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实际上,几乎每个人——包括埃隆·马斯克——都会发现,现实世界真的非常庞大,而且极其混乱。
What virtually everybody finds, including Elon Musk, is the real world is just really, really big and really, really messy.
人工智能这件事太有趣了。
The AI thing is so interesting.
对吧?
Right?
因为从技术角度来看,你似乎能立刻打造出一些注定会成功的产物。
Because from a technology perspective, it feels like you can build products pretty immediately that are gonna win.
我们人类做所有事情的方式,都将会发生改变。
Our entire way of doing everything as humans, we think is gonna change.
我们重新发明了计算机,而这台新计算机远比过去五十年里我们一直构建的计算机要优秀得多。
We reinvented the computer and the new computer is far better than the one that we have been building on for the last fifty or so years.
建立主导性风险投资品牌的目的,正是为了让这些公司在其发展的最关键时刻能够借用这一品牌,从而让公司能够把我们的声誉当作弹弓,助其迅速建立起自己的道路。
The purpose of building the dominant venture brand was precisely to be able to have the companies be able to borrow that at the most critical points in their development so that the companies can kind of use our course in the world as a slingshot to basically build their own course.
除非你签署文化文件,否则你无法加入这家公司。
You cannot join the firm unless you sign the culture document.
如果你必须选一样,你在积累什么?
If you had to pick a thing, what are you compounding?
声誉。
Reputation.
媒体生态系统正进入一个更加开放的时代,关于言论应为何种形态的讨论不再由少数机构掌控。
The media ecosystem is entering a more open era, and the conversation about what speech should look like is no longer controlled by a small set of institutions.
在本集中,a16z的联合创始人马克·安德森和本·霍洛维茨与《Not Boring》的创始人帕基·麦科马克对话,探讨了过去十年信息环境的变化,以及这种转变对创作者、平台和投资者意味着什么。
In this episode, a sixteen z cofounders Mark Andreessen and Ben Horowitz joined Not Boring founder, Paki McCormick, to talk through how the information environment changed over the past decade and what that shift means for creators, platforms, and investors.
我们从帕基的参考点开始——2015年《纽约客》的一篇报道,捕捉了主流新闻业普遍自视为言论自由捍卫者的时代终结;随后转入马克对当前无拘无束或自由化信息环境的解读。
We start with Paki's reference point, a 2015 New Yorker profile that captured the end of an era when mainstream journalism broadly positioned itself as a defender of free speech, then move into Mark's framing of the uncontrolled or liberated information environment where we are now.
马克和本剖析了他们认为最关键的转折点,包括埃隆·马斯克收购推特,以及Substack在巨大压力下始终坚持一贯的言论原则。
Mark and Ben break down the turning points they think mattered most, including Elon Musk's acquisition of Twitter and Substack's decision to hold a consistent, principled line on speech under heavy pressure.
他们解释了a16z为何投资Substack,以及如何通过让作者直接变现,创造出推动新需求产生的内容供给。
They explain why A16z invested in Substack and how enabling writers to monetize directly creates a supply of content that pulls new demand into existence.
本解释了‘不可替代的创作者’概念,并说明价值已从机构品牌转向个人声音。
Ben explains the non fungible writer and why value has shifted from institutional brands to individual voices.
我们还将这些媒体动态与a16z作为一家公司的运作方式联系起来,解释为什么声誉是核心的复利优势,这种声誉如何传递给投资组合公司,以及随着公司规模扩大,组织设计为何至关重要。
We also connect these media dynamics to how a16z operates as a firm, why reputation is the core compounding advantage, how that reputation transfers to portfolio companies, and why organizational design matters as the firm scales.
最后,马克和本深入探讨了他们个人最期待的下一步方向,包括马克对Z世代创始人的乐观态度。
Finally, Mark and Ben dive into what they're personally most excited about next, including Mark's optimism about Zoomer founders.
我们开始吧。
Let's get into it.
所以,塔基,我想先谢谢你写了这么精彩的文章。
So, Taki, I wanna start by saying thank you for the amazing piece.
真的,太棒了。
Like, it is incredible.
简直太出色了。
Like, absolutely incredible.
我们真的非常感谢你为此付出的巨大努力,因为这确实是个大工程。
So we we we just, like, really appreciate all the work that you put into it because that was a big one.
谢谢。
Thank you.
我的意思是,我很感激能讲述这个故事。
I I mean, I I appreciate being able to tell the story.
这是一个非常酷的故事,太棒了。
It's such a cool one, and It's awesome.
我很感激能和你们一起合作完成它。
I appreciate, you know, getting to work with you guys on it.
谢谢你们用了那些生动的动态效果,我一听到那个,就立刻明白了整个作品的样子。
And thank you for, the colorful motions, I think, made the whole as soon as I heard that, I was like, I I know what the whole piece looks like now.
我记得我当时想,我真不该在《纽约客》的记者面前说这些。
I remember thinking I really shouldn't be doing this in front of a New Yorker reporter.
但我实际上把那篇《纽约客》的文章看作是我的谢幕之作。
But I view that piece actually, I view that New Yorker piece as my last hurrah.
那是我最后一次能对主流媒体的人完全坦诚。
That was the last chance to be fully, like, honest with somebody from the mainstream press.
那是最后的时刻了。
That was, like, the very last moment.
那大概是2015年吧?
It was, like, what, 2015?
就在一切变得极度敌对之前不久。
It was, like, right before everything tilted and became super hostile.
你当时知道吗?
Did you know that at the time?
不知道。
No.
我完全没意识到。
I had no idea.
我完全没意识到。
I had no idea.
你知道吗,我认为因为这是文化上的转变,他们根本不知道自己在做什么。
You know, I think that because it was a cultural change, they they just had no idea what they were doing.
是的。
Yep.
你知道吗?
You know?
那时候,你是在写关于你自己的东西。
It was like, you're writing about your yeah.
尤其是商业类出版物。
And particularly the business publications.
是的。
Yeah.
谁会去读那些讨厌商业的商业文章呢?
It's like, who reads about business that hates business?
讨厌商业的人不会去读商业内容。
People who hate business don't read about business.
他们本质上是在毁掉自己的受众。
They're basically ruining your own audience.
是的。
Yeah.
事实上,关于这件事的完整情况是,我们做了那篇报道,之后我就从2007年开始进入了Facebook董事会。
So, in fact, the full story on that is so we did that story, and then I went to the so now I've been on the Facebook board since 2007.
因此,我亲身经历了几乎所有与Facebook相关的重大事件,这些事都直接、前沿地影响着我,尤其是在2010年代发生的各种事情中,我无一例外地身处其中。
And so I was experiencing a lot of this through basically everything that's had had Facebook really hard, really, you know, kind of upfront, know, kind of on the leading edge, you know, including in every aspect of all the stuff that happened in the in the twenty tens.
我们过去每年都会举办一场媒体派对,邀请所有记者、出版商和编辑,给他们喝酒,好好招待一番。
And so we used to hold an annual media party where we would, you know, buy all the reporters and publishers and editors and see them and get them liquored up and, like, do the whole thing.
那总是非常愉快的时光。
Do it was always a really good time.
我们一直都特别享受这个活动。
We always really enjoyed it.
但那篇报道发表后的下一场派对上,我记得有三位记者——三位商业和科技记者,正如本提到的——我认识他们很久了,他们竟然在派对上把我堵在角落,开始猛烈抨击我,说Facebook对政治内容的审查不够。
But then the one after that piece came out, we did the one, and I remember three reporters who I know three business reporters and tech reporters to Ben's point, who I'd known for a long time, like, literally cornered me in the party and started just, like, tearing into me because Facebook was not censoring enough political content.
他们简直气疯了,逼我去找扎克伯格,告诉他必须实施一套完全不同、更严格的审查制度,以阻止人们讨论所谓的‘错误话题’。
And they were just, like, absolutely furious that I had to, like, get to Zuckerberg and tell him that he had to implement, like, a much, much different, like, censorship regime to prevent people from talking about, you know, the wrong topics.
我记得,我自己是个X世代的人。
And I I remember, you know, I'm like a Gen X.
你知道吗,我就像个典型的、天真的X世代,有点古典自由派。
You know, I'm like a I'm like a, you know, you know, classic innocent Gen X, kinda classical liberal.
而且我觉得,你知道,言论自由,你知道,第一修正案。
And I'm like, you know, but, you know, freedom of speech, you know, the First Amendment.
他们气得要命,跟我说:不行。
And they got, like, super fucking mad at me, and they're like, no.
不行。
No.
不行。
No.
不行。
No.
人们不能被允许谈论这个。
People cannot be allowed to talk about this.
我当时就觉得,那就是我的时刻。
Like, And I was like that was like my moment.
记者们正在背离言论自由。
Like, journalists are turning against freedom of speech.
因为,是的,我这一辈子,记者们一直喋喋不休地谈论我们伟大的言论自由。
Because, yeah, I don't even like, my whole life, journalists been going on and on about our great freedom of speech.
他们的所有神话和传说都围绕着发布五角大楼文件、揭露水门事件这些不受审查就能完成的事情。
It's like all of their myths and legends are all about, know, publishing the Pentagon Papers and, like, all these the Watergate be able to do all these things without being censored.
然后却变成了反对言论自由。
And and then became anti freedom of speech.
我觉得重力仿佛倒转了,直到去年才基本恢复正常。
And I felt like gravity, like, inverted itself and basically, like, only started to return to normal last year.
所以,总之,这就是为什么我有这些故事——顺便说一句,你的那篇文章正好与那篇形成完美呼应,因为它感觉像是一个时代的开端,然后是另一个时代的终结,开端是
So, anyway, so that's that's why I I have Do you think it stories of the, by the way, your your piece is like a really good bookend to that piece because it feels like those so the beginning of an era and then at the end of an era, beginning of a
新时代。
new era.
你认为这个新时代是什么?
What do you think the new era is?
这简直失控得厉害。
It's like way more uncontrolled.
是的。
Yeah.
你可以用各种不同的词。
And you could use various words.
你可以说‘失控’。
You could you could say uncontrolled.
我还特别喜欢所谓的拉塞尔同义转换,通过它你能找出表达任何事物的中性、正面和负面方式。
You could say, a I'm big fan of so called Russell conjugation where you can kind of figure out a neutral, positive, and negative way to say anything.
所以你可以用‘失控’、‘过时’和‘解放’这些词。
So you could say uncontrolled and archaic and liberated.
对吧?
Right?
我的意思是,我们都在经历这一切。
And, you know, I mean, we're all experiencing this.
对吧?
Right?
你们知道,我们都看到了,但那种审查言论、控制言论的时代——至少在美国——已经结束了。
You're you know, we're all seeing it, but, like, know, just the days of the kind of censorship speech re you know, it's kind of fought control regime, At least in The US, like, those days are just over.
然后你可能在看,欧洲正在拼命努力。
And then I you may be watching, like, you know, Europe is trying, you know, furiously.
英国、欧盟和澳大利亚现在正拼命试图实施更严格的管控。
The UK, the EU, and Australia now are trying furiously to kinda lock down even harder.
实际上,澳大利亚现在正在做一件事。
And, actually, Australia is in the process of doing a thing right now.
这简直是一项极其严苛的反言论自由法案,直指本国公民。
It's like a super draconian anti free speech thing aimed squarely at their citizens.
所以,世界其他地方——在我看来,美国以外的西方国家在这方面仍然走向错误的方向——但美国,我们已经基本恢复了自由。
And so, like, the world is you know, the the West outside The US is still headed in the the wrong direction on this, in my view, but, like, The US, like, we've substantially restored that.
我认为我们已经恢复了。
And I think we've restored it.
你可以从不同角度来论证这一点,但我怀疑这些战争实际上已经结束了。
You could kinda argue this different ways, but I I think my suspicion is, like, those wars are just simply over.
即使那些极度支持审查的人重新掌权,我也不确定还有谁会容忍或回到那些日子。
Like, even if, like, super pro censorship people get back and control the government, like, I don't know that anybody's gonna tolerate or return back to those days.
是的。
Yeah.
当然,还会出现不同的斗争。
Like, you know, there there will be different fights.
当然,肯定会发生不同的政治争议,而且会非常激烈。
You know, there'll be different political controversies for sure, and then they'll be very intense.
但我认为,从回顾的角度看,2017年到2025年这段时期,是媒体和政府能够直接控制信息的最后一个窗口期。
But I I think the the the days of, you know, like, like, basically, in retrospect, 2017 to 2025 was, like, the last window for, you know, especially the press and the government to basically just, like, control it.
这是每个人都会做的事。
It's what everybody does.
我觉得现在这种情况还没有结束。
Like, I don't think that's over now.
你正处于中间
You're in the middle
了这场风波。
of this.
我的意思是,你们两个人,你们觉得自己在其中扮演了什么角色?
I mean, the two of you, like, what role do you think you played in that?
从内部来看,别太自夸,你和少数几个人,你们觉得这些行动真的让舆论和媒体的关系回到了现在这种无政府或自由的状态吗?
Like, from the inside, without getting cocky on it, like, you and a certain like, a small number of people, like, do you think that it actually, like, that kind of stuff shifts it back to this anarchic or liberated view of, the press or relationship with the media that we have now?
我应该先说,我完全不认为自己在这里有什么道德上的英雄主义,因为说实话,从1993年我就拒绝了在网页浏览器中实施审查的机会,那本会是一个完全不同的、极其反乌托邦的世界。
So I should start by saying I don't think I should claim any moral heroism at all here at all because, I mean, I have my own version of my own story going all the way back to I turned down the opportunity at the time in 1993 to implement censorship in the web browser, which would have been a completely different and very dystopian world.
所以我不确定。
So I don't know.
也许我因此能得一点功劳,但我觉得过去十年里,我和大家的境遇其实是一样的。
Maybe I get a little bit of credit for that, but I think for the last decade, like I was kind of on the same ride as everybody else.
我从2007年就开始在Facebook董事会了。
And I've been on this Facebook board since 2007.
所以我经历了这家公司过去十年所经历的整个疯狂过山车般的历程。
So I kind of went through the entire kind of crazy roller coaster that that company went through over the last decade.
然后我们还参与了众多这些公司。
And then we've been involved in lots of these companies.
我是推特的天使投资人。
I was an angel investor in Twitter.
我是领英的天使投资人。
I'm angel investor in LinkedIn.
它们在某些时候都成为了审查机器的关键部分。
They both became kinda key parts of the censorship machine at certain points.
所以我不想声称自己有多么伟大的道德英雄主义。
And so I don't wanna claim, like, huge moral heroism.
但我确实认为有几件事。
I do think a couple things.
第一,显然,马斯克收购推特无疑是一个巨大的转折点。
One is, obviously, Elon's purchase of Twitter obviously was, like, a gigantic turning point.
我也想向Substack的团队致以极大的赞誉,他们非常自豪,因为我们是他们的原始投资者,也是Substack最大的外部投资者。
I also wanna give just, enormous credit to the Substack guys, and they were very proud because we were the original investor, and we're the largest outside investor in Substack.
我认为他们在巨大的压力下,始终坚守言论自由的底线,做得非常非常出色,你知道吗?
And I think they did a really, really great job holding the line of freedom of speech under and I would tell you under enormous pressure, You know?
尤其是他们在这一立场上始终如一、完全秉持原则。
Especially very consistent and totally principled stance on it.
是的。
Yeah.
没错。
That's right.
我不知道人们是否还记得,但他们确实遭到了大量反言论力量的猛烈攻击,各种典型的指控接踵而至,简直糟糕透顶。
And I don't if people remember this or not, but, I mean, they got really lit up by a lot of the sort of anti speech forces for I mean, the whole litany of kind of standard accusations just being absolutely horrible.
而且,他们自始至终都坚持了自己的原则。
And, yeah, they stuck to their principles the whole time.
然后至少对于那个表现得像他自己一样的埃隆来说。
And then at least with Elon who acts like he's Elon.
所以当他想要对抗那些试图让他加强审查的人时,他会以一种非常公开、明显且强势的方式去做,而那时Substack还是一家年轻公司。
And so when he wants to go to war with somebody who's, like, trying to get him to censor more, like, he does it in a very kind of forced public visible and forceful way, some stack still a younger company.
因此,他们当时还没有在全球范围内拥有那种巨大的影响力。
And so they don't have that level of kind of just throw weight in the world yet.
所以他们面临的挑战更加艰难,必须打很多场仗,包括一些从未公开的战斗,以维持服务的高完整性。
And so they have the harder version of the challenge, and they had to fight a whole bunch of fights, including fights that aren't even public to basically keep the service with high integrity.
所以我认为,我们可以借此谈谈我们在文章中涉及的许多主题。
So I think a good place to kind of talk about a bunch of the themes that we covered in the piece.
其中之一就是Substack的投资。
One of which is, I mean, the Substack investment.
我记得当时我正在使用Substack。
I remember at the time I was on Substack.
我的职业生涯正是因Substack而起步,而那时我仍然觉得这是一项疯狂的投资。
My career was starting because of Substack, and I still, at the time, thought it was kind of a crazy investment.
你当时是从这个角度考虑的吗——这将会是一个回报极佳的投资?
Were you thinking about it from the perspective of this is gonna be a great returner?
这对未来是有好处的吗?
This is something that is good for the future?
这是这两者的结合吗?
Is it a mix of the two of those things?
你有多大程度上支持Substack,让他们能站在你这一边,而如果没有你,他们本无法完成这场斗争?
And then to what extent have you allowed Substack to fight that fight by being on their side that they wouldn't have been able to do if you weren't there?
是的。
Yeah.
所以我们从不纯粹因为社会或政治原因进行投资。
So we never make investments for just purely kinda social and political reasons.
当然,我们的主要业务始终是以受托人的方式追求回报。
So the well, obviously, always as sort of fiduciary system to generate returns in the main business.
因此,我们投资时始终希望所投资的公司有机会成为我们所说的行业基石型品牌,成为世界上一股重要的力量。
And so we always invest with the intention that the company that we invest in has the opportunity to become what we call kind of a cornerstone franchise, you know, in the industry and and an important force in the world.
我们当时确实这么认为,而今天比以往任何时候都更坚信这一点。
We certainly believe that as such at the time, and we believe that more than ever today.
所以我认为这是对的。
So I think that's true.
但我还认为,这在我们硅谷的许多工作中都是一种魔力,也就是说,虽然不是每个案例,但在许多情况下,那些成为最好版本的公司也会成为最成功的企业。
But I also think this is kind of the magic in a lot of what we do, you know, at Silicon Valley, which is I think the companies not in every case, but in many cases, the companies that become the best version of themselves also become the most successful businesses.
我认为Substack就是一个很好的例子。
And I think Substack is a great example of that.
Substack实际上是一个非常非常好的例子,因为如果Substack让它的作者成功了,那么它自己也会成功。
And Substack is actually a very, very, very good example of that because if Substack is making its writer successful, then it's making itself successful.
对吧?
Right?
因此,它的成功与作者的成功之间有着极其直接的利益一致。
And so it's got this just, like, extremely direct alignment of interest between its success and its writer success.
而由此带来的结果是,如果它的作者成功了,那么这些作者的读者也必然成功。
And then as a consequence of that, if its writers are successful, kind of by definition, those writers' readers are successful.
他们得到了自己想要的东西。
They're getting what they want.
所以我会说,我们投资Substack有好几个原因。
And so I would say there were sort of a bunch of reasons we invested at Substack.
其中一个就是我们被那几位创始人吸引了,而你可能也认识他们。
One was just we fell in love with the guys, and then you probably know the guys.
他们确实很容易让人喜欢。
They're easy to fall in love with.
这部分很简单。
That was the easy part.
而且,我们从很早以前就开始关注互联网的发展了。
And then, look, we had been around the web going all the way back.
尤其是博客的黄金时代,那确实是一个非常特别的时期。
And then particularly the kind of golden age of blogging, you know, was kind of this kind of very special time.
我认为博客这个现象可能被低估了,也许是因为没有哪家公司完全获得了应有的认可。
And blogging really, I think, maybe gets underestimated because maybe there was no single company that kinda got full credit for it or something.
但博客现象创造了大量原本不会存在的智力内容。
But the phenomenon of blogging created an enormous amount of intellectual content that basically was not going to exist otherwise.
然后,博客面临了一系列问题,因为背后没有一家公司支撑。
And then blogging kind of just had a series of problems because there was no single company behind it.
但其中一个问题是,博主们很难赚钱。
But one of the problems was it was just very hard for bloggers to make money.
对吧?
Right?
于是,Substack 的团队基本上说:我们要解决这个问题,我们来改善经济模式。
And so the subset guys basically said, well, we're gonna do that, but we solve the economic model.
现在人们已经准备好为内容付费了,这很合理。
People are ready to pay now for content, and this makes sense.
但一开始就有个鸡生蛋、蛋生鸡的问题:你真的能看到这一点吗?
And then there was this chicken and egg thing right up front, which was like, well, can you really see that?
你知道,互联网上内容泛滥。
You know, the Internet's awash with content.
几乎没人愿意为这些内容付费。
People aren't paying for almost any of it.
你知道,你得眯着眼睛,勉强说好吧。
You know, you have to kinda squint and kinda say, okay.
人们真的会为今天所获取的任何内容付费吗?
Are people actually gonna pay for any of the stuff that they're getting today?
我认为在这种情况下,我们所坚信的是,做一个所谓的供给驱动型市场——只要你提供了变现能力,就会催生出今天不存在的作者和内容。
And I think the thing that, in that case, that we had faith in was basically just to be what we call a supply driven market, which is if you provide the monetization capability, then you're going to bring into existence writers and content that don't exist today.
而这将创造出今天看不到的新需求。
And that is going to create new demand that's not visible today.
然后这种需求会反过来,激励更多的作者和内容产生。
And then that demand is gonna come back around, and it's gonna incent more writers and more content.
所以这本质上是一种赌注,认为有一整代高质量的内容尚未出现,只是因为缺乏变现机制。
And so it was basically a bet that there's an entire generation of high quality content that doesn't exist because the monetization mechanism doesn't exist.
这正是克里斯和他的合作伙伴所相信的。
And that's and that's certainly what Chris and his partners believe.
我认为这确实已经得到了验证。
And I think that that's absolutely what's proven out.
所以,这简直就是创始人的一个绝佳例子,他们真正看到了一个尚未存在的未来,而这对他们来说是显而易见的。
And so it's like a great example of founders that, like, really see a future that doesn't exist yet, and it's obvious to them.
但不幸的是,在这种情况下,他们成功说服了我们。
And, unfortunately, in that case, they were able to convince us.
但每当我们真正搞砸的时候,都是因为有一位创始人能看到未来,他们来到我们的办公室。
But, like, whenever we really screw up, it's because there's a founder who can see the future, and they come and they sit in our office.
他们告诉我们未来会是什么样子,而我们说,是的。
They tell us what the future is, and we say, yeah.
我其实并不相信。
I don't really buy it.
对吧?
Right?
然后接下来的三十年,我们不得不看着这个事物随着未来逐渐成真而取得辉煌的成功,这真的让人很沮丧。
And then for the next thirty years, we have to read about the glorious success of this thing as that future actually develops, and that really sucks.
我不太愿意谈这些,但我会说,你知道,Substack 就是那个例子。
And I don't like to talk about those, but I will say, you know, Substack is the yeah.
也许他们只是特别擅长销售,但确实完全说服了我们。
Maybe they're just really good at sales, but they fully convinced us.
我真的很高兴看到事情发展成这样。
And I'm really thrilled that that that's what's happening.
他们率先抓住了从传统媒体向新媒体转变的趋势,当品牌从《纽约时报》或《华尔街日报》转向作家本人时,Substack 成为了这一转变的强大推动力。
They were kind of ahead of the kind of change from old media to new media and that, you know, as the brand moved from The New York Times or The Wall Street Journal to the actual writers themselves, Substack was like a massive enabler for that.
他们创造了一种叫做‘非同质化作家’的概念,也就是说,报纸上能有多少内容是任何人都能写的——顺便说一句,包括 AI——又有多少才是真正有趣且有价值的。
And they created this thing, which they call the non fungible writer, which is like how many things in the newspaper could anybody write, including AI, by the way, and how much is truly interesting and valuable.
他们希望所有真正有趣且有价值的内容都能帮助创作者建立自己的个人品牌和事业,而 Substack 正是为此而生。
And they really wanted all the truly interesting and valuable things to be able to build their people, to build their own brands and their own businesses on Substack.
事实证明,这一点也完全正确。
And that also turned out to be very true.
是的。
Yeah.
尤其是哈米什,在他们的团队中发挥了至关重要的作用。
And that was where Hamish in particular, right, turned out to be really critical on their team.
早些时候我和他聊过这件事,我当时说:我不知道。
And he and I had a conversation early on this where I was like, well, I don't know.
这些人真的会离开他们的出版机构吗?
These people ever gonna leave their publications?
他们真的会亲自写内容吗?
Are they ever gonna actually write content?
你知道,当Substack刚开始筹备时,在我看来,媒体界已经变成了一种极端且消极的单一文化。
Like, you know, when Substack was gearing up, it's when the in in my view, the press kinda became this kind of extreme and negative monoculture.
所以我就想,好吧。
And so I was like, alright.
是的。
Yeah.
所有这些作家似乎都被困在这些地方。
All these writers kinda trapped at these places.
我就想,他们真的被困住了吗?
And I'm like, well, are they really trapped?
他们是被关在牢里,还是自己建了牢笼?
Are they in jail, or have they built a jail?
如果他们离开,他们会变得不一样吗?
And if they leave, are they gonna be any different?
他跟我说,你看。
And he's like, look.
如果他们唯一能养活自己的方式就是为一家要求他们以特定方式写作的出版机构工作,那么他们就会那样写,因为他们需要付账单。
If their only option to basically put food on the table is to work for a publication that basically requires them to write a certain way, then they're gonna write that way because they need to pay the bills.
但他基本上说,我敢保证,有很多这样的人,如果你给他们一条独立的路,他们会非常高兴能够挣脱牢笼,也非常愿意从不同的角度和观点来写作。
But he basically said, guarantee you that there's a lot of these folks, you know, where if they had an independent path, they would be thrilled to be able to maybe break themselves out of jail, and they would be thrilled to write about things from different angles and different takes on things.
你会看到一种解放现象发生,即使是一些你原本以为不会改变的人——比如那些为《纽约时报》或其他类似机构工作的人——也会涌现出多种不同的声音。
And you see this liberation phenomenon take place where you'd you'd have actually many different kinds of voices even coming from people where you wouldn't expect it based on the work that they did for The New York Times or whoever.
当然,他完全正确。
And, of course, he was a 100% right.
你可以想象这样一个世界:由于它吸引了来自各个地方的顶尖作家,让他们能建立自己的事业,Substack 的规模会比任何现有媒体机构大十倍。
You can see a world where because it attracts kind of all of the best writers from all of these different places who can build their own businesses, Substack becomes 10 times larger than any of the media organizations that are places.
我喜欢你发给Databricks的Ali和Ben的那封邮件,你在邮件中提到这家公司一直在低估自己。
I love the email that you sent, Ali, at Databricks, Ben, where you talk about the fact that the business was underselling itself.
他低估了这家公司的潜力,它本可以达到甲骨文的十倍大,也就是2万亿美元。
He was underselling the business, and it was gonna be 10 times bigger than Oracle, so $2,000,000,000,000.
我想了解这其中的机制。
I wanna understand like the mechanism of that.
你觉得每一代都会出现新公司比旧公司大十倍的情况吗?
Like, you think that happens every generation that the new companies are 10 times bigger?
为什么会这样?
Why does that happen?
只是因为软件吗?
Is it just software?
是的。
Yeah.
这一点其实很简单,因为如果你比较本地部署软件公司和云软件公司,比如PeopleSoft对比Workday,或者Siebel软件对比Salesforce,云版本的规模就是原来的十倍。
So on that one, it was actually pretty simple because if you compare the on premise software companies to the cloud software companies, so compare PeopleSoft to Workday, or compare Siebel software to Salesforce, the cloud version was just 10 times bigger.
Oracle 有点像是 Databricks 的本地部署版本。
And Oracle was kind of the on premise version of Databricks.
这种类比有点粗糙,毕竟情况不同,数据量更大等等。
Kind of rough analog, things are different, data's bigger, and so forth.
但如果你看看谁会成为云时代的数据提供商,也就是提供云上数据管理技术的公司,我非常确信 Databricks 会胜出。那么,如果你问,这个市场的规模有多大?
But if you look at who is going to be the data kind of provider in the cloud, the provider of technology to manage your data in the cloud, I I was very confident Databricks would win that, and so then if you say, Well, what's the market size of that?
顺便说一句,当我提到 AI 没有现在这么大的时候,我觉得这反而让我的预测更准确了,但当时很明显它会是原来的十倍大,于是我跟 Ali 说:‘你干嘛跟这个候选人说你值一百亿美元啊?你在说什么呢?’
And by the way, when I said that AI wasn't as big as it is, so I think that's helping my prediction, but it was just clearly going be 10 times bigger, and I was like, Ali, why are you trying to convince this candidate that you're going be worth $10,000,000,000 What are you even talking about?
但你知道,Ali 非常谨慎。
But, you know, Ali is super paranoid.
愿上帝保佑他。
God bless him.
所以,这些就是类似的事情。
So, know, those are kinds of things.
而且,你必须了解你的创业者。
And like, you have to know your entrepreneur.
我的意思是,我认为这是马克做得特别好的一件事,这种建议并不是给每个创业者都适用的。
I mean, I think this is, you know, one of the things that I think Mark does very well is, like, you know, that advice isn't advice you give to every entrepreneur.
这种建议特别适合他,效果非常好。
It's, you know, it was very worked well specifically for him.
我认为,这种情况总是如此。
I think that, you know, that's always the case.
经营公司本质上是一场心理博弈,你必须深入了解那个人独特的心理,才能把公司的发展方向引导到正确的轨道上。
Like, it's a very psychological game running a company, and so you have to kind of tap in to that person's particular psychology to kind of change the trajectory of what the company is doing into the right direction.
我还想补充一点,回到你提到的Substack,我认为Substack的规模有可能是现有内容产业——无论你怎么称呼它,媒体或新闻行业——整体价值的上千倍。
And I'd also add, you know, back to you on the Substack point, like, think Substack could be, like, a thousand times the size of the of the existing, like, content industry, whatever you wanna call it, media news industry, the collective, you know, kind of value.
原因在于,你自己就是一个很好的例子。
And and reason is because and, you know, you're an example of this yourself.
基本上,普通人都是傻瓜。
Basically normal people are idiots.
他们只想坐在电视机前消磨时间。
They just wanna sit in front of the boob tube.
他们就只想当沙发土豆。
They just wanna, like, be couch potatoes.
你知道的。
You know?
当时大家常说美国人每天看六小时电视,然后你一打开电视,就看到满屏的选秀节目和垃圾内容,他们有个词叫‘巨大的荒原’。
The the the the line everybody used at the time was Americans watch six hours of TV a day, and then you turned on TV, and you just saw this they they have this term, the the vast wasteland of, you know, game shows and bullshit.
那简直就像一种非常反乌托邦的景象,人们都是傻子。
And it was just like this, like, very dystopian kind of thing of just, like, people are just morons.
而互联网时代的版本,当然就是这种道德恐慌直接转移到了互联网上,表现为短视频、TikTok。
And then, you know, the Internet version of that is, of course, you know, that this is is straight you know, that kind of moral panic is transferred straight over onto the Internet in the form of, know, of course, know, short form videos, TikTok.
人们就只想看这些愚蠢的短视频,就是这样。
You know, so people just wanna watch, you know, these these these stupid short form videos, and it's just
钢琴才是最初的版本。
piano was the original one.
对吧?
Right?
是的。
Yeah.
这简直就是猫视频。
It's exactly cat videos.
顺便说一下,我是猫视频的爱好者。
By by the way, I'm an aficionado of cat videos.
我完全不鄙视猫视频。
I do not look down at cat videos whatsoever.
AI猫视频是我目前最爱的娱乐类型,所以我会
AI cat videos are my current favorite genre of any form of of entertainment, so I will
AI猫视频非常好。
The AI cat videos are very good.
我会。
I will.
我会。
I will.
是的。
Yes.
那么确认一下,我经常发给她很多AI猫视频。
Then to confirm, I send her I send her a lot of AI cat videos.
然而,对于像游戏节目、情景喜剧或肥皂剧这类大众媒体内容,现在也有现代版本,而猫视频的大众媒体市场巨大无比。
However, there is an enormous market for just, like, mass media just for, like, whatever, you know, for whatever game shows or sitcoms or, you know, soap operas where there are modern versions of those, and there's a giant, you know, mass mass mass mass media, market for, for cat videos.
但这又回到了这个供给驱动市场的观点。
But, this goes back to these this idea of supply driven market.
我认为,人们对真正智能、高质量的内容也有巨大的潜在需求。
There there's also, I think, just, like, enormous latent demand for actual smart high quality stuff.
尤其是在媒体领域,各种类型的媒体都是如此。
And and and particularly in media and in in in every kind of media.
我认为问题不在于需求不足。
And and I think the issue the issue is not lack of demand.
我认为问题在于供给不足。
I think the issue is lack of supply.
因为,你看,这其实回到了消费者营销的基础理念:消费者自己也不知道想要什么,直到这些东西被提供出来。
Because, like, look, it just kinda goes back to, you know, kinda consumer marketing one zero one, which is consumer people don't know what they want until it's given to them.
对吧?
Right?
没人曾经要求过麦金塔电脑。
You know, nobody ever asked for a Macintosh.
也没人曾经要求过iPhone。
Nobody ever asked for an iPhone.
就像,你知道的,这些东西必须由供应方设计和制造出来,之后需求才会出现。
Like, you know, these things had to be designed and built, you know, provided on the supply side before the demand materialized.
而后来,需求当然远超任何人预期。
And then the demand, of course, turned out to be, you know, far higher than anybody anybody expected.
我认为,媒体领域也是如此,情况完全一样。
And and I think that that same thing is is exactly true of media.
我认为这一点最早的有力证明就是长篇播客的成功,我记得我早期和一些早期长篇播客创作者的对话,他们说这是他们见过最奇怪的事:每个人都告诉我们消费者注意力时间很短,但数据显示,人们真的会从头到尾看完长达三小时的播客。
I think a great early existence proof of this was the success of long form podcasting, you know, which is I I remember my early conversations with some of the early long form podcasters, and they're like, it's the strangest thing we've ever seen because everybody tells us that the the consumers have short attention spans, but, you know, people are literally watching three hour podcasts, we get the analytics, and people are watching all the way to the end of the three hour podcast.
所以我把这看作是一个典型的双峰市场,一方面确实存在一定数量的主流卖家,不管是什么样的主流形式。
And so I view this very much as like, you know, this is one of these classic markets that's a barbell, which is, yeah, you have a certain amount of whatever just, you know, whatever, you know, mainstream you know, sort of mainstream, whatever, you know, seller or whatever on on the one side.
但另一方面,存在着一个巨大的、尚未开发的市场,即各个领域内的高质量内容。
But you have this massive sort of untapped market, for high quality content in basically every domain.
而我认为,这背后是技术变革的力量。
And they're just you know, and I think, know, technological transformation.
现有的媒体公司结构,是为集中式媒体时代设计的。
The the the existing structure of the media company was a structure that was designed for a world of centralized media.
今天我们需要一种全新的结构,而这正是我们如此看好Substack的原因。
You need you need a new structure today, and, know, of course, that's that you know, that's why we're we're so high on Substack.
但当我们将Substack与你刚才谈到的Databricks相比时,情况完全一样,真是令人惊叹。
But, yeah, when when we look at Substack, it's the exact same thing that you were just talking about Databricks, which is like, wow.
这个平台的规模有可能比我们迄今为止看到的任何东西大上好几个数量级。
The the this thing could be orders of magnitude orders of magnitude multiples, larger, you know, than than anything we've seen so far.
坦率地说,我认为我们已经开始看到这种趋势了。
And I and, know, frankly, I I think we're starting to see that.
因此,你们所募集的基金规模隐含了对未来的某种判断,即未来十年科技将渗透多少世界领域。
So implicit in in kind of the fund sizes that you raise is some kind of view on how big the future is going to be or how much of the world technology is going to eat over the next decade or so.
150亿美元这个数字,反映了十年后世界会是什么样子,以及会有多少个比它们取代的实体大得多的Substack?
What does 15,000,000,000 say about kind of what the world looks like in a decade and how many sub stacks there are that are much bigger than whoever they're replacing?
我认为我们重新发明了计算机。
Well, I think that we reinvented the computer.
这种新型计算机远优于我们过去五十年左右一直在构建的计算机。
And the new computer is far better than the one that we have been kind of building on for the last fifty or so years.
其实准确来说,这个时间跨度比五十年更长,但五十年是真正开始的节点。
Well, really longer than that, but fifty in earnest.
你知道,我们在公司里经常讨论这个问题,我们想不出任何一个问题,是AI无法解决的。
You know, there is not I mean, talk about this all the time in the firm there's not a problem that we can think of that you can't, that you won't be able to solve with AI.
所以,几乎世界上每一个问题,从癌症到交通,再到美国大规模的欺诈问题,
So, like almost every problem in the world, and you, you know, cancer to transportation to massive fraud in The U.
S.
S.
你随便举一个头条新闻里的问题。
You just name a problem in the headlines.
我们就会说,哦,这个问题我们能解决。
And we're like, Oh yeah, we can solve that.
因此,这可以说是对一切的重新发明。
And so, it's kind of the reinvention of everything.
我们觉得,人类做所有事情的方式都将发生改变。
So, like our entire way of doing everything as humans, we think is going to change.
因此,对我们来说,150亿美元只是一个起点,因为有太多事情要做,有太多东西将被创造出来。
And so, would view it as $15,000,000,000 to start for us because there's so much to do and there's so many things that are going to get built.
其中一些取决于创业者的时机,但我们认为创业者数量也会大幅增加,因为从一个想法到打造一个卓越的解决方案和产品,过程将变得简单得多,而AI最擅长的正是构建东西。
And some of it is just timing with the entrepreneurs, but we think the number of entrepreneurs is going to multiply as well, because the ease of going from an idea to a really fantastic solution and a fantastic product is just gonna be so much simpler, because one of the things that AI is best at of course is kind of building stuff.
所以,这确实是世界历史上一个非常独特的时刻。
And so yeah, it's just a very unique time in kind of the history of the world.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
我现在经常对人工智能有一种超脱体外的感觉,就是,嗯,感觉就是这样。
The the out of body experience I have on AI on a regular basis now is, you know, it's just like, okay.
所以我像本那样思考,然后我就想,好吧。
So I think about the way Ben does, and then I'm like, alright.
你该如何应用人工智能来解决这个问题?
How might you apply AI to solve?
是的。
Yeah.
比如,我们现在看到的那种欺诈丑闻。
For example, the fraud scandal, know, the the kind of fraud that we're seeing play out.
或者,任何类似的事情。
Or, you know, any any anything like that.
然后你就想,哦,明白了。
And and it's like, oh, okay.
嗯,我得好好想想怎么让AI来解决这个问题。
Well, I I need to think and think about how to how to have AI solve this.
然后我就想,等等。
And I'm like, well, wait a minute.
我为什么不问问AI呢?
Why don't I ask the AI?
是的。
Yeah.
对。
Right.
然后我就进去,开始说,哒哒哒哒哒。
And then I go in there, I'm like, know, da da da da da.
我该怎么做好呢?
How should I do this?
它就会说,哦,很明显你应该这么做,还有你需要做的18个步骤。
And it's like, oh, well, here's obvious how you would do it, and here's, you know, the 18 steps that you would take.
然后我跟它说,好吧,你知道的。
And then I tell it, well, you know, okay.
比如,你来采访我吧,采访一下这个话题里所有开放性的问题,了解我的看法。
Like, you know, interview me, you know, interview me on all the open questions in the topic, you know, to get my thoughts on them.
然后它就开始,你知道的,开始质问我了。
And then and then it starts, you know, it starts interrogating me.
对吧?
Right?
然后我就说,好吧。
And then I'm like, okay.
你给我你的观点吧。
And I'll give me your point.
你知道的?
You know?
所以,总之,就像你知道的,如果你在以前用普通电脑做这种事,它只会呆呆地盯着你。
And so, anyway, it's just like, you know, as you know, like, if you had tried to do that with a normal computer in the old days, it'd just, like, stare at you.
对吧?
Right?
这真的、真的、真的非常不一样。
Like, it's it's it's so, like, is really, really, really different.
然后,你知道,帕特,我认为从风险投资的角度来看,从风险资本的机制来说,经典的风险投资三角是团队、产品和市场,你总是在试图评估这三者。
And then, know, Pat, I think the venture lens I would put on this is, you know, the in terms of the mechanics of venture capital, you know, the the sort of classic, you know, venture capital triangle is is team, product, and market, and and you're always trying to kind of evaluate all three of those.
多年来,人们一直有不同的理论,认为这三者中哪些更重要,以及它们如何相互作用。
And people have always had, you know, different theories over the years of of which of those are more important than the others and how they how they interact.
但基本上,每个投资者——无论是公开市场投资者还是私人投资者——我们都被训练去做的一件事就是市场规模分析。
But the the the thing that basically every investor, public market investors, private investors, the thing that we're all trained to do is basically market sizing.
比如,我们被训练去做技术分析。
Like, we're, you know, we're we're we're, you know, for you know, we're we're trained to do technology analysis.
我们被训练去做背景调查,同时也被训练去做市场规模分析。
We're trained to do, like, you know, background checks on people, and then we're trained to do market sizing.
好吧。
Like, you know, okay.
这个市场有多大?
How big is this market?
因为,你知道,经典的说法是,如果你投入巨大的努力去追逐一个很小的市场,最终得到的还是一个小结果。
Because, you know, the the the classic adage, right, is if you if you put a huge amount of effort into going after a small market, you still get a small outcome.
但这里面有一个前提,那就是你实际上能够预测这些事物的市场规模。
But there's a presumption in there, which is that you you you can actually predict market sizes on these things.
而这个问题在于,这种前提假设你可以根据当前市场中的动态来预测市场规模。
And the and the the problem with that, again, is this sort of this presumption that you could predict market sizes based on the dynamics that exist in the market today.
但如果供应端发生了根本性变化,出现了尚未存在的重大突破或全新能力,你就无法准确估算市场规模,因为你根本还看不到它。
But if there's a fundamental change on the supply side, if there's if there's a fundamental breakthrough, a fundamental capability that doesn't exist yet, you you're not gonna be able to accurately model the market size because you can't you can't see it yet.
就像,你改变了一个主要变量,而你却做不到这一点。
Like, you you you've changed one of the major variables, and you you you can't do that.
而且,你知道,你可以称之为信仰一跃之类的,但其实就是这样。
And, you know, and then then you can call that the leap of faith or whatever, but it's like, okay.
如果你改变了供应端,那么市场可能会一下子扩大十倍、一百倍甚至一千倍。
If you if you make the change in supply side, then all of a sudden, the market gets 10 or a 100 or a thousand times larger.
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你几乎不可能在投资时用数学方法验证这一点,但正是这一点让那些表现卓越的项目真正脱颖而出。
Like, you you can almost never validate that with math at the time of the investment, but that's the thing that makes the outperformers, you know, really go.
而且,我和本在职业生涯中看到越来越多的例子,发现我们或他人犯的错误是:哦,Uber和Lyft的市场一定就是出租车市场的规模。
And and I just I just think, like, as as Ben and I kinda go through our careers, we just see more and more examples where the mistakes that we or others make is, oh, this must be a you know, the markets for Uber and Lyft must be the market for taxi cabs.
对吧?
Right?
或者,你知道,市场啊。
Or, you know, the market yeah.
或者,云软件的市场一定和本地部署软件的市场一样大。
Or or the market for cloud software must be the same as the market for for for for on prem software.
对吧?
Right?
或者,或者市场
Or or there are Or the market
GPU的市场就是喜欢玩游戏的人的市场。
for GPUs must be the market for people who like to play games.
是的。
Yes.
没错。
Exactly.
我们不断看到一个又一个例子,当供应方出现足够重大的技术或产品变革时,就会解锁更大的市场。
And we just keep seeing example after example after example where the, significant enough technology change, product change on the supply side unlocks much larger markets.
我认为这将成为——坦白说,这将是未来三十年投资领域最主导的趋势。
And I and I think that's gonna be the I I mean, frankly, frankly, that's gonna be like the single, like, dominant trend in investing for, the next thirty years.
我觉得这将会极大地扩展开来。
I think that that's just gonna, like, telescope way out.
对。
Yeah.
我觉得这非常有趣。
I think it's it's so interesting.
对吧?
Right?
从技术角度来看,感觉你可以立即构建出会获胜的产品。
Because from a technology perspective, it feels like you can build products pretty immediately that are gonna win.
在这种情况下,16Z就变得更有意义了,因为所有这些其他因素都随之而来。
And then a 16 z starts to make a lot more sense in that context where it's like all of these other things.
你怎么进入市场?
It's how do you do go to market?
你怎么处理政策?
How do you do policy?
你如何为真正最好的技术尽快获胜创造条件?
Like how do you set the conditions for the actual best technology to win as quickly as possible?
你如何思考那里需要做的各种事情?
Like how do you think about all the different things that you do there?
这是正确的思考方式吗?
And is that the right way to think about it?
最好的技术应该获胜,而平台的作用就是确保这一点发生?
Like the best technology should win and the platform is there to make sure that that happens?
我们一直以来对这家公司的理解是,合伙人能为创业者提供什么,不仅能帮助他们确保成功,还能帮助他们按照自己想要的方式,与自己想合作的人,建立自己引以为豪的文化和公司。
You know, the way we always thought about the firm was what can a partner do for an entrepreneur that will not only help them ensure their success, but help them kind of build the company they want to build and the way they want to build it with the people they want to build it with, and the culture that they're proud of.
要做到这一点,涉及很多很多方面。
And to do that, there's many, many pieces.
其中很多部分,有些只是非常基础的问题,比如:你能在美利坚合众国开展业务吗?
And a lot of it know, some of it is just like very fundamental, like can you do your business in The United States Of America?
你能在全球范围内开展业务吗?
Can you do it in the world?
这就是政策所涉及的地方。
And so that's where the policy comes in.
这只是一个非常基本的问题。
It's just like a very basic question.
当然,如今政府对技术有着巨大的兴趣,因此这个问题是必不可少的。
And look, governments have a huge interest in technology these days, so it's a necessary one.
其他很多方面则关乎你如何从一个发明家转变为一名称职的首席执行官,这本质上是一场信心的博弈,姑且这么说吧——当你完全不知道自己在做什么时,要管理一家组织是非常困难的,而发明家一开始恰恰就是这样。
A lot of the other things come down to how do you go from being an inventor to being a competent CEO, and that really is a confidence game, for lack of a better word, and that it's very difficult to run an organization when you don't know what you're doing, which nobody does when they're an inventor.
你会收到大量的建议,而这些建议往往非常糟糕,几乎完全违背了你应该做的事情。
And you get tremendous amount of advice, and advice that's often extremely bad, and almost the opposite of what you should be doing.
真正亲手打造过东西的人寥寥无几,而且他们也没时间跟你聊天。
And there are very few, like the people who've actually built things don't have time to talk to.
他们通常都在埋头做事。
They're often away building things.
于是你就会遇到一些顾问和硅谷人士,告诉你如何经营公司、该雇谁、该做什么、不该做什么。
So, you get these advisors and Silicon Valley people who tell you how to run your company, who to hire, this and that and the other.
结果这些 advice 都被证明是错的,你就会陷入一种信心恶性循环。
And then those things turn out to be wrong, and you get into this confidence spiral.
因此,整个公司体系的设计就是为了让你进入一种良性信心循环,而不是恶性信心循环。
And so, the whole firm is built to put you in a kind of a virtuous confidence cycle as opposed to a vicious confidence cycle.
这意味着,我得联系那些很难约到的人,比如一位重要的首席执行官,或者我得招募一位顶尖工程师,或者我得弄清楚如何推广我的产品,或者我得接触政府里的重要人物。
And that means, oh, I need to call somebody who's hard to get to, like an important CEO, or like, you know, I've got to recruit a top end engineer, or I have to figure out how to market my product, or I have to get to somebody important in the government.
如果我能做到这些,我的信心就会增强。
If I can do that, my confidence builds.
如果我做不到,我的信心就会下降。
If I can't do that, my confidence sinks.
因此,一旦你有了信心,你就能更快地做出决策,更有效地建设公司,追求你真正想要的东西,并确信自己想要的才是正确的,而不是被耳边那些人——无论是CEO教练、风险投资人,还是其他什么人——悄悄灌输的想法所左右。
And so, then, once you're confident, you can make decisions faster, you can build the company more effectively, you can go for what you actually want, you can have confidence that, okay, what I want is the right thing, as opposed to what somebody's whispering in my ear, you know, who is whatever, a CEO coach or a VC or this or that or the other.
因此,整个公司旨在帮助这位发明家成长为CEO,自主经营公司,并通过能够与任何人建立联系,不仅在本地,更在全球留下自己的印记。
And so, the whole firm is designed to kind of enable that inventor to become a CEO and run their own company and put their mark not just locally, but in the world by being able to kind of network to anyone.
所以,这正是我们所专注的大部分内容。
And so, that's a lot of what we're about.
是的,我还想从宏观层面、外部视角补充一点。
Yeah, and I'd just add the sort of macro, you know, kind of outside in lines on that.
我们有机会与这些超级天才合作,但他们特别擅长的是打造产品、开发技术。
It just, like, you know, we we we we get to work with these, you know, super geniuses, but they're specifically, are super geniuses at building products, building technologies.
要成为技术领域的超级天才,通常意味着你已经在一个实验室里,或在屏幕前,坐了十年、二十年。
You know, to be a super genius at building technologies generally requires you to have been sitting in a lab or, you know, in front of a screen for, you know, ten or twenty years.
这些人都完全有能力理解整个世界的方方面面。
You know, they they just they they have they're they're you know, these folks are fully capable of understanding everything about the world at large.
他们只是还没做过而已。
They just haven't they just haven't done it yet.
他们只是还没走出去过。
They just they they just haven't been out.
他们还没接触过所有人,也没处理过现实世界中的各种问题。
They they haven't met all the people, they haven't dealt with all the issues in the real world.
因此,这导致了一种反复出现的、我称之为误解的情况。
And and so that that leads to this kind of recurring, you know, kind of, I would say, misimpression sometimes that that that that people have.
就好像,只要你做出了正确的产品,比如实现了突破性的某个X Y Z小工具,世界自然就会接受它。
It's just like, well, if you just if you build the right product, you know, if you build the breakthrough, whatever x y z widget, like, it's just the world is obviously gonna adopt it.
每个人都会使用它。
Everybody's gonna use it.
它显然会自然而然地适应各种需求。
It's it's just obviously gonna, you know, kinda suit things.
如果它没有成功,那答案就是产品还不够好。
And, you know, if it and, basically, if if it doesn't, the answer is the product's not good enough.
而且,你知道,这种说法也有点道理。
And, you know, there's there's a little bit of truth to that.
比如,显然产品越突破、越创新,就越容易获得自然的用户增长。
Like, obviously, the better the more breakthrough the product, you know, the more there'll just be organic traction.
但几乎所有人的实际经验,包括埃隆·马斯克在内,都是如此。
But what virtually everybody finds, you know, up up to and including Elon Musk.
对吧?
Right?
大家实际发现的是,现实世界真的非常庞大,而且极其混乱。
What what what everybody finds is the real world is just, like, really, really big and really, really messy.
对吧?
Right?
世界上有80亿人,他们的观点未必和你一致。
And there are, you know, 8,000,000,000 people out there with, like, opinions that are not necessarily, you know, your opinions.
而且,其中许多人对你的产品和公司的发展方向拥有真正的发言权,比如是否有人购买你的产品,以及所有那些影响结果的未知因素——人们会以各种方式试图阻碍你的事业。
And, you know, many of them have a real vote as to what is gonna happen with your product and with your company, you know, including whether anybody buys, you know, your thing or, you know, all of the x factors that kick in, you know, to all the different ways that, you know, people are gonna come and try to, you know, cripple what you're doing.
或者,你知道,甚至更糟的是,干脆无视你。
Or or, you know, or or maybe even worse than that, you know, just ignore you.
对吧?
Right?
所以,这个世界上真的有一个非常庞大的世界。
And so there is this there there is this just there is this really big world out there.
它非常复杂。
It's really complicated.
它非常混乱。
It's really messy.
它并不一定支持新想法。
It's not necessarily in favor of new ideas.
在许多情况下,它非常不喜欢新想法,甚至想拒绝它们。
In many cases, it really, really doesn't like them and wants to reject them.
这其中确实需要一种真正的艺术与科学,你知道,是的。
And there there are there's real art and science, you know, to yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
正如本所提到的,围绕产品和创始人构建公司,使创始人能够将突破性成果成功推向世界。
To to Ben's point, to building the company around the product and the founder to be able to take the breakthrough and be able to take it successfully into into the world.
据我所知,这个过程正变得越来越复杂和棘手。
And and as far as we can tell, like, as far as I can tell, like, that that process is getting, you know, hairier and more complicated over time.
对吧?
Right?
这并没有变得更容易。
It's it's not getting easier.
反而看起来变得明显更困难了。
It's it's seems like it's actually getting significantly harder.
因此,这正是我们公司致力于解决的核心问题之一。
And so, yeah, that's that's a big part of what the what the firm is built to Yeah.
它真正帮助创始人应对并克服这些挑战。
It's really helped founders, you work through that.
马克过去曾提到过一件事,非常真实:作为发明家,你追求的是力量,一种动力的提升。
And one of the things that that that Mark said in the past, which is really true, is, like, look, as a as an inventor, you're looking for power, like a power boost.
那么,我该如何从一个平凡的自己和我的发明,变成这个领域里举足轻重的公司,能够积累势能,吸引顶尖工程师,更快地获得客户,从而形成滚雪球效应,一路顺势而下?
So how do I go from little old me with my invention to, like, I'm the important company in the space in the world, I can build momentum, I can get the best engineers, I can get the customers faster, and that turns into a snowball and I'm rolling downhill.
因此,整个公司就是设计成一个强大的实体,你可以直接借助它,利用我们的品牌、人脉和专业能力,迅速变得极其强大。
And so, the whole firm is designed as like a very powerful entity that you can just tap into and, you know, take our brand, take our connections, take our expertise, and become extremely powerful very fast.
是的。
Yeah.
顺便说一句,这正是长期以来人们对我们感到困惑的问题的答案:哇。
And by the way, this this this, you know, this this is the solution to puzzle that people have had about us for a long time, which is, wow.
这些人看起来好像特别爱宣传。
It seems like those guys are, like, you know, awfully promotional.
你知道,他们总是做各种营销工作。
You know, they're they're, you know, they're they're, you know, they do all this marketing stuff.
他们还做各种政治性的事情。
They, you know, they're doing all this politics stuff.
你知道,他们这么做一定是出于虚荣心。
You know, they they must be doing this for ego reasons.
他们一定特别自我膨胀。
They must be really fall themselves.
你知道,这一定是为了证明自己有多厉害。
You know, this must be about, know so much shit.
触及了某些东西,整个事情就是这样。
Touched certain shit like the whole thing.
至少,也许也许也许,我们可能说得太多废话了。
And at least, you know, for maybe, maybe, maybe, maybe it's possible possible we talk too much shit.
我会来评判这一点。
I'll judge that.
时不时地,也许吧。
From time to time, maybe.
然而,从一开始,建立主导性风险投资品牌的目标,就是为了在公司发展的最关键时刻,让它们能够借用我们的影响力,从而借助我们的全球力量作为弹射器,来构建自己的力量。
However, however, from the beginning, the goal was to build the the purpose purpose of of building building the the dominant venture brand was precisely to be able to have the companies be able to borrow that as at the most critical points in their development so that the companies can can can kinda use use use our force in the world as a slingshot to basically build their own force.
而且我觉得这效果非常好,所以我们不会退缩,不会回避这些事情。
And and I think that's worked really well, that's why we don't, you know, shrink back a lot of these things.
是的。
Yeah.
我想插一句话,然后马上回到这个话题上。
I I wanted, like, just squeeze something in and then get right back on this conversation.
说太多闲话真的很有趣,但我真的很喜欢这一点。
Talking too much shit is so interesting, but I really love it.
我刚开始和加密团队合作时,最让我印象深刻的是,他们从不在个人层面接受负面评价,从不诋毁任何技术、创始人或公司——你该怎么训练出这种态度?
Think the thing that impressed me the most when I started working with the crypto team was seeing never take the negative in person and, like, never talk shit on a technology, never talk shit on a founder, never talk shit on a company, like, how do you even train for that?
因为这真的、真的让我印象深刻。
Because that really, really impressed
我们就是这么训练的。
Well, we train for that.
我们就是这么训练的。
We train for that.
所以我们有一个成文的文化,任何人要想加入公司,都必须签署这份文化文件,承诺遵守这一文化。
So, we have a culture that is written culture that you cannot join the firm unless you sign document, the culture document, and says you will adhere to this culture.
然后你必须花一小时和我一起深入了解这种文化。
And then you must sit through one hour with me understanding the culture.
从根本上说,我们的核心理念是:如果你希望做超越自我的事,让世界变得更好,我们百分之百支持。
And fundamentally on that, our whole point is if you want to do something larger than yourselves and make the world a better place, we are 100% for it.
而我们根本不关心。
And we do not care.
比如,如果在当下我们认为你犯了错误,或者觉得你的想法不够好,这无关紧要——无论我们是否投资你。
You know, like if in the moment we think you're making a mistake or like the idea isn't good enough, and it doesn't matter if we invest in you or don't invest in you.
我们支持你这么做。
We're for that.
我们是梦想的建设者。
We are dream builders.
我们不是梦想的毁灭者。
We're not dream killers.
我们来这里不是为了当那种自以为是的分析达人,靠贬低别人来抬高自己。
We're not here to be like the analytical smarty pants who makes ourselves look smart by making somebody else look stupid.
这正是我们看待世界的根本方式。
And that's just that's fundamental to how we think about the world.
所以,任何试图推动世界进步、让它变得更好的人——无论我们是否认同他们的方法,我们都支持。
So, like, anybody who's trying to push the world forward and make it better, like, whether we agree with their method or not, like, we're for it.
因此,在你加入之前,我们只是要求你认同这个理念。
And so, we just ask you to sign up to that idea before you ever join.
凯瑟琳说,我们认为未来,并以这种方式押注公司,这应该是文化文件中的首要价值观。
Catherine said that, you know, we believe in the future and bet the firm that way should actually be the number one kind of value in culture doc.
顺便说一句,那是马克的主意。
By the way, was Mark's.
你知道,措辞是我写的,所以我给自己一点功劳。
You know, I did the wording, so I give myself a little credit.
但那是马克的想法。
But that was Mark's
理念。
idea.
做
Do
你认为这在实践中应该是第一位的吗?
you think that should be number do you think that is number one in practice?
你认为以一流的方式经营一流的企业是吗?
Do you think first class business in a first class way is?
如果你今天重写这份文件,公司里最重要的东西是什么?
Like, if you were to rewrite the doc today, what is the most important thing in firm?
我的意思是,文化文件列出了七件事,你知道的,而文化远不止这些。
Well, I mean, the culture document is seven things that, you know, and the culture is more than that.
每种文化都远不止七个理念和七组行为。
Every culture is more than seven ideas and kind of seven sets of behaviors.
但这七项是我们真正期望每个人践行的。
But those are the ones that, all seven of them, that we really expect everybody to live to.
所以,我不确定是否要按某种顺序排名,因为它们都是相互关联的。
So, don't know if I rank them in that sense, because they all go together.
它们是一个整体的一部分。
They're part of a single thing.
所以,我们相信未来,意味着我们相信那些创造未来的人,也就是说,我们不会批评他们,也就是说,我们不会站在对立面去攻击他们。
So, know, we believe in the future, means that we believe in the people who build the future, which means we're not going to criticize them, which means, you know, we're not going be on the attack side of that.
我们永远不会攻击未来。
We're never going to attack the future.
我们会努力去创造,当然,我们在构建未来的过程中会遇到问题,但我们会尽力打造最好的未来。
We're going to try and make, you know, there are going to be problems with how we build the future, but we're going to try and make it the best future we can.
我们不会试图活在过去。
We're not going to try and live in the past.
如果你一直攻击创业者,就做不到这一点。
And so, can't do that if you're attacking entrepreneurs all the time.
如果你去见试图创业的人时迟到了一小时,也做不到这一点。
You can't do that if you show up an hour late to meet with somebody who's trying to build a company.
你不能做这种事。
You can't do those kinds of things.
所以,我认为文化的一部分在于支持我们想要创造一个更美好的未来。
And so, part of the culture, I think, is in support of, we want to build a better future.
这就是我们在这里的原因。
Like, is, that's why we're here.
哈伯在他的文章《公司大于基金》中提到,公司是致力于构建复利型竞争优势的实体。
Haber, in his piece, Firm Kinda Greater Than Fund, talks about, you know, a firm is something that tries to build a compounding competitive advantage.
他举了阿波罗和高盛各自的一个例子。
And he points to one thing for Apollo, one thing for Goldman.
如果你必须选一个,你在积累的是什么?
If you had to pick a thing, what are you compounding?
你认为在这里,你长期构建的竞争优势是什么?
Like, what is the competitive advantage that you're you're building over time, you think here?
声誉。
Reputation.
声誉。
Reputation.
从我们创立公司那天起,韦马克和我就一直在讨论这一点。
Way Mark and I talked about that from the day we started the firm.
顺便说一句,曾经有一段时间,我们觉得我们在声誉上投入了太多,但确实花了很长时间,不过这正是我们竞争的核心。
And and by by the way, there were times when it was like, well, we're investing an awful lot in reputation, and, you know, it's taken a while, but it is that's what we compete on.
当我们跟创业者交谈,他们把我们和其他公司做比较时,我们会说:去找那些同时接受过这两家机构投资的创业者,听听他们怎么说。
Like, when we talk to an entrepreneur and they're comparing us to another firm, we say, Find an entrepreneur that's taken investment from both firms, see what they say.
这对我们来说就是对所有问题的回答。
Like, that's our answer to everything.
我们打造声誉。
We build reputation.
每一个关系都很重要。
Every relationship matters.
我们接触的每一个人,我们都尽量接触尽可能多的人,并以最优秀的方式去代表自己,长期积累声誉,这种声誉会在创业者之间、在各个行业、各个领域、从政府人员到我们未投资的公司中不断复利增长——任何在科技领域的人,我们都希望他们了解我们,并认为我们是与之合作的最佳公司。
Everybody who we touch, we try and touch as many people as we can, and we try and represent in the very, very best way possible to build reputation over time, and that compounds and compounds and compounds across entrepreneurs, across industries, across sectors, across everybody from people in the government to people in companies that we don't invest in, anybody who is anywhere in the world of technology, we want them to know us, and we want them to think of us as the best firm to do business with.
是的。
Yeah.
然后,这自然会从我们传递到投资组合公司。
And then that and then that transfers, of course, that that transfers from from us, that transfers to the portfolio companies.
对吧?
Right?
所以,这正是我们的目标:当一家公司接受我们的投资时,他们实际上可以利用我们的声誉,帮助自己度过关键的成长阶段——无论是面对潜在客户、招聘人才、后续投资者、监管机构,还是外部社会中的各种力量。
So the which is the goal of it, which is that then as a consequence, when a when a company takes investment from us, now they they're basically able to use our reputation to get themselves through the it's through those those those, you know, kinda key growth phases with, you know, with with potential customers and with recruits and with downstream investors and with, you know, regulators and with, you know, all all these different, you know, forces in the external society.
因此,声誉的回报不仅体现在我们自身,更体现在我们的投资组合公司因此能够实现的成果上。
So the the the the reputation pays off not just for us, but it pays off in the form of, what our what our portfolio companies are able to do as a result.
既然你已经从事这项工作十六、十七年了,那么在建立和传递声誉的过程中,你有没有学到一些并不显而易见的经验?
So having done this for sixteen, seventeen years, like, are are there things about building and transferring reputation that you've learned that are not obvious?
因为对我来说,这几乎就像一块电池。
Because to to me, like, it would almost seem that it's a battery.
如果你把声誉给了某一家公司,而它搞砸了,整个声誉体系就可能崩塌。
And if you give it to one company that messes it up, then the whole thing kind of falls apart.
但事实上,这可能就像爱一样,其实特别廉价。
But actually, maybe it's like love to be, like, super cheap.
你给予得越多,它就越增长。
Like, it just grows the more you give it.
你还有没有其他类似这样的发现?
Are there other things like that that that you've learned?
嗯,我认为这个洞察是正确的,因为你知道,一个错误的影响力远大于一次善举。
Well, look, I do think that that's a correct insight in that, you know, one mistake is much more powerful than, you know, one good deed.
所以,如果公司里有一个人行为粗鲁、对创业者撒谎,或者做类似的事情,造成的损害远超过你正确做事五次或十次所能弥补的,因此你必须对此保持高度警惕,绝不能容忍这种行为。
So, you know, one person being obnoxious who's in the firm or lying to an entrepreneur or doing something like that causes much more damage than you can do by doing that correctly, you know, five or 10 times, which is why you have to be so vigilant about it, like you cannot tolerate that kind of behavior.
但我认为我学到的最重要的一点是,建立声誉需要很长时间,但一旦建立起来,它就是最强大的资产。
But I think that the biggest thing that I've learned is it takes a long time to build a reputation, but once you do, it's the most powerful thing.
它真的会不断积累放大。
It really does compound.
举个例子,当马克和我筹措第一支基金时,那是一支3亿美元的基金。
And just to give you an example, look, when Mark and I raised Fund One, it was a $300,000,000 fund.
我觉得筹集资金花了大约六个月。
I think it took about six months to raise.
我们开了很多会。
We had a lot of meetings.
我都数不清开了多少次会议。
I can't count how many meetings.
有些人对我们不太好,就像特朗普可能会说的那样。
Some people did not treat us very well, as Trump might say.
他们根本没好好待我。
They didn't treat me well at all.
非常差劲。
Very badly.
这次募资,当我们实际完成基金募集时,金额是150亿美元,我认为马克做了一次AMA,我也做了一次AMA,我不记得自己还参加了其他任何关于这次募资的会议,整个过程完全依靠声誉完成,这真是巨大的变化,你知道的。
And, you know, this raise, which was $15,000,000,000 when we actually raised the fund, I think Mark did one AMA and I did one AMA, and I don't know that I took another meeting on this fundraise, and it was done on the reputation, and so, that's a heck of a change, you know.
而且说实话,我们并不是不经常和投资者交流,我的意思是,我一直在全球各地建立关系等等,但当我们真正去寻求资金时,完全是依靠声誉完成的。
And look, a lot of not that we don't we talk to our investors all the time, I mean, I've been all around the world building relationships and so forth, but when we came to ask for money, it was raised entirely on the reputation.
我认为,帕基,外部环境已经发生了巨大的变化。
I think, Paki, I think the external environment has changed, you know, enormously.
所以,我们和你以及许多其他人一样,亲身经历了这一切。
And so, you know, we've we've lived this, you know, as you have and many others.
我们见证了这一巨大的转变:科技如今比2009年我们起步时要大得多、也重要得多,同时,全世界对科技的参与度也达到了前所未有的水平。
We've, know, this incredible transformation where tech both is, like, much, much, much larger and more central now than it was in 2009 when we started, but also, you know, the the level of, let's just say, engagement on the on the part of the world.
攻击的强度——无论是来自批评、质疑,还是对社会影响的正当性问题——都达到了极高的程度。
Attack is, you know, the the level of intensity on everything from, you know, you know, attacks, you know, criticism, you know, by the way, you know, completely justifiable questions, you know, impact on society.
这种强度,说实话,我也不知道该怎么形容。
You know, the the the the intensity level is, you know, I don't know.
这简直像是十六年前的一千倍。
It's like I don't know, it's like a thousand x of what it was sixteen years ago.
所以,我认为,对你提出的问题,我们确实在这两方面都努力应对了。
And so I I think, yeah, you know, I think to your question, I think we've we've really tried to kinda rise to that on both sides.
我们正竭尽全力帮助这些公司达到以前没人敢想的规模。
Like, we're really trying to help these, you know, these companies get to levels of of scale that nobody ever thought was possible before.
但与此同时,我们也在努力帮助他们应对前几代创业者通常不必面对的压力。
But at the same time, trying to help them deal with pressures that previous generations of founders, you
你知道,一般不需要应对的压力。
know, generally didn't have to deal with.
是的。
Yeah.
你似乎独特地——可能是我认识的人中唯一一个——享受参与这些对话的过程。
You seem like you uniquely, maybe of anybody that I know, have fun taking you know, engaging in these conversations.
我在文章中稍微提到了这一点,但就是从局外人的角度来观察这种情况。
And I wrote about it a little bit in the piece, but, kinda stepping outside the situation and viewing it.
我的意思是,在这些情况下,你脑子里在想些什么?
I don't Like, what goes on in your head in these situations?
就像,你真的有看起来那么享受吗?
Like, are you having as much fun as it looks like?
承受这些攻击,会不会对你造成压力?
Does it take a toll ever kind of, like, taking the arrows?
在这种情况下,感觉是什么样的?
What does it feel like in these?
是的,本,你来说吧,本会给出一个理性的回答。
Yeah, Ben, why don't you yeah, Ben will give the rational response.
我会
I'll
我会说
I would say
我的意思是
it's I mean,
有时会很情绪化,因为你了解打造这些东西背后付出的努力,了解建设者们的初衷,也知道它们对世界产生的影响,而当这些攻击以人身攻击等形式出现时,你就会感到无奈,现在人人都以为马克是犹太人。
gets emotional from time to time, right, because you know what goes into building these things, and you know the intentions of the people building them, and you know, like, the kind of impact they have on the world, and then to just get, like you know, and a lot of the attacks tend to be in the form of character assassinations and so forth, and now everybody thinks Mark's Jewish.
只是为了能更方便地攻击他,结果人们似乎特别喜欢攻击犹太人,
You know, just so they can attack him more, it turns out people love to attack Jewish people,
是的。
Yeah.
所以我现在介绍自己为是的。
And so I I now introduce myself as Yeah.
我确实把它写在我的推特简介里。
I did have it in my Twitter bio.
我确实把它写在我的推特简介里。
I did have it my Twitter bio.
我的真名是安迪·霍罗维茨,我是犹太人,但我把它删了。
My real name is Andy is is Andy Horowitz, but, and I am Jewish, but I I took it down.
是的。
Yeah.
但我想说,能身处这一切的核心,简直是一种了不起的荣幸。
But I I would say mostly it's just like an amazing thing, an amazing privilege to kind of be in the center of it all.
而且,你知道,随之而来的责任是你必须努力引导世界走向正确的方向。
And, you know, like, and then the responsibility that goes with it that you have to kind of try and help drive the world to the right answer.
但说它是不是‘有趣’我不确定,但它确实很特别。
But, like it's I don't know if fun is the right word, but like it's special.
我们处于一个非常特殊的位置,我认为我们两人都尽力认真对待,并且明白事情会发生,我们会就如何应对某些事情、如何不应对某些事情、哪些问题我们可以表态、哪些问题我们不应该表态进行非常长时间的讨论。
It's like we've gotten to a very special position, and I think both of us try and take it as seriously as we can, and know, like things happen, and we have very, very long discussions about how we should react to certain things, how we should not react to certain things, what we can take a position on, what we shouldn't take a position on.
而且,能在这个人生阶段谈论这些,而不是像我们当年打造Netscape或Opsware时必须讨论的问题,这真是太棒了。
And, just to just to begin at this stage of life to be able to be talking about that as opposed to the things that we had to talk about when we were building Netscape or Opsware, like it's amazing.
我知道我 definitely 想交换它。
You know, I definitely want trade it.
而且,到目前为止我们已经被批评得太多了,有趣的是,这反而让公司内部的人比马克或我更在意。
And look, we've been criticized so much at this point that like it bothers interestingly, which I never thought I'd see, it kind of bothers people inside the firm much more than it bothers Mark or me.
当然。
Sure.
而且我目前正在为自己的成年礼学习。
And and I am just on the record studying for my bar mitzvahs.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
一半的托拉。
The half Torah.
你需要学习你那一半托拉的吟诵调。
You you need to learn your your half Torah tropes.
是的。
Yeah.
怎么
How
在这一点上,你们如何避免变成一家大公司?
do you avoid at this point becoming a big company?
比如,如何避免成为一个庞大的组织。
Like, is becoming a big organization.
你们如何避免变成一家大公司?
How do you avoid being a big company?
谷歌就希望避免这种情况。
Google wanted to avoid that.
比如,每个人都想避免这种情况。
Like, everyone wants to avoid that.
你到底该怎么做到这一点呢?
How do you actually do that?
是的。
Yeah.
所以,我认为这很大程度上是组织设计的问题。
So, think a lot of that is organizational design.
我的意思是,如果你看看那些很长时间都不像大公司的企业,它们在组织架构上都有着非常、非常、非常周密的设计。
I mean, So, if you look at the companies that didn't feel like big companies for a long time, they had very, very, very thoughtful design to the organization.
如果你看看那个团队——加密团队、基础设施团队、应用团队或美国活力团队——它们都感觉像小公司。
If you look at the firm, the crypto group or the infra group or the apps group or the American Dynamism group, they all feel like small companies.
它们是规模较小的公司,但拥有特定类型的支持,比如品牌、融资和其他方面的支持。
And they're smaller companies with a very specific kind of support know, in terms of the brand, in terms of fundraising and other kinds of things.
但融资团队是一个小团队,每个小组都与其他小组高度自治。
But the fundraising team is a small group, and every group is very autonomous from every other group.
比如,存在一些整合点,但都非常简单。
Like, there's integration points, but they're very simple.
因此,大部分情况下,有些比其他的更复杂。
And so, for the most part, there's some that are more complicated than others.
所以,你知道,小地方的美妙之处就在于你能把事情直接办成。
And so, you know, that's what makes it, you know, the beauty of a small place is you can just get shit done.
大机构的好处是你非常有力量,所以我们试图将这两者结合起来。
The beauty of a big place is you're very powerful, and so we try and kind of blend those two.
这花了很多时间,马克和我借鉴了很多东西。
Took a lot Mark and I borrowed a lot.
早期,我们深入研究了惠普,也就是在电脑业务吞噬公司之前最初的惠普,它和我们非常相似。
Early on, we really studied Hewlett Packard, which the original Hewlett Packard, before the computer business kind of swallowed the company was very much like us.
它们就像是公司内部的一系列独立公司,这和我们的模式很像。
They were like a series of companies inside a company, and that's a lot how we are.
你们如何筛选普通合伙人?
How do you vet GPs?
或者看起来,如果整个体系建立在声誉之上,你就必须对负责各个团队的人抱有极大的信任,同时你还得依靠这种去中心化的团队结构来实现规模化。
Or like it seems like you have to put a lot of trust in the people that are running the different teams if the whole thing is reputation but you need to be able to scale by having these kind of decentralized teams.
你们有没有什么独特甚至有点古怪的做法,来确保没有任何一个团队会污染整个体系?
Is there anything that you do there that's that's unique or or weird, that ensures that kind of like no one group can infect the whole?
我认为,首先,要领导其中一个团队,你必须在这里待过很长时间并表现出色,这是最基本的前提。
I think, look, first of all, in order to lead one of those groups, you just have to have been here and performed for a long time, so that's kind of the first thing.
所以我们对你非常了解。
So, we just know you extremely well.
我们不会从外部招聘人来担任这个职位,你不可能从外面直接得到这个职位。
We're not interviewing people for that job from the outside, like you can't get that job from the outside.
然后,由于我们的文化与其他风险投资公司截然不同——无论好坏——我们就是不一样,所以我们现在几乎不再从外部招聘普通合伙人了。
And then, you know, would say because our culture is so different than other venture firms, for better or worse, we're just different, that we don't hire a lot of outside GPs anymore.
我们通常会尝试在人们职业生涯的早期阶段就招募他们,然后逐步培养他们适应我们的模式,总的来说,这种方式对我们来说要好得多。
We generally try to hire people at an earlier stage of their career and kind of grow them into what we do, and that's worked much, much better for us, I would say, in general.
尽管我们所有人,最初那批人,都曾经是从外部加入的。
Although we had, like, all of us came from the outside at one point of the original cast.
这说得通。
That makes sense.
马克,我们快说完了,你曾经说过风险投资会是世界上最后的工作,我记得你因此被批评过。
Kind of winding down here, Mark, you said that, I I think you got shit at one point for saying the VC was gonna be the last job in in the world.
你知道,如果你相信的未来愿景是正确的,而这个机构能延续一个世纪,那么一百年后的16Z会是什么样子、做什么呢?
You know, if you if the vision of the future that you believe is true and this is gonna be an institution that that lasts for a century, like, what does a 16 z look like and do a century from now?
对。
Right.
是的。
Yeah.
所以我想先说,我可能被误引了。
So I'll start with I I believe I was misquoted.
我认为那只是其中一个假设性的思想实验,结果被过度引申了,但我想我不该只为自己辩护。
I I believe we it was a it was one of these, hypothetical, thought experiment things that, kinda got got, overly, extrapolated, but, I I guess I shouldn't just, defend myself.
所以,我当时在那场讨论中想表达的重点是,如果你找来原始对话,会发现那是一场更长的讨论。
So I the point of what I was trying to get across in that discussion, which we you know, I'd say I think if you pulled the original, it's it's a longer form discussion on it.
这其实回到了本早前说过的观点,那就是历史上存在一种反复出现的模式。
I it is goes back to what what Ben said early on, which is there is this repeating pat pattern in history.
我的意思是,我们肯定能追溯到五百年前的例子,这种模式就是:一个怀有梦想、具备深厚领域知识的人,在一个收益不对称的领域中行动,也就是说,风险与回报并存——顺便说一句,这个梦想也可能是错的。
I mean, we we can find examples of it for sure going back five hundred years, is this repeating pattern, which is basically a person with a dream, a person with a deep level domain knowledge and a dream, operating in a domain with asymmetric payoff, right, with with risk and reward where, you know by the way, the the dream may be wrong.
我可以说,他们可能无法实现这件事,但如果他们做到了,回报将不成比例地巨大。
I'd say they may not be able to do the thing, but if they can do the thing, it will it will have disproportionately high returns.
你知道,传统机构——人们通常去那里寻求支持和资金来实现梦想、推动新项目——却往往拒绝,因为银行无法为一项有50%概率获得十倍回报、同时有50%概率失败的项目提供贷款。
You know, the traditional institutional, you know, places people go to get support and funding, you know, for the dream, you know, for for for for new projects, just turn it down because, you know, a bank can't finance you know, a bank a bank can't issue a loan against something with a 50%, you know, 50% chance of a 10 x and 50% chance of failure.
银行根本无法承销这种风险。
Like, bank just can't underwrite that.
所以银行不会这么做。
So a bank won't do that.
大公司,绝大多数情况下,也不会这么做。
Big companies, you know, for the most part won't do that.
几乎没人会这么做。
You know, almost nobody will do that.
但有人怀揣着梦想。
But but somebody has a dream.
当这些梦想成真时,尤其是当你构建了一个包含这些梦想和人物的投资组合时,其预期价值将会非常高。
And then and, you know, when the dream works and especially if you construct a portfolio of those dreams and of those people, you know, then the expected, you know, value on that is is gonna be very high.
这是一件非常特别的事情。
Like like, that's a very special thing.
我曾与泰勒·科恩进行过长时间的对话,他对这一点有着非常深入的思考。
I I've had long conversations with Tyler Cohen, who's very particularly, is very thoughtful on this.
我想他们用的那个术语,我记不清确切的说法了。
And I guess the term, Forget the exact exact term they use.
这有点像是人才筛选者、项目筛选者的结合体,就像我们之前谈到的市场规模那样。
It's like it's it's like some combination of talent picker, project picker, and it's it's this thing, you know, it's like we're talking about earlier about market size.
这是一种既有分析性和科学性,又带有艺术性的行为,因为你在处理人类最原始层面的东西,尤其是在做一件前所未有的事情的早期阶段。
It's this thing where, like, there is an analytical scientific component to it, but there's also, like, an art to it, and there's there's there's some intangible because you're you're dealing with human beings at a very kind of primordial level, you know, kind of it it you know, kind of very early in the process of doing something that hasn't been done before.
坦白说,早期的一个例子就是伊莎贝拉女王资助了哥伦布。
And, you know, quite honestly, like, you know, an early example of this was, you know, Queen Isabella with Christopher Columbus.
对吧?
Right?
我只是在想象那个提案的情景。
And I I was just, I was just I was trying to picture the pitch.
对吧?
Right?
你知道,哥伦布出现了。
You know, Christopher Columbus rolls in.
对吧?
Right?
他说,好吧。
And he's like, you know, alright.
你看,我要找到一条新航线。
You know, here's you know, I'm gonna find a new route.
我们要走通往印度的路线。
You know, we're gonna route to India.
顺便说一下,你知道,大概有百分之五十到六十的概率,你再也听不到我的消息了。
By the way, you know, there's, like, I don't know, whatever, fifty, sixty percent chance that, you know, you'll never hear from me again.
而且,你知道,也许我已经在离西班牙两千英里远的地方去世了。
And, you know, you know, may you know, maybe maybe I've, you know, died 2,000 miles away from Spain.
也许,顺便说一下,我只是带着钱逃跑了。
Maybe I may by the way, maybe I just, like, ran away with money.
那时候又没有国际刑警组织。
It's not like they had Interpol in those days.
是的。
Yeah.
我要去干这件事。
And I'm gonna go do that.
然后,顺便说一下,那个赌注赢了,这事儿,不,不是这样的。
And then and then by the way, the the fact that that bet paid off, like, that that that's, like, it No.
不。
No.
整个想法都是错的。
The whole idea was wrong.
是的。
Yeah.
等等。
Wait.
但整个想法都是错的。
But the whole the whole idea was wrong.
我的意思是,整个想法都是错的。
I mean, the whole idea was wrong.
他发现了一个完全不同的大陆,但他自己却不相信他发现了一个完全不同的大陆。
He discovered a completely different continent, and he himself did not believe that he had discovered a completely different continent.
对吧?
Right?
而且我甚至不知道,这种痛苦在长远来看才是最大的受益者。
And I don't even know this pain was the main beneficiary of that in the long run.
对吧?
Right?
就像那样,但是,你知道的,她资助了它,哇。
Like so, like but, like, you know, like, she funded it and, wow.
对吧?
Right?
然后还有很多是的。
And then there's there's a lot of Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
没错。
Exactly.
对。
Yes.
他们确实发现了一些黄金。
They they did they did find some gold.
顺便说一下,有一个非常类似的故事,清教徒们有普利茅斯岩、整个那套东西、五月花号,他们也有一个非常类似的故事。
In a very similar story, by the way, the Puritans have a the, you know, the Plymouth Rock, the that whole thing, the Mayflower, they have a very similar story, to that.
我认为,筹集资金、完成五月花号远征花了二十年时间,他们需要像那样的赞助人。
It took, I think, twenty years to raise the financing, to be able to make the, make the Mayflower Expedition, and they needed they needed, you know, backers like that.
你知道,我们现在总在谈论冒险产业,四百年前的捕鲸产业。
You know, that we we always talk now about, you know, adventure industry, you know, the whaling industry four hundred years ago.
你知道,它的运作方式非常相似。
You know, it operated in a very similar way.
电影产业一直都是这样运作的。
The the movie industry has always worked this way.
图书出版业也一直都是这样运作的。
The book publishing industry has always worked this way.
顺便说一下,政治一直以来都是这样运作的,政治竞选就是这样,你知道,任何一位未来的总统最初都是不被看好的。
By the way, politics has always, you know, worked political campaigns work this way that, you know, any any any new, you know, future president starts out as a long shot.
有人会押注于他们。
Somebody bets on them.
因此,有一种难以言喻的东西,涉及到对那些结果高度不确定、失败率很高的长期投资做出押注。
And so there there's there's this intangible that has to do with making making these long dated bets with very uncertain outcomes and with high failure rates.
我的意思是,如果确实如此的话。
And, I mean, like, if yes.
我想我在原始访谈中说的是,你看。
Like, I think what I said in the original interview is, like, look.
如果我们让人工智能来做这件事,那就祝它好运吧。
If we're have AI do that, like, god bless.
我要去海滩放松了,一切都没问题。
Like, I'm gonna, like, I'm gonna hit the beach and, like, it's all good.
但你知道,我想我或许可以提出以下观点。
But, you know, like, I I guess maybe make the following claim.
你看,本,你怎么看这个:随着时间推移,那些无形的东西似乎变得越来越重要,而不是越来越不重要。
See see, Ben, what you think of this, the intangibles seem to be becoming more important, not less important over time.
随着时代发展,这似乎正越来越像一门艺术,而越来越不像一门科学。
It seems to be becoming more like an art and less like a science as we go.
你同意这一点吗?
Would you agree with that?
我 definitely 认为这是对的,因为历史并不是一个好的指南。
I definitely think that's right because history is a bad guide.
对我来说,风险投资最有趣的点,也是最重要的教训是,你必须对高度训练的神经网络保持警惕,因为正是在这种情况下你会犯错,因为情况在变化。
The interesting thing about VC for me, probably the biggest lesson is you've to be very careful about a highly trained neural net, because that's when you make mistakes, because things change.
我会说,变化的速度更快了。
And I would say things have changed more rapidly.
我们从未想过会永远消失的东西,就是‘人月神话’。
Like, the thing that we never thought would ever, ever, ever go away is the mythical man month.
九个女人不能在一个月内生出一个孩子。
Nine women can't have a baby in a month.
但有了人工智能,你就可以做到。
Well, with AI, you can.
软件。
Software.
这是对软件的一种隐喻。
It's a metaphor for software.
这是对软件的一种隐喻。
It's a metaphor for software.
是的,正是如此。
Yes, exactly.
抱歉,抱歉,抱歉。
Sorry, sorry, sorry.
在过去,无论你往团队里加多少工程师,结果往往是人越多,项目反而越慢,而不是更快。
So, in the old days, right, like, no matter how many engineers you put on a team, you still, you know, more engineers would actually slow down the project as opposed to speed it up.
现在,你不能再用钱来解决一个问题了。
Now, so you couldn't throw money at a problem.
你不能再用钱来追赶别人的科技优势。
You couldn't throw money at somebody's technological lead.
你必须采取不同的做法。
You'd have to do something different.
现在,你可以砸钱进去。
Now, you can throw money at it.
你知道,埃隆在基础模型问题上大手笔投入,很快就赶了上来。
Know, Elon did an amazing job of throwing money at the foundation model problem, and he caught up very, very fast.
这在我们整个行业历史上是以前从未发生过的事。
And that's something that in the whole history of our industry could never have happened before.
所以,如果你问人工智能,埃隆有没有可能追上OpenAI或Anthropic,它们会说:绝无可能。
So, if you had asked an AI if Elon had any prayer of catching OpenAI or Anthropic, they would have said, No way.
所以,你现在开始进入这样的情况——我的意思是,也许如果人工智能足够聪明,我猜是这样,但很多情况下,这取决于你对这个人有多信任。
And so, that's where you're getting into, I mean, maybe if the AI was smart enough, I suppose, but like there are these, a lot of it has to do with like how much do you believe in the person.
是的,另一部分是我们之前讨论过的,那就是漫长而曲折的道路,你知道,投资只是开始,对吧?
Yeah, and the other part is what we talked about already, but it's the long and twisting path, you know, investment's just the beginning, Right?
而这条漫长而曲折的道路,是这个人或这家公司随着时间推移所走过的,以及我们尝试帮助他们成功的各种方式。
And it's the long and twisting path that that person, that company take over time, and all the different ways that we, you know, we try to try to help them succeed.
所以我认为,是的。
And so I I think that yeah.
我,嗯,
I yeah.
是的。
Yes.
是的。
Yes.
我不知道怎么让AI做到这一切,但也许我们最终会找到办法。
I I don't know how to have AI do all that, but maybe maybe we'll figure out.
是的。
Yeah.
你可以想象一个能完成所有这些事情的AI,当然可以。
You you could imagine an AI who could do it all, of course.
如果一个AI在每件事上都像人类一样聪明,包括理解人类心理学,那当然有可能。
If an AI was smart at a human at about every single thing, including human psychology, then certainly.
有可能。
Could be.
等等。
Wait.
你负责训练这个AI。
You're you're you're tasked with training this AI.
比如,你在这一过程中学到了哪些可以言说的东西?
Like, what are the things that you've learned on this art that you can put into words?
比如,如果真是这样——这是我能想到的最乐观的未来图景——工具正在变得更好,但人的部分真的、真的很重要。
Like, if it is, and this is the most optimistic view of the future I can think of, the tools are getting better, but the human piece really, really matters.
比如,你从这门艺术中学到了哪些可以描述出来的东西?
Like, what have you learned about the art that you can that you can describe?
比如,你在寻找一个哥伦布式的人物时,会看哪些特质?
Like, what do you look for in in a Christopher Columbus?
嗯,我的意思是,我有点犹豫去列举这些,因为它们都太不一样了,对吧?
Well, mean, I think that the first thing, and I hesitate to name things in some sense because they're all so different, right?
比如,埃隆和马克·扎克伯格完全不一样,马克·扎克伯格和阿里·戈茨也完全不同,而他们又和布莱恩·切斯基毫无相似之处。
Like, Elon is really not at all like Mark Zuckerberg, who's not at all like Ali Goetzee, who's not like at all like Brian Chesky.
所以,他们都不一样。
So, like, they're all different.
但他们都做的一件事是,他们都会独立思考。
And, but the things that they all do, I would say, is they all think for themselves.
他们不是那种看人脸色、试图揣摩别人希望他们做什么的人。
They're not people who read the room and try and like figure out what people want them to do.
他们有原创的想法。
They have original ideas.
所以,想法可能是每个伟大企业家都具备的东西——他们是独立思考者。
So, idea is probably the thing that every great entrepreneur has, their original thinkers.
此外,他们也都具备某种程度的魅力,足够有趣,让人愿意追随他们,因为最终,你确实需要人们觉得:‘这个人就是领导者,我想和他共事、为他工作’等等。
And then, know, they all also have some combination of enough charisma, they're interesting enough that people want to follow them, because, know, ultimately, you kind of need people to go, Okay, that is the leader, and that's somebody who I want to work with, work for, and so forth.
所以,我认为几乎所有人都具备这些特质,而要成为伟大的人,这些特质都是必需的,但除此之外,比如史蒂夫·乔布斯就是完全不一样的人。
So, are the things that I would say almost all of them have, and and then think all of them have those to be great, but everything else, know, like Steve Jobs is a very different kind of guy.
他们都不一样,我觉得。
They're all different, would say.
像史蒂夫·乔布斯和安迪·格鲁夫完全不一样,根本不一样,但他们都了不起。
Like Steve Jobs is nothing like Andy Grove, like nothing, you know, they're both great.
为了收尾,我想听听你们每个人,未来几年——比如2016年左右——在科技领域最让你兴奋的是什么?
To close this out, I guess from from each of you, what is the thing that you're personally most excited about in the next kind of couple of years of a '16 z but just tech more broadly?
我的意思是,你知道,马克说过一句特别棒的话,说这就像蒸汽机或者电力一样。
Well, mean, I mean, you know, you know, Mark Mark had a great line like, well, this is on the order of like the steam engine or electricity.
这是一个如此重大的发明,我们将进入一个完全不同的世界。
This is such a big invention that we're going to end up in a different world.
对我来说,最令人兴奋的是,你明白,我可不想生活在电力出现之前的世界。
The thing that's most exciting to me about it is, you know, I wouldn't want to live in the pre electricity world.
我喜欢现在这个世界,好太多了。
Like, I like this world way, way, way better.
所以我认为,我们极有可能进入一个远超我们想象、甚至无法理解的更好世界,这正是让人感到恐惧的原因。
And so, I think that like odds are we're going to get to a world that's just way, way better than we can even like, we can't even get our heads around it, which is why it freaks people out.
我们过去不得不忍受、习以为常的那些烦人事情,以后都不再需要了。
Like, all the stuff that we have to do and so forth that we've just learned to live with that sucks isn't going to be required anymore.
所以,你知道,这意味著什么?
So, like, you know, what does that mean?
我们怎么看待它们?
What do we think of them?
生活会变成什么样?
Like, what does life become?
这可能会非常令人兴奋。
It could be, you know, super exciting.
人类有一点有点问题,就是如果这让我们离某些根本的目的、信念和精神层面太远了,那你就会去依赖一些愚蠢的东西。
The one thing with humans that's a little messed up is, you know, if that takes us too far away, like one of the too far away from some grounded purpose about, you know, and beliefs and spirituality, then, you know, you can attach on to some dumb stuff.
所以,这其实是我唯一的担忧,但我认为,每个人的生活质量即将变得前所未有的好。
So, you know, that would be actually my only worry, but I think life, just the quality of life for everybody is about to get, like, way, way better than it's ever been.
我对Z世代感到兴奋。
I'm excited about the Zoomers.
我是的。
I am.
是的。
Yeah.
好吧。
Alright.
我对Z世代充满期待。
I am psyched for the Zoomers.
前几天我跟一个创业团队在一起,我向他们解释为什么Z世代比千禧一代强得多,为什么他们能拯救我们,以及一切都会变得很棒。
I was with a I was with a founder a founder team the other day, and I was who are Zoomers, I was explaining to them, you know, why the Zoomers are so much better than the millennials and why they're gonna save us and, like, the whole thing is gonna be great.
这太棒了。
This is so great.
当然,他们只是盯着我,好像我在说希腊语一样,因为他们觉得千禧一代是完全脱节的老古董。
And, of course, they're just, like, staring at me like I was speaking Greek because, like, they did you know, they're you know, they they think, like, millennials are, old farts that are, like, completely out of touch.
是的。
Yeah.
当然,你知道,你一直是碘补充剂的爱好者。
And, of course, know, as a you've been an iodine extras.
我们简直就像石器时代一样。
We might as well be, you know, stone age.
我当时就想,但我也觉得,正是这些Zoomers最棒的地方。
And and I was like and but I was like but I was like, this is what's so great about these Zoomers.
他们就是,他们就是,我想形容为2015年到2024年这段时期非常非常奇怪。
Like, they're they're just, like, they're they're it's it's the it's the post that I would describe it as 2015 to 2024 was just it was a very, very strange period.
很多事都变得特别古怪。
And a lot of just things got really weird.
而Zoomers这一代人基本上是这段时期的直接受害者。
And the Zoomers are the generation that basically was on the receiving end of that.
至少对我们接触到的Zoomers来说,他们根本不买账。
And I they're at least for the Zoomers we get to deal with, like, they're just not having it.
他们不会整天都感到内疚。
And they're not walking around feeling guilty about everything all the time.
他们也不会觉得必须否认自己想要成功。
They're not feeling like they have to, like, deny that they wanna be successful.
你知道,他们完全没有那种道德上的苦行僧式包袱。
You know, they don't have any of the moral, you know, kinda hair shirt stuff.
他们就是,如果非要说的话,他们一直被
They're they're just like they're they're if anything, they were held
被我们所有人束缚着。
by us all.
也是这样。
Like that too.
X世代放下了六七十年代的种种疯狂。
Gen X kind of let go of all the craziness of the sixties and, early seventies.
是的。
Yeah.
没错。
That's right.
没错。
That's right.
X世代,你说得对。
Gen X you're right.
没错。
Exactly.
X世代是对婴儿潮一代的反叛,就像Z世代是对千禧一代的反叛一样。
Gen X was the reaction of boomers in the same way the Zoomers are reaction of millennials.
所以,我们所接触的Z世代创始人,在我看来,是最优秀、最有能力、最出色的。
And so the the the Zoomer founders that we get to deal I my view is, like, it's the best it's the best it's the best, most competent, most capable.
顺便说一下,他们真的非常优秀,接受过极其良好的训练和教育,因为他们是在网络环境中成长起来的。
By the way, they're just, like, incredibly well they come in all just they're incredibly well trained and educated because they grew up online.
你知道,他们看过成千上万小时的YouTube视频,内容都是科技界顶尖人物讲述如何做各种事情。
You know, they've seen, you know, a thousand hours of YouTube videos from all the great, you know, people in tech talking about how to do everything.
你知道,他们掌握的知识远超以往任何一代创业者。
You know, they just know so much more than previous generations of founders did.
而且,顺便说一句,他们都是天生的AI原住民。
And, you know, they're they're by the way, they're you know, they're all AI native.
你知道,他们基本上都是在大学里从零开始学习人工智能的,毕业后完全掌握了这项技术。
You know, they all, you know, basically learn AI from scratch and, know, in college, and, you know, they're coming out, and they they they totally understand it.
而且他们热情高涨,毫不掩饰自己的情感,把心都挂在脸上。
And so and they're just, like, tremendously fired up and, like, completely, you know, completely you know, they wear their, you know, they wear their heart on their sleeve.
他们决心要打造一些伟大的东西,并且对此毫不道歉。
They're, like, they're they're gonna build something they're gonna build something great, and they're completely unapologetic about it.
他们非常有魄力。
They're very forceful.
他们非常坚定。
They're very determined.
是的。
Yeah.
我只是觉得这太棒了。
I I I just think it's fantastic.
我一直都在等待,这一点埃里克和本会告诉你的。
I I've been waiting this Eric and Ben will tell you.
我一直在等待这一刻,已经等了很久。
I've been waiting for this for for a long time.
我们可能得把这段剪掉,但我真的很喜欢Z世代的一点是,我从没听过任何人说‘做好事也能做好自己’这样的话。
We may have to edit this out, but one of the things I do really like about the Zoomers, I haven't ever heard anybody say anything like, I'm gonna do well by doing good.
他们从来不会说这种废话。
They never fucking say that bullshit.
没错。
No.
这些都不用提了。
None of that stuff.
他们也有幽默感。
Sense of humor too.
他们很有趣。
They're funny.
是的。
Yes.
是的。
Yes.
他们非常幽默。
They're extremely funny.
嗯,他们非常幽默。
Well, they're extremely funny.
他们懂的。
They get they get it.
他们经历过的。
They get they they live through.
他们一直承受着大量的胡说八道,但他们就是不买账。
They were on the receiving end of just a tremendous amount of bullshit, and and they're just, like, they're just not having it.
所以,我觉得能和他们一起工作真的特别令人兴奋。
And so it's just I find it just, like, tremendously exciting, to to be able to work with them.
如果我能完全掌控自己的时间,我会百分之百这么做。
And I'm I'm if if I if I had total control over my time, it would be a 100%.
那就是。
That was.
嗯,感谢你花了一小时与一位千禧一代交谈。
Well, I appreciate you spending an hour with a millennial.
这太有趣了。
This was a ton of fun.
谢谢你让我写关于一个16Z的内容,也感谢这次对话。
Thank you for letting me write about, about a 16 z, and and thanks for thanks for the conversation.
我们正在谈论你所有未来的嘉宾。
We're we're talking about all your future guests.
是的。
Yes.
没错。
Exactly.
贝基,这真是
Becky, this was an
精彩的文章。
excellent piece.
非常感谢你撰写了这篇文章。
Thank you so much for writing.
是的。
Yeah.
一位很棒的嘉宾,我很高兴你。
A good guest, and I'm glad you.
百分之百。
100%.
感谢收听本集的a16z播客。
Thanks for listening to this episode of the a 16 z podcast.
如果你喜欢本集,请务必点赞、评论、订阅,给我们打分或留下评价,并分享给你的朋友和家人。
If you like this episode, be sure to like, comment, subscribe, leave us a rating or a review, and share it with your friends and family.
如需收听更多集数,请访问YouTube、Apple Podcasts和Spotify。
For more episodes, go to YouTube, Apple Podcasts, and Spotify.
在 X 上关注我们,账号是 a sixteen z,并在 a16z.substack.com 订阅我们的 Substack。
Follow us on X at a sixteen z, and subscribe to our Substack at a16z.substack.com.
再次感谢收听,我们下一期节目再见。
Thanks again for listening, and I'll see you in the next episode.
提醒一下,此处的内容仅作信息参考,不应被视为法律、商业、税务或投资建议,也不应用于评估任何投资或证券,且并非面向任何 a sixteen z 基金的投资者或潜在投资者。
As a reminder, the content here is for informational purposes only, should not be taken as legal business, tax, or investment advice, or be used to evaluate any investment or security, and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a sixteen z fund.
请注意,a sixteen z 及其关联方可能也持有本播客中讨论的公司股份。
Please note that a sixteen z and its affiliates may also maintain investments in the companies discussed in this podcast.
如需更多详情,包括我们的投资链接,请访问 a16z.com/discoveries。
For more details, including a link to our investments, please see a 16z.com forward slash disclosures.
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