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我们公司历史上表现最好的基金实际上是一支10亿美元的基金。
Our best performing fund in the history of the firm is actually a $1,000,000,000 fund.
如果你过度担心未来潜在的竞争,你总是能找到理由放弃投资。
If you overweight the fear of future theoretical competition, you can always talk yourself out of making an investment.
衡量一家公司的首要标准最终是投入资本回报率。
The number one way to measure a company is ultimately return on invested capital.
关于今天的毛利率问题,我想说这一点。
On the the gross margin point today, I'll say this.
我们现在对这一点的宽容度比以前更高了。
We give a little bit more of a pass than we used to.
你认为在什么价格点上,对OpenAI的投资就不再是一个明智的美元使用方式?
At what point does the entry price do you think for OpenAI become not a good use of dollars?
我就是不明白,而且我很想弄明白,这个现金流是怎么回事。
What I just don't understand, and I would love to, is flow.
你能帮我理解一下现金流吗?
Can you help me understand flow?
因为我觉得世界都感到困惑了。
Because I think the world kind of scratched their head.
当别人都不理解时,为什么它对你来说却说得通?
Why did it make sense to you when it didn't make sense to anyone else?
当传统的成长型投资规则失效,新的规则取而代之时,会发生什么?
What happens when the usual rules of growth investing stop working and new ones take their place?
在本集中,大卫·乔治与哈里·塞宾斯进行了他迄今为止最坦诚的一次公开对话,探讨了他如何评估公司、定价风险,以及在人工智能重塑的市场中做出决策。
In this episode, David George joins Harry Sebbings from one of the most unfiltered conversations he's had publicly about how he evaluates companies, prices risk, and makes decisions in a market reshaped by AI.
他们深入探讨了为何对理论性竞争的恐惧会扼杀优秀投资,如何在最佳公司比以往更快发展的背景下思考入场价格,以及大卫从支持定义类别的赢家中学到了什么。
They get into why fear of theoretical competition can kill great investments, how to think about entry price when the best companies move faster than ever, and what David has learned from backing category defining winners.
他们还涉及了一些更尖锐的话题。
They also cover some of the spicier topics.
在什么情况下值得为早期人工智能公司支付溢价?为什么某些遗漏的错误仍令人痛心?流量背后的真实逻辑是什么?以及如何在市场尚未察觉之前,就识别出创始人的真正优势?
When does it make sense to pay up for an early stage AI company, why certain errors of omission still sting, the real logic behind flow, and how to spot strength of strengths in a founder before the rest of the market sees it.
我们重新分享这一集,因为它为我们提供了最清晰的视角,让我们了解一位16倍思考者如何看待增长、人工智能和下一代突破性公司。
We're resharing this 20 episode because it's one of the clearest windows into how a 16 z thinks about growth, AI, and the next generation of breakout companies.
这是我和哈里·斯蒂宾斯的第二十期节目,今天我非常期待这期节目。
This is 20 with me, Harry Stebbings, and I'm so excited for the show today.
这位嘉宾是我的挚友,一个老朋友,所以当他最近与其他播客做了竞争性节目时,我感到更加受伤。
This guest is a dear friend, a long time friend, and so I was hurt even more when he did a competitive show recently with another podcast.
我气坏了。
I was so pissed off.
我实际上对他说:听着。
I actually said to him, listen.
我们会做我们的节目,但会比平时更尖锐。
We'll do our show, but it's gonna be spicier than normal.
我不会对你手下留情,你得忍着点。
I'm not gonna go easy on you, and you're gonna have to put up with it.
他说:好的。
And he said, fine.
那就开始吧。
Let's do it.
所以今天,我们欢迎大卫·乔治。
And so today, we welcome David George.
大卫·乔治是安德森·霍洛维茨的普通合伙人,负责该公司的成长型投资。
David George is a general partner at Andreessen Horowitz where he leads the firm's growth investing.
他的团队投资了这个时代一些极具开创性的公司,包括Databricks、Figma、Stripe、SpaceX、Andriel和OpenAI。
His team has backed some incredible defining companies of this era, including Databricks, Figma, Stripe, SpaceX, Andriel, and OpenAI.
他现在正在投资新一代的AI初创公司,比如Cursor、Harvey和Abridge等。
He's now investing behind a new generation of AI startups like Cursor, Harvey, and Abridge to name a few.
大卫,老兄,我太期待这次对话了。
David, dude, I am so excited for this.
我一直期待着这次访谈,现在感觉我特别兴奋。
I've been looking forward to this one for a while, and I feel like I'm extra prat now.
我刚听完你在《像顶尖投资人一样投资》上的访谈。
I've just listened to you on invest like the best.
我已经准备好,随时可以开聊了,老兄。
So I'm ready to I'm ready to go, dude.
我们开始吧。
Let's do it.
我实际上提前和你们的大多数合伙人聊过,他们告诉我,必须从我们和埃弗雷特·兰德尔做的那期节目说起。
I actually spoke to most of your partners beforehand, and they said to me that I had to start with a show that we did with Everett Randall.
埃弗雷特·兰德尔在节目中说,你无法直视有限合伙人的双眼,告诉他们你们能用你们当前的基金规模实现五倍回报。
Everett Randall said on the show that you cannot look LPs in the face and tell them you'll do a five x with the fund sizes you have.
你如何看待这种观点:认为用大规模基金不可能向有限合伙人承诺五倍回报?
How do you think about responding to the notion that one can't say to their LPs who'll do a five x with large funds?
嗯,哈里,能再次和你一起聊天真是太好了。
Well, Harry, it is great to be back with you.
我非常喜欢和你相处,很高兴我们能直接切入主题。
I love hanging out with you, so I'm glad we're diving right in.
是的。
Yeah.
关于基金规模,我们的基金在小型、大型、分散化和集中型风险投资基金中始终表现优异。
As it relates to fund sizes, so our funds consistently beat small, large, diversified, concentrated venture funds.
因此,我们的较大基金的表现优于较小的基金,而且在不同策略下,我们的较大基金与较小基金的回报倍数相似。
So our larger funds have outperformed our smaller ones, and our larger ones actually have similar multiples of money to our smaller ones across strategies.
所以,我想首先这么说。
So I would start by just saying this.
在风险投资领域,我们有两个客户。
In venture, we have two customers.
我们有有限合伙人,也有创始人。
We've got the LPs, and we have the founders.
在有限合伙人方面,资金会流向回报最高、风险收益比最优的地方。
On the LP side, money is gonna flow to where the highest returns and best risk reward are.
因此,我认为我们的基金规模正是这一趋势的体现。
And so I think our fund sizes are a reflection of that.
我们公司历史上表现最好的基金实际上是一支10亿美元的基金。
Our best performing fund in the history of the firm is actually a $1,000,000,000 fund.
所以这是一支大型基金。
So it's a large fund.
在该基金中,Databricks 已经实现了基金规模7倍的回报。
In that fund, Databricks has returned 7x the fund so far.
Coinbase 已经实现了基金规模5倍的回报。
Coinbase has returned already 5x of the fund.
在该基金中,我们还投资了 GitHub、DigitalOcean、Lyft 以及许多其他项目。
In that fund, we also had GitHub, DigitalOcean, Lyft, and many other things.
在我看来,我们已有的回报数据已经能清楚地说明这一点。
To me, you can kind of see it in the data in our returns already.
关键在于你捕捉到了多少个赢家。
It's about the number of winners you capture.
如果那些大赢家表现优异,结果就会非常理想。
And if the big ones are great, that can really work out.
因此,根据我们的经验,认为大基金无法取得优异回报的观点是不成立的。
So I think the idea that large funds can't have great returns is just not true in our experience.
私募市场已经发生了变化。
So private markets have changed.
技术浪潮创造了更大的机会。
Tech waves create bigger opportunities.
让我逐一谈谈每一个。
Let me just talk about each.
过去十年里,私募市场增长了十倍。
The private markets have grown 10x over ten years.
如今,我们的市场市值已超过5万亿美元。
It's over $5,000,000,000,000 of market cap now in our market.
我们刚刚研究了2017年至2025年最大的50次IPO。
We actually just looked at the 50 top IPOs from 2017 to 2025.
如果拆解收益来源,47%的收益发生在C轮到B轮之间,而53%的收益发生在C轮及之后。
And if you disaggregate where the dollars of return come from, 47% of the dollars of gain happens between the C and the Series B, and 53% of the dollars of gain happen from Series C plus.
当我们看到这一点时其实很惊讶,但后期阶段确实产生了巨额收益。
Was actually surprised when we looked at this, but there's a tremendous amount of dollars of gain that happened at the later stage.
这对应着17到25次IPO。
And that's 17 to 25 IPOs.
这实际上稍微偏向于公司在规模较小时就上市的情况。
That actually skews a little bit heavily toward when companies were still going public when they were smaller.
所以,退出收益的规模是巨大的。
So the size of outcomes, you know, is huge.
我们再次拥有5万亿美元的私募市场市值。
Again, we've got 5,000,000,000,000 of private market cap.
如果你看看我们的LSV基金,这些基金的合计市值范围在7000亿美元到1.5万亿美元之间。
If you look at our LSV funds, the aggregate market cap in those funds has ranged between 700,000,000,000 to 1 and a half trillion.
因此,这都是大型公司,如果你根据这些公司实现3倍或5倍回报的持股比例来计算,情况是相当可控的。
So it's just large companies, and if you apply ownership assumptions to that relative to generating three x or five x returns, it's pretty manageable.
这就是私募市场以及发生的变化,我们可以就此展开大量讨论。
So that's the private market and the conditions that have changed, and we can talk a bunch about that.
技术浪潮往往会创造截然不同的价值。
Tech waves tend to create massively different value.
这已经被广泛报道,但移动、社交、SaaS、云计算和电子商务同时兴起所带来的市值创造高达25万亿美元。
I mean, is very well covered, but the big story of mobile social SaaS cloud ecommerce all at once was 25,000,000,000,000 of market cap creation.
如果今天从零开始,考虑到我刚刚描述的公开与私人市场动态,如此多的价值创造将发生在私人市场。
And if that started from scratch today, given the public private market dynamic that I just described, so much of that value creation would take place in the private markets.
所以我们正处于这一轮新科技浪潮的第一局胜势中。
So we're in winning inning one of this new big tech wave.
我从未预料到,在上一轮浪潮中,像Salesforce这样的公司会值2300亿美元,ServiceNow会值1750亿美元,CrowdStrike会值1300亿美元,DoorDash会值1000亿美元。
I never would have expected in the last wave that companies like Salesforce would be worth $230,000,000,000, or ServiceNow would be worth a $175,000,000,000, or CrowdStrike, a $130,000,000,000, or DoorDash, a $100,000,000,000.
但事实就是如此。
But here we are.
如果你看看当前私人市场与公开市场的差异,新一轮科技浪潮中,赢家的规模将主要在私人市场中形成。
And if you look at what's happening in the private versus public markets now, the size of the winners from a new tech wave, that's going happen in the private markets.
随着私人市场的延长,你是否担心公司上市时间被过度推迟,以至于在它们上市前,就被新的私人公司竞争蚕食?
With the extension of private markets, are you worried that, essentially, companies are not going out for so long that they are getting competed by new private companies before they get a chance to get out?
可以看看Axon和Flock Safety之间的动态,这是一个很好的例子:Axon正在侵蚀Flock Safety的部分业务,比如在亚特兰大取代了Flock的核心业务,而两家公司都是私营的,它们在这样一个世界里相互蚕食——在传统世界中,其中一家本应在此期间上市。
Can look at the dynamic between Axon and Flock Safety as a good example of that, where Axon is, like, eating away at part of Flock Safety's business, where they replace them in Atlanta, a core part of Flock's business, and both are private, and they're eating away at each other in a world where one of them would have gone public in that time in a traditional world.
是的。
Yeah.
说实话,我认为是公开还是私有市场,与竞争格局关系不大。
I don't I don't think that whether it's public or private has much to do with the competitive dynamics, to be honest.
但
But it
这对风险投资者的流动性有影响。
does in terms of liquidity for venture investors.
比如,是的。
Like, if Yeah.
嗯,我们
Well, we, you
我们领投了FlockSafety的三轮融资。
know, we've led three rounds in FlockSafety.
我们还领投了他们的上一轮融资。
We we led their last round too.
因此,我们对FlockSafety仍然非常看好。
And so we're still quite bullish about FlockSafety.
你可以谈谈与Axon日益激烈的竞争。
You could talk about the increasing competition with Axon.
关于这一点,真正的故事是,市场现在终于开始接受技术了。
The real story of that one is that the market is actually embracing technology now, finally.
过去,向执法部门销售产品是一个非常糟糕的领域。
And so, it used to be that historically selling into law enforcement was a terrible category.
但现在看来,这反而成了一个绝佳的领域。
And now, it turns out that it's a wonderful category.
如果你的产品真正具有吸引力,就能获得巨大的市场份额。
If you actually have the most compelling products, you can get tremendous amounts of market share.
因此,我完全不担心这种竞争态势。
And so I don't worry about that dynamic at all.
说实话,我认为这些公司中有一些一直保持私有化,反而对我们有利,因为我们可以随着时间推移增加持股比例。
You know, frankly, think the more some of those companies have stayed private, it's been to our benefit because we've been able to increase our ownership over time.
考虑到你的名气和你通常持有的巨大份额,你能否通过Accenture的私募市场套现?
Are you able to take money off the table with the Accenture private markets given how big a name you are and how big a position you often have?
你只是股权结构中的一大块。
You're just a a big piece of a cap table.
对于像我这样的人,在后期轮次退出要容易得多。
For someone like me, it's much easier to sell out in a later round.
你能做到吗?
Are you able to?
你们内部有没有讨论过,嘿。
And do you have that discussion internally of, hey.
我们现在应该套现了。
We should take chips off the table now.
我们可以,但历史上我们一直没有这么做。
We could, but we historically have not.
对于大多数选择保持私有化的公司,我们一直非常乐意继续持有并支持它们,这可能也是我们未来将继续坚持的策略。
You know, for the most part, for the companies that has decided to stay private, we've been really excited to stay in them, keep backing them, and that's probably the strategy that we'll we'll continue to have.
我认为保持私有化的趋势被夸大了,因为某些公司选择私有化可能有一些特殊原因。
You know, I think this staying private dynamic is a little bit overblown because I think there's some idiosyncratic reasons why certain companies have stayed private.
我接触的许多公司、许多首席执行官都非常乐意成为上市公司,或者对上市感到兴奋。
Many companies, many CEOs that I talk to, they are very happy to be public or they're excited to go public.
我经常告诉我们的首席执行官们。
You know, I tell our CEOs all the time.
我很幸运能与多家上市公司合作。
I've been fortunate to work with a bunch of public companies.
他们中没有一个人说过我后悔上市。
Never one of them has said I regret going public.
我认为,对于我们所讨论的大多数公司来说,它们会比历史上等待更久,但最终仍会上市。
I think for most of the companies that we're talking about, they'll wait longer than they had historically, but they will still end up going public.
真的吗?
Seriously?
是的。
Yeah.
我不是那个意思,我不是想说得那么糟糕。
I don't mean I don't mean that horribly.
我遇到的公开上市公司的首席执行官中,有很多人告诉我,他们希望自己是私营企业。
I don't meet many public CEOs who don't tell me they wish they were private.
不。
No.
我的意思是,你看。
I mean, look.
我认为上市有巨大的好处。
I think there's tremendous benefits to being public.
当然,作为私营企业也有巨大的优势,我们可以谈谈。
Now there's huge benefits for being private as well, which we can talk about.
但你知道,你可以看看那些上市后经历艰难历程的公司,他们会说,他们不会后悔。
But, you know, you could look at many of the public companies that are out there that had difficult paths, and and they would say, you know, they wouldn't trade it.
对吧?
Right?
你能真正告诉我,上市的好处具体有哪些吗
Can can you genuinely, can you tell me what those benefits would be of
成为上市公司?
being public?
在某些情况下,这是获得资本的途径。
It's access to capital in some cases.
只有少数私营公司能在私募市场轻松获得资本。
So there are select few private companies that have very easy access to capital in the private markets.
我认为私募市场存在一种权衡,即使你能获得大量资本,其资本成本实际上更高。
I think there's a trade off in the private markets where you actually have a more expensive cost of capital, even if you have access to a lot of it.
我认为在公开市场可以获得更低的资本成本。
I think you can get a cheaper cost of capital in the public markets.
这有点
It's a little bit
团队在私募市场仍能获得比公开市场更低的资本成本。
The team can still get a cheaper cost of capital than public.
对我来说,公开市场更昂贵。
Like, public, to me, is more expensive to say.
对我来说,私人市场在价格上给了我们更多的弹性。
Privates, we've given more elasticity on price today to me.
不是吗?
No?
哦,我不这么认为。
Oh, I don't think so.
我不这么认为。
I I don't think so.
我们投资的公司,我对它们在私人市场上的前景非常看好。
The companies that we've invested in, I I'm very excited about them in the private market.
我认为如果它们
And I think if they were
比如,当你看Raptor或Lovable的定价时,它们的价格和Wix一样。
like, when you look at a Raptor or a Lovable price where it is, it's, like, priced at the same price as Wix.
而Wix的市值大约是20亿美元。
And the Wix is doing, you know, 2,000,000,000.
是的。
Yeah.
我离那些公司太远了,不了解。
I'm not close enough to those to know.
我不关注那些。
I don't I don't follow those.
我们离得不够近。
We're not close enough.
可比公司的情况与我们所说的形成了鲜明对比。
The comps are very, very sharply contrasting what we're saying there.
这实际上让私募市场的难度更大。
That actually publishes harder on private.
更低的资本成本。
A cheaper cost of capital.
是的。
Yeah.
你看。
Look.
我们和那些公司并不接近。
We're not close to those companies.
我还不够了解他们是如何根据业绩进行估值的。
I'm not close enough to know how they're valued relative to their performance.
我可以这么说,在我们的投资组合中,过去一年左右我们投资的公司,我很有信心,如果它们在公开市场上市,可能会以更低的成本获得资本。
I can say in our portfolio, the companies that we have invested in over the last year or so, I'm pretty confident that if they were in the public markets, they'd probably have access to capital at a cheaper cost.
我总是记得,我觉得是约翰·科利森说过,哦,我为什么不做那个口音呢,因为我口音模仿得烂透了,这也就是我为什么不是演员的原因。
I always remember watching I think it was John Collison say, oh, why why I'm not gonna do the accent because I'm shit at accents, which is, you know, why I'm not an actor.
你已经有了那个好的了。
You you already have the good one.
你没必要去改动它。
You don't need to mess with it.
别说了。
Stop it.
抱歉。
Sorry.
你太客气了。
You're too kind.
我不希望约翰因此取消对我的关注。
And I don't want John to, like, unfriend me.
但他却说,我不明白我为什么要上市。
But he was like, I don't understand why I would go public.
我不需要某个25岁的初级职员来告诉我,我需要更高效地做规划。
I don't need some, like, 25 year old associate to tell me that I need to, you know, plan more efficiently.
是的。
Yeah.
对于某些公司来说,这确实是个巨大的优势。
For certain companies, like, it's a huge benefit.
你知道的?
You know?
对于像Stripe这样能在私募市场获得相当流动性的人来说,我理解。
For somebody like Stripe that can get a pretty liquid, you know, market in the private markets, I get it.
对于他们来说,我认为最大的好处并不在于此,因为我认为从长远来看,如果你透明、讲好故事、与公开市场分享,他们最终会理解你的业务。
For them, I think the biggest benefit is not so much that, because I think in the fullness of time, if you're transparent, you tell a tell a good story, share with the public markets, they'll kind of understand your business.
我认为最大的优势在于避免股价波动以及员工管理方面的压力。
I think the biggest advantage is the avoidance of volatility in your stock price and sort of employee management.
你知道,如果你能在私募市场稳步增长或控制股价,即使比公开市场的价格略低,我也完全理解这种好处。
You know, if you can kind of steadily grow or control your stock price in the private markets, even if it's a slight discount to where you would be in the public markets, I get the benefit of that for sure.
我们已经看到一些公司成功做到了这一点。
We've seen some of our companies that have have been able to do that.
对吧?
Right?
Stripe、SpaceX、Databricks,显然这为他们带来了明显的优势。
Stripe, SpaceX, Databricks, you know, it's worked to their advantage for sure.
你认为在私募市场延长的背景下,还有什么是完全胡扯的,或者人们没有看到的、为你们这样规模的基金所带来的机会吗?
Is there anything else that you think is complete bullshit or that people don't see about the extension of private markets and the opportunity that's opened up for fund sizes like yours with this extension?
我认为最缺失的是对资产类别含义变化的认知。
I think the biggest thing that's missing is just the change in what that means for asset classes.
过去,你可以在公开市场接触到那些小型市值的优秀公司。
So it used to be that you could get access to great companies in the public markets that are small cap.
但现在,这样的公司越来越少、越来越难找到了。
It turns out that's fewer and further between now.
我们刚刚对此做了一项分析。
We just did an analysis on this.
事实上,过去二十年里,上市公司的数量减少了一半。
I mean, it turns out that the number of public companies has been cut in half over the last twenty years.
我们所讨论的许多公司,本应已经在公开市场上市,但它们并没有。
You know, the companies that we're talking about, many of them would already be in the public markets, and they're not.
因此,如果你看看收益的来源,实际上收益是在公司进入公开市场之前,就在私募市场中产生的。
And so, you know, if you look at where the returns are getting generated, the returns are actually getting generated in the private markets before they go to the public markets.
现在,如果你观察公开市场中剩余的小市值公司,确实还有一些高质量的企业,但整体质量已经下滑了。
And now, if you look at what remains in small cap land in the public markets, there are definitely some high quality companies, but the quality has deteriorated.
我一个朋友刚刚和我分享了这项分析,显示了过去三十年来罗素2500指数的投入资本回报率。
A friend of mine just shared this analysis with me that that showed the return on invested capital of the Russell twenty five hundred over the last thirty years.
如果你看ROIC——在我看来,这是衡量公司质量最简单的指标——它已从7.5%稳步下降到3%,下降了一半以上。
And if you look at the ROIC, which to me is, like, the easiest measure of the quality of the company, it's gone from seven and a half percent steadily down to 3%, more than cut in half.
这是一个相当平稳的下滑趋势。
And that's a pretty steady decline.
我的意思是,它会随着经济周期起伏波动。
Mean, it ebbs and flows with economic cycles.
所以我认为最被忽视的一点是,这可能是一种我们必须适应的现实,不仅对我们管理业务的方式如此,对机构投资者和有限合伙人群体而言也是如此:这个资产类别已不再是专门的小盘股了。
So I think the biggest thing that's that's missing, and it's probably a reality that we have to adapt to in how we run our business, but it's also a reality for institutional investors in the LP community that the asset class is no longer bespoke small thing.
它更像是成人的联赛。
It's like the grown up leagues.
你知道,这是顶级联赛。
You know, it's the big leagues.
如果你看看私人科技领域高质量公司的规模,它们的体量远超美国私募股权科技公司的规模。
Like, if you just look at the size of the private technology, high quality companies, it dwarfs the size of private equity technology in The US.
这是一个重大转变。
That's a major shift.
我们必须大幅调整我们的业务来适应这一点。
And we've had to adapt our business to it in a big way.
对吧?
Right?
比如,如果这些公司保持私有更长时间,我们就得为它们提供新的东西。
Like, if the companies stay private longer, we gotta give them new stuff.
它们必须推出多种产品。
They have to be multiproduct.
它们必须开拓多个渠道。
They have to be multichannel.
它们必须走向国际化。
They have to be international.
而有了人工智能,这一切正在快得多地发生。
And with AI, it's happening much, much faster.
所以我们自己的业务也发生了变化,但我
So we've changed our business as well, but I
我认为,市场现实是,对各类资产的历史性看法已经不能反映它们今天的实际状况。
think the market reality is just historical views of what the asset classes are do not reflect what they actually are today.
完全同意。
Completely agree.
我是一名机构投资者,管理着一笔100亿美元的捐赠基金。
So I'm an institutional investor with a $10,000,000,000 endowment fund.
鉴于你刚才提到的这种模糊性、融合性和缺乏清晰性,我应该如何调整私募股权、风险投资和公开市场的资产配置?
How should I change my asset allocation between PE, venture, publace, given that blurriness merging lack of clarity that you just mentioned?
你真正会给我什么建议?
What would you genuinely advise me?
我有严重的偏见。
I'm heavily biased.
而且,你知道,我承认许多捐赠基金的初始配置是这样的,我认为很多机构可能在私募资产上配置得过多了。
And, you know, look, I I recognize that many of the endowments have a starting position, which is, you know, I think many have probably find themselves a little bit over allocated to to privates.
我不知道如何将这一点与未来的前景进行比较。
And so I don't know how to assess that relative to the future outlook.
但如果只考虑未来前景,我认为最具吸引力的机会在哪里?
But if I take the future outlook only, where do I think are the most attractive opportunity set?
比如,你从当今世界市值最高的十家公司与二十五年前的情况开始比较,前十名中有八家是美国西海岸的科技公司,而且它们都曾获得风险投资支持。
Like, you just start with where the 10 most valuable companies in the world are today versus twenty five years ago, eight of the top 10 are US West Coast based technology companies, and they were venture backed.
如果你假设未来可能类似于过去二十年的情况,我认为最值得关注的资产类别就是那些能够投资于下一代主导型公司的领域。
If you assume that the future is likely to be something similar to what's happened in the last twenty years, I think the most interesting place to be is this asset class, which has exposure to what those next generational dominant companies can be.
资产配置应该反映这种变化:过去属于公开市场的部分,如今已不再属于,这构成了一个全新的资产类别。
The allocation should reflect this sort of melding of what used to be part of the public markets that no longer is, that's sort of a a newer asset class.
因此,这是其中的一方面。
And so that's one piece of it.
我在私募股权领域的朋友做得非常出色。
My friends in private equity do an amazing job.
他们的回报率极其惊人。
They have incredible returns.
他们的回报比你高吗?
Do they have better returns than you?
如果你问我,我的合规人员不让我们谈论回报。
If you were to look my compliance guy doesn't let us talk about returns.
但如果你看看我们的回报,或者顶级风险投资基金的回报——我们就这么叫吧——相对于顶级私募股权基金,顶级风险投资基金的表现更优。
But if you were to look at our returns or the top performing venture funds, let's just call it that, relative to, you know, top performing PE funds, the top performing venture funds outperform.
这是历史数据,但我认为未来会更加极端,因为我认为人工智能以及人工智能的有效应用,将是未来十年对公司最重要的因素。
That's historical, but I think it's gonna be, you know, more extreme in the future because I think AI and the effective implementation of AI is gonna be the most important thing for companies over the next ten years.
我有很多事情想聊。
There's so many things that I wanted to talk about.
你提到那十家公司中有八家是美国的。
You said that that that eight out of the 10 are US.
坦白说,你会不会觉得:别担心欧洲了。
Candidly, would you be like, ah, don't worry about Europe.
如果你已经覆盖了美国市场,就已经占了十家中的八家。
If you have a US covered, you've got eight out of the 10.
你占据了主导市场份额。
You've got dominant market share.
硅谷依然保持着人工智能中心的地位。
Silicon Valley's retained the title as AI center.
当然,我在伦敦。
Obviously, I'm in London.
我不介意,但你会这么说吗?
I'm not gonna be offended, but is that what you would say?
不会。
No.
完全不会。
Not at all.
我的意思是,欧洲有很多优秀的创业者,我们也投资了不少。
I mean, there's great entrepreneurs in Europe, and we've backed a bunch.
对吧?
Right?
比如,我们投资了Eleven Labs的Matty,他正在打造一家我们认为具有代际领先地位的公司,表现非凡。
Like, we backed Matty from eleven Labs, and he's doing an extraordinary job building what we think is a generational market leading company.
你摇头了。
You're shaking your head.
是的。
Yeah.
我在种子轮的时候拒绝了。
I turned it down at Seed.
你不能下注一千。
You can't can't can't bet a thousand.
老兄,你们那边有一个我当初在种子轮拒绝的项目,每天让我睡不着觉,天天如此。
Dude, one of yours, I turned down at seed that keeps me up every day, every day.
成交。
Deal.
我最喜欢Deal的地方是,他简直不知疲倦。
My favorite thing about Deal, mean, I is just absolutely relentless.
所以我最近发了一条帖子。
So I I recently I had some post.
我想那是一个公告,你知道的,我发在领英上的内容。
I think it was, you know, an announcement of something, you know, that I posted on LinkedIn.
有人评论了。
Somebody had commented.
一家成长型公司的CFO在下面评论了。
A CFO of a growth stage company had commented on it.
我立刻收到Alex发来的截图,他圈出了那条评论,说:你能介绍我认识这个人吗?
And I immediately get a screenshot from Alex circling the comment, and he said, can you introduce me to this guy?
他看起来像是个很棒的潜在客户。
He looks like a great deal customer.
我就想,这家伙真是无时无刻不在推销。
And I'm like, man, this guy is always selling.
在这样的市场里,这正是你所需要的。
In a market like that, like, that is exactly what you need.
我太喜欢了。
I love it.
老兄,我周日早上就给他发了消息,说嘿。
Dude, I pinged him on a Sunday morning, and I said, hey.
一家欧洲项目公司。
A Project Europe company.
这些都是年纪非常轻的创始人,不到25岁,还没有员工。
This is, like, very young founders under the age of 25 with no employees.
想成为我们的客户。
Wants to be a deal customer.
你们团队里最低层级的人是谁?我该把他们介绍给谁?
Who's the lowest person on your team I should introduce who should I introduce them to on your team?
我,你现在就可以做了。
Me, you can do it now, please.
我今天就接这个电话。
I'll take the call today.
我当时就想,天哪,就这一个人。
I was like, dude, it's like, this one person.
他说,我来搞定。
He said, I'll do it.
见到他真酷。
It's cool to meet him.
这简直太棒了。
It's actually amazing.
他真是不知疲倦。
He's he's he's relentless.
你知道吗,这正是我喜欢的那种创始人。
And, you know, look, like, this is very much the kind of founder that I love.
我同意你的看法。
I agree with you.
当我们看这个阶段的市场时,尤其是这种价格,我唯一担心的是,我们虽然承担的是早期公司的风险,但价格却高得像之前非常成熟的公司一样。
One thing I do worry about when we look at this stage of the market, especially when it comes to this price, is that we're, like, taking venture risk in terms of probability stage of company, but at prices that were previously very, very mature companies.
你怎么看待在如此高的成熟公司估值下承担风投风险?
How do you think about that taking venture risk at super high mature company prices?
我认为在某些情况下这是合理的。
I think there are certain instances where it makes sense.
我的意思是,我同意你的观点,市场上有很多情况这样做并不合理。
I mean, I would agree with you that there are many instances in the market where that doesn't make sense.
在某些情况下,尽管公司还处于非常早期的阶段,但成功的可能性却非常高。
There are certain instances where some degree of likelihood of success is very, very, very high despite a very early stage.
举个例子,我的合伙人莎拉主导了对Character AI的投资。
And so as an example, you know, my partner Sarah led around a Character AI.
当时它还处于极其早期的阶段,但我们却以你所谓的成长期价格进行了投资。
And, you know, it was extremely early stage and we invested at a, you know, what you would call a growth stage price.
但我们知道,支持Gnome并获得某种程度成功的可能性极高。
But we knew that the likelihood of some degree of success in backing Gnome was extremely high.
结果确实如我们所料。
You know, it worked out that way.
因此,对于像这样极其特殊的人,我们愿意进入这些情况。
And so for for extremely, extremely special people like that, we're we're comfortable to step into those situations.
那么,你会为这类交易辩护吗?
So would you argue for deals like that actually?
风险并不在于进入价格,因为你有清算优先权,这意味着像诺姆这样的人,无论清算优先权是多少,比如一亿或两亿美元,他都肯定能被收购。
The risk is not the entry price because you've got the lick pref, which means that someone like Norm, he's always gonna get bought for whatever the lick pref is, like, whatever, a 100 or 200,000,000, obviously.
是的。
Yeah.
我们几乎从不因为‘我们有’而做出投资决定。
We almost never make an investment saying, like, oh, we've got
清算优先权。
the liquidation preference.
但确实存在某些类似的情况,我们觉得回报非常不对称。
But, you know, there are certain situations like that where, know, you we feel like it's pretty asymmetric.
投资GNOME时,你觉得下行风险相当安全,而上行空间却极其巨大。
Backing GNOME, you feel like there's a pretty safe downside, and there's an extremely high upside.
我所说的这类人,其实有些是早期阶段的人才。
The kinds of people I I say people because these you know, some of these are, like, earlier stage people best.
像这样值得做出投资决策、需要如此思考的人,我认为非常少。
The kinds of people like that that warrant an investment decision, you know, a thought process like that, I think are extremely small.
我的名单上只有五个人。
I mean, the list is five people.
我跟你团队的Brian Kim聊过,他问我,你们的增长基金是否肩负着弥补风投团队遗漏错误的职责?
I spoke to Brian Kim on your team, and he asked me, do you see as part of the growth funds charter to fix the errors of omission from your venture team?
确实如此。
Very much so.
但我们是与早期阶段团队合作来完成的。
And but we do it in partnership with the early stage team.
这就是我们的整个模式。
So this is this is like our whole model.
对吧?
Right?
我们经常讨论自己犯的错误,而且在成长阶段,我也确实经历过一些非常痛苦的遗漏错误。
We talk about mistakes we make all the time, and and we have some very I have very painful errors of omission at the growth stage too.
如果你想想我们的业务本质,在早期阶段,我们永远不可能抓住所有最佳交易的100%。
If you think about what our business is, we're never gonna have at the early stage a 100% market share of all the best deals.
通过设立成长基金,我们可以在后期介入。
By having a growth fund, we can come later.
我们内部开玩笑时称它为‘纠正错误基金’,但我们会与早期阶段团队紧密合作来实现这一点。
We call it, like, the fix the mistake fund internally when we're joking around, we but do that in close partnership with our early stage team.
所以我们总是参加团队会议。
So we always join team meetings.
我们始终在彼此沟通。
We're always talking to each other.
你知道,我们会问早期团队,嘿。
You know, what what do you you know, asking the early stage team, like, hey.
你们错过的哪些A轮项目,现在后悔没投?
What series a's do you wish you had done that you passed on?
你知道,你觉得错过了哪些C轮项目?
You know, which c's do you feel like you passed on?
所以当你遇到像你描述的Maddie那样的情况,因为没投种子轮而抓狂时,没关系。
And so when you have a situation like what you described with Maddie, pulling your hair out that you that you didn't do the seed, you know, that's okay.
回头再来,把B轮或C轮的错误补回来。
Come back and, you know, come back and fix the mistake at the B or the C.
因此,这是我们的核心职责之一。
And so it's a huge part of our charter.
从数量上看,我们大约一半的投资都是对现有风险公司的跟投。
By the numbers, about half of what we do is follow ons from existing venture companies.
从金额上看,另外15%是对现有成长期公司的跟投。
And then from a dollar standpoint, another 15% is follow ons from existing growth stage companies.
大约三分之一则是完全全新的公司。
And then about a third or so is fully net new companies.
当我们投资完全全新的公司时,每次都会与这些创始人在早期阶段就建立过预先的关系。
And when we're doing the fully net new companies, we have a preexisting relationship with those founders from the early stage every time.
所以从定义上讲,你能
And so definitionally Can you
能跟我讲讲这50%和15%吗?
just tell me on the fifty and fifteen?
50%是跟投,那15%是什么?
Fifty is follow on, but 15 is what?
是另一种类型的跟投吗?
Follow on of a different kind?
是源自增长基金的投资。
Of a of an originated growth fund investment.
这一点很重要,因为我们投资时,大约三分之二的时间,都是投向那些我们早已建立关系的公司,要么是早期阶段,要么是增长基金阶段。
The thing that's important about that is, you know, when we invest, I don't know, two thirds of the time, it's into a company that we have a preexisting relationship with, either at the early stage or the growth fund.
所以这50%是,比如我们做了11 Labs的增长轮投资,而幸运的是,詹妮弗和布莱恩做了早期轮投资。
So the 50 is, you know, we we did the 11 labs growth round, and we you know, thankfully, Jennifer and Brian did the the early stage round.
那15%是指,我们主导了Flock Safety的另外两轮投资,或者主导了Figma的另一轮融资,或者给SpaceX追加了更多资金。
The 15 would be we led two more rounds in flock safety, or we led another round into Figma, or we put more money into SpaceX.
所以,有些项目是原本由增长基金发起的,比如Waymo,是我们最初从增长基金投的。
So something that was originated, you know, or Waymo, something that we originally did out of the growth fund.
风险基金错过的项目中,现在回头看看,有哪些让你想骂娘、后悔没加注的?
What did the venture fund do that you didn't double down into that with the benefit of hindsight, you're like, motherfucker, we should have done?
天啊。
Oh, man.
这种例子多得是。
There's many of these.
我的意思是,我们不可能每次都做对。
Mean, we don't we don't get it right all the time.
我认为最相关的是,我们曾经错过,后来又纠正了自己的错误。
I think the most relevant are, like, we passed and then we ended up fixing our own mistake.
比如Deal这家公司,当Anish领投A轮后,我们后来共同领投了C轮。
You know, for example, you know, with Deal, there was a round in between when Anish led the series a and then we co led the series c.
我们当然希望当初一开始就投了。
We obviously wish that we had done that.
但是
But
你从中学到了什么?
What do you learn from that?
嗯。
Yeah.
我也有这种情况。
I I I have this too.
我主动思考,错过Eleven Labs、错过Deal,我学到了什么?
I actively like, what do I learn from missing eleven Labs from missing deal?
我的收获非常简单。
My takeaway is very simple.
我以为自己比市场更聪明。
I thought I was smarter than markets.
我以为自己能预测OpenAI在Eleven Labs这个案例中的产品路线图。
I thought I could forecast what OpenAI's product road map would be in the case of Eleven Labs.
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实际上,我本应该完全押注在优秀的创始人身上。
And, actually, I should have just 100% backed up the truck on amazing founder.
Deal的Alex也是如此。
Same with Alex at Deal.
Payroll、ADP、paychex.com。
Payroll, ADP, paychex.com.
呸。
Bleh.
但Alex真的很棒。
But Alex is amazing.
错过这个机会,你从中得到了什么教训?这是一个错误。
What's your takeaway from missing that b, which is is a mistake?
通常,当我们进行投资时,我们应该始终投资于优势,而不是弥补劣势。
Often, the takeaway is when we make an investment, we should always be investing in strength of strengths as opposed to lack of weaknesses.
这是一种源自本的哲学。
And so this is a philosophy that comes from Ben.
如果创始人和公司有突出的优势,即使存在一些弱点或顾虑也没关系。
If you have spiking strengths in a founder and a company, it's okay if there are weaknesses or concerns.
通常,错误会表现为对未来的竞争感到恐惧,比如对理论上的竞争的担忧。
Often, the mistake will manifest itself as the fear of future competition, like the fear of theoretical competition.
对吧?
Right?
这正是你刚才对11实验室所表达的完美阐述。
So that's that's the perfect articulation of what you just had for 11 labs.
你说,天哪。
You say, oh my gosh.
那实验室不会做吗?
So aren't the labs gonna do it?
这是老派风投的陈词滥调:你知道的,谷歌难道不会做吗?
It's the old VC trope of, you know, well, isn't Google gonna do it?
或者如果Facebook做了这件事怎么办?
Or what happens if if Facebook does this?
如果你过分担心未来的理论性竞争,你总是能找到理由放弃投资。
If you overweight the fear of future theoretical competition, you can always talk yourself out of making an investment.
因此,我们竭尽全力避免这样做。
And so we try really, really hard not to do that.
如果我们错失了优秀的公司,那并不是因为它们是市场领导者。
Other other mistakes, if we if we pass on great companies, you know, it's not because they're, you know, the market leader.
也不是因为它们拥有良好的商业模式。
It's not because they have a good business model.
而是因为我们觉得市场可能太小了。
It's it's because we think the market might be too small.
这些也是错误。
Those are mistakes too.
我们总是低估市场的规模,关于这一点,我们有很多有趣的故事。
Like, we always underestimate the size of a market, and we have fun stories about that all over the place.
我们确实如此,但这只是个问题
We do, but it's just something
刚做了一个节目,嘉宾谈到了TAM陷阱,即为什么SaaS像日本一样,人口减少、座位减少,实际上TAM比我们想象的要小,无论是你的Dropbox、Twilio还是你的值班任务。
just did a a show where the guest talked about the TAM trap, which is like why SaaS is like Japan, which is like shrinking population, shrinking seats, and actually TAMs being smaller than we thought, and whether it's your Dropboxes or your Twilio's or your pager duties.
是的。
Yeah.
你看,我认为许多现有企业——我称它们为新的 incumbents——相比SaaS刚出现时的传统特许 incumbents,现在处于好得多的位置。
Look, I I think many of the incumbents I call them the new incumbents, and the new incumbents are in much better position, I would say, than, like, you know, licensed incumbents when SaaS came along.
如果我要对这些公司即将面临的颠覆程度进行排序,商业模式的转变是第一位的。
If I were to rank order the level of disruption that is coming for these companies, business model shift is number one.
我们可以谈谈当前最典型的例子。
And so we can talk about examples where that's most in practice today.
比如,我们这边的莎拉和金伯利主导了对Decagon的投资。
You know, Sarah and Kimberly from our side led investment investments in Decagon.
客户服务是最明显的例子,你可以根据任务完成情况来定价。
Customer service is the most obvious one where you can certainly price based on a completion of a task.
这对客户来说是更好、更快、更便宜的价值主张。
It's better, faster, cheaper value prop to the customer.
所以,如果你要与按席位收费的客服产品竞争,小心了。
So if you are going to compete with a seat based customer service thing, look out.
这很难。
That's hard.
这是一种商业模式的转变。
And that's a business model shift.
因此,这是最具颠覆性的一点。
So that's like the most disruptive piece.
我认为,第二具颠覆性的方面是用户界面和工作流程。
The second most disruptive piece, I would argue, is UI and workflow.
第三具颠覆性的方面是数据访问。
And then the third most disruptive piece is access to data.
那么,你到底能访问哪些数据?
So what data do you actually access?
如果你同时在这三个方面实现重大变革,我认为初创公司有很大机会击败现有巨头,也就是所谓的‘新巨头’。
If you have all three of those that undertake major change at the same time, I think you've got a really good chance for a startup to come and beat the incumbent, the new incumbent, if you will.
同时,我根本想不到大软件公司能变得如此庞大。
At the same time, I I just never in a million years would have thought that the big software companies could be as large as they are.
因此,我认为下一波浪潮很可能为这一代公司提供比上一代大得多的机会。
And so I have to think that this next wave probably presents the opportunity for this next generation to be much larger than the than the previous generation.
但这并不意味着它们必须吞噬所有劳动力。
And it doesn't mean that they have to go eat all labor.
我们在幻灯片上也提到过这一点。
We have that on slides too.
但我认为现实中并不会真的发生这种情况。
But I don't think in practice that's actually what happens.
我认为现实中真正发生的是,大量剩余价值被传递给了终端客户,你仍然可以创造出比上一代大得多的公司,
I think in practice what actually happens is there's massive surplus that gets delivered to end customers, and you can still create much bigger companies than
上一代。
the previous generation.
但我确实认为,这又回到了一个关键问题:我们必须看到支出从人力预算向技术预算的转变。
I do think it does go back to this great question though, which is like, we have to see the transition of spend from human labor budgets to technology budgets.
因为如果我们不这么做,技术支出的总可用市场就只会保持不变,而我们都多付了巨额费用。
Because if we don't, then the TAM for technology spend just stays the same, and we've all just overpaid a shit ton.
但这个逻辑唯一的缺陷是,它必须是产品驱动的,而不是自上而下驱动的。
So the only flaw in that logic is that has to be product driven, not top down driven.
这需要由市场拉动。
Like, that needs to be pulled from the market.
这需要让客户明显感受到其中的价值主张,而不是由CIO或CEO说:‘我们需要做AI相关的事情’,于是就转移劳动力支出。
That needs to be slapping the customers in the face that there's a value prop for them to go do that as opposed to CIOs or CEOs saying, you know, we need to do AI stuff, and so let's shift labor spend.
我认为有一些令人鼓舞的数据点。
I would say there's some encouraging data points.
如果你看看最近的财报,有几家公司——你得深入挖掘才能发现——但确实有几家公司已经开始展现出以不同方式运营业务的迹象,并且从AI中获得了极高的投资回报率。
If you look at recent earnings reports, there are a couple of companies, and and you gotta, like, look kinda deep for these, but there are a couple of companies that have started to show signs of actually running their business differently, and showing really high ROI from AI.
那你听说过CH Robinson这家公司吗?
So do you have you heard of CH Robinson?
没有。
No.
嗯。
Yeah.
这是一家卡车经纪公司。
It's a truck brokerage.
他们连接需要发货的客户和卡车公司,促成双方的交易,以便完成运输。
So they take customers who need to ship stuff and trucking companies, and they broker deals between the two so that they can ship things.
美国大部分行业实际上都是通过中介进行的。
Most of the industry in The US is actually intermediated.
不是直接的。
It's not direct.
卡车行业非常分散。
Like, the the trucking industry is very fragmented.
这是一个庞大的业务,过去,他们拥有像足球场那么大的呼叫中心,员工通过打电话来连接各方。
So this is a this is a large business, and, you know, historically, they've had football field sized call centers of people making phone calls and connecting dots.
他们在最近的财报中披露,自2022年以来,核心业务中每人每天的发货量提升了40%。
They just disclosed in their last earnings that they saw a 40% productivity increase measured in shipments per person per day in their core business since the 2022.
提升了40%,而且这是由人工智能驱动的。
40% increase, and it's it's AI driven.
所以实际上,他们的运营利润率提高了680个基点。
And so what's actually happened is their operating margin has gone up 680 basis points.
这真是人工智能的高效应用。
Like, that's very effective implementation of AI.
所以人们总是问,哦,真的有实际应用吗?
And so people always ask, they're like, oh, well, is there real usage?
你知道,我们是不是在泡沫里?
You know, are we in a bubble?
所有这些说法。
All this stuff.
但这恰恰证明了我之前说的没错,那就是将人力劳动转向技术,对我们打造卓越企业来说是根本性的必要。
But that just proves that just proves what I said to be true, though, which is like the transition of human labor to technology is fundamentally necessary for us to have a great business.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
我认为这会发生。
And I think it will happen.
我认为这会发生。
I think it will happen.
我只是说你看到了一些积极的迹象。
I'm just saying you're seeing green shoots.
我不认为这意味着每个SaaS公司都完了,但你知道,就连微软在过去一年左右也减少了6%的员工。
I don't think it necessarily means that every SaaS company is doomed, but, you know, even Microsoft has reduced their headcount by 6% over the last year or so.
我认为
I do think
这意味着你最终会退出。
it means you're gonna tap out, though.
你知道,遗憾的是,我是monday.com和Duolingo的大股东,我们最近的一位嘉宾,也是我的好朋友,就说,没错。
You know, sadly, I'm a big shareholder of monday.com in Duolingo, And, you know, one of our recent guests, who's a dear friend of mine, is like, yeah.
但这就是问题所在。
But that's exactly the problem.
那里并没有人力替代方案。
There's no human labor replacement there.
除非你在公开市场上有明确的人力替代方案,否则你无法获得溢价。
And unless you have a human labor replacement story in public markets today, you're not gonna get the premium.
是的。
Yeah.
而且我认为我们会看到这一点。
And I think that I think we'll see that.
而且我认为我们会看到这一点,同时这将伴随着商业模式的转变。
And I think we'll see that, and I think it will come with a business model shift.
你知道,你谈的是公开市场。
You know, you're talking about the public markets.
在今天的公开市场上,你被默认有罪,直到证明自己无罪。
Like, in the public markets today, you are guilty until proven innocent.
这完全颠倒了我们的刑事司法体系。
It's the full flip side of our criminal justice system.
除非你能证明不是这样,否则你被默认会被AI毁掉。
You are assumed that you are doomed by AI unless proven otherwise.
我认为这可能是一个机会。
I think there's probably opportunity.
我的意思是,你可以看到股价是如何走势的。
I mean, you can see the the way the the stock prices have gone.
我不必参与这个世界。
I don't have to play in that world.
我们可以押注下一件大事,但我确实认为,这将带来巨大的机会来改变现状。
We get to bet on the next thing, but I do think that, you know, there's gonna be a huge opportunity to shift that.
说到这个,
Speaking of,
比如,巨大的机会,一些公司正在抓住这些机会,收入增长的速度快得超出了我们以往的任何经历。
like, the huge opportunities, some companies are taking advantage of them, and the revenue scaling, dude, is just so much faster than any of us have ever seen before.
我们看到企业竞相达到一亿美元的年经常性收入(ARR)。
We see the race to a 100,000,000 ARR.
我觉得你们刚刚做的Gamma产品太棒了,格兰特。
I think you guys just did Gamma, awesome product, Grant.
迅速达到了一亿美元的收入。
Scaled very fast to a 100.
当收入增长如此迅速,而且似乎如此不稳定时,收入还像以前那样重要吗?
Does revenue mean as much as it used to when it's gained so quickly and also seems so transient?
好吧。
Okay.
这是个很好的问题,因为我认为在市场中,你必须非常谨慎地辨别。
So this is a great question because I think this is where you have to be really discerning in the market.
如果留存率和参与度都很高,那么收入的意义和以前是一样的。
It does mean the same as it has before if it is high retention and high engagement.
当我们看AI公司时,我们的标准实际上已经显著提高了,因为它们的增长速度太快了。
The bar has actually gone up significantly for us when we look at AI companies because it's grown so fast.
因此,你不能只看多年的续约行为,但可以观察较短周期的留存情况,最重要的是,你可以观察用户的参与度。
And so you can't actually look at years of renewal behavior, but you can look at shorter cycles of retention, and you, most importantly, can look at engagement.
如果人们大量使用产品并从中获得巨大价值,这是一个非常好的领先指标,我们可以对此感到安心。
If people are using the product a lot and getting a lot of value out of it, that's a really good leading indicator, and we can take comfort in that.
但我们花在关注这一点上的时间,远比上一代产品多得多。
But we have spent way more time focused on that than we did, you know, in the previous generation.
那么,像Gamma这样的公司究竟有什么特别之处呢?
And so what makes companies like Gamma so special?
这又是莎拉的投资之一。
Again, this is one of Sarah's deals.
第一,高度依赖自然增长的客户获取;第二,极高的参与度和留存率。
One, heavily organic customer acquisition, and two, really high engagement and retention.
我们谈到了参与度和留存率的问题。
We talked about the engagement and retention piece.
当客户获取变得容易时,这就太神奇了。
It's magic when you have ease of customer acquisition.
我以前也谈过这一点。
You you know, I've talked about this before.
但你知道,这是我们在AI公司中看到的最令人印象深刻的事情之一。
But, you know, this is one of the most impressive things that we're seeing in the AI companies.
Eleven Labs就有这种特点。
Eleven Labs has this.
ChatGPT也有这种特点。
ChatGPT has this.
X AI也有这种特点。
X AI has this.
那就是有机的客户获取,或者极低成本的销售获取,像Bridge、Harvey这样的公司,市场对它们的产品简直是极度渴求。
Where it's organic customer acquisition or very low cost sales acquisition, a bridge, Harvey, companies where, like, the market is just absolutely starving for their product.
这是一个非常好的迹象。
That's a really good sign.
所以,仅仅因为增长迅速,并不意味着它会变得短暂或质量低下,但评估这一点的标准比以往高得多。
And so just because it grows really fast doesn't mean it's gonna end up transient or lower quality, but the bar for assessing that is way higher than it used to be.
其他公司的标准似乎也高得多。
The bar for other companies is also way higher, it seems.
对此我的问题是,老兄,我手上有不少优秀的企业软件公司。
And my question to that is, dude, I'm sitting on a lot of great enterprise software companies.
我一直以来都被教导,老兄,如果你能实现三倍、三倍、双倍、双倍的增长,就能获得很好的融资。
I was always taught, dude, that you're gonna get great funding if you treble, treble, double, double.
在这个新世界里,三倍、三倍、双倍、双倍的模式还有效吗?
Is treble, treble, double, double dead in this new world?
我认为这个模式在这个新世界里并没有失效。
I don't think it's dead in this new world.
我倾向于认为,衡量一家公司的首要标准最终是投资资本回报率。
I tend to think that companies, the number one way to measure a company is ultimately return on invested capital.
对于早期公司来说,衡量这一点的主要方式是客户获取的效率。
The way you do that with an early stage company mostly is efficiency of customer acquisition.
并不是每家公司都需要从零增长到一百。
Not every company needs to zero to 100.
这取决于它们所处的市场。
It depends on what market they're in.
但我认为,对于拥有AI的公司来说,如果终端客户需求非常旺盛,高速成长能让你有机会建立护城河。
But I do think the companies with AI, if there's very starving end customers, high momentum gives you a chance to build a moat.
我认为,关于增长多快才算足够这一争论,最重要的就在于此。
And I think that's the most important thing about this sort of debate about how high of growth is is good enough.
这取决于你所处的市场。
It depends on the market you're in.
在某些市场中,它们不会那么快地发展。
In some markets, like, they're not gonna move as fast.
但在那些发展极其迅速的市场中,如果你不快速前进,那你就处于一个非常危险的境地。
But in the markets that are moving really fast, if you're not moving really fast, you know, that's a that's a risky place to be.
我认为关于增长势头最重要的事在于,它相对于你的同行群体而言。
I think the most important thing about momentum is just it's relative to your peer set.
如果你的同行群体增长非常迅速,你的直接竞争对手也在快速增长,并且客户留存率高、获客相对容易,那你必须
If your peer set is growing really fast and your your direct competitors are growing really fast, and it's, you know, high retention and customer acquisition is is relatively easy, you need to
也得快速增长。
be growing really fast too.
但现金的机会成本是实实在在的。
But, like, the opportunity cost of cash is so real.
我们前几天在公司内部讨论过这个问题。
We're we're talking about this the other day with the company internally.
我只是觉得,我完全同意。
I'm just like, I I completely agree.
这可能是长期打造一家非常稳健企业的绝佳方式,但我的现金的机会成本是,我本可以投资于下一个Gamma、Harvey、Lovable,随便哪个都行。
It could be a very good way to build a very solid business over a long period of time, but the opportunity cost of my cash is I could be in the next Gamma, Harvey, Lovable, you name it.
没错。
Yeah.
这不错,但这是我的宝贵资金和有限合伙人宝贵资金的最佳去处吗?
It's good, but is it the best place for my precious dollars and for my LP's precious dollars?
是的。
Yeah.
我们花所有时间思考他们的市场拉力在哪里?
We spend all of our time thinking about, like, where is their market pull?
因为那些才是你能最好地建立公司的地方。
Because those are the best places where you can build a company.
就像你刚刚提到的那些公司,它们都有极强的市场拉力。
Like, all those companies that you just described, there's extreme market pull.
它们快速增长的原因并不是因为投入了大量资金去招聘销售代表。
The reason they've grown really fast is not because they've poured tons of money into hiring sales reps.
它们发展迅速的原因是客户需求极其旺盛。
The reason they're going very fast is because there's tremendous customer pull.
所以我们寻找的就是这样的市场。
And so we look for, you know, we look for those markets.
我相信‘造王’现象确实存在。
I believe that king making does exist.
‘造王’现象,对于不了解的人来说,是指一位金融家能够投入如此巨大的资金,从而指定某个品类的赢家,这会带来护城河以及随之而来的各种优势,最终取得胜利。
And king making, for those that don't know, is when a financier is able to invest so much that they are able to anoint a winner in a category, and that then leads to moats and everything that comes with it and ultimately winning.
你认为‘造王’现象存在吗?还是你不同意它存在?
Do you believe that king making exists, or do you disagree that it exists?
当我们思考投资公司时,我们总是寻求投资于最终的赢家。
As we think about investing in companies, so we always seek to invest in the winner.
如果我们的投资逻辑是‘我们的投资能让它们成为赢家’,那这个投资逻辑可能非常脆弱。
If the investment thesis is our investment is going to make them a winner, it's probably a pretty flimsy investment thesis.
现在,如果我们投资一家已经能吸引资源、招聘出色、能轻松融资、能将更多资金投入市场推广、能将更多资金投入研发的公司,这种投资通常能起到助推作用。
Now, an investment that we make in a company that is already attracting resources, hiring really well, able to raise capital well, able to deploy more money into go to market, able to deploy more money into R and D, it can generally help.
这其实就是‘偏好依附’理论的全部,这也是规模收益递增这一概念的由来。
Like, is the whole theory of preferential attachment, which is why increasing returns to scale is a concept.
即使你不是网络效应驱动的业务,比如Salesforce、Workday、ServiceNow或CrowdStrike,一旦你成为领导者,越多的资源就会向你汇聚,事情也会变得对你越来越有利。
Even if you're not a network effect driven business, if you're salesforce.com or, you know, Workday or ServiceNow or CrowdStrike, the more you become the leader, the more resources come your way, and the easier things get for you, potentially.
我们寻找这样的情况。
We look for situations like that.
我会将其与软银愿景基金最初所做的大量非常出色的事情形成对比。
I would contrast it with situations like the original SoftBank Vision Fund did a lot of really good things.
老实说,他们确实做了很多非常出色的事情。
Honestly, they they did a bunch of really good things.
比如哪些?
Like what?
我今天真的想多了解一些,因为我立刻打了个寒颤。
I genuinely wanted to be educated today because I I immediately shivered.
他们很早就意识到人工智能将带来巨大的机遇。
They were early to figuring out that there would be a huge opportunity in AI.
所以,你知道,他们在这只基金中早早投资了英伟达,还做了其他一些非常出色的投资,比如Slack和Guardant。
So, you know, they famously were in NVIDIA in that fund, you know, and they did some really good investments like Slack, like Guardant.
其中缺失的一环是,将资本作为武器是一种可行的策略。
The one piece of it was missing was that capital as a weapon was a viable strategy.
因此,在企业领域,将资本作为武器是非常非常困难的,因为你必须实际招聘人员。
So capital as a weapon in enterprise is really, really hard to do, because you physically have to hire people.
你得雇佣销售代表。
You have to hire sales reps.
你得雇佣市场人员等等。
You have to hire marketing people, etcetera.
在消费领域,资本可以成为武器。
Capital is a weapon in consumer.
大多数情况下,这其实并不奏效。
Most of the time, it's it doesn't really work.
比如,我认为抖音可能是例外,也许还有优步。
Like, I would say TikTok is maybe the exception, maybe Uber.
但也许我们之前对这一点的误解是:只要把资本注入公司,就能让它们获胜。
But, you know, the thing that that maybe was wrong about it was we can king make if we just put the capital into the companies, and then that will allow them to win.
但这其实是一种逆向选择机制,那些选择将此作为制胜策略的公司,可能原本就缺乏足够充分的获胜理由或竞争优势。
But that's a bit of an adverse selection machine, where the companies that opt into that as their winning strategy are the ones that maybe don't have as good of a reason to win or competitive advantage in the first place.
如果这些钱最终流向消费者、司机或其他人,然后又流回谷歌和Facebook,我认为这种‘造王’策略未必是好的。
And so if that money is gonna go back to consumers or drivers or whatever it is, in that case, and just get funneled back to Google and Facebook, I don't think that king making for that is necessarily a good strategy.
但投入大量资本,并拥有一个能提供背书的品牌,确实可以帮助公司取得成功。
But investing a lot of capital, having a brand that gives a seal of approval, it can definitely help make a company succeed.
我觉得马克和本过去已经很好地描述过这一点了。
You know, I think Mark and Ben have described it well in the past.
我们到底给创业者提供了什么?
What are we giving to our founders?
某种程度上,我们给创业者提供的是一种品牌贷款,一种背书。
Partially, what we're giving to our founders is, you know, a loan on our brand, you know, a seal of approval.
尤其是对于早期公司,这真的能帮助招聘。
You know, often, especially for early stage companies, it it it really can help with hiring.
你有没有听过这样的说法:‘你想成为哪家店?’
Have you heard the talk track of, like, what store do you wanna be?
零售市场实际上存在一种两极分化现象。
There's sort of a barbelling of the retail market.
一边是亚马逊和沃尔玛,另一边则是极其高端的零售业。
There's Amazon and Walmart on the one end, and then on the other end, there's, like, extremely high end retail.
你管这叫香奈儿?
You call that Chanel?
对。
Yeah.
香奈儿、赛克西亚。
Chanel, Xenia.
这正是欧洲真正擅长的地方。
This is where Europe really thrives.
对。
Yeah.
有规模型玩家,也有专业型玩家。
There's scale players, and then there's specialists.
我认为,我们显然是一个规模型玩家。
And I think, you know, we're obviously a scale player.
我认为风险在于中间的所有部分。
I think the risk is is everything in between.
比如那些经营日用品但缺乏规模的百货商店。
Department stores that have general merchandise but don't have scale, for example.
那是一个非常危险的处境。
And that's a very risky place to be.
所以我们的策略是大力构建规模。
So our strategy is very much build scale.
我们这样做的原因是,这能为我们投资组合公司带来巨大的资源优势。
And the reason we do that is because it gives a huge advantage from a resources standpoint to our portfolio companies.
你介意做个像沃尔玛那样平价的公司吗?
Do do you mind being, like, cool Walmart then?
我不是想冒犯你,但我觉得你这样做很棒,而且看起来像一家精美的劳拉·皮亚纳。
I don't mean that rudely, but, like, I love that you do, but that looks like a beautiful Laura Piana.
你身上完全看不出有沃尔玛的影子。
There's nothing about you that screams there's nothing about you that screams Walmart.
我非常喜欢
I I love
这个。
that.
我们很乐意称自己为亚马逊。
We're happy to call ourselves amazon.com.
顾客很喜欢。
Customers love it.
顾客得到了很好的服务。
Customers are very well served.
我们是亚马逊。
We're Amazon.
我们有沃尔玛。
We got Walmart.
好的。
Okay.
明白了。
Gotcha.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
我们提到过,比如在那里面打造有竞争力的品类。
We mentioned, like, making competitive categories there.
我实在没法忽视的一个类别,老兄,我发过推文,就是客户支持类别,因为那里简直有50个之多。
One I just can't get over, dude, and I've tweeted this, is the customer support category because there's just, like, 50.
而布拉顿·西拉显然就是SaaS领域的元老中的元老。
And, like, Bratton Sierra is obviously, like, you know, the OG of OGs of SaaS.
你能帮我吗?
Can you help me?
我为什么在这个领域感到如此困惑是错的?
Why am I wrong on being so confused by this space?
每个垂直领域都有适合的东西。
There's just something for every vertical.
是的。
Yeah.
我认为这个领域之所以令人兴奋是有充分理由的。
Well, I think there's a good reason why there's excitement in the space.
如今,凭借当前的模型质量、推理能力以及模型成本,它已经更好、更快、更便宜了。
It's better, faster, cheaper already today with today's model quality, with the reasoning capabilities, you know, with the cost of the models.
因此,你不需要相信任何未来的产品状态或不同的模型能力。
And So you don't need to believe any future state of a different product or a different, you know, model capability.
这些功能已经具备了。
The functionality is there.
因此,我们为投资组合公司举办EBCs是有充分理由的。
And so there's good reason why, you know, we put on EBCs for our portfolio companies.
每次Decagon出现在这些EBC中时,都会引起极大的兴趣,而且大多数时候都能转化为交易。
Every time Decagon appears in one of these EBCs, there's extremely high interest, and, you know, most of the time conversion to a deal.
所以我认为,这个领域最有趣的是市场需求和市场规模。
So I think the market pull, the market size, is what is most interesting about that space.
如果你看一下SaaS和云市场,大约一半是赢家通吃,占据绝对多数份额,而另一半则分散了市场份额。
If you look at, like, SaaS and cloud markets, about half of them are winner take vast majority, the overwhelming majority, and about half of them sort of break up of market share.
比如,你提到的薪酬市场这样的案例。
So for example, you you know, you mentioned deal like payroll market.
薪酬市场并不是一个赢家通吃的市场。
Like, payroll market is not a winner take vast majority market.
在SaaS和云领域,有很多类似这样的市场。
There are many markets like this in SaaS and cloud.
因此,Decagon有可能成为赢家,它们在产品上快速推进,凭借最佳的产品、最佳的分销渠道以及我们所讨论的其他因素赢得市场。
And so it's possible that Decagon is the winner, and they move really fast on product, and they win the market based on having the best product and the best distribution and all the things that we talk about.
或者,也有可能这个市场更像薪酬市场一样,格局更加分散。
Or it's also possible that, you know, it's a sort of more distributed market sort of like payroll.
无论如何,增长都是惊人的。
Either way, the growth is staggering.
市场需求是惊人的。
The market pull is staggering.
对我们来说,Decagon 是一家很棒的公司。
It's a you know, Decagon for us is is a great company.
但你怎么看待提前支付的意愿呢?
But how do you just think about, like, the willingness to pay up ahead of time?
因为这正是你所指向的——你提前支付了这么多钱。
Because that's kind of where where you're going, which is that you're just paying so far ahead of time.
对于 Sierra 来说,100 亿美元真是太惊人了。
You know, 10,000,000,000 for Sierra is is amazing.
是的。
Yeah.
但你确实是提前支付了一大笔钱。
But you legitimately are paying a fuck ton ahead of time.
嗯。
Yeah.
我不知道。
I I don't know.
我们还没接近过那个水平。
We we've we've not been close to that.
显然,我们是Decagon的现有投资者,所以很难做到
Obviously, we're, you know, we're existing investors in in Decagon, so it's hard to
读出来。
read that.
但关于Decagon,你怎么看,你只是说好吧。
But you with Decagon on, like, how do you get you just say, okay.
如果市场继续这样发展,因为如果你绘制出预期增长率,你得戴上一副该死的迷幻眼镜才能看清这会落到哪里。
Well, if the market continues in this way because if you map out expected growth rates, you have to map out with a freaking LSD glasses to see where this lands.
实际上,我不确定是否同意这一点。
I'm not sure what I would I would agree with that, actually.
好的。
Okay.
我正在投资一家公司,不是Decagon。
I'm I'm taking a company, not Decagon.
在五千万美元的年经常性收入下,你必须预期它会增长五倍达到25亿美元,再增长四倍达到10亿美元,然后再增长三倍达到30亿美元,这些全是相当乐观的疯狂增长率。
At fifty million in ARR, you have to expect that it will five x to get to $2.50 and then four x to get to a billion and then three x to get to 3,000,000,000, which is all pretty optimistic fucking growth rates.
而在公开市场中,如果估值倍数是6倍或7倍,我们目前支付的价格将获得大约3倍的回报。
And then with a six x in public markets or seven x, we're looking at a, what, three x on the cash on the price that we're paying today.
哇。
Wow.
这不是一个划算的资金投入机会。
That's not a good opportunity cost dollar spent.
我过去一直对顶尖公司能有多优秀、成长有多快感到惊讶,尤其是在处于早期阶段并经历重大技术变革的市场中。
I've been historically surprised at how good the best companies can be and how fast they can grow, especially in markets that are early innings with a big technology shift.
所以我非常乐观。
So So I'm very optimistic.
这些只是抽象的数字。
Those are abstract numbers.
我也并不认为每一个高增长的优秀公司最终都会在公开市场上以六倍估值交易。
I also don't think that every great high growth company will end up trading for six times in the public markets.
有些公司由于极高的增长率或强劲的现金流,交易估值会更高。
There are some that are gonna trade higher based on very high growth rates or high cash flow.
你知道,很难去争论一个抽象的财务模型,但对于我们投资的大多数公司——这些成功的应用——它们的增长速度是前代SaaS和云公司的三倍。
You know, it's hard to debate, like, an abstract financial case, but for most of these companies that we've backed, these these winning apps, they're growing three x faster than predecessor SaaS and cloud companies.
所以,当然。
And so, you know, sure.
从外部来看,高估值,我认为在许多情况下
High valuations from the outside, I I think in in many of
这些情况下的高估值是合理的。
those cases are warranted.
每个人都嘲笑它们的利润率。
Everyone shits on them for margins.
你觉得批评AI应用是一个很弱的论点吗?
Do you think that's a really weak argument to shit on AI apps?
你认为在未来两到五年内,这些利润率会迅速发生转变吗?
And do you think we'll just see the transformation of those margins pretty quickly over the next two to five years?
技术投入的历史表明,利润率会趋于合理,并且会上升。
The history of technology inputs would suggest the margins will rationalize, and the margins are gonna go up.
如今存在很高的不确定性。
There's a high amount of uncertainty today.
这一代公司有可能实现50%的毛利率。
It's possible that this next generation of of companies is 50% gross margins.
如果它们在快速成长的同时提供了巨大价值,那完全没问题。
If they're delivering a ton of value growing really fast, that's totally fine.
如今,每个token的输入成本已经大幅下降,但随着推理能力的引入,token的使用量也大幅上升。
Today, the input costs per token have gone down massively, but token usage has also gone up massively with the introduction of reasoning.
所以在过去一年半左右,输入成本的情况一直有些模糊。
So in the last, you know, year and a half or so, it's been a bit of a muddy picture on the input costs.
我认为随着时间的推移,这种情况会趋于合理,成本会下降。
I think over time, that will rationalize, will go down.
我认为市场结构最终会像云服务之于模型那样,普通终端客户的云成本会保持在合理水平。
I think the market structure will end up sort of like cloud for the models, where cloud costs for the average end customer are fine.
而云服务是一个寡头垄断行业,它们能获得高额利润。
And, you know, cloud's an oligopoly, and they make high profits.
我认为提供API的模型公司,将会相对具有寡头垄断特性。
I think the model companies, you know, that serve APIs will be relatively oligopolistic.
它们可能会拥有相当高的利润率,而终端客户也会得到很好的服务。
They'll probably have reasonably high margins, and the end customers will be pretty high served or well served.
关于今天的毛利率问题,我想这么说。
On the the gross margin point today, I'll say this.
我们如今比过去给予了更多的宽容。
We give a little bit more of a pass than we used to.
如果我们遇到一家公司自称是AI公司,却拥有SaaS的毛利率,我们会提出大量问题。
And if we ever see a company that pitches us as an AI company and they have SaaS gross margins, we ask a lot of questions.
这可能意味着人们实际上并没有使用AI功能。
It probably means that people aren't actually using the AI features.
我想问一下这位先生,因为我确实听了帕特里克的节目,其中有一件事让我觉得有趣或印象深刻,就是你说你寻找那些别人忽视的伟大之处。
I do wanna ask this dude because I did I did listen to the show with Patrick, and there was something that was interesting or struck me with it where you said you look for greatness lying where others don't.
还有那种挑选艺术,比如在不明显的地方发现美。
And kind of the the art of the pick, like, in determining beauty where it's not obvious.
我觉得这挺有意思的。
I thought that was kind of interesting.
而且,你可以尽管批评我这一点。
And, again, you can shit on me for this.
但你最大的持仓是安德鲁或Stripe在OpenAI的股份,这让我觉得这并不像是被埋没的钻石。
But your biggest positions are Andrew or Stripe in OpenAI, which struck me as not exactly diamonds in the rough.
我很乐意换一种方式回答,那就是我所说的发现美或机会,通常是指看到一种表面上并不完全明显的巨大潜力。
I'm happy to I'm happy to answer it in a different way, which is what I mean by finding beauty or opportunity is most of the time, it's seeing a magnitude of greatness that isn't totally obvious on the surface.
所以,当我们最初投资这些公司时,比如我们在增长基金中投资Androl时,他们只有一个记录在案的项目,那就是边境塔。
And so, you know, when when we've made original investments in some of those companies, you know, we invested in Androl in the growth fund when they had one program of record, and it was and it was border towers.
而且,关键是,他们能否成为 massively multiproduct 的公司?
And, you know, the bet was, can they be massively multiproduct?
现在,他们已经有了许多、许多成熟的产品,其中一些是市场上最酷的产品。
And, you know, now they have, you know, many, many programs of record, some of the coolest products in the market.
OpenAI,我们在他们推出 ChatGPT 之前就投资了。
OpenAI, we invested before they had ChatGPT.
所以,很多时候,我们看到的是那些即使公司本身已经很优秀或很热门,未来仍可能变得伟大的机会。
And so often there's an opportunity where we see things that may be great in the future even if the companies themselves are already great or hot.
我们一直在避免遗漏的错误。
We set about errors of omission.
哪些遗漏的错误一直萦绕在你心头?
What error of omission lingers on your mind?
哪家公司是你没有投资但最想投资的?为什么?
What company are you not in that you would most like to be in and why?
对我来说,就是 Revolut。
So, like, for me, it's Revolut.
每天想到我没投资Revolut,我都感到很沮丧。
It actually upsets me every day that I'm not in Revolut.
我确实用它。
I I use it.
我非常喜欢它。
I love it.
这让我很懊恼。
It upsets me.
我有很多
I have a lot
错失的投资机会。
of errors of omission.
对于当前的公司来说,在模型方面,Anthropic做得非常出色。
For current companies, on the model side, Anthropic has done a really great job.
我们并不是Anthropic的投资人。
You know, we're not investors in Anthropic.
他们做得非常好。
They've done a really good job.
这是那种情况,类似于云服务,如果你能拥有AWS、Azure和GCP这三个独立公司,那对你来说会非常理想。
It's one of those cases where, similar to cloud, like, if you could own all of AWS, Azure, and GCP as independent companies, that would suit you pretty well.
这是一个即使具有规模效应但并非赢家通吃的市场。
And, that's that's one of those markets that was not winner take all, even though it's a scale market.
可以说,这是一种寡头垄断的市场。
You know, it's sort of oligopolistic.
如果模型公司的发展模式类似,考虑到我们预期需求将大幅增长,那可能就是其中之一。
If the model companies turn out to be something similar given given how much we expect demand to grow, that's probably one.
你认为市场会演变成OpenAI主导消费者市场,而Anthropic主导开发者和B2B市场吗?
Do you think the market will evolve with, like, OpenAI winning consumer and Anthropic winning dev and b to b?
是的。
Yeah.
我认为它们实际上会在很多重要方面产生分化。
I think they actually will diverge in pretty meaningful ways.
这在历史上技术市场中很常见,但每家公司都会努力在自己的领域保持竞争力。
This is sort of what we've seen in historical technology markets, but each will try and remain competitive in their spaces.
在B2B领域,Anthropic如今正投入更多资源。
B to b, Anthropic is certainly putting more resource after it today.
OpenAI的B2B业务会非常出色。
OpenAI is gonna have a really good b to b business.
他们已经做到了。
They already do.
我认为这个市场将会非常竞争激烈,不仅限于编程,还包括通用的B2B API使用,并向上延伸至应用层。
So I think that market is gonna be pretty competitive, not just coding, but general b to b API usage, and moving up into the application stack.
他们两者显然都在努力实现这一点。
Both of them are are obviously trying to do that.
所以我认为这个市场将会非常竞争激烈。
So I think that market is gonna be pretty competitive.
谷歌会在这一市场中扮演一定角色,但主要的正面竞争将发生在OpenAI和Anthropic之间。
Google will play some part in that market, but, you know, the big head to head competition will come, you know, between OpenAI and and Anthropic.
在消费者端,你知道的,就是ChatGPT。
On the consumer side, you know, it's ChatGPT.
问问我在肯塔基的家人。
Ask my family in Kentucky.
他们用什么?
What do they use?
你知道,他们知道什么是AI吗?
You know, they they know what what is AI?
他们知道ChatGPT。
They know ChatGPT.
他们广泛使用ChatGPT。
They use ChatGPT, you know, extensively.
谷歌也会尝试进入这个市场,而且他们已经在做了,但你知道,品牌和市场上最好的产品能让你走得非常非常远。
Google's gonna take a crack, and they already are, trying to compete in that market, but, you know, brand and the best product in the market can take you a really, really long way.
因此,当我们为OpenAI的后续轮次融资提供支持时,我们更多地是从消费者角度出发的。
And so, you know, as we have kind of underwritten future rounds of OpenAI or later rounds of OpenAI, it's very much, you know, with the mind of of consumer.
你认为OpenAI的进入价格在什么点上会变得不值得花这些钱?
At what point does the entry price do you think for OpenAI become not a good use of dollars?
这正是我一直在反复思考的问题。
This is one thing where I'm permanently, like, reflecting on it myself.
如果你觉得它是一家价值2万亿美元的公司,那么从现在起你仍然能看到四倍的增长空间。
You know, if you think it's a $2,000,000,000,000 company, well, you can still see a four x from here.
在什么点上,机会成本会让它不再值得?
At what point does the opportunity cost no longer make it worth it?
我们必须不断重新评估这一点。
We have to constantly reassess this.
你可以回顾一下我们在2019年投资Databricks时的投资理由。
You should look back at our investment case for investing in Databricks, you know, in 2019.
我们通过我们的增长基金进行了这项投资。
We did an investment out of our growth fund.
这是我们增长基金的首批投资之一,也是第一支基金中最大的一笔增长投资,金额为60亿美元。
It was one of our first investments, the largest growth fund investment in fund one at $6,000,000,000.
我们的投资理由从未预测到他们会发展到如此规模。
Our investment case never would have predicted what they became.
因此,我们必须不断鞭策自己,思考他们能变得多大。
And so we have to constantly push ourselves and think about how big they can become.
我对于这些公司在绝对美元金额上能变得如此庞大、表现如此出色感到惊讶。
I I I've been surprised at how big in absolute dollar terms the companies can be and how good they can be.
所以我们必须不断在这方面鞭策自己。
So we constantly have to push ourselves on this.
我常举的例子是谷歌和Facebook。
The example I always use is, you know, Google and Facebook.
十年前,谷歌和Facebook的用户变现能力只有今天的七分之一。
Ten years ago, Google and Facebook were monetizing their users at, like, one seventh of what they are today.
很难预测这一点。
It's hard to forecast that.
很难建模这种情况。
It's hard to model that.
但认为生产力或新产品已经到达终点状态,这种想法是局限的。
But it would be limiting to think, you know, you're ever at, like, an end state of productivity or end state of new products.
所以,我们一直感到惊讶。
So, you know, we've been we've been surprised.
我们喜欢投资那些有理论支持的公司,认为其核心市场会比我们或他人预期的更大。
We like to invest in the ones where there's a theory on how the core market can be bigger than we would expect or others would expect.
Stripe 就是一个这样的例子。
You know, Stripe is an example of this.
SpaceX 的 Starlink 也是一个这样的例子。
SpaceX with Starlink is an example of this.
Waymo 在我们投资时,也是一个这样的例子。
Waymo, when we invested, is an example of this.
此外,我们也喜欢投资那些我们认为创始人在预测下一产品方面具有优势的公司。
And then we also like to invest in the ones where we feel like the founders have an advantage in figuring out the next product.
Andrule 就是这方面的完美例子。
And so Andrule is, like, a perfect example of this.
你知道,我们早就知道边境塔会成为一个巨大的产品线,但有了这个团队,我们也非常有信心他们会发现很多其他东西。
You know, we knew border towers would would be a huge product line, but with the team, you know, we were also pretty high confidence that they were gonna figure out a bunch of other stuff.
我没想到他们会搞出自主战斗机,这真是太棒了。
I wouldn't have predicted that they figured out autonomous fighter jets, which is pretty awesome.
但你知道,那些最了解市场、拥有市场领导地位、既是产品专家又是技术专家的人,往往能发现下一个产品领域,而这正是我们想找到的。
But, you know, the best ones the best ones who know their markets the best, who have market leadership, who are product people, who are tech people, you know, they tend to find the next product areas, and and that's what we wanna find.
在你们这样的规模下,你们会不会直接说:嘿。
At scale, and at the scale you are, do you just say, hey.
我们必须投资竞争对手。
We have to invest in competitors.
你不能不这么做。
You can't not.
不。
No.
我们不这么做。
We we don't.
我的意思是,当我们投资时,我们会尽量避免利益冲突,尤其是当我们进入董事会时。
I mean, when we when we invest, we try to avoid conflicts as best we can, you know, especially if we're on the board.
所以,这是我们在规模化过程中最棘手的部分。
So, you know, it's the trickiest part of scale of our business.
我们并不总能在这方面做对。
We don't always get it right there.
我的意思是,你要巧妙地处理。
I mean, you delicately do
在不同基金之间划分,比如说,哦,那个属于早期基金。
it between funds and be like, oh, that's in the early fund.
我们尽量不这么做。
We try not to do that.
我的意思是,你看。
Mean, look.
我们更常看到的情况是,公司之间的分歧比融合更常见。
The the thing that we see that more often happens is companies diverge more often than they converge.
所以,你知道,未来可能产生利益冲突的这种认知,往往并不会被考虑进去。
And so, you know, the perception of what a conflict can be in the future, like, often doesn't come into play.
也有相反的例子,比如我们投资了一家公司,后来他们转型,进入了另一个领域。
There are also examples in in the opposite where we funded a company and then they pivoted and they pivoted into a different space.
在这种情况下,我们仍然会尽力帮助创始人。
And, you know, we we try and we try and help the founders as much we can even if that's the case.
卡内西,你和马克、本最不同意的决定是什么?结果如何?
Karnesie, what decision did you and Mark and Ben most disagree on, and what was the outcome?
最大的分歧是我们对Waymo的原始投资。
The biggest one was our original investment in Waymo.
我们在2020年初投资了Waymo。
So we invested in Waymo in early two thousand twenty.
在2020年初,我们是唯一一家投资Waymo的风投基金。
So we were the only VC fund that invested in Waymo in early two thousand twenty.
这非同寻常。
It was extraordinary.
我的意思是,当时这个产品简直神奇。
I mean, the product was magic even at the time.
我们做过演示驾驶。
You know, we did demo rides.
这显然远在它们遍布道路之前。
This is obviously well before they were everywhere on the road.
我们做过演示驾驶。
We did demo rides.
你知道,它能比人类开得更平稳。
You know, it could do it could drive smoother than a human.
它们能完成无保护左转。
They could do unprotected lefts.
它们能避开施工区域。
They could avoid construction sites.
它们能做所有这些当时人们根本想不到自动驾驶汽车能做到的特别事情。
They they they could do all these, like, really special things that you wouldn't think that an autonomous car could do at the time.
但当时,他们根本没有上市产品,我觉得他们的估值实在太高了。
But at the time, like, they didn't have a product in the market, and I thought the valuation was was really high.
于是我跟他们说,这是我们团队做的所有分析,我们整理了大量数据,证明价格确实高得离谱。
And so I said, here's all this analysis in our team, and, you know, we produced all this analysis that showed that, you know, the price was really high.
而马克和本则说,这是自动驾驶啊。
And Mark Mark and Ben, you know, were like, it's autonomous driving.
你在说什么呢?
What are you talking about?
这是个无限大的市场啊。
Like, this is the this is the this is the endless market size.
这可能会成为消费科技领域最大的公司,而且他们还是市场领导者。
You know, this this can be the biggest company in consumer technology, and they're the market leader.
我们当时的做法是,由于我们对此看法不一,只投入了一小笔资金。
And the way we did it was we, you know, we we invested a smaller amount at the time just given we were conflicting points of view on it.
但这个决定很明智,因为我们与团队保持了紧密联系,并在他们最近一轮融资中投了更大一笔钱。
But that served us well because we kept a close relationship with the team, and we wrote a much larger check into their most recent round.
我对此感到非常兴奋。
And and I'm really excited about it.
我的意思是,他们有着非常令人期待的未来。
I mean, they have a very exciting future.
我这次结束后就要去旧金山,打算从帕洛阿尔托坐Waymo自动驾驶汽车上高速公路去我们在旧金山的办公室。
I'm going to San Francisco after this, and I am gonna take a Waymo on the freeway up to our office in San Francisco from Palo Alto.
这真是一种神奇的产品体验。
That's sort of a magical product experience.
这属于那种情况。
This is one of those cases.
我们之前谈过潜在的未来竞争。
You know, we talked earlier about potential future competition.
这正是那种未来竞争潜力巨大,但当前市场上产品却无比神奇的情况。
Like, this is one of those cases where there's gonna be, you know, tremendous potential future competition, but the product in the market today is magical.
最近还有一篇评论文章,我想是《纽约时报》写的,由一位医疗专业人士撰写的。
And there was just an op ed written, I think was New York Times, that was like, it was done by a medical professional.
他说,好的,我们现在有足够多的Waymo数据,表明其安全性是人类驾驶员的7到10倍。
He said, okay, we now have enough data from Waymo that shows they are seven to 10 x safer than a human driver.
当我们在医疗行业的临床试验中看到这样的结果时,我们会加速药物的审批流程,尽快将其投入市场,因为其益处太过显著。
When we see results like this in clinical trials in the health care industry, we fast track the drug into full approval and just get it in the market because the benefits are so great.
他将这一点与Waymo相比较,意思是:看啊。
And he was comparing that to Waymo, which is like, hey.
每年道路上有多少人死亡?
How many deaths are there on the roads per year?
阻止这项技术,更不用说不加速其审批,都是不负责任的。
It would be irresponsible to block this, let alone not fast track approval of it.
这将成为有史以来最大的市场之一。
It's gonna be kinda the mother of all markets.
我认为,自动驾驶和机器人技术或许是人工智能时代即将到来的最伟大的市场。
Like, I think autonomous driving and robotics are are maybe the mother of all, you know, markets that are coming on AI.
我总是对这一点感到相当恼火
I'm always quite annoyed about
因为我在社交媒体上总看到,但伦敦没有。
it because I always see it on social, and we don't have it in London.
我从来没坐过。
And I've never been in one.
所以
And so
他们打算尽快进入伦敦市场。
They're gonna try to get to they'll they'll try to get to London soon.
你知道,伦敦是个很难进入的市场。
You know, London's a tough market to enter.
我的意思是,你还记得优步刚进入伦敦时是什么情况吗?
I mean, you remember what it was like for Uber to enter London in the first place.
它是被强行拉进市场的。
It got brought into the market kicking and screaming.
但你知道,伦敦、东京将成为自动驾驶最优秀的国际市场的几个之一。
But, you know, London, Tokyo, they'll be some of the best international markets possible for autonomous driving.
我明白。
That I understand.
我只是不明白,我特别想了解什么是心流。
What I just don't understand that I would love to is flow.
你能帮我理解一下心流吗?
Can you help me understand flow?
因为我觉得世界上的人都一头雾水。
Because I think the world kind of scratched their head.
为什么这件事对你来说说得通,对别人却说不通呢?
Why did it make sense to you when it didn't make sense to anyone else?
你还记得我之前说过的关于聚焦优势进行投资的话吗?
You remember what I said earlier about investing behind strength of strengths?
亚当拥有非凡的优势。
Adam has extraordinary strengths.
他拥有市场上任何企业家中最突出的优势之一。
He has some of the strongest strengths of anybody, any entrepreneur in the market.
这并不意味着他没有弱点,但他绝对在对他所要建立的业务最重要的领域表现出色。
It doesn't mean that he has no weaknesses, but he absolutely spikes in the areas that are most important for the business he's trying to build.
你想要
What would you
说说结果吧,因为我没参加那些会议,也没人参加,所以我非常感兴趣。
say the results to because I I'm not in those meetings, and no one is, and so I'm fascinated.
他在哪里达到了世界级水平?
Where was he world class?
他在品牌建设、公司建设和产品招聘方面都是世界级的。
He's world class at brand building, company building, product hiring.
这些听起来像是有点模糊的事情,但其实并不是。
Those sound like things that are, you know, a little fuzzy, but they're not.
我的意思是,它们是早期公司建设最重要的要素。
I mean, they're the most important ingredients for early stage company building.
你知道,他为自己组建了一支非凡的团队。
You know, he he's surrounded himself with an extraordinary team.
他有着非凡的洞察力,我认为这非常有趣。
He's got an incredible insight, which I think is fascinating.
显然,住房拥有率正在迅速下降,人们无力购房,这背后还涉及一系列政治和社会问题。
Obviously, homeownership is declining, you know, rapidly, and and people aren't able to buy homes, and and there's a whole political and social issue with that.
但这是现实情况。
But it's the reality of the case.
美国的普通租户将他们可支配收入的30%用于支付房租。
The average renter in The US spends 30% of their disposable income on rent.
这是任何类别中支出比例最高的。
It's the highest amount of spend of any category.
然而,这也是人们生活中唯一没有品牌化的体验。
And yet, it's the only unbranded experience in anyone's life.
如果你想想你吃的食物、穿的衣服、开的车、去的地方,所有这些都属于品牌化体验,消费者愿意为这些更好的品牌体验支付溢价。
If you think about the food you eat, the clothes you wear, the car you drive, the places you go, All of those are branded experiences and consumers pay a premium for that branded better experience.
他的想法是,如果能为租户的生活带来品牌和更优质的产品体验,会怎么样?
You know, his idea was kind of what if you actually brought brand and a better product experience to a renter's life?
这背后有着巨大的市场机会。
There's a huge market opportunity for it.
与此相关的商业模式也非常出色。
There's a great business model that goes with it.
如果考虑到房地产与品牌之间的交汇点,我认为亚当是最有可能做到这一点的人。
And if there's anybody who can do that, given, you know, the intersection of real estate and brand, I think it's Adam.
你想啊,一个普通的创业者走进来向我们推销一个想法,亚当能打造出一家庞大公司的可能性,跟普通创业者相比有多大?
You know, if you think about the average entrepreneur walks in off the street and pitches us an idea, what is the likelihood that Adam can build a humongous company versus the average entrepreneur?
可能性极高。
It's extremely high.
这就是背后的理论。
That's the theory behind it.
我每周都和Calm的创始人一起散步,他总是只问我一个问题。
The founder of Calm, I walk with every week, and he always just asked me one question.
他会问:你多久能遇到一个像这样的创始人?
He goes, how often do you meet a founder like this?
一个月一次,别他妈打支票。
Once a month, don't write the fucking check.
每六个月一次,大概就该打支票了。
Once every six months, probably write the check.
你多久能遇到一个像亚当这样的创始人?
How often do you meet a founder like Adam?
我不知道。
I don't know.
你可以从你的数据集中回答我,但这种情况 probably 非常罕见,所以你会想,那干脆就他妈打支票吧。
You can answer me on your dataset, but it's probably quite rare, in which case you're like, well, then write the fucking check.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
而且这种情况极其罕见。
And it's it's extremely rare.
而且,亚当是个学习者。
And and, like, Adam is a learner.
他是个深入研究自己领域的学生。
He is, like, a deep student of the game that he's in.
我对Flow感到非常兴奋。
I'm really excited about Flow.
你知道,马克、本和我都参与其中,还有我们团队的贾斯汀。
You know, Mark and Ben and I are all involved and Justin from our team.
他们已经验证了产品的价值主张。
They've sort of proven out the value prop of the product.
现在,就只是如何扩大规模的问题了。
You know, now it's just about scaling.
老兄,我能和你快速聊个话题吗?
Dude, can I do a quick firearm with you?
在过去十二个月里,你改变了哪些想法?
What have you changed your mind on in the last twelve months?
我的例子是安德里森。
Like, mine was Andreessen.
哦,这不错。
Oh, that's good.
我喜欢这个。
I like it.
安德里森和YC。
Andreessen and YC.
我认为YC是风投领域最大的一次成功投资。
YC is the single biggest buy, I think, in venture.
每个优秀的欧洲公司都是
Every great European company is
YC的公司。
a YC company.
所有人。
Everyone.
他们已经在国际市场上彻底碾压了,不管怎么说。
They've crushed international, like, for what it's worth.
我的意思是,他们在美国真的非常非常出色。
I mean, they and they and they they're really, really good in The US.
我很欣赏加里。
And I I'm I'm a big fan of Gary.
是的。
Yeah.
我不知道是不是在过去十二个月里,但当你想到所有模型开始展现能力的那一刻,曾经有一段时间我们认为这些模型会吞噬消费和企业软件的一切。
I don't know if it's in the last twelve months, but if you think about the moment that all of the models started to demonstrate their capabilities, there was a moment in time where we thought the models would eat everything in consumer and enterprise software.
我认为至少在公开市场上,可能正在出现一些回摆,即这些模型将吞噬所有这些应用软件类别。
I think maybe there's a bit of a shift back toward this in public markets at least, that the models are gonna eat all these application software categories.
我们已经彻底改变了想法。
We've fully changed our mind.
我认为几乎在每个方向上,都会出现基于模型构建的应用软件公司。
I I I think there's gonna be application software companies built on top of models in pretty much every direction.
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