本·霍洛维茨谈伟大创始人的特质

我说，托德，听着，如果这次招聘不成功，因为我们当时处境非常艰难，你应该明白，这将是你公司的末日。

I said, Todd, look, if this hire doesn't work, because we were in a lot of trouble at the time, you realize what's gonna happen is this is the end of your company.

这就完了。

This is it.

所以你必须百分之百有信心，因为我告诉你，你错了，我在这件事上的经验比你丰富得多，等等。

So you gotta be 100% confident because I'm telling you you're wrong, and I have more experience at this than you and so forth.

所以我给他施加了很大压力，他雇了亚当，结果真的拯救了公司，所以。

So I really put pressure on him, and he hired Adam, and it ended up really making the company, so

我有一堆问题。

have bunch of questions.

但这就是它的重要性所在。

But that's how important it is.

我觉得如果我们雇了另一个人，Okta早就破产了。

Like, I think if we had hired the other guy, Okta would have gone bankrupt.

哦。

Oh.

我对此有几个问题。

I have a couple questions on that.

听起来，如果我是那位正在取得进展的CEO，招聘销售负责人时，第一，背景调查真的很重要。

It sounds well, just the takeaway, if I'm that engineer who's CEO, I'm getting some traction, hiring head of sales, it's one, blind references really matter.

第二，找一个董事会。

And two, get a board

顺便说一下，销售这件事整个都很关键。

sales, by the way, it's the whole thing.

是的。

Yep.

你带了谁一起来？

Also, who are you bringing with you?

我总是这么说。

That's what I always say.

你带了谁一起来？

Who are you bringing with you?

好的。

Okay.

你带着这个人、那个人、还有别的什么人。

You're bringing this, that, the other.

好的。

Okay.

我可以打电话问问他们会不会来吗？

Can I call them and find out if they're coming?

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

因为任何优秀的销售领袖都会有一大批追随者。

Because any great sales leader has a big set of followers.

而不够优秀的人，谁都不会跟。

And anyone who's not great Nobody.

没人。

Nobody.

因为销售人员最擅长的就是识别领导者。

Because the one thing sales guys are, they're savvy about the leader.

是的。

Yes.

比如，我从未遇到过一个平庸的销售人员却不知道谁是好领导。

Like, you've I've never met even a mediocre salesperson knows who's a good leader.

好的。

Okay.

你提到了PTC。

You brought up PTC.

你雇过PTC的人。

You've hired people from PTC.

我来自PTC。

I came from PTC.

首先，现在谁是类似PTC的公司，正在培养那些涌入硅谷的销售领袖？

First of all, who's the equivalent of PTC now building on the sales leaders that are filling Silicon Valley?

我想不出来。

I can't figure that out.

其次，你认为PTC这个行业为什么如此成功？

And two, what do you think it was about the PTC industry that works so well?

顺便说一下，对听众来说，PTC是一家很棒的公司，至今依然出色，但在九十年代，它曾迅猛发展，一度成为全球增长最快的企业。

And by the way, for listeners, PTC was a great, still a great company, but in the nineties, it ripped and was fastest growing company in the world for a while.

我们销售CAD/CAM和PLM软件给制造商，属于硬销售，但我们非常擅长这一点。

And we sold CADCAM, we sold PLM software to manufacturers, hard sell, but we were very good at it.

PTC的销售高管遍布硅谷，这一现象非常有趣且引人注目。

And the diaspora of PTC sales execs throughout Silicon Valley was very interesting and compelling.

PTC有很多特点，但其中一个被低估的因素是，产品本身并不出色，尤其是风挡和铁环部分，是的。

There was a number of things about PTC, but one of the underrated things was the product wasn't that great, particularly the windshields, the hoop Yeah.

你能说说，你是不是喜欢雇佣那些有硬销售经验的销售员？

Can So say you like when you you like to hire a sales guy that had a hard sale.

你不喜欢雇用那种虽然业绩爆表、但任何人都能卖得动的产品的人。

You don't like to hire somebody who was like, yeah, he crushed his numbers, but anyone could have sold that.

对。

Yeah.

比如，雇一个卖谷歌广告的人。

Like, hire somebody selling Google AdWords.

行。

Fine.

你知道那份工作是做什么的吗？

Like like, you know what that job is?

你想要多少？

How much do you want?

完全没错。

Totally.

好的。

Okay.

你不会去打造一个OK的公司。

You're not gonna build the Okay.

不过，如果你看到一个来自Databricks的人，他曾是Databricks的副总裁，那你就会想在新公司里找一位首席营收官。

You see someone from Databricks, though, and they were VP of Databricks, you're looking for a CRO in your new company.

我不是说这很容易卖，但他们有品牌，有很多影响力。

I'm not saying that's easy to sell, but they have a brand, they have a lot of mojo.

你会在早期初创公司里寻找这样的人吗？

Is that someone you're looking for in an early stage startup or no?

嗯，我不能对此发表评论，因为Databricks是

Well, I can't comment on that because Databricks is

那你懂这个类比吗？

Well, do you know the analogy?

是的，就像甲骨文的早期阶段。

Yeah, it's like the early days of Oracle.

那些人和今天的甲骨文销售代表是不一样的，对吧？

Those guys were different than an Oracle salesperson today, right?

我认为随着它越来越成熟，就更难分辨了，因为你靠它也能生存下去。

And I think that as it gets more established, it's harder to tell because you can survive on that.

但我要说的是，如果你的产品很难销售，那就到了PTC的层级。

But I will say this, if you have a product that's complicated to sell, then that's when you get to the PTC level.

PTC最了不起的地方，除了文化和态度之外。

The thing about PTC that was so amazing, other than the culture and the attitude.

所以，文化和态度是我们讨论过的，那是独一无二的，今天可能已经违法了。

So, there's a culture and the attitude, and we talked about that, which was unique and probably illegal today.

我敢说，今天几乎肯定违法了。

I would say almost certainly illegal today.

但我觉得非常可复制的一点——前提是你的产品很难销售——就是纪律。

But the thing that I think is very replicable, but only if you have a difficult product to sell, is the discipline.

这种纪律具体体现在：你进入一个客户账户时。

And the discipline really came down to, okay, you're going into an account.

你知道那里有竞争对手。

You know there are competitors.

你们在设置陷阱对付竞争对手时有多系统化？是否确保了全面的技术论证和商业论证，是否已经梳理清楚了该组织中所有参与决策流程的人，而PTC的决策流程非常复杂，还需要确保所有人都达成一致。

And how systematic are you about laying the traps for the competitors, making sure you make a comprehensive technical case, a comprehensive business case, making sure that you've charted everybody in that organization who's in that decision process, and it's a very complicated decision process for PTC, getting assurances that they're all lined up.

这个过程如此复杂，需要极大的勇气、努力和竞争力，以至于它能转化为任何东西。

And that's so complicated and requires so much courage and effort and competitiveness that that translates into anything.

而如果你走进一个客户，他们本来就倾向于购买，你就可以跳过一些步骤。

Whereas, look, if you're walking into an account and they're already predisposed to buy, you can skip steps.

你可以敷衍了事。

You can get away with shit.

你只需要打个电话、露个面，说一句‘我是来自某某公司的销售’，然后事情就顺利推进了。

You just have to call in, show up, hey, I'm the salesperson from blah blah blah, and away you go.

比如现在，像OpenAI和Anthropic这样的公司，情况就是这样。

Like right now, I think with OpenAI and Anthropic and so forth, it's like that.

每个人都想买AI产品。

It's like everybody wants to buy AI.

他们本来就倾向于购买。

They're already predisposed to buy.

这和‘你到底是谁？’完全不同。

Very, very different than who the hell are you?

我从来没听说过PTC。

I never heard of PTC.

好吧，现在我进去了。

Okay, now I'm in the door.

我为什么要买这个？

Why should I buy this?

我根本用不了。

I can't get it to work.

让我来给你演示一下它是怎么工作的，诸如此类的事情。

Well, let me walk you through how it's going to work, like these kinds of things.

是的，如果你真有这个，那就太宝贵了。

Yeah, that's invaluable if you have that actually.

所以，我们请到了瑞安·加布里斯科，他是Databricks最初的销售负责人。

So Ryan Gabrisco, who's kind of the original head of sales at Databricks, we got him.

我从来没听说过他所在的公司，那是一家上市公司。

I had never heard, like I had never heard of the company he was at, which was a public company.

想象一下，一个我从未听说过其公司的科技销售员。

Imagine that, a tech sales guy that I had never heard of his company.

而那家公司 literally 在卖 FTP，好吧。

And the company was literally selling FTP, Okay.

但那是安全的 FTP。

But secure FTP.

好吧。

Okay.

想想看，作为一家上市公司卖这种产品，你需要有多强的销售能力才能完成业绩。

Like, think about how good at selling you have to be to make your number as a public company selling that.

是的。

Yep.

所以这个家伙，显然被逼出了纪律性，而且非常聪明。

And so this guy, like, obviously had the discipline forced upon him, and he was extremely smart.

这种组合，如果你有的话，我全天都想要。

And that combination, I'll take that all day if you've got that.

你更希望拥有一个成功的公司，但那是一种更难制定的运营模式，或一个更难打造的产品。

You'd rather have, a successful company is fine, but some kind of playbook that was harder to write, some product that was harder to build.

另一个关键问题是：你能执行一套运营模式吗？

And that's another big one is can you run a playbook?

你是那种在VMware如火如荼时加入，并获得重要职位，但只是执行了别人为你设定的运营模式的人吗？

Are you somebody who joined VMware when it was on fire and got a big position, but you ran the playbook that was set up for you?

还是说，你是那个制定运营模式的人——你搞清楚了如何销售这种极其复杂的软件，如何排除竞争对手，如何培训销售团队，如何约束他们，做所有这类事情？

Or are you the person who wrote the playbook, who figured out how to sell this very complicated piece of software, who figured out how to lock out the competition, to train the sales force, to discipline them, to do all that kind of thing?

这种人更难找到。

That's a much harder find.

这还取决于复杂程度。

And depending on the complexity.

听好了，如果你的产品很简单，那又是另一种情况。

Look, if you've got an easy product, then that's one kind of thing.

如果你的产品很难，那就是另一种情况。

If you've got a hard product, that's another.

我的一些体会是，我几乎是第一个BDR，工作了十年。

Some of my takeaways were, I was the first basically BDR and worked and spent ten years.

在很多方面，这与人们对于销售的看法背道而驰。

It was, in a lot of ways, contrarian to the way people thought about selling.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

我们销售的是一个应用程序。

We sold an application.

我们最初以一种方式销售，后来转向了平台业务。

We sold it one way, and then we moved into the platform business.

这彻底改变了我们的销售方式。

Totally changed the way we sold.

双方都非常有纪律性，而且非常注重流程，真正严格地管理整个流程。

Very disciplined on both sides and very process oriented, like really managed the process tightly.

所以我们在这方面非常擅长，对销售代表的画像要求也非常严格。

So we're very good at that and just very tight on the profile of sales rep.

这一点被打造得非常好。

It's built that very, very well.

画像。

The profile.

顺便说一下，当我面试销售人才时，我总会问他们：你们的销售代表画像什么样？

By the way, when I interview sales guys, I always ask them, what's the profile of your rep?

让我惊讶的是，一些职位很高、经验很丰富的高管，有时对画像的要求却很宽松。

And it's amazing to me that guys who are very senior and very big jobs have sometimes very loose profiles.

而那些必须激烈竞争的团队，画像则非常明确。

Whereas the ones who really have to compete, it's extremely tight.

他们寻找的东西非常具体，而且常常出人意料。

What they're looking for is it's so specific and often surprising.

其中一个

One of the

我们先说说销售方面。

things we just sticking on sales for a sec.

我们在HubSpot做对了一些事，但也做错了很多事。

One of the things we got right got a lot wrong in HubSpot.

我们做对的一件事是面试销售代表的流程。

One of the things we got right was the process to interview a rep.

我们发现，那些学习能力强的代表在HubSpot表现得很好。

And what we found out was reps who are good learners did well inside of HubSpot.

因此，我们收到了大量的简历。

And so we got lots of resumes.

我们更喜欢那些处于第二份销售工作的人，而不是第五份、第一份或第二份。

We like people on their second sales job, not their fifth, not their first or second.

所以他们已经有过一些经验了。

So they had done something.

如果他们上过一所还不错的学校，不是哈佛，也不是麻省理工，而是州立大学。

And if they had gone to a half decent school, not Harvard, not MIT, state school.

州立大学，B等成绩。

State school, B.

如果他们能在这里清晰表达，并且做到了这些，他们来之后我们就不多想了。

And if they could fog them here and they did those things, they come in and we didn't overthink it.

我们花半小时，这半小时就是，本，欢迎你。

We came in for a half hour, and the half hour was, Ben, welcome.

是的。

Yeah.

我会给你一个情景。

And I would give you a scenario.

是的。

Yeah.

我会扮演客户，然后说：把HubSpot卖给我。

And I would be the customer, and I would say, sell me HubSpot.

我会给你十二分钟时间来推销，真的就看十二分钟。

And I'd give you twelve minutes to sell me, like, literally watch 12.

我说，表现得很好，本。

I said, was very good, Ben.

这是我的反馈。

Here's my feedback.

几分钟的反馈。

A couple minutes of feedback.

你先想想，我们再来一次好吗？

Why don't you think about it, and let's do it again?

如果这个人能吸收这些建议，并在第二次推销时表现得更好，99%的情况下我们会录用他。

And if the person internalized that feedback and sold it better the second time, 99% of the time we hired them.

哦，这很有趣。

Oh, that's interesting.

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得那很好，而且现在依然很好。

I thought that was and it's still really well.

对。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

对吧？

Right?

他们倾听的能力怎么样？

Can they how good are they at listening?

顺便说一下，我认为这是人们常犯的另一个错误。

This is by the way, that's the other, I think, mistake people make.

他们寻找的是擅长表达的人。

They look for somebody who's good at talking.

你真的需要一个善于倾听的人。

You really want somebody who's good at listening.

是的。

Yeah.

这是一个重要而微妙的差别。

Well It's an important subtle difference.

是的。

Yeah.

好的。

Okay.

既然说到这个，你收到了我有史以来最喜爱的一封邮件。

While we're on this type of thing, you were the recipient of maybe my favorite email in the history of emails.

我可以念给你听吗？

May I read it

给你？

to you?

哦，当然。

Oh, sure.

当然。

Sure.

这件事的背景是你即将推出一个大型产品。

And the background of this was you had a big product launch coming.

你对此感到兴奋，并且几周后有一场媒体巡展。

You're excited about it, and you had a press tour coming up in a couple weeks.

马克·安德森主导了这件事，你给他发了一封邮件。

And Marc Andreessen front ran it, and you sent him an email.

我想我们不会等到五号才发布产品。

I guess we're not gonna wait until the fifth to launch a product.

是的。

Yeah.

本。

Ben.

马克·安德森对本·霍罗威茨的回应是，你根本不懂情况有多严重。

And the response to Ben Horowitz from Mark Andreessen, apparently, you don't understand how serious the situation is.

我们正在被彻底击垮，被彻底击垮，被彻底击垮。

We're getting killed, killed, killed out there.

我们当前的产品与竞争对手相比差得太远了。

Our current product is radically worse than the competition.

几个月来我们什么都没说。

We had nothing to say for months.

因此，我们的市值已经蒸发了超过30亿美元。

As a result, we've lost over 3,000,000,000 in market cap.

我们现在甚至面临公司倒闭的危险，这都是服务器管理团队的错。

We're now in danger of losing the whole company, and it's the server management's fault.

我喜欢这个结尾。

And then I love the ending.

下次你自己去搞那个该死的采访吧，滚开，马克。

Next time do the fucking interview yourself, fuck off Mark.

是的

Yeah.

是的

Yeah.

是的

Yeah.

是的

Yeah.

我们走出‘滚开’的时代了吗？

Are are we out of the fuck off era?

来自马克？

From Mark?

所有人。

Everyone.

就像我们在PTC收到的这些邮件。

Like, this is the emails that we get at PTC.

哦，是的。

Oh, yeah.

而且是否

And are

我们现在太软弱了吗？

we too soft now?

埃隆并不软弱。

Elon's not soft.

没错。

Nope.

我觉得有一部分是这样的。

And I think there's some of that.

但我认为还没到PTC那种程度。

I don't think it's quite at PTC level.

所以，在克兰尼对麦克马洪的采访中，我认为麦克马洪对他说：‘如果我现在打你一拳，你会怎么做？’

So in Cranny's interview with McMahon, I think McMahon said to him, What would you do if I hit you in the face right now?

我认为克兰尼的回答是：首先，你最好把我打晕。

And I think Cranny's response was, Well, first of all, you better knock me out.

然后麦马洪说：但你会怎么做呢？

And then McMahon says, Well, but what would you do?

他说：这是个问题吗？

He says, Is this a question?

你是在测试我的智力还是我的勇气？

Are you testing my intelligence or my courage?

好回答。

Good answer.

是的。

Yeah.

就是这种感觉。

And that kind of thing.

他们说，在我的

They said, in my

你不会在面试中问别人这样的问题。

You wouldn't ask somebody that in an interview.

我第一次面试时，

My first interview,

我穿着西装走进去，当时负责销售的哈里森说：‘我可不会穿这身西装去参加一场混战。’

I walked in with my suit on, and Harrison, who was originally head of sales, said, I wouldn't wear that suit to a shit fight.

我认为真正优秀的企业，尤其是顶尖的企业，其创始人和CEO通常会提出相当尖锐的问题。

I think really good companies, the very, very, very best companies tend to have founders and CEOs who ask pretty aggressive questions.

扎克伯格、拉里·佩奇这些人，已经登上了巅峰，他们都非常直率。

Zuckerberg, Larry Page, those guys are pretty who have kind of gotten all the way to the mountaintop, they're pretty blunt.

我觉得这很重要，因为企业文化中最关键的一点是：第一，你要直接给予反馈，而且可以坦诚交流。

Look, I think that's important in that one of the most critical things in a company culturally is, one, you give direct feedback, and you can have it out.

马克在给我的反馈上是错的。

Mark was wrong on that feedback to me.

我是对的。

I was right.

但重要的是，他能这么说，而我也能站出来回应。

But it's important that he'd be able to say that, and then it's important that I'd be able to stand up to it.

否则，真相就无法浮现。

Otherwise, the truth doesn't come out.

如果你为了保护情绪而逃避真相，这在科技公司里是非常危险的。

If you're running away from the truth to preserve feelings, that's a very dangerous thing in a tech company.

与此相关的是，坏消息必须迅速传开。

And the corollary to that is it's really important that bad news travels fast.

如果出了问题，作为CEO，你必须第一时间得知。

That if something's wrong, that as CEO you find out about it.

因此，你需要这种直率。

And so you need that bluntness.

安迪·格鲁夫曾称之为建设性的对抗。

Andy Grove used to call it constructive confrontation.

顺便说一句，我最喜欢的一个安迪·格鲁夫轶事是：有个人开会迟到了，那时英特尔如日中天，安迪就是上帝，诸如此类，他们迟到了走进会议室。

And he was, by the way, that's another one where one of my favorite Andy Grove anecdotes was somebody was late to a meeting, and then this is when Intel was a monster and Andy was God and all that kind of thing, and they come in late to the meeting.

他只是看着他们，说：我这一生只有时间，而你却在浪费它——这可能是你能对别人说的最刻薄的话了。

And he just looks at them, and he goes, all I have in this life is time, and you're fucking wasting it, which is like the meanest thing you could ever say to somebody.

但随着公司规模扩大，你需要重新塑造文化，尤其是在它开始出现裂痕的时候。

But particularly as the company grows, you need to reset the culture like if it's starting to fray at the edges.

你不能对此置之不理。

You can't just let that go.

他这么说可能会伤害那个人的感情，但每个人都在传这个故事，以至于我虽然没在英特尔工作过，也听到了。

And by him saying that, it might crush that person's feelings, but everybody's telling that story to the point where I heard it, I didn't work for Intel.

这就是文化的核心。

And that's a culture center.

我们这里绝不容忍迟到。

We're not fucking light to meetings here.

我们不是这样的。

That's not what we do.

当然，并不是每家公司都有这种文化，但如果你拥有这种文化，就必须维护它。

Look, not every company has that culture, but if you have that culture, you need to maintain it.

说到这个，我辅导过很多首席执行官。

Kind of speaking of that, I coach all these CEOs.

我注意到的一件事是，保罗·格雷厄姆写过一篇关于创始人模式的备忘录。

Well, one thing I've noticed is Paul Graham wrote that founder mode memo.

在我看来，这现在已经是相当标准的运营流程了。

It's it strikes me as relatively standard operating procedure now.

那你对这个有什么看法？

It's really Well, that your reaction to it?

嗯，是的，不过其中有一部分是不对的。

Well, yes, although there's a part that's wrong to

它。

it.

好吧。

Okay.

或者说，我觉得有一部分有点误导性。

Or there's a part that I would say is a little misleading to it.

我认为这最初来自布莱恩·切斯基。

And I think it came originally from Brian Chesky.

当然。

Sure.

所以布莱恩，他聘请了非常资深的人才。

And so Brian, like, so there's a part that's very right about it, which is what happened to Brian is he hired extremely senior people.

是的。

Yep.

然后他做了我们之前讨论过的事情，就是明确地退让。

And then he did the thing that we talked about which he overtly deferred.

对。

Yep.

这导致了各自为政、政治斗争，以及各种奇怪的现象。

And then that created fiefdoms, politics, all kinds of weird stuff.

然后在新冠疫情之后，他通过进入创始人模式，重新接管了公司，变得专断得多。

And then he kinda, after COVID, took the company back by going into founder mode and just was like, I'm being much more dictatorial.

我认为这部分完全正确。

And I think that that part is all correct.

我认为这个观点的危险在于，人们把它推向了极端，认为我根本不该雇佣任何资深人员。

I think the danger with the idea is people are taking it to the point where they're going, well, I don't want to hire any senior people.

是的，我明白这一点。

Yeah, I see that.

这就好比，你打算去竞争，你需要一个全球销售团队，却想从零开始培养这么一个庞大的组织。

It's like, well, okay, so you're gonna go compete with, and you need a worldwide sales organization, and you're gonna try and grow a motherfucker from scratch to do that.

让我告诉你，那个家伙根本不知道他将来要花你的钱去学多少东西，而这些你今天直接买现成的就行了。

Well, let me tell you all the things that that person doesn't know that they're gonna have to learn on your nickel that you could just buy today.

你的具体方案是什么？

What's your profile?

你们怎么划分区域？

How do you split territories?

你们怎么开拓国际市场？

How do you open it up international?

要做到这一点，需要多年的经验和人脉积累。

There's just years and years of experience and relationships that are required to do that right.

所以因为你处于创始人模式，你非常害怕这么做。

And so because you're in founder mode, you're so fucking afraid to do that.

不，当你需要时，你也得能雇用这样的人，但你还要能管理他们。

It's like, no, you need to be able to hire that person too when you need them, but you need to be able to manage them.

这和一味地回避、回避、回避是完全不同的。

And that's very different than avoid, avoid, avoid.

我认为人们误解了保罗写的东西，觉得哦不，你得彻底避开。

And I think people have taken what Paul wrote, and it's like, oh no, What you've for.

不要雇用有经验的人，去他的，特别是如果你是一家企业公司，这绝对行不通。

No experienced people, like screw that and And so particularly, if you're an enterprise company, think that definitely doesn't work.

即使是消费类公司，像CFO这样的职位也很难这样操作。

Even on a consumer company, it's gonna be shaky, positions like CFO and so forth.

外部的知识同样有价值。

Outside knowledge is as valuable.

你必须对那方面有足够的了解。

You have to understand enough about that.

在创始人模式下，你必须足够了解那份工作，才能自信地管理那个人、告诉他们该做什么，而不是让他们告诉你该怎么做，因为一旦那样，你就失去了对公司的控制。

In founder mode, you've gotta learn enough about that job that you feel confident managing that person and telling them what to do, and not having them tell you what to do, because that's when you lose the company.

所以我觉得这样很好。

So I think it's good.

这其实是对过去状况的一种过度纠正。

It's like an overcorrection from where things were.

顺便说一句，我觉得你讲得非常到位。

I think you're by the way, think you're spot on that.

我最欣赏的CEO之一是黄仁勋，他有一套独特的打法。

One of my favorite CEOs is Jensen Huang, and he's got a unique playbook.

他有60个直接下属。

He's got 60 direct reports.

他在公开场合接受反馈，而且人人都知道这个故事。

He gets feedback in public, and everybody knows the story.

我所指导的那些首席执行官们，有趣的是，他们其实都没有那样做。

The interesting thing about the CEOs I coach, none of them really do that.

他们没有六十个直接下属。

They don't have 60 direct reports.

他们也没有遵循他的方法。

They they haven't followed his playbook.

我有点想不通。

I kinda scratch my head.

但人们也没有遵循埃隆的方法。

But people also haven't followed Elon's playbook.

对吧？

Right?

没错。

Exactly.

除了埃隆的公司之外，没人使用这个算法。

No one uses the algorithm outside of Elon's companies.

我不明白。

I don't get it.

你也注意到了同样的事情。

You notice the same thing.

所以你招募的大多数公司并不是那样运作的。

So most of the companies you recruit out of don't run like that.

对。

No.

所以他们也不会这样想。

And so they don't think of it that way.

而且我认为，像詹森那样管理，说实话，这有点接近我管理安德森·霍洛维茨的方式，更像詹森的做法，但我觉得创始人缺乏的是做这种事所必需的那种自信。

And then also I think that to run it like Jensen does by the way, though, know, that's a little bit, like, I I would say closer to how I run Andreessen Horowitz, more like how Jensen But you gotta, I think what founders are lacking is the level of confidence that you have to have to do that.

因为你必须能够说，如果你向我汇报，那你必须具备CEO级别的能力。

Because you have to be able to say, if you're reporting to me, you gotta be basically CEO caliber.

自主的。

Autonomous.

我不是在培养你，这一点我非常坚信：CEO根本无法培养高管。

I'm not developing you, which is something that I highly believe in CEOs can't really develop executives.

他们要么能行，要么不行。

They either can do it or they can't.

我同意你的观点。

I agree with you on that.

你还需要有足够的知识，能够直接走进去，理解正在发生的事情，从而从那个层面评估公司的发展状况。

And then you have to have, feel like you've got enough knowledge to just be able to like walk in and understand what's going on and so forth and kind of be able to evaluate how the company's going from, you know, at that level.

你知道，埃隆是所有人中最有能力、最有自信的，而詹森也属于那个级别。

You know, Elon is the most competent and has the most confidence of anyone and Jensen is kind of at that caliber.

我认为很多人需要在过程中逐步培养这种能力。

I think that a lot of people need to develop that as they go.

就我观察扎克伯格而言，他一路以来都没有这种特质。

I would say like when I observed Zuckerberg, he didn't have that the whole way.

但随着时间推移，他正逐渐变得像那样。

He's kind of over time getting more like that.

但你知道，他把公司一半的股份让出来，暂时共享，直到他逐渐建立起那里的自信。

But you know, he deferred half the company to share all for a while until he could kind of build his confidence over there.

我认为这更像是正常的路径。

And I think that's a little more the normal path.

从零直接跃升到像Jensen这样的水平很难。

It's hard to go from zero to Jensen.

你

You

这很有趣。

it's interesting.

Jensen已经这样做了三十年。

Jensen's been doing it now for thirty years.

是的，三十多年了，那他刚上任四年时是什么样子？

Yeah, thirty plus So, what was he like four years on?

我猜他当时还没达到如今这种掌控全局的水平。

I suspect he wasn't quite at this level of master of the universe.

正在听的首席执行官们能学到什么？

What can the the CEOs listening learn?

当然，埃隆很早就被解雇了。

And Elon, of course, got fired early.

就像你所说的，即使对于最优秀的人，这份工作也有一个学习曲线。

Like, you do like, there is a learning curve to the job even for

顶尖人才也是如此。

the best.

首席执行官们能从扎克伯格身上学到什么？

What can CEOs learn from Zuckerberg?

你在这里和他合作得很密切。

You work with him pretty closely here.

我认为扎克伯格非常擅长从第一性原理出发思考，不会过度受他人观点或现有做法的影响。

Well, I think Zuck, he's very, very, very good at operating from kind of first principles thinking, not being overly influenced by, one, anybody else's ideas or just like the way things are.

他非常擅长直接审视问题本身。

He's very, very good at just looking at it.

而且，他们非常有纪律性地用数据视角来看待问题，比如，数据怎么说的，就照着做。

And then also, they were amazingly disciplined at looking at things through a data lens, like, okay, what does the data say and do that?

这就是他们能够如此迅速地成长、战胜竞争对手的原因。

That's how they were able to grow it so fast, overcome the competition and these kinds of things.

他 definitely 保持着极强的好奇心，我认为所有伟大的CEO都始终对一切充满兴趣。

And he definitely stays extremely curious, which I think all the great CEOs are very just interested in everything all the time.

我认为人们低估了他、埃隆和詹森这些人。

I think people underestimate him and Elon and Jensen and so forth.

他们总觉得这些家伙只是书呆子。

They're like, oh, those guys are nerds.

但他们的沟通能力其实非常出色。

Their people skills are astoundingly good.

你觉得他们一直都是这样吗？

And do you think they always were?

我觉得扎克伯格早期并不像这样。

Zuckerberg struck me as that not being the case early.

他非常内向，以至于你根本看不出来，但我感觉这些想法一直在他脑海中盘旋。

He was so introverted that you couldn't see it, but I felt like it was going on inside his head.

如果你看看他做的并购交易，他就像是一个极其出色的心理学家。

If you look at the M and A deals he's done, he's like a really outstanding psychologist.

我认为他一直都有这方面的天赋。

And I think that he always had some of that in it.

他妈妈从事这一行，而且她对此非常精通，凯伦。

His mom's in that profession, and she's very smart about it, Karen.

我觉得这种特质一直都在，只是他需要信心把它表现出来。

I think it was always in there, but he needed the confidence to get it out.

我的意思是，他小时候就创办了这家公司。

I mean, he started that company when he was like a little kid.

是的。

Yeah.

你写了一整本书关于企业文化。

You wrote a whole book about culture.

人们误解了什么？

What are people getting wrong?

我觉得人们并不知道它是什么。

I think people don't know what it is.

我的意思是，这才是最主要的问题。

Like, I mean, that's the main thing.

尤其是创始人不知道的那一点，这正是我写这本书的原因。

The main thing that particularly founders don't know, which is why I wrote the book.

不过有趣的是，真正喜欢那本书的人像是泰德·萨兰多斯。

Although it's funny, the people who really liked that book were like Ted Sarandos.

我写完之后才意识到，你真正遇到文化问题时，往往是公司变大之后。

And I realized after I wrote it, you really don't have the cultural issue till you get big.

所以在初创阶段，你可能正在播下自己文化问题的种子，但一开始并不存在文化问题，因为公司还小，你就在那里，无意识地亲手管理着文化。

And so at the startup phase, you may be sowing the seeds of your own cultural problems, but there are no cultural issues in the beginning because the thing is small, you're saying it, you're kind of managing the culture by hand unconsciously.

人们常常误以为文化就是价值观。

Big thing that people, people think of culture as values.

他们认为，哦，我们有一种正直的文化，或者某种其他的文化。

They think, oh, it's like we have a culture of integrity, or we have a culture of whatever.

尽管如此，每个人都有同样的东西。

All the same, everyone's got the same ones.

是的，我们是否彼此支持，或者类似的东西？

Yeah, Do we have each other's backs or whatever it is?

这些其实根本不算什么。

And those things aren't really anything.

它们只是空洞的套话。

They're just platitudes.

真正重要的是行为。

The actual thing is behaviors.

所以当你思考你的文化时，你实际上应该思考：哪些行为能让你成为你想要的那种公司，并为你带来你想要的优势。

And so when you think about your culture, you kind of want to think about what are the behaviors that put you in a place where you're the kind of company that you want to be and give you the advantage that you want to have.

好吧，我们是在风险投资领域。

Okay, we're in venture capital.

大家其实都非常热爱创业者。

What does everybody well, we really love entrepreneurs.

风险投资界每个人都他妈的热爱创业者。

Like everybody in venture capital fucking loves entrepreneurs.

但当你深入了解创业者对许多风投的看法时，他们会说：这些家伙他妈的太傲慢了。

But then you get down to the way entrepreneurs talk about a lot of VCs, they're like, these guys are fucking arrogant.

他们就是混蛋。

They're assholes.

他们居高临下地跟我说话，诸如此类。

They talk down to me, this and that.

那么，如果你想要成为那样的人，为什么又会是这样呢？

Well, like, if you want to be this, why are you that?

归根结底还是行为问题。

And it gets down to the behaviors.

你参加创业者的路演时守时吗？

Are you on time for a pitch me?

你在pitch过程中玩手机吗？

Are you on your phone during pitch me?

如果你决定不投资创业者，你会回复他们吗？

Do you get back to the entrepreneur if you're not going to invest in them?

这些行为最终塑造了文化，无论你是否关心创业者、是否尊重他们，还是认为自己高人一等。

These behaviors end up setting the culture whether you care about entrepreneurs, have respect for them, or you think you're above them.

这跟你说了什么无关，而跟你做了什么有关，这就是为什么我把这本书命名为《你做什么，你就是谁》。

And it doesn't have anything to do with what you said, it has to do with what you do, which is why I called the book What You Do Is Who You Are.

但这才是核心所在。

But that's really the core thing.

但要真正想清楚：好吧，如果我想成为那样的人，我该如何行事才能达到目标？

But it takes a lot of thought to say, okay, if I want to be this, how must I behave to get there?

你可以说，比如，把公司的钱当成自己的钱一样对待。

And you can say like, oh, treat the company's money like it's your own.

好，很棒。

Okay, great.

但那意味着什么？

But what does that mean?

嗯，你住在哪里？

Well, where are you staying?

哪家酒店？

What hotel?

你怎么出行？

How are you traveling?

你的安排是什么？

What's your thing?

所以，如果你想要那样，那就必须系统化。

And like, so if you want that, then that has to be systematic.

让我

Let me

问你关于

ask you about what

你现在可能并不想要那样。

Now you may not want that.

你知道的？

You know?

我经常看到一个文化上的陷阱：公司里有一位极其出色、堪称百倍效率的工程师，但他却是个混蛋。

There's one cultural gotcha that I see a lot where there's a brilliant, brilliant 100x engineer in the company that's an asshole.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

不是有时候。

Not sometimes.

资本的方式，比工程组织更像那样。

The way, the capital is more like that than engineering organizations.

这样的人更多。

There's more of those.

是的。

Yes.

嗯，我的意思是，我认为在工程团队里，你必须明确一些标准，比如，‘混蛋’到底指的是什么？

Well, like, I mean, and I think that on an engineering team, you kind of have to have the parameters of, okay, like, what does asshole mean?

如果‘混蛋’意味着你在代码审查时什么都不说，然后半夜偷偷重写我的代码，那随着团队扩大，这会变得很棘手。

If asshole means that in the code review I don't say anything, and then I go in the middle of night and I rewrite your code, That's going to be tricky as you grow.

这很难管理。

That's hard to manage.

如果‘混蛋’指的是我对标准有极高要求，那就是另一回事了。

If hassle is, I expect, a super high standard, that's another thing.

所以你需要明确界定：我们在这里到底不接受什么行为？

And so you kind of want to define, okay, what is it that we're not going to do here?

工程师的特点是，他们非常擅长遵守规则。

And the thing about engineers is they're amazing at following rules.

所以，如果你把界限说清楚，我发现风险投资领域也是如此。

So if you make clear what the parameters are on it, and I find that in venture capital too.

这真是我听过的最典型的风投问题了。

That's a venture capital problem, if I ever heard one.

你会遇到很多非常聪明但性格古怪的人。

You get a lot of very smart, spiky personalities.

马克和我有时候也会讨论这个问题。

And Mark and I talk about this sometimes.

就像，史蒂夫·乔布斯对人那么刻薄，是因为他太天才了所以本就如此，还是因为他太天才了所以才敢这么做？

It's like, well, was Steve Jobs so mean to people because that just goes with being so brilliant or because he could get away with it because he was so brilliant?

对吧？

Right?

还是说他本来就是这样？

Or did he come out?

哦，我也经历过同样的争论。

Oh, I've I've had the same debate.

是的。

Yeah.

所以我认为更偏向于后者。

So I think it's a little bit more the latter.

因此我认为，如果你在管理一个组织

And so I think that if you're running an organization

等等。

Wait.

后者是哪一个？

Which one was the latter?

我忘了。

I forgot.

就是他能逃脱惩罚。

That that he could get away with it.

对吧？

Right?

就像，他其实不必那样做。

Like, he didn't have to do that.

但他确实可以这么做。

But he could do that.

而且你知道，这是他的公司，他想怎么做就怎么做。

And you know, like it's his company, he can do what he wants.

我认为，创始人效仿乔布斯、某种程度上也效仿马斯克的问题在于，如果你不是乔布斯或马斯克，也许你就没法这么肆无忌惮。

I think that the problem with founders modeling themselves after Jobs, I mean, to some extent after Elon is, well, if you're not Jobs or Elon, maybe you can't get away with that.

而且可能人们会直接转身走人，而他们当初并不会对乔布斯或马斯克这么做。

And like maybe people just walk out the damn door in a way that they weren't with those guys.

如果没有这些行为，要留住最顶尖的人才非常困难。

And it's very hard to have like the highest performing talent without them coming with some of those behaviors.

这在工程、风投或者其他领域都一样。

And it doesn't matter, like in engineering and VC and whatever.

所以你必须非常明确地界定：好吧，我们不要这个，但我们会保留那个。

And so you kind of have to be very specific about, okay, we're not gonna have this, but we'll have that.

我在公司里明令禁止的一件事，也是很多人会做的，就是：别通过让别人出丑来凸显自己有多聪明。

One of the things that I've outlawed at the firm, which a lot of people of this would do, is like, look, can't make yourself look smart by making somebody else look dumb.

这他妈在这里不算数。

That fucking doesn't count here.

而且如果你这么对创业者做，比如你在推特上说，哦，那个生意一美元只卖85美分。

And if you do it, by the way, with an entrepreneur, like if you get on Twitter and say, oh, that business sells dollars for 85¢.

哈哈，我真聪明。

Ho, ho, ho, I'm so smart.

去你的，你被开除了。

Fuck you, you're fired.

我完全不会容忍这种事，因为我们不会成为那样的人。

I'm not dealing with that at all because that's just not who we're gonna be.

我们很喜欢你聪明。

We love that you're smart.

你可以想多聪明就多聪明。

You can be as smart as you wanna be.

这没问题。

That's fine.

你不必通过那种方式达到那里。

You don't have to get there through that method.

一旦人们明白了这一点，他们就不会再那样做了。

And then once people know that, they're fine not doing that.

但我不能说，我觉得很难说：别当个混蛋。

But I couldn't say, I think it would be hard to say, Just don't be an asshole.

因为你看，有时候，那些最聪明的人就是会想：我才不陪你们玩这种愚蠢的对话呢。

Because, look, sometimes, you know, the smartest, like, they're just like, I'm not gonna suffer through this dumbass conversation.

就像，你知道的，如果特别聪明的人会这么做的话。

Like, you know, if people who are extremely smart are gonna do that.

这不能变成：哦，不行。

And it can't be like, oh, no.

你必须忍受每一次愚蠢的对话。

You have to suffer through every dumb conversation.

那样是行不通的。

Like, that's not gonna work.

好的。

Okay.

但本·霍洛维茨的观点是，对此零容忍，绝不容忍。

But there's Ben Horowitz isn't like, don't tolerate it, zero tolerance for this thing.

不行。

It's No.

我认为‘不许有混蛋’这条规则根本行不通。

I think the no asshole role is never gonna work.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

那么你具体不希望他们做什么？

So what is it that you don't want them to do?

没错。

Yep.

什么是越界，什么不算越界？

Like, what's over the line and what's not over the line?

我认为即使是非常有棱角的人，也能在这种环境中生存。

And I think even very spiky people can live in that kind of context.

他确实很有棱角。

He's very spiky.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yep.

你提到这个的时候，是在另一个播客里，我想接着聊一下，你当时说的是多少百分比？

What percentage I like you brought this up, like, in another pod that I wanted to follow-up on.

当我担任HubSpot的CEO时，很多时候我都不知道自己在做什么。

Like, when I was CEO of HubSpot, I I didn't know what I was doing a lot of time.

我经常感到困惑。

I was confused a lot.

当你当CEO的时候，你也有同样的感觉。

And when you were CEO, you felt the same way.

比如，你有多少时间觉得自己完全不懂，又有多少时间觉得自己稍微掌握了一些？

Like, what percentage of the time do you feel like, I really don't know what I'm doing versus I kinda got a handle on this thing?

如今，无论是通过安德里森·霍罗维茨还是你的经历，创始人们都假装自己什么都知道。

And today, Andreessen Horowitz or through your journey, like, founders pretend like they know what they're doing.

是的。

Yeah.

每个人都在装，这正是这种挑战的一部分。

Well, everybody pretends, and this is kind of part of that challenge.

所以我觉得这需要一段时间。

So I think it takes a while.

我的意思是，我不得不迅速成长起来。

Mean, I, now like I had to grow up very fast.

我们18岁的时候就上市了，是的。

We went public when we were 18 old, Yeah.

所以这会让你迅速成长。

So that'll grow you up in a hurry.

是的。

Yes.

但我真正觉得自己懂行，可能要到四年之后了。

But I didn't really feel like I knew what I was doing there probably till four years into it.

当我重建销售团队、引进克兰尼，还有类似这些事情的时候。

When I rebuilt the sales force, brought in Cranny, all that kind of thing.

大概是三年半到四年左右。

Maybe three and a half, four years into it.

那时我远没有现在这么自信。

And I was never as confident at that as I as I am now.

这对不同的人情况不同，但你需要足够多的实践经验，才能越来越自信地做出判断，决策速度越快，越不在意别人怎么看，越不怕犯错。

And it's different for different people, but you need enough reps at it to have The more confident you are in your judgment, the faster the decisions you can make, the less you care about what people think, the less you care about making a mistake.

这些都是关键点。

And those are all the things.

这就是为什么詹森如此神奇。

That's why Jensen is so magical.

他坐在房间里，跟每个人交谈，清楚地知道自己想要什么。

He sits in the room, he talks to everybody, he knows exactly what he wants.

埃隆也是这样。

Same with Elon.

对吧？

Right?

他就能坐在那儿，直接行动。

Like, he can just sit there and go.

我敢保证，他们俩都不是一开始就这样。

I guarantee you neither of them started that way.

嗯。

Mhmm.

对。

Yep.

你知道的，你就把它融入进去。

You you know, like, you you build it into that.

我在推特上看到一些可笑的说法，有人说风险投资比创业容易，或者创业比风险投资容易。

I see silly things on Twitter where people say venture capital is easier than entrepreneurship or entrepreneurship's easier than venture capital.

有人问我这个问题。

People ask me that.

资金更容易。

Capital's easier.

大家都在说，简单多了。

Everybody's talking about Way easier.

这根本没法比。

Like, that's not even close.

我同意。

I agree.

谁他娘的

Who the fuck

谁会认为风险投资比创业更难呢？

would think venture capital is harder than entrepreneur?

很多人这么想。

A lot of people.

我觉得风险投资中涉及的运气成分更多。

I think the venture capital, there's a lot more luck involved.

比如，如果你今天加入安德森·霍洛维茨或者红杉资本，你拥有一个极其强大的平台。

Like, if you join Andreessen Horowitz today, you have amazing platform or Sequoia, amazing platform.

你可能只做了三笔投资，但其中有一笔可能变成一家万亿美金的公司。

And you may do three deals, you know, maybe one turns into a trillion dollar company.

这其中有着相当大的运气成分。

There's a fair amount of luck around that.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

我的意思是，我觉得

I I mean, I think that

创业没那么多运气成分。

Entrepreneurship doesn't have a lot of luck.

只是有一点运气。

It's just some luck.

也有很多坏运气。

It's also a lot of bad luck.

是的。

Yeah.

你知道，创业只有一次机会，你必须让它成功，而且你对自己的错误付出的代价要直接得多，时间也在紧迫地流逝。

You know, entrepreneurship, you have one shot and you have to make it work, and then you really, really pay for your mistakes much more directly, and then the clock is ticking in a way.

在风险投资里，没有暂停键。

It's like there are no quarters in venture capital.

风险投资只是一种相对更容易的生意。

Venture capital is just kind of an easier kind of business.

现在说吧，有很多人，我是以一个成功者的身份这么说的，如果你失败了，可能看起来会不一样地艰难。

Now, look, there's a lot of people, I'm saying that as someone who succeeded in it, I suppose if you failed in it, it might have looked harder in a different way.

但我认为压力和紧张程度根本没法比，因为如果你的小风险投资失败了，受影响的人从来不会很多。

But I think the pressure level and the stress level is not close because if you have a small venture capital thing and it fails, it's never a lot of people.

你可以把一家科技公司发展到几千人，然后又让所有人都被裁员。

You can get a tech company up to thousands of people and then have them lay them all off.

是的。

Yes.

这种情况很常见。

Like that is common.

对。

Yeah.

而且这非常残酷。

And it's brutal.

然后，那些你为他们融资的人会更加密切关注你，因为你可能只有一个资金来源。

And then the people that you're raising money for have a much tighter eye on you because you could have one funding source.