it turns out that winning it is a much bigger percentage of that equation than people like MVC World like to give credit for because they like to think of themselves as such super genius.

哦，我早早就看到了Facebook。

Oh, I saw Facebook early.

这是个实实在在的问题。

That's a real thing.

但你知道，如果你赢不了，那你就永远不可能获得好的回报。

But you know, if you can't win it, then you're still never going to have good returns.

所以，能够自动赢得投资机会，我认为这能让你跻身回报最高的梯队。

And so being able to win kind of automatically, I would say gets you to the top tier of returns.

而挑选项目则能让你在这个榜单上更进一步。

And then picking kind of moves you up that list.

你的意思是，即使你是个大致随机的或普通的项目选择者，但只要是个出色的赢家，也能获得比相反情况更好的回报？

You're saying you could be a roughly random picker or an average picker, let's say, and a great winner, and that's going to get better returns than the inverse?

没错。

Yes.

当然。

For sure.

在各个阶段都是如此。

At all stages.

是的。

Yeah.

我认为在所有阶段都是如此。

I think at all stages.

而且这也有点自我实现：如果你能赢，最好的选股者就会想加入你。

And it also kind of it's a little self fulfilling in that if you can win, then the best pickers want to join you.

作为一个投资者，为什么玛汀会在这里工作？

It's like as an investor, like, why does Martine work here?

为什么克里斯·斯蒂克森

Why does Chris Stickson

工作是因为更容易赢。

work Because makes easier to win.

是的。

Yeah.

因为他们想分享自己最好的想法。

Because like they want their best ideas.

他们希望真正参与到那些交易中去。

They want to actually be in the deals they want to be in.

对吧？

Right?

比如，如果你是个投资者，你会想，我觉得这才是未来。

Like if you're an investor and you go, Hey, I think that's the future.

我觉得这是我见过的最伟大的创业者。

I think that's the greatest entrepreneur I've met.

而你却无法投资于它。

And you can't invest in it.

这非常令人沮丧。

That's very frustrating.

所以，随着时间推移，赢家会吸引到最好的投资者，我认为。

So then you end up the winners get the best investors over time, I think.

这很有趣，因为我最近和一个人聊过，风险投资公司能拥有两位你认为具有代际水平的优秀投资者，实际上非常罕见。

It's an interesting thing because I was talking to somebody recently that it's actually really rare for a venture firm to have two, what you would consider, like, generationally good investors.

几乎从不发生。

Like, almost never happens.

是啊。

Yeah.

然后，拥有三个就简直是罕见至极。

And then it's, like, ridiculously rare to have three.

如果你有三个，那你基本上就是红杉资本和贾森了。

And, like, if you have three, then you're, like, you know, Sequoia and Jason, basically.

为什么在一个地方很难培养出这么多人才？

Why is it so hard to get many at one place?

这看起来太不寻常了。

It just seems so uncommon.

而且我也不知道。

And it seems like I don't know.

这是赢的能力决定的，还是选人的能力决定的？

Is that a function of winning ability, or is that a function of picking ability?

到底是什么让这件事这么难？

What is it that makes it so hard?

你和塞奎亚为什么不能把所有人都吸引过来？

Why don't you and Sequoia just end up with everybody?

我认为，从定义上来说，真正一代人中才出一个的天才本来就没几个。

Well, I think that there just aren't that many generationally good, right, by definition.

对吧？

Right?

比如，如果你是那种一代人一遇的天才，那可能就一两个这样的人

Like, if you're generational, there's only like one of you or two of you who

可以，是的。

can get Yeah.

随便吧。

Whatever.

是啊。

Yeah.

嗯。

Yeah.

不。

No.

听我说，我认为其中一部分是历史原因，对吧？

Look, I think that one, mean, like some of it's historical, right?

比如，从经济角度看，风险投资的一个好处是，如果你管理一个基金，就能获得附带权益。

Like once you get the nice thing about VC economically, if you run one is carry vests.

嗯。

Yeah.

所以，如果你职业生涯早期就做出了几笔成功的投资，你通常会想留下来。

And so like, if you made a bunch of good investments somewhere, start your career, you generally want to stay.

我想说的另一点是，至少对我们来说，我们其实可以从其他公司招募到很多优秀的投资人，但我们的文化与整个风投界大不相同，因此很难留住那些曾在其他公司工作过的人。

I'd say the other thing, at least for us, is there's a lot of Or there's great investors that we could probably recruit from other firms, but we're so different culturally than the rest of the VC world that we've had a lot of trouble getting people to stick here who have worked at other firms.

只是思维方式真的太不一样了。

It's just the mentality is so different.

并不是说他们的做法错了或者我们的做法错了，而是差异足够大，以至于我们无法直接引进他们。

And not to say that their way is wrong or our way is wrong, but it's different enough that we can't import them.

他们不愿意融入。

They're not willing to assimilate.

我们也不愿意改变。

We're not willing to change.

就是这种状况。

It's that kind of thing.

你能最好地阐述一下，或者最有力地反驳这个关于风险投资规模化观点的理由吗？

Could you give your best articulation or best steel man of the counter to this idea of venture scaling?

比如，如果你要为彼得在Benchmark、乔什在First Round的观点辩护，某种程度上，红杉也说过存在局限性。

Like, if you had to defend the view of I've had Peter at Benchmark or Josh at First Round, To some extent, Sequoia had said there's limitations.

在你看来，如果必须阐述支持风险投资无法规模化、或小规模更好的最佳论点，会是什么？

What is sort of, in your mind, if you had to give the best version of the argument for why a venture doesn't scale or why small is better in any way?

你能给出这个论述吗？

Could you give that narration?

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，确实存在一些情况，这种说法是成立的。

I mean, I think that there are kind of configurations where that is true.

对吧？

Right?

就像我之前说的，如果你有共同决策，那么在规模达到一定程度后，就会变成一种混乱疯狂的民主制度——民主对拥有三五千万人口的国家来说很好，但对风险投资公司来说就不行了。

Like, so, you know, as I said, look, if you have shared control, you just can't get past a certain size before it becomes some chaotic, crazy democracy, which like, democracies are great for like, if you've got three fifty million people, but like, they're not good if you're a venture capital firm.

这行不通。

It's not good.

至少从规模角度来看，它是行不通的。

At least in terms of scale, it's not going to work.

如果你不扩张，那倒是没问题。

It's fine if you don't scale.

第二点是，如果你的投资团队有20个人，别以为这样能行得通，因为我觉得这已经算不上是讨论了。

The second thing is if you have like 20 people on an investing team, don't think that works because I don't think that's a conversation anymore.

所以，投资的很大一部分就是试图找到真相，对吧？

And so, so much of investing is about like you're trying to find the truth, right?

你每天都在工作，进行这些对话，与创业者交流，与所有推荐人和客户交谈，理解这项技术以及其他方方面面。

Like you're working every day, you have these conversations and you're talking to entrepreneurs and you're talking to all the references and you're talking to customers and you're understanding the technology and this and that.

你一直在进行一场漫长而持续的对话，探讨：究竟什么是真相？

And you're having this long, long running conversation about like, okay, what is true?

比如，会存在一个上帝模型吗？还是说我可以拿一个小模型，用我自己的数据进行后训练，然后把OpenAI打得落花流水？

Like, is there going to be a God model or does like, can I like take a little model and post train it with my own data and beat the piss out of OpenAI?

从长远来看，这个问题的答案是什么？

Like I, what's the answer to that question long term?

这个问题今天的答案又是什么？

What's the answer to that question today?

我们必须搞清楚这个问题。

Like we've got to get it to that.

你如何跟20个人进行这样的对话？

How do you have that conversation with 20 people?

这非常困难。

Like it's, it's very hard.

所以我认为，如果你以这种方式配置，那么规模庞大是危险的，我认为非常危险。

So I think that if you're configured, in that kind of way, then being large is dangerous, I think, very dangerous.

所以，你知道，是有原因的。

So, you know, there are reasons.

如果你没有以某种方式扩展的能力，让你的投资团队看起来都像小型风投公司。

If you don't have the ability to scale in a way that makes you Like our investing teams all look like small VCs.

我的意思是，比如马丁的团队、克里斯的团队或亚历克斯的团队，他们都像一家小型风投公司。

I mean, like, so Martin's team or Chris's team or Alex's team, they all look like a little VC.

所以，在某些方面，我支持这种模式。

So, in some ways, I'm all for that model.

我只是在一个拥有平台和品牌、能比单个人为创业者提供更多帮助的背景下这样做。

I'm just doing it in a context where you have a platform and a brand that can be helpful to entrepreneurs more so than just having a person.

是的，这说得通。

Yeah, it makes sense.