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我们现在不需要在模型上和Anthropic、OpenAI竞争。
We don't need to compete with Anthropic and OpenAI on models right now.
关键的是人和模型之间的交互界面。
The interface between the human and the model is the key thing.
如果你看看竞争格局，那简直有点可笑。
If you looked at the competitive landscape, was almost silly.
我问了迈克尔。
I asked Michael.
我就说，你觉得Cloud Code怎么样？
I was like, what do you think about Cloud Code?
他大概说了这么个意思，你看。
And he said something to the extent, look.
我们要进军最大的市场，
We are going after the biggest market in
全球市场。
the world.
你总是会有多个竞争对手的。
You're always gonna have multiple competitors.
这并不会吓到我们。
That does not scare us.
作为创始人，我们都想有野心，想推到帕累托前沿的最大点，但你也得知道那条曲线是什么样的。
As founders, we all wanna be ambitious, and we wanna push, like, to the maximum point of Pareto frontier, but, like, you have to kinda know what the curve is.
对我们来说，投资Cursor的决定其实非常明显。
For us, the decision to invest in Cursor was actually pretty obvious.
我记得Andre Karpathy也在用。
I remember Andre Karpathy was using it.
这显然是个现象级产品。
It was clearly a phenomenon.
它显然是个知名品牌。
It's clearly the like, a known brand.
他们创纪录地拿下了所有用户。
They went and got all the users in record time.
现在他们有了资产、数据和技术，可以自己建模型了。
Now they have the asset, the data, the know how to build their own models.
除非你一开始就是前沿实验室，否则真的没法反过来做到这一点。
You really couldn't do the flip of that unless you started as a frontier lab.
他们确实有过几个高光时刻。
They were definitely a couple of oak moments.
比如，还记得两年前吗，
Like, remember when Two years ago,
当时押注一家独立的AI编程公司看起来几乎是不理性的。
betting on an independent AI coding company looked almost irrational.
微软拥有GitHub、VS Code、Copilot，还能用上世界上最好的AI模型。
Microsoft owned GitHub, VS Code, Copilot, and had access to some of the world's best AI models.
但Cursor还是突围了。
And yet, Cursor broke through.
本期节目中，Martin Casado、Sarah Wang和Matt Bornstein回顾了塑造Cursor从早期到现在的关键决策：打造独立产品而非插件，避免过早进入企业销售，以及在竞争格局不断变化时保持专注。
In this episode, Martin Casado, Sarah Wang, and Matt Bornstein look back at the decisions that shaped Cursor from its earliest days, building a standalone product instead of a plug in, resisting the push into enterprise sales too early, and staying relentlessly focused even as the competitive landscape changed around them.
他们还分析了这家公司如何随着AI的进步不断重塑自己，围绕速度和品味建立文化，并最终将投入产品的同样强度应用到招聘、销售和并购上。
They also unpack how the company repeatedly reinvented itself as AI advanced, built a culture around speed and taste, and eventually applied the same intensity it brought to product to hiring, sales, and m and a.
这是一场关于Cursor的对话，但更广泛地探讨了在一个技术、竞争和传统观念几乎可以一夜之间改变的市场中，打造一家具有定义性公司需要什么。
It's a conversation about Cursor, but also a broader look at what it takes to build a defining company in a market where the technology, competition, and conventional wisdom can change almost overnight.
所以，一开始，我其实想带大家回到2024年初。
So to kick off, I actually wanted to take us back to early twenty twenty four.
而且，显然，你们主导了那轮投资，我记得是在2024年5月。
And, obviously, you guys led the deal in I think it was May 2024 that year.
但你能带我们回顾一下那年第一季度和第二季度的情况吗？也许还有你们是如何在正式合作之前就开始与Cursor合作的？
But can you walk us through what was going on in the q one, q two of that year, and maybe how you guys started working with Cursor well before we ever partnered officially with them?
所以你得把自己带回到2023年底，2024年初。
So you have to sort of transport yourself back to late twenty twenty three, early twenty twenty four.
我回去查了一下。
I went back and looked it up.
当时领先的模型是GPT-4o、Claude 3和Llama 3。
The leading models at the time were GPT four o, Claude three, and Llama three.
那感觉像是很久以前的事了。
That feels like forever ago.
Llama 3？
Llama three?
对。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
那其实还挺不错的。
That was actually pretty good.
那很棒。
That was great.
是的。
Yeah.
是个很棒的模型。
Was a great model.
策略上当然有变化。
Change in strategy, obviously.
当时领先的编程工具是Copilot，而且领先得不是一星半点。
Now the leading coding harness was Copilot by, like, a mile.
对。
Yeah.
是的。
Mhmm.
对吧？
Right?
这是大家的共识。
This was, the consensus thing.
微软又在搞他们那一套。
Microsoft was doing their Microsoft thing.
对吧？
Right?
他们有Copilot。
They had Copilot.
他们有Office。
They had Office.
他们有VS Code。
They had VS Code.
这些加在一起，他们觉得肯定能在AI上赢。
All of these things combined, they were gonna somehow win AI.
所以很明显，AI编程当时已经有点效果了，但跟今天完全是两个世界。
And so it was clear that AI coding was sort of working, but it was a different universe compared to today.
对吧？
Right?
就是说，当时已经有一些早期迹象表明你可以用AI做正经事了，但那时候智能体还不存在，循环也不存在，推理能力也没有，所以那会儿挺疯狂的。
Like, you had the sort of early signs that you could do meaningful work with AI, but agents didn't really exist, loops didn't really exist, reasoning didn't really exist at the time, so it's sort of a crazy time.
当时有一连串的公司都在做编程这块，对吧？
There was a continuum of companies going after coding, right?
所以一方面，有些人觉得，要赢得编程领域，唯一的办法就是打造一个基础模型，而且必须是专门针对编程的。
So on one hand you had those that are like, the only way to win coding is to build a base model, and it has to be a coding specific one.
而另一方面，有些公司非常有先见之明地专注于智能体，对吧，而Cursor则介于两者之间。
And on the other hand, had, very presciently by the way, companies just focus on agents, right, and Cursor was somewhere in between.
而且不仅仅是模型，还有无数公司在做插件。
And not only models, there were a million companies doing plugins too.
这两件事都是非常合理的选择，而且都是聪明人做的。
And both of these were very reasonable things to do, done by very smart people.
这就是这些新领域最有趣的地方，聪明的创业者会出现，做出非常有意思的事情。
That's what's so interesting about these new spaces, it's like smart entrepreneurs show up and do really interesting things.
在这种情况下，训练模型是非常合理的，因为当时模型在编程方面还不够好，而且有一种理论认为，如果我们专注于这个，做一个专门针对编程的模型，那就是突破。
And in this case, model training was very reasonable thing to do because the models weren't that good at coding yet, and there was sort of a theory that if we focus on this and do a coding specific model, that's the breakthrough.
而做插件的人则是在说，嘿，我们别把整个IDE都扔掉。
People doing plug ins on the other side were sort of saying, hey, let's not toss out the whole IDE.
那才是疯狂的做法。
That would be a crazy thing to do.
但人和模型之间的界面真的很重要，所以插件是个很好的方向。
But the interface between human and model is really important, so plug in is a great place to go.
你知道，结果就是Cursor在做的事情恰好是对的。
You know, it just kind of turned out that the thing that Cursor was doing was the right thing to do.
对吧？
Right?
像我们一样，他们深受“苦涩教训”的影响，但当时他们可能会说，哦，我们没必要去训练自己的模型。
Like us, they were very bitter lesson pilled, but at the time they would have said, Oh, there's no need for us to go train our own model.
当然，后来因为不同的原因，这个情况变了，我们稍后会在播客里详细聊。
Of course, that changed later for different reasons, which we're gonna get into later in this podcast.
但现在我们不需要在模型上和Anthropic、OpenAI竞争。
But we it's don't need to compete with Anthropic and OpenAI on models right now.
人和模型之间的界面才是关键。
The interface between the human and the model is the key thing.
我记得Michael和Aman经常说这个，而且从最早的时候就很明确地说，未来的代码看起来会像伪代码。
This is something that I remember Michael and Aman saying a lot, and just saying very clearly from the earliest days of saying code in the future will look like pseudo code.
我记得迈克尔经常提到这一点。
I remember Michael making this point a lot.
你看那些老的计算机科学论文，里面有一个部分。
When you look at old computer science papers, there's a section.
就是算法部分，不是用代码写的，而是用伪代码，我相信很多人都很熟悉。
Here's the algorithm, not in code, but in pseudo code, which I'm sure many people are used to.
现在大家不一定真的用伪代码写，但很可能可以。
Don't exactly write in pseudo code now, but probably you could.
很可能你直接拿一篇老论文里的伪代码块，现在的模型就能把它实现出来。
Probably you could just take a pseudo code block from an old paper, and the models now would implement that.
这其实就是Cursor那帮人从一开始就坚信的，而且事实证明他们完全是对的。
This is really what the Cursor guys thought from the very beginning, and they've proven to be exactly right about this.
对吧？
Right?
就像是用一种自然语言式的规格说明，把程序员的意图压缩到最小的规格描述。
It's like this sort of natural language ish specification, like pairing the programmer's intent down to the minimum possible spec.
这才是现在真正重要的。
That's what really sort of matters now.
总之，就像马丁说的，我们当时接触了很多非常聪明、非常有趣的人，他们都在用各种方式做编程相关的事情。
So anyway, we were in this world, as Martin said, we were talking to a ton of very smart, very interesting people working on coding in various ways.
Cursor团队之所以突出，不仅是因为他们的想法和我们对世界的看法一致，更重要的是，比我们更聪明的人，还有那些工程师们，也都这么认为。
The Cursor team kind of stood out because not only did they sort of align with the things that we thought about the world, more importantly, smarter people than us and engineers working.
当时，像OpenAI、Midjourney、Replicate这些领先的AI公司，还有很多其他的，基本上都采用并认同这个模式。
At the time, the leading AI companies like OpenAI, Midjourney, Replicate, a bunch of others, all kind of use this and subscribe to this model.
而且说实话，这个团队看起来就是有点特别。
And the team, frankly, just seemed kind of special.
对吧？
Right?
他们有着非同寻常的专注度。
They had an unusual degree of focus.
我记得我们请迈克尔来给我们GP团队做演示，结果会议90%的时间他都在拒绝各种提议。对于正在做自己热爱产品的创业者来说，风投总是会问一些关于你可能做的其他事情，或者你相关的领域之类的傻问题，而迈克尔就是坐在那里，非常礼貌地听完所有问题，然后说，有意思。
I remember we got Michael to come pitch our GP group, and 90% of the meeting was him saying no to things, which is just like for founders out there working on products that you love, VCs will always ask you dumb questions about other things you might do, or things you're related to, or whatever, and Michael literally just sat there and very politely listened to all the questions and said, interesting.
不，我们不会。
No, we're not gonna
等等，等等。
Wait, wait.
说到这个，我能问你们一个问题吗？
Actually, on that point, can I ask you guys a question?
因为我对那次会议印象太深了，你带迈克尔来的时候，他拒绝的事情之一，就是你说的那个插件很多的问题。
Because I remember that meeting so vividly when you brought Michael in for the a, and one of the things that he said no to was actually and to your point on there were a lot of plug ins.
对吧？
Right?
所以当时可能大家更倾向于认为，做一个VS Code的分支，而不是在VS Code里做插件，会更适合企业用户，但结果不是前者。
And so there was this maybe more consensus thought that a VS Code fork versus the plug in into VS Code would one would be better for enterprise, and it wasn't the former.
而是后者。
It'd be the latter.
我记得，好像是马丁你，或者你们俩都问过他，那你打算靠这个方式去获取企业客户吗？
And I recall, I think it was you, Martin, or maybe it was both of you asking him, well, are you gonna get enterprise customers with this medium?
对吧？
Right?
然后他非常坚定地看着我们所有人，说：‘好，那我把这个问题抛回给你们。’
And he looked at all of us in the eye with high conviction and well, I'm gonna turn it back to you.
你们觉得他的回答怎么样？
And what did you think of his answer?
是什么让你们当时有勇气做出那么反常规的决定？
And what gave you guys the conviction to take a pretty contrarian bet at the time?
他们其实给出了非常合理的解释，说明了为什么他们所处的设计方向是最合理的。
They actually had a very reasoned articulation for why, where they were in the design space that makes the most sense.
比如说，为什么不专门做一个编程领域的基础模型呢？
So for example, why wouldn't you build a coding specific foundation model?
他们当时说，其实你并不是用代码跟这些模型交流，而是用自然语言像跟人一样交流，所以模型必须理解人类在语言上的广泛经验，对吧？
So what they said at the time was, it turns out that you don't speak to these models in code, you speak to these as humans in natural languages, therefore the model has to understand the breadth of human experience in language, right?
所以这意味着，要做一个编程模型，实际上是在做一个前沿的语言模型，这本身就是一件非常难的事情，而且当然还有其他公司在做，还有像代码补全这样更聚焦的问题需要解决。
And so that means in order to build a coding model, you're actually building a frontier language model, and that's just a very hard thing to do, and then of course there are other companies doing it, and there are much more focused problems like TAMP completion to do.
所以我觉得他们的每一个决定在我们看来都非常有道理。
So I think every one of their decisions was very reasoned in our opinion.
他们也非常注重产品，这在AI领域其实很少见。
They were also very product focused, which you actually don't see a lot in AI.
他们真的相信可以打造一个产品，如果这个产品真的要被采用的话，顺便说一句，这和埃隆的想法非常相似。
So they really believe that you can build a product, the product, if it's really gonna be adopted, which by the way is very similar to how Elon thinks.
这决定了他们的很多决策。
And that dictated a lot of their decisions.
如果你真的相信这个产品，你绝不会去做插件，因为那样你就成了别人产品的一部分。
If you really believe in the product, you would never do a plug in because then you're part of somebody else's product.
如果你真的相信这个产品，你就不会过早做企业市场，而是晚点再做，因为产品本身就是一种市场推广方式，所以我觉得，马特，如果你同意的话，他们对自己是什么样的公司以及由此而来的决策有着极其清晰的认识，对吧？
If you really believe in the product you wouldn't do enterprise early, do it later because the product itself is the kind of go to market motion, and so there was a, I would say, and Matt let me know if you would agree, tremendous clarity on exactly what type of company they were and the decisions that they said all fell from that consistently, right?
而我们看到的很多公司都是各种拼凑，什么都想试试，不确定什么会成功，所以有插件、有服务、有各种乱七八糟的东西，而这家公司是一个产品公司，他们把这个当作一个产品问题来对待。
Where many of the companies we saw were kind of these pastiches of, we'll try all of these different things, we're not quite sure what's gonna work, so there's plug ins and there are services and there are whatever, whatever, whatever, this was a product company going after, but they considered it to be a product problem.
对。
Yeah.
不是。
No.
我觉得你说得完全对。
I think that's exactly right.
我觉得他们有野心也有勇气，去做出产品最极致的形态。
I think they had the ambition and the courage to kinda do the maximal form of what the product would look like.
对吧？
Right?
我觉得，作为创始人，我们都想有野心，对吧，都想推到帕累托前沿的最大点，但你必须得知道那条曲线是什么样的。
I think, you know, as founders, we all wanna be ambitious, right, and we wanna push to maximum point of Pareto frontier, but, like, you have to kinda know what the curve is.
而他们就是知道那条曲线是什么样的。
And they just kinda knew what the curve was.
对吧？
Right?
然后被那些非产品的事情分心。
And then get distracted by the sort of nonproduct things.
我记得我们当时想说服Cursor团队让我们投资他们公司的时候，我问过迈克尔一次，他工作之外有什么爱好。
I remember when we were trying to convince the Cursor team to let us invest in their company, I asked Michael once what he did for fun outside of work.
我好像没听懂这个问题。
I like, didn't understand the question.
他说，你什么意思？
He's like, what do mean?
我说，就是不在办公室的时候。
I'm like, when you're not in the office.
他说，什么
He's like, what
你什么意思？
do you mean?
我还记得，顺便说一句，我们投资之后一起吃午饭的时候，我聊到以前互联网时代的一些类似情况，他说，那时候我才五岁。
I also remember, by the way, when we had the lunch after we did the investment, and I was talking about something about Internet days that were similar, and he was like, I was five.
我们当时就说，哦。
And we're like, oh.
但是，我想说的是，不仅迈克尔，所有创始人都很了不起，尽管很多这些事情发生的时候他们还很小，但他们实际上都是这段历史的学生，这是我们在所有顶尖创始人身上看到的一个特质，亚历克斯·特兰佩尔也提到过这一点。他们能够研究并真正从过去发生的事情中学习。
But, I mean, what's amazing about not just Michael, but all the founders is even though they were pretty young when a lot of these things happened, they actually were kind of students of all this history, which which is a trait that we see Alex Trempelt talks about this a We see this across all of our top founders that they're, like, able to study and really learn from what's kinda happened before.
我要把这个问题抛回给你。
I'm gonna turn the question back on you.
我想马特也会同意。
I think Matt would agree.
对我们来说，在A轮投资Cursor的决定其实非常明显。
For us, the decision to invest in Cursor at the A was actually pretty obvious.
团队非常出色。
The team was phenomenal.
他们极其专注。
It was incredibly focused.
我们所有人都是用户。
All of us were users.
实际上，我们团队有一半人都在用Cursor。
Half the team actually used Cursor.
我记得安德烈·卡帕西当时也在用。
I remember Andre Karpathy was using it.
这显然是个现象级的产品。
Was clearly a phenomenon.
显然是个知名品牌。
Was clearly a known brand.
增长是指数级的，所以对于早期投资者来说，这是个很直接的决定。
The growth was asymptotic, so from an early stage investor it a pretty straightforward decision.
对于成长型投资者来说，这个决定就没那么明显了，所以我想你们在第一次会议上听到的，可能和你们俩的投资方式有点不太一致，但你们很快就领投了下一轮，所以能不能聊聊你们是怎么克服典型的成长型评估，最终下定决心的？
It was a much less obvious decision for a growth investor, and so I think probably what you heard in that first meeting maybe was a little bit dissonant with how you'd both invest, but then you very, very quickly led the next round, so maybe talk through how you kind of got past the typical growth evaluation and got conviction.
对。
Yeah.
我觉得这里的时间线压缩得太厉害了。
I mean, I think the timelines are so compressed here.
回想起来真是疯狂，因为我记得你们在五月、六月，也就是初夏的时候领投了A轮。
It's crazy to think back on because I remember you guys led the a in May, June, right, early summer.
到了十月，我们就完成了B轮融资。
And by October, we had done we did the b.
所以很明显，这就是直线起飞。
And so it was clearly just vertical lift off.
那个夏天发生了好几件事。
And there were a couple of things that summer.
对吧？
Right?
你们提到了安德烈·卡帕西在推特上谈论他们，但他们还上了莱克斯的节目。
You guys talked about Andre Karpathy tweeting about them, but they went on Lex.
他们对自己未来编程愿景的讨论非常深刻。
Incredibly thoughtful discussion of how they thought about their vision for, like, coding going forward.
所以我觉得，马丁，这又回到了你之前说的——他们就是在重新构想一切。
And so I think it comes back to, Martin, something you said, which is they were just reimagining everything.
对吧？
Right?
而且你，你知道，你刚才也提到了这一点，马特。
And you you know, you just talked about this as well, Matt.
但是你不能那样写增长备忘录。
But you can't you can't write growth memos that way.
更别说你了。
Never mind you.
所以，你知道，你被吸引了，因为你给我们打电话，而我们当时非常专注。
So, you know, you've got the bug, you know, because you were calling us and we were so centered.
你是怎么说服大卫·乔治的？
How did you convince David George?
是的。
Yeah.
我就想，难道不是吗？
I'm like, don't you?
不是要展示，你懂吗？
Not to show, like you know?
对。
Yeah.
你知道吗，这真的很有意思，我觉得这件事你得跳出常规思维来想。
You know, it's so funny because and I think you had to think out of the box for this one.
我是说，当然，势头是向上的，但他们做了很多打破常规的事情。我记得第一次，马丁，你把我介绍给迈克尔的时候。
I mean, of course, the the momentum was vertical, but there were so many things that they defied conventional thinking where I remember I the first time, you know, Martin, you you introduced me to Michael.
那天我们喝了杯咖啡，你知道，迈克他们行动很快。
We got a coffee that day, you know, as Mike you know, they move quickly.
所以我给他们整理了一些资料。
So I pulled some stuff together for them.
对吧？
Right?
因为我们想向他们展示，嘿。
Because we're, you know, we're trying to show them, hey.
这就是增长的下一个阶段。
This is the next stage of what growth looks like.
而且他们完全打破了很多传统的经验法则。
And there's so many conventional pieces of conventional wisdom that they just completely broke.
比如我们会说，嘿。
Like, we would say, hey.
我们会帮你找一个销售负责人，因为以前在ARR达到2500万到5000万的时候，自助服务开始放缓，这时候开始引入销售负责人是合理的。
We'll help you find a sales leader because, you know, previously, it made sense to start layering a sales leader at 25 to 50,000,000 of ARR when self serve starts to peter out.
迈克尔直直地看着我说，自助服务并没有放缓。
Michael looks me dead in the eye and is like, self serve is not petering out.
对吧？
Right?
然后你开始思考这些驱动因素，你会想，哦，这些历史上任何增长模型都会有的假设，你不能让它在五年内以25%的增长速度趋于平稳。
And so then you start to pull these drivers that you're like, oh, these assumptions that would go into any growth model historically, you can't have that asymptoting at 25% growth in five years.
对吧？
Right?
所以我觉得当时很多增长投资决策，其实是抛弃了我们通常会做的那些假设，就是关于公司最终会如何开始放缓增长的假设。
And so I think a lot of the growth investment decision at the time was throwing out some of the assumptions that we would typically make on how a company would, you know, eventually start to slow growth.
我很高兴我们当时这么做了。
I'm very glad that we did that.
然后第二点是，我们应该谈谈竞争格局。
And then the second piece is we should talk about the competitive landscape.
对吧？
Right?
因为你提到了副驾驶。
Because you mentioned co pilot.
我其实正想说，而且我觉得马特在这方面功劳很大。我们现在回顾起来，觉得A轮融资是个挺容易的决定，但马特当时主导了早期交易，他看到了很多人没看到的东西，那就是如果你看竞争格局，那简直有点可笑。有一个大玩家，就是微软，他们有一家规模化的公司，拥有OpenAI的权重，还拥有VS Code。
I was actually gonna say, and actually, I think Matt deserves a ton of credit here, which is we talk about now in retrospect how it was a pretty easy decision on the series a, but, you know, Matt led the early deal, and he saw something a lot of people didn't, which was this, which is if you looked at the competitive landscape it was almost silly, which is you had a large incumbent, which is Microsoft, that had a company at scale that had the OpenAI weights and they owned VS Code.
所以你会说，面对这一个竞争对手，你根本不可能生存下去。我们待会儿再谈其他的竞争对手。我觉得你刚才说迈克尔的那番话，也正是我所看到的。如果能听听马特怎么说就太好了。我记得马特早期就说过，他说，你知道，他们对每个问题都有很好的答案。当创始人是自己领域的专家时，他们的回答非常一致。你知道，我觉得我们做这笔交易的时候，事情已经很明显了，但六个月前可没那么明显。马特和团队当时就有那种坚定的信念。我觉得每一场这样的竞争都是那次的翻版。
Would So say that there's just no way that you could survive relative to this one single competitor, we'll talk about the other ones later, and I think that also was the thing you said about Michael was what I witnessed, would be great to hear Matt, which I even remember when Matt said this early on, he was like, You know, they have a good answer for everything, which when you have founders that are students of what they do, they're very consistent in their answers, and you know, and this is not I think when we did the deal it was pretty obvious, but it wasn't so obvious six months before, you know, and Matt and the team had that deep conviction way back then, and I think for every one of these races, are mirrors of that.
总之，这是不是有点……
Anyways, is this kind
哦，是的。
Oh, yeah.
不是。
No.
完全同意。
Totally.
你看，人们觉得风险投资像个人运动，其实根本不是。
Look, I mean, people think venture capital is like an individual sport, like it's not at all at all.
我们整个团队当时都在忙这个。
I mean, our whole team was working working on this at the time.
我记得花了超过一年时间。
You know, I think it was over a year.
我们团队里甚至专门有个负责Cursor的小组。
We literally had a Cursor team on our team.
就像，有个RT
Like, with an RT
团队。
team.
太好了。
Great.
瑞秋表现得非常好。
Rachel was great.
对。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
你知道吗？
You know?
你带领了团队。
You you led the team.
我的意思是，这
I mean, it was
是一样的。
the same.
所以，但是，是的。
So but but yeah.
不。
No.
你说得完全对。
You're exactly right.
我的意思是，这些人聪明得离谱。
I mean, I I mean, these guys are crazy smart.
对吧？
Right?
他们就像，智商爆表，纯粹的天才。
They're, like, off the charts, sort of just just raw intelligence.
对。
Yeah.
他们能做到我们常说的那种在技术和市场之间无缝切换，真的非常流畅。
They're able to do this thing we talk about all, like context switch between tech and markets really, really seamlessly.
而且他们能吸收数据，不管是历史数据还是市场动态，然后行动非常迅速，就像你之前说的，莎拉。
And and and they, like, ingest data, whether it's historical data or things happening in the market, and act very, very quickly, which you said before, Sarah.
我同意这一点，但具体来说，想到你要从微软那里分叉一个东西，而微软是它的所有者，然后你要用更小的模型和他们竞争，即使他们拥有开放的权重，他们有企业级的Salesforce，而且他们
I agree with that, but specifically, it was just kinda crazy to think you're gonna fork something from Microsoft who owns the thing, and then you're going to compete with them with smaller models, even they own the opening eye weights, they have enterprise Salesforce, and they
拥有最强大的企业分销渠道，对。
have The greatest, yeah, enterprise distribution.
对。
Yeah.
史上最强。
Ever.
你知道，在很多这种情况下，这是传统智慧。
You know, it's the conventional wisdom, in many of these cases.
当时有个数据点，其实是Marco在我们团队安排了一顿晚餐，Aman正好坐在John Shulman旁边，他们聊了很多关于Cursor的事。
One of the data points at the time was actually Marco on our team set up a dinner where Aman sat right next to John Shulman, and they talked a lot about Cursor.
我觉得John当时的反应就是，哦，是的。
And I think John's thing was like, oh, yeah.
我试过Cursor，但我们的代码库——我记得他当时在Anthropic。
I tried Cursor, but our code base I think he was at Anthropic at the time.
我们的monorepo直接把它搞崩了。
Our mono repo just immediately killed it.
对吧？
Right?
就是连代码库都加载不了。
It's like I couldn't even load the code base.
然后第二天，Aman回来了。
And think the next day, Aman came back.
他说，哦，我们做了一些改动。
He's like, Oh, we made some changes.
而且你不仅能加快迭代速度，我们还会留意这些小的数据点，比如做插件或者在VS Code上写代码，显然行不通，因为世界上最聪明的人都试过了，就是不行。
And you can not only is speed of iteration, but we just look for these little data points where it's actually doing a plugin or just writing on top of VS Code is not is clearly not gonna work because, like, the smartest people in the world have tried it, and it doesn't work.
对吧？
Right?
所以这些人其实在听。
So it's like so these guys were sort of listening to it.
而且从历史上看，我们团队一直押注于大市场中的独立玩家。
And and historically, we as a team have always bet on the independent in in a large market.
对吧？
Right?
如果有一个领先的独立玩家，我们总是会押注，即使现有的大公司看起来很吓人。
If there's a leading independent, we'll always bet even if the incumbent seems very scary.
我觉得确实值得聊聊竞争，因为，你知道，我和你们所有人对Cursor的体验是，总有一个潜在的生存威胁，我们总是忘了它，但当然Copilot是最大的那个，然后还记得Windsurf那件事吗？
I do think it's worth talking about competition because my, you know, my experience with you, all of our experience with Cursor is that there is always, a looming existential threat, we always forget about it, but of course Copilot was the big one, and then remember the whole Windsurf thing?
Windsurf其实做了一件很聪明的事，他们去了YC，有很多YC用户在用，所以你在Windsurf上看到了一股热潮，而且Cognition是一家很棒的公司，确实在智能体方面掀起了波澜，他们做得很好，然后Cloud Code的第一个版本出来了，那也算是一种竞争，所以你会经历，总是有竞争，我想说的一点，也很想听听你的看法，就是和那些完全不为所动的创始人合作真是太愉快了。
Windsurf actually did this very smart thing where they went to YC, and there was a lot of YC users using it, so you kind of had this whole movement on Windsurf, and you know, Cognition was a phenomenal company, actually was making real waves with agents, and they'd done a great job with that, and then you had the first version of Cloud Code that came out, and that was kind of like a competitive thing, and so you kind of go through, there was always some competition, and one thing I would say, and I would love again to actually hear your perspective on, is it is such a pleasure to work with founders that are entirely unfazed.
是的。
Yes.
你知道，通常这些公司的创始人都会打电话来，有点慌慌张张的。
You know, like, normally, like, you know, founders of these things happen are calling, and they're kinda freaking out and whatever.
他们面对竞争完全不为所动。
They were a 100% unfazed by the competition.
对。
Yeah.
多疑，但不受影响。
Paranoid, but unfazed.
我永远不会忘记，你知道，我们很幸运能参与他们从A轮开始的每一轮融资，但有一轮
I'll never forget, you know, and we we we've been lucky to do, I think, all of all of their rounds starting from the a, but the one
每一轮Cursor的投资我们都参与了。
that was invested every Cursor round.
我们确实参与了。
We did.
对。
Yeah.
那真是太疯狂了。
With That's crazy.
投入的金额越来越大。
Increasing amounts of dollars.
但是莎拉，
But Sarah,
莎拉共同主导了B轮和C轮融资。
Sarah co led the b and the c.
太厉害了。
That's amazing.
那是真正的信念。
That's real conviction.
太厉害了。
That's amazing.
那是一场更难说服的对话，我说服他们支持我。
That was a harder conversation to convince I
我正想说C轮。
was gonna say the c.
C轮的那个团队。
The the team for the c.
你知道，在B轮的时候，你可能会说，天哪，就赌一把。
You know, at at the b, you could argue, god, just bet
赌垂直增长势头。
on vertical momentum.
那实际上就是。
That was actually what
C轮的情况。
was the c.
谁在四个月左右从四增长到五十，但那个，或者实际上，不是。
Who grows from four to 50 in, like, four months or whatever, but the the or actually, no.
其实，那是D。
It the it was the d.
所以，Claude Code，我们别再穿越时空了，但Claude Code是2025年5月推出的，对。
So the Claude Code not to take us on a time travel trip again, but Claude Code came out May 2025 Yeah.
一炮而红。
With a splash.
你知道，一开始并没有立刻火起来，但显然很厉害。
You know, it wasn't the pickup wasn't right away, but obviously formidable.
我记得大概过了几个月，可能三个月之后吧。
And I remember there was around, I think, a couple months after, three months after that.
我问了迈克尔。
And I asked Michael.
我说，你觉得Claude Code怎么样？
I was like, what do you think about Claude Coat?
他说的意思其实跟你现在说的完全一样，就是说，你看。
And he said something to the extent actually, you know, exactly what you're saying here, which is, look.
我们要进军全球最大的市场。
We are going after the biggest market in the world.
肯定会有竞争对手。
There's going to be competitors.
事实上，从一开始就有一批又一批的对手轮番上阵。
In fact, there's been a rotating cast of characters from the very beginning.
微软的Copilot是第一个。
Copilot Microsoft Copilot was the first one.
Claude Code也是这些轮换对手中的一员。
Claude Code is one of a rotating set of characters.
而且，你知道，在大市场里，总会有强大的竞争对手。
And, you know, we think in big markets, you're always gonna have formidable competitors.
这吓不到我们。
That does not scare us.
而且，我记得当时听到那句话，确实被那种清晰和毫无畏惧的态度震撼到了。
And, you know, I just remember being, yeah, somewhat blown away by the clarity of that comment, the lack of fear.
对吧？
Right?
同时也有谦逊。
There's humility as well.
是谦逊和虚张声势的结合。
It's humility mixed with bravado.
我觉得当你去挑战这样的巨头时，这种组合就是制胜之道。
And I just think that is kind of the winning combo when you're going after these juggernauts like that.
我知道这听起来有点模糊，但这种事情就是这样，有点说不清道不明。
And I know it sounds vague, but things like this, it's a ish thing.
就像，如果你既聪明又正确，我觉得这真的会给你信心和专注力，让你在面对这种超级竞争对手时能有那种态度。
It's like, if you're smart and right, it actually gives you, I think, the confidence and the focus to have that kind of attitude when have this mega competitor of coming after you.
对。
Yeah.
然后我要说，确实有过几次“卧槽”的时刻，但那些时刻总是围绕着模型。
Then I'll say, I will say, they were definitely a couple of oh fuck moments, but they were always around models.
比如，还记得 Opus 4.5 发布的时候吗？
Like, remember when Opus four five came out?
我们当时都在度假，我觉得全世界的人都震惊了，我们当时就想，天哪。
Like, we're all on vacation, and I think everybody in the world class, and we were like, oh fuck.
确实。
That's true.
你知道，这些技术的发展速度比我们任何人预想的都要快得多，然后当 Mythos 的预发布版本出来，大家都能用的时候，我也有同样的感觉。
You know, these things are moving much, much faster than any of us thought, and then I think the same thing when the pre release of Mythos came out and people had access to it.
这些模型进步得太快太猛了。
These models were getting so good so fast.
而且我觉得 Cursor 团队可能没有得到应有的认可，就是他们在短短两年内，以一种类似 Reed Hastings 的方式，极大地自我颠覆了。
And I think another thing that the Cursor team probably doesn't get, you know, the the level of credit for is to the extent they cannibalized themselves so dramatically in, like, a Reed Hastings type way in a matter of two years.
对吧？
Right?
他们最初是一个 IDE，然后转型为智能体平台，接着又变成了模型平台。
So they were first an IDE, and then they, you know, moved to an agent platform, then they moved to a model platform.
而且对于创始团队来说，真的非常非常难去
And it's very, very tough for, you know, founding teams to actually
保持这种自律。对。
have the discipline to Yeah.
这是个大问题。
Was the big thing.
你知道，Karpathy 发过那个著名的帖子，我觉得他有很多著名的帖子，他在里面就是不停地 tab、tab、tab。
You know, Karpathy had that famous post, I guess he has a lot of famous posts where he's like, he was just tab, tab, tab.
对。
Yeah.
没错。
Exactly.
就像，那种东西现在其实没那么重要了。
Like, that kinda doesn't matter that much anymore.
对。
Yeah.
我觉得这正好可以引出他们后来在商业模式上做的其他战略决策。
I actually think that's a good segue to maybe some of the other strategic decisions they made along the way around business model.
而且你提到的那种“哦，糟糕”的时刻，我觉得他们可能不觉得那是那种时刻，因为推特的那些变化对他们影响没那么大。
And to your point on oh, fuck moments, I don't I don't know if they would consider this that because I don't think the vagaries of Twitter impact them as much.
作为他们的投资人，作为投资人。
As their investor as the investor.
对。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
不像我们其他人，整天刷手机。
As the rest of us just, like, scrolling all day.
但大概是2025年夏天，那时候有很多关于他们毛利率之类的负面报道。
But was probably summer of twenty five where there was a lot of shit written about their gross margins, etcetera.
然后当然，你知道，在Opus 4或5之后，可能是一月份那段时间。
And then, of course, you know, post the Opus four or five, maybe the January period.
我觉得我们都该聊聊这个，因为那段时间虽然不同，但都挺有意思的。
I mean, we should all talk about that because that was kind of those are both in different but interesting times.
对。
Yeah.
我想说的是，我觉得X就是被那种追着尾巴跑的肾上腺素、冲动和恐惧驱动的。
I mean, thing I'll say is I just feel like X is driven by, like, tail chasing adrenaline sinking in shot and fright.
而且人们在X上说的和公司实际经营状况之间往往有巨大的脱节，所以尽管有这么多议论，公司其实一直做得很好。
And there tends to be a massive disconnect by what people say on X and like how the business is actually doing, and so even though there was a lot of this, the business tended to do very well.
这很有意思，而且这些议论很多来自投资者，尤其是关于业务质量的讨论，但技术转型总是先于业务模式的成熟。
And it's so interesting, and so much of this often comes from investors, especially things talking about like business quality, but text transformations always proceed figuring out the business.
你们还记得互联网吗？它花了很长时间才找到盈利方式。
Like, you guys remember the internet, like, didn't even figure out how to monetize it for a long time.
别说利润率了，连赚钱都谈不上，对吧？
Forget margins, making any money at all, right?
而现在你面对的是无限的需求、无限的增长和利润率，所以我觉得这往往就成了一个回音室，就像人们说的那样，但另一方面，每一波浪潮中都有投资者试图说些听起来很聪明的话，比如对新兴技术转型的商业模式挑三拣四，但我觉得从历史上看，他们总是被证明是错的。
And here you've got unlimited demand, unlimited growth, and margins, so I think this tends to be, you know, exits its own kind of echo chamber, as people say it, but also B, every single wave you have investors trying to say something that sounds smart, which is like picking apart you know, the business model of a nascent tech transformation, and I just think historically, they've always been proven wrong.
对。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
确实。
For sure.
我是说，你知道，我想借用你之前说过的一句话，马丁，但你知道，先是技术变革，然后是商业模式。
I mean, you know, think I'm gonna borrow this quote from something you said, Martin, but, you know, first comes the technical transformation, then comes the business model.
在这种情况下，我觉得他们的策略是创纪录地快速获取用户，现在他们有了资产、数据和专业知识等等，来构建自己的模型。
And in this case, like, I think the the strategy where they went and got all the users in record time, now they have the assets, the data, the know how, etcetera, to build their own models.
对吧？
Right?
除非你一开始就是前沿实验室，否则你不可能反过来做。
You really couldn't do the flip of that unless you started as a frontier lab.
而且，你知道，这显然在起作用，我们稍后会讨论这个组合。
And it, you know, it's clearly paying off in this combo that we'll talk about later.
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但我觉得看到那种迂回策略真的很鼓舞人心，而且他们为此承受了很多压力。
But I think seeing that kind of backdoor strategy was really inspiring, and they they took a lot of heat for it.
所以，马丁，你觉得
So, Martin, how do
Cursor 是怎么真正变成一家以销售为导向的公司，或者说擅长销售的公司？
you think Cursor really became a sales driven company or or a company that's good at sales?
因为，你知道，早期的时候，我也跟迈克尔说过几次。
Because, you know, early on, I think I I told Michael a few times too.
就是说，你最好在销售上多投入。
It's like, you better invest in sales.
他说，不。
He's like, nope.
不会那么做的。
Not not gonna do that.
他们直接在 cursor.com 上设置了企业版。
They literally set up enterprise at cursor.com.
就是说，如果你是企业客户，就把你的咨询发到这个邮箱。
It's like, if you're an enterprise, send your inquiries to this.
但是，很明显，现在他们非常擅长销售。
But but, like, but, obviously, now they're very good at sales.
对吧？
Right?
还有，总的来说，在进入市场方面，你觉得他们是怎么实现这个转变的？
And and and or go to market in general, how do you think they made that jump?
这是个好问题，我猜他们非常善于学习，他们做什么都很用心，每一轮融资，每一个产品决策都很深思熟虑。
It's a great question, so here would be my best guess, which is they are very much just students of what do they do, they're very thoughtful, every raise, know, every product decision.
而且我觉得随着他们对市场了解得更多，他们意识到利润主要在企业客户那里。
And I think as they learn more about the market, they realize that the margins were in the enterprise.
所以很典型地，如果你看看你的竞争对手，比如那些大型实验室，他们基本上会补贴或者免费提供个人版，但他们在第三方和企业客户那里却能获得很高的利润。
So very classically, if you view your competitive set, say the large labs, the large labs will basically subsidize or give away the single serve tier, but then they actually have they command great margins in third party, and they command great margins in the enterprise.
而且，你知道，Cursor 现在已经很有规模了。
And, you know, Cursor is really at scale.
而且，就像公司一贯的做法一样，他们决定，好吧。
And and as the company has always gone, they decided, okay.
就是说，为了未来的生存，我们需要进入企业市场，那里是大部分支出的所在，但也是很多利润所在，利润往往就是这里的价值所在，我们已经打造了一个很好的顶层漏斗引擎，所以这是生死攸关的，也是重要的。
Like, so, you know, for future viability, we need to go into the enterprise, that's where a, bulk of the spend is, but also a lot of the margin, the margin tends to be the value here, we've created a great top of funnel engine, and so this is existential and this is important.
然后当他们决定去做的时候，他们真的全力以赴，那可能是地球历史上最快的销售团队扩张，对吧？
And then when they decided to do it, they really went and that may be the fastest ground on the sales team in the history of the planet, right?
我是说，莎拉，你当时在招聘方面参与得很深。
Mean, you were very involved, Sarah, for example, on recruiting.
所以也许谈谈那次实际的扩张，因为那确实是——
So maybe talk about that actual expansion, because it was
是的。
it was Yeah.
我是说，看到那种表达方式真的很棒，你怎么做一件事，你就怎么做所有事。
I mean, it's it's so neat to see you know that expression, how you do anything is how you do everything?
你真的能看到这一点。
You you really see it.
你们刚才聊到的很多内容，以及他们对产品的思考方式，都体现在他们怎么招人、怎么进入市场，尤其是招聘方面。
So much of what you guys are talking about and how they thought about product, etcetera, was reflected in how they did hiring and go to market hiring in particular.
我们得特别感谢乔丹和罗曼，还有他们的团队，早期就是他们从零开始把这个体系搭建起来的。
And we gotta shout out Jordan and Roman and their their team there who in the early days built that from that that engine from scratch.
他们是我合作过的最了不起的人，或者说我们所有人合作过的最了不起的人。
They're just the most incredible some you of the most incredible people I've ever worked with, but or we've all ever worked with.
而且，所有——
And Well, all
他们还把40%的时间花在招聘上。
they also spend 40% of the time recruiting.
对。
Yeah.
是的。
Yes.
完全同意。
Absolutely.
对于技术产品创始人来说，花40%的时间在招聘上，这真的很了不起。
Which is amazing for for for technical product founders to spend 40% of their time recruiting.
我其实从来没见过
I've never actually seen
这种情况，
it before,
而且效果非常好。公司其实就是你组建的团队，他们真的把这句话记在了心里。
and it is so effective, and like a company really is the team that you build, and they took this to heart.
大家都这么说。
Like everybody talks about it.
大家都说要做一流的创始人什么的，但实际操作起来完全是另一回事。
Everybody talks about like doing A Class founders, whatever, but it's entirely different.
比如奥斯卡，他经常说，嘿，我坐红眼航班去欧洲，就是为了搞定一个候选人。
It's like how often was Oscar, you know, hey, I'm on a red eye to Europe to close?
我简直，真的，我节省了……这简直是常态。
I'm like, literally, like, I saved It was like, it was constant.
完全同意。
Totally.
而且，你知道，Brie 写的那篇关于他们招聘做法的文章特别好，每个人都应该读一读。
And, you know, there was that great piece that Brie wrote about their hiring practices that everyone should read.
那篇文章很多内容都集中在他们的边缘招聘上，比如勤工俭学之类的。
A lot of that focuses on their edge hiring, like the work study, all this stuff.
对吧？
Right?
但即使在市场推广招聘方面，他们对招聘一个普通客户经理的投入程度也可见一斑。
But even on the go to market hiring, when the thought that they would put into hiring a single AE.
对吧？
Right?
当然，这也不是什么新鲜事，但他们那种“内部推荐、内部推荐、内部推荐”的做法，真是做到了极致。
And, of course, like, this is nothing new, but just the back channel back channel back channel ethos, they had that to a tee.
他们非常清楚自己要找什么样的创始客户经理。
They knew exactly what they were looking for in founding AEs.
你知道吗，我记得我们会去他们办公室，坐在那儿八个小时，帮他们找这样的人。
You know, I remember we would go there and sit in their office for eight hours helping them source stuff like that.
他们不是说，哦，我们想按老办法来。
And they weren't like, oh, we wanna do it the old way.
我们觉得，那不行，我们是在用新方式建公司。
We're like, that that's not gonna we're building a company in a new way.
对吧？
Right?
所以我们想要非常特定的销售代表，符合这个画像。
So we want very specific AEs that fit this profile.
我们会主动去找他们。
We're gonna go get them.
我们不会只是等着人自己上门。
We're not just gonna wait for people to walk in the door.
那些在招聘方面被写了不少的事情，他们在市场推广方面也这么做了，显然效果非常好。
All of those things that have been written a bit on the side, they did that on the go to market side, and clearly to phenomenal results.
他们确实在《财富》500强中拿下了超过50%的份额。
I mean, they got to over 50% of the Fortune 500 in Yep.
我觉得比我们见过的任何人都快。
I think faster than anyone we've ever seen.
你能具体谈谈他们是如何将边缘招聘的经验应用到AE招聘中的吗？
Can you talk about specifically how they applied the lessons in edge hiring to AE hiring?
因为这是我觉得我们的创始人经常遇到的问题。
Because this is something I think our founders deal with a lot.
我个人也经常遇到这个问题。
I've dealt with this a lot personally.
你们是怎么实现这个跨越的，哪些经验真正能迁移过来？
How do you actually make that jump, what lessons really do carry over?
对。
Yeah.
或者你在Cursor中观察到的那些经验？
Or or that you observe in Cursor?
不是。
No.
对。
Yeah.
而且，你知道，我觉得这件事已经被写过了，所以希望不算泄露什么独家信息。
And and, you know, hopefully I think this has been written about, so hopefully it's not sharing alpha.
但他们思考的方式是，把一个人的职业生涯或者一家公司的发展分成不同的阶段，然后找出在每个阶段推动变化的关键人物是谁。
But the way that they think about sort of epochs of a person's career or of a company and who was the key dial in making that happen.
我很喜欢那种深入调研的阶段，就像在说，嘿。
I love this intense research period that goes on where it's like, hey.
这些是在这类销售中表现最出色的前十家公司。
This these are the top 10 companies who have seen great in this type of selling.
然后我们再深入一层。
And then let's go a level deeper.
这些是那些公司里的前十名团队，然后这是排名第一和第二的单个AE，他们推动了那种变化，而且，你知道，又是通过私下渠道，私下渠道，私下渠道。
Here are the top 10 teams in those companies, and then here are the one number one and number two single AEs who drove that change and accounted you know, again, back channel, back channel, back channel.
对吧？
Right?
比如，他们的老板、老板的老板、老板的老板的老板都会说，这是一位超级明星销售。
Like, who their boss, their boss's boss, and their boss's boss's boss would say, this is a superstar AE.
当然，在早期，关键是看他们能不能应对不确定性。
And, of course, in the early days, it was like, can they deal with some uncertainty?
因为你不想找一个只会照本宣科的人。
Because you don't want someone who could just run a playbook.
到了这个阶段，也许他们能找到这样的人。
At this point, maybe they can get those people.
但在早期，创始销售团队确实非常强。
But in the early days, right, the founding AE set was super strong.
我觉得弄清楚在哪个阶段什么样的人最优秀，以及是哪些人推动了这种优秀，这对工程、产品开发，甚至市场推广都非常有用。
And I think figuring out what does the best look like at what period of time and then which individuals drove that, that's so applicable for engineering, obviously, building, but on the go to market side as well.
而且我觉得，要找到在正确时间做对事情的明星，真的很难。
And I think that nailing the right star who did it the right time is really hard.
这完全缩小了你可以招聘的人才范围。
I mean, it narrows the base that you can hire from completely.
但因为乔丹·罗曼和早期团队做对了这一点，他们就能快速扩展，同时不失去Cursor的文化。
But because, you know, I think Jordan Roman and the early team got that right, they just were able to scale it quickly without losing the Cursor Culture.
对。
Yeah.
关于Cursor的文化，已经有很多文章写过了。
Which, you know, a lot's been written about the Cursor Culture.
我很好奇，也许你们可以分享一下你们对它的印象。
I'm curious, you know, maybe you guys can share your own impression of it.
我之前提到过，他们基本上只专注于编程。
You know, I mentioned earlier that, like, you know, kind of coding was all that they did.
我当时的感觉是——当然，创始人可能会纠正我们——
My impression at the time, and and, like, we you know, the the founders could could correct us on this.
我当时觉得，他们这么做并不是因为工作狂，而且我觉得现在他们也不是因为工作狂才这样。
Like, my impression at the time is they weren't doing that because they were obsessed with work, and I think they're still not doing it because they're obsessed with work.
他们真的就是纯粹热爱写代码，热爱系统。
They literally just love writing code and love systems.
我觉得我们三个人有时候也会有这种感觉。
I think the three of us can feel that way at times too.
这是完全可以理解的，而且那似乎就是推动他们文化的主要动力。
That's a very understandable thing, and that seemed to be the driving cultural impetus.
当时团队非常小。
The time, was a very small team.
每个人都有那种态度，而且我们都在思考未来，这到底会变成什么样？
Everybody had that attitude, and we're orienting towards the future of what is this actually going to be?
而且从最终目标和产品角度来看，他们非常专注于自己要实现的东西，以及如何管理团队。
And that kind of, from an end standpoint and product standpoint, like very narrowly focused on what they were trying to accomplish and like how how to run the team.
但这里有个巨大的矛盾，因为我完全同意。
But there's this huge paradox because I totally agree.
我百分之百同意。
I a 100% agree.
但是，如果你后来仔细看看他们的实际行动，你得出的结论就不是这样了。
However, if you actually detail their actions later on, that's not the conclusion you get to.
比如说，他们把时间都花在什么上了？
Like, what do they spend their time on?
就像招聘、市场推广、理解商业模式、业务拓展，所以某种程度上，我还是完全同意，一方面你有一个非常注重产品的团队，他们来自技术背景，真的想做出自己想用的产品。
It was like recruiting, go to market, understanding business models, biz dev, and so in a way, and again, I just totally agree, and again, on one hand you have a very product focused team that comes from the tech that literally wanted to build products that they wanted to use.
听我说，我觉得那些高能力的创始团队做的正是业务需要的事情，而且我觉得他们做得非常好，这让他们能够在可能是我们见过的最竞争激烈的市场中游刃有余。
Now listen, I think that high powered founding teams work on exactly what is needed by the business, and I think they did a very good job, and I think it allowed them to navigate the most competitive market we probably ever see.
还有比编程更竞争激烈的市场吗？
Has there been a more competitive market than coding?
很难说。
It's hard
想象一下数据库领域，竞争那么激烈？
to Database imagine, there's so many wars?
对，在相对狭窄的市场里竞争非常激烈。
Yeah, you have very intense competition in relatively narrow markets.
数据库市场很大，但跟编程比，我觉得其实小得多，对吧？
Databases are huge, but compared to coding, I actually think it's much smaller, right?
我是说，编程算是那种元类别，对吧？
I mean coding's kind of the meta category, right?
就像人类思想的所有表达，在经济形式上都算是编程。
It's like all expression of human thought in economic form is kind of like coding.
想象一下，一开始跟微软竞争，最后又跟Anthropic这样的公司竞争，你知道，这两家都是拥有巨额资本、权力和分销渠道的巨头，同时你还要从根本上改变产品策略，调整市场推广方式，然后还要进行史上最复杂的并购，而且这一切都发生在两年之内。
I mean imagine starting competing with Microsoft, ending up competing with say Anthropic, you know, both of these kind of mega companies with tremendous amount of capital and power and distribution, in the meantime you evolve fundamentally your product approach, and you change your go to market, and then you engage in the most complicated M and A of all time, and all in a matter of two years.
天哪。
My god.
想想都觉得疯狂。
Think this crazy.
我觉得就是两年。
I think it's two years.
就像那种巅峰之作，你知道，
Like the magnum opus of, like, you know,
创业公司，先生。
startups, sir.
就像不。
Just like No.
完全同意。
Totally.
你说得确实有道理。
There's definitely something to what you're saying.
对吧？
Right?
比如，一开始这些人非常专注于产品，而且真的是在丰富自己的生活。
Like, in the beginning, these guys were incredibly focused on the product and literally enriching their own lives.
真的，他们就是纯粹为了好玩而写代码。
Like, literally, they would be coding for fun.
对。
Yeah.
比如，当我终于让他们承认他们做某件事是为了好玩时，结果发现，哦，那还是编程。
Like, when I finally got them to admit they did something for fun, it was like, oh, that's also coding.
但是，对。
But like yeah.
这，
Which,
顺便说一句，
by the way, the
唯一的乐趣。
only Guilty.
乐趣。
Guilty.
对。
Yeah.
这是剩下的唯一乐趣了。
It's the only fun left
顺便说一句，对我们任何人来说都是这样。
to any of us, by the way.
听起来不错。
That sounds good.
你知道，这些模型给我们带来了后稀缺的未来。
Know, how the models have, you know, brought the post scarcity future to us.
编程就像是最后的堡垒。
It's, like, coding is, like, you know, the last bastion.
你知道，一直有这种意识，或者至少我和迈克尔聊的时候是这么想的。
You know, and there was always awareness, or at least I always thought talking to Michael.
他一直都明白这个游戏，你懂我的意思吧。
He was always aware of the game, if that makes sense.
他确实如此，而且他们真的都热爱编程，热爱创造伟大的产品。
He truly was, and they were all truly in love with coding and creating great products.
但他们也知道，建立一个持久的公司或伟大的公司，不仅仅是对产品的痴迷。
But they kind of knew that building an enduring company or a great company isn't just about product obsession.
我总觉得他一直都明白这一点，而且他好像还在想几件事。
I I just got in sense he always kind of understood that and and, like, was thinking a couple of things.
对。
Yeah.
如果你听的话，你的目标是创造软件，那关键是要把业务做对。
If you listen, your goal is creating software, that's a critical it's critical to get the business right.
对。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
我想补充一个跟编程无关的小故事，但我们在很多创始人身上都看到过，而迈克尔、索伊勒和阿曼他们特别体现了这一点，就是你怎么做一件事，就怎么做所有事。
I was gonna add an anecdote that's not related to them coding, but the other thing that, you know, we sort of seen across a number of founders, but Michael and Soile and Aman, they they sort of embodied this is this again, how you do anything is how you do everything.
对吧？
Right?
所以，当然，他们对产品的那种细致关注，非常工匠精神。
And so, of course, this detailed attention to the product, very artisan.
有匠心。
There's craftsmanship.
对吧？
Right?
品味出众。
Overused taste.
他们的品味非常出色。
They have taste in spades.
对。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
但这种态度不仅体现在招聘和市场营销上，还延伸到他们创造的空间和举办的活动上。
But it extended to how not only they did hiring on the edge, go to market side, but even the space they created, the events they throw.
我记得走进他们办公室时，心里想，哇。
Like, I remember walking to their office and thinking, wow.
我二十出头的时候，根本不会注意到这里挂些小彩灯什么的。
In my early twenties, I would not have paid attention to putting, I don't know, twinkle lights here.
他们那儿出了名的不穿鞋。
They famously no shoes.
对吧？
Right?
但你一进去，换上拖鞋，就会觉得像在家一样。
But you'd go in, you'd put on your slippers, and it would feel you feel at home.
所以大家都愿意在那儿一直工作，因为感觉特别舒服，就像在家一样。
Like, hence why everyone was there working all the time because you're like, this feels great like home.
而且他们的风格很北欧。
And they, you know, they it was very the Scandinavian style.
我记得他们后来扩张开了第二个办公室，我去的时候还夸了他们的沙发什么的，因为那时候我正好在装修自己的房子。
And I remember going to their second office when they finally expanded and complimenting them on a couch or something because I think I was redoing my own house at the time.
他们就说，哦，是啊。
And they're like, oh, yeah.
我们是从一个二手家具商那里买的。
We got that from a secondhand, like, very furniture dealer.
所以他们追求的是特定的风格和感觉。
And so they were going after a specific look and feel.
我当时就被这一点打动了，因为我想，哇。
And I just was struck by that because I was like, wow.
这可不是我记忆中二十出头的小伙子会考虑的事情，比如你创造的空间，或者，是的。
That is not how I remember guys in their early twenties, like, thinking about the space that you create or in Yeah.
这如何影响产品，以及你所在的心境。
How that leads to the product and, you know, mind space you're in.
其实他们做的很多决定都与此相关，营销就是一个很明显的例子。他们非常讲究，比如我们会说，我们用X，那不是我们的风格，我们不搞垃圾邮件。我们提了很多建议，我记得他们常说，哦，我们办这个活动吧，不，那不是我们的风格。
There's actually a nice adjacency here to a lot of the decisions they made, so marketing was a very obvious one, they were very, very particular, like we use X, that's not our voice, we're not spammy, we made so many suggestions that I remember were like, oh, let's do this event, no, that's not our style.
所以他们很擅长拒绝不合适的东西。
So they're very good at saying no for stuff.
我要说的是，他们在人事方面也很果断，如果觉得不合适，就会很快做出艰难的决定。
I will say that they were also very good about this when it came to personnel, like if there wasn't a fit, make the hard decision pretty quickly.
你很少能在早期创始团队身上看到这一点，而且他们在这方面非常一致。所以我觉得这几乎是公司未被提及的、可能是最大的优势——一旦他们做了决定，不管有多难，无论是决定不进入某个市场，还是决定把业务范围限制得很窄，他们都会坚持到底，或者决定谁留在公司、谁离开。所以真的要为他们点赞，因为他们有勇气和毅力去做出这些艰难的决定。
You very, very rarely see this with the early founding teams, and they're very consistent about that, and so I would say it's almost this kind of untalked about, probably greatest strength of the company is that once they made a decision, it doesn't matter how hard that was, whether it's deciding not to enter a market, deciding to be very limited in what they're doing, they kind of followed through, or who would stay in the company, who wouldn't stay in the company, and so kudos to them for actually having the courage and the tenacity for these tough decisions.
这有点像
Which is sort
埃隆的风格。
of an Elon ish trait too.
这也非常埃隆，是的。
It's also very Elon Yeah.
不是吗？
Isn't
我其实觉得这两家公司——我们刚才聊到并购——是非常合适的搭配。
I actually think that these two companies, mean, we just like, you know, talk about the M and A a little bit, are very good fits.
他们在技术层面上非常契合，对吧，埃隆有算力，他们有数据分发。
They're very good fits on like, a technical level, right, like Elon has a compute, they have the distribution of the data.
在愿景层面上，他们都认为代码是改变所有计算甚至整个人类的路径。而且在文化层面上，他们都非常注重产品工程，非常非常非常注重产品工程，迭代速度很快，做艰难决定也很快。所以，我参与过很多并购，我觉得这是我见过的最好的匹配，就整体而言。
On a vision level, they both think that, you know, code is the path to changing all of compute and maybe all of humanity, but also on a culture level, right, they're very product engineering focused, very very very very product engineering heavy, very fast iterating, you know, they make hard decisions very quickly, and so, I mean, I've been involved in a lot of M and A, and I would say this is probably the best fit I've ever seen as far as just the full package.
对。
Yeah.
完全同意，不能再同意了。
Could couldn't agree more.
我是说，我们在SpaceX那边的经历有个挺有趣的类比。
I mean, there there's a funny analogy with our experience on the SpaceX side.
我记得我们2019年见过他们。
I remember we met them in 2019.
那时候，他们完全是个发射业务，但SpaceX团队却说，不。
Back then, it was fully a launch business, but the SpaceX team was like, no.
我们要做全球通信。
We're gonna launch global communications.
我们要为全世界每个人提供互联网。
We're gonna power the Internet for everyone in the world.
他们当时什么都没有，你知道的。
They had not they you know, nothing at the time.
天上还没有星链卫星。
No Starlink satellites in the sky.
当然，他们最后做到了。
And, of course, they they did it.
对吧？
Right?
想想Cursor团队跟我们说的，他们实际上超出了我们所有的预期。
And if you think about the Cursor team telling us and, you know, they actually beat every forecast they ever gave us.
但是
But
哦，超出很多。
Oh, by a lot.
他们有很多特点，比如行动迅速、瞄准大市场、在看似不可能的竞争对手面前获胜，比如康卡斯特。
There's just so many characteristics of moving fast, going after large markets, winning them in the feet of impossible competitors, you know, Comcast.
对吧？
Right?
对。
Right.
在星链这个案例里，有太多相似之处了，虽然领域完全不同，但看到这些真的很让人感慨。
In in the Starling case, that there's so many parallels, totally different venues, obviously, but fascinating to see that.
我还想补充一点，我觉得在埃隆和Cursor之间，或者说SpaceX和Cursor之间，有一个共同点，就是两家公司都被外界无数次唱衰，说它们要完蛋了。
There's another thing I would say also, which I think between kinda Elon and Cursor, like SpaceX and Cursor, is like, in both cases, the consensus was decrying the death of both companies so many times.
所以我觉得这也是一种对质疑者的坚持，这种文化上的韧性，我其实非常敬佩双方这一点。
So I think there's also this kind of like, you know, you know, cultural perseverance to the naysayers, which I I actually really respect on both sides.
其实我还有一个真正的问题想问你们。
Actually, I do have one other real question I wanted to ask you guys.
Cursor在并购方面也很擅长，比如做……
Cursor is also really good at doing M and A, like doing
像小型交易是怎么做的，你知道吗，我正想提这个。
How does small the type deal, know, was actually gonna mention it.
好，你说吧。
Yeah, go ahead.
是的，我很想听听你们的看法，比如他们为什么这么做，背后的理念是什么，等等。
Yeah, I would love to know a little bit more from your perspectives, like why they were, and what the philosophy was, and all that.
我想说，现在人才争夺战非常激烈，那些懂得通过收购来获取人才的公司，真的能领先一步。
So I will say, listen, so there is such a war for talent right now that the companies that have figured out how to do talent via acquisition can really get ahead.
这里面有很多好处，所以他们早期的动作就是这样的，就是找到真正优秀的团队，然后直接收购。
Mean, there's just a lot of advantage there, and so the early motions that they did were of that nature, which is like really good team, you know, they'll just go ahead and do the acquisition.
Cursor 做得特别好的一点是，他们从不担心运营上的复杂性，他们觉得不管多乱都没关系，先做了再说。他们也不太担心自己融入文化的能力，因为他们在这方面太擅长了。
And what was really nice about Cursor, they were just never worried about operational complexity, they're just like, it doesn't matter how messy it is, we'll go ahead and do They also didn't really worry too much about their ability to set culture because they were just so good at it.
再说一次，这只是其中的一部分。
Like, again, like, that was just part of it.
直到后来，比如那笔收购，他们才开始从战略方向的角度来考虑收购，当然，那笔收购规模要大得多。
It wasn't until later, like the acquisition, where they started thinking about acquisitions in terms of strategic direction, and of course, that was a much larger acquisition.
而且，我觉得这家公司速度太快了，谁知道他们最终能把这些整合得多好，执行得多到位，因为现在他们已经被大公司收购了，但我要说的是，他们对待这些收购的方式，和他们对待其他所有事情一样，都是非常深思熟虑的。
And, you know, listen, I I think the company was so fast, like, who who knows to the extent that they would have figured out how to integrate all of these things and execute on them in the limit just because, like, know, like, now they're part of a a very large acquisition, but I will say that they approached these in the same way that they approached everything, which is incredibly thoughtful.
他们有计划。
They had a plan.
他们执行得相当好。
They executed quite well.
所以这可能是公司历史上并购最集中的一家公司。
And so this may be the most concentrated company in the history of companies having done m and a.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
你知道，然后其他所有事情。
You know, and then everything else.
对。
Yeah.
我正想说，我觉得现在如果一个公司的CEO说，我的公司里有X位创始人，这成了一种荣誉勋章。
I was gonna say, I feel like there's this badge of honor now when a CEO of a company says, I have x founders in my company.
对。
Yeah.
我觉得这确实应该是一种荣誉。
And I think it should be a badge of honor.
对吧？
Right?
我不知道Cursor那边具体有多少位创始人。
I don't know how many what that status for Cursor.
你们知道吗？
Do you guys know?
但我记得他们有很多优秀的创始人，我记得他们从Quala引进了Tito，还有Adam Ward负责人才方面。
But I remember and they have so many great founders there, but I remember when they brought on Tito from Quala and then Adam Ward on the talent side
对。
Yeah.
确实。
Actually.
而且我亲眼看到，他们引进了一位实际上是创始人兼CEO的人，但他很好地融入了Cursor的文化，把公司带到了新的高度，加速了发展。
And just seeing firsthand the leverage that they got from bringing in someone who was a founder, CEO effectively, but slotted really well into the Cursor culture and just take that to great heights and add to the acceleration.
我觉得那个说法，你知道，我也不太确定。
Like, I think that lay book you know, I don't know.
我敢说他们不一定是这个新生成式AI时代里第一个这么做的，但他们绝对是把创始人很好地融入公司的典范之一。
I'm sure they're not the ones who started it per se in this new Gen AI era, but they certainly are, I think, one of the best examples of how to integrate founders really, really well into your company.
挺有意思的。
It's funny.
对吧？
Right?
因为现在Anthropic经常被贴上这个标签。
Because Anthropic kind of gets that tag a lot now.
就像，哦，某公司的高管去Anthropic当了个普通员工。
It's like, oh, like, exec at company a just went to take an IC role Anthropic.
但Cursor其实早就这么做了，而且他们不只是把人塞进普通岗位。
But, like, Cursor kind of did this first, and they weren't just, like, slotting people into IC roles.
他们实际上是在用这种方式构建公司，我觉得这...
Like, they're actually building the company this way, which I
我完全同意。
I Absolutely.
对。
Yeah.
我觉得这非常非常不寻常，但确实很真实。
I thought it's very it's very unconventional, but but, like, real
这实际上在操作上极其复杂。
It's actually operationally incredibly complex.
对。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
那是传统智慧。
That's conventional wisdom.
对。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
而且我觉得这确实是真的。
And I I think it's actually true.
我的意思是，我觉得不是他们做了什么大家觉得难但其实容易的事。
I mean, I think it's not that they, you know, did something that people think is hard, but it's actually easy.
我觉得这确实很难，而他们就是成功做到了。
I think it's actually hard, and they just managed to pull it off.
你明白吗？
You know?
这真要给他们点赞。
Good credit to them.
感谢收听本期a16z播客。
Thanks for listening to this episode of the a 16 z podcast.
如果你喜欢这期节目，记得点赞、评论、订阅，给我们评分或写个评论，并且分享给你的朋友和家人。
If you like this episode, be sure to like, comment, subscribe, leave us a rating or a review, and share it with your friends and family.
更多节目，请前往YouTube、Apple Podcast和Spotify观看。
For more episodes, go to YouTube, Apple Podcast, and Spotify.
在X上关注我们@a16z，并订阅我们的Substack：a16z.substack.com。
Follow us on x at a sixteen z, and subscribe to our Substack at a16z.substack.com.
再次感谢收听，我们下期再见。
Thanks again for listening, and I'll see you in the next episode.
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As a reminder, the content here is for informational purposes only, should not be taken as legal business, tax, or investment advice, or be used to evaluate any investment or security, and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a sixteen z fund.
请注意，a16z及其关联公司可能也持有本播客中讨论到的公司的投资。
Please note that a sixteen z and its affiliates may also maintain investments in the companies discussed in this podcast.
更多详情，包括我们的投资列表，请访问a16z.com/disclosures。
For more details, including a link to our investments, please see a 16z.com forward slash disclosures.
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