大卫·所罗门与本·霍洛维茨谈构建组织韧性与应对宏观不确定性

十年前，我们是全球最大的批发融资机构。

We were the largest wholesale funder in the world ten years ago.

有很多事情。

There are a lot of things.

你想成为全球最大的吗？

You wanna be the largest in the world?

一个销售融资机构？

A sale funder?

它们都不是。

Not one of them.

我们收到了很多批评。

We got a lot of criticism.

比如，为什么你现在要筹钱？

Like, why are you raising money now?

你是什么？

What are you?

愚蠢。

Stupid.

结果发现，最好的融资时机是当没人有钱的时候。

And it turns out that the best time to raise money is when nobody has money.

去年，四家最大的公司通过其4000亿美元的支出，贡献了1%的GDP增长。

Last year, the four largest companies contributed 1% to GDP growth with their $400,000,000,000 of spending.

并购和资本募集、IPO都依赖于信心。

M and a and capital raising IPOs are driven by confidence.

过去四年，无论问题是什么，答案都是‘不’。

For the last four years, whatever the question was, the answer was no.

好的。

Okay.

现在，无论问题是什么，答案都是‘也许’。

Now whatever the question is, the answer is maybe.

大卫，你已经

David, you've

我在高盛已经工作了二十五年多。

been at Goldman now for over twenty five years.

你知道，你目前专注于什么来为高盛的未来做准备？

You know, what are you focused on to position Goldman for the future?

如果你从事我们这类业务，如果你与金融资产相关，这是我见过的最理想的时机。

If you're in our kind of businesses, if you're attached to financial assets, this is as sweet a spot that I've seen.

有了人工智能，如果你拥有专有数据和足够的GPU，你几乎可以解决任何问题。

With AI, if you have proprietary data and you have enough GPUs, you can solve, like, almost any problem.

这简直是魔法。

It is magic.

如果过去五十年让软件公司具有竞争力的因素突然不再成立，会怎样？

What if the thing that made software companies defensible for fifty years just stopped being true?

1975年，弗雷德·布鲁克斯出版了《人月神话》，其中包含一个简单的观察：九个女人无法在一个月内生出一个孩子。

In 1975, Fred Brooks published The Mythical Man Month, which included a simple observation: nine women cannot have a baby in one month.

你不能通过增加工程师数量来加速软件开发。

You couldn't accelerate software development by throwing more engineers at it.

这一见解塑造了初创公司数十年来的竞争方式。

That insight shaped how startups competed for decades.

一个小团队如果率先起步，就能超越巨头，因为你无法用金钱买来突破。

A small team with a head start could outrun a giant because you can't buy your way to a breakthrough.

五十年后，情况发生了变化。

Fifty years later, something has changed.

一些公司如今在不到一年的时间内，就实现了从零到超过10亿美元的收入。

Companies are going from zero to more than $1,000,000,000 in revenue in less than a year.

OpenAI 仅凭一个看似不可逾越的领先优势，就打造了一家价值100亿美元的企业，而竞争对手仍在追赶。

OpenAI built a $10,000,000,000 business with a seemingly insurmountable lead, and competitors are catching up anyway.

旧的模式假设领先优势会不断放大，但新现实表明，这种优势可能不再成立。

The old playbook assumed that leads compound the new reality suggests they might not.

这给创业者和投资者都提出了令人不安的问题。

This raises uncomfortable questions for founders and investors alike.

如果你能用资金解决这个问题，先发优势还会存在吗？

If you can throw money at the problem, what happens to the advantage of being first?

如果现有企业能更快地缩小差距，这是否改变了公司上市的时机以及它们为保持领先所需的资金规模？

And if incumbents can close gaps faster, does that change when companies should go public or how much capital they need to stay ahead?

a16z的普通合伙人戴维·哈伯与a16z联合创始人本·霍洛维茨以及高盛董事长兼首席执行官戴维·所罗门讨论了人工智能如何重塑竞争格局、企业采用为何比表面看起来更困难，以及当前围绕加密货币和人工智能的政策之争对创新者而言究竟意味着什么。

A16z general partner David Haber spoke with a16z co founder Ben Horowitz and Goldman Sachs chairman and CEO David Solomon about how AI is reshaping competitive dynamics, why enterprise adoption is harder than it looks, and what today's policy fights over crypto and AI actually mean for builders.

我有幸至少间接地为戴维·所罗门和本·霍洛维茨工作过，对高盛和a16z都怀有深厚的感情。

I've had the distinct pleasure of working, at least indirectly, for both David Solomon and Ben Horowitz and have a lot of affection for both Goldman Sachs and a six c z.

如果你还没读过，我强烈推荐阅读查尔斯·埃利斯所著的《合伙关系》，这本书详述了高盛近一百六十年的历史。

If you haven't read, I highly recommend reading the book, The Partnership, which is written by a guy named Charles Ellis, which chronicles Goldman's nearly one hundred and sixty year history.

我认为高盛历史中最了不起的一点是，它并非通过一系列银行并购建立起来的，这与许多同行截然不同。

And I think the most remarkable thing about Goldman's history is the fact that it's not a business built through a series of bank mergers, unlike many of its peers.

它实际上是通过一代代富有创业精神的合伙人亲手打造的，他们主动请缨，去开拓新业务——无论是拓展欧洲市场、创立商人银行业务，还是设立财富管理部门。

It was really a business built brick by brick by generations of entrepreneurial partners raising their hand, going off and building new businesses, whether it was expanding into Europe or starting the merchant banking business or the wealth management division.

这些业务单元中的许多都发展成了全球性品牌。

Many of these business units became global franchises.

我认为，高盛一直以来都是世界上最具创业精神的金融机构之一。

I'd argue that Goldman was and still is one of the most entrepreneurial financial institutions in the world.

当我思考安德里森·霍罗威茨自身发展的阶段时，我觉得这大概就是高盛在五十年前或七十五年前的感受——一群富有创业精神的投资者，押注于像你们这样出身富庶的人。

As I think about where we are in our own evolution at Andreessen Horowitz, I kind of like to think that this is what Goldman Sachs must have felt like fifty or seventy five years ago, You know, a small group of entrepreneurial investors betting on a born as rich as you guys.

是的。

That's Yeah.

而且还有

And and also

高盛从此再也不和萨克斯说话了。

Goldman stopped speaking to Sachs, like, forever.

他们因为萨克斯在第一次世界大战期间支持德国而彼此非常生气。

Like, they got very mad at each other over it was at Saks who supported Germany in World War one.

你居然还记得这段历史。

You actually remember your history.

是的。

Yeah.

嗯，确实如此。

Well yeah.

是的，一个小合伙企业，怀着巨大的希望和抱负押注未来。

Yeah, small partnership betting on the future with big hopes and ambitions.

我就说到这里。

I'll leave it at that.

干得好，大卫。

Well done, David.

谢谢。

Thank you.

但也许沿着这个思路继续深入，大卫，你已经在高盛工作了二十多年了。

But maybe just pulling on that thread, David, you've been at Goldman now for over twenty five years.

我相信你是1999年加入公司的，就在公司上市之后。

You joined the firm, I believe, in 1999, just after the firm's IPO.

在你任职期间，公司经历了怎样的演变？

How has the firm evolved during your tenure?

更重要的是，你目前关注哪些方面，以推动高盛面向未来？

And maybe more importantly, what are you focused on to position Goldman for the future?

首先，很高兴能来到这里。

First of all, it's great to be here.

很高兴能和大家在一起。

Great to be with everybody.

在我开始谈这个之前，我想说说我人生中的一个重大教训：如果你加入一家私营合伙制公司，别花六个月时间谈判，试图等到IPO之后再加入。

Before I start on that, I'd just say one of the big lessons I have in my life is if you're joining a new firm that's a private partnership, don't spend six months negotiating so you carry over past the IPO date.

在IPO之前，六月前就加入吧。

Join before June before the IPO.

这对所有在私营合伙制公司工作的人都是一个很好的教训。

It's a good lesson for all of you in private partnerships.

这家公司非常了不起，我非常感谢你对公司和公司创业精神的评价。

The firm's a remarkable place, and I really appreciate what you said about the firm and the entrepreneurial spirit of the firm.

长期以来，这家公司一直是一家私营合伙制企业。

The firm was, for a long time, a private partnership.

私营合伙制的特点是存在相互代理关系，人们会各自出去做事。

And the thing about private partnerships is you have this mutual agency where people go off and they do things.

每年或每个周期都会有一种结构，让一切回归并重新评估合伙份额，然后大家再次启程迈向未来。

There's some structure that creates a collective each year or each cycle where everything comes back, and then there's a reevaluation of the partnership shares and you go off again into the future to do more.

这种机制极大地促进了公司的发展，使公司作为合伙制企业存续的时间远长于其他任何大型华尔街公司。

And that served the firm incredibly well and the firm stayed a partnership much longer than any other real big Wall Street firm.

我想说，公司直到最后一刻才不得不放弃合伙制，因为这有助于建立永久性资本，使公司成为真正有竞争力的企业。

I'd like to say that the firm stayed a partnership until the last moment when it absolutely couldn't be a partnership anymore because it aided the permanent capital to really make it a relevant business.

如果公司在1999年没有上市，就可能会错过全球资本市场扩张的机遇，如今可能更像拉扎德（不针对任何人，只是举例），而不是高盛。

If the firm hadn't gone public in 1999, it would have missed kind of the global expansion of capital markets and probably would look more like, not to pick on anybody, but just to pick any more like Lazard today than like Goldman Sachs.

因此，当时公司的管理者们做出了非凡的贡献。

And so the stewards of the firm at that point did an incredible job.

我认为，在过去二十五年里，我们面临的挑战——过去八年里的领导团队在这方面合作得极为出色——是即使在上市二十五年后的今天，我们依然保持着这种合伙文化。

I think the challenge for us over the last twenty five years, and I think the leadership team over the last eight years has really done an incredible job at this working together to do this, is somehow twenty five years after an IPO, we still have this partnership culture.

每两年，成为高盛合伙人都是一个极具吸引力的目标。

It's highly aspirational every two years to become a partner of Goldman Sachs.

我们有四百五十人，他们的薪酬与公司整体业绩紧密挂钩。

We have four fifty people who really are compensated in a correlation to how the overall enterprise does.

但我真正引以为傲的是，我们作为领导者开始意识到，我们不再是小型私人合伙制企业，作为一家上市公司，你不能不增长，而必须有某种自上而下的战略方向，真正让整体产生协同效应，使一加一加一加一的结果大于数学上的简单相加。

But the big thing that I'm really proud of that is a broad leadership we've done is we've started to recognize that we're not a small private partnership and you can't be a public company and not grow and have some form of top down strategic direction that really gets the whole thing, making the one plus one plus one plus one equal more than what the math adds up to.

这是一段旅程，而且充满坎坷。

And that's been a journey and it's been bumpy.

你曾经历过其中一部分，但我认为我们应对得不错。

You were there for part of those But I think we've navigated well.

我仍然认为，我们作为公司所秉持的原则和价值观，是努力成为全球最卓越的金融机构。

I still think principles, the values that we kind of sit upon as a firm, we really strive to be the most exceptional financial institution in the world.

我们并不总能达成目标，但我们始终为此而努力。

We don't always get there, but we strive for that.

我们始终坚守四大核心价值观：客户服务、伙伴关系、诚信和卓越，并努力践行它们。

And we really sit on four core values of client service, partnership, integrity, and excellence, try to live it.

我认为公司目前处于一个非常好的状态。

And I think the firm's in a really good place.

但在某些方面，过去二十六年来它根本没有任何改变。

But in some ways, it hasn't changed at all in twenty six years.

在某些方面，它已经发生了巨大的变化。

In some ways, it's changed massively.

有没有一些

Are there a few

作为CEO，您未来五到十年最关注哪些方面？

things you're most focused on as CEO looking forward for the next five or ten years?

当然。

Sure.

你知道，我曾经

You know, I was

是一名银行家，在我职业生涯的大部分时间里为首席执行官们提供建议，但真正承担起责任——这是我过去八年最大的体会之一——与提供建议截然不同。

a banker and I advised CEOs for a lot of my career, but actually owning the responsibility, and that's one of my big takeaways the last eight years, is very different than giving advice.

我认为，像这样的大型企业中，首席执行官最重要的职责就是必须真正承担起公司的战略和方向。

I think the most important thing that a CEO has to do in a big enterprise like this is they have to kind of own the strategy and the direction of the firm.

我关注的是如何确保我们朝着增长公司方向切实执行，因为我知道我们必须这样做，才能在相对基础上取得优异表现。

And I'm focused on how we ensure we're executing toward growing the firm because I know we have to do that to perform on a relative basis.

但我也在思考和担忧那些可能让公司变得不那么相关、不那么成功、不那么重要、不那么有竞争力的宏观战略风险。

But then I'm also thinking about and worrying about big picture strategic risks that can make the firm less relevant, less successful, less important, less competitive.

对我们而言，我认为公司目前重点关注两件事。

And for us, I think there are two things that the firm is really focused on.

我认为，首先，美国之所以成为一个非凡的国家，是因为我们拥有世界上最卓越的资本市场、最卓越的金融体系和最卓越的金融机构。

I think, first of all, one of the things that makes The United States an extraordinary place is we have the most extraordinary capital markets, the most extraordinary financial system, the most extraordinary financial institutions.

我认为，美国最重要的六家金融机构全是美国本土机构，没有任何一家全球性机构能在全球影响力上与这六家美国顶尖机构相媲美。

I would argue that the six most important financial institutions in The US are all US financial institutions, and there is no global institution that can compete in terms of its relevance in the world with the six most important US institutions.

当你审视这些机构时，会发现它们属于不同类型。

When you look at those institutions, there are different kinds of institutions.

其中有零售银行，更传统意义上的银行。

There are retail banks, more traditional banky banks.

这包括摩根大通、富国银行、美国银行和花旗银行。

That would include JPMorgan, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Citibank.

它们都有全球业务，但本质上仍是银行。

They all have global businesses, but they are truly banks in what they do.

它们拥有零售平台和零售业务。

They have retail platforms, retail businesses.

然后你还有两家机构型公司。

And then you've got two institutional firms.

这并不意味着它们不以不同方式接触个人，但摩根士丹利和高盛都是机构型公司。

That doesn't mean they don't touch individuals in different ways, but Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs are both institutional firms.

在我们作为机构型公司的定位背景下，高盛是一个独特的存在。

And Goldman Sachs is a little bit of an island of one in the context of the way we're positioned as an institutional firm.

摩根士丹利在它们的定位方式上也是一个独特的存在。

And Morgan Stanley is a little bit of an island of one in terms of the way they're positioned.

规模非常重要。

Scale matters a lot.

我刚刚详细分析了这些公司。

And I just went through all those firms.

在所有这些公司中，规模最小的两家是高盛和摩根士丹利。

The two smallest firms of all those firms are Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.

因此，当世界出现动荡时，你总是需要规模。

And so when there's turbulence in the world, you always want scale.

在这些业务中，规模因其高度成熟而带来巨大的杠杆效应和自由度。

Scale in these businesses, because they're so mature, gives you enormous leverage and latitude.

因此，我们持续深入思考规模的问题。

And so we continue to think a lot about scale.

我们展望五年、十年、十五年，如何维持足以让我们保持竞争力的规模？

We think out five, ten, fifteen years, how are we going to maintain a level of scale that makes us competitive?

十年前，人们根本无法想象高盛会有1.9万亿美元的资产负债表。

Ten years ago, it would have been unfathomable that Goldman Sachs could have a $1,900,000,000,000 balance sheet.

但目前，摩根大通的资产负债表已达4.5万亿美元。

But at the moment, JPMorgan has a $4,500,000,000,000 balance sheet.

当摩根大通的资本充足率达到六时，必须至少为3.5。

When JPMorgan's six, going have to be at least 3.5.

你知道，至少要达到3.5。

You know, at least 3.5.

因此，我们必须思考如何持续创造这种规模，因为这些业务都非常成熟，单纯依靠内生增长来构建这种规模非常困难。

And so we have to think about how we can continue to create that scale because these are very mature businesses, and it's hard to really build that scale just purely organically.

所以这是第一点。

So that's one.

第二点，资金。

Two, funding.

为这些企业融资是它们面临的主要战略风险之一。

Funding these enterprises is one of the big strategic risks of these enterprises.

这些企业依赖资金和流动性，而我们并没有传统的存款融资平台。

These enterprises live on funding and liquidity, and we don't have a traditional deposit funding platform.

你参与了这个项目，我们如今拥有一个非常出色的数字存款平台，存款规模已超过2000亿美元。

We've got, you participated in this, a very excellent digital deposit platform that now has over $200,000,000,000 in deposits.

此外，我们的总存款规模约为5000亿美元。

And we've also we have about $500,000,000,000 of total deposits.

十五年前，我们的存款为零。

Fifteen years ago, we had zero.

因此，我们为公司约40%的存款提供资金，但存款相比机构批发融资要稳定得多。

So we fund about 40% of the firm deposits, but deposits is a much more stable funding source than institutional wholesale funding.

商业票据。

Commercial paper.

是的。

Yeah.

十年前，我们是全球最大的批发融资方。

We were the largest wholesale funder in the world ten years ago.

当时有很多因素。

There were a lot of things.

你希望成为全球最大的吗？

You want to be the largest in the world?

批发融资方？

Wholesale funder?

都不是。

Not one of them.

因此，从战略上讲，这也是我们担心的另一件事。

And so that strategically is another thing we worry about.

所以，当我们退一步，摆脱日常执行，思考十年、十五年、二十年的规划时，这些是重要的问题；顺便说一句，那时我不会在这里管理公司了，但我仍有责任守护并规划好这一切。

So those are big things on stepping back and getting away from the execution day to day and thinking ten, fifteen, twenty years, which by the way, I won't be here running the firm, it's still my responsibility to steward and chart that.

我为此感到担忧。

I worry about that.

短期来看，我们更关注整个组织的技术，技术如何改变我们的运作方式，以及我们在坚持核心业务的同时，如何构建不同的流程和运营模式。

The short term, much more focused on technology across the organization, how technology shifts the way we do things, how are we building processes operating differently while staying true to what we do.

太棒了。

Awesome.

今天我们也正是为此而来，提供帮助。

Well, we're here to help with that today too.

当然。

Absolutely.

本，也许我们转向你。

Ben, maybe transitioning to you.

你和马克在2009年金融危机之后的有利时机创立了这家公司。

You and Mark started the firm in an auspicious time in the wake of the financial crisis in 2009.

2009年，是的。

2009, yeah.

结果证明，那是一个非常有趣的时刻，因为那是移动互联网和云计算兴起的开端。

It turned out to be a really interesting moment because it was the beginning of mobile and the rise of the cloud.

说来也有趣。

Well, it's funny also.

我们在风险投资领域受到了很多批评。

We got a lot of criticism in kind of venture capital.

比如，为什么你现在要融资？

Like, why are you raising money now?

你们到底是什么？

Like, what are you?

傻瓜？

Stupid?

结果发现，融资的最佳时机是当别人都没钱的时候。

And it turns out that the best time to raise money is when nobody has money.

我的意思是，这么说确实很明显，但投资的本质就是人们总想在高位入场，总想在市场低迷时抽身而出。

I mean, like, it's it's very obvious in you know, when you say it that way, but just the nature of investing is people always wanna invest, you know, high, they always wanna walk away when the market is low.

这其实就是其中之一。

And it just is is one of those things.

所以，我觉得我们当时非常幸运。

So we got very fortunate then, I think.

也许你可以简单描述一下公司自创立以来的发展历程，以及你对未来的目标是什么。

And maybe you can kinda describe the evolution of the firm, you know, since you started, and and, again, maybe what your ambitions are, you know, for the future as well.

是的。

Yeah.

所以，最初在风险投资领域的核心理念是，你必须成为所谓的顶级机构。

So the original idea and in venture capital, like, the the fundamental thing that you have to be is you have to be what's known as top tier.

因为如果你不是顶级机构，那么最优秀的创业者就不会接受你的资金。

Because if you're not top tier, then the best entrepreneurs won't take your money.

所以，有时候市场会热到即使你是一家不重要的风投公司，也能投中好项目并赚钱。

And so, like, there are times when you can you know, when the market is so blazing hot that, you know, you can be, like, a not important venture capital firm and dump into good deals and make money.

但在大多数时候，如果你不是顶级的，就会倒闭，所以你必须做到顶级。

But in most times, if you're not top tier, you're gonna go out of business, and and so you have to be that.

而成为顶级的困难之处在于，历史上，成为顶级靠的是声誉。

And the difficult thing about being top tier is, historically, the way you became top tier was reputationally.

是的。

Oh, yeah.

如果你是红杉资本，你曾经投资过苹果、思科、雅虎和谷歌。

If you're a Sequoia, you had invested in Apple and Cisco and Yahoo and Google.

所以，如果你在2009年才起步，要追上这种差距真的很难。

And so it's really hard to make up that ground if you're starting in 2009.

因此，我们最初的想法是，通过提供一个更好的、专门为创业者设计的产品来达到顶级地位。

So the idea we had originally to get to top tier was, to basically have a better product, a better product specifically for entrepreneurs.

风投产品对有限合伙人来说很不错，但我们觉得对创业者来说只是平庸而已。

So the venture capital product was great for LPs, but we thought mediocre for entrepreneurs.

所以我们设计了这家机构，真正帮助创始人打造并亲自担任CEO运营自己的公司，这在当时并不是一个普遍的理念。

So we designed the firm to basically really enable a founder to basically build his or her own company and run it as CEO, which wasn't kind of an idea then.

最重要的是，这个理念是要取代创始人。

The idea was, most importantly, replace the founder.

这其中涉及很多内容，因为我们自己就是创始人，深知其中的艰辛，所以我们创建了一家机构，为创始人提供品牌、影响力、资源等各种支持——这些风险投资机构声称自己能提供，但实际上他们并不需要，因为他们本身就是顶级机构。

And, you know, there's a lot that went into it, and because we were founders, we knew what that was, and so we kind of created a firm to give a founder, like, a brand and power and access and all these kinds of things that VC said they did, but they they didn't have to because, like, they were top tier.

这并不重要。

It didn't matter.

于是我们这样做了，这也正是我们得以成为一家长期存续的机构的原因。

And so we did that, and that's kind of how we got into position to kind of be a long lasting firm.

第二阶段则主要基于马克在2011年撰写的《软件正在吞噬世界》一文。

The second phase was really kind of based on something that Mark wrote in 2011 called Software is Eating the World.

《软件正在吞噬世界》的核心观点是：回顾当时的风险投资领域，有研究指出，每年大约只有15家科技公司能实现一亿美元的收入，这些公司才具有价值，其他公司都不值钱。

And the idea of Software is Eating the World was basically, if you looked at venture capital up to that point, there were these studies that said, in any given year, there are going to be approximately 15 technology companies that get to $100,000,000 in revenue, and those are going to be the companies that are worth money, and nothing else is going to be worth money.

因此，整个风险投资行业的目标就是：你能投中这15家公司中的多少家？

So the whole venture capital sport was, how many of those 15 can you get into?

如果软件真的要吞噬世界，我们认为，也许这15家会变成150家。

If software was going to eat the world, though, we thought, well, maybe that 15 is going be 150.

也许风险投资公司的其中一个特点就是你必须能够规模化。

And maybe one of the features of a venture capital firm is you're going have to be able to scale it.

我记得大卫·斯文森，那位了不起的大卫·斯文森，已故，他曾多年管理耶鲁捐赠基金，他告诉我：你知道，一家优秀风险投资公司就像一支篮球队，五个人，最多六个人。

None of the traditionally I remember Dave Swenson, the great Dave Swenson, RIP, saying to me, who ran the Yale endowment for years, he said, You know, a good venture capital firm's like a basketball team, you know, five, maybe six players.

就这些。

That's it.

但你不可能用六个人去覆盖需要投资150家公司的市场。

But you can't address a market where you have to be in 150 companies with six players.

那么你该如何组织呢？

So how do you organize?

你该如何规模化？

How do you scale?

你该如何设计这家公司，以便抓住整个机会，同时依然能出色地进行投资，且参与每个交易讨论的人不超过五六个？

How do you design the firm so that you can get to the whole opportunity, yet still be really, really good at investing and not have more than five or six people talking about a deal?

所以这算是第二阶段。

And so that was sort of phase two.

这实际上意味着，我们在某种程度上离开了硅谷的主流思维，因为当时没有人这样想。

And that's really kind of, I would say, when we somewhat left the building in terms of what was going on in Silicon Valley because nobody else was thinking that way.

因此，在去年，也就是2025年，美国所有风险投资中，有18.3%是由我们筹集的。

And so this last year, 2025, about 18.3% of all venture capital raised in The US was raised by us.

所以我们现在已经从第一梯队跃升为最大的机构。

So we're now from tier one to the biggest.

展望未来，我认为这会是什么样子？我经常思考这个问题。

Going forward, what I think that looks like is And then I get a lot of this thinking.

我的一位老导师是安迪·格鲁夫。

My old mentor was Andy Grove.

还有扎克·布奇利，在他生命末期。

It was Zach Bouchley at the end of his life.

但他曾对我说过一句话，我一直铭记在心：对于那些不了解他的人，他曾执掌英特尔，带领公司渡过那场重大的内存危机，并彻底改变了企业——他可能是我们见过的最伟大的科技CEO。

But one of the things he said to me that always remember, and for those of you who don't know him, he ran Intel, and he got it through that great memory crisis and changed the company, probably the greatest tech CEO we've seen.

但他提到一件事，表面上看很显而易见，实则意义深远：如果你是某个行业的领导者，那么该行业的增长就取决于你。

But he said something that is very obvious in a way, but also profound, which was, if you're the leader of an industry, then the growth of that industry depends on you.

你必须推动市场发展。

You have to grow the market.

没人会替你做这件事。

Nobody else is going to do it.

这责任落在你肩上，而他在英特尔确实认真践行了这一点。

That is incumbent on you, and he really took that seriously at Intel.

因此，当我思考我们这家公司的定位时，很多责任也落在了我们身上。

And so when I think about what we are as a firm, a lot of it is incumbent on us.

我们在加密货币政策、国际事务以及美国创新活力方面所做的大量工作，都是在思考：我们如何不仅让安德里森·霍罗维茨取得成功，更让整个国家在技术上赢得优势？

And a lot of the work that we've done on policy for crypto and things that we're doing internationally, things we're doing on American dynamism, is like, how do we win not just we, Andreessen Horowitz, win, but how does the country win technologically?

我们如何继续与中国竞争？

How do we continue to compete with China?

我们如何确保在未来一百年里依然保持相关性，就像过去一百年那样？

How do we be relevant in the next one hundred years like we were in the last one hundred years?

而这反过来影响了我们对如何发展安德森·霍洛维茨公司的思考。

And then that drives backwards into how we think about how we should develop Andreessen Horowitz.

太棒了。

Awesome.

也许我们稍微转向一下市场话题。

Maybe we'll transition just a little bit to markets.

你知道吗，大卫，你会如何描述当前的宏观环境？

You know, David, how would you describe kind of the macro environment?

你知道吗，你从最常合作和咨询的首席执行官们那里听到了什么？

You know, what are you hearing from the CEOs that you work and advise most closely?

当然。

Sure.

你知道，贾斯汀，本和我之前讨论过这个问题。

You know, first, Justin, and Ben and I were talking about this.

好时光。

Good times.

如果你从事的是我们这类业务，如果你涉及金融资产或可投资资产，我已经干了四十多年了。

If you're in our kind of businesses, if you're attached to financial assets or investable assets, I've been doing this for forty some years.

这是我见过的宏观形势中最理想的一个时刻。

This is as sweet a spot I've seen kind of macro picture.

这并不意味着世界上没有各种困难和复杂的问题，但我觉得我们现在正处在一个关键时刻——让我们先聚焦在美国。

Now, that doesn't mean there aren't all sorts of difficult, complex things going on in the world, but I think we're at a moment Let's just be here in The United States for a minute.

我们可以环顾全球讨论这个问题，你想去哪儿谈都行，但我们就先从美国开始吧。

We can go around the world and talk about it anywhere you want, let's just start here in The United States.

财政刺激的规模巨大，而且还在持续增加；顺便说一句，2026年启动的那项宏伟法案又进一步增加了刺激力度。

The combination of the significant amount and continuing to increase fiscal stimulus And by the way, the big beautiful bill that started in 'twenty six just adds more to that.

我们并不是原本就不处于刺激状态，而是又额外增加了大量刺激措施。

It's that not we weren't in a very stimulative place, we just added a whole bunch of more.

我们有财政刺激。

We have fiscal stimulus.

我们还有货币刺激，因为我们正处于降息周期。

We have monetary stimulus because we're in a rate cutting cycle.

这并不意味着我认为我们会看到更多降息，但我们可能会再看到几次降息。

That doesn't mean I think we're going to see many more rate cuts, but we're probably going to see a couple more.

我们正处在一个资本投资超级周期中，这种规模我们前所未见。

We are in a capital investment super cycle, like something we've never seen.

去年，四家最大的公司通过高达4000亿美元的支出，为GDP增长贡献了1%。

Last year, the four largest companies contributed 1% to GDP growth with their $400,000,000,000 of spending.

我们正经历一个去监管的逆转周期，从上一届政府时期大规模的监管激增，转向放松监管。

We are in a deregulatory unwind cycle from a massive regulatory surge during the last administration to a deregulatory wind back.

这非常具有刺激性。

That is very stimulative.

所有这些因素叠加在一起，形成了一种强烈的刺激组合，使得经济很难放缓。

All these things, it's just such a cocktail of stimulus that it's very, very hard to slow the economy down.

尽管普通美国人确实感受到巨大压力，因为所有东西都更贵了，你可以说通胀从9%降到3%，但关键是，所有东西都贵了25%到30%，这才是美国人的真实感受。

And while average Americans definitely feel a lot of stress because everything's more expensive, You could talk about inflation going from nine to three, but the bottom line is everything is 25 to 30% more expensive, and that's the way Americans feel it.

有压力，但与此同时，巨大的金融杠杆仍在推动经济运转，并让经济更具韧性。

There's pressure, but at the same time, there's enormous financial leverage that keeps the economy going, and it makes the economy a little bit more versatile.

所以，如果你持有货币资产或可投资资产，如果你关注增长和科技领域，这将是一个非常有利的环境。

So if you own monetary assets or investable assets, if you're around growth and technology, this is a pretty prime environment.

我能举出一百种可能引发这种情况的因素。

I give you 100 things that can set it off.

去年四月，你知道，如果你去年一月在达沃斯，人们也是这么想的。

Last April, you know, if you were in Davos last January, people felt the same way.

到了四月，出现了一点小挫折，但我们当时都认为这只是短暂的放缓。

And then in April, had a speed bump, but we were all of these short speed bump.

我认为还有两件事推动了市场向前发展。

And I think one of the things that also as there are two things that I think has the market moving ahead.

第一，这位总统在去年四月市场出现波动后，每天都根据市场变化进行调整。

One, you've got a president that if you look at the speed bump last April, he marks to market to that market every single day.

当市场走向错误的方向时，他毫不犹豫地迅速做出调整。

And when the market's going in the wrong direction, he has no problem adjusting very, very quickly.

第二，人工智能投资带来的生产率提升，以及企业对它的采纳，使市场提前实现了原本预计在未来一到四年才会实现的成果。

And number two, the productivity gains from AI investment and putting it into the enterprise and having the enterprise pick it up the market is pulling forward a lot of what they expect to be delivered over the next one, two, three, four years.

所以这是一个非常理想的宏观环境。

And so that's a pretty prime macro environment.

现在，地缘政治就复杂多了。

Now, geopolitics, much tougher.

我们正在回归一个多极世界，地缘政治问题严重拖累经济增长的风险，我不说它很高，但比起墙倒塌后过去十、二十、三十年来说，确实高多了。

We're moving back to a multipolar world and the risk of a geopolitical problem that really slows down growth is just I'm not saying it's high, but it's much higher than it's been for the last ten, twenty, thirty years since the wall fell.

你看，这个世界很脆弱。

Look, the world is fragile.

社交媒体制造了大量波动和分裂，人们获取信息的方式以及信息传播的路径，让世界变得更快，但也更不稳定。

Social media creates a lot of volatility and division, the way people absorb information, way information moves, makes the world faster moving, but also more volatile.

所以很多事情都可能出错，但目前从经济基本面来看，这种刺激组合非常强劲。

And so a lot can go wrong, but at the moment from an economic, a base economic perspective, that cocktail of stimulus are pretty powerful.

我可能有个后续问题想问你们两位。

Maybe a follow-up question for both of you.

你们预计今年会看到大量并购或IPO吗？

Mean, do you expect to see a lot of M and A or IPOs this year?

您是如何向您的首席执行官们提供建议的？

How are you sort of advising your CEOs?

我们

We have

有

a

很多这样的听众。

lot of them in the audience.

这是个不错的银行家式回答。

It's a good banker response.

基于事实即可。

Just fact based.

您曾面临一个非常非常严苛的监管环境。

You had a very, very tough regulatory environment.

并购和资本募集、IPO都依赖于信心。

M and A and capital raising IPOs are driven by confidence.

因此，如果你处于一个严格的监管环境，这会影响信心。

And so, if you have a tough regulatory environment, that is something that affects confidence.

从并购的角度来看，

From an M

在过去四年里，无论提出什么问题，答案都是否定的。

and A perspective, on strategic M and A, for the last four years, whatever the question was, the answer was no.

对。

Right.

好的。

Okay.

现在，无论提出什么问题，即使是非常重大的问题，答案也可能是‘也许’。

Now, whatever the question is, even if it's very, very significant, the answer is maybe.

首席执行官们喜欢展望未来。

CEOs like to look forward.

他们喜欢做大事。

They like to do big things.

因此，现在有很多活动。

And so, there's a lot of activity.

事实如此。

Fact.

所以，我认为，这又是一个将看到重大活动的环境，这可能是有史以来最大的并购年。

And so, I just think, again, this is an environment where you're going to see a significant I think this could be the biggest M and A year.

这只是我的预测。

This is just me predicting.

我认为今年将是历史上最大的并购年。

I think it'd be the biggest M and A year in history this year.

这将是一次更大的IPO。

It's gonna be a bigger IPO.

你理性地认为，有一大批大公司终于决定要上市，你对此也会有自己的看法。

You're reason thinking you got a bunch of these big companies that are finally deciding they wanna come through the pipe, you'll have a view on that too.

成为一家上市公司是一件糟糕的事。

Being a public company is a horrible thing.

不要不要

Do Do not not

从 hindsight 来看，这很有挑战性。

It is challenging from hindsight.

嘿。

Hey.

你必须能接受经常被起诉。

You just have to be okay with getting sued Well, a lot the time.

你知道，这很有趣。

You know, it's funny.

我们有一家公司刚上市，他们说：我们可能会被起诉。

We we had a company that just went public, and they're like, we might get sued.

我当时说：当然，你肯定会被告。

I was like, of course, you're gonna get sued.

你上市了。

You're public.

这就是美国。

This is America.

你在说什么啊？

Like, what are you talking about?

我在并购方面很多地方都同意，但有一点例外，那就是联邦贸易委员会对这些问题的立场还不明确。

So I agree I agree a lot on on the m and a front, except well, with the, kind of exception that, like, it's not clear the FTC's kind of position on these things yet.

到目前为止，Shinamu，是的。

And so far, Shinamu yeah.

尤其是在大型科技公司方面。

Especially on big tech.

即使是小型科技公司，他们也一直非常积极。

Even on, like, small tech, they've been very, very aggressive.

所以我认为并购还是会发生的，但可能更多会以知识产权交易等形式出现，而不是传统的并购方式。

So I think M and A will happen, but it may happen more in the form of IP transactions and that kind of thing than as a traditional M and A.

我不希望这样，但情况可能就是这样。

I hope not, but that may be the case.

然后，是的，我认为我们这个领域将涌现大量IPO，有些是出于必要。

And then, yeah, I think there's going to be a lot of IPOs coming out of our world, so I think there's going to be some out of necessity.

公司成长得太快了。

Companies are growing so fast.

我们有太多公司从零起步，不到一年就突破一亿美元，有些甚至不到一年就突破十亿美元。

We have so many companies went zero to over $100,000,000 in less than a year, some zero to over $1,000,000,000 in less than a year.

所以，我们以前从未见过这种情况。

So it was like, we've never seen that before.

而在人工智能领域，与此相关的是，潜在客户的情况已今非昔比。

And then the kind of corollary to that in AI is that leads aren't what they once were.

在我整个科技生涯中，以及整个软件历史中，一直有个概念叫‘人月神话’。

So for my whole life in technology and for the whole history of software, there was this thing called the mythical man month.

人月神话的意思是，九个女人也无法在一个月内生出一个孩子。

And the way the mythical man month, nine women cannot have a baby in a month.

所以，你不能仅仅因为你是谷歌，就派一千名软件工程师去压垮一家初创公司，因为有些产品只能由大约七个已婚人士来开发。

So you can't just, if you're Google, you can't just put a thousand software engineers on a product and wipe out a startup because you can only build that product with, say, seven married people.

一旦他们搞定了，掌握了这个优势，你就得花很长时间才能追上。

And once they've figured it out, they've got that lead, and you're gonna have to you know, you're gonna be behind for a long time.

但在人工智能领域，情况并非如此。

That's not true with AI.

在人工智能领域，只要你拥有数据，尤其是专有数据，再加上足够的GPU，你几乎可以解决任何问题。

So with AI, if you have data, particularly proprietary data, and you have enough GPUs, you can solve almost any problem.

这简直是魔法。

It is magic.

但这意味着你可以砸钱来解决问题，而这种事在科技行业以前从未有过。

But it means that you can throw money at the problem, And we've never had that in tech.

因此，我认为这实际上将推动大量公司上市，因为人们希望套现，获得资金以继续竞争，因为这真的势在必行。

And so I think that that's actually going to drive a lot of IPOs because people are going to want to get out and have the capital to continue to compete because it's really necessary.

你不能只是拥有一个优势就坐享其成。

You don't just have a lead you can sit on.

所以我认为，这将是非常令人兴奋的一年。

So it's going to be a very exciting year, I think.

你刚才提到了联邦贸易委员会。

You were talking about the FTC earlier.

我知道你和马克最近在D区花的时间比以往多得多。

I know you and Mark are spending a lot more time in D.

在C区。

C.

比以前多得多。

Than you ever have.

还有克里斯。

Chris.

克里斯，你目前最关注哪些政策议程？为什么你觉得现在比以往任何时候都更重要？

And Chris, What are some of the policy agendas you're most focused on, and why do you think this is more important now than it's ever been?

首先是加密货币，因为我们当时认为，现在依然认为，加密货币是一项极其重要的技术。

Well, first one was crypto because we thought then and we continue to think crypto is an extremely important technology.

这不仅是我们在金融技术领域见过的最深刻的突破，更是对社会运作方式的一种真正变革。

It's kind of not just the kind of most profound breakthrough in kind of financial technology that we've seen, but a real breakthrough in just how society works.

所以，从互联网上的财产权如何运作开始，

So everything from, you know, how do property rights work on the Internet?

当创作者贡献了大部分价值时，什么样的架构才是合适的？

What is the right architecture for things where creatives contribute most of the value?

什么样的商业架构才是正确的？

What's the right business architecture?

利益相关者资本主义到底是什么？

What is stakeholder capitalism, really?

这些问题都可以通过加密货币来解决。

These are all things that get solved with crypto.

所以我们认为，加密货币对社会进步至关重要，我们必须避免滑向共产主义这类方向。

So we thought it was so important and so important for the advance of society to not have us descend into communism and these kinds of things.

但上届政府完全禁止了它，并非通过法律程序或立法程序，而是单纯依靠权力意志，我们称之为政府的滥用权力，包括像取消银行服务这样的手段。

And it got completely banned by the last administration, but not through a legal process, not through a legislative process, but just through sheer will and, we'd say, abusive power of the government, including techniques like debanking.

我们的公司收到了警告函，我以前从未在私营公司见过这种情况，这完全是政府对我国一个技术行业的打压。

Our company got Wells notices, which I've never seen before in a private company, so just an attack from the government on an industry, a technology industry in this country.

所以我们觉得，我们必须介入并着手解决这个问题。

And so we were like, Well, we've got to get in and work on that.

于是第一件事就是《天才法案》和《稳定币法案》，它们在《地狱法案》中通过了，我们对此非常自豪。

And so the first thing was the Genius Act and the Stablecoin bill, which passed in his hell law, and we're very proud of that.

第二项我们认为更重要的法案是《清晰法案》，也称为市场结构法案，它确立了——这对于这项技术来说是必不可少的，因为这些代币可以代表宝可梦卡、股票凭证，也可以代表一美元。

The second one, which we think is the more important bill, is the Clarity Act, which is also known as market structure, which kind of establishes, and it's such a necessary thing for this technology because you have these tokens that can represent Pokemon card, that can represent a stock certificate, that can represent a dollar.

但当时没有任何规则来说明：这个代币到底属于哪一种？

And there were no rules to say, Well, which one is this token?

而拜登政府的做法是：所有东西都算作证券，甚至到了起诉艺术家的地步，比如：‘我画了一幅画，做了个NFT。’

And the approach of the Biden administration was everything's a security, to the point where they sued artists for, like, oh, I painted a picture, I made an NFT.

‘你卖了证券。’

Oh, you sold a security.

这简直太荒谬了。

Like, that crazy.

所以我们现在正努力推动这项法案通过。

So this one, we're trying to get past right now.

关于这一点，我们经历了一些风波，我就不多评论了，但确实有这么回事。

And we've had some drama around it, which I'm not gonna comment on, but that's a thing.

第二个非常重要的领域是人工智能。

The second one that's really important is AI.

就像汽车或电力这些技术一样，人们往往会因为它们的巨大影响而感到恐慌。

So, you know, like with, I think, with the automobile or with electricity, with these two technologies, people kind of freak out about them because they do have big impact.

它们将改变世界。

They are going to change the world.

尤其是人工智能，有些声音来自内部，有人试图吓唬公众，有时是为了实现监管俘获或其他目的。

And with AI in particular, some of the calls are coming from inside the house where people are really trying to kind of scare the population, sometimes to achieve regulatory capture and other things.

但如果你禁止这项技术——有些人正是这么呼吁的——或者禁止、侵犯人们进行数学运算的能力——这也是许多人呼吁的——那么我认为我们肯定会把人工智能的主导权让给中国，这将带来长达百年的深远影响。

But if you ban the technology, which some people are calling for, or ban or kind of infringe people's ability to do mathematics, which is something that a lot of people are calling for, then I think we're definitely going to lose the AI rights to China, which has massive hundred year implications.

因此，我们努力保护的关键点之一是：模型就是模型。

And so the key things we're trying to protect are, one, the model is the model.

它就是一个模型。

It is a model.